When former President Donald Trump began his trade war with China in 2018, imposing tariffs as high as 25 percent on about three-quarters of all Chinese imports, he had three goals: Slash the trade deficit, which is his measure of economic success, bring back jobs to the United States and pressure China to stop ripping off U.S. intellectual property.

特朗普前总统于2018年开始与中国的贸易战，对约四分之三的中国进口商品征收高达25%的关税，当时他有三个目标：大幅缩小贸易逆差——这是他衡量经济成功的标准；将就业机会带回美国；向中国施压，要求其停止窃取美国的知识产权。

On all those scores, the trade war flopped. Although the trade deficit with China initially shrank, it grew during the pandemic, as did the total trade deficit. A pickup in manufacturing jobs stalled in 2019 as higher tariffs kicked in. And the U.S. Trade Representative complained this year that Chinese firms continue to steal U.S. trade secrets “with impunity.”

从这几个层面看，贸易战是一场彻底的失败。尽管最初有所缩小，与中国的贸易逆差在疫情期间反而扩大了，贸易逆差总额也出现了增长。随着关税的提高，制造业就业的回升在2019年停滞不前。美国贸易代表今年抱怨说，中国公司继续“肆无忌惮地”窃取美国的商业机密。

The best Mr. Trump could say is that China suffered more than the United States because it’s more dependent on trade. U.S. imports of Chinese semiconductors, furniture and other goods facing tariffs fell, and industrial areas in China making tariffed goods showed signs of a slowdown.

特朗普最多只能说，中国比美国遭受的损失更大，因为它更依赖贸易。美国对中国半导体、家具和其他面临关税的商品的进口下降，中国制造关税商品的工业领域出现放缓迹象。

The trade war’s only real winners were countries where Chinese firms shifted production to avoid U.S. levies, particularly Vietnam. Between 2018 and 2022, Chinese investment in Vietnam roughly doubled and its exports to Vietnam rose 75 percent, to $147 billion, according to the consulting firm Kearney. During that same period U.S. imports from Vietnam nearly tripled, to $136 billion, as Chinese firms used the country as a toll-free highway to the American market. This shift, which the economists Davin Chor and Laura Alfaro call the “great reallocation,” still leaves the United States dependent on China.

贸易战中唯一真正的赢家是中国企业为避免美国征税而将生产转移去往的国家，尤其是越南。根据咨询公司科尔尼的数据，2018年至2022年间，中国在越南的投资大约翻了一番，对越南的出口增长了75%，达到1470亿美元。同一时期，美国从越南的进口几乎增加了两倍，达到1360亿美元，因为中国公司把越南作为通往美国市场的免费高速公路。这种被经济学家戴维·乔和劳拉·阿尔法罗称为“大规模重新分配”的转型，仍然使美国依赖中国。

If the next administration wants to buck this losing streak, it will have to rethink how it designs tariffs. And to deliver the greatest benefit to the U.S. economy it should move beyond the single-minded framework, embraced by both parties, of blocking investment from China and instead encourage the country’s technology leaders to set up operations in the United States, the way Japanese carmakers built American factories in the 1980s.

如果下届政府想要扭转这种颓势，就必须重新考虑如何设计关税。为了给美国经济带来最大利益，它应该超越两党都支持的阻止中国投资的单一框架，而是鼓励中国的技术领导者在美国开展业务，就像日本汽车制造商在20世纪80年代在美国建厂一样。

While Mr. Trump has said he wants to boost foreign investment, he has been silent on a role for China. Instead he is doubling down on his old strategy, promising tariffs of 60 percent or more on China and 10 percent or 20 percent on the rest of U.S. trading partners. Those numbers may change — Mr. Trump regularly tosses out different figures — but his goal is clear: “a ring around the collar” of the U.S. economy.

尽管特朗普曾表示希望增加外国投资，但他一直对中国在其中扮演何种角色保持沉默。相反，他在他的旧战略上加倍下注，承诺对中国征收60%或更高的关税，对美国其他贸易伙伴征收10%或20%的关税。这些数字可能会改变——特朗普经常抛出不同的数字——但他的目标很明确：给美国经济“戴上领圈”。

His new trade war plan has the same flaw as the old one: Tariffs are generally assessed on imports from countries where the goods are last assembled, no matter their origin, so goods that ship from Chinese-owned factories in, say, Vietnam are considered Vietnamese exports. And because tariffs on China would be set far higher than for any other country, Chinese firms would have a huge incentive to try this two-corner shot into the U.S. market.

他的新贸易战计划与旧计划有同样的缺陷：关税通常是对来自商品最后组装国的进口商品征收的，无论其原产地在哪里，因此，从中国在越南工厂发货的商品被视为越南的出口。而且由于对中国征收的关税远远高于对其他任何国家，中国企业将有巨大的动机以这种拐个弯的方式尝试进入美国市场。

Vietnam would stand to win again from a second Trump trade war since it has invested heavily to support an export economy. But Mexico would probably be No. 1. It has a free-trade pact with the United States, meaning that it could become a zero-tariff port into the country.

越南将再次从特朗普的第二次贸易战中获胜，因为它已经投入了大量资金来支持出口经济。但墨西哥可能会是第一名。它与美国签订了自由贸易协定，这意味着它可以成为进入美国的零关税港口。

Chinese firms are clearly getting ready. While China is a relatively small investor in Mexico, the official data doesn’t capture the increased activity. This year, the Chinese electric vehicle maker BYD sent a delegation to the Mexican State of Jalisco, where it’s considering building a factory, and met with Chinese suppliers there. Lingong Machinery Group is building a construction equipment plant in Nuevo Leon, reportedly part of a $5 billion investment.

中国企业显然在做准备。虽然中国在墨西哥的投资规模相对较小，但官方数据并没有将投资活动的增长体现出来。今年，中国电动汽车制造商比亚迪派出一个代表团前往墨西哥哈利斯科州，与当地的中国供应商会面。比亚迪正考虑在那里建厂。临工机械集团正在新莱昂州建设一座建筑设备厂，据报道，这是该集团50亿美元投资的一部分。

Trump officials point to his talk of slapping tariffs of 100 percent or more on Chinese cars built in Mexico and shipped to the United States as an example of how he would crack down on China’s tariff evasion. But this tactic isn’t scalable: Tracking the pathway of the more than $400 billion in goods that China ships to the United States would be a nightmare.

特朗普的官员指出，他曾表示要对在墨西哥制造并运往美国的中国汽车征收100%或更高的关税，以此作为他将打击中国逃避关税的例子。但这种策略是不可扩展的：要追踪中国运往美国的价值4000多亿美元商品的路径将是一场噩梦。

If America’s goal is to block Chinese goods — no matter where they are made — it needs a more sophisticated approach. The Biden administration says it’s taking one by applying new sky-high tariffs to only a handful of high-tech goods, such as semiconductors, batteries and electric vehicles, a concept the Harris campaign has endorsed. Even so, Democrats are closer to the Trump approach than they admit because they haven’t scrapped any of his China tariffs.

如果美国的目标是封锁中国商品——无论它们在哪里制造——它需要一个更复杂的方法。拜登政府表示，将只对半导体、电池和电动汽车等少数高科技产品征收新的高额关税，贺锦丽竞选团队支持这一概念。即便如此，民主党人比他们承认的更接近特朗普的做法，因为他们没有取消特朗普对中国征收的任何关税。

A more effective way of reducing dependence on China would be to focus tariffs on high-tech goods, and to waive them only if a very high percentage of such a good is made with non-Chinese parts, regardless of where it was assembled. That’s the tack the Trump administration took when it renegotiated NAFTA in 2018: To qualify for zero-tariff entry now, 75 percent of a car’s value must be made in North America.

减少对中国依赖的更有效的方式是将关税集中在高科技产品上，只有当此类产品中有很高比例使用非中国零部件制造时，才免除关税，无论这些产品在哪里组装的。这就是特朗普政府在2018年重新谈判《北美自由贸易协定》时采取的策略：现在，要获得零关税准入资格，汽车价值的75%必须在北美制造。

The Biden administration is examining different techniques, such as barring Chinese vehicles, especially E.V.s if the data they produce could be transmitted to Beijing, which the administration frames as a national security risk.

拜登政府正在研究不同的方法，比如禁止中国车辆，尤其是电动汽车，如果它们产生的数据可能被传输到北京，美国政府认为这是一种国家安全风险。

America’s larger goal, though, should be to outcompete Chinese goods, not merely to block them, which has a big downside: It reduces competition for U.S. firms and their incentive to innovate. That hurts U.S. consumers, who get lousier products, and makes U.S. exports less competitive.

然而，美国更大的目标应该是与中国商品竞争，而不仅仅是阻止它们，因此这种做法有一个很大的弊端：它减少了美国公司的竞争和创新的动力。这损害了美国消费者的利益，因为他们得到的是更差的产品，同时也降低了美国出口产品的竞争力。

In industries where Chinese firms are technological leaders, such as E.V.s and batteries, the United States shouldn’t ban China but copy it. China advanced economically by wooing investment from leading U.S. and European firms, learning their technology and production techniques and incorporating them into Chinese-made products.

在电动汽车和电池等中国企业处于技术领先地位的行业，美国不应该禁止中国，而应该效仿中国。中国通过吸引欧美领先企业的投资，学习他们的技术和生产工艺，并将其融入中国制造的产品中，从而取得了经济上的进步。

The United States could do the same. On a case-by-case basis it should encourage Chinese firms to invest in high-tech fields in the United States, with the stipulation that they bring advanced technology, hire American engineers and scientists to use that technology, and train American workers to produce the high-tech goods.

美国也可以这样做。美国应根据具体情况鼓励中国企业在美国的高科技领域进行投资，但前提是中国企业必须带来先进技术，聘请美国工程师和科学家使用这些技术，并培训美国工人生产高科技产品。

That’s essentially the strategy the United States is using now to persuade South Korean and Taiwanese semiconductor makers to build factories here, offering subsidies and tax breaks to foreign firms that will produce advanced chips domestically and train American workers.

这实际上是美国目前正在使用的策略，目的是说服韩国和台湾的半导体制造商在美国建厂，向那些在美国国内生产先进芯片并培训美国工人的外国公司提供补贴和税收减免。

Of course, there is a difference between a firm from South Korea, a military ally, and one from China, America’s biggest rival. Washington would have to carefully weigh the costs (increased dependence) and benefits (access to leading-edge technology) before approving Chinese investment, which has plunged in recent years as Beijing and Washington sought to decouple their economies.

当然，来自军事盟友韩国和美国最大竞争对手中国的公司是有区别的。在批准中国投资之前，华盛顿必须仔细权衡成本（增加依赖）和收益（获得前沿技术）。近年来，随着北京和华盛顿寻求经济脱钩，中国投资大幅下降。

But the United States makes a mistake when it aims mainly to bar Chinese investment and imports. As the first U.S.-China trade war shows, the strategy doesn’t work, except to enrich third countries. And it deprives the United States of Chinese expertise, often developed with a big helping hand from U.S. firms, that could now give America’s economy a boost.

但是，美国的主要目标是禁止中国的投资和进口，这就犯了一个错误。正如第一次美中贸易战所表明的那样，这一战略不起作用，只会有利第三国。它还剥夺了美国获得中国专业技术的机会，这些技术通常是在美国公司的大力帮助下发展起来的，现在可以给美国经济注入活力。