China’s military exercises in the waters around Taiwan this month — the largest in almost three decades — highlight the growing risk of a total breakdown in United States-China relations. A full-scale invasion of Taiwan is one eventuality; last year, the C.I.A. director, William Burns, noted that China’s president, Xi Jinping, has instructed his armed forces to be ready for an invasion by 2027.

12月，中国在台湾周边海域举行了近30年来规模最大的军事演习，凸显出美中关系全面破裂的风险日益增大。全面入侵台湾是可能发生的；2023年，中情局局长威廉·伯恩斯指出，中国国家主席习近平指示中国军队做好在2027年前入侵台湾的准备。

That isn’t Mr. Xi’s only option. He could use his far larger coast guard and military to impose a “quarantine,” allowing merchant shippers and commercial airlines to travel in and out of Taiwan only on China’s terms. This strategy would mirror Beijing’s moves in the South China Sea, where its coast guard is trying to assert control over waters and atolls that are part of the Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally.

那不是习近平唯一的选择。他可以利用其规模大得多的海岸警卫队和军队实施“隔离”，只允许商船和商业航空公司按照中国的条件进出台湾。这一战略将与北京在南海的行动如出一辙，在那里，中国海警正试图控制属于美国条约盟友菲律宾的水域和环礁。

If China forces a confrontation over Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its own territory, the United States will need to respond decisively: The implications are enormous, potentially including a global economic crisis far worse than the shock caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.

中国声称台湾是自己的领土，如果中国在台湾问题上强行展开对抗，美国将需要做出果断反应：其影响是巨大的，可能包括一场比新冠大流行造成的冲击更为严重的全球经济危机。

Right now, America isn’t ready.

现在，美国还没有准备好。

As a report from a House panel concluded last year: “The United States lacks a contingency plan for the economic and financial impacts of conflict” with China.

正如众议院小组去年的一份报告所总结的那样：“面对与中国发生冲突的经济和金融影响，美国缺乏应急计划。”

Addressing this lack of preparation must be a bipartisan priority. The incoming administration must work with Congress and allied governments to develop a coherent plan that clearly outlines a vision for the global economy during and after a crisis that is anchored in American economic leadership.

这种缺乏准备必须成为两党优先考虑的问题。新一届政府必须与国会和盟国政府合作，制定一项明确的计划，以美国的经济领导地位为基础，清楚地勾勒出危机期间和危机后全球经济的愿景。

The most obvious economic implications relate to semiconductors. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company produces about 90 percent of the world’s most advanced computer chips. Some are now made in Arizona, but T.S.M.C.’s most cutting-edge chips are still produced in Taiwan. Industries from autos to medical devices depend on these chips; if Taiwanese chip production is disabled, the global economy could be plunged into a deep slump. If T.S.M.C.’s factories fall into China’s hands — it relies on T.S.M.C.’s chips, too — Beijing could seize a competitive edge, including in the development of artificial intelligence technology, and have American and European manufacturers over a barrel.

最明显的经济影响与半导体有关。台积电生产了世界上90%的最先进的计算机芯片。有些芯片目前在亚利桑那州生产，但该公司最尖端的芯片仍在台湾生产。从汽车到医疗设备等行业都依赖于这些芯片；如果台湾的芯片生产陷入瘫痪，全球经济将陷入严重衰退。如果台积电的工厂落入中国手中——中国也同样依赖台积电的芯片——北京可能会夺取竞争优势，包括在人工智能技术的发展方面，令美国和欧洲的制造商只能听从摆布。

But an invasion or quarantine of Taiwan matters economically for reasons far beyond semiconductor production. Two commitments form the basis of the economic order in the Indo-Pacific: The first is America’s warning, in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, that any violent move to threaten Taiwan’s political or economic autonomy would be a matter of “grave concern” to the United States. The second is China’s commitment, in 1982, to pursue unification with Taiwan through peaceful means, which Mr. Xi himself describes as part of the political foundation of U.S.-China relations.

但是，入侵或隔离台湾的经济意义远不止于半导体生产。有两项承诺构成了印太地区经济秩序的基础：首先是美国在1979年的《台湾关系法》中警告，任何威胁台湾政治或经济自主权的暴力行动都将是美国“严重关切”的问题。其次是中国在1982年承诺通过和平手段实现与台湾的统一，习近平本人将此称为中美关系政治基础的一部分。

If the United States failed to act in response to an invasion or quarantine, allies including Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines would become more vulnerable to economic coercion in turn. America’s relationships with its closest allies would be called into question.

如果美国未能对入侵或隔离采取行动，包括日本、韩国、澳大利亚和菲律宾在内的盟国将更容易受到经济胁迫的影响。美国与其最亲密盟友的关系将受到质疑。

The United States, then, needs economic contingency plans for any Taiwan crisis.

因此，美国需要为任何台湾危机制定经济应急计划。

Economic sanctions like those America has employed against Iran and Russia might seem superficially attractive, but because of China’s central role in global supply chains, similar efforts that disrupt its ability to trade would be self-defeating.

美国对伊朗和俄罗斯实施的经济制裁从表面上看似乎很有吸引力，但由于中国在全球供应链中的核心地位，类似的破坏中国贸易能力的措施将会弄巧成拙。

Indeed, imposing sweeping sanctions on China would undermine the international economic system that the United States is uniquely positioned to protect. Allies and neutral countries alike might refuse to cooperate with an American-led sanctions regime, given the huge costs of compliance for their own economies. Many Americans would find the probable rise in prices of consumer goods untenable.

事实上对中国实施全面制裁会破坏国际经济体系，而国际经济体系正是美国所要保护的。盟国和中立国家都可能拒绝与美国主导的制裁机制合作，因为遵守制裁会给本国经济带来巨大损失。许多美国人会觉得消费品价格可能上涨是难以承受的。

Our leaders must face reality: China cannot be sidelined or expelled from the global economy. Instead, the United States needs an affirmative vision for how it would respond in a Taiwan crisis to defend the global economy. Such a plan would involve three key elements.

我们的领导人必须面对现实：中国不能被边缘化，也不能被逐出全球经济。相反，美国需要一个积极的愿景——在台湾危机中如何应对，以捍卫全球经济。这样一个计划涉及三个关键要素。

During and after any Taiwan crisis, markets would be in a state of panic. The Federal Reserve would need to coordinate with other countries’ central banks to provide liquidity to prevent global financial collapse. And to sustain business confidence in the international trading system, the United States and its allies should establish and fund an Economic Security Cooperation Board, open to all nations except rogue states. This board would combine financial support for member countries with a framework for enforcing trade policies rooted in American national security interests.

任何台湾危机发生期间和之后，市场都将处于恐慌状态。美联储将需要与其他国家的央行协调提供流动性，以防止全球金融崩溃。为了维持企业对国际贸易体系的信心，美国及其盟国应该建立并资助一个经济安全合作委员会，向除流氓国家以外的所有国家开放。该委员会将把对成员国的财政支持与一个执行以美国国家安全利益为基础的贸易政策的框架结合起来。

Washington would also have to work with allies on a crash reshoring of critical products from China on which America and other countries have become heavily dependent, including active pharmaceutical ingredients and drones. (In September, the House passed the Biosecure Act, legislation aimed at strategic decoupling from China in the area of biotechnology, but that has stalled in the Senate.)

华盛顿还必须与盟友合作，将美国和其他国家严重依赖的关键产品的生产迅速转移到中国以外的地方，包括活性药物成分和无人机等等。（去年9月，众议院通过了《生物安全法案》，目标是在生物技术领域与中国进行战略脱钩，但该法案在参议院陷入停滞。）

To reduce reliance on noncritical consumer goods from China — think toasters and toys — the United States should adopt a gradual approach. A system of predictable, incrementally increasing tariffs on Chinese imports could guide manufacturers, importers and retailers to move production out of China without causing sudden inflationary pressures — unlike Donald Trump’s proposed approach of threatening immediate high tariffs to bargain for concessions. Washington shouldn’t try to direct the production of noncritical goods. Instead, it should work to create a level playing field, allowing countries to compete to attract production that moves out of China.

为了减少对来自中国的非关键消费品——烤面包机和玩具之类——的依赖，美国应该采取循序渐进的方法。对中国进口商品征收可预测的、逐步提高的关税，可以引导制造商、进口商和零售商将生产转移出中国，同时不会造成突然的通胀压力，这与特朗普提议的威胁立即征收高关税以换取让步的做法不同。华盛顿不应该试图指导非关键商品的生产。相反，它应该努力创造一个公平的竞争环境，允许各国竞相吸引从中国转移出去的生产业务。

Putting this vision into effect would not be easy. China would very likely retaliate, including by punishing foreign companies in China. Still, building an inclusive economic security framework would be the best defense against the threat of disruption to trade and financial markets. To maintain international solidarity, a U.S.-led coalition would need to aid all countries that are the target of Chinese economic coercion.

实现这一愿景并非易事。中国很可能会进行报复，包括惩罚在华的外国公司。尽管如此，建立一个包容性的经济安全框架将是抵御贸易和金融市场中断威胁的最佳防御。为了维护国际团结，以美国为首的联盟需要援助所有成为中国经济胁迫目标的国家。

Gaining political support for the kind of spending this would require wouldn’t be easy. A reasonable first step would be congressional hearings on the economic impact of a confrontation over Taiwan, with the eventual goal of drafting legislation that can be pulled off the shelf if a crisis arrives.

为这类支出而获得政治上的支持并非易事。合理的第一步应该是国会就台湾问题的对抗所带来的经济影响举行听证会，最终目标是起草在危机来临时可以立即生效的法律。

Whatever the answers, Washington needs to address these questions before something happens. Remember: If China invades or quarantines Taiwan, it wouldn’t just be targeting one island nation. It would be seeking to forcibly reshape the Indo-Pacific regional order and undermine the rules-based global economy. Without a plan, a Taiwan crisis risks undermining the foundations of American prosperity and security.

无论答案是什么，华盛顿需要在事情发生之前解决这些问题。请记住：如果中国入侵或隔离台湾，它的目标不仅仅是这一个岛国。它将试图强行重塑印太地区秩序，破坏以规则为基础的全球经济。如果没有计划，台湾危机有可能破坏美国繁荣与安全的基础。