In the first few months after President Trump returned to the White House, he held firm to an American technology policy that stretches back to the depths of the Cold War.

在重返白宫后的前几个月里，特朗普总统坚持推行一项可追溯至冷战时期的美国技术政策。

Don’t sell your adversaries America’s most advanced technology, the thinking went in those early months — starting with the computing power that has given the United States its edge in space and cyberspace, and in designing nuclear weapons and next-generation fighters.

那段时间的共识是：不要向对手出售美国最先进的技术——首先是那些让美国在太空与网络空间、核武器及下一代战机设计方面保持优势的计算能力。

But all that began to change a few months ago. A handful of the nation’s richest technology executives and Mr. Trump’s own artificial intelligence chief, David Sacks, arrived in Washington with a counterargument: that America’s best bet is to suck China and other nations into the “American tech stack,” the layer cake of American hardware and software that would making China’s users dependent on the most advanced chips in the American arsenal.

但几个月前，这一切开始发生变化。几位美国最富有的科技企业高管与特朗普的人工智能事务主管戴维·萨克斯来到华盛顿，提出了一个相反的论点：美国最好的选择是把中国和其他国家吸纳进“美国技术栈”，也就是由美国硬件和软件层层叠加而成的体系，从而让中国的用户依赖美国技术库中最先进的芯片。

Quickly that argument focused on the chips designed by Nvidia, now the world’s largest company, at least when measured by its $4.48 trillion market capitalization. The company won a huge victory late Monday afternoon, when Mr. Trump declared on his social media account that he was freeing Nvidia to sell its second most powerful chip, known as the H200, to China.

这一论点很快聚焦到英伟达设计的芯片上。按4.48万亿美元的市值计算，英伟达如今已是全球市值最高的公司。周一傍晚，该公司取得重大胜利，特朗普在自己的社交媒体账号上宣布，将允许英伟达向中国销售其性能排名第二的H200芯片。

The chip gives the Chinese a chance to speed ahead in the neck-and-neck artificial intelligence race. China’s own top executives, even the leaders of its most successful A.I. venture, DeepSeek, complain that their progress is limited by a shortage of computing power. Mr. Trump offered little rationale behind the decision, and said nothing about the intense lobbying by Jensen Huang, Nvidia’s chief executive and a frequent visitor to the White House.

这款芯片让中国有机会在白热化的人工智能竞赛中加速前进。就连中国最成功的人工智能企业DeepSeek的负责人在内的多位高管都抱怨，他们的进展受到算力短缺的限制。特朗普对此决定未多作解释，也未提及白宫常客、英伟达首席执行官黄仁勋为此展开的密集游说。

But he did say that in return, 25 percent of all the revenues from the sales would go to the United States.

但他明确表示：作为回报，相关销售收入的25%将归美国政府。

With that announcement, Mr. Trump made clear that decisions once made purely on the basis of national security were now up for sale — a move of dubious legality, since export licenses cannot be sold under existing federal law.

随着这项声明的发布，特朗普明确表明，原本纯粹基于国家安全考量的决定现在可以拿出来交易——这一举动在法律上是存有疑问的，因为现行联邦法律禁止出售出口许可证。

But it also raised the question: If the chips that power the most advanced technology can be sold to the United States’ chief technological, military and financial competitor, where is the new line drawn? By the same logic that it is better to have China using American technology, should Washington sell it F-35s? Advanced missiles?

但这也引发了一个问题：如果为最先进技术提供动力的芯片都可以卖给美国在技术、军事和金融领域的头号竞争对手，那么红线又该如何划定？按照同样的逻辑，既然让中国使用美国技术被认为更有利，华盛顿是否也该向它出售F-35战机？先进导弹呢？

And what happens when the Chinese break through the high barrier of producing the chips themselves? At that moment, do they stick with Nvidia’s astounding chips, essentially a supercomputer in a tiny box? Or, having received a huge boost from Mr. Trump’s decision, do they break out of the tech stack, and turn back to state champions like Huawei, the telecommunications giant that hopes to take on Nvidia, and rely on their own technology, as President Xi Jinping has seemed to suggest?

而当中国最终突破高门槛、能够自己生产这些芯片时，又会发生什么？届时他们会继续使用英伟达那些堪称微型超级计算机的惊人芯片吗？还是说，在特朗普决策的巨大助推下，他们将挣脱美国技术栈的束缚，正如中国国家主席习近平似乎所暗示的那样，转而依靠希望挑战英伟达的电信巨头华为这样的国家队企业、依靠本国技术呢？

Not surprisingly, on Capitol Hill and beyond, the administration’s decision is under new examination and, from many quarters, outright attack. Much as Mr. Trump has upended alliances and the post-World War II order, he is now loosening the stricture of export controls that kept Western technology from its rivals — first from the Soviets, then from China and an array of other competitors.

不出所料，在国会山以及更广泛的政治圈内，政府的这一决定正受到新的审视，并遭到多方激烈抨击。正如特朗普颠覆了盟友关系和二战后的国际秩序一样，他如今又在松动出口管制这道限制措施——这种限制曾阻挡西方技术流向对手，先是苏联，后来是中国以及一众其他竞争者。

In an era in which China is producing far more electric cars and solar panels than the United States, dominating in batteries and surging ahead in biotechnology, the design of the most advanced semiconductors is one of America’s few sparkling gems, an arena where China has struggled to keep up. To many veterans of the chip wars, Mr. Trump is prioritizing short-term economic gain over long-term U.S. security interests.

如今中国在电动车、太阳能电池板的产量上远超美国，在电池领域占据主导，并在生物技术方面突飞猛进；而最先进半导体的设计是美国少数仍然闪耀的“皇冠明珠”之一，是中国一直追赶不上的领域。在许多芯片战的资深人士看来，特朗普正在用美国的长期安全利益换取短期经济利益。

“This decision is nuts,” said Jake Sullivan, who served as national security adviser under President Joseph R. Biden Jr. and designed many of the Biden-era restrictions on chip sales to China.

“这个决定简直疯了，”曾在拜登总统任内担任国家安全顾问、主导制定多项对华芯片销售限制措施的杰克·沙利文表示。

“America and China are competing for leadership on A.I.,” Mr. Sullivan said. “China’s main problem is they don’t have enough advanced computing capability. It makes no sense that President Trump is solving their problem for them by selling them powerful American chips. We are literally handing away our advantage. China’s leaders can’t believe their luck.”

“美中正在争夺人工智能领域的领导地位，”沙利文说。“中国的主要问题在于他们没有足够的先进算力。特朗普总统通过向他们出售强大的美国芯片为他们解决这个问题，完全说不通。我们简直是拱手让出我们的优势。中国的领导人都不敢相信这样的好运气。”

Mr. Sacks sees it differently. One of Silicon Valley’s most successful tech entrepreneurs, he began arguing in the late spring for what he called a “more nuanced” view. When Mr. Trump agreed to allow Beijing to buy a custom, somewhat dumbed-down Nvidia chip, called the H20, he argued that it was the best way to keep Huawei, China’s telecommunications giant and an aspirant to take on Nvidia, from dominating its home market. Mr. Sacks said it was a logical choice.

萨克斯则持不同看法。作为硅谷最成功的科技企业家之一，他自今年春末便开始主张所谓“更精细”的角度看问题。当特朗普同意允许北京采购特制版、性能有所简化的英伟达H20芯片时，萨克斯辩称这是阻止中国电信巨头、英伟达的潜在挑战者华为主导其国内市场的最佳策略。他说，这是一个合乎逻辑的选择。

“You just don’t want to hand Huawei the entire Chinese market,” Mr. Sacks said on Bloomberg television, “when Nvidia is capable of competing for a big slice of it.” The idea, he said, was to deprive Huawei of huge revenues from its older, slower chips that it could pour into research and development. “It’s a huge subsidy for their R&D,” he continued.

“你显然不希望把整个中国市场都拱手让给华为，”萨克斯在彭博电视上说。“而英伟达是有能力争夺其中很大一部分市场的，”他解释说，这是要让华为无法通过其较老、较慢的芯片中获得的巨额收入，因为这些收入可用于研发。“那相当于对他们研发的巨大补贴，”他接着说。

But the Chinese didn’t bite. They refused to buy the H20, saying privately that they were insulted to be offered a chip whose powers were crippled. It may have been a negotiating tactic to get a more advanced chip, called the H200, which Nvidia brought out about a year and a half ago. If so, it worked. Mr. Trump agreed, saying vaguely on social media that it could be shipped “to approved customers in China, and other Countries, under conditions that allow for continued strong National Security.”

但中国方面并不买账。他们拒绝购买H20，私下表示提供性能遭削弱的芯片是一种侮辱。这也许是一种谈判策略，目的是换取一款更先进的芯片——即英伟达在一年半前推出的H200。如果是这样，那它确实奏效了。特朗普同意了，并在社交媒体上含糊地表示，该芯片可以“在符合继续保持强大国家安全的条件下，向中国及其他国家的获批客户”发货。

Mr. Trump said nothing about what those conditions would be. But a White House official, who declined to speak on the record about policy decisions, cast the decision as a compromise, splitting the difference between a national security establishment that would ship the Chinese nothing, and Mr. Huang, who they said wanted permission to ship all his products to China.

特朗普并未说明这些条件具体是什么。但一名不愿就政策决定公开发言的白宫官员表示，该决定是一种妥协，即在主张对中国全面禁运的国家安全体系与据称希望获准对华销售所有产品的黄仁勋之间的折中方案。

(The company’s fastest chip, the one sought by companies seeking to vastly improve their large-scale A.I. offerings and build data centers for high-performance computing, is called the Blackwell. It is still barred for export to China.)

（该公司性能最先进的芯片目前仍被禁止对华出口，那些希望大幅提升大规模人工智能服务、建设高性能计算数据中心的企业争相购买这款名为Blackwell的芯片。）

Of course, there is the matter of the 25 percent cut for the U.S. government, part of Mr. Trump’s argument that he is bringing in cash not only for Nvidia’s shareholders but also relieving the burden on American taxpayers. Appealing as that sounds, it creates a situation that appalls most national security traditionalists, who think export controls should be decided according to standards of potential harm to America’s advantage, particularly its military edge. Selling that off for short term profit, they argue, is a prescription for trouble.

当然，这其中还涉及向美国政府支付25%销售分成的安排，这一点也被特朗普用来证明措施的合理性，声称这不仅为英伟达股东带来收益，同时也减轻了美国纳税人的负担。这种说辞听起来诱人，却造成令多数国家安全传统派深感震惊的局面，在他们看来，出口管制应根据其可能对美国优势（特别是军事优势）构成的潜在损害标准来决定。他们认为，为短期利益出卖这种优势无异于埋下祸根。

Mr. Sullivan, who is now the Kissinger professor of the practice of statecraft and world order at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, says it is clear what may happen next. China’s leaders “intend to get off of American semiconductors as soon as they can,” he said. “So the argument that we can keep them ‘addicted’ holds no water. They want American chips right now for one simple reason: They are behind in the A.I. race and this will help them catch up while they build their own chip capabilities.”

现任哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院治国理政实践与世界秩序基辛格讲席教授的沙利文指出，接下来可能发生的事情是显而易见的。中国领导人“打算尽快摆脱对美国半导体的依赖”，他表示。“所以所谓让他们‘上瘾’的说法根本站不住脚。他们现在需要美国芯片只有一个简单原因：他们在人工智能竞赛中落后了，而这些芯片能在他们建设自主芯片能力的同时，帮助他们追赶上来。”

It may also create a problem with American allies. One company in the Netherlands, ASML, makes the wildly expensive, precision machinery needed to cut the tiniest of circuits on advanced chips. After lengthy negotiations, the company agreed in the Biden years to cut off China from the most advanced chip-making equipment.

此举也可能引发美国与盟友之间的问题。荷兰公司阿斯麦生产能切割最微小电路的昂贵精密设备，是先进芯片的制造不可或缺的。经过漫长谈判，该公司在拜登执政期间同意切断中国获取最先进芯片制造设备的渠道。

But now that it sees the United States profiting from advanced chip sales, it may well question why it should listen to Washington’s entreaties about the dangers of giving too much technology to Chinese makers.

但如今，当它看到美国正从先进芯片的销售中获利时，完全有可能质疑自己为何还要听从华盛顿关于向中国制造商提供过多技术存在风险的劝告。

“It's not reasonable to tell our allies we are going to sell the chips but you can’t sell the machines that make those chips,” said Rush Doshi, a China expert at Georgetown University and the Council on Foreign Relations. “As a result, it is possible that the allied coordination that supports our most important export controls might be seriously damaged by this decision.”

“告诉盟友我们可以销售芯片，但他们不能销售制造这些芯片的机器，这是不合理的，”乔治城大学兼美国外交关系协会中国问题专家杜如松(Rush Doshi)表示。“因此，这一决定有可能严重损害支撑我们最重要出口管制的盟友协调机制。”