The good news: I don’t think Donald Trump will cause a global trade war.

好消息：我认为特朗普不会引发全球贸易战。

The bad news: The reason I say that is I believe that a trade war would be coming even if Trump had lost the election, largely because China is refusing to act like a responsible economic superpower. Unfortunately, Trump may be the worst possible person to guide U.S. policy through the turmoil that’s probably ahead.

坏消息：我之所以这么说，是因为我相信，即使特朗普输掉了大选，贸易战也会爆发，这主要是因为中国不愿意像一个负责任的经济超级大国那样行事。不幸的是，要引导美国政策度过可能即将到来的动荡，特朗普可能是最糟糕的人选。

He won’t be the reason we have a trade war, but he may well be the reason we lose it.

他不会是我们打贸易战的原因，但很可能是我们输掉贸易战的原因。

China is the greatest economic success story in history. It used to be very poor; there are still many people alive who remember the great famine of 1959-61. But after the reforms that began in 1978 its economy soared. Even now, China is only a middle-income country, with G.D.P. per capita substantially lower than ours or in Western Europe. But China has a huge population, so by some measures it is now the world’s largest economy.

中国是历史上最了不起的经济成功故事。它曾经非常贫困，至今仍有很多人记得1959～1961年的大饥荒。但在1978年开始改革之后，中国经济飞速发展。即使现在，它依旧是一个中等收入国家，人均GDP远低于我们或西欧的水平。但中国拥有庞大的人口，因此以某些标准来衡量，它目前是世界上最大的经济体。

However, all indications are that China’s era of torrid economic growth is behind it. For decades, Chinese growth was fueled mainly by two things: a rising working-age population and rapid productivity growth driven by borrowed technology. But the working-age population peaked around a decade ago and is now falling. And despite some impressive achievements, the overall rate of technological progress in China, which economists measure by looking at “total factor productivity,” appears to have slowed to a crawl.

然而，所有迹象都表明，中国经济高速增长的时代已经过去。几十年来，中国的增长动力主要来自两个方面：适龄劳动人口的不断增长，以及引进技术推动的生产率快速增长。但适龄劳动人口在大约十年前达到顶峰，目前正在下降。尽管取得了一些相当厉害的成就，但中国的整体技术进步速度（经济学家通过“全要素生产率”来衡量）似乎已经放缓到了爬行的速度。

But a growth slowdown doesn’t have to be a catastrophe. Japan went through a similar demographic and technological downshift in the 1990s and has, on the whole, handled it fairly gracefully, avoiding mass unemployment and social unrest.

但增长放缓未必就是一场灾难。日本在上世纪90年代经历了类似的人口和科技的衰退，总体上处理得相当得当，避免了大规模失业和社会动荡。

China, however, has built an economic system designed for the high-growth era — a system that suppresses consumer spending and encourages very high rates of investment.

然而，中国建立了一个为高增长时代设计的经济体系——一个抑制消费者支出、鼓励高投资率的体系。

This system was workable as long as supercharged economic growth created the need for ever more factories, office buildings and so on, so that high investment could find productive uses. But while an economy growing at, say, 9 percent a year can productively invest 40 percent of G.D.P., an economy growing at 3 percent can’t.

只要经济的高速增长创造了对更多工厂、办公楼等的需求，那么这个系统就是可行的，这样高投资就可以找到生产性的用途。但是，虽然一个年增长率为9%的经济体可以将GDP的40%用于有效投资，但一个增长率3%的经济体就没法做到这一点。

The answer seems obvious: redistribute income to households and reorient the economy away from investment toward consumption. But for whatever reason, China’s government seems unwilling to move in that direction. Again and again, stimulus policies have been aimed more at expanding productive capacity than at empowering consumers to make use of that capacity.

答案似乎很明显：将收入重新分配给家庭，并将经济从投资转向消费。但不知出于何种原因，中国政府似乎不愿意朝着这个方向迈进。一次又一次，刺激政策的目的更多地是为了扩大产能，而不是让消费者能够利用这些产能。

So what do you do if you have lots of capacity but your consumers can’t or won’t buy what you make? You try to export the problem, keeping the economy humming by running huge trade surpluses.

那么，如果你拥有大量产能，但消费者无法或不愿购买你所生产的商品，你该怎么办？你试图将问题向外输出，通过维持巨额贸易顺差来维持经济运转。

And I mean huge. Tellingly, China seems to be playing games with its trade numbers in an attempt to make its surpluses look smaller than they really are. But China appears to be exporting close to $1 trillion more than it imports, and the trend is upward.

我的意思是，巨大的贸易顺差。值得注意的是，中国似乎对贸易数据做了手脚，试图使它的顺差看起来比实际规模要小。然而，中国的出口额似乎比进口额多出近1万亿美元，而且还处于上升趋势。

Hence the coming trade war. The rest of the world won’t passively accept Chinese surpluses on that scale. The “China shock” of the 2000s taught us that whatever the (real) virtues of free trade, a huge import surge does unacceptable damage to workers and communities in its path. Furthermore, China is an autocracy that doesn’t share democratic values. Allowing it to dominate strategically crucial industries is an unacceptable risk.

因此，贸易战即将到来。世界其他国家不会被动地接受中国如此规模的贸易顺差。本世纪前十年的“中国冲击”告诉我们，无论自由贸易有什么（真实的）好处，进口激增都会对受影响的工人和社区造成不可接受的损害。此外，中国是一个不认同民主价值观的专制国家。任由它支配战略上至关重要的产业会带来无法承受的风险。

That’s why the Biden administration has been quietly pursuing a quite hard line on China, retaining Trump’s tariffs and trying to limit its progress in advanced technologies. It’s why the European Union has imposed high tariffs on electric vehicles made in China, which is probably only the beginning of expanded trade conflict.

这就是为什么拜登政府一直悄然对中国采取强硬立场，保留了特朗普的关税，并试图限制其在先进技术方面的进步。这就是为什么欧盟对中国制造的电动汽车征收高额关税，这可能只是贸易冲突扩大的开始。

So the trade war is coming; in some ways it has already started. What will Trump add to the story?

因此，贸易战即将来临；在某种程度上，它已经开始。那么，特朗普会带来些什么？

Ignorance, lack of focus and potential cronyism. Oh, and gullibility.

无知、缺乏重点，以及任人唯亲的可能性。哦，还有容易上当受骗。

Ignorance: Trump’s insistence that tariffs don’t hurt consumers — even as businesses across America are planning to raise prices when his planned tariffs hit — strongly suggests that neither he nor anyone he listens to understands how global trade works. Not a good thing at a time of trade conflict.

无知：特朗普坚称关税不会损害消费者——尽管美国各地的企业都计划在他提议的关税生效时提高价格——这强烈表明，无论是他还是给予他建议的人，都不了解全球贸易是如何运作的。在发生贸易冲突的时候，这可不是一件好事。

Lack of focus: By proposing tariffs across the board, not on just China, Trump will raise costs for many American businesses and alienate allies who should be part of a cooperative response.

缺乏重点：特朗普提议全面征收关税，而不仅仅是针对中国，这将提高许多美国企业的成本，并疏远本应参与合作应对的盟友。

Cronyism: The president has great discretion in granting tariff exemptions to selected companies. During Trump’s first term, such exemptions went disproportionately to companies with Republican political connections. It’s naïve to think this isn’t likely to happen again, and on a much larger scale.

任人唯亲：总统在授予特定公司关税豁免方面有着很大的自由裁量权。在特朗普的第一个任期内，这种豁免不成比例地流向了与共和党存在政治联系的公司。如果认为这种情况不太可能再次发生，规模不再可能那么大，就太天真了。

Finally, gullibility: During his first term, Trump eventually stopped raising tariffs after signing what he called a “historic trade deal” in which China agreed to buy $200 billion in American goods. How much of that total did China actually buy? None.

最后一点，容易上当受骗：在他的第一个任期内，特朗普在最后签署了其所谓的“历史性贸易协议”后停止了提高关税，根据该协议，中国同意购买2000亿美元的美国商品。中国实际购买了多少？一分没有。

As I said, serious trade conflict is coming as China tries to export its policy failures. But America just elected perhaps the worst possible leader to manage that conflict.

正如我所说的，随着中国试图向外输出其政策失败，严重的贸易冲突即将到来。但美国刚刚选出了可能是最糟糕的领导人来处理这场冲突。