Credit goes to Donald Trump for alerting the world to the dangers posed by China, particularly its efforts to overtake the United States as the world’s most advanced economy. But neither his first administration nor President Biden’s has done enough to combat China’s incursions, which have cost America millions of manufacturing jobs and the closure of tens of thousands of factories, according to data compiled by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, the nonpartisan technology policy think tank I lead. That’s because policymakers on both sides of the aisle are only slowly waking up to the reality: We are already in the middle of an industrial war.

唐纳德·特朗普使世界意识到了中国带来的危险，尤其是中国试图超过美国成为世界上最先进的经济体的努力，在这一点上，他功不可没。但无论是他的第一届政府还是拜登总统的政府，在防止中国的侵袭方面都做得不够，据我领导的无党派技术政策智库信息技术与创新基金会汇集的数据，中国的做法已使美国失去了数百万个制造业岗位，导致数万家美国工厂倒闭。这是因为两党的政策制定者们才刚刚缓慢地意识到一个现实：我们已经处于一场工业战争之中。

Lawmakers need to understand that for China, a desire to make money — the fundamental driver of trade and of capitalism — is secondary. Its primary goal is to damage America’s economy and pave the way for China to become the world’s pre-eminent power. Countries like China are power traders, called such because their policies and programs are designed not only to advance their power but also to degrade their adversaries’, even at a financial cost to their own economies.

立法者们需要明白，虽然赚钱的欲望是贸易和资本主义的根本驱动力，但对中国来说，它是第二位的。中国的首要目标是破坏美国经济，为中国成为世界头号力量铺平道路。像中国这样的国家其实是强权贸易国，之所以这样说，是因为其政策和项目的设计不仅是为了提升自身的实力，也是为了削弱对手，甚至以牺牲本国经济为代价。

China’s rate of progress in production and innovation across a wide range of industries is striking. If our policymakers don’t work fast and smart enough, they will put at risk America’s workers, economy and place in the world.

中国在各个产业的生产和创新上的进步速度引人注目。如果我们的政策制定者们不够迅速机敏，他们将让美国工人、美国经济及其世界地位面临危险。

History has seen other campaigns like this. From the late 1800s to World War II, Germany illustrated how trade could be weaponized into “an instrument of power, of pressure and even of conquest,” wrote the development economist Albert O. Hirschman.

历史已见证过这种行动。从19世纪末到第二次世界大战的那段时间里，德国向世界证明了贸易能够怎样被用作武器，成为“强权、迫胁，甚至征服的工具”，发展经济学家阿尔伯特·赫希曼写道。

Like China, Germany mostly focused on importing goods needed for its war machine, redirected trade to friendly or subject nations and sought to control oceanic trade routes, all in an effort to limit development of its adversaries. Like China, the German government kept its currency undervalued (making its goods relatively cheaper for consumers in other countries), leveraged the use of tariffs and subsidized its exports to bolster its position in industry goods such as steel, chemicals and machinery.

和中国一样，当时的德国主要集中于进口其战争机器所需的商品，将对外贸易转向友好国家或附属国，并寻求控制海洋贸易航线，所有这些都是为了限制对手的发展。和中国一样，德国政府压低本国货币的价值（使其商品对其他国家的消费者来说相对便宜），充分利用关税和补贴出口，来巩固本国在钢铁、化学制品和机械等工业产品的地位。

Like China, German companies sold goods for less than the cost of manufacture to wrest market share from overseas rivals. Like China, Germans engaged in systemic industrial espionage. Engineers were sent overseas with the explicit order to return with trade secrets for German companies.

和中国一样，当时的德国公司为了与海外竞争对手抢夺市场份额，以低于制造成本的价格出口商品。和中国一样，德国人从事系统性的工业间谍活动。被派往海外的工程师得到明确的命令，要求他们将商业机密带回德国公司。

There was also the theft of intellectual property, including chemical formulas and machinery plans to give German manufacturers a leg up. “Trademarks are to be pirated,” declared a 1919 New York Tribune article on Germany — a declaration that could have been written today about China.

还有窃取知识产权问题，包括化学制品配方和机械设计方案，这为德国制造商带来优势。1919年，《纽约论坛报》在一篇关于德国的文章中写道：“商标被盗版是常事”，这个说法今天也能用在关于中国的文章里。

In short, Germany sought to gain technoeconomic power, especially over its European adversaries, then use that power to dominate the continent. As the French economist Henri Hauser wrote in 1915, “Germany made war in the midst of peace with the instruments of peace. Dumping, export subsidies, import certificates, measures with respect to emigration, etc., all of these various methods were used not as normal methods of economic activity but as means to suffocate, to crush and terrorize Germany’s adversaries.”

简言之，德国曾寻求获得技术经济实力，尤其是超出其欧洲对手的实力，然后用这种实力来称霸欧洲大陆。正如法国经济学家昂立·奥瑟尔1915年写的那样，“德国在和平时期用和平的手段发动了战争。倾销、出口补贴、进口资格证、移民方面的措施等，所有这些各种各样的措施都不是正常的经济活动方式，而是扼杀、制服、恐吓德国对手的手段。”

For a while, it was successful. Without American intervention in World War I and II, it is quite possible that Germany would have taken over much of Europe, in large part because its industries and hence military were so much stronger than those of other European nations. While America’s industrial revolution continued through the early 20th century, insulated by high tariffs initiated by Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War, the German trade shock stopped many Eastern and Southern European economies from fully industrializing and spurred the deindustrialization of nations like Britain. Many have not fully recovered.

在一段时间内，这些做法是很成功的。如果美国没有对第一次和第二次世界大战进行干预的话，德国很可能会占领欧洲的大部分地区，这在很大程度上是因为德国的工业实力、乃至军事实力比其他欧洲国家强大得多。美国的工业革命直到20世纪初仍在继续，这是因为受到林肯总统在内战期间设立的高关税的保护，但德国的贸易冲击阻止了许多东欧和南欧经济体实现全面工业化，并导致了英国等国家的去工业化。许多国家至今尚未完全恢复。

It seems all the trade lessons from that fraught period have been forgotten. In the postwar glow of American dominance, U.S. legislators and business leaders embraced an idealistic vision of an increasingly wealthy free world. Countries would embrace capitalism and, thus incentivized by self-interest, would trade fairly and freely with the United States, enriching their citizens and naturally leading to a democratic order. Because American companies were so strong, this was seen as a path to expanded U.S. global economic leadership.

那个令人忧虑的时期的所有贸易教训如今似乎已被忘记。在美国战后主导地位的辉煌下，美国立法者和商界领袖们接受了自由世界日益富裕的理想化愿景。所有的国家都会接受资本主义，因此会在自身利益的激励下，与美国进行公平自由的贸易，让本国公民变得富有，并且自然而然地走向民主秩序。因为美国的公司如此强大，这被视为扩大美国全球经济领导地位的途径。

As we now know, that vision was never fully realized. Today it is China that is weaponizing its roughly $18 trillion economy, using a vast array of policy tools to distort trade and increase its relative economic power. Wielding such weaponry as export financing and subsidies — almost four times as much as a share of G.D.P. as the United States, according to a study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies — China has already gained global leadership in telecommunications equipment, effectively destroying North America’s industry. It has done the same in solar panels and commercial drones and is close in high-speed rail and batteries.

正如我们现在所知，这个愿景从未完全实现。现在是中国正在将其约18万亿美元的经济变成武器，使用各种各样的政策工具扭曲贸易，提高自身的相对经济实力。中国使用的政策工具包括出口融资和补贴，据战略与国际研究中心的一项研究，这些政策的总支出在中国GDP中占的比例几乎是美国产业政策支出在GDP中占比的四倍。通过这些手段，中国在电信设备领域取得了全球领先地位，实际上摧毁了北美的电信设备工业。中国在太阳能电池板和商用无人机领域也做到了同样的事，并在高铁和电池等领域接近全球领先地位。

The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation found that in 10 advanced industries — including semiconductors, robotics, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, space and chemicals — China is making progress toward the global leading edge of innovation, backed by extensive intellectual property theft, enormous government subsidies and closed domestic markets. And in some industries, such as electric vehicles and commercial nuclear power, Chinese companies now lead.

信息技术与创新基金会发现，在包括半导体、机器人、人工智能、量子计算、空间，以及化学制品在内的十个先进行业中，中国正在向全球创新的前沿迈进，这得益于大范围的知识产权盗窃、巨额的政府补贴，以及封闭的国内市场。而在电动汽车和商用核电等一些行业，中国公司目前处于领先地位。

China installed more industrial robots last year and has more nuclear power plants under construction than the rest of the world combined. It spent almost $50 billion on subsidies to catch up on semiconductors before the U.S. Congress responded with the CHIPs Act. It is seeking to flood the world with electric vehicles, as well as gasoline-powered models. It has spent as much as three times as much on semiconductor subsidies as the United States. And it is spending billions of dollars more on the development of quantum technology than any other government, according to an analysis by the consulting firm McKinsey. Sales of the C919 by COMAC (a state-owned company) are on pace to make it the top-selling jet aircraft in the world this year, contributing even further to Airbus’s and Boeing's travails. And China accounts for 44 percent of the world’s chemical production, according to my research.

去年，中国安装的工业机器人数量和在建的核电站数量都超过了世界其他国家的总和。在美国国会通过《芯片法案》做出回应之前，中国为半导体行业提供了几乎500亿美元的补贴，以便赶上国际水平。中国寻求让电动汽车和汽油动力汽车大举占领全球市场。中国为半导体行业提供的补贴是美国同类支出的三倍。据咨询公司麦肯锡的一项分析，中国政府在量子技术研发上花的钱比任何其他国家的政府都多出数十亿美元。中国商飞（一家国有企业）生产销售的C919客机有望在今年成为全球最畅销的喷气式飞机之一，进一步加剧了空客和波音的困境。而据我的研究，中国的化学制品产量已达到全球产量的44%。

China has demonstrated time and again a willingness to lose money to gain power — decisions that would make little sense under the regular dynamics of profit and loss. Look at the LCD display and OLED display industry (high-definition electronic screens), which are critical to smartphone and television production. In 2023, China’s leading producer, BOE, received more in government subsidies ($532 million) than the company generated in profits. That could explain why, for displays like those used in smartphones, Chinese suppliers are charging just $20 to $23 while rivals charge more than twice that. This is why China accounted for 72 percent of LCD production in 2024, up from virtually nothing in 2004.

中国一次又一次地表明，它为了获得影响力不惜赔钱，这样的决定从正常的损益角度来看毫无意义。以LCD和OLED显示器板面行业为例（后者是对智能手机和电视生产至关重要的高清电子屏幕），2023年，中国最大的生产商京东方从政府获得了超过公司利润的补贴（约合5.32亿美元）。这或许可以解释为什么中国供应商能以20至23美元的价格销售智能手机等产品使用的显示器板面，而竞争对手的售价是中国价格的两倍多。这也是为什么中国在2004年时几乎不生产LCD显示器，到2024年，其产量已经占到全球的72%。

U.S. policymakers are starting to wake up. Rush Doshi, formerly the deputy senior director for China on the National Security Council under Mr. Biden, titled his 2021 book “The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order.” And Marco Rubio, the former chair of the U.S. Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship and Mr. Trump’s choice for secretary of state, issued a report concluding that China was doing more than “breaking the rules” to dominate high-value industrial sectors. This helps explain why, despite a highly polarized political climate, Congress managed to pass the CHIPS and Science Act, which invested billions of dollars to support new semiconductor factories in the United States. Nothing promotes unity like a common and frightening enemy.

美国政策制定者开始觉醒。曾在拜登的白宫国家安全委员会担任中国事务副主任的杜如松(Rush Doshi)给他2021年出版的书取名为《长期博弈——中国取代美国秩序的大战略》（The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order）。美国参议院小企业和创业委员会的前主席、特朗普的国务卿人选马可·卢比奥在他发布的一份报告中总结，为了主导高价值工业部门，中国正在做比“打破规则”更多的事情。这有助于解释为什么尽管美国的政治高度极化，但国会仍设法通过了《芯片与科学法案》，投资数十亿美元支持美国的新半导体工厂建设。没有什么比令人恐惧的共同敌人更能促进团结。

But these measures are not enough. America must expand its competitiveness in a range of other industries — including aerospace, biopharmaceuticals and machinery — and lead in emerging ones such as A.I., quantum computing and nuclear fusion.

但这些措施还不够。美国必须在航空航天、生物制药，以及机械制造等其他一系列行业中扩大竞争力，同时在人工智能、量子计算、核聚变等新兴行业中保持领先地位。

Instead of across-the-board tariffs, the new administration should take a page from Ronald Reagan and negotiate a major decline in the value of the U.S. dollar vis-à-vis our trading partners, and if that does not work, the Treasury Department should take unilateral steps to drive down the value of the dollar. That would make American exports less expensive and imports pricier without the risk of trade retaliation. Congress should also update U.S. trade law, such as by eliminating the requirement of harm to U.S. companies from foreign unfair trade practices before remedies can be enacted.

与其全面提高关税，下届政府不如向罗纳德·里根学习，通过谈判，让美元相对于我们贸易伙伴的货币大幅贬值，如果谈判无效的话，财政部应该采取单边措施压低美元的价值。这将让美国的出口产品更便宜，进口产品更贵，而不会有贸易报复的风险。国会还应该修订美国贸易法，例如，在制定补救措施之前，不再要求美国公司提供外国的不公平贸易已对其造成损害的证据。

America needs closer collaboration among allied nations to push back on China’s predatory power trade practices, including increasing foreign aid to help developing nations avoid their dependency on Beijing. And the United States needs to take advantage of its being a magnet for the best and the brightest globally by making it much easier for scientists and engineers to work here.

美国需要与盟国进行更密切的合作，以对抗中国掠夺性的强权贸易做法，包括增加对外援助，帮助发展中国家摆脱对中国的依赖。美国需要利用其吸引全球最优秀人才的优势，让科学家和工程师们在这里工作变得更容易。

America should respect free-trade ideals and hold them dear. But that should not blind us to the harsh reality that the world now is distorted by its strongest power trader. The answer is not deglobalization or protectionism. America depends on too many industries — like aerospace, biopharmaceuticals, software and semiconductors — that cannot thrive without access to global markets. And it is not holding on naïvely to the hopes that free trade could yet prevail if the United States simply ended the trade war. China will not end its power trade regime until it has gained dominance across a wide range of advanced industries. Rather, we need to understand the adversary we face and respond bravely, strategically and expeditiously.

美国应该尊重并珍视自由贸易的理想。但这不应让我们无视当今世界已被最大的强权贸易国扭曲的严酷现实。解决方案不是去全球化或贸易保护主义。美国依赖的太多行业，如航空航天、生物制药、软件和半导体，如果没有全球市场就无法蓬勃发展。而美国也不应天真地怀着希望，如果美国结束贸易战，自由贸易依然会盛行。中国在大范围的先进行业占据主导地位之前不会结束本国的强权贸易政策。我们需要了解我们面临的对手，大胆地、有战略地、迅速有效地做出回应。