In Northern Virginia’s Data Center Alley, windowless buildings the size of aircraft hangars are powering America’s artificial intelligence industry, which is locked in a race against China.

在北弗吉尼亚的“数据中心走廊”，一座座没有窗户、大小如飞机库般的建筑正为美国的人工智能产业提供动力，后者正与中国展开竞赛。

Yet, these data centers are increasingly reliant on China, America’s geopolitical rival, for a vital technology: batteries.

然而，这些数据中心日益依赖美国的地缘政治对手中国提供一项关键技术：电池。

These facilities can use as much electricity as a small city, straining local power grids. Even flickers can have cascading effects, corrupting sensitive A.I. computer coding.

这些设施的耗电量堪比一座小型城市，给当地电网带来巨大压力。即使是瞬时电压波动也可能引发连锁反应，损坏敏感的人工智能程序代码。

To cope, tech giants are looking to buy billions of dollars of large lithium-ion batteries, a field in which “China is leading in almost every industrial component,” said Dan Wang, an expert on China’s technology sector at Stanford’s Hoover Institution. “They’re ahead, both technologically and in terms of scale.”

为应对这一问题，科技巨头们正寻求购买价值数十亿美元的大型锂离子电池。在这个领域，“中国几乎在每一个产业环节上都处于领先地位”，斯坦福大学胡佛研究所研究中国科技的专家王丹指出。“无论是技术还是规模，他们都走在前列。”

A short drive from the data centers, at the Pentagon, military officials are sounding similar warnings, for different reasons. Military strategists, watching as modern warfare is reinvented in Ukraine, say the armed forces will need millions of batteries to power drones, lasers and countless other weapons of the future.

距离这些数据中心不远处的五角大楼内，军方官员基于不同理由发出了类似警告。目睹乌克兰战场如何重塑现代战争的军事战略家们表示，未来军队将需要数以百万计的电池来驱动无人机、激光武器及无数其他新型装备。

Many of those batteries, too, come from China.

而这些电池同样多来自中国。

Chinese battery dominance has long been a problem for industries like auto manufacturing, but now is increasingly being viewed as a national security threat. Currently, U.S. military forces rely on Chinese supply chains for some 6,000 individual battery components across weapons programs, according to Govini, a defense analytics firm.

长期以来，中国在电池领域的主导地位一直是汽车制造等行业所面临的问题，但现在这日益被视为国家安全威胁。根据国防分析公司Govini的数据，目前美军各类武器项目依赖中国供应链的电池零部件约达6000种。

“The reality is very stark,” Tara Murphy Dougherty, Govini’s chief executive, told a recent gathering of top defense and industry officials in California. “There are foreign parts in 100 percent of our weapon systems and military platforms.”

Govini首席执行官塔拉·墨菲·多尔蒂在近日于加州举行的国防和产业高层会议上表示：“现实非常严峻。我们所有的武器系统和军事平台中都含有外国零部件。”

China understands the importance of these batteries. On Oct. 9, amid growing trade disputes, China threatened to limit exports of some of its most advanced lithium-ion technologies, including fundamental components like graphite anodes and cathodes.

中国深知这些电池的重要性。10月9日，在贸易摩擦不断升级之际，中国威胁将限制部分最先进锂离子技术的出口，其中包括石墨负极和正极等关键基础部件。

The Trump administration is facing a dilemma.

特朗普政府正面临两难境地。

When President Trump came to office, his administration initially froze billions of dollars in Biden-era federal grants for battery manufacturing, lumping batteries in with electric vehicles, solar farms, wind turbines and other clean energy technologies Mr. Trump had sought to de-emphasize. Mr. Trump has been scornful of electric cars, calling them a “scam.”

特朗普总统上任之初，其政府曾冻结数十亿美元拜登时期用于电池制造的联邦拨款，将电池与电动汽车、太阳能农场、风力涡轮机等清洁能源技术一并归为他试图弱化的领域。特朗普一直对电动车嗤之以鼻，称其为“骗局”。

Yet more recently, the administration has come to see battery technology as pivotal for many of the things it cares most about, including A.I. and defense. In interviews, more than a dozen battery-industry executives, lobbyists, military experts and others close to the administration said the White House had taken a growing interest in fostering a domestic battery industry disentangled from China.

但近期，政府逐渐认识到，电池技术对其最为关注的诸多领域至关重要，包括人工智能和国防。在采访中，十多位电池行业高管、游说人士、军事专家以及接近政府的人士均表示，白宫对培育一个摆脱中国的本土电池产业的兴趣正在不断上升。

一组磷酸铁锂电池装置的内部，中国在该领域占据着主导地位。

In recent weeks the White House has held high-level meetings on the battery supply chain, according to three people familiar with the matter. The National Energy Dominance Council, which Mr. Trump established to coordinate energy policy, has been meeting with battery companies. The Energy Department has quietly allowed many Biden-era grants for battery makers to proceed. It also recently announced up to $500 million for battery materials and recycling projects.

据三位知情人士透露，在最近几周里，白宫已就电池供应链召开了高级别会议。特朗普设立的负责协调能源政策的国家能源主导委员会正在与电池企业会面。能源部已悄然允许多项拜登时期面向电池制造商的拨款继续推进，并且近期还宣布将为电池材料与回收项目提供最高达5亿美元的资金支持。

The administration has started investing in companies that develop battery components or critical minerals, including Eos, a next-generation battery company. As part of a trade deal, officials prodded Japan to promise to invest billions of dollars in U.S. battery manufacturing. And the National Defense Authorization Act, passed this month, includes Pentagon restrictions on battery purchases from “foreign entities of concern,” primarily China.

政府已开始向从事电池组件或关键矿物开发的公司投资，其中包括下一代电池企业Eos。作为贸易协议的一部分，官员们还敦促日本承诺向美国电池制造领域投资数十亿美元。本月通过的《国防授权法》更是规定五角大楼不得采购“受关注外国实体”的电池，这主要针对的是中国。

The administration is saying “we don’t like electric vehicles, but we do need batteries for drones and data centers and A.I.,” said Samm Gillard, executive director and co-founder of the Battery Advocacy for Technology Transformation Coalition, a trade group. “They’re recognizing that China’s stranglehold on the battery supply chain is undermining our national security.”

行业组织电池技术转型联盟的执行董事、联合创始人萨姆·吉拉德表示，政府的立场是“我们不喜欢电动车，但确实需要为无人机、数据中心和人工智能配备电池”。他说，“他们意识到中国对电池供应链的控制正在削弱我们的国家安全。”

Taylor Rogers, a White House spokeswoman, said President Trump was “deploying all aspects of the government to work closely together” to “ensure the U.S. is the global leader in critical mineral and battery production.”

白宫发言人泰勒·罗杰斯则表示，特朗普总统正在“调动政府各部门协同发力”，以“确保美国在关键矿产与电池生产领域成为全球领导者”。

Experts say that building an industry not dependent on China will be enormously difficult. China is dominant in lithium iron phosphate batteries, or LFP, preferred for both E.V.s and for stationary storage.

专家指出，建立一个不依赖中国的产业将极其困难。中国在磷酸铁锂电池领域占据主导地位，这种电池既是电动汽车的首选，也广泛用于固定式储能。

中国在电池供应链的主导地位：在储能领域最常用的磷酸铁锂电池的每个生产环节，中国的占比。

In 2024, China made 99 percent of the world’s LFP cells and more than 90 percent of the main components, according to the International Energy Agency. That dominance extends to the refining of raw materials like lithium and graphite, as well as to fundamental components like cathodes and anodes that drive the movement of electrons within batteries.

国际能源署数据显示，2024年全球99%的磷酸铁锂电池电芯和90%以上核心部件产自中国。这种主导地位贯穿锂、石墨等原材料精炼，以及决定电池内部电子运动的阴极、阳极等基础组件。

The United States has its own lithium deposits and battery start-ups. But experts say it may take a coordinated effort and government support to compete against heavily subsidized Chinese competitors. Refining critical minerals can also be a hazardous process and American environmental standards could make the process much more expensive than in China.

尽管美国拥有锂矿资源和电池初创企业，但专家认为，要与获得了大量补贴的中国企业竞争，仍需协同推进并获得政府支持。此外，关键矿物的精炼过程属高危工序，而美国更严格的环保标准可能使成本远高于中国。

Analysts estimate it would take at least half a decade for U.S. manufacturers to produce enough LFP cells to meet domestic demand, and much longer to create supply chains for underlying components.

分析人士估计，美国制造商至少需要五年才能实现磷酸铁锂电池自给自足，而构建基础组件供应链则需更长时间。

Fatih Birol, the I.E.A.’s executive director, likened the world’s reliance on China to Europe’s dependence on Russian natural gas. After Russia attacked Ukraine, there were concerns that Moscow would cut supplies.

国际能源署执行干事法提赫·比罗尔将世界对中国的依赖比作欧洲对俄罗斯天然气的依赖。俄罗斯入侵乌克兰后，人们曾担心莫斯科会切断供应。

“Reliance for a strategic commodity or a technology on one single country, one single trade route,” Mr. Birol said, “is always risky.”

比罗尔说，“一种战略性商品或技术依赖于单一国家、单一贸易通道始终会存在风险。”

夜视镜等装备对电池依赖度极高，一名普通士兵执行标准巡逻任务时，携带的电池重量可达约11.3公斤。

The dilemma represents a shift in the A.I. race, which increasingly hinges on a nation’s electrical infrastructure — its ability to reliably deliver vast amounts of electricity to power-hungry data centers — as much as on computing chips.

这一困境标志着人工智能竞争的格局正在转变：角逐不仅仅取决于计算芯片，也日益取决于一国的电力基础设施，即为耗电量巨大的数据中心稳定输送海量电力的能力。

“Electricity is not simply a utility,” the A.I. giant OpenAI said in an October letter. “It’s a strategic asset that will secure our leadership on the most consequential technology since electricity itself.”

人工智能巨头OpenAI在去年10月的一封信中指出：“电力已不仅仅是一项公用事业，还是确保我们在继电力革命后最具颠覆性的技术领域保持主导地位的战略资产。”

Battery dominance is a big part of China’s growing lead in power generation overall, including renewable energy. China has long seen batteries as an industrial and military priority, according to Mr. Wang, the Hoover Institution expert.

电池领域的主导地位是中国在整体发电能力（包括可再生能源）上不断拉开领先优势的重要一环。胡佛研究所的王丹表示，中国长期以来将电池视为工业和军事发展的优先事项。

A.I. experts say U.S. companies still lead in computing capacity. Yet there is a rising concern that China’s advantage in energy infrastructure could help the country pass the United States.

人工智能专家表示，美国企业在算力方面仍处于领先地位。但人们越来越担心，中国在能源基础设施方面的优势可能帮助其超越美国。

“I’ve called A.I. ‘Manhattan Project 2,’” Chris Wright, the energy secretary, said in September, referring to America’s effort in the 1940s to make nuclear weapons. If “China got meaningfully ahead of us in A.I., we’d become the secondary nation of the planet,” he added.

能源部长克里斯·赖特在9月表示，“我将人工智能称为‘曼哈顿计划2.0’”，“曼哈顿计划”指的是美国在上世纪40年代研制核武器的计划。他补充道，如果“中国在人工智能领域实质性地超越我们，美国将沦为地球上的次等国家”。

Why data centers want batteries

数据中心为何需要电池

The engineers who keep data centers humming refer to the “five nines” of reliability. That is, they strive to keep the facilities online 99.999 percent of the time.

维持数据中心运转的工程师常提到“五个九”的可靠性标准，即力求确保设施99.999%的时间保持在线。

Doing so demands reliable power. Tech giants have been scrambling for energy from natural gas or existing nuclear plants, which can run at all hours, and are making bets on nascent technologies like smaller reactors or advanced geothermal plants.

要做到这一点，离不开可靠的电力供应。科技巨头们一直在争抢天然气或现有核电站的能源，因为它们可以全天候运行；同时也在押注一些新兴技术，比如小型反应堆或先进的地热电站。

“It’s get what you can get,” said Justin Gruetzner, an executive with Burns & McDonnell, a data center engineering firm.

数据中心工程公司Burns & McDonnell的高管贾斯汀·格鲁茨纳坦言：“现在是能争取到什么资源就用什么。”

Batteries are increasingly critical: Most data centers rely on them for backup. Batteries can provide instantaneous power in an outage while generators fueled by natural gas or diesel fire up, helping ensure that data isn’t lost.

电池正变得日益关键：大多数数据中心依赖电池进行备份。在断电时，电池能提供瞬时电力，为天然气或柴油发电机的启动争取时间，从而确保数据不丢失。

A.I. has particularly immense energy needs. An A.I. query can require about 10 times the electricity of traditional internet searches, the Electric Power Research Institute estimates. And the vast computing power can cause significant fluctuations in energy demand.

人工智能对能源的需求尤为巨大。据电力研究院估计，一次人工智能查询所需电力可能是传统互联网搜索的十倍。而庞大的算力还会导致能源需求出现显著波动。

《国防授权法》包含对五角大楼从“受关注外国实体”采购电池的限制条款。

Power “can fluctuate dramatically multiple times a minute,” said Chris Brown, chief technical officer at the Uptime Institute, a data-center advisory body. At scale, these swings can amount to tens or hundreds of megawatts and even damage power grid infrastructure, Microsoft researchers have warned.

数据中心咨询机构Uptime Institute的首席技术官克里斯·布朗指出，电力“负载每分钟都可能多次剧烈波动”。微软研究人员警告称，在大规模运行下，这种波动可能达到数十甚至上百兆瓦，甚至会损坏电网基础设施。

Even minor disruptions can lead to what’s known as “silent data corruption,” an emerging concern where A.I. hardware produces calculation errors. During one experiment, “a silent data corruption error actually broke the model,” said Jeffrey J. Ma, lead author of a paper on the phenomenon.

即使轻微的中断也可能引发所谓的“静默数据损坏”，即人工智能硬件在未被察觉的情况下产生计算错误，这一现象正日益引发关注。相关论文的第一作者杰弗里·J·马表示，在一次实验中，静默数据损坏错误直接导致了模型的损坏。

The lithium-ion batteries that China dominates are becoming increasingly prevalent. In February Google said that it had installed more than 100 million cells across its data centers and had started to replace diesel generators with batteries. Microsoft said it aimed for its data centers to eliminate diesel fuel for backup by 2030 to meet environmental goals.

中国占据主导地位的锂离子电池正变得越来越普及。今年2月，谷歌表示已在它的数据中心部署了超过1亿个电池单元，并开始用电池替代柴油发电机。微软表示，为达成环保目标，计划在2030年前彻底淘汰数据中心备用柴油发电机。

Batteries and the realities of war

电池与战争的现实

去年9月，一名乌克兰士兵正在练习操作无人机。小巧灵活的无人机武器正在改变战争形态。

Among the lessons from the horrors of Ukraine is a daunting realization: The future of military power rests with batteries.

乌克兰战场的惨痛教训之一令人警醒：未来的军事力量建立在电池之上。

Many battlefield drones are powered with lithium batteries that rely on materials and technology from China. Within Ukraine, Chinese export controls have slowed production and tripled the prices for some components, according to defense analysts.

许多战场无人机使用锂电池供电，而这些电池依赖来自中国的材料和技术。国防分析人士称，在乌克兰境内，中国的出口管制已拖慢了生产速度，并使部分零部件价格上涨了三倍。

“Every Chinese export restriction since 2022 has reverberated directly onto the battlefield,” said Catarina Buchatskiy, a defense expert at the Snake Island Institute, which focuses on military technology. The U.S. could soon face the problem, she said, adding that the kinds of components Ukraine has struggled to secure “are embedded across Western defense programs.”

专门从事军事技术研究的蛇岛研究所防务专家卡塔琳娜·布哈茨基指出：“自2022年以来，中国的每一次出口限制都直接影响了战场态势。”她还说，美国可能很快面临同样问题，并强调乌克兰难以获得的这类零部件“已广泛应用于西方的防务项目”。

俄罗斯与乌克兰使用的大部分电池购自中国：2023年可充电电池进口情况

Lasers, hand-held radios, night vision goggles, satellites and drones use advanced batteries. The average soldier carries as much as 25 pounds of batteries for a standard 72-hour patrol.

激光武器、手持无线电、夜视仪、卫星和无人机都依赖先进电池。一名普通士兵执行72小时标准巡逻任务，携带的电池重量可达约11.3公斤。

And the shift toward stealthier vehicles, unmanned systems, electronic warfare and constellations of small satellites have swelled demand, said Jeffrey Nadaner, who was deputy assistant defense secretary for industrial policy during the first Trump administration. Shoring up America’s battery industry, he said, merits an effort on par with “the Apollo space program.”

曾在特朗普首个任期内担任国防部工业政策副助理部长的杰弗里·纳达纳表示，随着隐形能力更强的载具、无人系统、电子战和小型卫星的发展，相关电池需求急剧增长。他强调，巩固美国电池产业需要与“阿波罗登月计划”相当的投入力度。

The Pentagon is paying attention. The 2025 National Defense Authorization Act mandated a new battery strategy, and in a white paper published this year, the Defense Logistics Agency said the department should treat battery technology as mission-critical.

五角大楼已经开始重视这一问题。《2025国防授权法》明确要求制定新的电池战略，而国防后勤局今年发布的一份白皮书也指出，国防部应将电池技术视为关乎任务成败的关键能力。

Elaine K. Dezenski, an expert on geopolitical risk and supply-chain security at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said, “When we think about the future of manufacturing and defense, and how we should be protecting critical supply chains, the chips are the brain, and batteries are the heart.”

保卫民主基金会的地缘政治风险与供应链安全专家伊莱恩·K·德曾斯基指出：“当我们思考制造业和国防的未来，以及该如何保护关键供应链时，芯片是大脑，电池是心脏。”

Battery companies go to Washington

电池企业涌向华盛顿

密歇根州的初创企业Our Next Energy正在进行磷酸铁锂电池组的测试。

In 2024, the start-up Group14 Technologies won a $200 million Biden administration grant to build a factory in Moses Lake, Wash., to produce a substitute for graphite, a key material that today mostly comes from China. But after Mr. Trump took office, Group14’s grant got tied up in a broader effort by the administration to freeze clean energy funding.

2024年，初创企业Group14 Technologies曾获得拜登政府2亿美元资助，计划在华盛顿州摩西湖建厂，生产目前主要依赖中国进口的关键材料——石墨——的替代品。但特朗普执政后，这笔拨款被纳入政府冻结清洁能源资金的整体行动，导致项目一度受挫。

After an extensive review, the Energy Department allowed many battery grants to move forward “because the administration recognized that this isn’t about left versus right or green versus not green,” Rick Luebbe, Group14’s chief executive, said.

经过全面审查，能源部最终允许包括电池项目在内的多项资助继续推进。Group14首席执行官里克·吕贝表示：“政府意识到这无关左右立场或环保争议。”

Still, he said, the factories that Group14 is building will be able to displace only a fraction of Chinese materials. To compete with China’s industrial subsidies, Washington would need to do more. “I see more tolerance for battery projects. What I don’t see is investment,” he said.

尽管如此，他也指出，Group14正在建设的工厂只能替代一小部分中国材料。若要与中国的产业补贴竞争，华盛顿还需要加大力度。“我看到的是对电池项目的容忍度提高了，但尚未见到实质性投资，”他说。

Other battery companies have noticed the administration’s new receptiveness. “The Biden administration liked our sustainability story,” said Judy Brown, head of external affairs at South32, a company that has received federal support to develop an Arizona mine for manganese, a key battery material. “The Trump administration likes the national-security story.”

其他电池企业也注意到政府态度的转变。获得联邦资助在亚利桑那州开发关键电池材料锰矿的South32公司对外事务负责人朱迪·布朗表示：“拜登政府青睐我们的可持续发展故事，而特朗普政府更关注国家安全叙事。”

One question, experts say, is whether the United States can sustain a domestic industry, even as sales of electric vehicles slow, undermined by Mr. Trump’s policies.

专家们指出，一个问题在于：电动车受特朗普的政策拖累销量放缓的背景下，美国本土电池产业能否获得持续发展。

Trump officials have “softened their tone on batteries,” said Noah Gordon, an expert on sustainability and geopolitics at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “But the policy is still incoherent” because of its hostility toward E.V.s, he said. “They’re trying to boost battery manufacturing while also undermining the biggest sources of demand.”

卡内基国际和平基金会可持续发展与地缘政治专家诺亚·戈登分析称，特朗普官员对电池的态度“已有所软化”，但由于对电动车的抵触情绪，“政策仍缺乏连贯性。”他指出：“他们试图在提振电池制造业的同时，又一直在削弱其最大的需求来源。”

Early this year, Chinese automakers enthusiastically announced that they would soon be mass-producing and selling self-driving vehicles.

今年年初，中国汽车制造商纷纷热情宣布将很快量产并销售自动驾驶汽车。

Most of those plans have now been delayed after a deadly crash that drew broad public attention.

但现在，大多数计划在一场引发公众广泛关注的致命车祸后已被推迟。

China’s regulators finally gave the go-ahead last week to only two of the nine automakers that had submitted plans to sell self-driving cars. And the approvals by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology were narrowly tailored to allow little more than further testing, not mass production.

九家提交自动驾驶汽车销售计划的车企中，中国监管机构上周最终仅批准了两家。工业和信息化部的批准文件严格限定了适用范围，仅允许企业开展进一步测试，而非大规模生产。

Beijing Automotive Group and Changan Automobile in Chongqing will be allowed to operate self-driving taxis on three stretches of highway in each company’s hometown, the ministry said, and the taxis will not be allowed to change lanes while under computer control. On any other road, the taxis will need to be under the control of a driver.

工信部表示，北京汽车集团和重庆长安汽车获准在各自城市的三段高速公路上运营自动驾驶出租车，且车辆在电脑控制下不允许变道。在其他任何道路上，这些出租车必须由驾驶员控制。

The limited programs represent a recognition by the Chinese government that objectives set nearly five years ago, to begin mass production for sale to the general public by the end of this year, were too ambitious.

这些有限的项目表明，中国政府承认五年前设定的目标——即到今年年底开始面向公众大规模生产销售——过于雄心勃勃。

China’s regulators began to pull back after a crash of a Xiaomi SU7 in late March killed three women, all university students. News of previous accidents involving assisted driving had been suppressed by China’s censors. But news of the crash in March, on a highway in central China’s Anhui Province, spread quickly and widely.

3月底一辆小米SU7发生致命车祸后，中国监管机构开始收紧政策。该事故造成三名女大学生死亡。此前涉及辅助驾驶的事故新闻常被中国审查机构压制，但3月发生在安徽高速公路上的这起事故迅速广泛传播。

2025年4月上海车展上的小米SU7 Ultra。监管机构在3月小米SU7发生致命车祸后开始收紧政策。

Questions swirled over whether drivers or automakers could be held legally responsible for such crashes.

公众开始质疑驾驶员或汽车制造商是否应为此类事故承担法律责任。

According to Xiaomi, the car was moving at 72 miles per hour in assisted-driving mode when it detected that its lane had been closed because of construction. The car issued an audible warning: “Please be aware of obstacles ahead.” The driver took control of the vehicle, which crashed one second later into a concrete barrier, according to the company.

根据小米公司的说法，事故发生时车辆以116公里的时速处于辅助驾驶模式，系统检测到前方因施工而封闭的车道。车辆发出语音警告：“请注意前方障碍物。”驾驶员接管车辆，但仅一秒后撞上混凝土护栏。

The public discussion of the tragedy prompted China’s Ministry of Public Security to get involved. The ministry issued a statement warning that the assisted-driving technology currently available on mass-produced cars in China was not the same as fully automated driving. It warned motorists against having conversations that might distract them.

这起悲剧引发公众热议，中国公安部随后介入。公安部发布声明，警告称目前量产车上的辅助驾驶技术并非完全自动驾驶，并提醒驾驶员不要进行可能分散注意力的交谈。

“The risky behavior of playing with mobile phones, sleeping, chatting and eating after turning on the assisted-driving function not only violates road traffic safety laws and regulations, but also poses serious threat to the safety of other road users,” the ministry said.

公安部表示：“开启辅助驾驶功能后玩手机、睡觉、聊天、吃饭等危险行为，不仅违反道路交通安全法律法规，也对其他道路使用者构成严重威胁。”

Three levels of assisted or driverless technology are being debated in China.

中国正在讨论三种辅助或无人驾驶技术等级。

So-called Level 2 technology helps steer the car, but drivers are required to keep their hands on the wheel and eyes on the road. This is already widely available in China, including on the SU7 that crashed. But a report aired by state television last summer found that none of the domestic manufacturers’ systems were as reliable as those of Tesla, the American automaker that is popular in China.

所谓L2级技术可辅助转向，但要求驾驶员双手握方向盘、眼睛注视道路。这种技术在中国已广泛应用，包括事故中的SU7。但今年夏天央视报道显示，国内厂商的L2系统在可靠性上均不如在中国颇受欢迎的特斯拉。

Under Level 3 technology, drivers do not need to keep their hands on the wheel and eyes on the road, but must be in the driver’s seat and ready to take control of the car.

L3级技术允许驾驶员无需一直握方向盘或注视道路，但必须坐在驾驶座并随时准备接管车辆。

Level 4 involves robot taxis with no drivers at all; passengers sit in the back seat and may be blocked by a partition from even reaching the empty front seats. More than a dozen Chinese cities, notably Wuhan, are testing robot taxis.

L4级涉及完全无人驾驶的出租车，乘客坐在后排，甚至可能被隔离板挡住无法触及空置的前排座位。中国已有十多个城市（尤其是武汉）在测试自动驾驶出租车。

Days before the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology approved the two limited taxi services for Level 3, Geely Auto, China’s second-largest automaker, had tried to reassure regulators and the Chinese public about traffic safety. On Dec. 12, Geely opened the world’s largest automotive safety testing center in Ningbo.

在工信部批准两家有限的L3级出租车服务前几天，中国第二大车企吉利汽车试图安抚监管机构和公众对交通安全的担忧。12月12日，吉利在宁波启用了全球最大的汽车安全测试中心。

Jerry Gan, chief executive of Geely, said his company had already begun shipping some of its Zeekr cars with the hardware needed for Level 3 operations. “This represents the highest safety standard for assisted driving for the L3 era,” he said.

吉利首席执行官淦家阅表示，公司已开始交付部分搭载L3级运行所需硬件的极氪汽车。“这代表了L3时代辅助驾驶的最高安全标准，”他说。

China’s state-run television followed the Xiaomi crash with a report in July that was widely viewed on Chinese internet. Tests of Level 2 technology on 36 car models from 20 brands had found that slightly fewer than half the cars could safely avoid a crash when they encountered trucks near a construction site at night, the report stated.

小米车祸后，央视7月播出一期广受关注的报道。报道称，对20个品牌36款车型的L2级技术测试显示，夜间在施工现场附近遇到卡车时，仅不到一半的车辆能安全避撞。

Only the two Tesla models in the test had assisted-driving systems that were reliable in a wide range of safety situations.

测试中，只有特斯拉的两款车型在各种安全场景下辅助驾驶系统表现可靠。

Some Chinese automakers, like Geely, were so certain that Level 3 self-driving systems would be approved soon that they had already begun mass-producing cars with the necessary cameras and other equipment. But for now, the cars are being sold with only Level 2 software because of Beijing regulators’ tilt toward greater caution.

一些中国车企（如吉利）曾确信L3级系统很快获批，因此已开始批量生产配备必要摄像头等硬件的车辆。但由于北京监管机构倾向于更加谨慎，目前这些车辆仅搭载L2级软件销售。

吉利在中国宁波的新安全中心，一台强大的滑轨加速器正在进行碰撞测试。吉利安全中心库房中的碰撞测试假人。

Geely, XPeng Motors and Li Auto are among the companies with licenses to continue testing Level 3 cars on roads. But unlike the taxi affiliates of Changan and Beijing Automotive, they do not yet have licenses allowing them to start commercial service with these cars.

吉利、小鹏汽车和理想汽车等公司获得继续在道路上测试L3级车辆的许可。但与长安和北汽的出租车子公司不同，它们尚未获得允许用这些车辆开展商业服务的许可。

“What looked like an imminent L3 rollout was, in hindsight, a marketing-led acceleration running ahead of governance, insurance frameworks and public trust,” said Bill Russo, an electric cars consultant in Shanghai.

上海电动车顾问比尔·拉索表示：“回顾来看，看似即将来临的L3级大规模推广，其实是营销驱动的加速，超前于治理框架、保险体系和公众信任。”

The government’s decision on taxi services, he added, “formalizes a pause — not to stop progress, but to slow it down, narrow the scope and put guardrails around it.”

他补充说，政府对出租车服务的决定“正式确立了一次暂停——不是停止进步，而是放慢速度、缩小范围并设置护栏。”

When Barack Obama joined Silicon Valley’s top luminaries for dinner in California last February, each guest was asked to come with a question for the president.

去年2月 ，巴拉克·奥巴马在加州与硅谷的各位顶尖名人共进晚餐。按照这次晚宴的规矩，每位客人都得向总统提一个问题。

在中国，林丽娜（音）是PCH International的一个项目经理。该公司和苹果签有合同。"有很多工作机会，"她说。“特别是在深圳。”

But as Steven P. Jobs of Apple spoke, President Obama interrupted with an inquiry of his own: what would it take to make iPhones in the United States?

然而，轮到苹果公司的史蒂芬·P·乔布斯(Steven P. Jobs)说话的时候，奥巴马总统却用自己的问题打断了他：要在美国生产iPhone的话，需要满足什么样的条件呢？

Not long ago, Apple boasted that its products were made in America. Today, few are. Almost all of the 70 million iPhones, 30 million iPads and 59 million other products Apple sold last year were manufactured overseas.

没多久之前，苹果公司还吹嘘自己的产品都是“美国制造”。今天，美国制造的苹果产品已经少之又少。苹果公司去年售出了7000万部iPhone、3000万台iPad和5900万台其他产品，这些产品几乎都是在海外制造的。

Why can’t that work come home? Mr. Obama asked.

干嘛不把这些工作拿回来做呢？奥巴马先生问道。

Mr. Jobs’s reply was unambiguous. “Those jobs aren’t coming back,” he said, according to another dinner guest.

乔布斯先生的回答毫不含糊。按照另一位在座嘉宾的说法，乔布斯的回答是：“这些工作是不会回来的。”

The president’s question touched upon a central conviction at Apple. It isn’t just that workers are cheaper abroad. Rather, Apple’s executives believe the vast scale of overseas factories as well as the flexibility, diligence and industrial skills of foreign workers have so outpaced their American counterparts that “Made in the U.S.A.” is no longer a viable option for most Apple products.

总统的问题触及了苹果公司的一个核心信念。苹果的做法不光是因为外国工人比较便宜。更重要的是，苹果公司管理层认为，外国工厂的巨大规模，以及外国工人的灵活性、勤勉精神和工业技能，全都远远地超过了美国同侪。这样一来，对于大多数的苹果产品来说，“美国制造”已经不再是一个可行的选择。

Apple has become one of the best-known, most admired and most imitated companies on earth, in part through an unrelenting mastery of global operations. Last year, it earned over $400,000 in profit per employee, more than Goldman Sachs, Exxon Mobil or Google.

苹果公司已经成为全球最知名、最受人崇敬、最多人仿效的企业之一，原因之一就是它毫不手软地实施着高水平的全球运作。去年，苹果公司员工创造的人均利润超过了40万美元，令高盛(Goldman Sachs)、埃克森美孚(Exxon Mobil)和谷歌(Google)相形见绌。

However, what has vexed Mr. Obama as well as economists and policy makers is that Apple — and many of its high-technology peers — are not nearly as avid in creating American jobs as other famous companies were in their heydays.

然而，让奥巴马先生、各位经济学家和各位决策人士着恼的是，说到为美国创造工作机会的问题，苹果公司跟它的许多高科技同行一样，远不像其他一些鼎盛时期的著名公司那么热心。

Apple employs 43,000 people in the United States and 20,000 overseas, a small fraction of the over 400,000 American workers at General Motors in the 1950s, or the hundreds of thousands at General Electric in the 1980s. Many more people work for Apple’s contractors: an additional 700,000 people engineer, build and assemble iPads, iPhones and Apple’s other products. But almost none of them work in the United States. Instead, they work for foreign companies in Asia, Europe and elsewhere, at factories that almost all electronics designers rely upon to build their wares.

苹果公司在美国有四万三千名雇员，并有两万名海外雇员。20世纪50年代的通用汽车公司(General Motors)雇用了超过40万美国工人，20世纪80年代的通用电气(General Electric)也拥有数十万美国员工，与之相比，苹果公司的员工数目只是一个零头。为苹果的外包商打工的人却要比这多得多：苹果员工之外，另有70万人在设计、制造和组装iPad、iPhone和其他苹果产品。不过，这些人的工作地点几乎都不在美国。恰恰相反，他们的雇主是亚洲、欧洲和其他地方的外国公司，几乎所有的电子产品设计商都要靠他们服务的厂家来制造产品。

“Apple’s an example of why it’s so hard to create middle-class jobs in the U.S. now,” said Jared Bernstein, who until last year was an economic adviser to the White House.“If it’s the pinnacle of capitalism, we should be worried.”

直到去年还在担任白宫经济顾问的杰瑞德·伯恩斯坦(Jared Bernstein)说，“今天的美国很难创造出适合中产阶级的工作机会，苹果公司的做法就可以说明原因何在。如果说苹果公司代表着资本主义巅峰状态的话，我们就该担惊受怕了。”

Apple executives say that going overseas, at this point, is their only option. One former executive described how the company relied upon a Chinese factory to revamp iPhone manufacturing just weeks before the device was due on shelves. Apple had redesigned the iPhone’s screen at the last minute, forcing an assembly line overhaul. New screens began arriving at the plant near midnight.

苹果管理层宣称，走向海外是他们在目前阶段的惟一选择。按照一位前苹果管理人员的讲述，离iPhone预定上架日期只有数周的时候，苹果公司靠一家中国工厂帮忙才完成了生产计划。原因在于苹果公司临时改变了iPhone屏幕的设计，不得不对装配线进行全面调整。将近午夜的时候，新的屏幕才陆续运抵装配工厂。

A foreman immediately roused 8,000 workers inside the company’s dormitories, according to the executive. Each employee was given a biscuit and a cup of tea, guided to a workstation and within half an hour started a 12-hour shift fitting glass screens into beveled frames. Within 96 hours, the plant was producing over 10,000 iPhones a day.

根据这位管理人员的说法，厂里的一名工头立刻叫醒了公司宿舍里的八千名工人，给每名工人发了一包饼干和一杯茶，吩咐他们前往车间。不到半个钟头，往倾斜放置的手机外壳上安装玻璃屏幕的12小时工作班次宣告开始。不到96个小时，那家工厂就已经在以日产一万多台的速度生产iPhone了。

“The speed and flexibility is breathtaking,” the executive said. “There’s no American plant that can match that.”

这位管理人员说，“那家工厂的速度和灵活性令人咋舌，没有哪家美国工厂能跟它相提并论。”

Similar stories could be told about almost any electronics company — and outsourcing has also become common in hundreds of industries, including accounting, legal services, banking, auto manufacturing and pharmaceuticals.

几乎所有的电子公司都讲得出类似的故事，“外包”也已经成为数百个行业的通行做法，会计、法律服务、银行、汽车制造和制药行业都是如此。

But while Apple is far from alone, it offers a window into why the success of some prominent companies has not translated into large numbers of domestic jobs. What’s more, the company’s decisions pose broader questions about what corporate America owes Americans as the global and national economies are increasingly intertwined.

苹果公司虽然远远算不上个例，但却为我们提供了一个窗口，我们可以从中窥见，一些杰出公司的成功表现为什么没有衍生大量的国内工作机会。除此之外，这家公司的种种决策还引出了一个更为深广的问题，在全球经济与国内经济日益融合的今天，美国企业对美国国民负有什么样的责任。

“Companies once felt an obligation to support American workers, even when it wasn’t the best financial choice,” said Betsey Stevenson, the chief economist at the Labor Department until last September. “That’s disappeared. Profits and efficiency have trumped generosity.”

直至去年9月还是美国劳工部首席经济学家的贝特西·史蒂文森(Betsey Stevenson)说，“美国公司曾经觉得自己有责任支持美国工人，即便这并不是财务上的最佳选择。这样的观念已然不复存在，利润和效率压倒了慷慨的情操。”

Companies and other economists say that notion is naïve. Though Americans are among the most educated workers in the world, the nation has stopped training enough people in the mid-level skills that factories need, executives say.

各家公司以及其他一些经济学家纷纷表示，前述观念实属天真幼稚。公司高管们指出，美国人虽然居于世界上教育程度最高的工人之列，但美国的培训工作已经跟不上形势，再也不能为各家工厂提供足够数量的中等技术工人了。

To thrive, companies argue they need to move work where it can generate enough profits to keep paying for innovation. Doing otherwise risks losing even more American jobs over time, as evidenced by the legions of once-proud domestic manufacturers — including G.M. and others — that have shrunk as nimble competitors have emerged.

各家公司辩称，要想兴旺发达，他们就只能把工作转移到那些利润足以维持不断创新的地方。如其不然，假以时日，美国的工作机会还有进一步减少的风险。例证便是包括通用在内的众多美国制造业巨头，它们曾经豪气干云，后来却纷纷缩水，因为市场上出现了一些身手灵活的竞争者。

Apple was provided with extensive summaries of The New York Times’s reporting for this article, but the company, which has a reputation for secrecy, declined to comment.

《纽约时报》向苹果公司提供了本篇报道的详细纲要，然而，以行事隐秘著称的苹果公司拒绝就此发表评论。

This article is based on interviews with more than three dozen current and former Apple employees and contractors — many of whom requested anonymity to protect their jobs — as well as economists, manufacturing experts, international trade specialists, technology analysts, academic researchers, employees at Apple’s suppliers, competitors and corporate partners, and government officials.

本篇报道基于大量访谈，采访对象包括近40名离职或现职苹果员工及外包商，其中多人都要求隐去姓名，怕的是丢掉工作。此外，报道的采访对象还包括一些经济学家、制造业专家、国际贸易专家、技术分析家、学术研究人员、苹果供应商员工、竞争对手、合作伙伴以及政府官员。

Privately, Apple executives say the world is now such a changed place that it is a mistake to measure a company’s contribution simply by tallying its employees — though they note that Apple employs more workers in the United States than ever before.

苹果公司的一些管理人员私下表示，鉴于世界形势已经急剧改变，仅以员工数目来衡量企业贡献是一种错误的做法。他们同时指出，苹果在美国的工人数目比以往任何时候都要多。

They say Apple’s success has benefited the economy by empowering entrepreneurs and creating jobs at companies like cellular providers and businesses shipping Apple products. And, ultimately, they say curing unemployment is not their job.

他们说，苹果的成功给创业者带来了商机，并在手机运营商以及苹果产品承运人之类的企业里催生了更多的工作机会，由此推动了美国经济。他们还说，说到底，消除失业并不是他们的事情。

“We sell iPhones in over a hundred countries,” a current Apple executive said. “We don’t have an obligation to solve America’s problems. Our only obligation is making the best product possible.”

苹果公司的一位现职管理人员说，“我们在100多个国家销售iPhone，并没有义务解决美国的问题。我们只有一个义务，那就是推出最好的产品。”

‘I Want a Glass Screen’

“我想要玻璃屏幕”

In 2007, a little over a month before the iPhone was scheduled to appear in stores, Mr. Jobs beckoned a handful of lieutenants into an office. For weeks, he had been carrying a prototype of the device in his pocket.

2007年，离iPhone预定的上架时间还有一个月出头，乔布斯先生把一小群僚属召进了一间办公室。几个星期以来，他兜里一直都揣着一部iPhone样机。

Mr. Jobs angrily held up his iPhone, angling it so everyone could see the dozens of tiny scratches marring its plastic screen, according to someone who attended the meeting. He then pulled his keys from his jeans.

据一名与会者回忆，乔布斯先生气冲冲地举起了样机，调整着样机的角度，好让大家都看到塑料屏幕上的几十条微小划痕。这之后，他把自己的钥匙从牛仔裤兜里掏了出来。

People will carry this phone in their pocket, he said. People also carry their keys in their pocket. “I won’t sell a product that gets scratched,” he said tensely. The only solution was using unscratchable glass instead. “I want a glass screen, and I want it perfect in six weeks.”

他告诉与会者，人们都会把手机揣在兜里，还会把钥匙装进去。“我不愿意出售会有划痕的产品，”他疾言厉色地说。这一来，惟一的办法便是代之以不会产生划痕的玻璃。“我想要玻璃屏幕，这件事情必须在六周之内办好。”

After one executive left that meeting, he booked a flight to Shenzhen, China. If Mr. Jobs wanted perfect, there was nowhere else to go.

与会的一名管理人员走出房间，订了一张去深圳的机票。既然乔布斯先生提出了“办好”的要求，那就只能到深圳去。

For over two years, the company had been working on a project — code-named Purple 2 — that presented the same questions at every turn: how do you completely reimagine the cellphone? And how do you design it at the highest quality — with an unscratchable screen, for instance — while also ensuring that millions can be manufactured quickly and inexpensively enough to earn a significant profit?

两年多的时间里，苹果公司一直在开发这个代号为“紫色2”(Purple 2)的项目，同样的一些问题在项目的每个阶段反复浮现：怎样才能彻底颠覆原有的“手机”概念？怎样才能设计出一款质量最上乘——比如说，带有不会划花的屏幕——的手机，同时确保公司能以足够低廉的成本迅速推出数以百万计的产品、由此赚取丰厚的利润呢？

The answers, almost every time, were found outside the United States. Though components differ between versions, all iPhones contain hundreds of parts, an estimated 90 percent of which are manufactured abroad. Advanced semiconductors have come from Germany and Taiwan, memory from Korea and Japan, display panels and circuitry from Korea and Taiwan, chipsets from Europe and rare metals from Africa and Asia. And all of it is put together in China.

几乎是在每一次讨论当中，问题的答案都出现在美国之外。iPhone的组件虽然因型号而异，所有的iPhone却都包含着数百个零件，在海外生产的零件估计占总数的90%。高科技半导体来自德国和台湾，内存来自韩国和日本，显示屏和电路板来自韩国和台湾，芯片组来自欧洲，稀有金属来自非洲和亚洲，组装的地点则是中国。

In its early days, Apple usually didn’t look beyond its own backyard for manufacturing solutions. A few years after Apple began building the Macintosh in 1983, for instance, Mr. Jobs bragged that it was “a machine that is made in America.” In 1990, while Mr. Jobs was running NeXT, which was eventually bought by Apple, the executive told a reporter that “I’m as proud of the factory as I am of the computer.” As late as 2002, top Apple executives occasionally drove two hours northeast of their headquarters to visit the company’s iMac plant in Elk Grove, Calif.

创业之初，苹果公司通常只会在自家后院里寻找代工厂。举例来说，该公司于1983年推出了个人台式电脑Macintosh，数年之后，乔布斯先生曾经吹嘘它是“真正美国制造的机器”。1990年，乔布斯先生还在打理后来被苹果收购的NeXT公司。当时他曾经告诉一名记者，“我为我们的电脑自豪，同样为我们的工厂自豪。”迟至2002年，苹果公司的高层都还会时不时地开车往总部的东北方向走上两个小时的车，到加州的埃克格鲁夫(Elk Grove)去视察公司的iMac工厂。

But by 2004, Apple had largely turned to foreign manufacturing. Guiding that decision was Apple’s operations expert, Timothy D. Cook, who replaced Mr. Jobs as chief executive last August, six weeks before Mr. Jobs’s death. Most other American electronics companies had already gone abroad, and Apple, which at the time was struggling, felt it had to grasp every advantage.

然而，进入2004年的时候，苹果公司已经把大部分的生产工作转到了国外。主导这一决策的人是苹果公司的运营专家蒂莫西·D·库克(Timothy D. Cook)。去年8月，乔布斯先生去世六周之前，他接替乔布斯先生当上了苹果的首席执行官。2004年的时候，大多数美国电子公司已然转向海外，正在挣扎求生的苹果公司由是认为，自己必须用上所有的有利条件。

In part, Asia was attractive because the semiskilled workers there were cheaper. But that wasn’t driving Apple. For technology companies, the cost of labor is minimal compared with the expense of buying parts and managing supply chains that bring together components and services from hundreds of companies.

亚洲之所以诱人，部分原因是那里的半熟练工人比较便宜。不过，吸引苹果公司的并不是这一点。对于高科技公司来说，支出的大头是零件采购和管理来自数百个公司的组件及服务供应链，与之相较，人力成本可谓微不足道。

For Mr. Cook, the focus on Asia “came down to two things,” said one former high-ranking Apple executive. Factories in Asia “can scale up and down faster” and “Asian supply chains have surpassed what’s in the U.S.” The result is that “we can’t compete at this point,” the executive said.

一名苹果公司前高管说，按照库克先生的看法，聚焦亚洲的决策“可以归结为两个原因”。亚洲的工厂“扩大或缩小规模的速度比较快”，与此同时，“亚洲的供应链也比美国强”。这名前高管说，由此而来的结果就是“在这一阶段，我们没法跟别人竞争”。

The impact of such advantages became obvious as soon as Mr. Jobs demanded glass screens in 2007.

2007年，乔布斯先生提出关于玻璃屏幕的要求之后，上述条件的优越性立刻变得一目了然。

For years, cellphone makers had avoided using glass because it required precision in cutting and grinding that was extremely difficult to achieve. Apple had already selected an American company, Corning Inc., to manufacture large panes of strengthened glass. But figuring out how to cut those panes into millions of iPhone screens required finding an empty cutting plant, hundreds of pieces of glass to use in experiments and an army of midlevel engineers. It would cost a fortune simply to prepare.

多年以来，手机生产商一直不愿意使用玻璃屏幕，因为它需要精确的切割和打磨，达到标准的难度非常之大。苹果公司已经选定美国的康宁公司(Corning Inc.)来生产大块的强化玻璃板。然而，要想把玻璃板切成数以百万计的iPhone屏幕，那就得找到一家空闲的切割工厂、数百块实验用的玻璃板以及一大帮中级技师。光是准备工作就得消耗一大笔资金。

Then a bid for the work arrived from a Chinese factory.

就在这时，一家中国工厂跑来投标，要求承揽这项工作。

When an Apple team visited, the Chinese plant’s owners were already constructing a new wing. “This is in case you give us the contract,” the manager said, according to a former Apple executive. The Chinese government had agreed to underwrite costs for numerous industries, and those subsidies had trickled down to the glass-cutting factory. It had a warehouse filled with glass samples available to Apple, free of charge. The owners made engineers available at almost no cost. They had built on-site dormitories so employees would be available 24 hours a day.

苹果的考察小组赶到那家中国工厂的时候，厂主们已经开始兴建新厂房了。一名前苹果公司管理人员回忆，厂长的解释是，“这是在提前做准备，免得你们的订单让我们措手不及”。此前中国政府已经承诺为许多产业提供成本补贴，那家玻璃切割工厂也从中分了一杯羹。他们有一间装满玻璃样品的仓库，可以向苹果公司提供免费样品。厂主们还答应提供技师，几乎不需要费用。他们已经建起了厂内宿舍，员工可以24小时随叫随到。

The Chinese plant got the job.

那家中国工厂拿到了订单。

“The entire supply chain is in China now,” said another former high-ranking Apple executive. “You need a thousand rubber gaskets? That’s the factory next door. You need a million screws? That factory is a block away. You need that screw made a little bit different? It will take three hours.”

另一名前苹果高管说，“整条供应链如今都在中国。需要1000个橡胶垫圈吗？隔壁就有这样的工厂。需要100万个螺丝钉吗？厂子就在一个街区之外。需要对螺丝钉做一点小小的改动吗？三个小时就可以办到。”

In Foxconn City

走进“富士康城”

An eight-hour drive from that glass factory is a complex, known informally as Foxconn City, where the iPhone is assembled. To Apple executives, Foxconn City was further evidence that China could deliver workers — and diligence — that outpaced their American counterparts.

距那家玻璃厂8小时车程的地方是一大片俗称“富士康城”(Foxconn City)的建筑，iPhone的装配线就在那里。在苹果管理层看来，富士康城进一步证明了一个事实：中国有能力提供比美国同行更好的工人，勤勉的态度也超过美国。

That’s because nothing like Foxconn City exists in the United States.

原因在于，美国根本找不出像富士康城这样的东西。

The facility has 230,000 employees, many working six days a week, often spending up to 12 hours a day at the plant. Over a quarter of Foxconn’s work force lives in company barracks and many workers earn less than $17 a day. When one Apple executive arrived during a shift change, his car was stuck in a river of employees streaming past. “The scale is unimaginable,” he said.

这片厂区有23万员工，其中许多人都是每周工作6天，一天的工作时间经常会达到12小时。超过四分之一的富士康员工住在公司的宿舍里，许多工人的日薪都不到17美元。一名苹果管理人员曾经在换班的时候进入工厂，他的轿车卡在了川流的员工之中。“这样的规模真是难以想象，”他说。

Foxconn employs nearly 300 guards to direct foot traffic so workers are not crushed in doorway bottlenecks. The facility’s central kitchen cooks an average of three tons of pork and 13 tons of rice a day. While factories are spotless, the air inside nearby teahouses is hazy with the smoke and stench of cigarettes.

富士康雇了将近300名保安来引导步行的人流，免得工人堵在门口的狭窄区域。厂区的主食堂平均每天消耗3吨猪肉和13吨大米。厂房虽然一尘不染，附近的茶馆里却弥漫着烟雾和臭烘烘的烟草味道。

Foxconn Technology has dozens of facilities in Asia and Eastern Europe, and in Mexico and Brazil, and it assembles an estimated 40 percent of the world’s consumer electronics for customers like Amazon, Dell, Hewlett-Packard, Motorola, Nintendo, Nokia, Samsung and Sony.

富士康科技公司(Foxconn Technology)在亚洲、东欧、墨西哥和巴西拥有数十家工厂，组装的电子消费品估计占世界总量的40%，客户都是亚马逊(Amazon)、戴尔(Dell)、惠普(Hewlett-Packard)、摩托罗拉(Motorola)、任天堂(Nintendo)、诺基亚(Nokia)、三星(Samsung)和索尼(Sony)之类的公司。

“They could hire 3,000 people overnight,” said Jennifer Rigoni, who was Apple’s worldwide supply demand manager until 2010, but declined to discuss specifics of her work. “What U.S. plant can find 3,000 people overnight and convince them to live in dorms?”

詹妮弗·瑞格尼(Jennifer Rigoni)担任苹果公司全球供需经理至2010年，但却拒绝谈论自己的工作细节。她说，“他们可以在一夜之间雇来三千人。哪家美国工厂能在一夜之间雇来三千人、说服他们住进宿舍呢？”

In mid-2007, after a month of experimentation, Apple’s engineers finally perfected a method for cutting strengthened glass so it could be used in the iPhone’s screen. The first truckloads of cut glass arrived at Foxconn City in the dead of night, according to the former Apple executive. That’s when managers woke thousands of workers, who crawled into their uniforms — white and black shirts for men, red for women — and quickly lined up to assemble, by hand, the phones. Within three months, Apple had sold one million iPhones. Since then, Foxconn has assembled over 200 million more.

2007年中期，做了一个月的实验之后，苹果公司的技师最终拿出了一个完善的办法，可以把强化玻璃板切割成适合iPhone的屏幕。据一名前苹果公司管理人员所说，夜深人静的时候，运送第一批玻璃屏幕的卡车才抵达富士康城。各位工头立刻叫醒了数千名工人，工人手忙脚乱地穿上制服——男制服是黑白衬衫，女制服则是红色——迅速排成队伍，开始手工组装手机。不到三个月，苹果公司就卖出了100万部iPhone。那之后，富士康又组装了超过2亿部iPhone。

Foxconn, in statements, declined to speak about specific clients.

富士康在声明当中拒绝对具体的客户发表意见。

“Any worker recruited by our firm is covered by a clear contract outlining terms and conditions and by Chinese government law that protects their rights,” the company wrote. Foxconn “takes our responsibility to our employees very seriously and we work hard to give our more than one million employees a safe and positive environment.”

该公司在书面声明当中宣称，“本公司招募的所有员工都签有列明各种条款及工作条件的合同，受到中国劳动法的保护。”富士康“认真履行对员工的责任，努力为百万有余的员工提供安全有益的工作环境”。

The company disputed some details of the former Apple executive’s account, and wrote that a midnight shift, such as the one described, was impossible “because we have strict regulations regarding the working hours of our employees based on their designated shifts, and every employee has computerized timecards that would bar them from working at any facility at a time outside of their approved shift.” The company said that all shifts began at either 7 a.m. or 7 p.m., and that employees receive at least 12 hours’ notice of any schedule changes.

富士康对那名前苹果管理人员讲述的一些细节提出了异议，并在书面声明当中指出，所谓的午夜班根本不可能存在，“因为我们为不同班次员工的工作时间制定了严格的规章，所有的员工都有电子计时卡，根本不可能在规定班次之外的时间进厂工作。”公司还说，所有班次要么是从早上7点开始，要么就是从晚上7 点开始，如果有所变更，公司会提前至少12个小时通知员工。

Foxconn employees, in interviews, have challenged those assertions.

接受采访的时候，富士康的员工对公司的说法提出了质疑。

Another critical advantage for Apple was that China provided engineers at a scale the United States could not match. Apple’s executives had estimated that about 8,700 industrial engineers were needed to oversee and guide the 200,000 assembly-line workers eventually involved in manufacturing iPhones. The company’s analysts had forecast it would take as long as nine months to find that many qualified engineers in the United States.

对苹果公司来说，另一个至关重要的有利条件是中国可以提供大量技师，数目令美国望尘莫及。按照苹果管理层之前的估计，生产iPhone最终要用到20万名装配线工人，需要大约8700名工业技师来承担监督和指导的职责。苹果公司的分析师预计，要想在美国找到这么多的合格技师，所需时间将会长达9个月。

In China, it took 15 days.

到了中国，这件事情只花了15天的时间。

Companies like Apple “say the challenge in setting up U.S. plants is finding a technical work force,” said Martin Schmidt, associate provost at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In particular, companies say they need engineers with more than high school, but not necessarily a bachelor’s degree. Americans at that skill level are hard to find, executives contend. “They’re good jobs, but the country doesn’t have enough to feed the demand,” Mr. Schmidt said.

麻省理工学院(Massachusetts Institute of Technology)副教务长马丁·施密特(Martin Schmidt)说，苹果之类的公司“宣称，在美国建厂的难点在于寻找技术工人”。这些公司还说，具体说来，他们需要的技师应该受过超过高中生的教育，但又不是非得拥有学士学位。管理人员们坚称，这种层次的技师在美国非常难找。施密特先生说，“这样的工作相当不错，美国却找不出足够的人来填补这些空缺。”

Some aspects of the iPhone are uniquely American. The device’s software, for instance, and its innovative marketing campaigns were largely created in the United States. Apple recently built a $500 million data center in North Carolina. Crucial semiconductors inside the iPhone 4 and 4S are manufactured in an Austin, Tex., factory by Samsung, of South Korea.

iPhone具有一些美国独有的特色，软件就是其中一例，与此同时，它新颖的营销手段也基本上源自美国。不久之前，苹果公司在北卡罗莱纳建立了一个耗资5亿美元的数据中心。用于iPhone 4和4S的关键性半导体由韩国的三星公司提供，产地则是位于德克萨斯州奥斯丁(Austin)的一家工厂。

But even those facilities are not enormous sources of jobs. Apple’s North Carolina center, for instance, has only 100 full-time employees. The Samsung plant has an estimated 2,400 workers.

但是，以上这些设施并不能提供大量的工作机会。举例来说，苹果的北卡罗莱纳中心只有100名全职员工。据估计，三星的奥斯丁工厂也只有2400名工人。

“If you scale up from selling one million phones to 30 million phones, you don’t really need more programmers,” said Jean-Louis Gassée, who oversaw product development and marketing for Apple until he left in 1990. “All these new companies — Facebook, Google, Twitter — benefit from this. They grow, but they don’t really need to hire much.”

让-路易斯·卡西(Jean-Louis Gassée)曾经负责苹果公司的产品开发和营销，于1990年去职。他说，“即便手机销量从100万部增加到了3000万部，你也用不着更多的程序员。包括Facebook、谷歌和推特(Twitter)在内，所有的新公司都尝到了这种甜头。他们不断成长，但却不需要雇用太多的人。”

It is hard to estimate how much more it would cost to build iPhones in the United States. However, various academics and manufacturing analysts estimate that because labor is such a small part of technology manufacturing, paying American wages would add up to $65 to each iPhone’s expense. Since Apple’s profits are often hundreds of dollars per phone, building domestically, in theory, would still give the company a healthy reward.

在美国生产iPhone会增加多少成本，相关的数字很难估算。不过，按照多位学者和制造业分析师的估计，由于人力成本对高科技制造业来说微不足道，支付美国标准的薪金会让每部iPhone的成本增加至多65美元。鉴于苹果公司从每部手机收获的利润往往可以达到数百美元，从理论上说，即便在美国生产手机，苹果公司依然可以得到相当不错的收益。

But such calculations are, in many respects, meaningless because building the iPhone in the United States would demand much more than hiring Americans — it would require transforming the national and global economies. Apple executives believe there simply aren’t enough American workers with the skills the company needs or factories with sufficient speed and flexibility. Other companies that work with Apple, like Corning, also say they must go abroad.

然而，这样的分析从很多方面来说都没有什么意义，原因在于，在美国生产手机的条件远不只是雇用美国人那么简单，还意味着要对美国乃至全球经济进行调整。苹果管理层认为，美国就是没有那么多符合公司需要的工人，也没有速度够快、灵活性够大的工厂。康宁公司之类的苹果合作方也宣称，他们必须走向海外。

Manufacturing glass for the iPhone revived a Corning factory in Kentucky, and today, much of the glass in iPhones is still made there. After the iPhone became a success, Corning received a flood of orders from other companies hoping to imitate Apple’s designs. Its strengthened glass sales have grown to more than $700 million a year, and it has hired or continued employing about 1,000 Americans to support the emerging market.

苹果公司的玻璃订单让康宁公司设在肯塔基州的一家工厂获得了新生，时至今日，用于iPhone的大部分玻璃仍然产于此地。iPhone大获成功之后，康宁公司从急欲模仿苹果设计的各家公司那里接到了一大堆订单。它的强化玻璃年销售额增长到了7亿美元以上。为了满足新起的市场需求，公司雇用了或说是保留了大约1千名美国员工。

But as that market has expanded, the bulk of Corning’s strengthened glass manufacturing has occurred at plants in Japan and Taiwan.

不过，随着市场的扩张，康宁公司已经把大部分的强化玻璃生产任务转到了位于日本和台湾的工厂。

“Our customers are in Taiwan, Korea, Japan and China,” said James B. Flaws, Corning’s vice chairman and chief financial officer. “We could make the glass here, and then ship it by boat, but that takes 35 days. Or, we could ship it by air, but that’s 10 times as expensive. So we build our glass factories next door to assembly factories, and those are overseas.”

康宁公司副主席兼首席财务官詹姆斯·B·弗罗斯(James B. Flaws)说，“我们的客户来自台湾、韩国、日本和中国大陆。我们固然可以在美国生产玻璃，然后再用船运过去，航程却长达35天。我们也可以改用空运，可空运的费用是海运的10倍。既然如此，我们就把玻璃厂开在了那些组装厂的隔壁，那些组装厂都在国外。”

Corning was founded in America 161 years ago and its headquarters are still in upstate New York. Theoretically, the company could manufacture all its glass domestically. But it would “require a total overhaul in how the industry is structured,” Mr. Flaws said. “The consumer electronics business has become an Asian business. As an American, I worry about that, but there’s nothing I can do to stop it. Asia has become what the U.S. was for the last 40 years.”

161年前，康宁公司在美国诞生，时至今日，它的总部依然位于纽约州北部。理论上说，公司可以把所有的玻璃生产任务放在国内。但是，弗罗斯先生说，这就“需要对整个行业的结构来一次全面调整。电子消费品行业已经变成了亚洲的独门生意。身为美国人，我对这种状况感到担心，可我没办法阻止这样的势头。亚洲已经取代了美国在过去40年当中的地位。”

Middle-Class Jobs Fade

中产阶级工作萎缩

The first time Eric Saragoza stepped into Apple’s manufacturing plant in Elk Grove, Calif., he felt as if he were entering an engineering wonderland.

第一次踏进加州埃克格鲁夫那家苹果工厂的时候，埃里克·萨拉戈萨(Eric Saragoza)恍然觉得，自己走进了一处工程技术的仙境。

It was 1995, and the facility near Sacramento employed more than 1,500 workers. It was a kaleidoscope of robotic arms, conveyor belts ferrying circuit boards and, eventually, candy-colored iMacs in various stages of assembly. Mr. Saragoza, an engineer, quickly moved up the plant’s ranks and joined an elite diagnostic team. His salary climbed to $50,000. He and his wife had three children. They bought a home with a pool.

当时是1995年，这家邻近萨克拉门托(Sacramento)的工厂雇用了超过1500名工人。厂房里面就像是一个万花筒，有各式各样的机械手，有承载着各种电路板的传送带，最后还有处于各个装配流程的花花绿绿的苹果电脑。身为技师的萨拉戈萨先生在厂里的地位迅速攀升，很快就进入了负责诊断产品问题的精英团队，薪水也增加到了5万美元。他和妻子生了三个孩子，还买了一幢带游泳池的房子。

“It felt like, finally, school was paying off,” he said. “I knew the world needed people who can build things.”

他说，“当时的感觉就是，我的学总算是没有白上。我早就知道，这个世界需要会做东西的人。”

At the same time, however, the electronics industry was changing, and Apple — with products that were declining in popularity — was struggling to remake itself. One focus was improving manufacturing. A few years after Mr. Saragoza started his job, his bosses explained how the California plant stacked up against overseas factories: the cost, excluding the materials, of building a $1,500 computer in Elk Grove was $22 a machine. In Singapore, it was $6. In Taiwan, $4.85. Wages weren’t the major reason for the disparities. Rather it was costs like inventory and how long it took workers to finish a task.

与此同时，电子产业却起了变化。由于产品销势每况愈下，苹果公司正在奋力进行自我改造。萨拉戈萨先生入职几年之后，他的老板谈起了加州工厂相对于海外工厂的劣势：刨去原材料不算，在埃克格鲁夫生产一台售价1500美元的电脑需要22美元的成本，在新加坡生产的成本是6美元，台湾则是4.85美元。造成差距的主要原因并不是工资，而是仓储之类的成本，以及工人完成活计的速度。

“We were told we would have to do 12-hour days, and come in on Saturdays,” Mr. Saragoza said. “I had a family. I wanted to see my kids play soccer.”

萨拉戈萨先生说，“老板告诉我们，我们必须每天工作12个小时，星期六也得上班。可我是个有家有口的人，还想看我的孩子们踢足球呢。”

Modernization has always caused some kinds of jobs to change or disappear. As the American economy transitioned from agriculture to manufacturing and then to other industries, farmers became steelworkers, and then salesmen and middle managers. These shifts have carried many economic benefits, and in general, with each progression, even unskilled workers received better wages and greater chances at upward mobility.

现代化的进程总是会让一些工作变化或者消失。美国经济先是从农业转型为制造业，然后又转入其他产业，在此期间，农夫变成了钢铁工人，跟着又变成了推销员或者中层管理人员。这样的转变带来了许多经济效益，总体说来，即便是没有技术的工人也可以通过每一次的转变获得更高的工资，获得更大的上升机会。

But in the last two decades, something more fundamental has changed, economists say. Midwage jobs started disappearing. Particularly among Americans without college degrees, today’s new jobs are disproportionately in service occupations — at restaurants or call centers, or as hospital attendants or temporary workers — that offer fewer opportunities for reaching the middle class.

然而，经济学家们指出，过去20年当中，某种更为根本的东西发生了改变。中等收入的工作开始消失。今天的新工作过多地集中于餐馆职员、接线员、医院护理人员和临时杂工之类的服务性岗位，这些岗位提供不了多少升入中产阶级的机会。对于没有大学学位的美国人来说，情况尤其如此。

Even Mr. Saragoza, with his college degree, was vulnerable to these trends. First, some of Elk Grove’s routine tasks were sent overseas. Mr. Saragoza didn’t mind. Then the robotics that made Apple a futuristic playground allowed executives to replace workers with machines. Some diagnostic engineering went to Singapore. Middle managers who oversaw the plant’s inventory were laid off because, suddenly, a few people with Internet connections were all that were needed.

即便是拥有大学学位的萨拉戈萨先生也抵挡不住这样的势头。刚开始，公司把埃克格鲁夫工厂的一些日常工作交到了海外，萨拉戈萨先生没有在意。接下来，人工智能设备把苹果公司变成了一个未来主义风格的游乐场，也给公司管理层提供了用机器取代工人的机会。公司把一部分的问题诊断工作交给了新加坡。管理工厂库存的中层纷纷下岗，原因在于，公司突然发现，有那么几个连着网的人就够用了。

Mr. Saragoza was too expensive for an unskilled position. He was also insufficiently credentialed for upper management. He was called into a small office in 2002 after a night shift, laid off and then escorted from the plant. He taught high school for a while, and then tried a return to technology. But Apple, which had helped anoint the region as “Silicon Valley North,” had by then converted much of the Elk Grove plant into an AppleCare call center, where new employees often earn $12 an hour.

萨拉戈萨先生身价太高，没法安排不需要技术的工作。与此同时，他又不具备担任高层管理人员的资质。2002年的一次夜班之后，上头把他叫进一间小办公室，辞退了他，然后就让人送他出厂。他教了一阵高中，跟着又尝试重返科技行业。然而，到那个时候，曾经帮助该地区赢得“北方硅谷”美名的苹果公司已经把埃克格鲁夫工厂的大部分改造成了一个售后服务电话中心，新员工的时薪通常只有12美元。

There were employment prospects in Silicon Valley, but none of them panned out. “What they really want are 30-year-olds without children,” said Mr. Saragoza, who today is 48, and whose family now includes five of his own.

硅谷倒是有工作机会，只可惜都没有变成现实。萨拉戈萨先生现年48岁，家里已经有了5个孩子。他说，“他们真正想要的是30来岁、没有孩子的人。”

After a few months of looking for work, he started feeling desperate. Even teaching jobs had dried up. So he took a position with an electronics temp agency that had been hired by Apple to check returned iPhones and iPads before they were sent back to customers. Every day, Mr. Saragoza would drive to the building where he had once worked as an engineer, and for $10 an hour with no benefits, wipe thousands of glass screens and test audio ports by plugging in headphones.

找了几个月工作之后，他产生了绝望的感觉。就连教书的工作也已经无处寻觅了。于是乎，他在一家电子行业临时工介绍所找了个工作，苹果公司雇那家介绍所来检修退回的iPhone和iPad，然后再把机器还给顾客。萨拉戈萨先生每天都要开车去他曾经担任技师的那座大楼，在那里擦洗数以千计的玻璃屏幕、插入耳机以测试音频接口，时薪10美元，没有福利。

Paydays for Apple

苹果公司的发财日子

As Apple’s overseas operations and sales have expanded, its top employees have thrived. Last fiscal year, Apple’s revenue topped $108 billion, a sum larger than the combined state budgets of Michigan, New Jersey and Massachusetts. Since 2005, when the company’s stock split, share prices have risen from about $45 to more than $427.

苹果公司的海外业务及销量膨胀之际，公司高层也大发其财。上一个财政年度，苹果公司的收入高达1080亿美元，超过密歇根、新泽西和马萨诸塞三州预算的总和。2005年拆分股份之后，苹果的股价已经从45美元左右涨到了427美元以上。

Some of that wealth has gone to shareholders. Apple is among the most widely held stocks, and the rising share price has benefited millions of individual investors, 401(k)’s and pension plans. The bounty has also enriched Apple workers. Last fiscal year, in addition to their salaries, Apple’s employees and directors received stock worth $2 billion and exercised or vested stock and options worth an added $1.4 billion.

一部分的财富落到了股东手里。苹果股票是股东最分散的股票之一，高涨的股价让数百万个人投资者、401(k)基金和养老基金从中受益，也让苹果的工人发财致富。上一个财政年度，除了工资之外，苹果的员工和经理还得到了总值超过20亿美元的股票，兑现或生效的股票及期权总值也达到了14亿美元。

The biggest rewards, however, have often gone to Apple’s top employees. Mr. Cook, Apple’s chief, last year received stock grants — which vest over a 10-year period — that, at today’s share price, would be worth $427 million, and his salary was raised to $1.4 million. In 2010, Mr. Cook’s compensation package was valued at $59 million, according to Apple’s security filings.

不过，最大的受益者通常都是苹果公司的高层管理人员。去年，苹果首席执行官库克先生获得了将在10年之内逐步生效的大量赠与股，按现在的股价计算，这些股票的价值是4.27亿美元。除此之外，他的薪水也涨到了140万美元。苹果公司的证券披露材料显示，2010年，库克先生的薪酬包总值为5900万美元。

A person close to Apple argued that the compensation received by Apple’s employees was fair, in part because the company had brought so much value to the nation and world. As the company has grown, it has expanded its domestic work force, including manufacturing jobs. Last year, Apple’s American work force grew by 8,000 people.

一名与苹果公司关联紧密的人士宣称，苹果员工的薪酬是合理的，部分是因为苹果公司为美国乃至全世界创造了如此庞大的价值。随着业务的发展，公司已经扩大了国内员工的规模，包括从事制造业的员工。去年，苹果公司在美国的雇员增加了八千人。

While other companies have sent call centers abroad, Apple has kept its centers in the United States. One source estimated that sales of Apple’s products have caused other companies to hire tens of thousands of Americans. FedEx and United Parcel Service, for instance, both say they have created American jobs because of the volume of Apple’s shipments, though neither would provide specific figures without permission from Apple, which the company declined to provide.

其他公司纷纷将电话中心迁往海外，苹果公司却把自己的电话中心留在了美国。某消息来源估计，苹果产品的销售已经促使其他公司雇用了数以万计的美国人。举例来说，联邦快递(FedEx)和UPS宣称，由于苹果产品带来的巨大运输量，他们都为美国人提供了更多的工作机会。不过，两家公司都不愿意提供具体的数字，说是需要得到苹果公司的许可，与此同时，苹果公司拒绝提供这样的许可。

“We shouldn’t be criticized for using Chinese workers,” a current Apple executive said. “The U.S. has stopped producing people with the skills we need.”

苹果公司的一名现职管理人员说，“我们雇用中国工人的做法无可指责，因为美国已经不能提供我们需要的人才了。”

What’s more, Apple sources say the company has created plenty of good American jobs inside its retail stores and among entrepreneurs selling iPhone and iPad applications.

除此之外，苹果方面的消息来源说，公司已经为美国人创造了大量的好工作，有的岗位是在苹果的零售店里，还有的是在销售iPhone和iPad应用软件的商家那里。

After two months of testing iPads, Mr. Saragoza quit. The pay was so low that he was better off, he figured, spending those hours applying for other jobs. On a recent October evening, while Mr. Saragoza sat at his MacBook and submitted another round of résumés online, halfway around the world a woman arrived at her office. The worker, Lina Lin, is a project manager in Shenzhen, China, at PCH International, which contracts with Apple and other electronics companies to coordinate production of accessories, like the cases that protect the iPad’s glass screens. She is not an Apple employee. But Mrs. Lin is integral to Apple’s ability to deliver its products.

做了两个月iPad测试工作之后，萨拉戈萨先生辞了职。按他的盘算，与其忍受这么低的薪水，还不如把时间用来寻找别的工作。不久之前的一个十月夜晚，萨拉戈萨先生坐在自己的苹果笔记本跟前，又在网上发了一轮简历。与此同时，半个地球之外，一位女士走进了自己的办公室。这位女士名叫林丽娜（音译），是PCH国际公司深圳分公司的项目经理，该公司与苹果等电子公司签有合约，负责协调配件生产，比如iPad玻璃屏幕的保护套。林女士不是苹果雇员，但却为苹果的生产能力发挥着不可或缺的作用。

Mrs. Lin earns a bit less than what Mr. Saragoza was paid by Apple. She speaks fluent English, learned from watching television and in a Chinese university. She and her husband put a quarter of their salaries in the bank every month. They live in a 1,080-square-foot apartment, which they share with their in-laws and son.

林女士的工资略少于萨拉戈萨先生受雇于苹果时的工资。通过看电视和中国一所大学的教育，她学会了一口流利的英语。每个月，她和丈夫都会把四分之一的工资存入银行。夫妻俩住在一套108平方米的公寓里，同住的还有儿子和姻亲。

“There are lots of jobs,” Mrs. Lin said. “Especially in Shenzhen.”

“工作机会多得很，”林女士说，“尤其是在深圳。”

Innovation’s Losers

创新浪潮的输家

Toward the end of Mr. Obama’s dinner last year with Mr. Jobs and other Silicon Valley executives, as everyone stood to leave, a crowd of photo seekers formed around the president. A slightly smaller scrum gathered around Mr. Jobs. Rumors had spread that his illness had worsened, and some hoped for a photograph with him, perhaps for the last time.

去年，奥巴马先生与乔布斯先生及其他硅谷高管的那场晚宴临近尾声的时候，所有人都起身准备离开。一群想要合影的人围在了总统身边，乔布斯先生身边也围起了一群规模略小的人。关于他病情恶化的流言已经传开，有些人希望跟他合个影，没准儿是最后一次了呢。

Eventually, the orbits of the men overlapped. “I’m not worried about the country’s long-term future,” Mr. Jobs told Mr. Obama, according to one observer. “This country is insanely great. What I’m worried about is that we don’t talk enough about solutions.”

到最后，两个人走到了一起。按照一名旁观者的叙述，乔布斯先生对奥巴马先生说，“我并不为国家的长远前途担心。这个国家棒极了。我只是担心，我们关于解决方案的探讨不够彻底。”

At dinner, for instance, the executives had suggested that the government should reform visa programs to help companies hire foreign engineers. Some had urged the president to give companies a “tax holiday” so they could bring back overseas profits which, they argued, would be used to create work. Mr. Jobs even suggested it might be possible, someday, to locate some of Apple’s skilled manufacturing in the United States if the government helped train more American engineers.

举例来说，晚宴过程之中，各位高管曾经建议政府修改签证政策，为各家公司雇请外国技师打开方便之门。有些人敦促总统给各家公司一个“税负假期”，好让他们把海外利润转回国内，同时还说，他们会用这些利润来创造工作机会。乔布斯先生甚至提出，如果政府愿意协助培训美国技师的话，有朝一日，苹果兴许会把一部分高技能制造业务迁回美国。

Economists debate the usefulness of those and other efforts, and note that a struggling economy is sometimes transformed by unexpected developments. The last time analysts wrung their hands about prolonged American unemployment, for instance, in the early 1980s, the Internet hardly existed. Few at the time would have guessed that a degree in graphic design was rapidly becoming a smart bet, while studying telephone repair a dead end.

经济学家们就以上及其他一些措施的效用争论不休，同时指出，有些时候，意料之外的发展会为步履艰难的经济带来转机。举例来说，分析师们上一次为美国失业率高居不下而揪心的情形出现在20世纪80年代早期，那个时候，互联网几乎还不存在。当时很少有人能够想到，平面设计学位会迅速成为一个精明的赌注，与此同时，电话修理却会变成一个没有前途的专业。

What remains unknown, however, is whether the United States will be able to leverage tomorrow’s innovations into millions of jobs.

不过，美国能不能把未来的技术革新变成千百万个工作机会，眼下还是个未知之数。

In the last decade, technological leaps in solar and wind energy, semiconductor fabrication and display technologies have created thousands of jobs. But while many of those industries started in America, much of the employment has occurred abroad. Companies have closed major facilities in the United States to reopen in China. By way of explanation, executives say they are competing with Apple for shareholders. If they cannot rival Apple’s growth and profit margins, they won’t survive.

过去10年当中，太阳能、风能、半导体制造以及显示技术方面的技术飞跃已经带来了数以千计的工作机会。这类产业有许多都是发源于美国，由此而来的大部分工作机会却落到了国外。各家公司纷纷关闭在美国的大型设施，为的是在中国重新开张。公司管理层的说辞是，他们这么做，是为了跟苹果争夺投资者。要是增长速度和利润率赶不上苹果的话，他们就无法生存。

“New middle-class jobs will eventually emerge,” said Lawrence Katz, a Harvard economist. “But will someone in his 40s have the skills for them? Or will he be bypassed for a new graduate and never find his way back into the middle class?”

哈佛大学的经济学家劳伦斯·凯茨(Lawrence Katz)说，“新的中产阶级工作机会终将出现。可是，那些40多岁的人具备赢得机会的技能吗？他们会不会被刚刚毕业的大学生抢在头里、再也无法回到中产阶级的行列呢？”

The pace of innovation, say executives from a variety of industries, has been quickened by businessmen like Mr. Jobs. G.M. went as long as half a decade between major automobile redesigns. Apple, by comparison, has released five iPhones in four years, doubling the devices’ speed and memory while dropping the price that some consumers pay.

来自多个产业的管理人员纷纷表示，乔布斯先生之类的商人加快了创新的速度。在以前，通用公司要等长达五年的时间才会对车型进行大幅度修改。反观苹果公司，它在4年之内就推出了5款iPhone，手机的速度和内存都翻了倍，针对部分用户的售价却有所降低。

Before Mr. Obama and Mr. Jobs said goodbye, the Apple executive pulled an iPhone from his pocket to show off a new application — a driving game — with incredibly detailed graphics. The device reflected the soft glow of the room’s lights. The other executives, whose combined worth exceeded $69 billion, jostled for position to glance over his shoulder. The game, everyone agreed, was wonderful.

跟奥巴马先生道别之前，乔布斯先生从兜里掏出了一部iPhone，为的是炫耀一款影像效果无比精细的应用软件——一款驾驶游戏。手机反射着房间里的柔和光线，身价总和超过690亿美元的其他高管争先恐后地隔着他的肩膀观赏游戏画面。所有的人众口一词，这款游戏妙不可言。

There wasn’t even a tiny scratch on the screen.

手机屏幕之上，不见丝毫划痕。

A federal judge in Brooklyn on Monday declared a mistrial in the case of Linda Sun, a former aide to Democratic governors who was accused of working as an agent of China, after jurors said they could not reach a verdict.

周一，布鲁克林的一名联邦法官宣布孙雯案审判无效。此前陪审团表示无法就此案达成一致裁决。孙雯(Linda Sun)曾是民主党州长的一名助手，被控充当中国代理人。

Ms. Sun, 42, was accused by federal prosecutors of being an unscrupulous public servant who sold her allegiance to China, which rewarded her handsomely for helping to carry out its global campaign of influence peddling.

42岁的孙雯被联邦检察官指控为一名不择手段的公务员，将自己的忠诚出卖给了中国，帮助中国实施全球影响力渗透行动并得到丰厚的回报。

She and her husband, Chris Hu, who was also on trial, carried out Beijing’s bidding, prosecutors claimed, including by blocking Taiwanese officials from meeting the governor and by removing references to the Uyghurs, a primarily Muslim ethnic minority that has faced persecution from the Chinese Communist Party, from official speeches.

检察官称，她和同时受审的丈夫胡骁(Chris Hu)按照北京的指示行事，包括阻止台湾官员与州长会面，以及从官方演讲中删除有关维吾尔人的表述。维吾尔人是一个主要为穆斯林的少数民族，长期受到中国共产党迫害。

In exchange, the couple was compensated with orchestra tickets, travel benefits and a series of Nanjing-style salted ducks, among other payoffs.

作为回报，这对夫妇获得了包括交响乐演出门票、旅行福利以及多只南京盐水鸭在内的诸多好处。

But the couple’s lawyers argued that she was just doing her job. And jurors seemed unconvinced by the case brought by the Justice Department, which under President Trump has scrutinized the very statute under which Ms. Sun was charged, the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

但夫妇两人的律师辩称，她只是履行职责。而陪审团似乎对司法部提出的指控并不信服。在特朗普总统时期，司法部对指控孙雯所依据的《外国代理人登记法》本身进行了严密的审视。

Ms. Sun, her face partially obscured by a pair of black sunglasses, shook her head with a small smile when reporters asked for a statement. Jarrod L. Schaeffer, a lawyer for Ms. Sun, said in a statement outside the courthouse that the mistrial underscored “how questionable and flawed these charges were.”

面对请求置评的记者，被一副黑色太阳镜遮住部分面容的孙雯微微一笑，并摇了摇头。她的律师贾罗德·谢弗在法院外发表声明称，审判无效“凸显了这些指控多么可疑和站不住脚”。

“Throughout this trial, Linda Sun has steadfastly maintained her innocence,” Mr. Schaeffer said. “And that does not change now.”

“在整个审判过程中，孙雯始终坚称自己无辜，”谢弗说道。“这一点现在也没有改变。”

The law has been used to crack down on political influence peddling sought by foreign governments, a major pursuit in Washington, D.C. But in February, Attorney General Pam Bondi directed that prosecutions under the law be limited to “more traditional espionage by foreign government actors.”

《外国代理人登记法》一直被用来打击外国政府试图在美国进行的政治影响力操作，这是华盛顿近年来的重点目标。但今年2月，司法部长帕姆·邦迪指示，该法的起诉应限于“外国政府行为人进行的相对传统的间谍活动”。

Alexander A. Solomon, a prosecutor, told the judge, Brian M. Cogan, on Monday that the government wanted to retry the case as soon as possible. Both parties are due back in court on Jan. 26.

检察官亚历山大·所罗门周一向法官布赖恩·科根表示，政府希望尽快重审此案。双方定于1月26日再次出庭。

The jury’s work did not proceed smoothly. On Dec. 18, Judge Cogan had to dismiss a juror because she had previously planned travel during the week of Christmas, forcing the 12-person jury to restart deliberations on Dec. 22 with a new member.

陪审团的工作并不顺利。12月18日，科根不得不撤换一名陪审员，因为此人此前已计划在圣诞节那周旅行，迫使12人陪审团于12月22日更换新成员后重新开始审议。

Over a week of deliberation, the jurors indicated that they were facing difficulty reaching consensus on any of the 19 counts, which included visa fraud, alien smuggling, money laundering and federal program bribery.

在超过一周的审议中，陪审团多次表示，他们在全部19项指控——包括签证欺诈、协助偷渡、洗钱和联邦项目贿赂——上都难以达成共识。

On Monday afternoon, there appeared to be little progress. Jurors sent notes that morning to the judge detailing their various scheduling conflicts over the next couple of weeks, and one juror expressed financial concerns over continued service.

周一下午，进展似乎仍然甚微。当天上午，陪审员致信法官，详细说明未来几周的各种日程冲突，还有一名陪审员表达了继续服务会引起的经济担忧。

Judge Cogan called in the jury and asked the forewoman whether the jurors had reached a verdict on any of the counts, for either defendant. She shook her head.

科根召集陪审团，询问首席陪审员是否已对任何被告的任何一项指控达成裁决。她摇了摇头。

Ms. Sun’s and Mr. Hu’s lawyers argued that her job as co-director of the Asian American Advisory Council under Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo required her to travel to China and correspond with officials there. Kenneth M. Abell, a lawyer for Ms. Sun, said there was no “smoking gun” proving the government’s case.

孙雯和胡骁的律师辩称，她在州长安德鲁·科莫政府担任亚裔美国人顾问委员会联合主任的职责，要求她前往中国并与那里官员通信。孙的律师肯尼思·阿贝尔表示，政府没有拿出任何“确凿证据”来证明其指控。

“To say that Linda did what the government said she did for salted ducks is as absurd as it sounds,” Mr. Abell said during his closing arguments.

阿贝尔在最后陈词中说：“说Linda为了几只盐水鸭做了政府指控的那些事，听起来有多荒谬就有多荒谬。”

Ms. Sun’s case represented the modern push to use the law to go after efforts to influence domestic politics, said Robert K. Kelner, a lawyer at the firm Covington & Burling who has specialized in foreign agent cases.

科文顿·柏林律师事务所专门研究外国代理人案件的律师罗伯特·凯尔纳表示，孙雯案代表了近年来利用该法打击影响国内政治行为的趋势。

Ms. Sun joined the Cuomo administration in 2012. She had previously worked as a chief of staff for a Democratic state assemblywoman, Grace Meng, who is now a congresswoman representing parts of Queens.

孙雯于2012年加入科莫政府。此前，她曾担任民主党州众议员孟昭文(Grace Meng)的幕僚长，孟现为代表皇后区部分地区的联邦众议员。

Ms. Sun rose through the administration, moving from a deputy position in the diversity office to a co-director role at the Asian American Advisory Council. She was retained by Mr. Cuomo’s successor, Kathy Hochul, who promoted Ms. Sun to deputy chief of staff in 2021. She earned about $145,000 that year, according to public records.

她在政府中逐步升迁，从多元化办公室副主任升至亚裔美国人顾问委员会联合主任。科莫的继任者凯西·霍格尔继续留用她，并于2021年将其提拔为副幕僚长。据公开记录，她那一年年薪约14.5万美元。

During the trial, which lasted more than a month, prosecutors presented evidence that showed much of Ms. Sun’s work was mundane. In one instance, when Mr. Cuomo was the governor and Ms. Hochul the lieutenant governor, a Chinese consular official asked Ms. Sun to film a video celebrating the Lunar New Year with Mr. Cuomo.

在持续一个多月的审理期间，检察官提交的证据显示，孙雯的许多工作内容相当日常。例如，当科莫担任州长、霍格尔担任副州长时，一名中国领事官员要求孙拍摄一段与科莫共同庆祝农历新年的视频。

Ms. Sun suggested having Ms. Hochul appear in the video, as someone who “listens to me more than the governor does,” she wrote to another consular official.

她建议让霍格尔出镜，并对另一名领事官员写道，霍格尔“比州长更听得进去我的话”。

Yet prosecutors also said that Ms. Sun did more substantial work for China helping its government combat the “five poisons” — topics that Beijing is intent on suppressing, including Taiwanese independence and the Uyghurs — from her perch in New York’s executive chamber.

但检察官也表示，在纽约州行政部门任职期间，孙雯为中国政府做了更实质性的工作，帮助其对抗“五毒”——北京急于压制的议题，包括台湾独立和维吾尔问题。

In July 2024, Ms. Sun and Mr. Hu’s home on Long Island was raided by federal agents who recovered luxury items like a Rolex and a Ferrari Roma that prosecutors said the couple bought with money from China.

2024年7月，联邦探员突查孙雯夫妇在长岛的住所，查获了劳力士手表和法拉利Roma跑车等奢侈品，检察官称这些是用来自中国的资金购买的。

Ms. Sun was also rewarded with status in China, prosecutors said. She was named the chair of a Communist Party group that recruits Chinese nationals overseas to work in the party’s best interests. Such a title gave Ms. Sun “another avenue to reach leadership” in the party, Julian Ku, a professor of international law and an expert witness called by the government, testified during the trial.

检察官表示，孙还在中国获得了身份地位上的回报。她被任命为一个中共海外组织的主席，该组织负责招募海外华人华侨为党的利益工作。政府专家证人、国际法教授朱利安·库在庭上作证称，这一头衔让孙女士“有了另一条通向党内领导层的途径”。

Prosecutors presented photos at trial of Ms. Sun socializing with officials of the Chinese Consulate in New York. They also showed letters inviting Chinese delegations to New York that they said contained signatures from the governor that had been forged by Ms. Sun.

庭审中检察官展示了孙与中国驻纽约领事馆官员往来的照片，并出示了他们称由孙伪造州长签名的中国代表团访美邀请函。

A cellphone case of Ms. Sun’s seized by prosecutors, also shown to the jury, had been decorated with the words “Get Rich, Good Luck.”

检察官还向陪审团展示了一部从孙雯处查获的手机壳，上有“Get Rich, Good Luck”（意为“发财好运”。——译注）的字样。

Ms. Sun’s and Mr. Hu’s lawyers emphasized to the judge the toll that the trial had taken on their clients. They noted the difficulty of another lengthy trial because the defendants have had most of their assets seized, hindering their ability to pay for counsel.

孙雯夫妇的律师向法官强调了审判给他们的客户带来的巨大负担。他们指出，由于大部分资产已被没收，被告难以支付又一场漫长审判的律师费用。

Some of the people Ms. Sun socialized with in New York, prosecutors said, were members of “hometown associations” hailing from the same town or province in China. These groups, which exist in part to promote a common Chinese cultural heritage, have become channels through which Beijing carries out its influence-peddling campaigns, the prosecutors said.

检察官称，孙雯在纽约交往的一些人来自“同乡会”，这些团体以促进共同的中国文化遗产为名，实际上已成为北京开展影响力行动的渠道。

They said that Ms. Sun corresponded frequently with “middlemen” in New York from a hometown association connected to the Henan provincial government. Ms. Sun primarily kept in touch with two of these middleman, Frank Zhang and Morgan Shi, who reported to China’s consul general in the city, Huang Ping. None of the men were accused of wrongdoing.

他们表示，孙频繁与纽约一个与河南省政府有关联的同乡会的中间人通信，主要是张富印(Frank Zhang)和摩根·史(Morgan Shi)。这两人向中国驻纽约总领事黄屏汇报工作。上述人员均未被指控有任何不当行为。

When Ms. Sun followed through on the Chinese Consulate’s wishes, prosecutors said, she was rewarded. One of the more striking examples of these payoffs were the salted ducks, which prosecutors said she received from Mr. Ping’s chef.

检察官称，孙雯按照中国领事馆的要求行事，就会获得回报。其中最引人注目的回报之一就是盐水鸭，检察官说这是由黄屏的厨师烹制的。

In texts to Mr. Ping in 2021 that prosecutors shared with the jury, Ms. Sun made a simple request: She wanted to eat salted duck. Mr. Ping arranged for his chef to prepare the dish.

检察官向陪审团展示了2021年孙发给黄屏的短信，她简单地提出：“我想吃盐水鸭。”黄屏随即安排厨师制作。

“The ducks were received,” Ms. Sun wrote to Mr. Ping. Later that night, she texted that they had been “delicious,” adding an emoji of a face licking its lips.

“鸭子收到了，”孙雯后来回复。又过了一会儿，她发短信说“非常美味”，并附上一个舔嘴唇的表情符号。

When Judge Cogan thanked the jurors, he noted that the British government had recently moved to get rid of jury trials for certain crimes. He said he did not agree.

科根在感谢陪审员时提到，英国政府最近已着手取消某些犯罪的陪审团审判。他表示自己不同意这种做法。

“You almost always get it right,” Judge Cogan told them.

“你们几乎总是能做出正确裁决，”科根对他们说。

Tomahawk missiles are coveted by militaries around the world because they can hit a target 1,000 miles away. That accuracy is possible because their fins use powerful magnets made of samarium — a rare-earth metal that can tolerate high heat.

由于能精准命中千里之外的目标，“战斧”巡航导弹成为了各国军方所觊觎的利器。这种精确制导的实现依赖于弹翼上使用了由钐制成的强力磁体——钐是一种能够耐受高温的稀土金属。

When China put restrictions on some rare-earth exports this year, it cut off the supply of samarium to American defense contractors that sell to Raytheon, the maker of Tomahawk missiles. Samarium is processed almost exclusively in China, where more than 85 percent of the world’s rare-earth magnets are made.

今年中国对部分稀土实施出口管制后，切断了向美国国防承包商供应钐的渠道，而这些承包商为“战斧”导弹的制造商雷神公司供货。钐几乎完全在中国进行加工，全球超过85%的稀土磁体产自中国。

A carefully orchestrated deal involving two European companies gave U.S. defense contractors access to a new source of samarium, allowing production to continue for now. But that supply — made from material that had been sitting in a factory in France since the 1970s — is limited. Now the Trump administration is racing to develop a new source before the European stockpile runs out.

一项经过精心安排、涉及两家欧洲公司的交易为美国国防承包商提供了新的钐来源，使生产暂时得以继续。但这一供应来自一批自上世纪70年代起就存放在法国一家工厂里的原料，数量十分有限。现在，在欧洲库存耗尽之前，特朗普政府正争分夺秒地开拓新的供应来源。

China began requiring export licenses for samarium and six other rare-earth metals in April after President Trump rolled out tariffs against China and several other nations. A spokesman at the Chinese Embassy in Washington said in an email that the export controls had been instituted to “defend world peace.” Foreign companies that use samarium for military purposes are no longer allowed to buy it.

今年4月，在特朗普总统对中国等多国加征关税后，中国开始要求钐以及另外六种稀土金属的出口必须获得许可证。中国驻华盛顿大使馆的一名发言人在电子邮件中表示，这些出口管制措施是为了“维护世界和平”。将钐用于军事目的的外国企业已被允许采购该材料。

“No defense contractor will be able to use the same path to buy samarium metal that we’ve used in the past,” said an executive for one of Raytheon’s suppliers, who asked for anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject. “You’re on the naughty list. You’re not getting that material.”

“所有国防承包商都无法沿用过去的采购渠道获取钐金属，”雷神公司一家供应商的高管坦言。由于话题敏感，此人要求匿名。“我们已被列入黑名单，再也拿不到这种材料了。”

Most rare-earth magnets are made of neodymium, which is used in everyday applications such as cellphones, auto parts and electronics. But the defense industry requires samarium-cobalt magnets, which can withstand extreme heat.

大多数稀土磁体由钕制成，广泛用于手机、汽车零部件和电子产品等日常领域。但国防工业需要的是钐钴磁体，它们能够承受极端高温。

一块钐样品，它具有很高的耐热性。

The stakes for finding alternatives are enormous. Unless new sources of samarium or a substitute material can be found, American manufacturers won’t be able to build fighter jets or precision-guided missiles. They may be forced to sacrifice precision if they can’t get the right magnets, said Aisha Haynes, a former Defense Department official responsible for supply chain issues.

寻找替代方案极为重要。除非能够找到新的钐来源或替代材料，否则美国制造商将无法生产战斗机或精确制导导弹。曾负责供应链事务的前国防部官员艾莎·海恩斯表示，如果无法获取合适的磁体，他们可能被迫在武器精度上作出牺牲。

New systems in development — such as hypersonic missiles — also depend on securing non-Chinese sources of samarium.

正在研发的新型装备系统——例如高超音速导弹——同样取决于能否从中国之外的地方获得钐金属。

“You never want to give any one nation that much power,” said Ms. Haynes, who retired in April. “They can turn that source on and off whenever they want.”

“绝不能让任何一个国家拥有如此大的主动权，”已于4月退休的海恩斯说。“对方随时可以切断供应阀门。”

The situation would be more dire if not for the foresight of people experienced in magnet making. Arnold Magnetic Technologies, a Rochester, N.Y.-based manufacturer of samarium-cobalt magnets with factories in Switzerland, Thailand and China, had over a year’s supply of the metal on hand when China announced its export controls on April 4, said Aaron Williams, the company’s chief commercial officer.

若非磁体制造业内人士的远见，局势或将更为严峻。总部位于纽约罗彻斯特，在瑞士、泰国和中国设有工厂的Arnold Magnetic Technologies首席商务官亚伦·威廉姆斯透露，当中国于4月4日宣布出口管制时，该公司手头已备有超过一年的钐金属库存。

As the summer wore on, Arnold’s customers began to worry about what would happen when that inventory ran out. Arnold turned to Grant Smith, the chairman of Less Common Metals near Liverpool, England, one of the last remaining manufacturers of rare-earth metals in the Western world.

到了夏天，Arnold公司的客户开始担心库存耗尽后怎么办。于是，Arnold公司向英格兰利物浦附近的Less Common Metals公司董事长格兰特·史密斯求助——该企业是西方世界所剩不多的稀土金属制造商之一。

Mr. Smith had already spent years hunting for alternatives to Chinese samarium. He found one: a decades-old cache of samarium nitrate in a factory in France. The material was owned by Solvay, a Belgian chemical company with a factory in France that was once one of the world’s largest producers of rare-earth oxides.

史密斯多年来一直在寻找中国钐的替代来源。最终他在法国的一家工厂找到了：一批封存数十年的硝酸钐库存。这批原料的所有者是比利时化工企业索尔维，其法国工厂曾位居全球最大稀土氧化物生产商之列。

Turning rock into magnets requires separating the 17 rare-earth elements from one another using massive vats of solvents, a process Solvay helped pioneer. Solvay had stopped separating rare-earth elements in France two decades ago, according to a spokeswoman, who said it had become “uneconomical.” Samarium processed outside China is five to eight times as expensive, Mr. Williams said.

将矿石转化为磁体需使用大型溶剂槽分离17种稀土元素，这一工艺正是索尔维公司参与开创的。据该公司发言人透露，20年前索尔维已停止在法国的稀土分离业务，称其变得“无利可图”。威廉姆斯指出，在中国以外加工的钐成本要高出五到八倍。

But Solvay kept its stock of semifinished materials and still had the know-how and equipment to refine it into a form that Mr. Smith could use. And Less Common Metals happened to have an old furnace that could handle the job.

但索尔维保留了半成品库存，并且仍掌握着将其进一步精炼成史密斯所需形式的技术与设备。而Less Common Metals恰巧拥有一台能处理此工序的旧熔炉。

法国拉罗谢尔的一家索尔维公司旗下的稀土工厂。

Mr. Smith lined up customers, including Arnold and Permag, which owns Electron Energy Corporation, another American manufacturer of samarium-cobalt magnets that has supplied the American defense industry for decades. That created a kind of buyers’ club, enabling Mr. Smith to offer Solvay an attractive price to refine the entire stash, roughly 200 tons.

史密斯迅速组建了客户联盟，除Arnold还包括Permag——后者旗下的Electron Energy Corporation是数十年来为美国国防工业供应钐钴磁体的另一家制造商。这种买家俱乐部模式使史密斯能向索尔维报出具有吸引力的价格，以精炼全部约200吨库存。

Mr. Smith brought Solvay’s samarium to Britain, where his company is turning it into metal that will be melted into alloys. His customers will press the material into blocks that factories in the United States will cut into magnets. Those magnets can go into motor systems of devices called fin actuators, which adjust the trajectory of a missile by positioning the fins on its body.

史密斯将索尔维的钐运至英国，在那里将其转化为可熔炼合金的金属锭。随后，他的客户会把这些材料压制成块，美国的工厂再将其切割成磁体。这些磁体最终将植入导弹的弹翼舵机系统——通过调节弹体尾翼方位来控制飞行轨迹。

Mr. Smith’s deal was just coming together when China announced its restrictions. Since then, his phone has not stopped ringing as desperate aerospace and defense companies search for samarium.

史密斯的交易刚刚谈妥，中国宣就布了出口限制。自那以后，他的电话几乎就没停过，焦急的航空航天和国防企业四处寻找钐的来源。

“When they rang up, I was able to put my hand on my heart and say: ‘You do not need to panic. We have you covered,’” said Mr. Smith, whose company previously struggled to make a profit. “From April 4, I’ve had two days off. I’m not joking. It’s been crazy.”

“他们打来电话时，我可以拍着胸口告诉他们：‘不用恐慌，我们已经替你们安排好了，’”史密斯说。他的公司此前经营状况一直不佳。“从4月4日开始，我只休了两天假。我不是在开玩笑，真是忙疯了。”

Mr. Smith estimated that Solvay’s stash would last his American defense industry customers more than a year.

史密斯估计，索尔维的这批库存足够其美国国防工业客户使用一年多。

“The issue with rare earths is that it has to be economical to process — you need volume,” Mr. Williams of Arnold said. “Grant made a short-to-medium-term bridge, and it was extremely important.”

Arnold公司的威廉姆斯表示：“稀土的问题在于，加工过程必须足够经济——你需要足够大的规模。格兰特搭建了一座短期到中期的‘过渡桥梁’，这一点至关重要。”

The demand for samarium is relatively small. The U.S. defense industry requires less than 200 tons per year, according to estimates by Jack Lifton, co-chair of the Critical Minerals Institute, an organization that advises the industry.

钐金属的市场需求相对有限。据行业咨询机构“关键矿物研究所”联合主席杰克·利夫顿估计，美国国防工业年需求量不足200吨。

Mr. Smith expressed confidence that other sources would be up and running before the Solvay stash ran out, but it is far from clear where the next batch will come from.

史密斯对在索尔维库存耗尽前启动其他供应源充满信心，但下一批钐将来自哪里，仍远未明朗。

The Trump administration has given MP Materials, the owner of a California rare-earth mine, a $150 million loan to expand its processing facility to handle samarium, as part of a larger, multibillion-dollar deal with the company. But that project could take years to come to fruition.

特朗普政府已向加利福尼亚稀土矿的所有者MP材料公司提供了1.5亿美元贷款，用于扩建其钐金属加工设施，这是与该企业数十亿美元合作计划的一部分。但该项目可能需要数年才能实现产能。

The Trump administration has also extended a $80 million loan to ReElement Technologies, an Indiana firm that is using a new technology to process samarium. A third company, Ucore Rare Metals, from Canada, has received $22.4 million in grant funding from the U.S. military to build a facility dedicated to producing samarium and gadolinium in Louisiana, also using a new technology.

此外，政府还向印第安纳州的ReElement Technologies提供了8000万美元贷款，该公司正运用新技术加工钐。第三家企业——加拿大的Ucore Rare Metals——已获得美国军方2240万美元资助，将在路易斯安那州建设专门生产钐和钆的设施，同样采用创新技术路线。

But government support is no guarantee of success. In 2023, Lynas Rare Earths, an Australian mining company, received a Defense Department contract to build a rare-earth processing plant in Seadrift, Texas. The project wasn’t completed. Now Lynas is expanding a plant in Malaysia where it aims to separate samarium and other metals by April.

但政府的支持并不能保证成功。2023年，澳大利亚矿业公司Lynas Rare Earths获得美国国防部合同，在得州锡德里夫特建设一座稀土加工厂，但该项目未能完成。如今，Lynas正在扩大其位于马来西亚的工厂，目标是在4月前分离钐及其他金属。

Skeptics say the Trump administration is giving money to companies that have never made magnets before. They add that much of the funding is going into producing neodymium-iron-boron magnets, not the samarium-cobalt magnets that the defense industry needs most.

质疑者指出，特朗普政府正在资助那些从未生产过磁体的企业，且大量资金流向了钕铁硼磁体生产，而非国防工业最急需的钐钴磁体。

The administration’s efforts to boost the industry have prompted a flurry of ambitious announcements. For instance, USA Rare Earth, a company formed in 2019, recently announced plans to build a processing facility in Stillwater, Okla. Last month, it cleared the final hurdle to buy another company: Mr. Smith’s Less Common Metals.

政府推动产业发展的努力引发了一连串雄心勃勃的计划。例如，成立于2019年的USA Rare Earth近日宣布计划在俄克拉何马州斯蒂尔沃特建设一座加工设施。上个月，该公司为收购另一家公司——史密斯的Less Common Metals——扫清了最后一道障碍。

When President Trump hosted the crown prince of Saudi Arabia last month, he pulled out all the stops. To the traditional pomp of a formal White House visit, he added a few even fancier touches: a stirring military flyover, a procession of black horses and long, regal tables for the lavish dinner in the East Room instead of the typical round tables.

上个月在白宫接待沙特阿拉伯王储时，特朗普可谓使出了浑身解数。在正式白宫访问的传统排场之外，他又加上了一些更为奢华的点缀：一场激动人心的军机飞行表演，黑马仪仗队，还在东厅举行的盛大晚宴上用华贵的长桌取代了传统的圆桌。

For surprised White House veterans who were paying attention, the unusual flourishes looked a little familiar. Just two months earlier, King Charles III of Britain welcomed Mr. Trump for a state visit that included, yes, a stirring military flyover, a procession of black horses and a long, regal table for the lavish dinner in St. George’s Hall at Windsor Palace.

在留意观察的白宫资深人士眼中，这些非同寻常的安排透着些许熟悉。仅仅两个月前，在接待特朗普的国事访问时，英国国王查尔斯三世同样安排了激动人心的军机飞行表演、黑马仪仗队，以及温莎堡圣乔治大厅盛大晚宴上的华贵长桌。

In his first year back in office, Mr. Trump has unabashedly adopted the trappings of royalty just as he has asserted virtually unbridled power to transform American government and society to his liking. In both pageantry and policy, Mr. Trump has established a new, more audacious version of the imperial presidency that goes far beyond even the one associated with Richard M. Nixon, for whom the term was popularized half a century ago.

重返白宫的第一年里，特朗普毫不掩饰地对皇室排场有样学样，正如他以近乎不受约束的权力按个人喜恶改造美国政府与社会那般。无论仪式排场还是政策上，特朗普都确立了一种新的、更为大胆的“帝王式总统”，其程度甚至远超半个世纪前因理查德·尼克松而被广泛讨论的那种模式。

He no longer holds back, or is held back, as in the first term. Trump 2.0 is Trump 1.0 unleashed. The gold trim in the Oval Office, the demolition of the East Wing to be replaced by a massive ballroom, the plastering of his name and face on government buildings and now even the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, the designation of his own birthday as a free-admission holiday at national parks — it all speaks to a personal aggrandizement and accumulation of power with meager resistance from Congress or the Supreme Court.

他已不再像第一任期那样有所克制，或受到制约。特朗普2.0就是全面释放的特朗普1.0。从椭圆形办公室里的金色装饰到拆除东翼改建巨型宴会厅，从政府建筑乃至肯尼迪表演艺术中心布满他的姓名与肖像到将个人生日定为国家公园免费开放日——这一切都显示出一种个人自我膨胀与权力集中的趋势，而国会或最高法院几乎没有形成有效制衡。

Nearly 250 years after American colonists threw off their king, this is arguably the closest the country has come during a time of general peace to the centralized authority of a monarch. Mr. Trump takes it upon himself to reinterpret a constitutional amendment and to eviscerate agencies and departments created by Congress. He dictates to private institutions how to run their affairs. He sends troops into American streets and wages an unauthorized war against nonmilitary boats in the Caribbean. He openly uses law enforcement for what his own chief of staff calls “score settling” against his enemies, he dispenses pardons to favored allies and he equates criticism to sedition punishable by death.

在美国殖民者推翻国王、建立共和国将近250年后，这或许是这个国家在总体和平时期最接近君主式集权的时刻。特朗普自行其是地重新解读宪法修正案，架空国会设立的机构和部门。他向私营机构发号施令。他把军队派上美国街头，并在加勒比海对非军事船只发动未经授权的战争。他公然将执法行为用于其幕僚长所称的“清算宿敌”，向亲信盟友滥施赦免，并将批评等同于可判处死刑的叛乱行为。

特朗普在白宫宴请沙特王储，其排场与他与英国国王查理三世会面时如出一辙。

Mr. Trump’s reinvention of the presidency has altered the balance of power in Washington in profound ways that may endure long after he departs the scene. Authority once seized by one branch of government is rarely given back willingly. Actions that once shocked the system can eventually become seen as normal. While other presidents pushed the limits, Mr. Trump has blown right through them and dared anyone to stop him.

特朗普对总统职权的重塑已深刻改变了华盛顿的权力平衡，这种影响或许将延续至他离任之后。权力一旦被某个政府部门攫取，便鲜有自愿归还。曾经震惊体制的举动终将被视为常态。尽管其他总统也曾试探权力边界，但特朗普已径直冲破界限，并挑战任何阻止他的力量。

“His second term in many respects represents not simply a break from presidential norms and expectations,” said Matthew Dallek, a political historian at George Washington University. “It’s also a culmination of 75 years in which presidents have reached for more and more power.”

乔治·华盛顿大学政治史学家马修·达莱克指出：“他的第二任期在许多方面不仅意味着对总统规范与预期的背离，更是75年来总统权力持续扩张的顶峰。”

It is also a culmination of four years of planning between Mr. Trump’s first term and his second. The last time around, he was a political novice who did not understand how government worked and surrounded himself with advisers who tried to restrain his most extreme instincts. This time, he arrived in office with a plan to accomplish what he did not in his first term, and a team of like-minded loyalists intent on remaking the country.

这同样也是特朗普在两个任期之间四年筹划的结果。上一次执政时，他还是一名政治新手，不了解政府如何运作，身边是试图约束其极端想法的幕僚。而这一次，他带着完成第一任期未竟之业的计划上任，并配备了一支志同道合、忠诚于他的团队，决心重塑这个国家。

“The president knew exactly what he wanted to do coming into office this time,” said Jason Miller, a longtime Trump adviser. “Now the president had four years under his belt. He knows exactly how everything works. He knows all the international players. He knows all the national players. He knew what strategies and tactics worked the first go around and what strategies didn’t work.”

“总统这次上任时非常清楚自己想做什么，”特朗普的长期顾问杰森·米勒说。“总统现在已经有了四年的执政经验。他非常清楚一切如何运转。他了解所有国际参与者，也了解所有国内关键人物。他知道第一次执政时哪些战略和战术奏效，哪些行不通。”

Strong and Weak

强与弱

The presidency is a living organism, shaped by the person inhabiting it, whether it be self-styled men of action like Andrew Jackson and Theodore Roosevelt, father figures like Dwight D. Eisenhower, legislative wizards like Lyndon B. Johnson or captivating communicators like Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama. More than the sum of the clauses of the Constitution’s Article II, it is an evolving construct, one that has adapted to the ever-changing challenges of a complex and fast-moving world.

总统职位是一个鲜活的有机体，由具体执掌它的人塑造而成——无论是像安德鲁·杰克逊和西奥多·罗斯福那样自诩为行动派的人物，还是像德怀特·D·艾森豪威尔那样的父亲式形象，抑或是林登·B·约翰逊那样的立法高手，或是罗纳德·里根和贝拉克·奥巴马那样极具感染力的沟通者。它不仅仅是宪法第二条各个款项的总和，而是一个不断演进的体系，以适应复杂多变的世界所带来的种种挑战。

Mr. Trump wears it like a cloak. Power is the leitmotif of his second term. For the record, he disclaims royal aspirations. “I’m not a king,” he said after millions of Americans took to the streets in “No Kings” demonstrations in October. But at the same time, he embraces the comparison, at least in part to troll his critics but also, it seems, because he enjoys the notion.

特朗普将总统职权披在身上，如同披着一件斗篷。权力是他第二个任期的主题。表面上，他否认自己有君主野心。“我不是国王，”在10月数百万美国人走上街头参加“No Kings（不要国王）”示威后，他这样表示。但与此同时，他又在欣然接受这种类比——部分是为了嘲讽批评者，但显然也因为他乐于接受这种说法。

He and his staff have posted images of him in monarchical regalia, including an A.I.-generated illustration of him wearing a crown and flying a fighter jet labeled “KING TRUMP” that dumps excrement on protesters. He delighted when the South Koreans gave him a replica of an ancient golden crown. “LONG LIVE THE KING!” he wrote about himself on social media.

他和团队曾发布多张他身着君主服饰的图片，包括一幅由人工智能生成的插图：他头戴王冠、驾驶标有“KING TRUMP（特朗普国王）”的战斗机，向抗议者倾倒粪便。当韩国人送给他一顶古代金冠的复制品时，他很高兴。“国王万岁！”他在社交媒体上这样写道。

6月，俄勒冈州波特兰市举行的“不要国王”示威活动。这是今年全国各地为抗议特朗普的君主制倾向而举行的多场示威活动之一。

To his supporters, Mr. Trump’s assertion of vast power is invigorating, not disturbing. In a country they see in decline, a strong hand is the only way to dislodge a liberal, “woke” deep state that in their view has suffocated everyday Americans to the advantage of unwelcome immigrants, street criminals, globalist tycoons, underqualified minorities and out-of-touch elites. Voters struggling to maintain their standards of living or make sense of a society changing rapidly around them have twice given Mr. Trump a chance to make good on his promise to blow up politics as usual and address their concerns.

在支持者眼中，特朗普对巨大权力的主张令人振奋而非不安。在他们看来，美国正在衰落，只有强腕才能撼动自由派“觉醒”的深层政府。在他们看来，这一体系压迫普通美国人，却让不受欢迎的移民、街头罪犯、全球主义富豪、低素质的少数族裔以及脱离现实的精英阶层受益。那些难以维持生计、或难以适应社会急剧变化的选民已经两次给予特朗普机会，希望他兑现瓦解陈规旧制的政治运作的承诺，并回应他们的诉求。

To his critics, Mr. Trump is narcissistic, uncouth, corrupt and a danger to American democracy. He has used the office to enrich himself and his family, sullied the image of the United States around the world, sought to erase the true history of Black Americans and pursued policies that harm the very people he purports to represent.

而在批评者看来，特朗普自恋、粗俗、腐败，是美国民主的威胁。他利用总统职位为自己和家人牟利，玷污了美国在全球的形象，试图抹去非裔美国人的真实历史，并推行了一系列伤害其宣称所代表群体的政策。

What everyone agrees on is that Mr. Trump dominates the political landscape like none of his predecessors going back generations, single-handedly setting the agenda and forcing his will on the rest of the system. At the same time, he is the most consistently unpopular president since the advent of polling. He has never had the support of a majority of Americans, not in any of his three presidential elections and not for a single day of either term in Gallup surveys.

所有人都认同的是，特朗普正以前所未有的方式主宰政治格局。他只手设定议程，并将自己的意志强加于整个体制之上。与此同时，他也是自民意调查出现以来持续不受欢迎程度最高的总统。根据盖洛普民意调查，在他参与的三次总统选举以及在他两次任期内的任何一天中，他从未获得过多数美国人的支持。

His current 36 percent approval rating in Gallup is lower than that of every elected modern president at the end of their first year, lower even than it was in his first term (39 percent) and seven percentage points below the next-lowest (Joseph R. Biden Jr., at 43 percent). If compared against presidents who served two terms consecutively, Mr. Trump is still below each of them at the end of their fifth year, except Mr. Nixon, who had plummeted to 29 percent in the throes of Watergate.

目前，他在盖洛普民调中的支持率为36%，低于所有当代经选举产生的总统在执政第一年结束时的水平，甚至低于他首个任期同期的数字（39%），也比排名比倒数第二的总统（小约瑟夫·R·拜登，43%）低七个百分点。如果只与连续执政两届的总统相比，特朗普的支持率仍低于他们几乎所有人在执政第五年结束时的支持率，唯一的例外是尼克松——在水门事件风暴中其支持率暴跌至29%。

Some critics predict that Mr. Trump’s unpopularity will begin to erode his power. “It’s been striking that Republicans in Congress have stuck behind him,” said former Senator Jeff Flake, a Republican from Arizona who broke with Mr. Trump in the first term. “But I do think that is changing. Some of it’s not exactly a profile in courage, but it’s looking at the electoral wins and realizing the midterms are going to be very difficult.”

一些批评者预测，特朗普的不受欢迎将开始侵蚀他的权力。“国会共和党人一直站在他身后，这很惊人，”在特朗普的第一任期与其决裂的亚利桑那州前共和党参议员杰夫·弗莱克说。“但我认为这种情况正在改变。有些不是勇气之举，而是看到近期的选举结果后意识到中期选举将非常艰难。”

Mr. Trump’s allies dismiss that as wishful thinking by the president’s critics. Mr. Miller called current polling a “temporary blip” that will reverse as tax cuts passed earlier this year take effect in the first couple of quarters of 2026. “Once the economy rockets to where everyone’s predicting it to be for Q1 and Q2,” he said, “that will all snap back.”

特朗普的盟友认为这是批评者的一厢情愿。米勒称当前民调只是“暂时波动”，一旦今年早些时候通过的减税政策在2026年第一、二季度生效，民调将反弹。他说，“一旦经济像所有人预测的那样在第一、二季度飙升，一切都会迅速回升。”

Bypassing Limits

绕过限制

Presidents have been pushing the boundaries of power going back to the early days of the republic, most aggressively during wartime. Abraham Lincoln suspended habeas corpus even beyond the battlefield and emancipated enslaved people in rebel areas. Woodrow Wilson prosecuted critics of World War I and effectively censored some newspapers. Franklin D. Roosevelt interned more than 100,000 people of Japanese ancestry, including American citizens. In most cases, the pendulum swung back to a degree after the wars were over and security restored.

共和国伊始，总统们就已经在试探权力边界，尤其在战时最为激进。亚伯拉罕·林肯甚至在战场之外暂停人身保护令，并在叛乱地区解放奴隶。伍德罗·威尔逊起诉一战批评者，并实质审查部分报纸。富兰克林·D·罗斯福拘禁了超过10万日裔，包括美国公民。大多数情况下，战争结束且安全得到恢复后，权力天平会在一定程度上回摆。

In the modern era, the notion of an imperial presidency was made prominent by the book of that name published in 1973 by the historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., who had worked in John F. Kennedy’s White House. Mr. Schlesinger argued that under Mr. Nixon, who refused to spend certain money appropriated by Congress, secretly bombed Cambodia, wiretapped opponents and used government to pursue his enemies, the presidency “has got out of control and badly needs new definition and restraint.”

在近现代，“帝王式总统”这一概念因1973年历史学家小阿瑟·M·施莱辛格出版的同名书籍而广为人知。施莱辛格曾在约翰·F·肯尼迪的白宫工作。他认为，在尼克松拒绝拨付国会批准的特定款项、秘密轰炸柬埔寨、窃听对手并利用政府追捕敌人的情况下，总统职位“已经失控，急需重新定义和约束”。

The system of checks and balances eventually did reassert itself during Watergate. The Supreme Court unanimously ordered Mr. Nixon to release incriminating tapes and a bipartisan coalition in Congress moved to impeach the president, prompting him to resign. Starting late in Mr. Nixon’s tenure, Congress passed new laws meant to restrain the executive on war powers, impoundment, eavesdropping and government ethics.

在水门事件期间，制衡体系最终重新确立。最高法院一致裁定尼克松交出罪证录音带，国会两党联盟推动弹劾总统，促使其辞职。从尼克松任期末开始，国会接连通过旨在限制行政权的新法案，涵盖战争权力、扣押、窃听和政府操守。

Some argued that the post-Watergate reforms went too far in emasculating the presidency after the voter-abbreviated tenures of Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter. Mr. Reagan and George W. Bush in different ways worked to empower the office again, particularly in foreign policy and national security. Mr. Obama pushed further by exempting from deportation many immigrants who had arrived illegally as children and Mr. Biden unilaterally tried to forgive $400 billion in student loan debt. But all four encountered pushback from the courts and Congress and none went as far as Mr. Trump has.

一些人认为，水门事件后的改革在只有一届任期的杰拉尔德·R·福特和吉米·卡特后过度削弱了总统权力。罗纳德·里根和乔治·W·布什以不同方式重新增强总统权力，尤其是在外交政策和国家安全领域。奥巴马让童年时期非法入境的移民免于遣返、拜登单方面试图免除4000亿美元学生贷款债务，这都是权力的进一步扩张，但这四位总统都遭遇法院和国会的阻击，且都没有像特朗普走得那么远。

“Some of the stuff that people were upset at Nixon for doing was kind of quaint compared to just the totally out-of-control stuff” that Mr. Trump has been doing, said Robert Schlesinger, a son of Arthur Schlesinger and himself a longtime journalist and historian of the White House.

“人们对尼克松做的一些事情感到不安，但相比特朗普完全失控的行为，那些简直是小巫见大巫，”长期研究白宫历史的记者和历史学家、阿瑟·施莱辛格之子罗伯特·施莱辛格说道。

“Even Nixon was a guy who got that there were limits that he had to tread carefully around even as he was trying to push them,” Mr. Schlesinger added. “Whereas Trump, he’s not interested in limits. And whether it’s through a conscious strategy or just unconscious cunning, by being so open about it, it normalizes it to some extent.”

“即便是尼克松也明白界限的存在，在试图突破时仍会小心翼翼，”施莱辛格补充道。“而特朗普对界限不感兴趣。无论是有意策略还是无意识的狡黠，他如此公开行事的方式在某种程度上使越界行为常态化了。”

Working off a Project 2025 blueprint devised by allies during his four years out of power, Mr. Trump came back to office with a raft of executive orders that have allowed the instant-gratification president to dispense with the slow grind of congressional negotiations. So far this year, Mr. Trump has issued about 225 executive orders, nearly three times as many as any other first-year president in three-quarters of a century.

依托盟友在他四年失权期间制定的“2025计划”蓝图，特朗普重返白宫后颁布了大量行政命令，让这位追求即时满足的总统省去了国会谈判的漫长过程。今年迄今，特朗普已签署约225项行政命令，几乎是过去四分之三世纪里任何一位总统在执政第一年所签署命令的三倍。

Mr. Miller credits a more cohesive team. “There are a lot less hangers-on or superfluous characters floating around,” he said. “That White House is about getting things done.”

米勒认为，团队更具凝聚力。他说，“少了很多闲人或多余角色，这个白宫就是为了做事。”

But some Republicans said the lack of contrary voices in the West Wing has a cost. While Mr. Trump has successfully sealed the border as he promised and brokered a fragile cease-fire in Gaza, he looks out of touch on affordability and was rolled by the bipartisan coalition demanding the release of files related to the sexual predator Jeffrey Epstein.

但一些共和党人表示，白宫西翼内缺乏反对声音是有代价的。虽然特朗普如承诺般封锁了边境，并在加沙促成脆弱停火，但他对生活成本问题的看法显得与现实脱节，且在要求公开杰弗里·爱泼斯坦性侵案档案的两党联盟面前被迫让步。

“You live in a bubble if that’s the situation and sometimes you get blindsided by reality,” said Representative Don Bacon of Nebraska, one of the few incumbent Republicans who have been critical at times. “I don’t know that he’s hearing that kind of feedback. His first administration he had people who would say, ‘Mr. President, I know what you’re saying, this is what I’m thinking.’” By contrast, Mr. Bacon said, “this time, you’ve got pretty much yes men.”

“如果你生活在泡泡里，有时会被现实打个措手不及，”少数会偶尔批评特朗普的在任共和党人、来自内布拉斯加州的众议员唐·培根说道。“我不确定他是否听到这种反馈。第一任期时，他身边有人会说：‘总统先生，我知道您的意思，但这是我的想法。’而现在，基本上都是唯唯诺诺的人。”

特朗普在白宫召开内阁会议。在其第二个任期内，特朗普身边都是对他忠心耿耿的拥护者。

Imperial or Imperiled?

帝王还是岌岌可危？

As the year ends, there have been signs of resistance to unchecked power. A judge threw out the Trump administration’s indictments against two of the president’s adversaries, Letitia James and James B. Comey, and two grand juries refused to re-indict Ms. James. In addition to legislating release of the Epstein files, Congress passed a measure slashing Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s travel budget by 25 percent if he does not turn over video of a second strike on a boat of supposed drug traffickers.

一年接近尾声之际，已经出现了对不受约束权力的抵制迹象。一名法官驳回了特朗普政府对总统的政敌莱蒂西亚·詹姆斯和詹姆斯·B·科米的两项起诉，两个大陪审团也拒绝重新起诉莱蒂西亚·詹姆斯。国会通过立法要求公开爱泼斯坦档案，此外还通过一项法案，要求国防部长皮特·海格塞斯交出对所谓毒贩船只的第二次打击的视频，否则将扣减其25%的差旅预算。

If Democrats win the midterm elections next year, they will surely use their newfound power to push back further against Mr. Trump. Some, like Mr. Flake, predict that even some Republicans will begin to speak out after filing deadlines for possible primary challengers have passed. And the Supreme Court could clip Mr. Trump’s wings on tariffs and birthright citizenship.

如果民主党在明年中期选举获胜，他们必将利用新获得的权力进一步反击特朗普。弗莱克等人预测，甚至一些共和党人也会在初选挑战者报名截止后开始发声。最高法院也可能在关税和出生公民权问题上限制特朗普。

Russell Riley, a presidential historian at the University of Virginia’s Miller Center, acknowledged the nation’s long history of expanding presidential authority. But, he added, “we have an equally robust history of cramming the presidency back into its constitutional box once war or economic crisis has passed.”

弗吉尼亚大学米勒中心的总统历史学家拉塞尔·莱利承认，美国扩张总统权力的历史源远流长。但他补充说，“一旦战争或经济危机过去，我们同样有将总统重新塞回宪法框架的稳定表现。”

That history “strongly suggests that what we are seeing today will not, in fact, endure.” Is that a guarantee? “I’m not smart enough to know the answer to that.”

这些历史“有力地表明，我们今天看到的不会持久”。敢打包票吗？“我尚无足够智慧解答这个问题。”

The Trump administration announced on Monday that all foreign-made drones and their components posed “unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States” and would be put on a federal blacklist of equipment makers prohibited from selling their goods freely in the country.

特朗普政府周一宣布，所有外国制造的无人机及其零部件都“对美国的国家安全构成不可接受的风险”，将被列入设备制造商联邦黑名单，禁止它们在美国境内自由销售产品。

A fact sheet released by the Federal Communications Commission left some room for exceptions. The Pentagon or the Department of Homeland Security can clear a drone or component for use. But it heralded a new reality that American drone pilots have been dreading for months: New models produced by DJI, the Chinese manufacturer that makes most of the world’s drones, will no longer be sold in the United States. The statement did not mention DJI by name.

美国联邦通信委员会发布的情况说明书为例外情况留出了一些余地。五角大楼或国土安全部可以批准特定无人机或零部件的使用。但该决定预示着一个美国无人机飞手数月来担忧的新现实：作为全球大多数无人机制造商的中国大疆创新，其新型号无人机将不再在美国销售。该声明未直接提及大疆公司。

“The F.C.C. will work closely with U.S. drone makers to unleash American drone dominance,” Brendan Carr, the commission’s chairman, said in a statement.

“联邦通信委员会将与美国无人机制造商密切合作，激发美国在无人机领域的主导地位，”委员会主席布伦丹·卡尔在声明中表示。

Many of the nearly half a million registered drone pilots in the United States have built small businesses with DJI equipment. The drones perform a variety of jobs, such as spraying farmers’ fields with fertilizer, surveying land, monitoring construction projects and inspecting roofs and utility lines.

在美国近50万名注册无人机驾驶员中，许多人使用大疆设备建立起小型企业。这些无人机承担着各种工作，如为农田喷洒肥料、勘测土地、监控建设项目，以及检查屋顶和公用事业线路等。

“People are pissed — incredibly, incredibly pissed — about the whole thing,” said Vic Moss, the volunteer director of the Drone Advocacy Alliance, which represents pilots who want to continue to buy DJI drones.

“人们对整件事感到不满——极度、无比的愤怒，”维克·莫斯说。他是“无人机倡导联盟”的志愿负责人，该组织代表希望继续购买大疆无人机的飞手。

One reason the administration did not try to ban the use of drones that Americans already possess, he said, was that doing so would impede emergency workers. Law enforcement agencies across the country use fleets of DJI drones to track down fleeing suspects, lost hikers and the bodies of children who have washed away in floods.

他指出，政府没有试图禁止美国人使用已拥有的无人机，其中一个原因是那样会妨碍应急工作。全美各地的执法机构都在使用大疆无人机来追踪逃犯、搜寻迷路的徒步者，以及寻找在洪水中被冲走的儿童遗体。

The seeds of the decision were planted in Congress a year ago, when the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act mandated a determination by Dec. 23, 2025, about whether video surveillance equipment produced by DJI or Autel Robotics, another Chinese manufacturer, posed a security threat. The language came from a bill written by Representative Elise Stefanik, Republican of New York, who vowed to “ensure Chinese drones are banned from American skies.”

这一决定的伏笔早在一年前就已在国会埋下。当时，《2025财年国防授权法》要求在2025年12月23日前，就大疆或另一家中国无人机制造商道通智能生产的视频监控设备是否构成安全威胁作出评估。相关条款源自纽约州共和党众议员埃莉斯·斯特凡尼克起草的一项法案，她曾誓言要“确保中国无人机被禁止进入美国天空”。

Many in the drone industry expected a comprehensive examination of the technology to see if DJI drones contained secret back doors that shared information with entities in China. Instead, the decision appears to have been based on a simple review of what government agencies already knew.

无人机行业的许多人原本预期会对该技术进行一次全面审查，以确定大疆无人机是否含有与中国实体共享信息的秘密后门。然而，该决定似乎仅基于对政府机构已知信息的简单审查。

For months, DJI has written letters to U.S. officials asking for a rigorous audit.

数月来，大疆一直致函美国官员要求进行严格审计。

“We stand ready to work with you, to be open and transparent, and provide you with the necessary information to complete a thorough review,” Adam Welsh, head of global policy for DJI, wrote in a letter this month to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and others.

“大疆随时准备与你们合作，保持开放和透明，并提供完成全面审查所需信息，”大疆全球政策负责人亚当·威尔士本月在致国防部长皮特·海格塞斯等人的信中写道。

The decision, while not unexpected, deeply disappointed drone pilots around the country, most of whom own and operate DJI equipment.

这一决定虽在预料之中，却令全美大多数拥有和操作大疆设备的无人机驾驶员深感失望。

DaCoda Bartels, chief operating officer of FlyGuys, a company that connects commercial drone pilots with freelance work around the country, said he owned the first DJI drone — the Phantom V-1 — and every updated version since then. Now, he faces the prospect of being cut off from the improvements that the company releases each year.

在全美范围内为商业无人机驾驶员提供自由职业机会的FlyGuys公司首席运营官达科达·巴特尔斯表示，他拥有第一代大疆精灵V-1无人机迄今所有的迭代升级版本。如今，他面临无法再获得该公司每年发布的技术升级的前景。

“DJI as a company will still be innovating and offering their products in other countries,” Mr. Bartels said. “We just won’t have access to them. That’s unfortunate.”

“大疆公司仍将继续创新，并在其他国家提供产品，”巴特尔斯说。“只是我们将无法接触到它们。这很遗憾。”

American-made versions are four times as expensive, he said, and “half as good.”

他表示，美国制造的无人机价格高出四倍，“性能却只有一半。”

But the announcement was cause for celebration for the fledgling American drone companies that pushed for such an opening.

但这一宣布却让推动这一政策的美国本土新兴无人机公司欢欣鼓舞。

“This was a historic decision that will change everything for U.S. drone manufacturers,” said a statement from BRINC, a Seattle-based manufacturer that makes drones for public safety. “BRINC and our peer companies are ready to meet the call for service to rebuild the American drone industry.”

为公共安全领域制造无人机的西雅图公司BRINC在声明中表示：“这是一个具有历史意义的决定，将改变美国无人机制造商的一切。BRINC及同行已准备好响应号召，重建美国无人机产业。”

Another company that hopes to fill the void left by DJI is Skydio, a U.S. drone company that hired Joe Bartlett, Ms. Stefanik’s former national security adviser, as its director of federal policy. Mr. Bartlett is now the deputy under secretary in the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security, which played a role in determining DJI’s fate. Skydio declined to comment.

另一家希望填补大疆空缺的公司是Skydio，这家美国无人机企业聘请了斯特凡尼克的前国家安全顾问乔·巴特利特担任其联邦政策主管。巴特利特现任商务部工业与安全局助理副部长，该部门参与了这一关乎大疆命运的决策。Skydio拒绝置评。

Unusual Machines, a Florida manufacturer of drone components, also stands to benefit from the decision. In a statement to The New York Times on Monday, its chief executive, Allan Evans, said the decision meant domestic manufacturers “have both an opportunity and a responsibility to build and deliver world-class products as quickly as possible.” Donald Trump Jr. sits on his advisory board.

总部位于佛罗里达的无人机零部件制造商Unusual Machines同样有望从这一决定中受益。该公司首席执行官艾伦·埃文斯周一在致《纽约时报》的声明中表示，这一决定意味着本土制造商“既拥有机遇，也肩负起尽快打造并交付世界级产品的责任”。小唐纳德·特朗普是该公司顾问委员会成员。

The F.C.C. statement made clear that the decision does not affect drone pilots’ ability to fly the drones they already have or previously approved models.

联邦通信委员会的声明明确指出，这一决定不影响无人机飞手继续使用已拥有的无人机或此前获批的型号。

“There will be a window for American companies to catch up,” Mr. Bartels said. “I sure hope that they do.”

“这为美国公司争取到一个迎头赶上的窗口期，”巴特尔斯说。“我真心希望他们能做到。”

China Vanke, the latest developer to teeter in the country’s long-running real estate crisis, said bondholders agreed to a plan that gave the company a 30-day grace period to negotiate repayment of a $285 million bond.

房地产开发商万科表示，其债券持有人已同意一项方案，给予公司30天的宽限期来协商偿还一笔20亿元人民币的债券。万科是中国旷日持久的房地产危机中又一家陷入困境的公司。

Approval from bondholders after a vote on Monday provided Vanke with a temporary lifeline, preventing the company from immediately tipping into default for failing to repay a bond that matured on Dec. 15. However, the bondholders again rejected Vanke’s proposal to delay repayment by one year.

债券持有人周一的投票结果为万科提供了暂时的喘息之机，避免其因未能偿还一笔于12月15日到期的债券而立即陷入违约的境地。不过，债券持有人再次否决了万科将还款期限延长一年的提议。

Vanke, which has more than 126,000 employees and carries more than $50 billion in debt, has until Jan. 28 to reach a deal to either delay payments or pay the principal to avoid default, according to a filing with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.

根据提交给港交所的一份文件，万科拥有超过12.6万名员工，负债逾500亿美元，公司必须在1月28日前达成协议，或推迟付款，或偿还本金来避免违约。

Vanke is the latest and most urgent test of the government’s handling of China’s long-running real estate crisis, which has unsettled the economy and challenged policymakers’ resolve on whether to bail out debt-laden developers, even if doing nothing risks pushing the financial system to the brink.

万科成为检验中国政府如何应对长期房地产危机的最新、最紧迫的考验。这场危机已扰乱经济，并考验政策制定者是否有决心救助负债累累的开发商——即便袖手旁观可能会将金融体系推向崩溃的边缘。

Chinese officials did not intervene to rescue China Evergrande or Country Garden, once considered the country’s two largest developers, as both crumbled under the weight of enormous debts. Evergrande filed for bankruptcy protection two years ago. Around that time, Country Garden defaulted on a bond, with some creditors pushing the company to liquidate.

中国官员此前并未出手拯救曾被视为中国最大两家房地产开发商的恒大和碧桂园，两间公司最终都在巨额债务的重压下崩溃。恒大两年前申请了破产保护。大约在同一时期，碧桂园也发生债券违约，部分债权人要求对其进行清算。

Vanke was viewed differently from the two privately held developers because its largest shareholder is the state-owned railroad company Shenzhen Metro, which had repeatedly extended loans to Vanke over the past few years to cover obligations related to the developer’s debts.

外界对万科的看法与这两家民营开发商不同，因为其最大股东是国有企业深圳地铁。深圳地铁在过去几年中多次向万科提供贷款，以帮助其履行与债务相关的义务。

This year, after a $6 billion loss in 2024, Vanke’s top executives stepped down and were replaced by executives from state-owned firms. Shenzhen Metro has extended more than $3 billion in loans this year to Vanke, even as the company continues to face a severe cash crunch. In a midyear corporate filing, Vanke said that, as of the end of June, $22 billion of its debt was due within the next 12 months.

在2024年出现约495亿元亏损后，万科高管于今年辞职，由来自国有企业的高管接任。今年以来，尽管万科持续面临严重的现金流危机，深圳地铁仍向其提供了220亿元贷款。万科在年中提交的公司文件中表示，截至6月底，其未来12个月内到期的债务规模为1553.7亿元。

But more recently, Shenzhen Metro has begun imposing stricter borrowing terms on Vanke. In early November, Shenzhen Metro demanded that Vanke pledge collateral to back up unsecured loans it had already extended to the developer. Then, Vanke, for the first time, asked bondholders to accept a delay in repayment of a bond.

但近期，深圳地铁开始对万科施加更严格的借贷条件。11月初，深圳地铁要求万科为此前已发放的无担保贷款提供抵押品。随后，万科首次请求债券持有人接受债券还款延期。

Vanke offered three proposals to bondholders seeking a one-year delay of payments due on Dec. 15. None of the proposals received enough support to meet the 90 percent approval threshold, moving the company closer to default.

万科向债券持有人提出了三项方案，寻求将原定于12月15日到期的付款延期一年。但这些方案均未获得达到90%批准门槛的支持率，使该公司距离违约更近了一步。

Vanke said it had a “grace period” of five working days, which expires on Dec. 22, after failing to make a payment on time.

万科表示，在未能按时付款后，公司获得了为期五个工作日的“宽限期”，于12月22日到期。

The developer’s negotiations with bondholders point to the “Chinese authorities’ preference for market-oriented support approaches, rather than providing blanket support to individual developers — even some government-linked entities,” the credit ratings agency Fitch said in a report this month.

信用评级机构惠誉在本月的一份报告中指出，万科与债券持有人的谈判表明，“中国当局更倾向于市场导向的支持方式，而非对个别开发商——即便是一些与政府有关联的实体——提供全面兜底式支持。”

It was October 2023, and F.B.I. agents told Hui Bo not to come to their office.

那是2023年10月，联邦调查局的特工告诉惠波不要去他们的办公室。

For his own safety, it would be better to meet in public, he recalled them saying, so he waited near a park in Los Angeles. He was warned that he was being watched by agents of the People’s Republic of China after he commissioned sculptures in protest of China’s government.

他回忆说，特工们表示，为了他的安全最好在公共场所见面，于是他在洛杉矶的一个公园附近等他们。他被警告称，由于委托制作了抗议中国政府的雕塑，他正受到中国特工的监视。

“The F.B.I. said that you are in great danger, that we strongly recommend that you move and not live here anymore,” Mr. Hui said in an interview. “That’s when I felt fear.”

“FBI说，你的处境非常危险，我们强烈建议你搬家，不要再住在这里，”惠波在接受采访时说。“那一刻我感到了恐惧。”

Mr. Hui’s story is part of a larger trend, one that federal law enforcement officials said exposes an aggressive new phase in China’s global campaign to silence dissent.

惠波的遭遇并非个案，联邦执法官员表示，这揭示了中国在全球范围内压制异见人士的行动已进入一个更为强硬的新阶段。

Where once the Chinese state focused on political dissidents and exiled activists, it now targets artists like Mr. Hui, whose creative protests have tested the government’s tolerance and reach, the officials said.

这些联邦执法官员说，过去中国政府主要针对政治异见人士和流亡活动人士，如今则把目标对准了像惠波这样的艺术家——他们以充满创意的抗议方式考验着政府的容忍度和影响范围。

The crackdown has intensified and extended beyond China’s borders since the country’s top leader, President Xi Jinping, rose to power in 2012.

自中国最高领导人习近平于2012年上台以来，这种打压行动日益加剧，并延伸至境外。

The government has even expanded its influence to elections abroad, including races in New York City, to try to quash criticism of the Chinese state in places where people are more free to speak out than they are in China.

中国政府甚至对海外的选举施加影响，包括纽约市的竞选活动，试图在言论环境比中国更自由的地方压制针对中国政府的批评声音。

China is not alone in seeking to silence critics abroad.

中国并非唯一一个试图在海外噤声批评者的国家。

Russia does it. Iran does it. Saudi Arabia does, too, according to Roman Rozhavsky, the assistant director of the F.B.I.’s counterintelligence division in Washington.

据华盛顿的联邦调查局反情报部门助理主任罗曼·罗扎夫斯基称，俄罗斯、伊朗和沙特阿拉伯也这样做。

But China, he said, is the most prolific, devoting substantial resources to the effort in the United States. Suppressing dissent is a priority for China’s president, Mr. Rozhavsky said.

但他表示，中国是规模最大的一个，在美国投入了大量资源用于此类行动。罗扎夫斯基指出，压制异议是中国国家主席的一个优先事项。

“We are seeing more of these cases and we’re seeing the Chinese government be more aggressive in going after people on U.S. soil,” Mr. Rozhavsky said.

“我们看到这类案件越来越多，也看到中国政府在美国本土针对个人采取行动时变得更加强硬，”罗扎夫斯基说。

The cases involving the artists share a common thread: They were targeted for criticizing President Xi, the Chinese Communist Party, or the workings of the Chinese government.

涉及这些艺术家的案件都有一个共同点：他们因批评习近平主席、中国共产党或中国政府的行事方式而成为针对目标。

A spokesman for the Chinese embassy in Washington said that he was unfamiliar with Mr. Hui’s case.

中国驻华盛顿大使馆的发言人表示，他不了解惠波的案件。

He rejected the claims made by the U.S. Department of Justice that China had been silencing critics abroad, calling it, in a statement, a “completely unwarranted accusation and a malicious smear against China.”

他在一份声明中驳斥了美国司法部关于中国在海外噤声批评者的说法，称这是“完全毫无根据的指责，是对中国的恶意抹黑”。

Mr. Rozhavsky said that critics of China have had relatives living in the country threatened by the Chinese government, or that China has hired a person in the United States to intimidate or physically hurt them.

罗扎夫斯基表示，中国的批评者曾遭遇生活在国内的亲属被政府威胁的情况，或者在美国雇用他人对批评者进行恐吓或人身伤害。

“Their job is to silence people and, unfortunately, it works,” Mr. Rozhavsky said. “It creates this Orwellian climate of fear where people are afraid to speak their mind even though they’re on U.S. soil and they’re just exercising their right to freedom of speech.”

“他们的工作就是让人闭嘴，遗憾的是，这确实奏效了，”罗扎夫斯基说。“这制造了一种奥威尔式的恐惧氛围，让人们即便身处美国领土、只是在行使言论自由权利时，也会害怕表达自己的想法。”

Mr. Hui, 57, left China for Los Angeles in 2017 with his wife and two children. He hoped to give his children a better life, one far from the reach of an oppressive government, he said.

惠波现年57岁，他于2017年带着妻子和两个孩子离开中国前往洛杉矶。他说，他希望给孩子更好的生活，一个远离高压政府掌控的生活。

Years after leaving China, disillusioned by its handling of public health crises and its suppression of free expression, Mr. Hui began working with a sculptor in secret.

离开中国数年后，由于对中国处理公共卫生危机的方式以及对言论自由的压制感到失望，惠波开始与一位雕塑家秘密展开合作。

Together, they created four statues.

他们共同创作了四尊雕像。

The statues depict Mr. Xi and the first lady, Peng Liyuan, kneeling and their hands bound behind them. In one set, they are clothed. In the other, they are bare-chested, emphasizing their humiliation.

这些雕塑描绘了习近平和第一夫人彭丽媛跪着、双手反绑在身后的形象。其中一组身着衣物，另一组则赤裸上身，刻意强化了受辱的意味。

This depiction of a disgraced, kneeling couple evokes a potent and specific Chinese historical parallel: the enduring example of Qin Hui.

这种跪地、蒙羞的夫妇的形象，让人想到了一个有力而具体的中国历史参照：千古罪人秦桧。

He was the 12th-century official blamed for the wrongful execution of General Yue Fei, an admired national figure. A bronze statue of the official, and another of his wife, kneel in atonement outside the general’s tomb in Hangzhou, China.

秦桧是12世纪的一名官员，被认为应为冤杀受人景仰的民族英雄岳飞将军负责。在中国杭州的岳飞墓外分别放置着这位官员及其妻子以示赎罪的青铜跪像。

杭州岳飞庙内的秦桧夫妇铜像。

Mr. Hui understood the symbolism of the statues of the Chinese president and his wife kneeling. He also understood the risks.

惠波明白中国国家主席及其夫人的跪像所蕴含的象征意义。他也明白其中的风险。

In November 2023, as Mr. Xi prepared to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in San Francisco, Mr. Hui was preparing his protest. He had posted on social media that he planned to display the sculptures near the summit as a silent rebuke to a government he believed had abandoned its people.

2023年11月，正当习近平准备参加在旧金山举行的亚太经合组织峰会时，惠波也在筹备他的抗议活动。他在社交媒体上发布消息称计划在峰会附近展示这些雕塑，作为对他所认为的背弃了人民的政府进行无声谴责。

Federal prosecutors said that two men, Cui Guanghai, 44, of China, and John Miller, 64, a British national who is a permanent U.S. resident, orchestrated a harassment campaign to derail Mr. Hui’s protest. The harassment took place from October 2023 through at least April 2025, according to court documents.

联邦检察官称，两名男子——44岁的中国公民崔广海（音），以及64岁的英国籍、拥有美国永久居留权的约翰·米勒——策划了一场骚扰行动，意在破坏惠波的抗议。据法庭文件，这些骚扰行为从2023年10月持续到至少2025年4月。

Tracking devices were placed on Mr. Hui’s car. His tires were slashed to keep him from making the six-plus-hour drive with the sculptures to the conference in San Francisco.

惠波的车被装上了追踪设备。他的轮胎被割破，以阻止他带着雕塑驱车六个多小时前往旧金山举行的峰会。

In May, a grand jury indicted Mr. Cui and Mr. Miller on charges of conspiracy, interstate stalking and smuggling. The Justice Department called the incident part of “a blatant assault on both our national security and our democratic values.”

今年5月，大陪审团以共谋、跨州跟踪和走私等罪名对崔广海和米勒提起公诉。司法部称该事件是“对我们国家安全和民主价值的公然攻击”。

It was unclear from court records whether Mr. Cui and Mr. Miller had legal representation.

法庭记录未显示崔广海和米勒是否有法律代表。

Mr. Hui said he had also learned that in China, police officers had taken his parents in for questioning.

惠波说，他得知他在中国的父母被警方带走问话。

A few days before the summit, his mother, who is in her 80s, called from his hometown in Liaoning, China. She was in tears, begging him not to attend the summit, he said.

峰会前几天，他80多岁的母亲从中国辽宁的老家给他打来电话，哭着恳求他不要前往峰会。

For Mr. Hui, it wasn’t the first signal of trouble, but it was the clearest. “I had no other choice but to cancel my plan,” he said.

对惠波来说，这并非麻烦降临的第一个信号，却是最清晰的一个。“我别无选择，只能取消计划，”他说道。

Mr. Hui was not alone in his experience.

惠波并非唯一有此遭遇的人。

In the Mojave Desert, Chen Weiming, a California-based sculptor from China, created a towering installation made of fiberglass that partially portrayed Mr. Xi with protruding spikes of the coronavirus on his head. It was titled “CCP Virus,” alluding to the Chinese Communist Party.

在莫哈韦沙漠，来自中国、现居加州的雕塑家陈维明创作了一件大型玻璃钢装置作品，部分形象描绘了习近平，其头部伸出类似新冠病毒的突刺。作品名为《中共病毒》，影射中国共产党。

In spring 2021, vandals set it ablaze. Mr. Chen said it wasn’t the first time — or the last.

2021年春天，这件作品遭纵火焚毁。陈维明说，这既不是第一次，也不会是最后一次。

“The pressure is constant,” he said. “But the message must stand.”

“压力是持续不断的，”他说。“但信息必须传达出去。”

Mr. Chen, 68, runs Liberty Sculpture Park in Yermo, Calif., where dozens of politically charged works are on display, including those that memorialize Tiananmen Square and denounce Hong Kong’s national security laws.

68岁的陈维明在加州耶尔莫经营着自由雕塑公园，园内展出着数十件带有强烈政治色彩的作品，其中包括纪念天安门广场事件、谴责香港国安法的作品。

Mr. Chen said that he and his volunteers have faced repeated harassment since 2022: studio break-ins, surveillance and threats. Even collaborators — curators, filmmakers, publishers — have reported harassment, Mr. Chen said.

陈维明表示，自2022年以来，他和他的义工团队屡屡遭到骚扰：工作室被闯入、被监视、受到威胁。他说，甚至连合作伙伴——策划人、电影制作人、出版商——也报告受到了骚扰。

The attacks, he said, have only deepened his resolve.

他说，这些攻击只会让他变得更加坚定。

“I had to rebuild it,” Mr. Chen said of the sculpture. “This time in steel so they can’t destroy it.”

“我必须把它重建起来，”陈维明谈到那座雕塑时说。“这一次要用钢材建造，这样他们就无法摧毁它了。”

In March 2022, federal prosecutors announced charges against three people over their involvement in a repression scheme, which included setting fire to Mr. Chen’s sculpture and spying on the artist.

2022年3月，联邦检察官宣布对三人提起指控，指控他们参与了一项打压行动，其中包括焚毁陈维明的雕塑以及监视这位艺术家。

Maya Wang, an associate Asia director at Human Rights Watch, said these cases underscore how far the Chinese government will go.

人权观察的亚洲区副主任王松莲表示，从这些案例可以看出中国政府为了达到目的而愿意将行动推进到何种程度。

“The use of transnational repression demonstrates a symptom of the underlying structure of the Chinese government’s influence operations around the world,” Ms. Wang said. “It has marginalized voices critical of Beijing and elevated those who are friendly to it.”

“动用跨国打压手段，反映出中国政府全球影响力行动背后的一个结构性特征，”王松莲说。“它对批评北京的声音加以边缘化，同时提升了对其友好的声音。”

Since 2023, Mr. Hui has lost more than 30 pounds, he said. He struggles to sleep. He keeps his phone close.

惠波表示，自2023年以来，他已经瘦了近14公斤。他经常失眠，手机从不离身。

Still, Mr. Hui opened his exhibition at the Pandemic Victims Memorial Organization in Corona, Calif. The sculptures stand in place. Security cameras watch the doors.

尽管如此，惠波还是在加利福尼亚州科罗纳的“疫情受难者纪念组织”举办了他的展览。雕塑安放就位。监控摄像头紧盯着大门。

As for continuing to commission art in protest of the government, he said: “Whether I do it or not, I will face huge risks. Therefore, I will continue.”

至于是否继续委托创作抗议政府的艺术作品，他说：“不管我做不做，都会面临巨大的风险。所以，我会继续。”

Despite being swatted about like a tetherball by ever-shifting trade wars, shortages of critical minerals and tense standoffs between the United States and China, the global economy has turned out to be more resilient than predicted.

尽管在变幻莫测的贸易战、关键矿产短缺以及中美之间紧张对峙之下，全球经济像梨球一样不断被打来打去，但表现出的韧性却超出了预期。

But don’t think that it’s time to take a breath. The whirligig shows no sign of stopping.

不过，现在还不是松口气的时候。经济漩涡并没有停下来的迹象。

“We are living through a singularly turbulent time,” said Daron Acemoglu, an economist at M.I.T. who won the Nobel in economic science last year.

“我们正经历一个极其动荡的时代，”麻省理工学院经济学家、去年获得诺贝尔经济学奖的达龙·阿西莫格鲁说。

Transformational changes continue to rattle the global economy, including the revolution in artificial intelligence, rapidly aging populations, climate change, and a worldwide turn against liberal democracy and a rules-based international order.

变革性的变化仍在持续撼动全球经济，包括人工智能革命、人口迅速老龄化、气候变化，以及全球范围内对自由民主和基于规则的国际秩序的普遍背离。

All of which are poised to remake jobs, politics and lives.

所有这些势必重塑就业、政治和生活。

The transition has been complicated by chaotic economic policymaking around the world this year.

今年的全球经济政策制定一片混乱，使得这一转型过程更加复杂。

In the United States, contradictory pronouncements are regularly issued from the Oval Office, as tariffs are enacted and retracted without warning. Last month, for instance, President Trump lifted tariffs on beef, tomatoes, bananas, coffee and other groceries, while last week, he threatened to raise them on rice from India and China.

在美国，白宫经常发出前后矛盾的政策声明，关税时而实施时而撤销，毫无预警。例如，上个月特朗普总统取消了对牛肉、西红柿、香蕉、咖啡等食品的关税，而上周他又威胁要对来自印度和中国的稻米加征关税。

Delayed price increases from tariffs are still working their way through the American economy like a mouse being digested by a snake.

就像蛇在消化老鼠一样，关税带来的延迟性价格上涨缓慢地在美国经济中传导。

麻省理工学院的达龙·阿西莫格鲁9月在联合国表示，欧洲科技产业“存在巨大的创新问题”。

At the same time, the future of a large chunk of the president’s tariff policies remains unclear until the Supreme Court rules on their constitutionality.

与此同时，总统的大规模关税政策未来走向仍不明朗，要等到最高法院就其合宪性作出裁决。

On the spending side, Mr. Trump has vowed to use a $250 billion pot of money generated by tariffs to pay out trillions of dollars to farmers, taxpayers and creditors. Public debt has shot up to record levels, reaching 125 percent of the country’s total output.

在支出方面，特朗普承诺用关税产生的2500亿美元资金向农民、纳税人和债权人支付数万亿美元。公共债务已飙升至创纪录水平，达到全国总产出的125%。

And the dizzying rise in the stock market, pumped by artificial intelligence companies, is fueling both fortunes and fears of a future crash.

人工智能公司推动的股市狂飙既造就了巨额财富，也引发了对未来崩盘的恐惧。

In Europe, most countries continue to be plagued by slower growth more than other advanced economies. For several years now, the European Union’s share of the global economy has been shrinking amid sharper competition from the United States and China.

在欧洲，大多数国家仍深陷增长乏力的困境，增速仍然低于其他发达经济体。多年来，欧盟在全球经济中的份额一直在萎缩，面临来自美国和中国的更激烈竞争。

Investment in artificial intelligence has also fallen far behind.

在人工智能领域的投资也远远落后。

“Europe has a huge innovation problem in the tech sector,” said Mr. Acemoglu, who won his Nobel for research on how institutions shape national prosperity.

“欧洲在科技领域的创新存在巨大问题，”因研究制度如何塑造国家繁荣获诺贝尔奖的阿西莫格鲁说。

With 27 members that have varying priorities and domestic pressures, the European Union has enormous difficulty carrying out critical policy recommendations like strengthening its single market for trade and capital, streamlining regulations and signing on to new trade pacts. This week, for example, the bloc delayed a vote on whether to approve a trade deal with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay that has been in the works for decades.

欧盟的27个成员国各有各的优先事项以及各不相同的国内压力，很难落实关键政策建议，例如加强单一市场在贸易和资本方面的整合、精简监管、签署新的贸易协定。比如在本周，欧盟就推迟了一项已酝酿数十年的与阿根廷、巴西、巴拉圭和乌拉圭贸易协定的表决。

Producers and manufacturers are held back by high energy prices and face growing competition from cheap Chinese exports that before Mr. Trump’s tariffs would have been directed to the United States.

高能源价格拖累了生产商和制造商，同时他们还面临来自中国廉价出口品日益激烈的竞争——这些商品原本在特朗普加征关税前会主要流向美国。

中国经济正因房地产市场崩盘遭受重创，为此中国大幅增加出口，今年贸易顺差已超过1万亿美元。

Security threats are pushing European governments to further strain budgets and dig deeper into debt as they devote substantially more resources to military spending.

安全威胁迫使欧洲各国政府进一步压缩预算，增加债务，因为他们不得不将更多资源投入军费开支。

The war in Ukraine grinds on, and President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has shown little sign of curbing his aggressive stance. Mr. Trump continues to enfeeble America’s commitment to the Atlantic alliance. A recent Danish intelligence analysis warned that the United States “no longer rules out the use of military force, even against allies.”

乌克兰战争仍在持续，俄罗斯总统普京几乎没有表现出任何收敛其强硬姿态的迹象。特朗普继续削弱美国对北大西洋联盟的承诺。丹麦情报机构最近的一份分析警告称，美国“不再排除对盟友使用武力”。

On the other side of the globe, China is still suffering from a collapse in its real estate market and a pullback in property, infrastructure and manufacturing investments.

在地球另一端，中国仍在遭受房地产市场崩盘以及房地产、基础设施和制造业投资大幅回落的痛苦。

China’s economic influence, though, is building. A record $1 trillion global trade surplus shows that Mr. Trump’s tariffs have done little to dampen the country’s trade domination or its reliance on exports to propel its economy. The International Monetary Fund recently revised the country’s annual growth forecast up to 5 percent.

然而，中国的经济影响力仍在增强。创纪录的1万亿美元全球贸易顺差表明，特朗普的关税几乎未能削弱中国的贸易主导地位或其依赖出口拉动经济的模式。国际货币基金组织最近上调了中国年度经济增长预期至5%。

“These imbalances are becoming unbearable,” President Emmanuel Macron of France said during a visit to China this month.

“这些失衡正变得令人难以忍受，”法国总统埃马纽埃尔·马克龙本月访华期间表示。

Europe is not the only destination for the growing flood of Chinese exports. Southeast Asia is among the regions that have seen the sharpest increases.

欧洲并非中国出口激增的唯一目的地。东南亚是中国出口增长最迅猛的地区之一。

Dani Rodrik, an economist at Harvard, said the West’s “response to China’s manufacturing onslaught has been misguided and ineffective.” Chinese innovation has produced significant climate and energy-related advancements, which benefit the entire globe, he said, adding that “instead of blanket condemnation of Chinese mercantilism, the West needs a more differentiated strategy.”

哈佛大学经济学家丹尼·罗德里克认为，西方“对中国制造业攻势的应对是失当的，也是无效的”。他说，中国创新在气候和能源领域取得了重大进展，惠及全球，他还补充说，“西方不应一味谴责中国重商主义，而需要采取更有区分度的战略。”

He suggested focusing on the next generation of technology rather than trying to ape what China had already done.

他建议应聚焦下一代技术，而不是试图模仿中国已经做的事情。

巴黎的一家咖啡馆。法国总统埃马纽埃尔·马克龙本月访华时表示，全球贸易失衡“正变得令人难以忍受”。

In terms of artificial intelligence, China offers the United States significant competition. Mr. Acemoglu at M.I.T. said China had an advantage over the United States when it came to the number of well-trained engineers.

在人工智能领域，中国对美国构成了重大威胁。麻省理工学院的阿西莫格鲁表示，中国在高素质工程师的数量上拥有优势。

The unseating of the longstanding trading order, with the United States clearly on top and leading the way, is also creating new uncertainties and costs for the world economy.

长期以来以美国居首、引领全球的贸易秩序被打破，也为世界经济带来了新的不确定性和成本。

“We’re certainly in this limbo where there’s no hegemon, and countries are feeling more entitled to go their own way,” said Maurice Obstfeld, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

“我们现在确实处于一种没有霸权的状态，各国愈发觉得自己有权走自己的路，”彼得森国际经济研究所高级研究员莫里斯·奥布斯特菲尔德说。

As ad hoc bilateral trade deals proliferate, businesses also have to worry more about the source of their materials and rising compliance costs with added demands for documentation. “It’s a much creakier trade system than the one we’ve been used to,” Mr. Obstfeld said.

随着临时双边贸易协定激增，企业还必须更加关注原材料来源以及因额外手续要求而增加的合规成本。“现在的贸易体系比我们习惯的那个要脆弱得多，运转起来也更费力，”奥布斯特菲尔德说。

Diane Coyle, an economist at the University of Cambridge, noted how the Covid-19 pandemic and its aftermath had revealed unforeseen vulnerabilities in the global supply chain. “I think we still don’t have a detailed insight into global and national production networks and where those bottlenecks are,” or where they will show up when a new crisis hits, she said.

剑桥大学经济学家黛安·科伊尔指出，新冠疫情及其后果暴露了全球供应链中意想不到的脆弱性。“我们仍然缺乏对全球和国家生产网络的详细洞察，不知道瓶颈在哪里，”她说。“也不知道下一次危机来临时，瓶颈会在哪里出现。”

Political currents could bring further instability to the world economy.

政治浪潮可能给世界经济带来进一步的不稳定。

“A lot of people in a lot of countries feel that their lives are going backward,” Ms. Coyle said, and distrust in government is increasing.

“很多国家、很多人感觉自己的生活正在倒退，”科伊尔说，对政府的信任也在下降。

Elections in several nations next year could shift policy. Midterm congressional elections in the United States, which may serve as a referendum on Mr. Trump’s economic agenda, are likely to prompt the administration to pump up government spending — and the deficit — to spur the economy.

明年多个国家的大选或将引发政策转向。美国中期国会选举很可能成为对特朗普经济议程的一次公投，政府可能因此加大支出、扩大赤字以刺激经济。

生产瓶颈的薄弱环节在新冠疫情期间已暴露无遗，但其深层机理至今仍未得到充分认知。

Sweden’s general elections will show how some of Europe’s far-right populist parties are faring and test the electoral system’s susceptibility to foreign disinformation campaigns. In Latin America’s largest economy, Brazil, where Mr. Trump has used tariffs to try to influence domestic politics and judicial rulings, the president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, will face off against a far-right populist challenger.

瑞典大选将显示欧洲极右翼民粹主义政党表现如何，并考验选举系统对外国虚假信息运动的抵抗力。在拉美最大经济体巴西——特朗普曾利用关税试图影响其国内政治和司法裁决——现任总统卢拉将面对极右翼民粹主义挑战者。

A group of external advisers to the twin stewards of the global financial system, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, captured this sense of dislocation — and perhaps even dread — in a new analysis of the future of the world economy and the institutions’ roles in it.

在一份关于世界经济未来及机构角色的新分析报告中，全球金融体系双巨头——世界银行和国际货币基金组织——的一个外部顾问团队捕捉到了这种失序感——甚至可能是恐惧感。

They introduced the report with a quote based on the 1929 writings of the political philosopher Antonio Gramsci: “The old world is dying, and the new world struggles to be born; now is the time of monsters.”

他们在报告开头引用了政治哲学家安东尼奥·葛兰西在1929年写下的文字：“旧世界正在死去，新世界挣扎着诞生；现在是怪兽的时代。”

One pastor was at an airport in Shanghai. Another was in the rural outskirts of Beijing. Another was at home in Guangxi, in southwestern China.

一名牧师当时在上海的一座机场。另一名在北京的城乡结合部。还有一名在位于中国西南部广西的家中。

In early October, they were all detained, alongside nearly 30 other pastors and church members across China, as the police rounded up people affiliated with Zion Church, one of the country’s largest unofficial Protestant congregations.

10月初，他们与全国各地近30名牧师和教会成员一同被拘留。警方当时在全国范围内展开行动，抓捕与锡安教会有关联的人士。锡安教会是中国规模最大的非官方新教教会之一。

It was the most wide-ranging crackdown on Chinese Christians in years, according to activists and supporters. And many fear it is just beginning.

据维权人士和支持者称，这是多年来针对中国基督徒范围最广的一次打压。许多人担心，这只是一个开始。

在警方10月那次行动中被捕的人士。

The detained members included people who had been Christians since childhood, and others who had joined the church recently. They ranged in age from their 30s to their 50s, and included lawyers, physicists and music students.

被拘留者中有些人自幼就是基督徒，也有近年才加入教会的人。他们年龄从30多岁到50多岁不等，职业包括律师、物理学家和音乐专业学生。

So far, 18 of the detainees have been formally arrested. The police have provided little information about the investigation, other than issuing the families of those arrested one-sentence notices listing only the suspected crime and where the person is being held.

截至目前，已有18人被正式逮捕。除了向被捕者家属发出仅列明涉嫌罪名和被关押地点的简短通知外，警方几乎没有披露调查细节。

The most prominent of those arrested was the church’s lead pastor, Jin Mingri, who also goes by the name Ezra. He founded Zion in Beijing in 2007 as an unregistered evangelical church.

被捕者中最引人注目的是教会的主任牧师金明日，他也使用以斯拉(Ezra)这一名字。2007年他在北京创立了锡安教会，这是一个未注册的福音派教会。

Chinese law guarantees freedom of religion, but in reality, the governing Chinese Communist Party requires religious groups to register with the government and submit to strict political controls. Those who do not want to do so — including by some estimates, tens of millions of unregistered Chinese Christians — have to worship underground.

中国法律保障宗教信仰自由，但在现实中，中共当局要求宗教团体向政府登记，并接受严格的政治控制。那些不愿意这样做的群体——据估计包括数以千万计未登记的中国基督徒——只能在地下进行宗教活动。

That has become especially difficult under China’s current leader, Xi Jinping. As he has tightened control over Chinese society, major underground churches have been shut down, including Beijing Zion in 2018.

在现任领导人习近平上台后，这变得尤为艰难。随着他不断收紧对社会的控制，许多大型地下教会被关闭，其中就包括2018年遭到取缔的北京锡安教会。

锡安教会牧师金明日（又名以斯拉），2018年摄于北京。该教会是中国国内最著名的地下教会之一。他的家人表示，他于周五被拘留。

Some churches, like Zion, have moved largely online instead. But the government is cracking down on that, too. The charge that the Zion members are being accused of, “illegally using information networks,” broadly targets the sharing of so-called illegal or criminal information online. The government has moved recently to classify unauthorized religious activities under that label. It issued new regulations in September that online preaching may be done only through the licensed websites and platforms of officially registered faith groups.

一些像锡安这样的教会转而主要在网上活动。但政府对此同样展开了打压。锡安教会成员被指控的罪名是“非法使用信息网络”，这一罪名范围广泛，主要针对所谓在网上传播非法或犯罪信息。近年来，政府已将未经授权的宗教活动纳入这一范畴。9月出台的新规规定，线上布道只能通过依法登记的宗教团体所运营、并获得许可的网站和平台进行。

Dr. Jin had helped turn Zion into one of the most successful online churches, according to members. He still met church members offline, but he also gave sermons online, using platforms like YouTube or WeChat. There are hundreds of videos on Zion Church’s YouTube page featuring members singing hymns and putting on Christmas shows.

据教会成员介绍，金牧师曾将锡安教会打造为最成功的线上教会之一。他仍然在线下与信徒见面，同时也通过YouTube、微信等平台进行线上布道。锡安教会的YouTube频道有数百段视频，记录着成员们唱圣诗、举办圣诞演出的画面。

When the coronavirus pandemic forced many unofficial churches to stop in-person services, Zion, with its established online presence, grew rapidly, according to Dr. Jin’s daughter, Grace Jin, who lives in the United States. More than 100 small groups met every Sunday across dozens of Chinese cities, she said.

金牧师的女儿金婷雅现居美国。她说，新冠疫情迫使许多非官方教会停止线下活动，而锡安教会凭借既有的线上基础迅速壮大。她表示，当时每个周日全国数十座城市里有100多个小组同时聚会。

But the government surveillance followed. In the past three years, officials stepped up the pressure on Zion. Before his arrest, Dr. Jin said in a series of video conversations with Grace and her husband that church staff members had been detained or groundlessly accused of offenses like bribery or disorderly conduct.

但政府的监控随之而来。过去三年里，当局不断加大对锡安教会的压力。在被捕前，金牧师曾在与女儿及女婿的一系列视频通话中表示，教会工作人员被拘留，或被无端指控行贿、寻衅滋事等罪名。

Dr. Jin’s family said it had decided to record those conversations because it was concerned that a bigger crackdown was coming and wanted to keep a record.

金牧师的家人说，他们决定录下这些对话，是因为担心会有更大规模的镇压行动，希望留下记录。

The authorities also frequently disrupted church gatherings, like one in July in the city of Zhongshan, in southern China.

当局也频繁干扰教会聚会活动。例如7月在中国南方城市中山的一次聚会。

At least seven men in police uniforms stormed in during a Sunday service in an office building, alongside multiple men and women in plainclothes who later identified themselves as police officers or employees of the religious affairs bureau, according to videos. One officer in a white T-shirt said that they suspected the group, which included children, was holding an illegal gathering.

据现场视频显示，至少七名身着警服的男子闯入一栋写字楼内的周日礼拜现场，同行的还有多名便衣男女，后来他们自称警察或宗教事务部门工作人员。一名身穿白色T恤的人员表示，他们怀疑这场包含儿童在内的聚会属于非法集会。

As worshipers tried to leave the room, officers demanded that they first register their personal information. A uniformed officer filmed people on his phone as they filed out.

当信徒试图离开房间时，执法人员要求他们先登记个人信息。一名穿制服的警察还用手机拍摄信徒离开的过程。

Then, in October, officials cracked down, just as Dr. Jin and his family had feared.

随后，正如金牧师一家所担心的那样，当局在10月展开了集中打压。

On Oct. 10, Sun Cong, a Zion Church pastor, was at a guesthouse on the outskirts of Beijing at a retreat for older church members. Around 10:30 p.m., as the group was getting ready for bed, multiple men in plainclothes and one uniformed police officer appeared, according to Mr. Sun’s wife, Gu Xiaoyu. They handcuffed Mr. Sun as other attendees demanded to know what he had done wrong.

10月10日，锡安教会牧师孙聪正在北京郊外一家招待所参加为年长教会成员举办的团契活动。大约晚上10点半，当大家准备就寝时，多名便衣男子和一名穿制服的警察出现了。孙牧师的妻子谷晓羽说，对方当场给孙聪戴上手铐，其他参与者则质问他究竟犯了什么错。

Then a group of eight officers took Mr. Sun, still handcuffed, to his home in Beijing. They rang the doorbell at nearly 1 a.m., demanding that his wife let them in.

随后，八名警员将仍被铐着的孙聪带回他在北京的家中。接近凌晨1点，他们按响门铃，要求谷晓羽开门。

Once inside, the police began searching the home. They copied files from Mr. Sun’s laptop and rummaged through books of Christian literature, Ms. Gu said. When Ms. Gu asked if they had a search warrant, they filled one out on the spot, she said.

进入屋内后，警方开始搜查。他们拷贝了孙聪笔记本电脑里的文件，并翻查基督教书籍。谷晓羽询问是否有搜查令时，对方当场填写了一份。

Similar raids were happening across China. That same day, Dr. Jin was arrested at his home in Guangxi. Around 2 a.m. on Oct. 11, the police also arrived at a house in Beijing where Gao Yingjia, another Zion pastor, and his wife, Geng Pengpeng, were staying with friends. (The couple had left their own home after hearing about the arrests, Ms. Geng said.)

类似的突袭行动在全国多地同时发生。金明日牧师当天在广西的家中被捕。10月11日凌晨2点左右，警方还来到北京一处住所，锡安教会牧师高颖佳和妻子耿朋朋当时正借住在朋友家。（耿朋朋说，他们夫妇在得知逮捕行动后离开了自己家。）

The police took Mr. Gao away while Ms. Geng remained behind with their 5-year-old son, she said. When she returned to her own home the next morning, she found the front door ajar and the electronic lock had been dismantled and replaced.

警方将高颖佳带走，留下了耿朋朋与他们五岁的儿子。第二天早晨，当她回到自己家时，发现大门虚掩，电子门锁已被拆除更换。

Her home had been searched by the authorities. More than a dozen of her diaries were missing, she said, as well as some religious and philosophy books, the couple’s laptops and their bank cards.

她的家已被当局搜查。她说，十多本日记不见了，一些宗教和哲学书籍、夫妻二人的笔记本电脑以及银行卡也被带走。

Since October, the raids have continued. More than 20 police officers broke up a Thanksgiving gathering of Zion members in Beijing and took away one member, according to a statement from the church on X. Several of the arrested pastors’ relatives have fled overseas, including Ms. Gu, Mr. Sun’s wife. She said by phone that she did not dare return to China, even though it meant uprooting her three young children.

自10月以来，突袭行动仍在继续。据教会在社交平台X上发布的声明，20多名警察在北京突袭了锡安教会成员的感恩节聚会，并带走了一名成员。多名被捕牧师的亲属已逃往海外，包括孙聪的妻子谷晓羽。她在电话中表示，自己不敢回中国，即使这意味着不得不带着三个年幼的孩子背井离乡。

“In the current religious environment in China, especially with the waves of persecution of Christians, we had some mental preparation,” she said, choking up. “But when it really happened — and even now, even though two months have passed — my heart still hurts.”

“在中国现在的这个宗教环境下，尤其基督教的迫害，一波接着一波, 我们是有心理准备的，”她哽咽道。“但是当真的到的时候，包括现在，这个事情已经过去两个月了，我心里也会很痛。”

The man who stabbed three people to death in Taipei, Taiwan, appeared to have prepared meticulously for his attack, police investigators said on Saturday, even as they struggled to find a motive for his spree of violence.

警方调查人员上周六表示，在台湾台北持刀刺死三人的男子似乎为这次袭击做了周密准备，但他们仍难以确定其疯狂暴力行为的动机。

Two days before the man began his assault with smoke grenades and a long knife in the city’s main subway station on Friday afternoon, he checked into a cheap hotel only 50 yards from the store where he ended his spree, Taiwanese police officers said.

该男子于上周五下午在台北市的一个主要捷运站使用烟雾弹和一把长刀发动袭击，台湾警方称，在发动袭击两天前，他入住了一家距离其行凶的最后一个地点——一家店铺——不到50米的廉价旅馆。

He had left evidence of his plans in digital form, they said, and on foot and bicycle he scouted the locations where he attacked stunned shoppers and commuters.

警方表示，他以数字形式留下了其作案计划的证据，并曾步行和骑自行车踩点，勘察他袭击惊骇不已的购物者和通勤人群的地点。

And during his hourslong assault, he changed his outfit five times, the police said, although they did not make clear exactly where or when.

警方还称，在持续数小时的袭击过程中，他换了五次衣服，但没有明确说明具体的地点和时间。

“Up to now, we have not been able to clarify his motive. We know only that he had a plan for this attack,” Lu Chun-hung, the chief of the criminal investigation division of the Taipei City Police, told reporters. He also sought to douse rumors that the attacker, whom the police identified as Chang Wen, had acted in league with others who remained at large.

“我们目前为止没有办法厘清动机，我们只是知道他有这个攻击的计划，”台北市警察局刑事警察大队大队长卢俊宏告诉记者。他还对嫌疑人并非单独行动、仍有同伙在逃的传言进行了澄清。

“We’ve reviewed all the surveillance camera footage and found that he acted alone and did not have any contact with anyone else,” Mr. Lu said.

“我们调了所有的监视器，他都是单独行动，没有跟任何其他人接触，”卢俊宏说。

Three people died from wounds suffered in the attacks, and the attacker died after apparently jumping from the fifth floor of a retail building where he had just fatally stabbed a man. Eleven other people were injured, six of whom were still in the hospital on Saturday, said Taiwan’s minister of health, Shih Chung-liang.

在此次袭击中，三人伤重不治，袭击者在当地一家购物场所的五楼刺死一名男子后，疑似从该处跳楼身亡。台湾卫生福利部部长石崇良称，另有11人受伤，其中六人截至上周六仍在住院治疗。

The bloodshed drew intense public attention in Taiwan, where outbursts of deadly violence are rare.

这起流血事件引起了台湾民众的极大关注，在当地，致命的暴力事件非常罕见。

For the second day in a row, Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te, and other senior officials sought to reassure residents that the government would thoroughly investigate the killings and look for lessons to prevent any similar attacks. The last similar case was in 2014, when a man went on a stabbing spree on a Taipei subway train, killing four people. He was executed in 2016.

台湾总统赖清德及其他高级官员连续两天出面安抚民众，表示政府将彻底调查这起杀人事件，并从中吸取教训，以防止类似袭击再次发生。上一次类似案件发生在2014年，当时一名男子在台北捷运上持刀行凶，造成4人死亡。该男子于2016年被执行死刑。

The latest series of attacks began around 3:40 p.m. and ended a little over three hours later, according to a timeline described by Chang Jung-Hsin, the director-general of Taiwan’s National Police Agency, in a televised meeting. At the same meeting, Taiwan’s premier, Cho Jung-tai, suggested that answers were needed about why the attacker could continue his actions for so long after witnesses were already alarmed.

据台湾警政署署长张荣兴在一个视讯会议上介绍的时间线显示，这一系列袭击始于下午3点40分左右，在三个多小时后结束。在同一次会议上，台湾行政院院长卓荣泰表示，有必要弄清楚在目击者已经报警的情况下，袭击者为何还能持续行动如此之久。

The police said the man set out from his hotel room and began by trying to set on fire parked vehicles. He went back to a small apartment he rented and tried to set fire to it, and then went to Taipei Main Station, pulling a small trolley holding improvised smoke grenades. He tossed the grenades near a busy concourse and entryways and attacked a man with a knife, after the man tried to stop his attack, the mayor of Taipei, Chiang Wan-an, told reporters.

警方表示，该男子从所住的旅馆房间出发，首先试图点燃停放的车辆。随后他回到自己租住的一间小公寓，试图纵火；接着前往台北车站，拖着一辆装有自制烟雾弹的小推车。台北市长蒋万安告诉记者，他在一处人流密集的连通道和出口附近投掷烟雾弹，并在一名男子试图阻止其行凶后，用刀袭击了该男子。

Police officers arrived to try to catch the attacker, but he escaped back to his hotel room, and then walked about half a mile to a branch of the Eslite bookstore in Zhongshan neighborhood, an area thronged by young Taiwanese, especially on a weekend evening. He had rented a hotel room a stone’s throw from the store.

警方赶到现场试图抓捕袭击者，但他逃回了自己的旅馆房间，随后步行近千米，前往位于中山区的一家诚品书店分店。该区域挤满年轻人，尤其在周末夜晚。他租住的旅馆房间距离该书店仅咫尺之遥。

He threw more smoke grenades at the crowd, which was growing increasingly alarmed. The attacker, dressed at this point in black shorts, shirt and cap, then stabbed a second man. Then he rushed upstairs in the bookstore and fatally stabbed another man on the fourth floor.

他又向恐慌情绪不断加剧的人群投掷了更多烟雾弹。此时，身穿黑色短裤、衬衫、戴着帽子的袭击者随后刺伤了第二名男子。接着，他冲至书店楼上，在四楼将另一名男子刺死。

Moments later, the attacker climbed to the fifth floor of the building, left some clothes and equipment on the floor, and plunged to his death on the street below.

不久之后，袭击者爬上大楼五楼，将部分衣物和装备留在地上，然后一跃而下，坠亡于下方街道。

While officials stressed that they were still trying to understand the attacker’s motives, details of his life and final actions suggested that he led an isolated and increasingly troubled life.

官员们强调，他们仍在努力弄清袭击者的动机，但其人生经历和最后的行为细节表明，他过着一种孤立且日益备受困扰的生活。

He had fallen out of contact with his family for two years or more, and had also lost his job, the police said. Previously, he had been discharged from the Taiwanese military in 2021 for driving while drunk. Family members told the police investigators that he had been interested in weapons since childhood.

警方表示，他已与家人失去联系两年或更长时间，并且失去了工作。此前，他曾因酒驾于2021年被台湾军方开除。家属向警方调查人员表示，他从小就对武器感兴趣。

When he fled the train station, he left behind gasoline bottles, a tactical vest and a gas mask. At his small apartment, which he had tried to set on fire, investigators found more knives, five gasoline containers and a laptop computer that was burned. Inside the hotel room that the man had rented for his final three days, they found 23 primitive gasoline bombs, two tablet computers and more knives.

他在逃离车站时留下了汽油瓶、一件战术背心和一个防毒面具。在他试图纵火的小公寓里，调查人员发现了更多的刀具、五个汽油容器以及一台被烧毁的笔记本电脑。在这名男子为生命最后三天租住的旅馆房间内，警方发现了23枚简易汽油炸弹、两台平板电脑和更多的刀具。

When Ueno Zoo in Tokyo announced this week that its most famous residents, Xiao Xiao and Lei Lei — twin 4-year-old giant pandas on loan from China — would go home in late January, a frenzy broke out in Japan.

本周，东京上野动物园宣布，其最知名的居民——从中国租借的4岁双胞胎大熊猫晓晓和蕾蕾——将于1月底返回中国。消息一出，日本国内掀起轩然大波。

Thousands of people descended on the zoo after seeing news alerts warning that Japan would soon be panda-less for the first time in more than half a century. Fears spread that the pandas would not be replaced as China punishes Japan over its of recent expression of support for Taiwan.

成千上万人看到新闻中关于半个多世纪以来日本将首次没有熊猫的警报后，纷纷涌向动物园。由于中国近期因日本表态支持台湾而对其采取反制措施，民众纷纷担忧这对大熊猫走后不会有替代者。

Mitsuko Usui, 65, visited the zoo on Tuesday with her family, lining up at 9 a.m. for a glimpse of Lei Lei. When her son was young, she brought him to see Chinese pandas here, and she wanted to repeat the tradition with her granddaughters.

65岁的臼井美津子（音）周二与家人一同前往动物园，早上9点便开始排队，只为一睹蕾蕾的风采。在她儿子小时候，她曾带他来这里观看中国大熊猫，如今她希望能和孙女们延续这一传统。

“It’s so hard to imagine Japan without pandas,” Ms. Usui said.

“很难想象日本没有熊猫的日子，”臼井说。

China and Japan made plans months ago for Xiao Xiao and Lei Lei, who were born at Ueno Zoo in 2021, to return home early next year. But Japanese officials say there has been no progress in talks with the Chinese authorities about sending replacements.

这对双胞胎大熊猫于2021年在上野动物园出生，中日两国数月前就已计划让它们明年初回国。但日本官员表示，与中国当局就派遣替代熊猫的谈判尚未取得任何进展。

Now the political climate has turned dire, as China fumes about comments by Japan’s prime minister, Sanae Takaichi. She said last month that Japan could intervene militarily if China were to attack Taiwan, a self-governed democracy that Beijing claims is part of its territory. Beijing has urged millions of tourists to avoid Japan, restricted Japanese seafood imports and increased military patrols.

如今，两国之间的政治氛围变得十分紧张。中国对日本首相高市早苗的相关言论表示强烈不满——她上月称，若中国攻击台湾这个北京声称是其领土的自治地区，日本可能会进行军事干预。对此，北京已敦促数百万游客避免前往日本，限制日本海产品进口，并加强了军事巡逻。

The Chinese foreign ministry declined to comment on whether it would keep sending pandas to Japan, referring questions to the “relevant Chinese authorities.”

中国外交部拒绝就是否会继续向日本派遣大熊猫置评，将相关问题交由“中国主管部门”处理。

周二，上野动物园的游客们排起长队，只为观看双胞胎熊猫晓晓和蕾蕾。

In Japan, pandas are considered the epitome of “kawaii,” or cute, culture. Millions of people visit Ueno Zoo each year to see Xiao Xiao and Lei Lei, the first twin pandas to be born there. Pandas are everywhere: on keychains, coffee mugs, winter socks and cream-filled pastries.

在日本，熊猫被视为可爱文化的象征。每年有数以百万计的人前往上野动物园看望晓晓和蕾蕾——它们是首次在该动物园诞生的双胞胎熊猫。这里的熊猫元素无处不在：钥匙扣、咖啡杯、冬季袜子和奶油糕点上都能见到它们的身影。

Mami Yonezawa, a frequent visitor, lined up repeatedly on Tuesday to say goodbye to the pandas, saying their departure made her sad.

常客米谷真美（音）周二多次排队与熊猫道别，称它们的离开让她十分难过。

“Pandas should be separate from political disputes,” she said. “They shouldn’t be used as cards.”

“熊猫应该远离政治争端，”她说。“它们不应该被当作筹码。”

Pandas have symbolized friendship between China and Japan since 1972, when China sent its first delegation of pandas, Kang Kang and Lan Lan, to celebrate the establishment of diplomatic ties between the countries. China has continued to dispatch the furry ambassadors even through disputes over territory, military policy, human rights and Japan’s wartime atrocities.

自1972年以来，熊猫一直是中日友谊的象征。当年，中国派遣首对熊猫“康康”和“兰兰”前往日本，庆祝两国建立外交关系。即便在发生领土争端、军事政策、人权问题以及日本战时暴行等争议期间，中国仍继续派遣这些毛茸茸的大使们。

1972年，为庆祝中日建交，大熊猫康康（左）和兰兰从中国抵达上野动物园。

Minoru Kihara, a top official in Ms. Takaichi’s cabinet, said he hoped a solution could be reached.

高市早苗内阁高级官员木原稔表示，希望双方能找到解决方案。

“Pandas are widely beloved by the Japanese people,” he said at a news conference in Tokyo on Monday. “Pandas have contributed to improving public sentiment in both Japan and China. We hope that these exchanges will continue.”

“熊猫深受日本民众喜爱，”周一他在东京的新闻发布会上说。“熊猫为改善中日两国公众情绪做出了贡献。我们希望这类交流能够继续下去。”

China has long used pandas to cultivate relationships with foreign politicians, soften China’s image abroad and shape policy on Taiwan. The hashtag “Japan will no longer have pandas” trended this week on Weibo, a popular Chinese social media platform, and some commenters said Japan did not deserve pandas until it changed its tune on Taiwan.

长期以来，中国一直利用熊猫与外国政界人士建立关系、软化自身海外形象，并影响有关台湾的政策。本周，“日本将不再有大熊猫”的话题登上中国热门社交媒体微博的热搜榜，部分网友表示，在日本改变对台湾的态度之前，不配拥有熊猫。

周二，上野动物园的晓晓。

Some zoos have gone without pandas for long stretches of time, including the Smithsonian’s National Zoo in Washington, which endured an 11-month pause before welcoming a pair of pandas last year. (Foreign zoos usually agree to send young pandas back to China before they turn 4 so they can take part in a breeding program. Adult pandas go back when they are elderly, typically in their 20s.)

有些动物园曾长期没有熊猫，例如华盛顿史密森尼国家动物园在去年迎来一对熊猫之前，曾经历了11个月的“熊猫空窗期”。（外国动物园通常同意在熊猫幼崽四岁前将其送回中国，以便它们参与繁育计划；成年熊猫则在年老时返回，通常是在20多岁的时候。）

For foreign leaders, pandas are often high on the list of priorities. During a recent state visit to China, President Emmanuel Macron of France secured replacements for two elderly pandas that recently returned to China. A pair of pandas will come to France in 2027 under a 10-year agreement.

对于外国领导人来说，熊猫往往是优先事项清单上的重要一项。在最近对中国的国事访问期间，法国总统马克龙成功为两只近期返回中国的老年熊猫争取到了替代者。根据一项为期10年的协议，一对熊猫将于2027年前往法国。

Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Stimson Center in Washington, said Beijing’s panda diplomacy was “more a policy instrument than conservation program.”

华盛顿史汀生中心中国项目主任孙韵表示，北京的熊猫外交“更多是一种政策工具，而非保护计划”。

“Given the current realities of the Sino-Japan relations, and the unlikelihood for Takaichi to take steps the Chinese would deem necessary and satisfactory to de-escalate, new pandas for Japan will be unlikely for the foreseeable future,” she said.

“考虑到当前中日关系的实际情况，以及高市早苗不太可能采取中国认为必要且满意的降温措施，在可预见的未来，日本很难迎来新的熊猫，”她说。

At Ueno Zoo, the last day of viewing for Xiao Xiao and Lei Lei is Jan. 25. Zoo officials have set up a reservation system for visits, to prevent overcrowding. More than 187,000 people are expected to visit in the coming weeks, subjected to a viewing limit of one minute.

在上野动物园，晓晓和蕾蕾的最后参观日被定为1月25日。动物园官员已设立预约参观系统，以防止过度拥挤。预计未来几周将有超过18.7万人前来参观，每位游客的观看时间限制为一分钟。

On Tuesday, a line to see pandas stretched for more than a mile. Television crews set up shop near bamboo groves. Zookeepers fielded questions from journalists about China-Japan tensions.

周二，看望熊猫的队伍绵延超过1.5公里。电视台工作人员在竹林附近搭建了拍摄点，动物园饲养员则回应了记者关于中日紧张关系的相关提问。

Ms. Usui and her family were giddy after they emerged from seeing Lei Lei. Her son Tsuyoshi Usui, 39, said he was pleased to be able to carry on the family’s panda-viewing tradition.

臼井一家看完蕾蕾后十分兴奋。她39岁的儿子、理发师臼井刚（音）说，能够延续家族看熊猫的传统，他感到很开心。

“It’s so sad that we won’t be able to see them anymore,” said Mr. Usui, a hairdresser. “They’re so cute.”

“以后再也看不到它们了，真的很伤心，”臼井刚说。“它们太可爱了。”

When the world’s tallest bridge opened in China’s Guizhou Province in September, a state-run political talk show filmed an episode from its summit to showcase what it called “the remarkable story of China’s path to modernization.”

当世界上最高的桥梁于9月在中国贵州省开通时，一档国有媒体的政治脱口秀节目在桥顶拍摄了一期节目，展示他们所称的“中国式现代化的精彩故事”。

A Canadian influencer on the panel marveled, “You have projects like this the West could only dream of.”

节目中一位加拿大网红惊叹道：“你们有这种西方难以企及的工程。”

CNN and NBC broadcast segments of their own about the bridge, which stands roughly 200 stories above a river. So did Matt Walsh, a right-wing commentator. “Why aren’t we building stuff like this any more?” he asked on his show on YouTube. He lamented that America had “lost the will and desire to do great things.”

CNN和NBC报道了这座高悬于离河面约200层楼高处的桥。右翼评论员马特·沃尔什也提到了它。“我们为什么不再建造这样的东西了？”他在YouTube节目中问道。他感叹美国已经“失去了做大事的意志和欲望”。

It would be a mistake to brush off the story of the Guizhou bridge as simply a victory of Chinese propaganda. The reactions to the bridge point to something deeper than admiration for Chinese infrastructure: a widening imbalance between the self-images of the world’s two largest powers.

将贵州大桥的故事简单归为中国宣传的胜利将是一个错误。对这座桥的反应指向了比对中国基础设施的钦佩更深层的东西：世界上两大强国自我形象之间日益扩大的失衡。

China has been buoyed this year by a surge of confidence, convinced that its governance model is ascendant and its rise inevitable. That confidence often overlooks serious vulnerabilities: a slowing economy, a deepening housing crisis and falling birthrates.

今年，中国因信心激增而振奋，坚信其治理模式更优越，其崛起不可避免。这种信心往往忽略了严重的脆弱性：经济放缓、不断深化的住房危机以及出生率下降。

The United States, meanwhile, has taken a different tone — one that China experts say exhibits defeatism. President Trump’s national security strategy, released this month, frames China more as a business competitor than as a rival for military, technological and ideological power. That is a shift from the views of prior administrations, including Mr. Trump’s own in his first term. Chinese analysts have interpreted the new strategy as evidence of American retreat.

与此同时，美国采取了不同的基调——中国专家称其表现出一种失败主义。特朗普总统本月发布的国家安全战略，将中国更多地定位为商业竞争对手，而不是军事、技术和意识形态力量的对手。这与前几届政府（包括特朗普的第一任期）的观点有所转变。中国分析人士将这一新战略解读为美国退缩的证据。

The document describes China as a “near peer.” It downplays Beijing’s military and technological strengths and reframes the relationship largely in commercial terms — a striking position when China sees itself advancing on every front.

该文件将中国描述为“实力相近的国家”。它淡化了北京的军事和技术优势，并主要从商业角度重新定义了这种关系——当中国认为自己在各领域都在前进的时候，这样的立场显得很惊人。

An official Chinese commentary published by the Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy Studies Center argued that the “near peer” phrasing reflects “deep anxiety” within America’s decision-making establishment and amounts to a “painful” acknowledgment that earlier U.S. strategies have failed.

习近平外交思想研究中心发表的一篇中文官方评论认为，“实力近乎对等”的表述反映了美国决策层内部的“深切焦虑”，并相当于在“痛苦地”承认此前的美国战略的失败。

Similarly, Mr. Trump reversed Washington policy this month when he allowed the Silicon Valley giant Nvidia to sell advanced semiconductors to China, as long as the company shares the proceeds with the U.S. government. The move, in effect, cast competition with China as a losing battle best managed through short-term commercial transactions.

同样，本月特朗普逆转了华盛顿的政策，允许硅谷巨头英伟达向中国销售先进半导体，只要该公司与美国政府分享收益。这一举动实际上将与中国竞争视为一场注定失败的战斗，通过短期商业交易来管理最为妥当。

世界最高大桥花江峡谷大桥，位于中国贵州省。

A danger is that Mr. Trump, by downplaying the geopolitical rivalry with China, could give license to pessimism about America’s place in the world.

一个危险是，特朗普淡化与中国的地缘政治竞争可能助长对美国国际地位的悲观情绪。

The gap in superpower perception — overconfidence in the rising power and defeatism in the incumbent — could destabilize U.S.-Chinese relations. It makes it less likely the two sides can view each other’s strengths with clear eyes and heightens the risk of strategic miscalculation.

超级大国认知的差距——崛起大国过度自信、现任大国失败主义——可能破坏美中关系。这使得双方不太可能清晰看待彼此的优势，并增加了战略误判的风险。

“Scholars of international relations have long argued that overconfidence and false optimism can intensify conflicts and even contribute to the outbreak of wars,” said Haifeng Huang, a political scientist at Ohio State University. He pointed to how China’s belligerent brand of wolf-warrior diplomacy has alienated key trading partners, including Australia and the European Union. He cited Russia’s underestimation of the challenges it faced when it invaded Ukraine as another example of the perils of geopolitical hubris.

“国际关系学者长期以来认为，过度自信和虚假乐观会加剧冲突，甚至导致战争爆发，”俄亥俄州立大学政治学家黄海峰说。他指出，中国“好战”的狼战外交如何疏远了包括澳大利亚和欧盟在内的关键贸易伙伴。他还以俄罗斯入侵乌克兰时低估自身面临的挑战为例，说明地缘政治傲慢的危险性。

In recent years, the triumphant narrative that China has cultivated in its propaganda has taken root at home and echoed abroad.

近年来，中国在其宣传中构建的胜利叙事已在国内扎根，并在国外产生共鸣。

During the Covid-19 pandemic, global views of China dipped to their lowest in decades. But the Chinese public, its information filtered by a tightly controlled media, consistently overestimated the country’s international standing, according to two surveys conducted by Mr. Huang. The surveys showed that Chinese people believed that China was admired and endorsed far more widely around the world than Pew Research Center and Gallup surveys indicated.

在新冠疫情期间，全球对中国看法降至几十年来的最低点。但根据黄海峰进行的两次调查，中国公众的信息被严格控制的媒体过滤，一贯高估本国在国际上的地位。调查显示，中国人认为中国在世界范围内受到的钦佩和认可远超皮尤研究中心和盖洛普调查所显示的程度。

Beijing could not prevent a crisis of confidence in 2023 and 2024 after it ended its strict Covid policies. The housing market crashed, youth unemployment surged and consumer sentiment plunged. A slump in confidence, largely driven by the decline in real estate values, continues to hang over China’s economy.

结束严格的新冠防疫政策后，北京未能阻止2023年和2024年出现的信心危机。房地产市场崩盘，青年失业率飙升，消费者信心暴跌。主要由房地产价值下降驱动的信心低迷继续笼罩着中国经济。

But 2025 began differently. In January, DeepSeek announced a big advance in artificial intelligence and became a catalyst for a wave of technological confidence in China.

但2025年的开局有所不同。1月，DeepSeek宣布人工智能领域的一项重大进展，成为中国技术信心浪潮的催化剂。

Over the past two months, I’ve interviewed more than a dozen Chinese tech executives and investors. They said they felt more optimistic than at any point in the previous four years, even as they acknowledged that the wider economy was sluggish and that intense domestic competition was eroding their profit margins.

过去两个月里，我采访了十多位中国科技高管和投资者。他们表示，他们比过去四年中的任何时候都更加乐观，尽管他们承认，整体经济低迷，激烈的国内竞争正在侵蚀他们的利润率。

Market sentiment has shifted, too. Hong Kong’s Hang Seng stock index, heavily weighted toward Chinese companies, is up about 25 percent this year, compared with 16 percent for the S&P 500. The founder of a Shanghai-based A.I. start-up told me that major banks were so busy working on initial public offerings that it had become difficult to get meetings with their senior executives. A year ago, the banks were asking to see him.

市场情绪也发生了变化。以中国企业为主的香港恒生指数今年上涨了约25%，而标准普尔500指数的涨幅为16%。上海一家人工智能初创企业的创始人告诉我，各大银行都忙于首次公开募股，以至于很难与它们的高管见面。一年前，银行还在主动约见他。

China’s confidence is magnified by the acclaim it receives from abroad. Western influencers routinely post videos of China’s megaprojects — from high-speed rail hubs to astonishing urban skylines — that feed a narrative of Chinese competence. American commentators gush at China’s tech and manufacturing advances. State media eagerly amplifies these voices as proof that the world views China as the standard-bearer of modern development.

从国外获得的赞誉增强了中国的信心。西方网红经常发布中国大型项目的视频——从高铁枢纽到惊人的城市天际线，不断强化着有关中国实力的叙事。美国评论人士对中国的科技和制造业进步赞不绝口。官方媒体急切地放大这些声音，作为世界将中国视为现代发展标杆的证据。

The scholar Zhang Weiwei, whose political talk show featured the opening of the Guizhou bridge, has advised top leaders on how to shape China’s messaging abroad. In July, he devoted an episode to praising what he called the “wise Americans” who, in his telling, have begun to acknowledge China’s rise and America’s decline.

学者张维为的政治脱口秀节目谈到了贵州大桥的开通，他就如何塑造中国的对外信息向最高领导人提出建议。今年7月，他用一集的篇幅赞扬了他所谓的“美国智者”，用他的话来说，这些人已经开始承认中国的崛起和美国的衰落。

“Since Trump’s return to the White House,” he said, “more Western voices have been reflecting on what the U.S. has done wrong and what China has done right. Their conclusion: America’s problems are intractable.”

“总之，特朗普再度入主白宫以来，从各个角度反思美国做错了什么、中国做对了什么的西方人士越来越多，而他们最后的结论似乎都是一样的，即美国的问题基本无解，”他说。

Chinese state media also widely reported a Pew survey showing that views of the United States have worsened this year in 10 high-income countries while views of China have improved.

中国官方媒体还广泛报道了皮尤研究中心的一项调查，该调查显示，今年10个高收入国家对美国的看法有所恶化，而对中国的看法有所改善。

American elites who visit China typically stay at high-end hotels, visit companies that are making money and meet with officials who have survived under the iron rule of Xi Jinping, China’s top leader. A Hong Kong-based economist I interviewed, requesting anonymity because Beijing had warned the person not to speak ill of the economy, said visitors rarely got to meet with people who had lost their businesses or been detained under Mr. Xi. Americans also rarely encounter ordinary Chinese who face economic pressures that might feel familiar.

访华的美国精英通常下榻高端酒店，参观利润丰厚的企业，会见在习近平铁腕统治下生存下来的官员。一位要求匿名的香港经济学家接受采访时表示，访华者很少能接触到在习近平执政期间破产或被拘留的人士。美国人也很少接触到那些承受着他们可能熟悉的经济压力的普通中国人。

7月，上海世界人工智能大会上，众多人形机器人争相吸引观众目光。

China’s advances in artificial intelligence, robotics and manufacturing pose real challenges for the United States. But the larger risk is the extent to which the American psyche internalizes a Beijing-driven narrative of U.S. decline, often without understanding China’s own weaknesses.

中国在人工智能、机器人和制造业方面的进步对美国构成了真正的挑战。但更大的风险在于，美国人的心理在多大程度上内化了北京主导的美国衰落叙事，而往往不了解中国自身的弱点。

What worries some observers most is not China’s rising confidence but what they say is America’s diminishing faith in its own abilities. To Jianying Zha, a writer in New York City who has chronicled Chinese politics for decades, that shift is the real strategic danger.

一些观察家最担心的不是中国日益增强的自信，而是他们所说的美国对自己能力的信心正在减弱。几十年来一直记录中国政治的纽约作家查建英认为，这种转变是真正的战略危险。

“America’s greatest enemy is itself — losing faith in its core values and its fighting spirit,” she told me. “That’s exactly what plays into China’s ancient art of war: defeating you without waging war, because you’ll defeat yourself.”

“美国最大的敌人是它自己——对它的核心价值观和战斗精神失去信心，”她告诉我。“这正是中国古代兵法的精髓所在：不战而屈人之兵，因为你会打败自己。”

The Trump administration asked Congress on Wednesday to approve an arms package for Taiwan valued at more than $11 billion, in what would be a huge injection of military aid to the self-governing democratic island bracing for a long-feared invasion by China.

特朗普政府周三要求国会批准一项价值超过110亿美元的对台军售方案，这将为这个自治的民主岛屿注入大量军事援助，台湾正为人们长期担忧的中国入侵做准备。

If approved by Congress, as is likely given Taiwan’s strong bipartisan support, the package would exceed the $8.4 billion in arms sold to Taiwan during the Biden administration, according to figures recently compiled by the research arm of Britain’s House of Commons. And it would be equivalent to more than half the $18.3 billion in arms sold to Taiwan during President Trump’s first term in office.

根据英国下议院研究部门最近汇编的数据，如果国会批准——鉴于台湾享有两党广泛支持，这很可能实现——该方案将超过拜登政府期间对台出售的84亿美元武器。而且，这相当于特朗普总统第一任期内对台出售的183亿美元武器的半数以上。

The size of the proposal is likely to reassure China hawks in Washington who have grown uneasy about Mr. Trump’s commitment to defending Taiwan as he seeks to cut trade and economic deals with Beijing.

该方案的规模很可能安抚华盛顿的对华鹰派人士，随着特朗普寻求与北京达成贸易和经济协议，这些人士对其保卫台湾的承诺日益感到不安。

The arms sales cleared by the State Department include more than $4 billion each for high mobility artillery rocket systems, known as HIMARS, and M109A7 self-propelled howitzers. The package would also include more than $700 million for Javelin and TOW anti-armor missiles, as well as Altius kamikaze drones made by the military technology company Anduril.

国务院批准的军售包括价值超过40亿美元的高机动性火炮火箭系统（简称HIMARS）和M109A7自行榴弹炮。该方案还包括价值超过7亿美元的标枪和陶式反装甲导弹，以及由军事技术公司Anduril制造的Altius自杀式无人机。

In a statement on its website, the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency said the proposed sale would serve U.S. interests by supporting Taiwan’s “continuing efforts to modernize its armed forces and to maintain a credible defensive capability.”

五角大楼国防安全合作局在其网站上发表声明称，该拟议出售将通过支持台湾“持续努力实现武装力量现代化并维持可靠的防御能力”来服务美国利益。

Without explicitly mentioning Beijing, Taiwan’s defense ministry said in a statement that the weapons package would provide “strong deterrence and deterrence combat capabilities” and “asymmetric combat advantages.”

台湾国防部在声明中虽未明确提及北京，但表示该武器方案将提供“强大的威慑和威慑性作战能力”以及“不对称作战优势”。

U.S. officials and China experts have warned for years that China’s president, Xi Jinping, appears determined to regain control of Taiwan, which he considers a rogue province that belongs under Beijing’s control, and has been organizing his military for a potential invasion in the coming years.

美国官员和中国专家多年来警告称，中国国家主席习近平似乎决心重新控制台湾，他视台湾为属于北京管辖的叛离省份，并一直在为未来几年可能的入侵行动组织其军队。

Though not formally independent, Taiwan has been a self-governing democracy since China’s communist revolution and is a close U.S. ally and economic partner. Washington has supplied Taipei with advanced weapons for decades, even though it does not formally recognize Taiwan as a country and maintains a policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding whether it would come to the island’s defense in the event of an attack.

虽然没有正式独立，台湾自中国共产主义革命以来一直是自治民主政体，也是美国的密切盟友和经济伙伴。华盛顿没有正式承认台湾为国家，并在发生攻击时是否保卫该岛问题上维持“战略模糊”政策，但数十年来一直向台北提供先进武器。

The announcement of the package came while Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te, is seeking to push through Taiwan’s annual budget as well as an additional $40 billion special budget for increased spending on military hardware up to 2033.

该方案宣布之际，台湾总统赖清德正寻求推动通过台湾年度预算以及一项额外400亿美元的特别预算，用于增加至2033年的军事装备支出。

Taiwan’s opposition Nationalist Party, which, together with a smaller opposition party, controls the majority in Taiwan’s legislature, has criticized Mr. Lai’s proposals, citing issues such as delayed deliveries of previous weapons orders and wasteful projects, and could delay or even block the proposed increases in military spending.

台湾的反对党国民党与一个较小的反对党一起控制议会多数席位，国民党批评赖清德的提案，理由包括先前武器订单交付延迟和浪费项目，并可能推迟甚至阻拦拟议的军费增加。

But politicians on both sides in Taiwan have indicated that they expect Mr. Lai’s proposed special budget to pass eventually, possibly after changes demanded by the opposition.

但台湾政界两大阵营都表示，他们预计赖清德提出的特别预算最终将获得通过，可能是在按反对党要求修改后。

“Taiwan will also continue to deepen cooperation with the United States and other security partners, steadily enhancing its defense capabilities and resilience,” Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement about the latest arms purchases from the United States.

台湾外交部在关于最新美国军购的声明中表示：“台湾也将继续深化与美国及其他安全伙伴的合作，稳步提升国防能力和韧性。”

The economic relationship between the United States and China is as fraught as it has been in recent memory, but that has not stopped a wave of Chinese food and beverage chains from moving aggressively into the United States for the first time.

尽管近年美中经济关系前所未有地紧张，但并未阻挡一波中国餐饮连锁品牌首次大举进军美国市场。

Chinese tea shops in New York and Los Angeles are offering consumers drinks topped with a milk or cheese foam. Fried chicken sandwich joints are trying to lure diners in California with affordable fast food. Restaurant and drink brands, some with thousands of stores in China, are taking root in American cities to escape punishing competition at home.

纽约和洛杉矶的中式茶饮店带来了奶盖或芝士顶饮品。在加州，来自中国的炸鸡三明治店铺试图以亲民价格吸引食客。为了逃离国内残酷的竞争，这些中国餐饮品牌——其中有一些在国内已经拥有了数千家门店——正在美国城市扎下根来。

HeyTea, a tea chain originating in Jiangmen, a city in southern China, has opened three dozen stores nationwide since 2023, including a flagship operation in Times Square, in New York. Two other rival tea brands, Chagee and Naisnow, opened their first U.S. stores this year. Luckin Coffee, a chain with three outlets for every one Starbucks in China, opened several spots across Manhattan.

起源于中国南方城市江门的喜茶，自2023年以来已在全美开设了30多家门店，包括一家位于纽约时报广场的旗舰店。另两家茶饮竞争对手霸王茶姬与奈雪的茶也于今年登陆美国市场。在中国门店数量三倍于星巴克的瑞幸咖啡已在曼哈顿开设多家分店。

Wallace, one of China’s largest fast-food chains with more than 20,000 stores selling fried chicken and hamburgers, landed in Walnut, Calif., for its first shop. Haidilao, China’s largest hot-pot chain, is redoubling its efforts in the United States after entering the market more than a decade ago.

中国最大西式快餐品牌之一、有两万余家炸鸡和汉堡门店的华莱士在加州核桃市开了美国首店。进入美国市场十余年后，中国最大火锅连锁海底捞如今正加倍推进在这里的扩张。

The American expansion comes at a challenging moment for China’s food and beverage industry. The Chinese economy is no longer growing at a breakneck pace, hampered by a long-running real estate crisis and sluggish consumer spending. To survive, restaurant chains are undercutting one another on prices, inciting an unsustainable, profit-killing race to the bottom.

中国餐饮业向美国市场的扩张正值一个面临严峻挑战的时刻：受长期房地产危机与消费疲软拖累，中国经济已告别高速增长时代。为了生存，餐饮连锁竞相压价，引发了一场不可持续、吞噬利润的恶性竞争。

“China’s food service industry is suffering from severe oversupply,” said Bob Qing, the founder of Tomato Capital, a Chinese firm that invests in restaurants.

“中国的餐饮是严重过剩的，”投资餐饮企业的番茄资本创始人卿永说。

In China, there are three times more food and beverage establishments per capita than there are in the United States, according to Mr. Qing. And half the new restaurants that open in China close within a year.

据他介绍，中国的人均餐饮门店数量是美国的三倍，且新开业餐厅中有半数撑不过一年。

时报广场的喜茶旗舰店内，员工正在制作茶饮。这家连锁品牌起源于中国南方城市江门。喜茶在中国国内有4000家门店，两年前开始在美国扩张。顾客经常在喜茶的时报广场旗舰店排队购买招牌的芝士奶盖水果茶。

Many Chinese fast-food restaurants have expanded internationally in recent years, especially in Asia, but the United States, according to Mr. Qing, holds significant appeal because it is “the only market as mature and large as China.”

近年来，许多中国快餐品牌已走向国际市场，尤其是在亚洲。但在卿永看来，美国市场独具魅力，因为这“算是极少数大家都还是愿意去做交流的”。

But a U.S. expansion is not without its challenges. Chinese brands must walk a geopolitical tightrope because of China’s position as an economic rival — or adversary — to the United States. While their global expansion is celebrated in China as a sign of the country’s progress and development, it can be viewed as a threat to America’s local businesses.

但进军美国市场并非没有挑战。由于中国被美国视为经济竞争对手乃至敌手，中国品牌必须在地缘政治上谨慎行事。虽然它们在全球的扩张在中国被视为国家进步与发展的象征，但在美国却可能被视为对本土企业的威胁。

Chinese food and beverage chains are moving into the United States as many American brands that stormed into China decades earlier are pulling back.

当中国餐饮连锁大举入美之际，那些几十年前大举进入中国市场的美国品牌却在收缩战线。

This month, Starbucks sold a controlling stake in its China operations to a Chinese investment firm, Boyu Capital. The fast-food conglomerate Restaurant Brands International sold most of Burger King’s China business to a Chinese private equity firm.

11月，星巴克将中国业务的控股权出售给中国投资公司博裕资本。餐饮巨头餐饮品牌国际公司也将汉堡王中国业务的大部分股权售予一家中国私募股权公司。

Domestic competition is especially fierce in China, where milk tea shops have sprouted up over the last decade. According to some estimates, there are 420,000 milk tea shops in China. Some stores have started selling drinks for less than $1, while others offer free online orders. Many of these brands carry an upscale version of bubble tea, which has been wildly popular for years. They brew loose tea leaves instead of using tea bags or powder and add fruit slices, fresh milk or whipped cream cheese foam on top.

中国本土市场竞争格外激烈，过去十年间，奶茶店如雨后春笋般涌现。据估算，目前全国奶茶店数量已达42万家。部分门店饮品售价已跌破7元人民币，还有品牌提供线上点单免单。多个主打高端新式茶饮的品牌近年来风靡市场。它们坚持使用原叶茶汤而非茶包或粉末，佐以鲜果切片、鲜奶或特调芝士奶盖。

HeyTea, which helped pioneer the trend and has about 4,000 stores in China, stopped accepting new franchise applications earlier this year. The company started its American expansion two years ago as the battle among tea brands intensified.

作为该趋势的引领者之一，在中国市场拥有约4000家门店的喜茶于今年初停止接受新的加盟申请。随着茶饮品牌竞争白热化，该企业于两年前启动了美国扩张计划。

At HeyTea’s store in Times Square one recent afternoon, lines stretched out the door with groups of customers waiting for elaborate drink concoctions such as a signature fruit tea topped with cheese foam.

近日的一个午后，纽约时报广场的喜茶门店外排起长龙，顾客们等待着购买精心调制的特色饮品，比如有芝士奶盖的招牌鲜果茶。

“They are getting so big now,” said Farida Abdelaziz, 20, who waited up to 30 minutes with her friends for drinks.

“它家生意太火爆了，”排队近半小时的20岁顾客法里达·阿卜杜勒阿齐兹感叹道。

Naisnow, a smaller Chinese tea brand, opened its first U.S. store in Flushing, a predominantly Asian neighborhood in New York, in October. The lines were long and sales were brisk. Its most popular items were avocado and kale-based drinks made for the United States. The company said it aimed to expand to 500 stores over the next three to five years.

规模小一些的中国茶饮品牌奈雪的茶于10月在纽约亚裔聚居区法拉盛开设美国首店。开业以来门庭若市，其中专为美国市场打造的牛油果羽衣甘蓝系列成为最畅销单品。该企业宣布未来三至五年计划拓展至500家门店。

在纽约法拉盛，一名奈雪的茶门店员工正在整理展示柜。法拉盛的这家店是奈雪的茶在美国的首店，该公司计划在未来几年内在美国扩张至500家门店。在以亚裔为主的法拉盛社区，奈雪的茶门店外顾客大排长龙购买牛油果羽衣甘蓝饮品。

Jerry Yao, Naisnow’s deputy manager in charge of overseas development, said one difference was already apparent: “The margins are definitely better than in China.”

奈雪的茶海外开发副经理姚建宇指出，美中市场有一个差异显而易见：“这里的利润率绝对高于中国。”

The transition to the United States is not always smooth. The hot-pot chain Haidilao, which has a cultlike following in China, struggled when it first entered the market in 2013.

进军美国市场并非总是一帆风顺。在中国拥有狂热粉丝的火锅连锁海底捞在2013年首次进入美国市场时就遇到了困难。

It did not provide English-language menus. The prices were higher than customers had expected. And its trademark over-the-top service came across as intrusive.

当时未提供英文菜单，定价超出顾客预期，其标志性的极致服务反被视作侵扰。

In China, Haidilao’s staff provides free manicures to customers waiting for a table, performs noodle-making dances to entertain guests and even peels shrimp by hand for diners. But the staff’s attentiveness was initially perceived as “eavesdropping” in the United States, said Qu Cong, the chief financial officer of Super Hi International Holdings, Haidilao’s overseas business entity.

在中国，海底捞员工会为等位顾客提供免费美甲服务，表演拉面秀来娱乐客人，甚至亲手为食客剥虾。但据海底捞海外业务主体特海国际首席财务官瞿骢透露，这种无微不至的服务最初被美国顾客视为“窥探隐私”。

“For American customers, there’s a strong sense of boundaries, so simply copying the practices used in China might not work,” Ms. Qu said.

“美国本地客人他会有一个比较强的边界感，完全照搬国内这套可能行不通的，”瞿骢表示。

Haidilao provided more guidance, in English, on how to navigate the hot-pot dining experience, in which diners dip various raw ingredients into a pot of boiling broth at the table. It tweaked the spice levels on some soup bases and expanded the beef selection.

为此海底捞增加了英文指引，帮助顾客理解火锅的用餐方式——食客需要将各种生食材放入桌上的沸汤中涮煮。它还调整了部分锅底的辣度等级，并丰富了牛肉品类选择。

The chain generated social media buzz over the summer when one of its restaurants appeared in the final episode of “And Just Like That…,” the sequel to “Sex and the City.” In the episode, the hostess sees that Carrie Bradshaw is dining alone and brings out “Tommy Tomato,” a plush doll, to fill the empty seat.

今年夏天，它的一家门店出现在《欲望都市》续集《就这样……》的大结局里，女服务员见凯莉·布拉德肖独自用餐，拿出一只名为“汤米·汤米拖”的番茄玩偶陪坐，引发社交媒体热议。

Chinese brands must weigh how much to cater to local tastes. When Wallace, the fast-food chain, opened its first U.S. store last year, it stripped down its sprawling menu to focus mainly on fried chicken sandwiches.

中国品牌还需权衡本地化程度。华莱士去年在美国开首店时，大幅精简菜单，集中主打炸鸡三明治。

Ricky Chen, the president of Wallace USA, said the standard chicken sandwich the company served in China came with lettuce and mayonnaise. For American diners, Wallace removed the lettuce and added a pickle, which is something Chinese customers “don’t really eat.” It also made its food saltier.

美国区总裁里奇·陈表示，中国版经典鸡腿堡带生菜和蛋黄酱，美国版去掉生菜，加了中国顾客“不怎么吃”的腌黄瓜，并把整体口味调得更咸。

Mr. Chen likes Wallace’s chances in the new market. “American fast food is getting too expensive,” he said. At its location in California, Wallace offers three full-size chicken sandwiches for $10. By comparison, a single chicken sandwich at Chick-fil-A or KFC sells for about $6.

他看好在这个新市场的前景。“美国快餐已经太贵了，”在其加州门店，三份足量鸡腿堡只需10美元。相比之下，Chick-fil-A或肯德基单份就要约6美元。

Wallace does not hide its Chinese roots, Mr. Chen said. But it also does not promote them. At first, most of his customers were Asian because they were familiar with the brand. That has since changed.

华莱士并不掩饰中国背景，里奇·陈说。但也没有刻意宣传。开业初期，顾客多是认识品牌的亚裔。但现在情况已经不同。

Wallace said it planned to open 10 more locations by the end of 2026.

华莱士称计划2026年底前再开10家店。

Chagee, a tea brand that started selling shares on the Nasdaq stock exchange in May, said customers did not perceive it as a Chinese brand. It derives its name from an ancient Chinese love story. Its logo features a concubine in a Beijing Opera costume, faintly resembling the Starbucks two-tailed mermaid logo.

5月在纳斯达克上市的霸王茶姬表示，顾客并未将其视作中国品牌。品牌名取自中国古代爱情故事，商标采用京剧旦角形象，隐约有点像星巴克双尾美人鱼。

Emily Chang, Chagee’s chief commercial officer in North America, said she was hired to develop the company as an ABC, or American-born Chinese, brand. She said that it had more than a dozen stores “in the pipeline” and that it planned to move beyond California. Chagee started in Los Angeles in April.

霸王茶姬北美首席商务官艾米莉·张说，她得到的任务就是把霸王茶姬打造成一个“ABC（美国出生的华人——译注）品牌”。她说目前已有十多家店在“筹备中”，并且计划走出加州。霸王茶姬4月在洛杉矶开设首店。

Mr. Qing, the restaurant investor and consultant, said that despite geopolitical tensions, the United States had welcomed China’s food and drink brands. He said the U.S. embassy in Beijing invited him and chain restaurant owners to tour various American cities earlier this year.

餐饮投资人卿永表示，尽管地缘政治紧张，美国对中国的餐饮品牌依然持欢迎态度。今年早些时候，美国驻北京大使馆还邀请他和多家连锁品牌负责人赴美多城市考察。

“This is one of the few industries in which people are still willing to engage in that kind of exchange,” he said.

“这是目前少数几个两国人民仍愿意相互交流的行业，”他说。

When China’s rulers ordered tens of thousands of soldiers to crush pro-democracy demonstrations in Beijing in 1989, Gen. Xu Qinxian was the commander who famously said no.

1989年，当中国统治者下令数万士兵镇压北京的民主示威活动时，徐勤先将军以拒绝执行命令而闻名。

He refused to lead his troops into the capital to help clear the protesters in Tiananmen Square by armed force. For decades, the story of his defiance remained murky.

他拒绝率领部队开进首都，以武力清剿天安门广场的抗议者。几十年来，他的反抗故事一直鲜为人知。

Now, a leaked video of his secret court-martial has shed a rare light on General Xu, and on the tensions inside the military as Deng Xiaoping, China’s paramount leader at the time, prepared to send the soldiers into Beijing. That deployment culminated in the killing of hundreds — by some estimates, thousands — of unarmed people on June 3 and 4 as soldiers fired on protesters and bystanders.

如今，一段泄露的秘密军事法庭审判视频罕见地揭开了徐勤先的真实面貌，也展现了当时军队内部的紧张局势——时任中国最高领导人邓小平正准备向北京派遣军队。这一部署的高潮发生在6月3日和4日，士兵向抗议者和旁观者开枪，杀死了数百名手无寸铁的人（根据某些估计达到数千人）。

In the trial footage, General Xu explains that he refused the order as a matter of individual conscience and professional judgment. He tells judges that sending armed troops against civilians would lead to chaos and bloodshed, saying that a commander who carried out martial law poorly would go down as “a sinner in history.”

在审判录像中，徐勤先解释说，他拒绝命令是出于个人良心和职业判断。他告诉法官，派遣武装部队对抗平民会导致混乱和流血，并说执行戒严令不力的指挥官将成为“历史罪人”。

General Xu had risen from a family of small-time vendors to command the 38th Group Army, one of the military’s most prestigious units. But by the time of his court-martial in 1990, captured in the video, he had been stripped of his command, charged with disobeying martial law orders, and brought before the judges to defend the decision that abruptly ended his career.

徐勤先出身小贩家庭，却一路晋升至第38集团军司令——最负盛名的部队之一。但在1990年的军事法庭上，他被剥夺指挥权，被控违反戒严令，并且要在法官面前，为这个突然结束他职业生涯的决定辩护。

The six-hour video of the trial shows General Xu, in drab civilian clothes, entering a courtroom, guarded by three soldiers. Three judges gaze down from a podium. The courtroom is devoid of spectators.

长达六小时的审判录像显示，徐勤先穿着朴素便服，在三名士兵的看守下进入法庭。三位法官端坐审判席俯视全场。法庭中没有观众。

General Xu does not beg for mercy. Instead, he tersely lays out why he refused to comply.

徐勤先没有乞求宽恕。相反，他简洁地列出了他拒绝服从的原因。

“I said that whoever carries this out well could be a hero,” he tells the judges, “and I said that whoever carries this out poorly would become a sinner in history.”

他对法官们说：“执行这样的任务可能立功，也可能成为历史罪人。”

It is almost unheard of for such footage, describing internal decision-making and dissent within the Chinese military, to become public, and discussion of the 1989 crackdown is still heavily censored in China. The video, which has been shared on YouTube, a platform blocked in China, has drawn intense interest, with more than a million views on one channel alone.

这类描述中国军队内部决策和异议的录像非常罕见，而且关于1989年镇压的讨论在中国仍然受到严格审查。这段视频在中国被屏蔽的YouTube平台上分享，引起了人们的强烈兴趣，仅一个频道的观看量就超过了100万次。

“It is one thing to read about General Xu taking a stand and following his conscience. It is another to see him sitting in such a vulnerable position in court,” said Jeremy Brown, a professor at Simon Fraser University in Canada who wrote a history of the Tiananmen protests and crackdown. “To see Xu explain how he decided to refuse to follow a bad order from his well-informed military perspective forces the observer to think: ‘What would I do in this situation?’”

“读到徐将军秉持良知挺身而出的报道是一回事，亲眼目睹他在法庭上如此脆弱的姿态则是另一回事，”加拿大西蒙弗雷泽大学教授周杰荣(Jeremy Brown)表示。他曾撰写过天安门事件抗议与镇压的历史著作。“当看到徐勤先从深入的军事专业视角阐述拒绝执行错误命令的抉择时，观者不禁会自问：‘如果身处同样情况，我将如何抉择？’”

General Xu tells the judges that he was speaking only for himself, not for the 38th Army, in refusing the order.

徐勤先告诉法官，他拒绝命令只是代表他自己，而不是代表38军。

His account, along with the testimony of other generals cited by the judges and prosecutor at his trial, provides new insights into how Chinese leaders secretively developed and conveyed the plans for martial law and tried to stifle misgivings in the People’s Liberation Army.

他的陈述，以及法官和检察官在审判中引用的其他将军的证词，为中国领导人如何秘密制定和传达戒严令计划，并试图消除人民解放军的疑虑提供了新的视角。

General Xu, perhaps like other generals, was summoned individually to hear the orders. It may have been an effort to prevent them from sharing any concerns, said Wu Renhua, an independent historian from China who now lives in Taiwan. Mr. Wu, who has written several studies of the 1989 pro-democracy uprising and crackdown, also noted that General Xu’s trial showed how the martial law orders were delivered orally, leaving no paper trail.

徐勤先也许和其他将军一样，被单独召见听取命令。现居台湾的中国独立历史学家吴仁华说，这可能是为了防止他们相互交流自己的疑虑。吴仁华撰写过若干关于1989年民主起义和镇压的研究，他还指出，徐勤先的审判表明，戒严令是口头下达的，没有留下任何书面记录。

“This counts as the most important material I have come across in over 30 years of collecting material on June 4,” Mr. Wu said of the trial video.

“这可以说是我30多年收集六四资料当中所见到的最重要的一份，”吴仁华在谈到庭审视频时说。

“General Xu Qinxian’s insubordination was a pivotal event in the June Fourth events, but many details remained unclear before this footage emerged,” said Mr. Wu, who as a young scholar in Beijing went to Tiananmen Square in 1989 to join the protests.

“徐勤先将军抗命的事件，在整个六四事件当中是一个非常重大的事件，但是很多细节，这个录像出来之前的都是不明了的，尤其是关于戒严的决定，”吴仁华说。1989年，身为年轻学者的他曾前往天安门广场参与抗议活动。

Mr. Wu was among the people who posted the video online, but said he did so only after seeing that others had. He said he had been given the video by a trustworthy source, whose identity he declined to reveal, and that he checked details carefully to confirm that the footage was authentic. Professor Brown and another historian of the Tiananmen protests, Timothy Brook, a professor emeritus at the University of British Columbia, also said they saw no reason to doubt the authenticity of the video.

吴仁华是在网上发布视频的人之一，但他说他是在看到其他人上传之后才跟进的。他说，他从一个值得信赖的消息来源那里得到这段视频，但他拒绝透露此人的身份。他还说，他仔细检查了细节，以确认视频的真实性。周杰荣及另一位研究天安门事件的历史学家、不列颠哥伦比亚大学名誉教授卜正民(Timothy Brook)均表示，他们认为该视频真实可信。

The trial centers on a tense meeting between General Xu and his commanders on May 18, 1989. For weeks, students had occupied Tiananmen Square, demanding political liberalization. China’s top leader, Deng, wanted a decisive end to the tumult.

审判的焦点集中于1989年5月18日徐勤先和他的指挥官们的一场紧张的会议。当时学生们已经占领天安门广场几个星期，要求政治自由化。中国最高领导人邓小平想要果断地结束这场骚乱。

General Xu was in a hospital, recovering from a kidney stone, when he was summoned to the Beijing Military Region headquarters. China’s leaders had decided to impose martial law, and General Xu was being ordered to send about 15,000 armed troops from the 38th Army — an elite force based about 90 miles from Beijing — to be part of an initial force of 50,000.

正因肾结石住院治疗的徐勤先被叫到北京军区总部。中国领导人已经决定实施戒严令，徐勤先奉命从38军——一支驻扎在距离北京约150公里的精锐部队——派出大约1.5万名武装官兵，作为最初的5万人部队的一部分。

“I said that I had disagreements about this,” General Xu told the court, referring to the martial law order. The protests should be resolved mainly through political means, not by force, he said. If the central government ordered troops in, they should be deployed only to Beijing’s outskirts.

“我说这个事情我有不同意见，”徐勤先对法庭说，他指的是戒严令。他说，抗议活动应该主要通过政治手段解决，而不是武力。如果中央政府命令军队进驻，应该只部署在北京的郊区。

General Xu acknowledged that the 38th Army would have to comply. But he did not want to be part of the operation, he told the commanders.

徐勤先承认38军必须服从命令。但他告诉指挥官，他不想参与这次行动。

“I said to them that my superiors can appoint me, and they can also dismiss me,” he recounted in court, seeming to indicate that he was willing to lose his job over his decision.

“当时我说，我说上级可以任我，也可以免我，”他在法庭上叙述道，似乎表明他愿意因为自己的决定付出丢掉职位的代价。

One of the generals at the meeting, Dai Jingsheng, told investigators that he and his colleagues went silent for about a minute while they absorbed General Xu’s defiance. “Nobody expected words like this from Xu,” said General Dai, according to the testimony.

会议上的一位将军戴敬生告诉调查人员，他和同事们沉默了大约一分钟，徐勤先的反抗让他们一时没回过神来。“没想到徐会说这些话，”戴敬生在证词中说。

Under questioning, General Xu acknowledged that the military answered to China’s Communist Party leaders. But he suggested that it should also be subject to a broader authority.

在质询之下，徐勤先承认军队听命于中国共产党领导人。但他表示，军队也应该受到更广泛的权威的约束。

He told the commanders that an order so momentous should first be discussed more widely among senior party and government officials and — crucially, perhaps — by the National People’s Congress, the legislature that some moderates in the party also hoped would step in to halt the slide toward carnage.

他对指挥官们说，如此重大的命令，首先应该在党政高级官员之间进行更广泛的讨论，最关键的是，也许应该由全国人民代表大会进行讨论。一些党内温和派人士也希望全国人民代表大会能够介入，阻止事态滑向屠杀。

To support his case, General Xu said the People’s Liberation Army had been “incorporated into the state system” and so answered not only to party leaders, but to the government and lawmakers. (Communist Party leaders, especially Xi Jinping, have since condemned the idea of a “national” military as a threat to the party’s control of the armed forces.)

为了支持自己的观点，徐勤先说，解放军已经“纳入国家体制”，因此不仅对党的领导人负责，也应对政府和立法者负责。（此后中共领导人——尤其是习近平——谴责“国家军队”理念威胁了党对武装力量的控制。）

General Xu “seemed to believe that there was a possibility that his expression of concern would go up the food chain to higher levels that would essentially pump the brakes on martial law,” said Joseph Torigian, a historian of the Chinese Communist Party at American University in Washington who has examined the trial video.

徐勤先“似乎相信，他表达的担忧有可能会上升到更高层，从根本上踩下戒严令的刹车，”华盛顿美利坚大学研究中国共产党的历史学家唐志学(Joseph Torigian)看过审判录像后说。

“The trial reveals, I think, that there was a sense even within the military that conversation, dialogue, to try to win over the students — that option had not been exhausted,” Mr. Torigian said.

唐志学说：“我认为，这次审判表明，甚至在军方内部也有一种感觉，通过对话争取学生支持的途径尚未穷尽。”

General Xu seemed to wrestle with how far to take his dissent.

徐勤先似乎在纠结该将异议表达到何种程度。

Pressured by his commanders during the Beijing meeting, he relayed the martial law orders to a 38th Army colleague in a phone call, but also told him that he did not want to participate. He later called one of the commanders who had passed on the orders, repeating that he did not want to be involved. The next day, after a 38th Army officer beseeched General Xu to stay with the army if it went into Beijing, he said he would. But by then, it was too late to change course.

在北京会议期间，迫于指挥官的压力，他在电话中向38军的一位同事转达了戒严令，但同时告知对方自己不愿参与。后来，他打电话给一名下达命令的指挥官，重申自己不想参与其中。第二天，一名军官恳求徐勤先若部队进京务必随行。徐勤先表示同意。但到那时，改变态度为时已晚。

“This is intolerable,” one vice chairman of the Chinese military said of General Xu’s actions, according to the trial testimony. Senior leaders cut off his contact with 38th Army officers, and he was later detained.

“这是不能容忍的，”根据审判证词，中国军方的一位副主席在谈到徐勤先的行为时说。高层领导人切断了他与38军军官的联系，他后来被拘留。

Under a new commander, the 38th Army became notorious for its bloody advance into Beijing, shooting bystanders as well as people who resisted.

在新指挥官的领导下，38军以向北京进军的血腥行动而臭名昭著，不仅射杀抵抗者，连路人也不放过。

General Xu was sentenced to five years in prison, and he died in 2021 at 85. Parts of his story surfaced in books and news reports. In 2011, he told a Hong Kong newspaper that he had no regrets about his decision.

徐勤先被判处五年徒刑，他于2021年去世，享年85岁。他的部分故事出现在书籍和新闻报道中。2011年，他对一家香港报纸表示，对自己的决定并不后悔。

BEIJING — On a spring evening in 1989, with the student occupation of Tiananmen Square entering its second month and the Chinese leadership unnerved and divided, top army commanders were summoned to headquarters to pledge their support for the use of military force to quash the protests.

北京——1989年春，学生对天安门广场的占领进入了第二个月，中国领导层紧张不安、意见相左。一天傍晚，军方高级将领被召集到军区总部，表态支持动用武力镇压抗议者。

1989年5月19日凌晨，中共中央总书记赵紫阳出现在天安门广场，呼吁学生停止绝食，这是他最后一次公开露面，当时他已失去了权力。时任中央办公厅主任温家宝（右二）后来成为国家总理。

One refused.

有一个人拒绝了。

1989年6月4日，在天安门广场附近的尸体。学生们抗议的是腐败、不公和通货膨胀。

In a stunning rebuke to his superiors, Maj. Gen. Xu Qinxian, leader of the mighty 38th Group Army, said the protests were a political problem, and should be settled through negotiations, not force, according to new accounts of his actions from researchers who interviewed him.

在强大的第38集团军担任军长的徐勤先少将，令人震惊地违抗了上级。根据采访过徐勤先本人的几名学者新近对其举动做出的描述，他当时表示，抗议活动属政治问题，应该通过谈判解决，不应动用武力。

李晓明（左五）在北京和战友的合影。照片由李晓明本人提供。

“I’d rather be beheaded than be a criminal in the eyes of history,” he told Yang Jisheng, a historian.

“宁杀头，不做历史罪人，”他告诉历史学者杨继绳。

现居澳大利亚的李晓明，是1989年奔赴天安门广场的军人之一。他说，“我们的部队受到的教导是，我们不准朝学生开第一枪。”

Although General Xu was soon arrested, his defiance sent shudders through the party establishment, fueling speculation of a military revolt and heightening the leadership’s belief that the student-led protests were nothing less than an existential threat to the Communist Party.

尽管徐勤先很快被捕，但他抗命一事令党内权势集团深感震动，不仅加剧了对军队倒戈的猜忌，也让领导层更坚定地相信，由学生领导的抗议活动是关涉共产党存亡的重大威胁。

The new details of the general’s defiance and the tremors it set off are among a series of disclosures about the intrigue inside the Chinese military preceding the bloody crackdown in Beijing on June 3 and 4, 1989, some contained in army documents spirited out of China in recent years, and others revealed in interviews with party insiders, former soldiers and other people directly involved in the events 25 years ago.

得到披露的一系列信息揭示了，1989年6月3日到4日的血腥镇压前，解放军内部的角力，其中包括徐勤先抗命的新细节，以及由此引发的震动。这些信息中，有一部分包含在近年来流出中国的军方文件里，还有一些则是通过对直接参与25年前的事件的党内人士和退伍军人进行采访而获得。

Contrary to rumors at the time, the documents show that army units did not fight one another. But they show that General Xu’s stand against the threatened use of lethal force fanned leaders’ fears that the military could be dragged into the political schisms and prompted party elders to mobilize an enormous number of troops.

与当时的传闻不同，这些文献显示，解放军并未内斗。不过，它们的确表明，徐勤先对采取致命武力所表达的反对立场，激起了领导层的忧虑——军队可能会陷入政治分裂。他的表态也促使党内元老调集了规模庞大的部队。

Even after a quarter century, the night of bloodshed remains one of the most delicate subjects in Chinese politics, subjected to unrelenting attempts by the authorities to essentially erase it from history. Yet even now, new information is emerging that modifies the accepted understanding of that divisive event.

尽管四分之一个世纪已经过去，但是那个血腥的夜晚却依然是中国政治中最敏感的话题之一，当局将它实质上从历史中抹去的努力一直没有懈怠。然而，就算到了今天，也仍有新的信息浮出水面，修正人们对这起分歧深重的事件公认的理解。

At the time, Deng Xiaoping, the party patriarch who presided over the crackdown, praised the military for its unflinching loyalty, and the image of a ruthlessly obedient army lingers even in some foreign accounts. But the military speeches and reports composed before June 4 that year, and in the months after, show soldiers troubled by misgivings, confusion, rumors and regrets about the brutal task assigned to them. “The situation was fluid and confusing, and we underestimated the brutality of the struggle,” Capt. Yang De’an, an officer with the People’s Armed Police, wrote in one assessment found among military documents acquired by the Princeton University Library. “It was hard to distinguish foes from friends, and the target to be attacked was unclear.”

当时，主持镇压的党内元老邓小平赞扬军队忠诚不二，就连一些国外的报道也保留了部队坚定冷酷地服从命令的形象。不过，1989年6月4日前夕及后来几个月的军队讲话和报告显示，对于下达的残酷任务，官兵们心存疑虑、感到困惑，流言和悔恨也让他们颇为不安。在普林斯顿大学图书馆(Princeton University Library)取得的中国军方文献中，有一份评估报告写道，武警杨德安称，“情况多变，很混乱。我们对斗争的残酷性估计不足。敌友难分，攻击目标也不明确。”

Some former soldiers and officials who agreed to talk about their roles in the crisis said they were alarmed by the state-enforced censorship and silencing of witnesses that has left a younger generation largely ignorant about one of the most devastating episodes in modern Chinese history.

一些退伍官兵同意谈论自己在这场危机中扮演的角色。他们表示，国家强制实施的审查，再加上制止目击者发声的做法，使得年轻一代对中国当代史中堪称最为沉痛的这一事件基本一无所知，这让他们忧心忡忡。

“I personally didn’t do anything wrong,” said Li Xiaoming, who in 1989 was among the troops who set off toward Tiananmen Square, “but I feel that as a member, a participant, this was a shame on the Chinese military.”

李晓明说，“我个人没有做错事，但我觉得作为其中一个成员，作为一个参与者，这是中国军队的一种耻辱。”1989年的时候，他就身在向天安门广场进发的部队当中。

While official secrecy makes it difficult to confirm elements of the new accounts, scholars who have reviewed the army’s internal reports, including unit-level descriptions of mobilization as well as detailed accounts about the violent confrontations with protesters, say they are authentic. An earlier attempt to pierce the party’s imposed blackout, “The Tiananmen Papers,” a collection of documents published in 2001, has been dogged by controversy about its intent and authenticity.

虽然官方的遮掩使得这些新说法的细节难以得到确认，但是研究过解放军内部报告的一些学者表示，这些说法真实可信。他们浏览的报告包括对部队动员的描述，以及对军队与抗议人群暴力冲突的详尽叙述。此前也曾有人尝试还原共产党强行抹去的记忆，于是有了2001年发表的文献集《天安门文件》(The Tiananmen Papers)，但外界对其意图与真实性的争议一直挥之不去。

The interviews and documents show that even at the time few in the military wanted to take direct responsibility for the decision to fire on civilians. Even as troops pressed into Beijing, they were given vague, confusing instructions about what to do, and some commanders sought reassurances that they would not be required to shoot.

采访与文献显示，就连在当时，军队里也没什么人原意承担向平民开火的直接责任。就在部队迫近北京的当口，他们接到的行动指令仍然含糊不清、令人费解，还有部分军官希望得到保证，他们不会接到开枪的命令。

In an interview, a former party researcher with military ties confirmed the existence of a petition, signed by seven senior commanders, that called on the leadership to withdraw the troops.

一位与军队有联系的前党内研究人员在接受采访时确认，存在一份由七名军官联署的请愿书，呼吁领导层退兵。

“The people’s military belongs to the people, and cannot oppose the people,” stated the petition, according to the former researcher, Zhang Gang, who was then trying to broker compromise between the protesters and the government. “Even less can it kill the people.”

这名前研究人员名为张刚，当时曾试图协调抗议者与政府达成妥协。他表示，请愿书中写道，“人民军队是属于人民的军队，不能同人民对立，更不能杀死人民。”

There were fewer episodes of outright military defiance, like that of General Xu. No dissident, he had written a letter in blood during the Korean War begging to join the army as an underage youth, according to Mr. Yang, the historian who was among the few people to interview him after 1989. The elite 38th Group Army, which General Xu commanded from a base about 90 miles south of Beijing, was a bulwark protecting the capital.

像徐勤先那样直接违抗军令的事件则更为少见。历史学者杨继绳是少数几个在1989年后采访过徐勤先的人之一，根据他的说法，徐勤先并非异见人士，当初为参加朝鲜战争而写下血书，不到年龄的他才得以参军。徐勤先指挥的第38集团军是精锐部队，驻扎在北京以南约150公里处，担负着保卫首都的重任。

Having witnessed the student protests during an earlier visit to Beijing, where he was receiving treatment for kidney stones, he feared the consequences of quelling them with troops trained to fight foreign invaders. Sending armed soldiers onto the streets, he warned, would risk indiscriminate bloodshed and stain the reputation of the People’s Liberation Army.

在事件之前，他曾赴京治疗肾结石，亲眼目睹了学生的抗议活动。军队的训练目的是抵御外敌入侵，他担忧，动用军队镇压抗议会产生恶劣的后果。他警告，派全副武装的军人上街，可能会造成子弹不长眼的流血，玷污人民解放军的声誉。

“If there was a conflict with ordinary civilians, and you couldn’t tell the good guys from the bad guys, who would shoulder responsibility for problems?” he later said, according to Dai Qing, a Beijing writer who had access to separate interview notes with the general.

据北京的作家戴晴所看到的访谈资料，徐勤先后来表示，“和老百姓发生冲突，好人坏人又分不清，出了事谁负责？”

In the end, General Xu agreed to pass the orders to his officers, but not to lead armed troops into the capital. He was arrested, expelled from the party, and served four years in prison, Mr. Yang said.

杨继绳表示，徐勤先最终同意向手下的官兵传达命令，但他本人不会带领武装部队进入首都。徐勤先遭到逮捕，并被开除党籍，还在监狱服刑四年。

In poor health, General Xu lives in a sanitarium for military officials in Hebei Province in northern China, according to another researcher who interviewed him and demanded anonymity for speaking. The general declined to be interviewed for this article.

据另一位采访过徐勤先的研究人员透露，徐勤先身体虚弱，住在河北省一家军队领导专用的干休所里。这名研究人员要求匿名。徐勤先拒绝就这篇文章接受采访。

According to an internal history of the army among the Princeton documents, his act kindled rumors among soldiers that officers of the 38th Group Army had resigned en masse and that the army had refused to enter Beijing. To counter the hearsay, officers of the 38th were assembled to condemn their former commander and pledge unyielding obedience in enforcing martial law, according to the army documents.

普林斯顿文献中部队内部的历史档案显示，徐勤先的举动在士兵中催生了谣言：38军的军官集体辞职，该军拒绝入京。军方文件显示，为了破除谣言，38军的军官被召集在一起，谴责他们的前任军长，并宣誓坚决服从命令，实行戒严。

But General Xu was not the sole dissenter within the military elite. Col. Wang Dong, a People’s Liberation Army officer and aide to a respected veteran commander, organized the petition of military leaders opposed to martial law, said Mr. Zhang, the former researcher. With Colonel Wang now dead, Mr. Zhang and others decided that the time had come to step forward with details of his role organizing the petition.

但徐勤先并不是军队高层中唯一的异议者。前研究员张刚表示，人民解放军军官王东上校是一位受人尊敬的老司令员的助手，他组织反对戒严的军队高层进行请愿。王东如今已经去世，张刚和其他人认为现在是时候公布他组织请愿的细节了。

Mr. Deng and his allies were so alarmed by spreading misgivings about martial law that they disconnected many of the so-called red phones that allowed senior officials to speak with one another, Mr. Zhang said. But Colonel Wang offered to use his elite connections to organize a show of dissent from within the military.

张刚表示，军中对戒严令的疑虑的扩散让邓小平等人非常担心，以至于他们切断了很多所谓的“红机子”。高层官员本可以通过这种电话互相联系。但王东试图利用自己的高层关系，组织军队内部人士表达不同意见。

Copies of the petition spread around Beijing that May, but its origins and authenticity were unclear, diminishing its impact. But Mr. Zhang, who had contacts with senior military officers, now says that he wrote down the statement and names during a phone call from Colonel Wang and then passed it on to friends who made copies.

1989年5月，请愿书的复印件传遍北京，但其来源和真实性却并不清晰，因此削弱了它的影响力。张刚曾与军队高级军官有联系，他如今表示，自己边接王东的电话，边记下了请愿书的内容和名字，之后将请愿书交给朋友，由他们进行了复写。

In interviews, several of those who took part in back-channel efforts to defuse the crisis described how Colonel Wang held a secret meeting with Wang Juntao and Zhou Duo, two liberal intellectuals who were trying to avert a military assault, even as they chided protesters for disorganization and naïveté. Both men recalled a long night in Mr. Zhou’s home when they peppered Colonel Wang with questions about attitudes in the army. He played down the risk of mass bloodshed, both men recalled.

几名曾私下努力化解危机的人接受采访时称，王东与王军涛、周舵举行了秘密会议，这两名自由主义知识分子当时在设法阻止军队发起攻击，同时也斥责抗议者组织混乱，思维天真。两人回忆称，他们在周舵家待了一晚上，反复询问王东有关军队态度的问题。两人均称，王东淡化了出现大规模流血事件的风险。

“He said, ‘If the Communist Party fires on and kills ordinary people, then wouldn’t the Communist Party be committing suicide?'  ” Mr. Zhou, who lives in Beijing, said in a telephone interview. He said they “absolutely never imagined it would turn out as brutally as it did.”

目前居住在北京的周舵接受电话采访时表示，“他说，‘如果共产党射杀平民百姓，那共产党不是在自杀吗？’”周舵表示，他们“绝对没有想到，最后的结局会是那么残酷”。

Even as the petition circulated around Beijing, 180,000 to 250,000 troops from across the country were mobilizing to enforce martial law. Although the resistance by ordinary Beijingers is well established, the documents and interviews describe the dismay, frustration and rumors that unsettled the military when residents were galvanized into defiance, rather than being cowed by the rush of soldiers clutching guns.

就在请愿书被传至北京各处之时，共有18万至25万名士兵从全国各地赶来实施戒严。虽然北京普通民众进行反抗的举动已经得到充分证实，但相关文件及采访内容说明，荷枪实弹的士兵进入北京时，居民们没有感到害怕，而是奋起反抗，由此在部队内部引发了沮丧、失望的情绪及谣言，这些都让士兵们有所动摇。

Many Beijing residents were swept up by the idealism of the students and their grievances over corruption, inequality and inflation. From May 19, as word of impending martial law leaked, tens of thousands of them poured out of their homes to stop the troops at key intersections, pleading with them to understand the students’ demands.

学生们的理想主义及他们对腐败、不平等现象和通货膨胀的愤懑之情感染了很多北京居民。从5月19日开始，随着即将戒严的消息走漏至外界，数以万计的民众走出家门，来到主要路口阻止军队进城，并恳请他们理解学生的诉求。

One soldier, Chen Guang, then 17, from rural Henan Province, said his unit was enveloped by students after its convoy of 10,000 soldiers was halted on Chang’an Avenue on May 20.

当时，来自河南农村的士兵陈光只有17岁。陈光表示，他的部队被学生围了起来，在此之前，也就是5月20日，他所属部队的一万名士兵被拦在长安街上。

For three days, as the weary, marooned soldiers clutched their rifles in the wilting sun, he recalled how residents and students brought them food and escorted them to toilets, all the while bombarding them with the message that theirs was a just cause. “Even in the restroom, there was no reprieve,” Mr. Chen said in an interview. “If one student would go hoarse yelling, another would take his place.”

他回忆称，在三天的时间里，疲惫不堪、孤立无援的士兵在炙烈的太阳下紧握枪支，居民和学生给他们送来食物，并带他们上厕所，还无时不刻地向他们灌输信息——他们从事的是正义的事业。“就连上厕所都不会停，”陈光接受采访时说。“一个人讲累了讲哑了，另一个上来继续跟你讲。”

Rattled by the impasse and worried that troops might waver in their loyalties, the commanders ordered their withdrawal, the documents say. “We wrote our names and addresses in their notebooks and there were quite a few tears as we pulled out,” Mr. Chen said, recalling makeshift banners that hung from windows hailing their loyalty to the people. “It felt like a victory after a battle.”

文件显示，这一僵局和军队的忠诚可能出现动摇的情况让将领们非常担心，他们命令士兵们撤退。“我们走的时候还在本子上给他们留下名字和通信地址，撤走时很多人都哭了，”陈光说，“感觉跟打了场胜仗似的。”陈光回忆称，车窗内挂着临时做好的横幅，宣示着他们对人民的忠心。

Over the next 10 days, several former soldiers said they were fed a confusing diet of indoctrination at their encampments on the outskirts of Beijing. They studied the speeches of Mr. Deng and were told the demonstrations were the work of a subversive minority bent on toppling the Communist Party.

几名军人表示，在接下来的十天时间里，他们在北京郊区的营地被灌输了一些令人困惑的思想。他们学习邓小平的讲话，被告知示威活动是由少数颠覆分子发起的，目的是推翻共产党。

Even as the troops imbibed the propaganda, the notion that they might have to shoot the demonstrators appeared remote, recalled Mr. Li, who was then 25 and a radar operator in the 39th Group Army. “Our unit was educated that we mustn’t fire the first shot at students, and if we fired the first shot at the public, we’d be responsible to history,” he said in an interview from Australia.

李晓明回忆称，即便在士兵们学习这种宣传思想时，可能必须朝示威者开枪的概念似乎还很遥远。李晓明当时25岁，是第39军的一名雷达兵。他在澳大利亚接受采访时表示，“我们的部队受到的教导是，我们不准朝学生开第一枪，如果我们朝老百姓开了第一枪，我们就得对历史负责。”

Even after over a week of such training, commanders worried about the commitment of the troops to take the square.

即使是接受了一周这样的培训，将领们依然担心军队夺取广场的决心有多大。

“They’re baffled why so many members of the public have taken part in the demonstrations,” Gen. Yang Baibing, whose older brother was a confidant of Mr. Deng’s, told military officers on May 31, according to a compilation of party and military speeches at Princeton. “Some comrades have all kinds of views and doubts about stopping the turmoil.”

根据普林斯顿大学图书馆汇总的党内及军队讲话记录，杨白冰上将曾在5月31日对军官们说，“有些同志对为什么有这么多群众参加游行有些困惑不解。”杨白冰的兄长是邓小平的亲信。“有些同志对制止动乱还有这样那样的想法和疑惑。”

The messages of restraint were jettisoned on June 3, when the troops received orders to retake the square by early the next day “at any cost,” former soldiers said.

6月3日，保持克制的讯息被放弃了。一些当年的士兵表示，军队当天接到了命令，要求“不惜一切代价”在第二天清早夺回天安门广场。

“Reach Tiananmen or die,” party members from one battalion declared in a ceremony before they set off, according to one entry. In some units, troops recorded their determination with oaths signed in blood. But amid the bravado, there was also fear and confusion, magnified by rumors of mutinous units who might turn on other armies, according to soldiers who were there and the military documents.

根据一份记录，有一个营的党员在出发前的仪式上宣称，“誓死到达天安门。”有些部队的军人用写血书立誓的方式表决心。然而，根据现场士兵的描述和军方的文件，这种虚张声势还夹杂了恐惧和困惑，而后两种情绪因抗命部队可能会调转枪头的流言而被强化。

“At that moment, some officers and soldiers experienced some mental turmoil,” read an account by the 63rd Group Army, based in Shanxi in northern China, which was one of the principal forces mobilized for the crackdown. “Some felt the situation was grim and experienced some panic. Some felt that they had already tried to go in twice, and going in this time would be perilous.”

驻扎在山西省的第63集团军的一份记录显示，“当时部分官兵思想上出现了一些波动。”63军是被调集实施镇压的主要力量之一。“有的感到事态严重，心里有些恐慌。有的感到两次都没法进去，对这次开进有些畏难。”

When troops from the 39th Group Army’s 116th Division left its temporary base in far eastern Beijing, Mr. Li, the radar operator, recalled his biggest fear was that they might have to fight the 38th Group Army, whose loyalty had been thrown in doubt by General Xu’s defiance and rumors of wider defections. He grabbed a semiautomatic rifle and extra ammunition just in case.

雷达兵李晓明回忆，当39军116师离开北京东部远郊的临时驻地时，他最大的恐惧是，他们部队可能要打38军，因为后者的忠诚因徐勤先的抗命及存在更广泛背叛的传言而遭到质疑。

As the troops set out with their orders to take the square and other important positions, they lacked standard tools for crowd control as well as clear instructions about how and when to use their guns.

当军队带着夺取广场等重要场所的命令进发时，他们既缺乏控制群众的常规工具，又没有得到关于如何开枪及何时开枪的清晰指示。

“There was a lack of protective equipment and nonlethal weapons,” read one People’s Armed Police assessment of the crackdown in the documents. “Imagine if they had tear gas, flash grenades, shields, helmets and other protective equipment.”

“缺乏防护器材与非致命性武器，”文献中有一份关于武警部队对镇压行动的评估报告这样写道。“缺乏防护器材与非致命性武器。设想，若配有催泪弹、闪光弹、盾牌、头盔等防护器材。”

Mr. Li said he was spared the decision of whether to fire by his divisional commander, Xu Feng, who ignored instructions to plow toward Tiananmen. Instead, after learning of the unfolding bloodshed, Commander Xu kept his troops in the eastern suburbs, where the turmoil was less intense, and pretended his battalion’s communication radio had malfunctioned. Mr. Li can still recall the frantic calls: “Division 116, Division 116, where are you?”

李晓明说，他所在的116师的师长许峰没有理会向天安门广场进发的命令，他因而无需决定是否开枪。在得知军队展开血腥镇压后，许峰在冲突较为缓和的东郊按兵不动，还假装军中的无线电通讯出了故障。李晓明仍然能回忆起电台里疯狂的呼叫：“116师、116师，你们在哪儿？”

In the precincts where there was large-scale killing, confusion dogged the troops at every turn, the documents suggest.

文献显示，在发生大规模屠杀的区域，军队在每次行动的关头都颇为迷惘。

Chinese leaders approved the use of live fire around 9:30 to 10 that night, according to Wu Renhua, a scholar who took part in the protests. He has written two books in Chinese about the military crackdown and now lives in Los Angeles. Passed down orally, he said, the directive lacked guidance on when or how to shoot and it most likely did not reach all units.

根据参加了当时抗议活动的学者吴仁华的说法，领导层大约是在当晚9：30分到10点之间批准使用实弹。吴仁华撰写了两本关于军方镇压行动的中文书籍，目前生活在洛杉矶。他说，指令是口头传达的，关于何时开枪、如何开枪并没有给出指示，而且，很有可能未能传达到所有部队。

“Whether the shooting should be into the air or into the crowd was left unclear,” he said in a telephone interview.

他在电话采访中说，“朝天鸣枪，还是对人群开枪，没有说清楚。”

Wang Yongli, who was riding with the 38th Army, described how some civilians threw bricks and bottles at the troops and then attacked military vehicles with iron bars. He said that the soldiers, shaking with fear and rage, first shot into the air, but at some point, the rifle sights were aimed at the crowds. “No one said to shoot, but it was, like, ‘We’re going to teach them a lesson,’ and then those soldiers unleashed their fury,” he said. “You pulled the trigger and bang, bang, bang, it was like rain, the noise shaking the heavens.”

据与38军同行的王永利（音译）描述，一些民众向军队扔砖头和瓶子，然后用铁棍袭击军车。他表示，战士们又紧张又生气，一开始向天开枪，不过，到了某个时刻，他们的步枪瞄准了人群。“也没说打，（当官的）就说‘狠狠教训下这些人，’那战士手就发狠了，”他说。“啪，一扣那个扳机，轰轰轰轰轰，跟下雨似的，哗地就朝天上打去了。”

Although an accurate death toll may never be known, estimates of the number of civilians killed by gunfire or crushed by tanks range from the hundreds to more than 1,000. The government estimated that 300 lives were lost, many of them soldiers.

尽管确切的死亡人数或将永远不得而知，但据估计，被枪杀或遭坦克碾死的平民少说也有数百人，多则有逾千人。政府估算的数据是300人丧生，其中许多是士兵。

The next day at dawn, Mr. Yang, the historian, then a reporter with the Xinhua news agency, made his way to Muxidi, a neighborhood west of the square that was the scene of some of the fiercest resistance to the military attack.

第二天的黎明，当时是新华社记者的历史学者杨继绳设法赶到了木樨地。这一带位于天安门广场以西，军队的攻击行动在此遭遇到了某些最为激烈的抵抗。

He saw a tangle of abandoned bikes, charred vehicles and drying pools of blood. “Everywhere you looked there were bullet holes,” he recalled. But perhaps the most chilling sight, he said, was the crimson-colored graffiti slathered across a wall. “People’s Blood!” it read. “People’s Blood!”

他看到废弃的自行车凌乱地堆在地上，还有烧焦的车辆和一滩滩干涸的血迹。他回忆道，“到处都是枪眼。”不过他说，最让人不寒而栗的场景，也许是一面墙上涂抹的厚厚的血红大字，写的是“人血！人血！”

Finland’s prime minister apologized on Wednesday to China, South Korea and Japan in an effort to quash a growing racism scandal in the country.

芬兰总理周三向中国、韩国和日本致歉，试图平息在该国愈演愈烈的种族歧视丑闻。

Over the past few days, lawmakers in Finland’s most prominent anti-immigration party have posted pictures of themselves pulling back their eyelids, apparently in support of a Finnish beauty queen who was stripped of her crown last week for making a similar gesture.

过去几天，芬兰最具影响力的反移民政党的多名议员接连发布自己扯眼角的照片，显然是在支持一位因做出类似手势而被剥夺桂冠的芬兰选美皇后。

“I sincerely apologize for recent offensive social media posts by individual members of Parliament, which do not reflect Finland’s values of equality and inclusion,” Prime Minister Petteri Orpo said in a Chinese-language statement posted on social media on Wednesday by the Finnish Embassy in China.

芬兰驻华大使馆周三在社交媒体发布了总理佩泰里·奥尔波的中文声明，他在声明中表示：“对于近期个别议员在社交媒体上发表的冒犯性言论，我深表诚挚歉意。这些言论与芬兰倡导的平等与包容的价值观背道而驰。”

Finland’s embassies in South Korea and Japan shared similar statements on social media.

芬兰驻韩、驻日大使馆也在社交媒体上发布了类似致歉声明。

The controversy began this month when pictures surfaced on social media of Sarah Dzafce, Finland’s representative to the Miss Universe pageant, pulling her eyelids back at a slant, according to Helsingin Sanomat, Finland’s largest newspaper.

据芬兰最大报纸《赫尔辛基新闻报》报道，这场争议始于本月。当时，芬兰环球小姐参赛代表萨拉·扎夫采在比赛中向后拉扯眼皮形成斜眼的照片在社交媒体流传开来。

Ms. Dzafce apologized in an Instagram statement last week.

扎夫采上周在Instagram上发文致歉。

“One of the most important things for me is respect for people, their backgrounds and differences,” she said, adding, “I take responsibility for my actions and will learn from this.”

她表示：“对我而言，尊重每一个人、尊重不同的背景与差异是至关重要的事。我会为自己的行为负责，并从中吸取教训。”

The Miss Finland Organization then stripped her of her title, saying in a statement that her comment was “offensive, harmful and completely against the values” of the pageant.

随后，芬兰小姐组委会撤销了她的冠军头衔，并在声明中指出，她的这一行为“具有冒犯性和危害性，完全违背了选美赛事的核心价值观”。

前芬兰小姐萨拉·扎夫采上周在赫尔辛基的新闻发布会上。

Ms. Dzafce did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

截至目前，扎夫采尚未回应置评请求。

The loss of her title angered lawmakers in the Finns Party, a populist, anti-immigration party that is part of Mr. Orpo’s governing coalition.

扎夫采被夺头衔一事激怒了正统芬兰人党的议员们。这个民粹主义反移民政党属于奥尔波领导的执政联盟。

Two Finnish members of Parliament, Juho Eerola and Kaisa Garedew, and a Finnish lawmaker in the European Parliament, Sebastian Tynkkynen, posted social media images similar to the ones Ms. Dzafce posted. Ms. Garedew said in her caption that she was giving herself a temple massage; Mr. Eerola and Mr. Tynkkynen posted captions in support of Ms. Dzafce.

芬兰国会的尤霍·埃罗拉、凯萨·加雷杜以及欧洲议会中的芬兰议员塞巴斯蒂安·滕基宁均发布了与扎夫采动作相似的照片。加雷杜称自己只是在做太阳穴按摩；埃罗拉和滕基宁则在配文中表示支持扎夫采。

Mr. Eerola has since apologized. “I am deeply sorry that my photo caused offense to Asian people,” he told The Asahi Shimbun, a Japanese newspaper.

此后埃罗拉已公开致歉。他向日本《朝日新闻》表示：“我发布的照片冒犯了亚洲民众，对此我深感愧疚。”

Ms. Garedew declined to apologize in an interview with Iltalehti, a Finnish tabloid. Mr. Tynkkynen criticized China in a post on Instagram and said resisting Ms. Dzafce’s “cancellation” was the right choice.

而加雷杜在接受芬兰小报《晚报》采访时拒绝道歉。滕基宁则在Instagram上发文指责中国，还称抵制对扎夫采的“取消行动”才是正确选择。

The three lawmakers did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

这三位议员目前均未回应置评请求。

Mr. Orpo has denounced the posts as “childish” and “stupid.” But the controversy is still brewing in Finland. The national broadcaster, Yle, reported that the lawmakers’ party is set to meet on Thursday to discuss it.

奥尔波已公开谴责这些照片既“幼稚”又“愚蠢”，但争议在芬兰境内仍持续发酵。芬兰国家广播公司报道称，涉事议员所属政党将于周四召开会议，就此事展开讨论。

Robots made by Chinese start-ups have danced on television, staged boxing matches and run marathons. When one company debuted its most recent robot last month, people online in China thought it looked so much like a human that workers cut the robot’s leg open onstage to reveal its metal pistons.

中国初创企业研发的机器人已登上电视跳舞、登台打拳击，还跑马拉松。某公司上月推出最新机器人时，中国网友认为外观太像真人，现场工作人员只得当众剖开机器人腿部，展示其内部金属活塞结构。

Despite the public fascination, concerns are growing that China’s robotics industry is moving too fast. The robots can mimic human movement and even complete basic tasks. But they are not skilled enough to handle many tasks now done by people. And with so many companies rushing into the industry, Beijing is warning of a bubble.

尽管这类机器人引发了公众的广泛关注，外界对中国机器人产业发展过快的担忧也在不断加剧。目前这些机器人虽能模仿人类动作，甚至完成一些基础任务，却尚未熟练掌握人类当下承担的诸多工作技能。面对大批企业争相涌入的现状，中国政府已发出行业泡沫预警。

Over 150 manufacturers are vying for a piece of the market, the Chinese government said last month, warning that the industry was at risk for a crowd of “highly repetitive products.”

北京上月指出，国内已有超过150家制造商竞逐机器人市场，并警示称，该行业正面临“产品同质化严重”的风险。

“China has an attack-first approach when it comes to the adoption of new technology,” said Lian Jye Su, a chief analyst at Omdia, a tech research firm. “But this generally leads to a large number of vendors fighting for small chunks of market.”

“在新技术应用方面，中国向来采取先发制人的策略，”科技研究机构Omdia首席分析师苏连杰表示。“但这种模式通常会导致大量厂商瓜分有限的市场份额。”

As it did with electric vehicles, China has gained an early global lead in making robots. China is using more robots in factories than the rest of the world combined, moving farther ahead of Japan, the United States, South Korea and Germany. Robots have transformed Chinese factory lines, doing things like welding car parts and lifting boxes onto conveyor belts.

如同在电动汽车领域的发展路径，中国在机器人制造领域也已率先抢占全球领先地位。中国工厂的工业机器人使用量，已超过世界其他国家的总和，将日本、美国、韩国和德国远远甩在身后。机器人已然改变了中国工厂的生产线运作模式，承担起焊接汽车零部件、将箱子搬上传送带等一系列工作。

It’s not unusual to run into a robot in Beijing. Robotic machines deliver room service in hotels and buff the floors in airports. Four-legged robots help deliver packages on university campuses. Robots cooked and served food in canteens during the 2022 Winter Olympics.

在北京，偶遇机器人早已不是新鲜事：酒店里，机器人负责送客房服务；机场里有机器人承担拖地工作；大学校园里，四足机器人帮忙配送包裹；2022年冬奥会期间，食堂里有机器人负责烹饪和上菜。

But China is also working on the next frontier of robotics: robots that not only look but think and act like people. Public and private investors spent over $5 billion this year on start-ups making humanoid robots — the same amount spent in the last five years combined.

与此同时，中国正致力于攻克机器人领域的下一个前沿课题——研发不仅外形酷似人类，更能像人类一样思考、行动的机器人。今年以来，公共与私人投资者已向人形机器人初创企业投入超50亿美元，这一数额相当于过去五年的投资总和。

Chinese robot makers have significant advantages. They are able to draw on the world’s strongest manufacturing sector and the backing of multiple levels of government. They are getting better at making parts like the motors and specialized screws in robot joints.

中国机器人制造商具备诸多显著优势，他们能依托全球最完备的制造业体系，再加上各级政府的支持，企业在电机、机器人关节专用螺丝等零部件制造等技术方面正持续精进。

今年，中国多家公共和私营企业纷纷向机器人初创企业投入资金。政府宣称该行业将助力推动中国经济增长。8月，宇树及其他初创企业制造的人形机器人在北京参加了一场仅限机器人的体育赛事。一些中国创始人与投资者坚信，人形机器人可能是人工智能在现实世界中形成实体力量的途径。

What Chinese robot start-ups have not been able to do is make humanoid robots that could transform the economy.

然而，中国机器人初创企业至今未能实现的目标是打造出足以推动经济变革的人形机器人。

Experts say the humanoid robots that have been released so far struggle with unpredictable situations. They can be programmed to follow patterns, but they have a hard time reacting to events as they happen.

专家表示，目前已推出的人形机器人难以应对各类突发状况。它们可以按照预设程序完成重复性动作，却很难对实时发生的事件做出灵活反应。

Chinese companies are realizing that making robots is not enough, said P.K. Tseng, a research manager at TrendForce, a market research firm in Taipei, Taiwan. “Without use cases, even if they can ship the products, they don’t know where to sell them,” he said.

“中国企业逐渐意识到，光造出机器人还远远不够，”台湾市场研究机构集邦科技研究经理曾伯楷指出。“如果没有具体的应用场景，就算产品能生产出来，企业也不知道该卖给谁。”

Company founders and investors believe that artificial intelligence will be the answer and that humanoid robots could be how A.I. becomes a physical force in the world.

企业创始人和投资者坚信，人工智能将是破局的关键，而人形机器人有望成为人工智能在现实世界中发挥实际作用的载体。

In Silicon Valley, tech executives often talk about achieving what they call artificial general intelligence. There is no settled definition, but for many it is the idea that A.I. could match the powers of the human mind.

在硅谷，科技高管们常常提及实现“通用人工智能”的目标。这一概念目前尚无统一定论，但在很多人看来，通用人工智能指的是具备与人类大脑同等能力的人工智能。

In China, robotics companies claim they will make A.G.I. a reality.

在中国，机器人企业纷纷宣称将率先让通用人工智能成为现实。

“For people in China, A.G.I. should be something that benefits people in their everyday life,” said Sunny Cheung, a fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, which studies Chinese government influence. “Robotics is a testament of applied A.I. in real life.”

“对于中国人而言，通用人工智能理应是一种能切实惠及人们日常生活的技术，”研究中国政府影响力的机构詹姆斯敦基金会研究员桑尼·张（音）表示，“机器人技术正是人工智能在现实生活中落地应用的绝佳例证。”

But there is a big gap between this vision and the current abilities of robots. Many Chinese robotics start-ups are working on software they hope will transform robot behavior the way large language models have transformed A.I.

但这一愿景与当前机器人能力存在巨大鸿沟。许多中国机器人初创企业正着力研发相关软件，希望能像大型语言模型颠覆人工智能领域那样，彻底改变机器人的行为模式。

One way that robots can learn to act more like people is by repetitively doing basic tasks. For example, a limited number of robots made by UBTech Robotics, which is based in Shenzhen like dozens of other start-ups, have been lifting boxes over and over again at electric vehicle factories.

机器人要学会更贴近人类的行为方式，一种途径是通过反复执行基础任务积累经验。例如，与众多同行一样扎根深圳的优必选科技已在部分电动汽车工厂部署少量机器人，让它们反复练习搬箱子的动作。

Another way to train robots is by simulation, in which they watch a lot of videos of the thing they will do. Many of China’s leading robotics start-ups use software and chips made by the Silicon Valley company Nvidia to run their robots’ simulation training, Mr. Cheung said.

另一种训练方式是模拟教学，即让机器人观看大量相关任务的视频。桑尼·张称，中国多家头部机器人初创企业均采用美国硅谷企业英伟达研发的软件和芯片，开展机器人的模拟训练工作。

在7月于上海举行的世界人工智能大会上，与会者得以与松延动力公司一款具有逼真特征的人形机器人进行互动。宇树科技宣布了上市计划，这可能帮助它成为中国领先的人形机器人制造商。展会上的机器人零部件。中国机器人制造商在批量生产方面日益精进，使企业相较于外国竞争对手更具优势。

While no one is certain how useful humanoid robots will turn out to be, China has already put two million manufacturing robots to use. Factories in China installed nearly 300,000 new robots last year, while American factories installed 34,000.

尽管人形机器人未来的实用价值尚无定论，但中国目前已投入使用200万台工业机器人。去年，中国工厂新增工业机器人安装量近30万台，而美国工厂的安装量仅为3.4万台。

Chinese factories have also gotten better at making robots, a major advantage over foreign firms that struggle to manufacture them in large numbers.

中国工厂在机器人生产制造方面的能力也日益提升，使其相较于难以实现大规模生产的外国企业具备显著优势。

The start-up Unitree Robotics has announced plans to do an initial public offering, which could provide the capital it needs to help it become China’s leading humanoid robotics maker. Its latest basic humanoid robots are priced at about $6,000 in China, a fraction of the price of robots made by Boston Dynamics, long the leading American player in the industry. Boston Dynamics was acquired by the South Korean giant Hyundai Motor in 2020.

初创企业宇树科技已宣布计划启动首次公开募股，此次上市有望为其募集足够资金，助力其成为中国首屈一指的人形机器人制造商。该公司最新推出的基础款人形机器人，在中国市场的售价约为4.2万元，仅为长期领跑美国机器人行业的波士顿动力公司同类产品售价的一个零头。波士顿动力于2020年被韩国巨头现代汽车收购。

Major A.I. research labs, universities and start-ups in the United States have bought Unitree robots in recent months to test the robots’ abilities and interactions with their software.

近几个月来，美国多家顶尖人工智能研究实验室、高校以及初创企业纷纷采购宇树科技的机器人，用于测试其性能以及与自研软件的适配性。

Chinese robot makers can offer lower prices in part because they are getting a lot of funding from municipal governments and state-backed hedge funds. The Beijing government has started a $14 billion fund to invest in A.I. and robotics. Shanghai set up an embodied A.I. fund with an initial investment of about $77 million.

中国机器人制造商之所以能给出更低的售价，部分原因在于它们能获得大量来自地方政府和国有对冲基金的资金支持。北京市政府已设立规模达140亿美元的基金，专门用于人工智能和机器人领域的投资；上海市也成立了一支具身智能专项基金，初始投资额约为7700万美元。

机器人学习更接近人类行动的一种方式就是反复执行基础任务。宇树机器人的价格仅为波士顿动力公司所产机器人的一个零头。优必选公司于2019年进行的演示。

In Hangzhou, a tech hot spot, Unitree and a rival, Deep Robotics, are part of a group of A.I. and robotics start-ups that the Chinese media has crowned the “six dragons.” The A.I. start-up DeepSeek is another.

在科技热点城市杭州，宇树科技与其竞争对手云深处科技同属被中国媒体誉为“六小龙”的人工智能与机器人初创企业阵营，人工智能企业深度求索也位列其中。

This month, Deep Robotics said it had raised $70 million in its latest funding round.

本月，云深处科技宣布在最新一轮融资中募集到7000万美元资金。

The humanoid robot maker Robotera said in November that it had raised more than $140 million from investors, including the venture capital arm of Geely, an electric carmaker, and the Beijing city government’s dedicated investment funds for robotics and artificial intelligence.

人形机器人制造商星动纪元则于11月表示，已从投资者处筹集超1.4亿美元资金，投资方包括电动汽车制造商吉利集团的风险投资部门，以及北京市政府专门设立的机器人与人工智能投资基金。

In late November, the Chinese central government set up a committee to establish industry standards. Members included founders, university research labs, municipal government hedge funds and Chinese state officials working on cryptography.

11月下旬，中国中央政府成立专项委员会，负责制定机器人行业标准。委员会成员涵盖企业创始人、高校研究实验室代表、地方政府对冲基金负责人，以及从事密码学研究的中国政府官员。