There are moments in great-power politics when the tectonic plates seem to shift perceptibly beneath us. The recent summit between President Trump and President Xi Jinping of China was one of those inflection points.

在大国政治中，总有一些时刻会让人清晰感受到地缘战略格局的变迁。美国总统特朗普与中国国家主席习近平近期的峰会正是这样的转折点之一。

The two leaders agreed during their meeting on Oct. 30 to pause the trade war that Mr. Trump launched this year. But the real story to emerge from the event was not the inconclusive truce they reached in the South Korean city of Busan but the unmistakable demonstration that China could now face America as a true peer.

两位领导人在10月30日的会晤中同意暂停特朗普在今年发起的贸易战。但这次会晤的真正意义并非在于双方在韩国城市釜山达成的贸易战阶段性停火协议，而在于它清楚地表明，中国已具备与美国平起平坐的实力。

China absorbed the full weight of American economic pressure and retaliated successfully with greater pressure of its own, weaponizing its dominance of global supply chains on which America relies, particularly rare earth minerals and magnets. After decades of deindustrialization, a poorly prepared United States would not — or could not — respond.

中国不仅顶住了美国全方位的经济施压，更是通过运用自己在美国所依赖的全球供应链的主导地位——特别是稀土矿物与磁体领域，以更具威慑力的反制措施成功实施反击。在经历了数十年产业空心化之后，准备不足的美国既无意也无力作出回应。

If historians someday try to identify exactly when China became America’s geopolitical equal, they might point to the outcome of Mr. Trump’s ill-considered trade war.

如果未来的历史学家要明确中国在地缘政治上开始与美国平起平坐的确切时点，他们也许会认为是特朗普轻率发起的贸易战的结局。

This reckoning comes at a critical time.

这个历史性转折偏偏发生在一个至关紧要的时刻。

We are halfway through what strategists in both U.S. political parties believe will be a decisive decade that determines whether America can avoid falling behind China economically, technologically and militarily. Mr. Trump’s team is moving urgently to bring manufacturing back to the United States, rebalance trade and rebuild the defense industrial base.

我们如今已经走过了这个决定性十年的前半程，两党战略家都认为，这十年将决定美国能否避免在经济、技术和军事方面落于中国之后。特朗普团队正采取紧急行动推动制造业回流、重塑贸易格局并重建国防工业基础。

The outcome of the recent summit could undercut those important efforts.

最近这次峰会的结果可能会削弱这些重要的努力。

Mr. Trump framed the meeting as a U.S.-China “G2,” diminishing the importance of allies whose help America needs to reindustrialize at home and balance China abroad. And by showing Beijing that its coercive tools work, Mr. Trump risks inviting more pressure, potentially giving China veto power over his “America First” agenda.

特朗普将会晤定位为中美“G2”模式，这是对盟友体系重要性的贬低，而美国既需借助盟友实现本国的再工业化，又需依靠它们在海外牵制中国。同时，特朗普让北京看到它的胁迫工具确实行之有效，他有可能因此招来更多来自中国的施压，甚至让中国获得对其“美国优先”议程的否决权。

None of this had to happen. The road to Busan began with needless provocation by Mr. Trump. In February, he reignited the trade war that he started in his first term, levying tariffs on Chinese goods that eventually rose past 140 percent. But he failed to first assess America’s own vulnerabilities or shore up its supply chains. By contrast, Beijing had spent the years since 2018, when Mr. Trump first began imposing tariffs, preparing for exactly this moment.

这一切本可避免。通往釜山之路始于特朗普的无谓挑衅。今年2月，他重启首个任期发起的贸易战，将中国商品关税最终提升至140%以上，却未预先评估美国自身的脆弱性或先夯实自己的供应链。相比之下，自2018年特朗普首次加征关税以来，北京一直在为这一刻做准备。

Backed into a corner, Mr. Xi reached for his break-glass tool. In April, he halted exports to the United States of rare earths minerals and magnets — critical materials for everything from cars to missiles — an escalation beyond anything he had threatened under President Joe Biden. It was a calculated risk given the potential for more American retaliation. But Mr. Xi gambled that Mr. Trump would fold. He was right. In May, Mr. Trump radically reduced tariffs and pursued de-escalation.

被逼到墙角的习近平使出了他的杀手锏。4月，他暂停向美国出口稀土矿物及磁体——这些关键材料广泛应用于汽车至导弹等各个领域——这是他在拜登总统任内从未采取过的升级行动。鉴于美国可能进一步报复，这是一步经过计算的险棋。但习近平押注特朗普会让步。他赌赢了。5月，特朗普大幅降低关税并寻求冲突降级。

Emboldened, China wielded rare earths again in October — and raised the stakes dramatically. Using the pretext of new U.S. export controls, Beijing responded with a sweeping licensing regime requiring companies anywhere in the world to obtain China’s approval not only to buy the country’s rare earths but to sell any product made with even trace amounts of them.

此举鼓舞了中国，到了10月，北京再度挥舞稀土大棒，且大幅加码。它以新的美国口管制为由，建立全面许可制度，要求全球任何企业不仅采购中国稀土需获批准，连销售含微量中国稀土的产品亦需获得许可。

It was an unthinkable escalation, well beyond anything Washington had ever attempted, and a gun to the head for U.S. and global manufacturing.

这种升级程度超乎想象，远远超出华盛顿曾采取过的任何手段，对美国和全球制造业而言犹如枪顶在了脑门上。

Mr. Trump’s team readied drastic countermeasures — from new chip controls to financial sanctions — that might have forced Beijing to question its coercive approach. Instead, Mr. Trump flinched, shelving those options and retreating to the familiar comfort of tariffs — by now an empty threat since he had lifted them in the spring after Beijing halted rare earths exports. By the time the leaders met in Busan, Mr. Trump’s earlier bravado was nowhere to be seen. He chose to de-escalate, and cut tariffs again, among other concessions.

特朗普的团队原本准备了激烈的反制措施——从新的芯片管制到金融制裁——这些手段本可能迫使北京方面重新审视其胁迫策略。然而，特朗普最终退缩了，把这些选项搁置一旁，转而退回到他熟悉的关税措施——但自从他今春在北京停止稀土出口后取消关税以来，这种威胁已然失效。当两位领导人在釜山会晤时，特朗普先前的虚张声势已不复存在。他选择了降级冲突，并做出了包括再次降低关税在内的让步。

With the dust now settled, Mr. Trump has not only revealed the limits of America’s resolve to its greatest rival, but has left the United States worse off than when he started this fight.

尘埃落定后，特朗普不仅向最大对手暴露了美国战略决心的局限性，更让美国处境较开启贸易战之前更为不堪。

Beijing has resumed imports of U.S. soybeans — one of America’s major exports to China — but at lower volumes than before. China has postponed its new licensing regime on rare earths for a year, but fear that China might invoke it in the future has already caused the Trump administration to suspend export restrictions that would have tightened controls on Chinese-linked firms. China also received a ten percent tariff reduction for pledging to crack down on production of fentanyl precursors. But that brings its tariff rate closer to that of American allies and partners, which reduces incentives for American businesses to diversify their suppliers to countries other than China.

北京恢复了从美国进口大豆——大豆是美国对中国的主要出口商品之一——但采购量已不及以往。中国将其新的稀土许可制度推迟一年实施，但由于担心中国未来可能启用该措施，特朗普政府已经暂停了那些旨在对中国关联企业加强管控的出口限制措施。此外，中国承诺打击芬太尼前体化学品的生产，因此获得了10%的关税减让。但这使中国的关税水平更接近美国的盟友与伙伴，从而降低了美国企业将供应链从中国转移至其他国家的动力。

The reverberations of Mr. Trump’s mishandling of China will echo far beyond trade. U.S. allies may now have reason to doubt America’s ability to stand with them when it cannot even stand up for itself. Beijing may feel emboldened to test U.S. resolve on Taiwan and other issues. China, after all, has other chokepoints it can weaponize, such as its dominance over the production of pharmaceutical ingredients for dozens of critical drugs, including antibiotics.

特朗普对华政策的失误产生的涟漪效应将远远超出贸易范畴。当美国连自身立场都无法坚守时，其盟友自然有理由怀疑华盛顿履行承诺的能力。北京在台湾等议题上试探美国决心的底气可能更足。毕竟，中国还掌握着其他的命门，包括对抗生素等数十种关键药物的医药原料生产主导权。

There is an old lesson that many generals learned too late: It is unwise to invade Russia in the winter. The economic corollary should now be equally clear. It is unwise to start a trade war with the main supplier of your most critical imports until you have mitigated your vulnerabilities. Mr. Trump, who mistook political theater for strategy, lost ground against China not solely because he misjudged Mr. Xi but because he underestimated America’s dependence on the supply chains it no longer controls and the allies that he too often ignores.

不要在冬季入侵俄罗斯，这是许多军事将领付出惨重代价才领悟一个古老教训。其经济对应原则现在也同样明晰：在未消除自身脆弱性之前就对最关键进口品的主要供应国发动贸易战，这绝非明智之举。误将政治作秀当作战略谋划的特朗普之所以在与中国的较量中落于下风，不仅源于对习近平的误判，还因为他低估了美国对那些自己已不再掌控的供应链的依赖，以及对那些他屡屡轻慢的盟友的依赖。

Building and wielding national power is deadly serious business. It takes more than bluster. It takes patience, endurance, planning and the discipline to know when to fight and when not to.

建设并运用国家力量是一件极其严肃的事。光靠虚张声势是不够的，更需要耐心、规划，以及知道什么时候出手、什么时候收手的定力。

China understood that when it was weaker — steadily building its strength over the course of decades and avoiding premature tests of power. Mr. Trump, who blithely took American primacy for granted, is only now learning that lesson.

中国在实力尚弱时就深谙此道——它在数十年间稳步积蓄实力，避免过早地接受实力的考验。而轻率地将美国的主导地位视为理所当然的特朗普，直到此刻才逐渐领悟这个道理。