When President Xi Jinping presided over an enormous exhibit of China’s military might in Beijing on Wednesday, there were more than fighter jets and missiles on display.

当习近平主席上周三主持一场展示中国强大军力的盛大阅兵时，亮相的不仅仅是战斗机和导弹。

Mr. Xi, flanked by the leaders of Russia, Iran and North Korea, was signaling to the world that a viable alternative to U.S. leadership exists. That China, in alignment with these other states, could upend the existing international order and resist the current system’s chief architect, the United States.

在俄罗斯、伊朗和朝鲜领导人的簇拥下，习近平向世界释发出了信号：美国的领导地位已有可行的替代之选。中国与这些国家结盟，可以颠覆现有的国际秩序，对抗该体系的主要设计者——美国。

The show of unity may have seemed remarkable to some, given that just over two months ago some observers dismissed the understanding between the four — what we have called the “axis of upheaval” — as either dead or overblown from the beginning. In June Russia, China and North Korea had more or less stood by as Iran endured 12 days of punishing war at the hands of Israel and the United States, issuing statements condemning the attacks but little else.

对一些人来说，这种团结秀可能显得非同寻常，因为就在两个多月前，一些观察人士还认为这四个国家之间的共识——我们称之为“动荡轴心”——要么已经瓦解，要么从一开始就被夸大了。6月，当伊朗遭受以色列和美国长达12天的严厉军事打击时，俄罗斯、中国和朝鲜或多或少采取了袖手旁观的态度，除了发表声明谴责攻击外，鲜见其他行动。

But to dismiss the axis on these terms is to misunderstand what it truly is: an alignment of four countries that, despite vast differences, see a common adversary in the United States. Though they may occasionally come to one another’s aid — like the North Korean soldiers who joined their Russian allies in battle against Ukrainian forces — that is not the point. The group has a much more ambitious objective. It seeks, like the World War II era Axis Powers of Germany, Italy and Japan, “a new order of things,” in which each country can claim “its own proper place.” Discontented with an international system they believe denies them the status and freedom of action they deserve by virtue of their power and civilizations, they are united in the desire to change it.

但若以此来否定这一轴心，就误解了它的本质：这是四个尽管存在巨大差异，但都与美国为敌的国家形成的结盟关系。它们偶尔会相互援助，比如朝鲜军人和盟友俄罗斯一道，与乌克兰军队作战，但这并非它们结盟的重点。这个集团有更宏大的目标。就像“二战”时期的德意日轴心国一样，它追求的是“一种新秩序”，让每个国家都能获得“应有的地位”。它们对现行的国际体系不满，认为这个体系剥夺了他们以自身实力和文明程度本应享有的地位和行动自由，因此它们要联合起来，希望改变这个体系。

Already, cooperation among the four has strengthened the military capabilities of America’s adversaries while weakening the foreign policy tools that Washington can wield to confront them. Nowhere has their impact been more apparent than in Ukraine, where China, Iran and North Korea have enabled the Kremlin to sustain its war and better withstand international pressure. The axis countries are likely to continue to cultivate their economic and technological ties to improve their ability to bypass U.S. and allied sanctions and export controls while offering third countries alternatives to dependence on America’s market, banks and currency.

四国之间的合作已经增强了美国对手的军事实力，同时削弱了华盛顿可以用来对抗它们的外交政策工具。这一点在乌克兰战争中表现得最为明显，中国、伊朗和朝鲜使克里姆林宫能够维持战争，并更好地承受了国际压力。这些轴心国可能会继续培养它们的经济和技术联系，以提高绕过美国及盟友制裁和出口管制的能力，同时为第三国提供替代选择，减少对美国市场、银行和货币的依赖。

It is the military impact of the ties between them that is bound to be most consequential. These countries are sharing military technology and know-how in ways that allow them to narrow America’s military edge. Their cooperation could shorten the time it would take Russia to reconstitute its conventional forces in any pause in the war in Ukraine, by supplying ammunition or the component parts Moscow needs to manufacture more weapons faster. This could create a window of vulnerability for NATO if Russia can rebuild faster than Europe can ramp up its capabilities. Axis cooperation also complicates the picture for U.S. and allied defense planners who can no longer assume that any one of these countries would fight alone, either because one or more of these countries provides military aid and weapons or, less likely, fighters. And there is also a risk that they could initiate concurrent crises in an explicitly coordinated or opportunistic manner, overstretching U.S. bandwidth and capabilities.

最为深远的则是它们之间的军事联系产生的影响。这些国家通过共享军事技术与专业知识，不断削弱美国的军事优势。通过提供弹药或莫斯科制造更多武器所需的零部件，它们的合作可能缩短俄罗斯在乌克兰战争暂停期间重建常规部队所需的时间。如果俄罗斯的军力速度超过欧洲提升自身能力的速度，这可能给北约造成一个脆弱的窗口期。这些轴心国之间的合作也使美国及其盟友的防御规划变得更加复杂，后者不能再假设这些国家会单打独斗，因为其中一个或多个国家可能会提供军事援助和武器，甚至派遣战斗人员——尽管可能性较小。此外，还存在一种风险，即四国可能以明确协调或抓住机会同时挑起多场危机，从而让美国的应对能力不堪重负。

Indeed, the gathering in Beijing suggests that the axis, rather than withering following the war in Iran in June, has momentum. Its members sense an opportunity. The Trump administration is riling America’s longtime allies and partners, closing off access to its market, withdrawing humanitarian aid and development assistance, ceasing international broadcasting and democracy support, and explicitly declining to play its longtime global leadership role. For Mr. Xi, Vladimir Putin of Russia and others, there may never be a better moment to challenge the U.S.-led global system and hasten American retrenchment.

此次北京会晤恰恰表明，这个轴心非但未因6月伊朗境内的战事受挫，反而呈现扩张态势。其成员国看到了机会。特朗普政府正在激怒美国的长期盟友和伙伴，关闭市场准入，撤回人道主义援助和发展支持，停止国际广播以及对民主的支持，更公开放弃长期担当的全球领导角色。对习近平、俄罗斯的普京等人来说，或许再没有比现在更好的时机来挑战美国主导的全球体系，并加速美国的收缩了。

That President Masoud Pezeshkian of Iran was included in the gathering certainly suggests it is too soon to assume Iran is sidelined. Although it was weakened by the U.S. and Israeli strikes, China, Russia and North Korea are likely to see value in helping Iran to reconstitute its capacity to antagonize the United States.

伊朗总统佩泽什基安此次获邀与会，这充分说明现在就断言伊朗遭边缘化为时过早。尽管伊朗因美国和以色列的打击被削弱，中俄朝三国仍看重助其恢复反美能力的战略价值。

The Trump administration is well aware of the challenge the axis poses. Its solution, so far, has been one that aims to improve relations with Russia under the assumption that by doing so, it can draw Moscow away from its other backers. Ending the war in Ukraine in a way that allows for a better relationship with Russia would seem to be their first step.

特朗普政府非常清楚这个轴心所带来的挑战。迄今为止，特朗普政府的解决方案是试图改善与俄罗斯的关系，假设通过这样做可以拉拢莫斯科，使其疏远其他支持者。以实现美俄关系改善的方式结束乌克兰战争，这似乎是设想的第一步。

But another attempt to reset relations with Russia is not only bound to fail — as it has before — but also exacerbate the problem. The Kremlin will not abandon its view of Washington as the key impediment to Moscow’s aims, and Mr. Putin is unlikely to believe that a single U.S. president can undo, in any long-term way, decades of U.S. foreign policy toward Russia.

但再次尝试重启与俄罗斯的关系注定会失败——正如以往一样——而且只会让问题恶化。克里姆林宫绝不会放弃将华盛顿视为莫斯科实现目标的主要障碍这一立场，而且普京也不太可能相信，一个美国总统能从长远层面改变美国数十年来的对俄外交政策。

Efforts to lure China are likely to be similarly futile. Certainly, the administration’s attempt to get to a trade deal with Beijing by handing out geopolitical concessions — for example, allowing advanced A.I. chips to go to China — is unlikely to succeed in pulling the axis’ most powerful member away from its partners. Russia and China are likely to simply pocket the concessions this administration is willing to make and use them to strengthen their ability to challenge the United States.

试图拉拢中国的努力可能同样是徒劳的。显然，政府通过做出地缘政治方面的让步——例如允许向中国销售先进的人工智能芯片——来达成与北京的贸易协议，这不太可能成功地离间这个轴心中最强大的成员，使其与其他成员分道扬镳。俄罗斯和中国很可能会欣然接受特朗普政府愿意做出的让步，并利用这些让步增强挑战美国的能力。

The good news is that Washington does have the necessary tools at its disposal to overcome the axis. The American economy is the world’s largest and most attractive. Its alliance system is still unparalleled, its network of overseas bases unmatched and its military might enormous. American values — of democracy, basic rights and dignity, and of opportunity and equality — are a supreme strength, more so when we embrace them at home. America, if it chooses to, can sustain a global order that is far superior to anything the axis has to offer. The question is whether the Trump administration will choose to do so.

好消息是，华盛顿确实拥有战胜这个轴心国所需的必要手段。美国有着世界上最大、最具吸引力的经济。它的联盟体系仍然无与伦比，海外基地网络无人能及，军事实力依然强大。美国的价值观——民主、基本权利与尊严、机会与平等——是一大优势，若能在国内真正予以践行，其力量将更为强大。如果美国选择这样做，它能够维持一个远超轴心国所能提供的全球秩序。问题在于，特朗普政府是否会选择这样做。