For the first time in its modern history, the United States faces a rival — China — that has greater scale in most of the critical dimensions of power, and American national capacity alone may not be enough to rise to the challenge.

美国面临一个在多数关键实力维度上都具备更大规模优势的竞争对手——中国，这在美国现代历史上是第一次。而仅凭美国自身的国力可能不足以应对这一挑战。

We are entering an era where the true measure of American primacy will be whether Washington can build what we call allied scale: the power to compete globally in tandem with other countries across economic, technological and military domains.

我们正步入一个新时代。在这个时代里，衡量美国主导地位的真正标准将在于华盛顿能否建立我们所谓的同盟规模，即与其他国家在经济、科技和军事领域协同合作，从而在全球范围内展开竞争的能力。

President Trump appears to be moving in the opposite direction. His go-it-alone, tariff-centric diplomacy has alienated allies and left openings for Beijing to build its own coalitions. Mr. Trump’s recent imposition of high tariffs on India are just one example. The United States spent three decades courting India as a geopolitical counterweight to China. But after the tariffs were applied on India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi last week visited China for the first time in seven years, where he and President Xi Jinping agreed to move past a recent history of tense relations and work as partners, not rivals.

特朗普总统的举措却似乎背道而驰。他以关税为核心的单边外交策略疏远了盟友，并为北京构建自己的联盟体系留下了空间。近期对印度征收高额关税便是例证：在过去30年里，美国一直在拉拢印度，将其作为制衡中国的地缘政治力量。但关税措施出台后，上周印度莫迪总理七年来首次访华，与中国国家主席习近平一致同意化解近年来的紧张关系，以伙伴而非竞争者的关系进行合作。

Mr. Trump is playing with fire.

特朗普正在玩火。

Throughout the 20th century, America outproduced and out-innovated Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union. But China is different. On the metrics that matter most in strategic competition, it has already surpassed the United States.

在整个20世纪，美国一直在生产与创新上领先德国、日本和苏联。但中国与这些国家不同。在战略竞争最重要的指标上，中国已经超越了美国。

Its economy, while slowing, is still nearly 30 percent larger than America’s when one accounts for purchasing power. China has twice the manufacturing capacity, producing vastly more cars, ships, steel and solar panels than the United States and more than 70 percent of the world’s batteries, electric vehicles and critical minerals. In science and technology, China produces more active patents and top-cited publications than the United States. And militarily, it has the world’s largest naval fleet, a shipbuilding capacity estimated to be more than 230 times as great as America’s and is fast establishing itself as a leader in hypersonic weapons, drones and quantum communications.

中国经济虽然在放缓，但按照购买力平价计算，其规模仍比美国大近30%。中国的制造产能是美国的两倍，生产的汽车、船舶、钢铁和太阳能电池板远远超过美国，全世界70%以上的电池、电动汽车和关键矿物都是中国生产的。在科学技术领域，中国的有效专利和高被引论文数量均超过美国。在军事上，中国拥有世界上最大的海军舰队，造船能力估计是美国的230倍以上，并正在迅速确立自己在高超音速武器、无人机和量子通信领域的领先地位。

China has its problems, such as a shrinking and aging population, excess industrial capacity, rickety state finances and high debt. But any serious U.S. strategy toward China must reckon with the Cold War aphorism “Quantity has a quality all its own.”

中国有自己的问题，比如人口萎缩和老龄化、工业产能过剩、政府财政不稳定和债务高企。但任何严肃的美国对华战略都必须考虑到那句冷战格言——“数量本身就是一种质量。”

The rise and fall of great powers has often turned on scale — the size, resources and capacity that make a nation formidable. Once countries reach similar levels of economic productivity, those with larger populations and continental size eventually surge ahead. Britain’s first-mover advantage in the Industrial Revolution gave way once larger countries like the United States and Russia caught up. In the 20th century, America awed its enemies: Hitler called it a “giant state with unimaginable productive capacities,” and Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, architect of the attack on Pearl Harbor, admitted he could run wild in the Pacific Ocean for only so long before American industry overwhelmed Japan.

大国的兴衰往往取决于规模——决定国家强盛的体量、资源和能力。一旦各国的经济生产率达到相似水平，人口更多、幅员更大的国家最终会领先。当美国和俄罗斯等大国迎头赶上时，英国在工业革命中的先发优势就消失了。在20世纪，美国让敌人敬畏：希特勒称美国是一个“拥有难以想象的生产能力的大国”，偷袭珍珠港的策划者、海军大将山本五十六曾承认，他只能在太平洋上放肆一时，不久后美国工业就将压倒日本。

Today, that sense of daunting scale describes China. America’s best hope for matching that lies in maximizing its own strength through alliances. That means no longer treating U.S. allies as dependents under our protection, but as partners in building power jointly by pooling markets, technology, military capability and industrial capacity. Investments in American renewal are necessary, but insufficient by themselves.

如今，这种令人生畏的规模属于中国。而美国最大的希望在于通过联盟最大化自身实力。这意味着不再将美国的盟友视为我们保护下的依附者，而是作为合作伙伴，通过共享市场、技术、军事能力和工业能力，共同建设力量。对美国复兴的投资是必要的，但仅靠投资本身是不够的。

Alone, the United States will be smaller compared with China by many important metrics. But together with economies such as Europe, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, Canada, Mexico, Taiwan and others, there is no competition. This coalition would be more than twice China’s G.D.P. when adjusted for purchasing power, more than double its military spending, the top trading partner of most countries in the world, and would represent half of global manufacturing to China’s one-third. It would possess deeper talent pools, create more patents and top-cited research, and wield a degree of market power that could deter Chinese coercion. Allied scale would win the future.

单独来看，美国在许多重要指标上都比不上中国。但加上欧洲、日本、韩国、澳大利亚、印度、加拿大、墨西哥、台湾和其他经济体，中国就远不能匹敌。经过购买力平价调整后，这个联盟的GDP将是中国的两倍以上，军费开支是中国的两倍以上，是世界上大多数国家的最大贸易伙伴，占全球制造业的一半，而中国只占三分之一。这个联盟将拥有更深厚的人才库，创造更多的专利和高被引研究，并拥有一定程度的市场力量，可以阻止中国的胁迫。联盟的规模将赢得未来。

在各项关键指标上，美国需要盟友和伙伴才能超越中国。数据来源：世界银行、联合国工业发展组织、国民经济核算、斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所、Scimago期刊与国家排名、世界知识产权组织、《自然》杂志 • 注：盟友与合作伙伴包括澳大利亚、加拿大、印度、日本、韩国、墨西哥、新西兰、欧盟、英国及台湾地区。购买力平价调整后的数据考虑了当地价格差异，使各国军费支出具有可比性。军事支出按GDP占比进行购买力平价调整。中国军事支出数据源自弗雷沃等人2024年研究。所有数据反映2024年数值，数字经过取整。

The aim is not to contain China — an impossible goal — but to balance it. Only through partnerships can we protect our shared industrial bases, technological edge and the ability to deter China.

这样做目的不是遏制中国——这个目标根本不可能实现——而是平衡中国。只有通过伙伴关系，我们才能保护我们共同的工业基础、技术优势和威慑中国的能力。

The Biden administration favored persuasion in winning over other countries. It helped create the Trade and Technology Council with Europe; elevated the so-called Quad grouping that combines the United States, India, Japan and Australia to balance China’s growing influence; reached a nuclear submarine deal with Australia and Britain; and struck new export control and trade arrangements.

拜登政府倾向于通过说服赢得他国支持。它帮助建立了美欧贸易和技术委员会；提升了由美印日澳组成的所谓四方集团的地位，以平衡中国日益增长的影响力；与澳大利亚和英国达成核潜艇协议；并达成了新的出口管制和贸易安排。

Mr. Trump is not entirely allergic to this approach. In his first term, he pursued initiatives such as the Abraham Accords in the Middle East, signed the U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade agreement, and it was he who initially revived a previously dormant Quad. But he was often more comfortable with bilateral coercion, which alienated allies.

特朗普并非完全排斥这种做法。在第一个任期内，他推行了中东地区的《亚伯拉罕协定》等倡议，签署了美墨加贸易协定，也是他率先恢复了此前处于休眠状态的四方会谈。但他通常更倾向于双边胁迫手段，这会导致疏远盟友。

This is true once again. Mr. Trump’s hardball tactics target the very economies that the United States should be pulling closer. Even his handshake trade deals with Japan, South Korea and Europe focus narrowly on reducing bilateral trade deficits, raising tariff revenue and securing vague investment pledges rather than balancing China. U.S. allies have publicly likened his approach to a “landlord seeking rent.” America’s global popularity has plummeted, even falling behind China’s in many countries.

这种情况再次发生了。特朗普的强硬策略瞄准的正是美国本应该拉近距离的经济体。就连他与日本、韩国和欧洲的象征性贸易协议也只局限于减少双边贸易逆差、提高关税收入和获得模糊的投资承诺，而不是制衡中国。美国的盟友公开把他的做法比作“房东寻租”。美国在全球的受欢迎程度直线下降，甚至在许多国家落后于中国。

A Trumpian path to achieving allied scale, if it exists, is likely to lean on more coercion. That might generate short-term concessions from desperate partners, but it would deplete trust over the long term. Mr. Trump is not wrong to seek more from allies. But he is squandering America’s precious leverage on the wrong objectives. Instead of settling for vague pledges from trade partners, he should push them for significant and specific long-term investment in sectors that will spark American reindustrialization. Instead of focusing on trivial disputes — like trying to sell more American rice to Japan — he should press them to commit to building a multilateral tariff and regulatory wall that protects the industrial bases of the countries behind it from being hollowed out by China’s mercantilism.

如果真的存在特朗普式实现同盟规模的道路，很可能依赖于更多的胁迫。这或许能迫使迫切的合作伙伴在短期内做出让步，但从长期来看，这种做法将耗尽信任。特朗普寻求从盟友那里得到更多，这并没有错。但他把美国宝贵的影响力浪费在了错误的目标上。与其满足于贸易伙伴含糊的承诺，他更应该推动他们，在能够激发美国再工业化的领域进行重大而具体的长期投资。与其把注意力放在琐碎的争端上——比如试图向日本出售更多的美国大米——他应该敦促贸易伙伴致力于建立一个多边关税和监管壁垒，保护壁垒背后国家的工业基础不被中国的重商主义掏空。

The destination is visible. If Japan and South Korea follow through on pledges to help build American ships, Taiwan builds more semiconductor plants in America and the United States sells some of its best military technology to allies — all under better trade terms than each of them offers to China — this would be consistent with Mr. Trump’s preferences and serve as templates for future deals. These two-way flows of capacity could garner bipartisan support and buy-in from our international partners. It is a path to allied scale that might work.

目标已经很清晰了。如果日本和韩国兑现帮助建造美国船只的承诺，台湾在美国建造更多的半导体工厂，美国向盟友出售一些顶尖军事技术——且所有交易条款均优于各国给中国的条件——这既符合特朗普的偏好，又能成为未来交易的模板。这种双向能力流动可以获得两党的支持和我们国际伙伴的认可。这条通向同盟规模化的道路或许是可行的。

What won’t work is punishing our friends while courting Beijing. Offering China tariff relief or access to U.S. semiconductors in exchange for hazy promises to buy American goods would offer fleeting benefits but permanent damage to America’s position. It could alienate potential partners and lead them to embrace China, as India appears to be doing.

在讨好北京的同时惩罚我们的朋友是行不通的。对中国减免关税或允许其购买美国半导体，以换取购买美国商品的模糊承诺，这样做能够带来短暂的好处，却会对美国地位造成永久性损害。这可能会疏远潜在的合作伙伴，导致他们投向中国怀抱，就像印度当前似乎正在做的那样。

America’s singular advantage in the global power landscape is its allies and partners. Many of these, fearing abandonment, are prepared to accommodate Mr. Trump in ways few would have expected. Under U.S. pressure, South Korea has offered major investments in shipbuilding, Vietnam announced it would drop all tariffs on U.S. goods, and Europe is increasing military spending. Countries like these are willing to do more than those that Mr. Trump chases after, like Russia and China, ever would.

美国在全球权力格局中的独特优势是它的盟友和伙伴。其中许多国家担心被抛弃，正以超乎预期的方式迎合特朗普。在美国的压力下，韩国承诺对造船业进行重大投资，越南宣布将取消对美国商品的所有关税，欧洲正在增加军事开支。这些国家的配合程度，远远超过特朗普所讨好的俄罗斯和中国等国家。

It’s not too late for Washington to build allied scale, even through Mr. Trump’s coercive style. But unless the president redirects his leverage toward the goal of balancing China’s overwhelming capacity, he will leave America smaller and more isolated.

对华盛顿来说，形成同盟规模还为时不晚，即使是通过特朗普的胁迫方式。但是，除非总统将他的影响力转向制衡中国的压倒性实力这一目标，他将让美国变得更弱小，更孤立。

The next century, then, will be China’s to lose.

这样一来，下个世纪就属于中国了，除非他们自己搞砸。