The world reacted with alarm this year when Beijing introduced waves of export controls on rare earths, the minerals vital to the manufacturing of everything from cars to advanced electronics. For Japan, the experience felt like déjà vu.

今年，中国多次出台稀土出口管制措施，引发全球担忧。稀土这种矿物对从汽车到高端电子产品的各类制造业都至关重要。而对日本来说，这一幕似曾相识。

China maintains a near monopoly on the supply of the metals. Japan learned that the hard way in 2010 when China effectively cut it off during a territorial dispute between the countries. Tokyo has since quietly stitched together a supply chain that is considerably less dependent on China. For Japan, that is an important hedge to political risk, as a recent flare-up in tensions between the nations underscores.

中国几乎垄断了稀土金属的供应。2010年中日领土争端期间，中国曾实质性切断对日本的稀土出口，让日本深受其苦。此后，日本悄然构建起一条大幅降低对中国依赖程度的供应链。正如近期两国紧张局势升级所凸显的，这一举措成为日本应对政治风险的重要保障。

As the United States and other nations scramble to secure rare earths outside China and build up their domestic supplies, Japan’s experience provides lessons in how it can be done, according to interviews with current and former government officials, business executives and industry experts in Japan.

根据对日本现任及前任政府官员、企业高管和行业专家的采访，在美国等国家急于寻找中国以外的稀土来源并扩大本土供应之际，日本的经验提供了可借鉴的路径。

“The urgency of the rare-earths situation is just now dawning on the United States and Europe,” said Naoki Kobayashi, an official working in the minerals division of Japan’s trade ministry. “For Japan, this painful lesson came 15 years ago,” he said.

“欧美国家现在才逐渐意识到稀土问题的紧迫性，”日本经济产业省矿物部门官员小林直贵表示。“而对日本来说，早在15年前就有了这个惨痛的教训。”

President Trump has said he believes it will take the United States about a year to secure ample rare-earth supplies. But Japan is a case study in how hard it is to pull out of China’s grip — especially its extremely cost competitive rare-earth processing facilities. Experts say such an effort requires both sustained government support and international collaboration.

特朗普总统称，美国大约需要一年时间就能确保充足的稀土供应。但日本的情况表明，摆脱中国的掌控——尤其是其极具成本竞争力的稀土加工设施——难度极大。专家表示，这需要政府持续支持与国际合作双管齐下。

当时担任日本经济产业省高官的寺泽达也回忆称，2010年曾有人警告他，稀土供应中断可能导致整个汽车供应链停摆。

Supply Shock

供应冲击

In September 2010, a collision near disputed islands between a Chinese fishing trawler and two Japanese Coast Guard vessels escalated into a diplomatic and economic crisis. Japan detained the captain of the Chinese ship, and Beijing, in retaliation, implemented an unannounced, two-month embargo on rare-earth exports.

2010年9月，一艘中国渔船与两艘日本海上保安厅船只在争议岛屿附近发生碰撞，事件升级为外交和经济危机。日本扣押了中国渔船船长，作为报复，中国未事先通知便实施了为期两个月的稀土出口禁令。

At first, the significance of China’s move was lost on some Japanese officials.

起初，部分日本官员并未意识到中国这一举措的严重性。

Tatsuya Terazawa was in charge of economic policy at Japan’s trade ministry in 2010. He recalled that the ministry’s lead auto industry official rushed to his desk, warning that the entire automotive supply chain could be suspended because of the sudden cutoff.

2010年担任日本经济产业省经济政策负责人的寺泽达也回忆，当时产业省负责汽车行业的主管匆忙跑到他的办公桌前，警告称稀土突然断供可能导致整个汽车供应链停摆。

“I had to confess, I had zero knowledge about rare earths,” Mr. Terazawa said. He said his colleague explained that these materials were essential ingredients for the magnets used in motors across Japan’s auto sector. And Japan, like most industrialized nations, had ceded control of this vital supply almost entirely to China.

“我得承认，当时我对稀土一无所知，”寺泽达也说。他的同事解释说，这些材料是日本汽车行业电机所用磁体的关键成分。而与大多数工业化国家一样，日本已将这一关键供应的控制权几乎完全交给了中国。

Mr. Terazawa was responsible for developing the trade ministry’s next suite of economic policies. He compiled a package, worth a little over $1 billion at the time, aimed at reducing Japan’s supply chain vulnerability to rare earths. It included substantial support for Japanese groups to diversify rare-earth sources.

寺泽达也负责制定经济产业省的新经济政策。他拟定了一套当时价值略超10亿美元的扶持计划，旨在降低日本稀土供应链的脆弱性，其中包括大力支持日本企业拓宽稀土来源渠道。

“At the time, I was criticized that I was demanding much more money than necessary,” Mr. Terazawa said. “But I was determined that Japan never repeat this incident.”

“当时有人批评我要求的资金远超实际需要，”寺泽达也说。“但我决心让日本永远不再重蹈覆辙。”

2011年2月，马来西亚关丹正在建设的莱纳斯稀土加工厂。

Finding Lynas

找到莱纳斯

The timing was, in some ways, opportune. Sojitz, a Japanese conglomerate, and Jogmec, the government body overseeing mineral resource security, were seeking non-Chinese rare-earth options. And Lynas, an Australian mining company, was dealing with financial difficulties.

从某种程度上说，当时的时机恰到好处。日本综合商社双日株式会社与负责矿产资源安全的政府机构金属和能源安全组织(Jogmec)正在寻找非中国来源的稀土；而澳大利亚矿业公司莱纳斯当时正面临财务困境。

Lynas was trying to create the world’s first integrated rare-earths supply chain without using China, instead mining the ores in Australia and refining them in Malaysia. But it was struggling to amass the capital it needed to increase production at its Malaysian refining site.

莱纳斯当时正试图打造全球第一条不依赖中国的一体化稀土供应链——在澳大利亚开采矿石，在马来西亚进行精炼。但该公司难以筹到足够资金以扩大马来西亚精炼厂产能。

Sojitz had to find sources of rare earths outside China. Without stable supplies, “factories in many places would have to stop operating,” said Kosuke Uemura, the chief executive of Sojitz. At the time, “Lynas was the only option,” he said.

双日株式会社必须找到中国以外的稀土来源。“如果没有稳定供应，许多地方的工厂将被迫停产，”双日株式会社社长植村幸佑表示。他说，当时“莱纳斯是唯一的选择”。

In 2011, Jogmec and Sojitz did a deal that provided $250 million in loans and equity to Lynas. The transaction secured for Japan a long-term supply of rare earths sourced outside China.

2011年，Jogmec与双日株式会社达成协议，向莱纳斯提供2.5亿美元的贷款和股权融资。这笔交易为日本确保了长期稳定的非中国来源稀土供应。

Today, in Western Australia, workers on the remote Mount Weld volcanic plug are flown out from Perth on rotations to extract rare-earth ore from an open-pit mine owned by Lynas

如今，在澳大利亚西部，工人轮班从珀斯乘机前往偏远的韦尔德火山岩丘，在莱纳斯旗下的露天矿开采稀土矿石。

The partially purified concentrate is then shipped 5,000 miles to the company’s facility in Kuantan, Malaysia — until this year, the only large-scale rare-earth separation plant operating outside China. There, the materials are refined through a chemical process into individual rare-earth oxides pure enough to use in manufacturing.

经过部分提纯的稀土精矿随后被运往约8000公里外的马来西亚关丹工厂——该厂直至今年仍是唯一在中国境外运营的大型稀土分离设施。在那里，原材料通过化学工艺被精炼成纯度足以用于生产的单一稀土氧化物。

From Malaysia, the metals are transported another 3,000 miles to Japan, where Sojitz manages distribution to domestic magnet makers. In Japan, the magnets are used in a number of products, including vehicles produced by automakers like Toyota.

这些稀土金属再从马来西亚运往约5000公里外的日本，由双日株式会社负责分销给日本国内的磁体制造商。这些磁体被用于丰田等汽车制造商生产的各类产品中。

莱纳斯技术人员于2018年在马来西亚进行稀土精矿混合作业。

Early Challenges

早期挑战

Japan has significantly bolstered its supply chain resilience. While industry estimates placed Japanese rare-earth imports from China at 90 percent or more during the 2010 trade dispute, that figure now stands closer to 60 percent to 70 percent.

日本已显著增强了其供应链的韧性。2010年贸易争端期间，行业估计日本90%以上的稀土进口来自中国，而目前这一比例已降至60%至70%左右。

Sojitz received its first large shipments of rare earths from the Malaysia facility in 2012 and has continued to expand the breadth of metals it imports. In October, it added a type of specialized, heat-resistant magnet ingredients to its portfolio.

双日株式会社2012年首次从马来西亚工厂收到大规模稀土货物，并持续扩大进口稀土的种类。今年10月，其产品线新增了一种特殊的耐高温磁体原料。

According to Mr. Uemura, the Sojitz chief executive, the toughest bottleneck was the refining process in Malaysia. The chemical separation of rare earths produces large volumes of acidic waste and thousands of tons of low-level radioactive residue. Proper management and disposal of the waste is expensive and time consuming.

植村幸佑表示，最大的瓶颈是马来西亚的精炼过程。稀土的化学分离会产生大量酸性废料和数以千计吨低放射性残渣，妥善管理和处置这些废弃物既昂贵又耗时。

Between 2011 and 2012, the Lynas facility in Malaysia faced months of delays because of fierce local opposition and legal challenges. The facility began operating only after it revised its residue management plan multiple times.

2011年至2012年间，由于当地民众的强烈反对和法律诉讼，莱纳斯在马来西亚的工厂遭遇了数月的延误。直到多次修改残渣管理计划后，该工厂才得以投产。

In contrast, Chinese processing factories are often lightly regulated, and some illegally operated, creating toxic waste sites.

相比之下，中国的加工工厂往往监管宽松，部分甚至非法运营，形成了有毒废弃物污染堆积地。

As a result, Mr. Uemura said, Sojitz and Lynas have higher costs than Chinese rivals and require public backing. “If we were to compete normally with China, we’d be playing on a different field altogether,” he said. “This gap is absolutely unbridgeable.”

植村幸佑表示，正因如此，双日株式会社和莱纳斯的成本高于中国竞争对手，需要政府支持。“如果我们与中国进行正常竞争，那完全是在不同的赛道上，”他说。“这种差距是绝对无法弥合的。”

2012年马来西亚格本，莱纳斯工厂建设期间的反莱纳斯活动人士。

Export Controls

出口管制

This year, China introduced expansive rare-earth export controls, first in April and again in October, restricting the materials themselves and the processing technology. Beijing’s measures targeted all exports, not just those bound for Japan.

今年，中国先后在4月和10月出台了大范围的稀土出口管制措施，不仅限制稀土本身的出口，还包括加工技术。中国的这些措施针对所有出口目的地，不仅限于日本。

Although the broader October restrictions were temporarily suspended through a truce with the United States in November, countries are scrambling to lessen their dependency on China.

尽管11月美国与中国达成休战协议，10月出台的更广泛管制措施得到暂停，但各国仍在急于降低对中国的依赖。

The Trump administration has begun investing federal money to construct a domestic supply chain. The effort entails support for the sole U.S. rare-earth mining operation at Mountain Pass, Calif., as well as for processing and magnet manufacturing facilities in North Carolina and Texas.

特朗普政府已开始投入联邦资金构建本土供应链，包括支持加利福尼亚州帕斯山的美国唯一稀土矿开采项目，以及北卡罗来纳州和得克萨斯州的加工及磁体制造设施。

The United States has also signed international agreements meant to diversify supply chains away from China. Pacts were reached with Australia, the European Union and Japan, the latter of which was signed during Mr. Trump’s visit to Tokyo in October.

美国还签署了多项国际协议，旨在实现供应链多元化、减少对中国的依赖，合作伙伴包括澳大利亚、欧盟和日本，其中与日本的协议是在特朗普10月访日期间签署的。

‘Moment of Truth’

“关键时刻”

For officials in Japan, the current situation presents an opportunity to band together with other countries to solve the issue of cost — one that, over the past 15 years, Japan has struggled to tackle on its own.

对日本官员来说，当前局势为各国联合解决成本问题提供了契机——过去15年来，日本一直在独自艰难地应对这一挑战。

双日公司首席执行官植村幸佑在公司的东京总部。

If nations agree to buy more non-Chinese rare-earth materials, they can build scale and eventually bring down costs, according to Mr. Kobayashi, the trade ministry official. More coordination can also mean creating deeper ties between Japan, which has experience building mine-to-magnet supply chains, and countries willing to host and fund processing facilities.

经产省官员小林直贵表示，如果各国同意购买更多非中国来源的稀土材料，就能形成规模效应，最终降低成本。加强协调还意味着，拥有从矿山到磁体完整供应链建设经验的日本，能与愿意接纳和资助加工设施的国家建立更深厚的联系。

But Mr. Terazawa, the former trade ministry official, who now heads an energy think tank in Tokyo, believes that any push for international cooperation will be a test of genuine commitment. “The question we need to be asking is why this didn’t happen over the past 15 years,” he said.

但现任东京某能源智库负责人、前经济产业省官员寺泽达也认为，任何推动国际合作的努力都将是对真正承诺的考验。“我们要追问的是，为什么过去15年没有实现这一点？”他说。

When he was in government, Mr. Terazawa attempted to stress rare earths as a critical area for bilateral collaboration, including during the first Trump administration. “We are still vulnerable, especially the U.S. is still so vulnerable,” he said.

寺泽达也在政府任职期间，曾试图强调稀土作为双边合作的关键领域，包括在第一届特朗普政府时期。“我们仍然很脆弱，美国尤其脆弱，”他说。

“The U.S. is a great country, for sure, but I don’t think it can deal with China effectively on its own,” Mr. Terazawa said. The recent agreements to coordinate are the groundwork. Now, he said, comes the moment of truth: “Is the U.S. really committed to work with its allies?”

“美国无疑是一个伟大的国家，但我认为它无法独自有效应对中国，”寺泽达也表示。近期达成的协调协议是基础工作，他指出，现在到了关键时刻：“美国是否真正致力于与盟友的合作？”