For nearly two decades, Israel avoided all-out war with its biggest enemies.

近20年里，以色列始终避免与最大的敌人发生全面战争。

It fought contained conflicts with Hamas, but ultimately allowed the group to retain power in Gaza. It maintained an uneasy calm with the Lebanese militia Hezbollah, even as its fighters entrenched themselves in southern Lebanon. And despite planning a major assault on Iran, it limited its attacks to smaller, clandestine operations.

虽然以色列与哈马斯发生过有节制的冲突，但最终仍容其掌控加沙地带。尽管黎巴嫩民兵组织真主党的武装人员在黎巴嫩南部扎下了根，以色列仍与其维持着一种不稳定的平静。尽管以色列有对伊朗发动大规模打击的计划，但以前的打击仅限于小规模的秘密行动。

Israel’s massive, ongoing assault on Iran highlights an extraordinary shift in Israeli military doctrine since Hamas, Iran’s Palestinian ally, attacked the country in October 2023. It is a change that has redrawn the power dynamics in the Middle East, unraveled Iran’s regional alliance and enshrined Israel as the dominant military force in the region.

此次以色列对伊朗发动大规模持续打击，标志着自伊朗在巴勒斯坦的盟友哈马斯2023年10月袭击以色列以来，以色列军事战略发生重大转变。这一转变重塑了中东地区的权力格局，瓦解了伊朗的区域联盟，并让以色列成为在该地区占支配地位的军事力量。

Having given Hamas years to prepare for the Oct. 7 attack, Israel reversed course afterward to unleash one of the most destructive campaigns in recent warfare. It then assassinated most of Hezbollah’s leadership and decimated large parts of southern Lebanon. Now, in Iran, it is carrying out the kind of broad and brazen attack that it long threatened but never dared to enact.

在给了哈马斯多年时间为10月7日的袭击做准备后，以色列改变了行动方式，发动了近年来最具毁灭性的军事行动。以色列在那之后还暗杀了真主党的大部分领导层，摧毁了黎巴嫩南部的大片地区。如今在伊朗境内，以色列正在实施它长期威胁却从未敢落实的大胆全面攻击。

“We are changing the face of the Middle East,” said Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel during a press briefing on Monday. “And this could lead to far-reaching changes within Iran itself,” he added.

“我们正在改变中东的面貌，”以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡在周一的新闻发布会上说。“这会导致伊朗内部发生影响深远的变化，”他还说。

For now, that second claim remains unproven. The Israeli military campaign has weakened Iran, but it has not yet destroyed the country’s nuclear program or collapsed its government, and it may still fall short of both. The war could also devolve into an intractable quagmire with no exit strategy or offramp.

就目前而言，他的第二个宣言还没有得到验证。虽然以色列的军事行动已削弱了伊朗，但还没有摧毁该国的核项目，也未颠覆其政权，而且与实现这两个目标仍有很大距离。这场战争还可能陷入一个难以脱身的泥潭。

伊朗人在德黑兰的加油站排队，摄于周一。

Mr. Netanyahu’s broader point is harder to contradict. Hamas is no longer a threat to Israel. Hezbollah’s influence over Lebanon — let alone the danger it poses to Israelis — is much diminished. The government in Syria, a pillar of Iran’s regional alliance, was overthrown last December, in part because Hezbollah could no longer come to its aid.

内塔尼亚胡的更广泛论点难以辩驳。哈马斯不再对以色列构成威胁。真主党对黎巴嫩的影响已大大减弱，更不用说给以色列人带来的危险。叙利亚政府已在去年12月被推翻，它曾是伊朗在该地区联盟的中流砥柱，这在一定程度上是因为真主党无法再为其提供援助。

These tectonic shifts also speak to a vast change within the Israeli psyche and strategic outlook since Hamas’s attack in October 2023.

这些结构性的变化也反映了自2023年10月哈马斯袭击以来以色列人在心理和战略观念上的巨大变化。

For Israel’s critics, the attack was the inevitable consequence of the country’s blockade of Gaza, occupation of the West Bank, and failure to resolve the Palestinian conflict through diplomatic concessions. Many Israelis have drawn the opposite conclusion: They believe that the October attack — the deadliest in Israeli history — stemmed from Israel’s failure to pre-emptively and decisively defeat its enemies.

在以色列的批评者眼里，那次袭击是以色列封锁加沙、占领西岸，以及未能通过在外交上做出让步解决巴勒斯坦冲突的必然结果。但许多以色列人却得出了相反的结论：他们认为，发生10月份那次以色利历史上最惨烈袭击的原因是，以色列未能先发制人、果断地打垮敌人。

“In the 20 years before Oct. 7, we allowed threats to develop beyond our borders, trusting that our intelligence would give us prior warnings of any attack,” said Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin, a former head of Israeli military intelligence.

“在10月7日以前的20年里，我们任由境外的威胁增长，相信我们的情报部门会在袭击发生前向我们预警，”曾任以色列军事情报部门负责人的阿莫斯·亚德林少将说。

“The trauma of Oct. 7 completely changed that mind-set and made us willing to take risks that we didn’t take in the past,” General Yadlin said. “We will no longer wait to be attacked, and we will not wait to be surprised.”

“10月7日的创伤彻底扭转了我们的思维模式，让我们愿意承担过去未曾冒过的风险，”亚德林说。“我们不会再等着被袭，也不会再等着被打个措手不及。”

The approach echoes Israel’s strategic outlook in the early decades of its existence, when it often acted more swiftly and decisively to remove threats on its borders, General Yadlin said. The clearest example was in June 1967, when Israel pre-emptively attacked Egypt after the Egyptian military moved troops toward the Israeli border.

亚德林说，这种做法与以色列建国最初几十年的战略观如出一辙，即以更迅速果断的行动消除边界上的威胁。最明显的例子是1967年6月，当时埃及军队向以色列边境调动部队，以色列对埃及实施了先发制人的打击。

1967年6月，以色列战斗机飞越埃及西奈半岛。以色列目前在中东地区采取的策略与它在建国最初几十年的战略如出一辙：以更迅速果断的行动消除边界上的威胁。

“As Egypt massed troops on our southern border, we did not wait to be surprised,” General Yadlin said. “Now, we are reviving that doctrine.”

“当埃及在我们南部边境集结军队的时候，我们没有坐等突袭，”亚德林说。“现在，我们正在复兴这一信条。”

Israel’s new approach is the culmination of months of re-evaluation, during which the military’s confidence — crushed by the failures of Oct. 7 — was gradually restored.

以色列的新策略是数月来重新评估的最终结果，在此期间，军方因10月7日失败而遭受重创的信心逐渐得到恢复。

While Israel’s approach to Hamas was immediately wrathful, the country was initially wary of taking on Hezbollah and Iran. Mr. Netanyahu called off a pre-emptive attack on Hezbollah in the first week of the war in 2023, amid fears that Israel would struggle to maintain a multi-front war against the Iran-led alliance.

虽然以色列对哈马斯立即采取了雷霆手段，但它最初对于同时跟真主党和伊朗交手持谨慎态度。内塔尼亚胡在2023年战争的第一周取消了对真主党的先发制人攻击，因为担忧以色列难以维持针对伊朗领导的联盟的多线作战。

For nearly a year, Israel fought only a low-level border conflict with Hezbollah. Despite increasing clashes with Tehran in 2024, Israel limited its strikes on Iran to avoid an all-out conflict.

此后的近一年里，以色列与真主党只发生了低级别的边境冲突。尽管与德黑兰的冲突在2024年有所加剧，但以色列对伊朗坚持有限打击，以避免全面冲突。

Israel’s approach began to change last September, when a sequence of unexpected moves allowed Israel to decimate much of Hezbollah’s senior leadership.

去年9月，以色列的策略开始转变，当时一系列意想不到的行动使以色列得以重创真主党高层。

That increased Israel’s confidence and prompted its leaders to order a more decisive assault on the group. Troops invaded southern Lebanon and the air force killed Hezbollah’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah.

这一胜利增强了以色列的信心，促使它的领导人下令对该组织进行更果断的攻击。军队入侵黎巴嫩南部，空军击毙了真主党领导人哈桑·纳斯鲁拉。

Israel then severely weakened Iran’s air defense systems and successfully repelled massive barrages of Iranian missiles, giving Israel greater confidence in its offensive and defensive abilities. More than a year after Oct. 7, Israeli leaders finally concluded that they had a rare window of opportunity to mount a decisive blow against Iran’s nuclear program.

随后，以色列严重削弱了伊朗的防空系统，并成功拦截伊朗的大量导弹，使以色列对自己的进攻和防御能力更有信心。10月7日的袭击过去一年多后，以色列领导人终于得出结论，他们迎来一个难得的机会窗口，可以对伊朗的核计划进行决定性的打击。

周日，德黑兰西部一处储油设施遭到以色列空袭。

Though Israel’s new approach has undercut Iran’s regional influence, it has done little to resolve Israel’s oldest and most intractable problem: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

尽管以色列的新策略削弱了伊朗的地区影响力，但它对解决以色列最久远、最棘手的问题——巴以冲突方面却没有太大帮助。

In Gaza, Israel’s retaliation has led to widespread destruction and bloodshed, reinstating a fearsome sense of Israeli might and reducing Hamas’s threat for a generation.

在加沙，以色列的报复行动导致了大范围的破坏和流血，使人们重新认识到以色列的可怕威力，也使得哈马斯在未来一代人时间内难以构成威胁。

But the conflict has provided no clear long-term trajectory for either Gaza or the wider Palestinian question. Mr. Netanyahu has consistently ignored opportunities to end the war, balking at the idea of either leaving Hamas’s remnants in charge or allowing other Palestinian groups to take over.

但这场冲突并未为加沙或更广泛的巴勒斯坦问题指明清晰的长期方向。内塔尼亚胡屡次错失结束战争的机会，既不愿让哈马斯的残余势力继续掌权，也不愿让其他巴勒斯坦组织接手。

“Instead, we are left with only bad options,” said Tzipi Livni, a former Israeli foreign minister. “Either occupation or chaos, rather than a diplomatic process involving moderate regional and Palestinian stakeholders that could change the reality on the ground for both Palestinians and Israelis.”

“相反，我们只剩下糟糕的选择，”以色列前外交部长齐皮·利夫尼说。“要么是占领，要么是混乱，而不是一个能改变巴以现实的外交进程——该进程本应包括温和的地区国家以及巴勒斯坦各方。”

A similarly aimless dynamic could yet emerge in Iran, analysts said, if the Israeli leadership fails to clearly define its goals there and set an exit strategy.

分析人士指出，如果以色列领导层不能明确其在伊朗的目标并制定退出战略，类似的盲目态势也可能在伊朗问题上重演。

For now, Israeli officials hope the United States will join the attack and help Israel destroy Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities. If the United States stays away, and if Iran refuses to stop the enrichment by choice, it is unclear whether Israel’s forceful new doctrine will achieve the kind of game-changing outcomes that many Israelis desire.

目前，以色列官员希望美国加入打击行动，帮助以色列摧毁伊朗的核浓缩设施。如果美国选择置身事外，而伊朗又拒绝主动停止铀浓缩活动，那么以色列的强硬新策略能否实现许多以色列人所希望的那种改变游戏规则的结果，这一点尚不明朗。

“One wonders whether effective military performance is matched by a sober political vision,” said Nimrod Novik, a former senior Israeli official and a fellow at Israel Policy Forum, a research group in New York. “Or, like in Gaza, we are left without an endgame. Time will tell.”

“人们不禁要问，出色的军事表现是否有清醒的政治愿景来匹配，”前以色列高级官员、纽约研究机构以色列政策论坛研究员尼姆罗德·诺维克说。“或者，就像在加沙一样，我们没有一个终局。时间会给出答案。”