One day after 14 American 30,000-pound bombs thundered down on Iran, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry issued a typically florid public statement through its state-run media, claiming the United States had “violently trampled down the territorial integrity and security interests of a sovereign state.”

14枚3万磅重的美国炸弹呼啸着落在伊朗后第二天，朝鲜外务省通过其官方媒体发表了一份典型的堆砌辞藻的公开声明，声称美国“粗暴地践踏了一个主权国家的领土完整和安全利益”。

Unlike North Korea, Iran doesn’t yet have a nuclear weapon. But for North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, America’s airstrikes on Iran’s aspirational nuclear infrastructure must have reinforced what he has long held to be true: that possessing nuclear weapons is vital for his and his nation’s survival. Would the United States carry out such a brash, pre-emptive operation if Iran could credibly strike back with the bomb?

与朝鲜不同，伊朗还没有核武器。但对朝鲜领导人金正恩来说，被伊朗寄以厚望的核基础设施遭到美国空袭肯定强化了他长期以来的看法：拥有核武器对他和他的国家的生存至关重要。如果伊朗具备用核弹进行反击的可靠能力，美国还会采取如此强横的先发制人行动吗？

This calculus has been at the forefront of Mr. Kim’s mind since taking power from his father more than a decade ago. Nothing has diverted him from driving North Korea’s military, industrial and science communities to develop nuclear weapons and long-range missiles that put targets on the United States and its allies.

自十多年前从父亲手中接过政权以来，金正恩一直在盘算着这个问题。没有什么能阻止他推动朝鲜军事、工业和科学界发展核武器和远程导弹，将目标对准美国及其盟国。

And remarkably, he’s accomplished those tasks. Despite decades-long efforts by the United States and other world powers to persuade North Korea off the nuclear path, the small, isolated nation is estimated to have assembled around 50 warheads and produced enough fissile material for up to 40 more. Its arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles can very likely target every major U.S. city, and thousands of additional missiles are currently in range of U.S. military bases across the Asia-Pacific.

令人瞩目的是，他完成了这些任务。尽管美国和其他世界大国数十年来一直在努力劝说朝鲜放弃核道路，但这个孤立的小国据估计已经组装了大约50枚弹头，并生产了足够多的裂变材料，可以再生产40枚弹头。朝鲜的洲际弹道导弹武库很可能可以瞄准美国的所有主要城市，另外还有数以千计的导弹，目前射程已经覆盖美国在亚太地区的全部军事基地。

The internet is awash with photos of Mr. Kim observing missile tests, meeting with scientists designing those missiles and touring yawning complexes that produce bomb-grade atomic fuel. Mr. Kim wants the world to know that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, already formidable, is advancing each day.

互联网上充斥着金正恩观察导弹试验、与设计这些导弹的科学家会面以及参观生产炸弹级原子燃料的庞大建筑群的照片。金正恩希望全世界都知道，朝鲜的核武器计划已经非常强大，而且每天都在进步。

Unlike with Iran, President Trump is not threatening war to disarm North Korea. In fact, five months into his second term, he doesn’t seem to be paying much attention at all, even as Mr. Kim has grown stronger through new nuclear weapons, missiles and alliances. If the United States was unable to inflict irreversible damage to Iran’s nuclear program through airstrikes, as some early intelligence suggests, it’s difficult to imagine the sort of sustained campaign that would be needed to succeed in North Korea.

与伊朗不同，特朗普总统并没有威胁用战争来解除朝鲜的武装。事实上，他的第二任期已经开始五个月，但他似乎根本没花多少心思在这上面，即使金正恩已凭借新的核武器、导弹和联盟变得更加强大。如果美国无法通过空袭对伊朗的核计划造成不可逆的破坏（如一些早期情报所显示的那样），那么在朝鲜取得成功所需的那种持续行动也是很难想象的。

Now that the flurry of military activity to neutralize Iran’s nuclear ambitions has died down, the intractable problem of North Korea’s program looms even larger. There are no outward signs that a similar mission is being considered. And it shouldn’t be. Let’s think instead about a more promising way forward.

如今遏制伊朗核野心的一系列军事活动已经平息，朝鲜核计划的棘手问题就显得更加突出起来。目前还没有迹象表明有类似的任务正在考虑之中。也不应该考虑。让我们思考一下更值得期待的未来之路。

Mr. Kim has repeatedly made it clear that he has no intention of giving up the program, seeing it as essential to ensuring his family’s hold on power. But Republican and Democratic presidents alike have nevertheless spent a quarter-century seeking North Korea’s “complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization.” (In 2021, President Joe Biden invited talks with Pyongyang with no preconditions, but that offer went nowhere.) This year, Mr. Trump became the latest commander in chief to publicly commit to the unrealistic goal of getting Mr. Kim to abandon his program altogether.

金正恩曾多次明确表示，他无意放弃该计划，并将其视为确保其家族掌权的关键。然而，美国两党的总统依然用了四分之一个世纪来寻求朝鲜实现“完全、可核查和不可逆转的无核化”。（2021年，拜登总统邀请平壤举行没有先决条件的会谈，但这一提议不了了之。）今年，特朗普成为最新一位公开承诺让金正恩彻底放弃核计划这一不切实际目标的统帅。

America can no longer afford for its outdated denuclearization demands to be an obstacle to kick-starting diplomacy. Though Washington does not officially acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, the U.S. military already plans and conducts drills based on the fact that North Korea has a nuclear arsenal. Mr. Trump, himself, has publicly said on at least three occasions that it is a nuclear power. Acknowledging this as a diplomatic fact is a difficult decision, to be sure, but it is also necessary to achieve a breakthrough that can reduce tensions, avert unwanted war and prevent hundreds of new weapons from entering North Korea’s ever-growing arsenal.

美国不能再让过时的无核化要求成为启动外交的障碍。虽然美国没有正式承认朝鲜是拥核国家，但美国军方已经根据朝鲜拥有核武库的事实来计划和进行演习。特朗普本人也至少三次公开表示，朝鲜是一个核大国。诚然，承认这是一个外交事实是一个艰难的决定，但这也是实现突破的必要条件，这可以缓解紧张局势，避免不必要的战争，并防止数百件新武器进入朝鲜不断增长的武器库。

The Trump administration should draw up a diplomatic road map that would freeze North Korea’s fast-growing nuclear program in place in exchange for relief from the sanctions that have crippled the nation’s economy. The policy upheaval is almost certain to trigger backlash from South Korea and Japan, the U.S. allies most directly threatened by North Korea’s nuclear program, and stoke concerns among other nations for rewarding North Korea’s bad behavior. But a change in approach is necessary to begin managing the mounting risks.

特朗普政府应该制定一份外交路线图，冻结朝鲜快速发展的核计划，以换取减轻对朝鲜经济的制裁。这一政策变动几乎肯定会引发韩国和日本的强烈反对，这两个国家是美国的盟友，受到朝鲜核计划最直接的威胁，同时也会引发其他国家对“奖励朝鲜恶行”的担忧。但要开始管理不断增加的风险，就必须改变做法。

To understand the scope and sprawl of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, The Times examined dozens of commercial satellite and state-issued propaganda images collected by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. Based on these images, it is hard to envision how Mr. Kim’s multibillion-dollar, yearslong investment in his nuclear and missile complex — spread across 28 sites, with likely many others underground — can ever be entirely dismantled. Acknowledging that reality, and getting Mr. Kim back to the negotiating table, is the only way to contain the growing threat that North Korea poses.

为了了解朝鲜核武器计划的范围和规模，时报研究了明德大学詹姆斯·马丁防扩散研究中心收集的数十幅商业卫星和国家发行的宣传图片。根据这些图片，我们很难想象金正恩耗资数十亿美元、耗时数年的核与导弹综合体（分布在28个地点，可能还有许多地下场所）可以怎样被完全拆除。承认这一现实、让金正恩回到谈判桌前，这是遏制朝鲜日益增长的威胁的唯一途径。

If the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results, then Washington’s approach to North Korea certainly meets that mark. The United States has never had formal diplomatic relations with Pyongyang, a policy that no longer makes sense with thousands of centrifuges spinning in North Korea all day, every day. If nothing is done, North Korea’s stockpile will continue to grow, narrowing its gap with the eight other nuclear powers.

如果疯狂的定义是一再地做同样的事情却期待不同的结果，那么华盛顿对待朝鲜的方式无疑符合这一标准。美国从未与平壤建立过正式外交关系，鉴于朝鲜每天都有数以千计的离心机在运转，这种政策已不再有意义。如果不采取任何措施，朝鲜的核武库将继续增长，从而缩小与其他八个核大国的差距。

朝鲜已将其核工业存在扩大到全国。

Yongbyon

宁边

The focus of every denuclearization proposal that the United States has made to North Korea has included the complex at Yongbyon. Comprising hundreds of buildings peppered across about 10 square miles of low-lying hills, the Yongbyon nuclear complex produces North Korea’s plutonium, along with highly enriched uranium and tritium — all materials necessary to make thermonuclear weapons.

美国向朝鲜提出的每一项无核化建议的重点都包括宁边的核设施。宁边核设施由数百座建筑组成，分布在约2600公顷的低洼丘陵地带，生产钚、高浓缩铀和氚——制造热核武器所需的所有材料。

Source: Image via Planet Labs, analysis by the Open Source Team at the Middlebury Institute

Initial construction began at Yongbyon in the 1960s following an atomic energy agreement with the Soviet Union. In 1991, North Korea lost its largest benefactor when the Soviet Union dissolved; the United States subsequently withdrew all its nuclear weapons deployed to South Korea. North and South Korea signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which led to the term “denuclearization” being ensconced in the political lexicon.

20世纪60年代，在与苏联达成原子能协议后，宁边核设施开始了建设。1991年，苏联解体，朝鲜失去了最大的资助者；美国随后撤回了部署在韩国的所有核武器。朝韩签署了《朝鲜半岛无核化共同宣言》，“无核化”一词由此进入了政治词汇。The Federation of American Scientists, a Washington-based nonprofit, estimated in 2024 that North Korea had produced up to 4,000 pounds of highly enriched uranium and 178 pounds of plutonium. The country can potentially make enough material to build half a dozen new weapons annually.

据总部位于华盛顿的非营利组织美国科学家联合会在2024年的估计，朝鲜已经生产了多达约1800公斤高浓缩铀和80公斤钚。该国每年有可能生产出足够制造六件新武器的材料。

Emboldened by advancements in weapons production, Mr. Kim first said in 2021 that he would expand his weapons program beyond city-busting hydrogen bombs to start building smaller-yield “tactical” nuclear warheads that are designed to fit on short-range missiles for regional targets. He has since said he’s developed enough of the smaller warheads, which are designed to be mounted on at least eight delivery systems, including a submarine drone.

由于武器生产的进步，金正恩在2021年首次表示，他将扩大武器计划，不再局限于摧毁城市的氢弹，而是开始制造当量较小的“战术”核弹头，这些弹头可安装在短程导弹上，用于攻击地区目标。他后来表示，他已经开发出足够多的小型弹头，设计用于安装在至少八个运载系统上，包括一种无人潜航器。

Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site

丰溪里核试验场

After U.S. military forces invaded Iraq and deposed Saddam Hussein in 2003, North Korea pushed ahead with its missile and nuclear programs. In Pyongyang, the invasion was seen as a grim warning: Mr. Hussein didn’t have the bomb and he lost his power, then, ultimately, his life. North Korea wouldn’t make the same mistake.

2003年美国军队入侵伊拉克并推翻萨达姆·侯赛因后，朝鲜继续推进其导弹和核项目。在平壤，入侵被视为一个严峻的警告：侯赛因没有核弹失去了权力，最终失去了生命。朝鲜不会重蹈覆辙。

Its first nuclear weapon test took place underground in 2006 at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site in the country’s mountainous northeast, making North Korea the first and only nation to test a nuclear weapon since all other nations stopped doing so nearly a decade earlier.

2006年，朝鲜在位于该国东北部山区的丰溪里核试验场进行了首次地下核武器试验，成为自近十年前所有其他国家停止核武器试验以来第一个也是唯一一个进行核武器试验的国家。

The detonation, which was picked up by seismic and radiation sensors around the world, sent the international community in a tailspin. World leaders subsequently persuaded North Korea in 2007 to again agree to shut down a reactor at Yongbyon and invite International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors into the country for verification. It did both, but after diplomatic efforts later collapsed, inspections were no longer allowed and the reactor was restarted.

这次爆炸被世界各地的地震和辐射传感器捕捉到，使国际社会为之震惊。随后，世界各国领导人在2007年说服朝鲜再次同意关闭宁边的一座反应堆，并邀请国际原子能机构核查人员进入朝鲜进行核查。朝鲜两件事都做了，但在外交努力失败后，朝鲜不再允许核查，反应堆重新启动。

Source: Image via Planet Labs, analysis by the Open Source Team at the Middlebury Institute

North Korea has since tested five more devices at the site, and America’s director of national intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, said in March that Mr. Kim was very likely preparing for another one. In 2018, parts of the site were blown up in an apparent show of good faith before a planned summit with Mr. Trump. The summit was canceled, and today, Middlebury analysis shows that North Korea has rebuilt the buildings and a tunnel entrance that were destroyed.

此后，朝鲜又在该试验场测试了五个装置，美国国家情报总监图尔西·加巴德3月表示，金正恩很可能正在准备另一个装置。2018年，在计划与特朗普举行峰会之前，朝鲜炸毁了该场址的部分设施，显然是为了表示诚意。后来，峰会被取消，今天，明德大学的分析显示，朝鲜已经重建了被摧毁的建筑物和隧道入口。North Korea’s emerging strategic partnership marks one of the biggest opportunities for Pyongyang since the Cold War. For most of North Korea’s existence, China has been its staunchest ally. Beijing sent military forces to fight against the United States in the Korean War, and it has been its strongest trade partner and benefactor.

朝鲜正在形成的战略伙伴关系标志着平壤自冷战以来最大的机会之一。在朝鲜存在的大部分时间里，中国一直是其最坚定的盟友。在朝鲜战争中，北京曾派出军队与美国作战，并且一直是朝鲜最强大的贸易伙伴和捐助者。

Last June, Pyongyang signed a mutual defense pact with Russia. Analysts believe Moscow is already providing North Korea with hard-won expertise on missile technology, helping it improve manufacturing practices, produce lightweight composite materials and capture performance data from missiles used on the Ukrainian battlefield. There are even recent reports that Russia is lending its assistance to North Korea’s nuclear submarine program.

去年6月，平壤与俄罗斯签署了共同防御条约。分析人士认为，莫斯科已经在向朝鲜提供来之不易的导弹技术专业知识，帮助朝鲜改进制造工艺，生产轻质复合材料，并从乌克兰战场上使用的导弹中获取性能数据。最近甚至有报道称，俄罗斯正在协助朝鲜的核潜艇项目。

Sohae

西海

Although North Korea built and tested missiles under Mr. Kim’s father and grandfather, it wasn’t until the younger Kim took over in 2011 that the program matured after hundreds of tests. Many missile components are tested at Sohae Satellite Launching Station, located alongside the Yellow Sea, about 50 miles from Yongbyon.

虽然朝鲜在金正恩的父亲和祖父领导下建造并测试了导弹，但直到年轻的金正恩于2011年接手后，经过数百次测试，朝鲜的导弹项目才逐渐成熟起来。许多导弹部件都在西海卫星发射站进行测试，该发射站位于黄海沿岸，距离宁边约80公里。

The military is now armed with all manner of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonic delivery systems and large solid-propellant ICBMs that can be driven on a mobile launcher into a remote area and launched with no warning. Many land in the Sea of Japan, where fishing and shipping lanes separate North Korea and Japan, and some have even flown over parts of Japan.

朝鲜军队现在装备了各种各样的弹道导弹、巡航导弹、高超音速投送系统和大型固体推进剂洲际弹道导弹，这些导弹可以用移动发射车机动到偏远地区，并在没有警告的情况下发射。许多导弹落在日本海，那里的捕鱼和航道将朝鲜和日本分开，有些导弹甚至飞越了日本部分地区。

The missile tests are carried out at a variety of sites across the country, including Sohae, which Middlebury analysis shows has been expanding in recent years.

导弹试验在朝鲜全国各地的不同地点进行，包括西海，明德大学分析显示，近年来西海的试验规模一直在扩大。

Mr. Kim’s pace of testing brought Washington and Pyongyang to the brink of war in 2017 during Mr. Trump’s first term, when he threatened to unleash “fire and fury” on North Korea. The heightened tensions ultimately led to a brief détente between the countries, when, for the first time, an American president and a North Korean leader spoke directly.

2017年，在特朗普的第一个任期内，金正恩的试验速度使华盛顿和平壤走到了战争的边缘，当时特朗普威胁要对朝鲜释放“火与怒”。紧张局势的加剧最终导致两国之间出现短暂的缓和，美国总统和朝鲜领导人首次直接对话。

Three meetings between Mr. Trump and Mr. Kim in 2018 and 2019 — as the pair exchanged love letters — that many hoped would slow down North Korea’s nuclear program ended in disappointment due in large part to hasty planning and the United States’ continued insistence on denuclearization. Mr. Kim held back from missile tests in 2018 and launched just a handful in 2020 and 2021, but the pace picked back up in 2022. In the past few years, under the Biden administration, Pyongyang test-fired more missiles than ever before while also revealing an array of new weapons.

2018年和2019年，特朗普和金正恩会晤了三次，两人互送秋波，许多人希望这些会晤能减缓朝鲜核计划的进展，但最终还是以失望收场，这在很大程度上是由于计划仓促和美国继续坚持朝鲜无核化。金正恩在2018年暂缓了导弹试射，在2020年和2021年仅发射了少量导弹，但在2022年又加快了步伐。过去几年，在拜登政府时期，平壤试射的导弹数量超过以往任何时候，同时还展示了一系列新武器。

So what do we know about North Korea’s nuclear weapons program? We know that its nuclear program’s infrastructure is vast. We know its weapons work. We know its missiles work. Why wouldn’t the United States negotiate to obtain better insight and open communication channels to help shape Mr. Kim’s choices in a potential crisis?

那么，我们对朝鲜的核武器计划了解多少呢？我们知道，朝鲜核计划的基础设施非常庞大。我们知道它的武器可以使用。我们知道它的导弹可以使用。美国为何不通过谈判获得更深入的了解，并开放沟通渠道，影响金正恩在潜在危机中的选择？

Pursuing diplomacy with North Korea won’t be universally popular. The regime is far from admirable. It has, among other things, advanced its military capabilities at the expense of its starving and impoverished population. But the looming nuclear threat is now so severe that joint U.S.-South Korea exercises in April involved nuclear weapon effects scenarios. It’s wise that they do, considering U.S. intelligence says North Korea could use a nuclear weapon early in a conflict to make up for its deficit in conventional capabilities.

寻求与朝鲜的外交途径不会受到普遍欢迎。这远不是一个值得敬仰的政权。别的且不说，它会以饥饿和贫困的人民为代价提高自己军事能力。但现在核威胁是如此迫在眉睫，以至于美韩在4月的联合演习中涉及了核武器影响的场景。考虑到美国情报部门称朝鲜可能会在冲突初期使用核武器来弥补其常规能力的不足，这样做是明智的。

It makes sense for the Trump administration to shift toward a strategy that aims to contain escalation rather than keep a white-knuckled grip on a failed policy. South Korea bristled when Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth referred to North Korea’s “status as a nuclear power” during the confirmation process on his nomination. It was virtually the same language Mr. Trump offhandedly used when talking to the media. (The White House later walked the comments back.)

特朗普政府应该转向一种旨在遏制事态升级的战略，而不是抓住一项失败的政策不放手。当国防部长皮特·海格塞斯在提名确认听证中提到朝鲜的“核大国地位”时，韩国感到愤怒。而这与特朗普在接受媒体采访时不假思索地使用的语言几乎相同。（白宫后来收回了这一言论。）

But common sense must prevail. No nation armed with an arsenal of this size has ever given it up — other than former Soviet nations, which didn’t control the weapons on their territories. Every president since Bill Clinton has missed an opportunity to rein in North Korea’s nuclear ambitions because of denuclearization’s all-or-nothing approach. Mr. Trump should not allow the shackles of the past to hobble his administration when there are more sensible strategies available to shape a more promising future.

但常识必须占上风。没有任何国家放弃过如此规模的武器库——除了那些无法控制其境内武器的前苏联国家。自克林顿以来的每一位美国总统都因为“非黑即白”的无核化方针而错失了遏制朝鲜核野心的机会。特朗普不应该让过去束缚自己的政府，因为还有更明智的战略，可以塑造一个更有希望的未来。