On May 26, 2023, a U.S. Air Force plane was on a routine reconnaissance mission over the South China Sea when a Chinese fighter jet banked dangerously close to it. Several months earlier over the same waters, a U.S. military plane was forced to take evasive action when a Chinese fighter came within 20 feet.

2023年5月26日，一架美国空军飞机在南海上空执行例行侦察任务时，一架中国战机在危险接近处倾斜飞行。几个月前，在同一海域，一架中国战斗机距离一架美国军用飞机仅约六米，迫使后者采取规避行动。

Risky intercepts and unsafe encounters like these between air and naval forces of China and the United States and its allies have spiked in recent years, and there appears to be no letup. In August, China released footage of what it claimed was a near miss between Chinese and U.S. helicopters in the Taiwan Strait. Territorial confrontations between Chinese and Philippine vessels have become routine in the South China Sea, and this week Australia said a Chinese fighter jet had released flares dangerously close to an Australian Air Force plane.

近年来，中国与美国及其盟友的空军和海军力量之间的此类危险拦截和不安全相遇事件激增，而且似乎没有缓和的迹象。8月，中国发布了一段视频，称其显示了中美直升机在台湾海峡险些相撞的画面。中菲船只在南海的对峙已成为常态，上周，澳大利亚称一架中国战斗机在危险接近澳大利亚空军飞机的距离释放了干扰弹。

The danger of one of these incidents tipping into an actual conflict has never been higher. Yet in sharp contrast to the era of U.S.-Soviet confrontation, there are virtually no reliable systems of real-time communication between American and Chinese military forces to defuse an inadvertent crisis.

此类事件升级为实际冲突的风险空前之高。然而，与美苏对抗时代形成鲜明对比的是，美中军事力量之间几乎没有可靠的实时沟通机制来化解意外危机。

President Trump, who plans to meet President Xi Jinping of China next week on the sidelines of a regional summit in South Korea, has made clear that his priority with China is a trade deal.

特朗普总统计划本周在韩国举行的一次地区峰会间隙与中国国家主席习近平会面，他已明确表示自己的对华优先事项是达成贸易协议。

But trade depends on peace and stability. By working to lay the foundation for durable crisis management systems with China, Mr. Trump can secure his legacy as the president who pulled the two powers back from the brink of World War III.

但贸易依赖于和平与稳定。通过努力为与中国建立持久的危机管理系统奠定基础，特朗普可以确保自己成为将两个大国从第三次世界大战边缘拉回来的总统，从而留名青史。

History has shown how superpower confrontation can quickly spiral toward nuclear Armageddon. The 1962 Cuban missile crisis is perhaps the most chilling example.

历史表明，超级大国之间的对抗可能迅速升级为核灾难。1962年的古巴导弹危机或许是最令人胆寒的例子。

The United States and China have also come dangerously close to blows.

美国和中国也曾危险地接近交火边缘。

In 2001, a U.S. Navy spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet in the South China Sea. The Chinese pilot was killed, and the American aircraft made an emergency landing on China’s Hainan Island, where the crew was captured. The ensuing 10-day standoff was resolved only after delicate diplomacy that reached the highest levels of the Chinese and U.S. governments.

2001年，一架美国海军侦察机在南海与一架中国战斗机相撞。中国飞行员丧生，美国飞机紧急降落在中国的海南岛，机组人员被扣押。随后是长达10天的对峙，直到中美两国政府最高层进行了微妙的外交斡旋才得以解决。

Whether that kind of crisis resolution can be replicated today is uncertain. China is far more assertive and militarily powerful than it was in 2001, and tensions with the United States are more combustible, amplified by nationalistic pressures on both sides.

此类危机化解模式在当下能否复制，尚不得而知。中国比2001年时更自信，军事力量也更强大，而且与美国的紧张关系更易激化，双方的民族主义压力更是加剧了这种情况。

The situation between the United States and the Soviet Union was different. Although sworn ideological adversaries, they had the wisdom to put reliable checks and balances in place. They notified each other before missile launches, agreed to a range of transparency requirements so that each side could tell that the other’s activities were exercises, not attacks, and followed safety protocols designed to reduce the chance of run-ins. These safeguards remained functional even when tensions spiked.

美国和苏联之间则不同。尽管在意识形态上是死敌，双方有建立可靠制衡机制的智慧。它们在发射导弹前会相互通知，达成一系列透明度要求，以便双方都能判断对方的活动是演习而非攻击，并遵循旨在减少冲突可能性的安全协议。即使在紧张局势加剧时，这些保障措施仍然有效。

The importance of open lines of contact cannot be overestimated.

保持畅通的联络渠道至关重要，其价值不可低估。

In 2015 Russia dramatically increased its military presence in Syria. One of the writers of this essay assisted Ash Carter, then the U.S. secretary of defense, and Joe Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in reopening military communication channels with the Russians that had been severed a year earlier after Russia invaded Crimea. We took measures to avoid accidental clashes in Syria, and no such run-ins occurred.

2015年，俄罗斯大幅增加了其在叙利亚的军事存在。本文的一位作者协助当时的美国国防部长阿什·卡特和参谋长联席会议主席乔·邓福德，重新开启了因俄罗斯入侵克里米亚而在一年前中断的美俄军事沟通渠道。我们采取措施避免在叙利亚发生意外冲突，而此类冲突也并未发生。

There has been a modest level of military contact between China and the United States over the years, but nothing that resulted in the dependable safeguard systems that existed with the Soviets. And China has repeatedly severed all military exchange out of anger, most recently in 2022 after the visit to Taiwan by Nancy Pelosi as House speaker.

多年来，中美之间有过一定程度的军事接触，但从未有过像美苏之间那样可靠的保障体系。而且中国多次因愤怒而切断所有军事交流，最近一次是在2022年佩洛西以众议院议长身份访问台湾之后。

President Joe Biden and Mr. Xi agreed in 2023 to re-establish military dialogue. But that agreement came late in Mr. Biden’s presidency and has failed to fully take root. Communication remains precarious and insufficient, consisting of occasional phone calls between top government or military officials and other sporadic engagement. This fragile framework cannot be counted on to quickly defuse potential accidents in the air and at sea the way regular, predictable contact can, and it remains vulnerable to rupture in tense times.

拜登总统和习近平主席在2023年同意重新建立军事对话。但这一协议是在拜登总统任期后期达成的，没有完全落实。沟通仍然不稳定且不充分，主要是政府或军方高层之间偶尔的电话以及其他零星的接触。这种脆弱的框架无法像定期、可预测的接触那样，迅速化解海空潜在事故，而且在紧张时期仍然容易破裂。

There have been encouraging recent signs. Last month Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth called the Chinese defense minister, Dong Jun — the Trump administration’s first real step toward correcting this military blind spot. But one-off video calls and predictable measures like setting up hotlines are not enough. During the 2001 crisis, the U.S. ambassador to Beijing, Joe Prueher, was unable to reach senior Chinese military officials at the outset: “They didn’t answer my phone call,” he said. And as the former deputy secretary of state Kurt Campbell has put it, past Chinese reluctance to use hotlines means that American calls have “just rung in an empty room for hours upon hours.”

最近有一些令人鼓舞的迹象。上个月，国防部长海格塞思致电中国国防部长董军——这是特朗普政府为纠正这一军事盲点迈出的实质性一步。但一次性的视频通话和设立热线等常规措施是不够的。在2001年的危机中，时任美国驻北京大使乔·普理赫一开始无法联系到中国高级军事官员，“他们不接我的电话，”他说。正如前副国务卿库尔特·坎贝尔所说，过去，中国不愿使用热线，这意味着美国的电话“只能在空荡荡的房间里响上几个小时”。

China has hinted at a new readiness to engage. A Chinese military spokesman suggested in late September that Beijing was “open” to pursuing closer military relations with the United States in the name of “greater stability.” In 2017, Mr. Xi himself told General Dunford, the Joint Chiefs chairman, that military ties can act as a stabilizing force in the broader China-U.S. relationship. He was right then, and the point becomes more relevant with each passing day.

中国已暗示有新的接触意愿。一位中国军方发言人在9月下旬表示，北京“愿意”以“高度的稳定性”为名，寻求与美国建立更密切的军事关系。2017年，习近平主席曾亲自告诉参谋长联席会议主席邓福德将军，军事关系可以在更广泛的中美关系中起到稳定作用。他的话在当时是对的，而且这一点随着时间的推移变得越来越重要。

Mr. Trump should build on this momentum by creating a system of routine, sustained, real-time military contact. It could be the difference between war and peace.

特朗普应该利用这一势头，建立一个常态化、持续性、实时性的军事接触体系。这可能是战争与和平的分水岭。