2025年9月1日
President Trump’s 50 percent tariffs landed like a declaration of economic war on India, undercutting enormous investments made by American companies to hedge their dependency on China.
特朗普总统对印度征收50%的关税做法仿佛是在向印度宣战,并且削弱了美国公司为减少对中国的依赖而进行的巨额投资。
India’s hard work to present itself to the world as the best alternative to Chinese factories — what business executives and big money financiers have embraced as part of the China Plus One strategy — has been left in tatters.
印度一直在奋力向世界展示自己是中国工厂的最佳替代——企业高管和大型金融机构将该国视为“中国+1”战略的一部分——如今这一努力遭受了重创。
Now, less than a week since the tariffs took full effect, officials and business leaders in New Delhi, and their American partners, are still trying to make sense of the suddenly altered landscape.
关税全面生效还不到一周,新德里的官员和商界领袖,以及他们的美国合作伙伴仍在努力理解突然改变的局面。
Just how much things have changed was evident from Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to China over the weekend to meet with Xi Jinping, China’s top leader. Trade and political relations between India and China have been strained, at times severely, and it was Mr. Modi’s first trip there in seven years.
莫迪总理上周末前往中国与最高领导人习近平会面,足以见得局势变化之剧烈。印度和中国之间的贸易和政治关系一直很紧张,有时陷入严重僵局,这是莫迪七年来首次访问中国。
The China Plus One approach has been critical to India’s budding ambitions to become a factory powerhouse. Manufacturing growth, especially in high-end sectors like technology, was seen by India as addressing chronic problems like the underemployment of its vast population of young workers. Now pursuing that path, without the support of Washington, and in potentially closer coordination with China, promises to be even more difficult.
“中国+1”战略对印度成为工业强国的雄心壮志至关重要。在印度看来,制造业的增长,尤其是科技等高端行业的增长,可以解决大量年轻工人就业不足等长期问题。现在,如果没有华盛顿的支持,以及与中国可能展开的更密切的合作,这条路肯定会变得更加困难。
Mr. Trump’s tariffs are already causing dislocation in supply chains. India has been rendered far less enticing to American importers. Companies can go to other places for lower tariffs, like Vietnam or Mexico. A U.S. court ruling, which on Friday invalidated the tariffs but left them in place while Mr. Trump appeals, did nothing to repair the rupture between the countries.
特朗普的关税已经造成供应链混乱。印度对美国进口商的吸引力大大降低。各个公司可以转向其他关税更低的地方,比如越南或墨西哥。上周五,美国法院的一项裁决宣布关税无效,但允许在特朗普上诉期间继续征收关税,这无助于修复美印之间的裂痕。
The “Trump shock will reduce manufacturing export growth and kill even the few green shoots of China Plus One-related private investment,” four Indian economists, including a former chief economic adviser to Mr. Modi, wrote in an Indian newspaper last week.
“特朗普冲击将降低制造业出口增长,甚至扼杀与‘中国+1’相关的私营投资的微弱萌芽,”包括前莫迪首席经济顾问在内的四名印度经济学家上周在一份印度报纸上撰文称。
India still aspires to become one of the world’s three largest economies. It is currently fifth and on pace to overtake Japan soon. If the United States won’t help or, worse, gets in its way, India has no choice but to get closer to Beijing, even as it holds to its goal of becoming a stronger manufacturing rival to its giant neighbor.
印度仍然渴望成为世界三大经济体之一。该国目前排名第五,很快将超过日本。如果美国不提供帮助,甚至阻碍它的发展,印度别无选择,只能向北京靠拢,尽管它的目标始终是成为中国这个庞大邻国的一个更强大的制造业竞争对手。
“China Plus One, minus China, is too difficult,” was the wry reaction of Santosh Pai of the New Delhi law firm Dentons Link Legal. Mr. Pai is near the center of gravity: He set up a practice advising companies from all three countries. “They have to reconcile themselves to seeing China as part of the supply chain,” he said.
“中国+1,再减去中国,这太难了,”新德里律师事务所Dentons Link Legal的桑托什·派伊讽刺地说。帕伊正处于一个中心的位置:他成立了一家为中美印三国公司提供咨询的公司。“人们必须接受中国仍是供应链的组成部分,”他说。
But the India-China relationship is as complicated as they come. The countries have armies ranged against one another, across their disputed borders in the Himalayas. A decade of cross-border incursions culminated in June 2020 with hand-to-hand combat that killed at least 24 soldiers. But the economic conflict was already burbling under the surface.
但印中关系复杂得不能再复杂了。两国军队在喜马拉雅山脉有争议的边界上相互对抗。持续十年的越境侵犯在2020年6月达到高潮,肉搏战导致至少24名士兵丧生。而经济冲突早已暗流涌动。
Early in the Covid-19 pandemic, with its stock market nose-diving, India was alarmed to discover that China’s central bank had quietly acquired 1 percent of one of India’s biggest private banks. India responded by blocking many forms of investment from China. Eventually it kicked out most Chinese venture capital from its tech start-up hubs and barred more than 200 Chinese apps, including TikTok.
在新冠大流行初期,随着本国股市暴跌,印度震惊地发现,中国央行悄悄收购了印度最大私营银行之一1%的股份。印度的回应是阻止来自中国的多种形式的投资。最终,它将大多数中国风险资本赶出了其科技创业中心,并禁止了200多个中国应用程序,包括TikTok在内。
China has an even larger arsenal of economic weapons. It has restricted India’s access to rare earths and dozens of other technologies that India needs to keep its factories running.
中国拥有更大的经济武器库,它限制了印度获得稀土和其他几十种印度工厂维持运转所需的技术。
“These past five years, with the stalemate, China has progressively weaponized everything,” Mr. Pai said. He counts 134 industrial categories that China controls, creating Indian vulnerabilities.
“过去五年里,由于这种相持不下,中国逐步将所有东西变成武器,”派伊说。他统计了中国控制的134个工业类别,这些都成了印度的薄弱环节。
在莫迪对习近平进行外交访问之前,印度和中国就已开始讨论恢复两国间直飞航班以及在边境开设贸易站等事宜。
But Mr. Trump’s weaponization of economic policy has dealt a much crueler blow to Indian companies. Business people in Moradabad, a center of handicrafts and light industry less than 100 miles from New Delhi, said they felt betrayed.
但特朗普将经济政策变成武器的做法对印度企业造成了更为残酷的打击。距离新德里不到160公里的莫拉达巴德是手工艺品和轻工业中心。这里的商人说,他们感觉遭到了背叛。
“Most people are still in shock,” said Samish Jain, a manager at Shree-Krishna, a family-owned company that makes a full range of housewares, 40 percent of them bound for the American market. Until the final deadline came on Aug. 27, he said, “everyone was like ‘no, this isn’t going to happen.’”
“大多数人仍然感到震惊,”家族企业Shree-Krishna的经理萨米什·贾恩说。该公司生产各种各样的家庭用品,其中40%销往美国市场。他说,在8月27日最后期限到来之前,“每个人都在说,‘不,这是不可能的。’”
Now that it has happened, Mr. Jain is groping for a way out, along with the many Indian suppliers and American customers of his company and thousands of others. India’s government is announcing programs to help businesses financially, but Mr. Jain said they would not be enough to keep Shree-Krishna from having to make hard choices.
现在这种情况已经发生了,贾恩正在与他公司的许多印度供应商和美国客户,以及其他数以千计的公司一起寻找出路。印度政府宣布了一些在财政上帮助企业的计划,但是贾恩说,这些计划不足以让Shree-Krishna避免艰难的选择。
“I have people working in my factory since when my dad started this business 30 years ago,” Mr. Jain said. “We can’t just let them go.” He is trying to find new markets for their goods, in the Middle East, Europe or India itself. But so is everyone else in his predicament.
“有些员工在我父亲30年前创办工厂时就已经入职,”贾恩说。“我们不能就这么让他们走。”他试图在中东、欧洲或印度本土为他们的产品寻找新的市场。但其他陷入困境的同行也是如此。
Mr. Modi came to China under tremendous pressure. India’s marketing of itself as an option for multinationals that want to move production out of China was not lost on the Chinese leadership.
莫迪是在巨大压力下来到中国的。印度将自身包装成跨国企业转移中国产地的替代选项,这一点中国领导层也看在眼里。
“I think both are going into this as a dilemma because it’s fundamentally a competitive relationship,” said Tanvi Madan, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington.
华盛顿布鲁金斯学会高级研究员坦维·马丹说,“我认为双方都将陷入两难境地,因为从根本上说,这是一种竞争关系。”
Even before Mr. Modi’s diplomatic visit, India and China were talking about resuming direct flights between the countries and opening trading posts along the border. The meeting in Tianjin, China, on Sunday, didn’t produce any joint agreements, but India’s foreign ministry said that Mr. Modi and Mr. Xi made plans “to expand bilateral trade and investment ties.”
印度和中国在莫迪访华前就已经在讨论恢复两国之间的直航,并在边境沿线开设贸易站。上周日在中国天津举行的会议没有达成任何协议,但印度外交部表示,莫迪和习近平计划“扩大双边贸易和投资关系”。
China has at times made it hard for the Taiwanese giant Foxconn to send Chinese engineers to India. Foxconn is the main contract manufacturer for Apple, which has become a touchstone for India’s China Plus One approach. Apple still makes a majority of its iPhones in China but has in recent years shifted more of that work to India.
中国曾屡次阻挠台湾巨头富士康将中国工程师派往印度。富士康是苹果的主要代工制造商,而苹果已成为印度“中国+1”计划的试金石。大部分iPhone仍在中国生产,但近年来苹果已将更多业务转移到印度。
And on its side, India has been refusing to grant some business visas to Chinese investors.
与此同时,印度也拒绝向部分中国投资者签发商务签证。
China is eager to invest in India. Now, national security concerns notwithstanding, India will be hungrier for a new inflow of foreign exchange as its $129 billion trade in goods with the United States unravels.
中国渴望在印度投资。现在,尽管存在国家安全方面的担忧,随着印度与美国之间1290亿美元的商品贸易破裂,印度将更加渴望新的外汇流入。
Foxconn is an example of the tricky spot Mr. Modi is in, and also of how India could benefit from warmer ties with China.
富士康既体现了莫迪面临的棘手处境,也揭示了印度如何能从与中国关系升温中获益。
In June, Big Kitchen, a Chinese restaurant catering to East Asian expatriates working at the newest iPhone plant near the Indian city of Bengaluru, was desolated. A Foxconn employee from Vietnam, sharing a dish of twice-cooked pork, grumbled that his Chinese colleagues were stuck outside the country, leaving him and a smaller number of non-Chinese engineers to train thousands of new Indian workers.
今年6月,在印度城市班加罗尔附近的一座最新的iPhone工厂,为工厂的东亚外籍员工供餐的中餐馆“大厨房”门可罗雀。一名来自越南的富士康员工吃着一盘回锅肉,抱怨说他的中国同事被困在国外,只剩他和少数非中国工程师培训数以千计新的印度工人。
布里格德果园购物中心的顾客包括许多在印度班加罗尔工业区工作的外籍人士。
If India makes it easier for China to invest in Indian companies, China could make it easier for India to take a few steps in its direction.
若印度为中国投资印度企业提供更多便利,中国则可能相应为印度向中方靠拢创造更多条件。
“We want the Chinese to come in,” said Mr. Pai, the New Delhi business lawyer. India would be “grateful,” he added, for some kinds of Chinese investment, especially in technology, because it would bring jobs to India.
“我们希望中国人进来,”新德里的商业律师派伊说。他还说,印度会“感激”中国的某些投资,尤其是在科技领域,因为这会给印度带来就业机会。
China and the United States have been India’s two most important trading partners, each indispensable in some ways. But India is relatively small fry to both, in terms of imports and exports.
中国和美国一直是印度最重要的两个贸易伙伴,各自在某些方面都不可或缺。但就进口和出口而言,印度对这两个国家来说都相对较小。
If this were a love triangle, India would be the jilted lover. Mr. Trump has, with the 50 percent tariffs and his advisers’ hostile remarks, dumped it. That casts a shadow over Mr. Modi’s new approach to Mr. Xi.
如果这是一场三角恋,印度将是被抛弃的一方。特朗普已经用50%的关税和他的顾问的敌对言论抛弃了它。莫迪所采取的对华新姿态,笼罩在这一阴影之下。
The direction is clear, even though important details are not. “China has not showed its hand yet,” Mr. Pai said. By contrast, “India has a huge dependency on China for imports. It’s clear what India wants.”
方向是明确的,但重要的细节还不清楚。“中国还没有亮出底牌,”派伊说。相比之下,“印度在进口方面严重依赖中国。印度的诉求是很明显的。”