Whether Americans realize it or not, the Trump administration is trying to engineer a radical reconstruction of capitalism in the United States. The new model looks more like China’s, which allows private-sector development but emphasizes government ownership and control. Various academics and politicians — many of whom have never run a business — are arguing that this is a wise model.

无论美国人是否意识到，特朗普政府都正在试图对美国的资本主义进行彻底改造。这种新模式更像中国模式——允许私营部门发展，但强调政府所有权和控制权。许多学者和政客（其中不少人从未真正经营过企业）都声称这是一个明智的模式。


It is not.

事实绝非如此。

We know from a century of evidence and a lifetime of practice that healthy economies grow from innovation that produces wealth. America’s economic system, built on three pillars — innovation, a big market and a stable rule of law — has been one of its greatest strengths and unique advantages. Do we need to do a better job of distributing the gains from America’s economic success? Clearly. Is state-controlled industry and planning the way to do that? Absolutely not.

一个世纪的证据和长期的实践告诉我们，健康的经济增长来自能创造财富的创新。美国的经济体系建立在三大支柱之上：创新、庞大的市场以及稳定的法治，这是美国最强大的优势和独特优势。我们是否需要更公平地分配经济成功带来的收益？毫无疑问，是的。但靠国家控制的产业和计划经济是实现这一目标的方式吗？绝对不是。

America’s economy has been struggling to deliver broadly felt progress for some time, a failure especially evident in the shrinking middle class and its declining opportunities. We hear this echoed in populist calls from both left and right. But the way to restore faith in American capitalism is not to discard it in favor of a Chinese-style approach. That model is showing signs of failure in China after an initial burst of success.

长期以来，美国经济难以让民众普遍感受到进步，这种失败尤其体现在中产阶级的萎缩及其机会的减少方面。无论左翼还是右翼的民粹主义呼声都反映了这一点。但重拾人们对美国资本主义的信心并不是要把它抛弃，转而采用中国模式。在最初取得成功后，该模式如今已在中国显现败象。

President Trump is dangerously close to copying its mistakes.

特朗普总统正危险地接近重蹈中国的覆辙。

Take three of Mr. Trump’s most recent moves. First, in June his administration pushed a “golden share” arrangement in the merger of Nippon Steel and U.S. Steel, ensuring the government a veto right over key decisions — a tool straight out of Beijing’s playbook. Second, last month the administration took a 10 percent stake in Intel, effectively making Washington a shareholder in one of America’s most important technology companies, using money Congress had already allocated. And third, Mr. Trump has turned tariffs into a tool for political favoritism, granting exemptions to preferred companies in exchange for loyalty and concessions. Together, these steps blur the line between private enterprise and state ownership, substituting political calculation for competitive discipline and market-driven innovation.

看看特朗普最近的三项举措。首先是在今年6月，他的政府在日本制铁与美国钢铁公司的并购案中推动“黄金股”安排，确保政府对关键决策拥有否决权——这完全是照搬北京的游戏规则。第二，上个月，政府持有了英特尔10%的股份，实际上让华盛顿成为了美国最重要科技公司之一的股东，所用资金来自国会此前的拨付。第三，特朗普将关税变成政治偏袒的工具，对其青睐的公司予以豁免，以换取忠诚与让步。这三项措施结合起来，模糊了私营企业与国有之间的界限，用政治算计取代了竞争约束和市场驱动的创新。

To be sure, there are times when state intervention in markets is appropriate. Government helps build infrastructure and funds science that supports the creation of new technologies (sometimes entire industries). The internet and the Interstate System of highways are two classic examples, among countless others. And in national emergencies, such as the 2008 financial crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic, the government has a vital role to play in stabilizing the economy and mobilizing a national response to protect public welfare.

诚然，政府在某些时候对市场进行干预是合理的。政府帮助建设基础设施，资助科学研究以推动新技术（有时甚至是整个行业）的诞生。互联网和州际高速公路系统就是众多典型例子中的两个。在2008年金融危机和新冠疫情等国家紧急状态下，政府更是肩负着稳定经济、动员全国力量保障公共福利的重要使命。

But government intervention damages the economy when it singles out individual companies instead of offering a broader program to support an industry, engage in general R&D or build infrastructure. Programs that apply transparent rules fairly preserve competition, while political favoritism distorts it. When the government — or an individual official — handpicks winners and losers, it undermines markets and rewards inside access.

然而当政府不是通过制定面向整个产业的支持计划、开展一般性研发或建设基础设施等方式进行干预，而是遴选特定企业时，便会对经济造成损害。依照透明规则公平实施的项目能够维护竞争，而政治偏袒则会扭曲竞争。当政府或个别官员亲自挑选赢家与输家时，不仅破坏了市场机制，更变相奖励了内部寻租行为。

That is exactly what’s happening now. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick has suggested that in addition to Intel and Nippon Steel, Washington could buy into military contractors such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Palantir. The White House has pushed chip makers like Nvidia and AMD to give a share of revenue from sales in China to the U.S. government, providing it a stake without formal ownership. It is not clear how these equity stakes will be held or managed (for instance, who will decide when to sell them). These moves are fundamentally changing the relationship between the private sector and the state.

眼下发生的正是这种情况。商务部长霍华德·卢特尼克暗示，除英特尔和新日铁外，华盛顿还可能入股洛克希德·马丁、波音和Palantir等军火承包商。白宫已敦促英伟达和AMD等芯片制造商将中国市场的部分销售收入上缴美国政府，让政府在没有正式持股的情况下也能分一杯羹。目前还不清楚这些股权将如何持有或管理（例如，谁来决定何时出售）。这些举措正在从根本上改变私营部门与国家间的关系。

While libertarians and traditional conservatives in the MAGA coalition have objected to the administration’s infringement on economic liberty, some on the left, such as Senator Bernie Sanders, have applauded its steps toward state ownership, arguing that Americans deserve a share of the profits from companies that receive federal money.

虽然让美国再次伟大联盟中的自由主义者和传统保守派反对政府侵犯经济自由，但一些左派人士，如参议员伯尼·桑德斯，却对政府迈向国有化的举措叫好，他们认为接受联邦资金的公司所获利润理应由美国人民分享。

There are certainly cases in which this can make sense. After the Great Recession, banks should have compensated the United States for bailing them out. And when Tesla received $465 million in loans during a precarious moment in its existence, a stake in the company would have been an appropriate return. Tesla paid the loan back early and with interest, but the public never received compensation proportionate to the risk it took on. The government must design such arrangements systematically and transparently from the start and apply them evenly across industries. The federal initiative that funded Tesla (as well as other automakers), for example, and the CHIPS Act that funded Intel and other chip makers should have included taxpayer compensation mechanisms that applied to all participating companies.

这类做法在某些情况下确实具有合理性。大衰退过后，接受救助的银行本应向美国政府支付补偿金；当特斯拉在其生存危机中获得4.65亿美元贷款时，获取股权本应是合理的风险回报。虽然特斯拉提前偿还了本息，但公众从未获得与承担风险相称的补偿。政府必须从一开始就系统且透明地设计此类安排，并且要在所有行业均等适用。例如，为特斯拉（以及其他汽车制造商）提供资金的联邦计划，以及为英特尔和其他芯片制造商提供资金的《芯片法案》，本应包含适用于所有参与企业的纳税人补偿机制。

Instead, the Trump administration is handing out or imposing deals arbitrarily and retroactively. The danger is evident: The government is not stepping in to solve a true crisis, protect taxpayers or advance the nation’s strategic priorities; it is perverting markets in favor of politically connected companies and hampering innovation. In other words: crony capitalism.

然而，特朗普政府却在任意地、事后追溯性地发放或强加交易。危险显而易见：政府并不是在应对真正的危机、保护纳税人或推进国家战略目标；相反，它是在为了偏袒有政治关系的公司而扭曲市场，阻碍创新。换句话说，这就是裙带资本主义。

Authoritarian regimes don’t stop with large companies. State control inevitably reaches start-ups and small businesses, hollowing out the heart of the economy. Consider China. In 2018 more than 51,000 venture-backed start-ups formed. By 2023, that number had collapsed, reportedly to just 1,202. (The Chinese government disputes these numbers.) Innovation was replaced by access, creativity by compliance.

威权政权并不会只停留在控制大公司。国家的掌控必然会延伸到初创企业和小企业，掏空经济命脉。看看中国。2018年，中国有超过5.1万家由风投支持的初创公司成立。据报道，2023年这一数字已骤降至区区1202家。（中国政府对这一数字提出异议。）创新被关系所取代，创造力被服从所取代。

This is how authoritarian economies function. Success depends less on building products that meet people’s needs and more on cultivating connections with the state. In China knowing the right officials is often a prerequisite for even starting a business. That same pay-to-play culture is metastasizing in the United States today.

这就是威权经济的运作方式。成功不再取决于能否打造满足人们需求的产品，而更多依赖于经营政府关系。在中国，认识关键官员往往成为创业的必要前提。这种“花钱买门路”的文化如今正在美国蔓延。

And perhaps most dangerous, the Chinese model relies not just on favoritism but also on fear — fear of crossing the government or simply of being overlooked by party elites. In 2023, reports began surfacing of disappeared Chinese founders and executives. The risk of unwanted attention from President Xi Jinping is destroying the incentive to take risks.

或许最危险的是，中国模式依赖的不仅是特权恩惠，还有恐惧——害怕触怒政府，或者仅仅是被党内高层忽视。2023年起，中国的企业创始人和高管“被失踪”的报道开始浮现。引发习近平主席不必要关注的风险正在摧毁企业家的冒险动力。

We see this fear taking hold in the United States, with company officials across industries genuflecting to Mr. Trump or simply trying to stay out of his line of fire.

我们看到这种恐惧正在美国蔓延，各行各业的企业高管要么对特朗普卑躬屈膝，要么试图避免成为他的攻击目标。

The American model is capable of renewal. We need a system that adapts by encouraging innovation, empowering entrepreneurs and ensuring that risk and reward are fairly shared across society. America thrives when markets are large, rules are stable and opportunities are open to those willing to take risks, not just those with the best political connections. In practice, this means the government should create hands-off policy, while companies should take more responsibility for their employees and communities. And the two should work together to open more paths for people to build ownership — whether through their labor as workers, their capital as investors or their initiative as entrepreneurs.

美国模式具有自我更新的能力。我们需要一个通过鼓励创新、赋能企业家、确保风险与回报在社会中得到公平分配而实现自我完善的制度。当市场规模庞大、规则稳定、机会向勇于冒险者而非仅限权贵关系网开放时，美国才能繁荣发展。实际上，这意味着政府应制定不干预的政策，而企业则需对员工和社区承担更多责任。双方应共同努力，通过劳动者的付出、投资者的资本以及企业家的创新精神，为民众开拓更多拥有财富的途径。

Mr. Trump is exploiting popular discontent with the U.S. economy, but state capitalism corrodes even the strongest systems, as China’s stagnation shows. We abandon the American model at our peril.

特朗普正在利用民众对经济现状的不满，但正如中国经济停滞所证明的，即便是最强大的体系，国家资本主义也会对其造成侵蚀。放弃美国模式将使我们陷入危险境地。