Iran’s supreme leader may be dead, but there will be another. Its slain military commanders will be replaced. A governing system created over 47 years will not easily disintegrate under air power alone. Iran retains the capacity to strike back against American and Israeli airstrikes, and the war’s trajectory is unclear.

伊朗的最高领袖或许已经身亡，但还会有继任者。被击毙的军事指挥官也将被替换。一个历经47年建立起来的治理体系不会仅因空中打击就轻易瓦解。伊朗仍然具备对美国和以色列的空袭发起反击的能力，战争走向仍不明朗。

But the Islamic Republic, already weakened and unpopular, is now further diminished, its power at home and in the region at one of its lowest ebbs since its leaders took power during the revolution that overthrew Iran’s American-backed shah in 1978-79.

但这个本已虚弱且不得人心的伊斯兰共和国如今进一步遭到削弱，其在国内和地区的影响力已降至自1978–1979年革命推翻美国支持的巴列维国王以来的一个低点。

Even if the regime does not fall, which remains the stated aim of President Trump, this massive attack is likely to have strategic consequences in the Middle East comparable to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

即使该政权并未垮台——尽管这仍是特朗普总统公开宣称的目标——此次大规模打击也很可能对中东产生堪比苏联解体的战略后果。

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader killed on Saturday morning, maintained a visceral antagonism toward Israel and the United States, which he consistently called “the Great Satan.” He built and financed a regional set of proxy militias that surrounded Israel and shared his hatred of it. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza and the West Bank, the Houthis in Yemen — all served both to attack Israeli interests and protect Iran itself.

周六早间被击毙的最高领袖哈梅内伊一直对以色列和美国怀有根深蒂固的敌意，他始终称美国为“大撒旦”。他建立并资助了一系列环绕以色列的地区代理民兵组织，这些组织同样对以色列怀有仇恨。黎巴嫩的真主党、加沙和约旦河西岸的哈马斯与伊斯兰圣战组织、也门的胡塞武装——这些军事力量既用于打击以色列的利益，也用于保护伊朗自身。

Iran built up its missile program and enriched uranium to nearly bomb grade, even as it denied ever wanting a bomb. It became a regional power so strong that Sunni leaders in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Gulf sought to keep good ties with a Shia Islamic regime that also threatened them.

伊朗不断发展导弹计划，并将铀浓缩至接近武器级水平，同时又否认寻求制造核武器。它成长为一个实力强大的地区大国，以至于沙特阿拉伯、埃及以及海湾地区的逊尼派领导人都试图与这个同样对他们构成威胁的什叶派伊斯兰政权保持良好关系。

Iran’s decline began two years ago, with Israel’s tough and sustained response to an invasion by Hamas from Gaza. It accelerated when Israel eroded Iran’s air defenses, defeated Hezbollah and profited from the Syrian revolution that overthrew Bashar al-Assad, another ally of Tehran.

伊朗的衰落始于两年前，当时以色列对哈马斯从加沙发动的袭击作出了强硬而持续的回应。随着以色列削弱伊朗的防空体系、击败真主党，并从推翻德黑兰盟友巴沙尔·阿萨德的叙利亚革命中获益，这种衰落进一步加速。

But now, with the ayatollah’s death and intense destruction from the air, Iran’s regional sway has ebbed further, with uncertain consequences that will play out over months and even years.

但现在，随着最高领袖的死亡和来自空中的大规模打击，伊朗的地区影响力进一步衰退，其不确定的后果将在未来数月乃至数年内逐渐显现。

周日，德黑兰遭遇袭击。

“The Islamic Republic as we know it will not survive this,” said Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North Africa Program at Chatham House, a London-based research group.

位于伦敦的研究机构查塔姆研究所中东和北非项目主任萨纳姆·瓦基尔说：“我们所熟知的那个伊斯兰共和国将无法在这场打击中幸存。”

“The Mideast won’t be the same again,” she said. “For 47 years the Mideast has been living with a hostile regime and a destabilizing force that it has tried to first isolate and then manage.”

她表示：“中东的面貌将彻底改变。47年来，中东一直与一个敌对政权和一个制造不稳定的力量共存，国际社会先是试图孤立它，后来又试图管控它。”

Now, she said, the regime might be dismantled and something new and different might emerge. That leadership may turn out to be even less friendly to Washington, particularly if dominated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.

她说，这个政权现在可能被拆解，可能会出现一个全新的、不同的政权。新的领导层甚至可能对华盛顿更加不友好，尤其是如果由伊斯兰革命卫队主导的话。

Whoever takes charge, Iran will be badly weakened in the medium term, more inward-looking, and focused on political competition, internal security and economic chaos, Ms. Vakil said.

瓦基尔认为，无论最终由谁掌权，在中期内伊朗都将遭到严重削弱，更加无暇他顾，并专注于政治竞争、内部安全和经济混乱上。

In the coming days, however, Iran may spread more short-term chaos as its current leadership tries to bring an end to the war while saving the regime.

不过在接下来几天里，随着伊朗的现任领导层试图在拯救政权的同时结束战争，可能会出现更多短期混乱。

Iran will try to rapidly increase the cost for Israel, the United States and its Gulf allies “to force them to back down before this succeeds in destabilizing the regime,” said Ellie Geranmayeh, deputy head of the Middle East and North Africa program at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

伊朗将试图迅速增加以色列、美国及其海湾盟友的代价，“迫使它们在成功动摇伊朗政权之前退缩，”欧洲对外关系委员会中东和北非项目副主任埃莉·格拉迈耶表示。

Increasing its attacks on Arab countries in the gulf is risky but may be Iran’s best chance to shorten the war — since it could prompt the Arab world to pressure the U.S. and Israel to end their campaign.

加强对海湾阿拉伯国家的攻击风险很大，但这可能是伊朗缩短战争的最佳机会——因为这可能促使阿拉伯国家向美国和以色列施压，要求结束军事行动。

“Iran’s aim now is to absorb U.S. and Israeli attacks, hold its position and signal expansion of war, and wait for worried regional actors to mediate a cease-fire,” said Vali Nasr, an Iran expert at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, on social media. “They expect that if Trump does not get a quick win then he will look for an exit, and negotiations afterwards will be different.”

华盛顿约翰斯·霍普金斯大学高级国际研究学院的伊朗问题专家瓦利·纳斯尔在社交媒体上表示：“伊朗现在的目标是承受美国和以色列的打击，守住阵地，同时释放战争可能扩大的信号，并等待忧心忡忡的地区国家出面调解停火。他们预期，如果特朗普不能迅速获胜，他就会寻求退出，而之后的谈判格局将会不同。”

周六，巴林一栋建筑遭伊朗无人机袭击后起火燃烧。

Iran’s proxies across the Mideast could also come to Iran’s defense, increasing the price of an extended war, according to Ali Vaez, Iran project director for the International Crisis Group, a research institution.

国际危机组织伊朗项目主任阿里·瓦埃兹表示，中东各地的伊朗代理武装也可能出面支援伊朗，从而增加战争旷日持久的代价。

“If Hezbollah fully engages from Lebanon, if militias strike U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria, or if the Houthis escalate in the Red Sea, this stops being a bilateral conflict and becomes a regionwide war stretching across the Middle East,” Mr. Vaez said. A wider war would have considerable longer-term impact on oil prices and inflation, especially if Iran can shut the Strait of Hormuz, a key international shipping route.

“如果真主党从黎巴嫩全面参战，如果民兵组织袭击美国在伊拉克和叙利亚的基地，或者胡塞武装在红海升级行动，这就将不再是双边冲突，而会演变成一场横跨中东的地区性战争，”瓦埃兹说。一场更广泛的战争将对油价和通胀产生相当大的长期影响，尤其是如果伊朗能够封锁关键的国际航运通道霍尔木兹海峡的话。

But in the longer term, an Iran that is wrapped up in its own domestic problems — trying to avoid elite fragmentation and consolidate a new leadership or even move toward a more consultative one, with less clerical influence and more power sharing — will not have the energy or the resources to meddle in the region. That could open up new opportunities for Lebanon and the Palestinians, as it has already done for the Syrians.

但从更长远来看，如果伊朗深陷自身国内问题——试图避免精英阶层分裂，巩固新的领导层，甚至走向一种有更多协商、神职人员影响减弱、更多分享权力的模式——没有精力也没有资源干预地区事务。这可能为黎巴嫩和巴勒斯坦人带来新的机遇，正如这种局面已经为叙利亚带来的变化一样。

It leaves Israel ascendant, making it even more of an ineradicable fact in the region that the Sunni nations must accommodate. A new and more moderate government could take office in Israel after elections later this year. With Iran defanged, it may feel it has the mandate to build on the cease-fire in Gaza and negotiate seriously with the Palestinians, under pressure from Washington and the Saudis.

这使以色列处于有利地位，使其在该地区愈加成为一个不可消除的现实，而逊尼派国家必须加以适应。今年晚些时候选举之后，以色列可能会产生一个更加温和的新政府。在伊朗遭到削弱后，在华盛顿和沙特的压力下，以色列可能会觉得可以放手在加沙停火基础上继续推进，与巴勒斯坦人展开认真的谈判了。

周日，以色列安全官员在检查特拉维夫一栋遭伊朗袭击损毁的建筑。

Presuming there is no revolution, a reconstituted Iranian government must still grapple with a powerful Israel and a United States it cannot trust. The current regime has made nuclear enrichment a key element in its efforts to cement regional power and deterrence. And it has refused to change course, even as that display of persistence seems to have brought it closer to destruction than any other policy, whether that be supporting terrorism abroad or massive repression at home.

假定没有革命发生，一个重新组建的伊朗政府仍然必须面对一个强大的以色列以及一个它无法信任的美国。现政权一直把核浓缩作为巩固地区实力和威慑力的关键手段。尽管与其他任何政策相比——无论是支持海外恐怖活动还是在国内实施大规模镇压，都使其更接近毁灭，伊朗仍拒绝改变路线。

It is unclear if even a more moderate government would make new concessions over its nuclear program under the pressure of war. It is also unclear if any Iranian leader would feel able to trust President Trump, who tore up President Obama’s nuclear deal in 2018, and now has bombed Iran twice in the middle of ongoing negotiations. Would Tehran deem it necessary to give in on the nuclear issue to survive? Or if a hard-line, more security-dominated government emerges, will it try to race toward a nuclear weapon, more convinced than ever of its need?

目前尚不清楚，即使在战争压力下，一个更温和的政府是否会在核计划上做出新的让步。同样也不清楚，是否会有任何伊朗领导人觉得可以信任特朗普总统——他在2018年撕毁了奥巴马总统达成的核协议，如今又在谈判仍在进行之际两次轰炸伊朗。德黑兰是否会认为，为了生存必须在核问题上让步？还是说，如果一个更强硬、更加以安全机构为主导的政府出现，它会比以往任何时候都更加确信核武器的必要性，从而试图加速研制核武器吗？