No matter what Americans think of their politics, the United States still operates in the open. When the most powerful politician and the richest businessman fell out, the public got the full spectacle: barbed posts on social media and sniping in speeches.

无论美国人如何看自己的政治，美国仍是公开运作的。最有权势的政客与最富有的商人闹翻时，公众看到了完整的场面：社交媒体上的尖刻言论和演讲中的相互抨击。

China is the opposite. The country still doesn’t know why former President Hu Jintao was abruptly escorted out of the 2022 Communist Party congress, or what really happened when former Premier Li Keqiang died at 68 in 2023. And decades later, the full story of Lin Biao, Mao Zedong’s chosen successor, who fled China and died in a plane crash in 1971, is still unknown.

中国的情况则相反。中国人至今仍不知道为什么前国家主席胡锦涛突然被带离2022年的中共“二十大”会场，也不知道前总理李克强在2023年68岁去世时究竟发生了什么。毛泽东指定的接班人林彪1971年逃离中国时坠机身亡，直到几十年后的今天，人们仍不知道完整真相。

The secrecy has spawned a niche industry of “bedside eavesdroppers” — Chinese online commentators who parse rumors and fleeting clues for signs of political shifts. Their YouTube videos dissect the gait, complexion or media appearances of China’s leader, Xi Jinping, and can draw millions of views from outside the country’s internet firewall.

这种神秘不透明催生了一个所谓“中南海听床师”的小众行业——中文社区的网络评论员们从谣言和转瞬即逝的线索中揣摩政治风向。他们在YouTube上发视频，剖析中国领导人习近平的步态、面色或在媒体上露面的情况，这些视频能在中国互联网防火大墙外吸引数百万的观看量。

The bedside eavesdroppers have had a busy summer. Mr. Xi has purged a number of military and political leaders this year, all of whom he had appointed. The eavesdroppers have contrived a timeline of Mr. Xi’s exit, a combative meeting between Mr. Xi’s bloc and that of the party elders and even the military’s secret plan to topple his rule. The chatter was joined by American voices: a former U.S. national security adviser, a former diplomat and Washington think tanks that suggested there was a fracture in his power structure. Political risk consultancies and investment funds rushed to brief clients: Why is Mr. Xi doing this? Does it signal strength or weakness?

这个夏天，“听床师”们颇为忙碌。习近平今年清洗了一批军政要员，而这些人都是他一手提拔的。“听床师”们杜撰出习近平下台的时间表，杜撰出习近平阵营与党内元老阵营之间的一次激烈会议，甚至还拿出了军队推翻习近平统治的秘密计划。一些美国人的声音也加入进来：包括一名曾任美国国家安全顾问的人，一名前外交官，以及华盛顿的一些智库，他们暗示习近平的权力结构出现了裂痕。政治风险咨询公司和投资基金也急不可待地向客户们报告：为什么习近平正在这样做？这是他强大还是弱势的信号？

Chinese politics remains a black box, and few credible observers are willing to be seen as indulging in rumor. Yet the questions themselves are legitimate. And they have deep historical echoes.

中国政治仍是一个黑箱，可靠的观察家们大都不愿被视为沉迷于谣言。但提出这些疑问本身是正当合理的。它们有着深刻的历史渊源。

Mr. Xi’s purges follow in the tradition of Joseph Stalin and Mao, and they serve as tools to discipline the elite and cement the absolute authority of one man. The campaign by Mr. Xi, who rose to the top over 12 years ago, underscores the difficulty of managing a vast system, even for a leader with seemingly unchallenged power. The feverish rumor mill may be a symptom of growing tension between Mr. Xi and the Communist Party elite.

习近平的清洗延续了斯大林和毛泽东的传统，用以管束精英阶层、巩固个人的绝对权威。习近平12年前登上了最高领导人的位置，他发起的清洗运动凸显了管理一个庞大体系的难度，即便对于一位看似拥有绝对权力的领导人来说也是如此。极速运转的谣言工厂也许是习近平与中共精英阶层关系日益紧张的一个症状。

In the 1930s, Stalin’s Great Purge eliminated 70 percent of the Soviet Communist Party’s Central Committee and more than half of the 1,966 delegates to its 1934 congress. Vast swaths of the Soviet military leadership were executed.

斯大林20世纪30年代的大清洗从肉体上消灭了苏共中央委员会70%的成员，以及1934年苏共代表大会1966名代表中的一半以上，还有大批军事领导人遭处决。

“This is one of the most amazing things of Communism — that it kills its own loyalists,” said Stephen Kotkin, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and author of two volumes of a planned three-book Stalin biography. “People who don’t waver in their loyalty are nonetheless targeted by the regime in its paranoia and its paroxysms.”

“这是共产主义最惊人的一点，它会处决自己的忠实信徒，”胡佛研究所高级研究员斯蒂芬·科特金说，他计划写三卷《斯大林传》，前两卷已经出版。 “那些对忠诚毫不动摇的人仍然会因为政权的偏执和阵发性狂热而成为打击目标。”

Nearly a century later, Mr. Xi’s campaign is neither bloody nor as sweeping, but it’s the most far-reaching since the Cultural Revolution, when Mao sidelined or destroyed most of his top lieutenants, including Deng Xiaoping and Mr. Xi’s own father, Xi Zhongxun.

近一个世纪后，习近平搞的运动既没有那么血腥，涉及范围也没有那么大，但仍是自文化大革命以来影响最为深远的整肃。毛泽东的“文革”使他的大多数高级副手靠边站或被打倒，包括邓小平和习近平的父亲习仲勋。

In 2024, the Communist Party disciplined 889,000 members, including 73 at or above the provincial or ministerial level, according to official statistics. Since late 2022, about 10 percent of the party’s Central Committee, its top decision-making body, has been purged, sidelined or conspicuously absent from key meetings, the Stanford political scientist Wu Guoguang estimates.

据中国官方统计，中共2024年处分了88.9万名党员，其中包括73名省部级以上干部。据斯坦福大学的政治学家吴国光估计，自2022年底以来，最高决策机构中共中央委员会约10%的成员已被清洗、靠边站，或在重要会议上明显缺席。

The military has been hit the hardest. At least 45 officials in the People’s Liberation Army and China’s military-industrial complex have been removed since 2023, according to the Jamestown Foundation. Two defense ministers were charged, on the same day in 2024, with corruption and with deeds that amounted to a betrayal of Mr. Xi.

军队受到的打击最为严重。据詹姆斯敦基金会，自2023年以来，中国人民解放军和中国军工企业至少有45名官员被免职。两名国防部长曾在2024年的同一天被指控腐败、对习近平不忠诚。

All of this came after Mr. Xi secured a third term in 2022 and filled the leadership ranks with his allies. Why can’t he stop?

这一切都发生在习近平2022年获得第三个任期、把自己的亲信安排在领导层之后。他为什么停不下来呢？

Paranoia is a main driver. In authoritarian regimes, control over military and security forces is existential, said Mr. Kotkin at Hoover, but even loyalists develop their own interests and networks, posing risks for the leader. Mr. Xi, like other strongmen, faces the immense challenge of controlling a vast system that far exceeds the reach of his personal network, Mr. Kotkin said. Mr. Xi has had to reshuffle and purge and pit officials against one another and manipulate rivalries.

偏执是主要的驱动力。胡佛研究所的科特金表示，在威权主义政权中，控制军队和安全部队至关重要，但即使是忠诚者也有他们自己的利益和裙带网络，这给领导人带来风险。与其他强人一样，习近平面临着控制一个庞大体系的巨大挑战，只靠自己的亲信远远不够，科特金说。习近平不得不用改组、清洗、让官员们互相告密，以及操纵对立等手段来应对。

“My point is not that Xi Jinping is in trouble,” Mr. Kotkin said. Rather, it’s about the difficulties anyone would have managing such a big system.

“我的观点不是说习近平陷入了困境，”科特金说。而是任何人管理如此庞大的体系都很困难。

Mr. Wu of Stanford sees a recurring cycle in Stalin, Mao and now Mr. Xi: Political purges follow governance failures and further centralize power. Stalin’s Great Purge followed a horrifying famine that his policies helped cause. Mao’s Cultural Revolution came after China’s own Great Famine, which was a result of his disastrous decisions. Mr. Xi’s current campaign follows the “zero Covid” debacles, regressive economic measures and contentious foreign policy moves.

斯坦福大学的吴国光在斯大林、毛泽东，以及现在的习近平身上看到了一种反复出现的现象：治理失败和权力进一步集中，然后是清洗。斯大林的大清洗发生在一场可怕的饥荒之后，而正是他的政策导致了那场饥荒。毛泽东的文化大革命发生在中国的一场大饥荒之后，而那场大饥荒也是毛泽东灾难性决策的后果。习近平当前的运动发生在“新冠清零”政策失败、倒退的经济措施，以及有争议的外交政策措施之后。

“There is a spiraling, mutually reinforcing relationship between highly centralized power and governance disasters,” Mr. Wu said. “The key link between governance failures and a dictator’s further consolidation of power is the purge.”

“高度集中的权力与治理灾难之间有一种螺旋式的、相互强化的关系，”吴国光说。“治理失败与独裁者进一步巩固权力的关键纽带是清洗。”

In other words, the worse the governance, the greater the purge; and the greater the purge, the tighter the grip. Mr. Wu calls that cycle the “Stalin logic.”

换句话说，治理越糟糕，清洗就越严厉；清洗越严厉，控制就越紧。吴国光将这种循环称为“斯大林逻辑”。

习近平检阅军队，摄于去年12月。

One distinction between Stalin’s rule and Mr. Xi’s is that the vast majority of Russians under Stalin, out of both fear and conviction, believed that he was protecting his country and upholding communism. The same can be said about Mao, but probably not Mr. Xi.

斯大林的统治与习近平的统治有一个区别，那就是，在斯大林的统治下，绝大多数俄罗斯人出于恐惧和信念，认为他在保卫国家、维护共产主义事业。对毛泽东的统治也可以这样说，但对习近平可能并非如此。

No one is predicting the demise of Mr. Xi’s rule. But the speculation about his grip on power may be a sign of deepening tensions between him and the Communist Party elite.

没有人预测习近平的统治将终止。但关于他对权力控制的猜测也许是他与中共精英阶层的紧张关系加剧的迹象。

The elites tolerated Mr. Xi as he consolidated power through anticorruption campaigns, revised the Constitution to eliminate term limits and cracked down on the private sector, said Cai Xia, a retired professor at the Central Party School who has become a party critic. They stayed silent because he didn’t touch their privileges, she said.

中央党校退休教授、现已成为共产党批评者的蔡霞表示，中共精英们容忍了习近平通过反腐巩固权力，修改宪法取消任期限制，打击民营经济这些做法。她说，他们保持沉默是因为习近平没有触及他们的特权。

But now his purges and China’s economic problems are hitting closer to home. “If this continues, it could lead the party elites to believe that it won’t be Xi who falls, but the party itself,” Ms. Cai said.

但习近平现在的清洗，加上中国经济的问题，正在更直接地影响到他们。“如果这种情况持续下去，可能会导致党内精英阶层认为，垮台的不只是习近平，而是中共本身，”蔡霞说。

Mr. Xi could rule for another decade or two, if his health permits, but only if he maintains the loyalty of the party’s leaders. “One of the great vulnerabilities of the regime is when the elite begins to have doubts,” Mr. Kotkin said.

如果身体状况允许，习近平可能还能统治一二十年，但前提是他能维持中共领导层对他的忠诚。“这个政权最大的弱点之一就是精英阶层开始产生疑虑的时候，”科特金说。

The Central Intelligence Agency sees potential cracks it is trying to exploit. In May, it released two Mandarin recruitment videos aimed at Chinese officials.

美国中央情报局看到了它正在试图加以利用的潜在裂痕。中情局已在今年5月发了两段面向中国官员的普通话招聘视频。

“As I climbed the ranks within the party, I watched my higher-ups fall suddenly into disgrace,” one fictional party official narrates. “Now I realized my destiny is just as precarious as theirs.”

“在党内，我一边往上升，一边看着比我职位高的人一个个被弃如敝履，”视频中，一名虚构的党内官员这样说。“但现在，我意识到我的命运和他们同样的岌岌可危。”

Recruitment is not really the point. The U.S. government is trying to convey a message that it believes there is disaffection in elite ranks.

招聘并不是视频传递的真正要点。美国政府正在试图传递一个信息：它认为中共精英阶层内部存在不满。

It’s not clear how effective Mr. Xi’s purges will be, though there is no end in sight.

不清楚习近平的清洗运动效果如何，但目前还看不到运动的尽头。

“Xi Jinping’s new model of totalitarianism clashes with the crony-capitalist model favored by C.C.P. elites under his two predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao,” Mr. Wu of Stanford said.

“习近平的新极权主义模式，与他的前两任江泽民和胡锦涛执政期间受中共精英阶层青睐的裙带资本主义模式有冲突，”斯坦福大学的吴国光说。

He added, “This is not a conflict that Xi can resolve simply by replacing 1,000, 2,000 or even 10,000 cadres.”

他补充说：“这不是习近平用撤换一千、两千，甚至一万名干部就能轻易解决的冲突。”