The war in Ukraine is at an inflection point, with President Trump seeking rapprochement with the Russian leader, Vladimir V. Putin, and pressing for an end to the fighting.

随着美国总统特朗普寻求与俄罗斯领导人普京和解，并力促结束战斗，乌克兰战争正处于拐点。

But for nearly three years before Mr. Trump’s return to power, the United States and Ukraine were joined in an extraordinary partnership of intelligence, strategy, planning and technology whose evolution and inner workings have been known only to a small circle of American and allied officials.

但在特朗普重新掌权前的近三年时间里，美国和乌克兰在情报、战略、规划和技术方面结成了非同寻常的伙伴关系，其演变和内部运作情况只有一小部分美国和盟国官员知道。

With remarkable transparency, the Pentagon has offered a public accounting of the $66.5 billion in weaponry it has supplied to Ukraine. But a New York Times investigation reveals that America’s involvement in the war was far deeper than previously understood. The secret partnership both guided big-picture battle strategy and funneled precise targeting information down to Ukrainian soldiers in the field.

五角大楼对价值665亿美元的援乌武器装备的详情披露体现出极大的透明度。但《纽约时报》的一项调查显示，美国在这场战争中的参与远比人们之前所了解的要深入得多。这种秘密合作不仅指导了宏观层面的作战策略，还将精确的目标信息传递给了乌克兰前线的士兵。

Here are five takeaways from the investigation.

以下是调查的五大收获。

A U.S. base in Wiesbaden, Germany, supplied the Ukrainians with the coordinates of Russian forces on their soil.

位于德国威斯巴登的一个美国基地向乌克兰人提供了其境内俄罗斯军队的坐标。

The idea behind the partnership was that America’s close cooperation with Ukraine would compensate for Russia’s vast advantages in manpower and weaponry. To guide the Ukrainians as they deployed their ever-more-sophisticated arsenal, the Americans created an operation called Task Force Dragon.

美国与乌克兰的密切合作旨在抵消俄罗斯在人力和武器装备方面的巨大优势。为了指导乌克兰人部署日益精良的武器库，美国人建立了一个名为“龙特遣队”的行动。

The secret center of the partnership was at the U.S. Army garrison in Wiesbaden, Germany. Each morning, U.S. and Ukrainian military officers set targeting priorities — Russian units, pieces of equipment or infrastructure. American and coalition intelligence officers searched satellite imagery, radio emissions and intercepted communications to find Russian positions. Task Force Dragon then gave the Ukrainians the coordinates so they could shoot at them.

合作的秘密中心位于德国威斯巴登的美国陆军驻地。每天早上，美国和乌克兰军官都会确定优先目标——俄罗斯部队、装备或基础设施。美国和联军情报人员通过搜索卫星图像、无线电发射和截获的通信信息来寻找俄罗斯的阵地。然后，“龙特遣队”将坐标提供给乌克兰人，以便他们射击。

Military officials worried that it might be unduly provocative to call the targets “targets.” Instead they were referred to as “points of interest.”

军方官员担心，将这些目标称为“目标”可能会造成不适当的挑衅。于是，他们将其称为“兴趣点”。

U.S. intelligence and artillery helped Ukraine quickly turn the tide against the Russian invasion.

美国情报和火炮帮助乌克兰迅速扭转了俄罗斯入侵的势头。

In spring 2022, the Biden administration agreed to send High Mobility Artillery Systems, or HIMARS, which used satellite-guided rockets for strikes up to 50 miles distant.

2022年春，拜登政府同意向乌克兰输送高机动性火炮系统（即海马斯），该系统使用卫星制导火箭进行打击，射程可达80公里。

In the war’s first year, the Ukrainians were extremely dependent on the Americans for intelligence, and Task Force Dragon vetted and oversaw virtually every HIMARS strike.

在战争的第一年，乌克兰人极其依赖美国人提供的情报，“龙特遣队”几乎审查并监督了每一次海马斯攻击。

The strikes caused Russian casualty rates to soar, and Ukraine’s 2022 counteroffensive was largely successful: By December, the Ukrainians held an unlikely, David-versus-Goliath upper hand against their Russian foe.

这些攻击导致俄罗斯人的伤亡飙升，乌克兰在2022年的反攻也取得了显著成功：到12月，面对他们的俄罗斯敌人，乌克兰人出人意料地建立了“以弱胜强”的优势。

The Biden administration kept moving its red lines.

拜登政府不断移动红线。

From the first, administration officials sought to lay down a red line: America was not fighting Russia; it was helping Ukraine. Still, they worried that steps taken to accomplish that might provoke Mr. Putin to attack N.A.T.O. targets or perhaps make good on his nuclear threats. Even as the administration developed an ever-greater tolerance of risk to help Ukraine meet the evolving threat, many of the most potentially provocative steps were taken in secret.

从一开始，政府官员就试图划定红线：美国不是在与俄罗斯作战，而是在帮助乌克兰。尽管如此，他们还是担心，为实现这一目标而采取的措施可能会激怒普京，导致其攻击北约目标或兑现核威胁。尽管美国政府为帮助乌克兰应对不断变化的威胁而不断提高风险容忍度，许多最具潜在挑衅性的措施还是秘密进行的。

• Easing a prohibition against American boots on Ukrainian ground, Wiesbaden was allowed to put about a dozen military advisers in Kyiv. To avoid drawing public attention to their presence, the Pentagon initially called them “subject matter experts.” Later the team was expanded, to about three dozen, and the military advisers were eventually allowed to travel to Ukrainian command posts closer to the fighting.

· 美国军队驻扎乌克兰的禁令得到放宽，威斯巴登方面获准派遣大约12名军事顾问前往基辅。为了避免引起公众的注意，五角大楼最初称他们为“领域专家”。后来，这支团队扩大到大约三十人，军事顾问们最终被允许前往离战斗更近的乌克兰指挥部。

• In 2022, the U.S. Navy was authorized to share targeting information for Ukrainian drone strikes on warships just beyond the territorial waters of Russian-annexed Crimea. The C.I.A. was allowed to support Ukrainian operations within Crimean waters; that fall, the spy agency covertly helped Ukrainian drones strike Russian warships in the port of Sevastopol.

· 2022年，美国海军得到授权，可以分享情报供乌克兰无人机打击俄罗斯吞并的克里米亚领海之外的军舰。美国中央情报局获准支持乌克兰在克里米亚水域内的行动；那年秋天，该间谍机构暗中帮助乌克兰无人机袭击了塞瓦斯托波尔港的俄罗斯军舰。

• In January 2024, U.S. and Ukrainian military officers in Wiesbaden jointly planned a campaign — using coalition-supplied long-range missiles, along with Ukrainian drones — to attack about 100 Russian military targets across Crimea. The campaign, named Operation Lunar Hail, largely succeeded in forcing the Russians to pull equipment, facilities and forces in Crimea back to the Russian mainland.

· 2024年1月，美国和乌克兰军官在威斯巴登联合策划了一场行动——使用联军提供的远程导弹和乌克兰无人机——攻击克里米亚各地约100个俄罗斯军事目标。这次行动被命名为“月雹行动”，在很大程度上成功地迫使俄罗斯人将克里米亚的装备、设施和部队撤回俄罗斯本土。

Ultimately, the U.S. military and C.I.A. were allowed to help with strikes into Russia.

最终，美国军方和中情局获准协助对俄罗斯境内进行打击。

The hardest red line was the Russian border. But in spring 2024, to protect the northern city of Kharkiv against a Russian assault, the administration authorized the creation of an “ops box” — a zone of Russian territory within which U.S. officers in Wiesbaden could provide the Ukrainians with precise coordinates. The box’s first iteration extended across a wide swath of Ukraine’s northern border. The box was expanded after North Korea sent troops to help fight the Ukrainians’ incursion into Russia’s Kursk region. The U.S. military was later allowed to enable missile strikes in an area of southern Russia where the Russians staged forces and equipment for their offensive in eastern Ukraine.

最严格的红线是俄罗斯边界。但在2024年春季，为了保护北部城市哈尔科夫免受俄罗斯进攻，政府授权设立一个“作战区”——一个位于俄罗斯领土内的区域，威斯巴登的美国官员可以向乌克兰提供精确坐标。这个区域最初的范围覆盖了乌克兰北部边界的广阔地带。随着朝鲜派遣部队协助打击进入俄罗斯库尔斯克地区的乌克兰人，该区域进一步扩大。后来，美国军方获准支持对俄罗斯南部的一个地区进行导弹袭击，俄罗斯人在那里部署了进攻乌克兰东部的部队和装备。

Longstanding policy barred the C.I.A. from providing intelligence on targets on Russian soil. But the C.I.A. could request “variances,” carve-outs to support strikes for specific objectives. Intelligence had identified a vast munitions depot in Toropets, 290 miles north of the Ukrainian border. On Sept. 18, 2024, a swarm of drones slammed into the munitions depot. The blast, as powerful as a small earthquake, opened a crater the width of a football field. Later, the C.I.A. was allowed to enable Ukrainian drone strikes in southern Russia to try to slow advances in eastern Ukraine.

长期以来的政策禁止中情局提供关于俄罗斯境内目标的情报。但该机构可以申请“变通”，为特定目标的打击提供支持。情报显示，在距离乌克兰边界约470公里的托罗佩茨有一个巨大的军火库。2024年9月18日，一个无人机群撞进了这个军火库。爆炸的威力如同一次小型地震，炸出了一个足球场宽的深坑。后来，中情局获准支持乌克兰无人机在俄罗斯南部进行打击，试图减缓俄罗斯在乌克兰东部的进攻。

Political disagreements in Ukraine contributed to the 2023 counteroffensive’s collapse.

乌克兰的政治分歧导致了2023年反攻的失败。

The 2023 counteroffensive was meant to build momentum after the first year’s triumphs. But after the partners held war games in Wiesbaden and agreed on a strategy, the plan ran headlong into Ukrainian politics.

2023年反击战的目的是在第一年的胜利基础上再接再厉。但合作各方在威斯巴登举行兵棋推演并就战略达成一致后，该计划却因乌克兰政治局势而受到阻碍。

The Ukrainian armed forces chief, Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, embraced the plan, whose centerpiece was an assault in the direction of the southern city of Melitopol that would cut off Russian supply lines. But his rival and subordinate, Col. Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky, had his own plan — to impale Russian forces in the occupied eastern city of Bakhmut. The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, sided with him and divided up the ammunition and forces between two main fronts instead of one. The Ukrainians never did reclaim Bakhmut, and within months, the counteroffensive ended in failure. Russia now had the upper hand.

乌克兰武装部队总司令瓦列里·扎卢日尼将军支持这一计划，其核心是向南部城市梅利托波尔发起进攻，切断俄罗斯的补给线。但与他对立的下属亚历山大·西尔斯基上将有自己的计划——在被占领的东部城市巴赫穆特重创俄罗斯军队。乌克兰总统泽连斯基支持了西尔斯基的计划，将弹药和部队分别投入到两个主要战线，而非集中于一处。乌克兰最终未能收复巴赫穆特，几个月后，反攻以失败告终。俄罗斯此时占据了上风。