Russian counterintelligence agents are analyzing data from the popular Chinese messaging and social media app WeChat to monitor people who might be in contact with Chinese spies, according to a Russian intelligence document obtained by The New York Times.

据《纽约时报》获得的一份俄罗斯情报文件显示，俄罗斯反情报人员正在分析中国热门的信息和社交媒体应用程序微信的数据，以监控可能与中国间谍有联系的人。

The disclosure highlights the rising level of concern about Chinese influence in Russia as the two countries deepen their relationship. As Russia has become isolated from the West over its war in Ukraine, it has become increasingly reliant on Chinese money, companies and technology. But it has also faced what the document describes as increased Chinese espionage efforts.

曝光文件突显出，在两国关系不断深化过程中，俄罗斯内部对中国在俄影响力的担忧日益加剧。由于俄罗斯因乌克兰战争而遭西方孤立，它越来越依赖中国的资金、企业和技术。据文件披露，俄方同时也面临着中方日益猖獗的间谍活动威胁。

The document indicates that the Russian domestic security agency, known as the F.S.B., pulls purloined data into an analytical tool known as “Skopishche” (a Russian word for a mob of people). Information from WeChat is among the data being analyzed, according to the document.

该文件表明，俄罗斯联邦安全局(FSB)将窃取的数据输入一个名为“Skopishche”（俄语的意思是“一群乌合之众”）的分析工具中。根据这份文件，来自微信的信息是正在分析的数据之一。

The document offers insights into the espionage tactics of two authoritarian governments that are preoccupied with surveillance.

这份文件可以让人深入了解两个专注于监控的威权政府的间谍策略。

According to the document, the system processes detailed data on WeChat users, including account logins, contact lists and message archives, some of which are extracted from phones seized from people of interest to Russia’s spy hunters.

根据该文件，该系统处理微信用户的详细数据，包括帐号登录信息、通讯录和聊天记录存档，其中一些数据是从俄罗斯情报部门感兴趣的人扣押的手机中提取的。

The tool is used to scrutinize the data trail of “people using the Chinese messenger WeChat to talk to representatives of the PRC intelligence services,” the document says, using the abbreviation for the People’s Republic of China.

文件称，该工具用于审查“使用中国聊天工具微信与PRC情报机构代表交谈者”的数据轨迹。PRC是中华人民共和国的缩写。

The exact functionality of the system is unclear. It is described in Russian as an automated data processing system that can be used in “search activities.” Intelligence agencies typically use such tools to map messenger and social network connections to spot potential spies.

这个系统的具体功能尚不清楚。俄方文件将其描述为一种可用于“搜索活动”的自动化数据处理系统。情报机构通常使用这类工具来绘制聊天工具和社交网络的关系图谱，以发现潜在的间谍。

The document makes clear that the F.S.B. is particularly interested in WeChat.

这份文件清楚地表明，FSB对微信特别感兴趣。

The Russian security agency asks field officers to send WeChat accounts and logins of interest to the China counterintelligence team, including “lists of contacts (logins) and archives of chats from WeChat obtained during direct access to the smartphones of targets of interest.”

俄罗斯安全机构要求外勤人员将微信账户和登录信息发送给反中国情报团队，包括“在直接访问目标智能手机时获得的微信联系人（登录）列表和聊天记录”。

The document says data can be run through another automated system, known as Laretz, a Russian word for a small decorated box, that can check “more than a thousand electronic indicators simultaneously.”

该文件称，数据可以通过另一个名为“Laretz”的自动系统进行处理，Laretz在俄语中是“装饰精美的小盒子”，该系统可以“同时检查1000多个电子指标”。

The Times was unable to confirm whether Skopishche had been effective as a counterintelligence tool, or how extensively the F.S.B. could intercept data from WeChat.

时报无法核实“Skopishche”作为反间谍工具是否有效，也无法确认FSB对微信数据的拦截范围。

One Western intelligence agency told The Times that the information in the document was consistent with what it knew about “Russian penetration of Chinese communications.”

一家西方情报机构告诉时报，文件中的信息与其所了解的“俄罗斯对中国通信的渗透”情况一致。

The F.S.B and the Chinese Foreign Ministry did not reply to requests for comment.

FSB和中国外交部没有回复置评请求。

WeChat, owned by the Chinese tech giant Tencent, is one of the most widely used digital platforms in the world, mostly concentrated in China and among Chinese communities. It functions as an all-in-one tool that combines messaging, mobile payments, social networking and government services. The app has over 1.4 billion users globally according to Tencent financial disclosures.

微信属于中国科技巨头腾讯所有，是全球使用最广泛的数字平台之一，主要集中在中国和华人社区。它是集信息、移动支付、社交网络和政府服务于一体的多功能工具。根据腾讯披露的财务信息，该应用在全球拥有超过14亿用户。

Tencent did not reply to a request for comment.

腾讯没有回复置评请求。

Russian intelligence agencies have worked to penetrate encrypted communication apps like Signal and WhatsApp. The F.S.B. has have long viewed those apps, which are widely used by dissidents, as tools of subversion and foreign influence. In April, President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia barred government and bank employees from using foreign messaging apps.

俄罗斯情报机构一直致力于渗透诸如Signal和WhatsApp等加密通信应用程序。长期以来，FSB一直将这些被异见者广泛使用的应用程序视为颠覆和外国影响力的工具。今年4月，俄罗斯总统普京禁止政府和银行雇员使用外国即时通讯应用。

WeChat is different. By design, it does not use end-to-end encryption to protect user data. That is because the Chinese government exercises strict control over the app and relies on its weak security to monitor and censor speech.

微信则不一样。根据设计，它不使用端到端加密来保护用户数据。这是因为中国政府对这款应用实施严格控制，并依靠其薄弱的安全性来监控和审查言论。

Foreign intelligence agencies can exploit that weakness, too.

外国情报机构也可以利用这一弱点。

WeChat added some limited encryption features in 2016, according to Mona Wang, a research fellow at the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab. But the security improvements still fall short of the encryption offered by other messaging apps like Signal or WhatsApp.

据多伦多大学公民实验室研究员莫娜·王（音）称，微信在2016年增加了一些有限的加密功能。但与Signal或WhatsApp等其他即时通讯应用提供的加密功能相比，安全方面的改进仍显不足。

It is unclear why Chinese intelligence officers would use WeChat to communicate with sources, given its lack of end-to-end encryption. But sources or potential recruits may not know they are communicating with spies, who often pose as diplomats and strike up casual conversations at first.

鉴于微信缺乏端到端加密，目前尚不清楚中国情报官员为何会使用微信与线人联络。但线人或潜在的被招募者可能不知道他们正在与间谍交流，间谍通常会伪装成外交官，一开始只是随便聊聊。

WeChat was briefly banned in Russia in 2017, but access was restored after Tencent took steps to comply with laws requiring foreign digital platforms above a certain size to register as “organizers of information dissemination.”

2017年，微信曾在俄罗斯遭短暂禁用，但在腾讯采取措施，遵守要求一定规模以上的外国数字平台注册为“信息传播组织者”的法律之后，又得以恢复服务。

The Times confirmed that WeChat is currently licensed by the government to operate in Russia. That license would require Tencent to store user data on Russian servers and to provide access to security agencies upon request.

时报证实微信目前已获得政府在俄罗斯运营的许可。这意味着腾讯必须将俄罗斯用户的数据存储在本地服务器，并根据安全部门的要求提供访问权限。

Russia is separately pursuing a government messaging app of its own, one that has drawn comparisons to WeChat.

俄罗斯正在单独开发自己的政府信息应用，该应用被拿来与微信作比。