The détente between China and the United States was already fragile. Now it faces a new strain: the killing of Iran’s supreme leader, an American-backed strike that Beijing denounced as a blatant attempt at regime change.

中美之间本就脆弱的缓和关系如今又面临新的压力：美国支持的刺杀伊朗最高领袖行动被北京谴责为公然企图改变政权。

China has moved quickly to condemn the U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, with its top diplomat, Wang Yi, accusing both governments of assassinating another country’s leader and pledging to support Tehran’s sovereignty and security.

中国迅速谴责了美国和以色列对伊朗的袭击，中国最高外交官王毅指责两国政府暗杀他国领导人，并承诺支持伊朗的主权与安全。

The killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei came less than two months after American forces captured President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela, another close partner of China. Together, the moves amount to a forceful display of American power against governments China has cultivated as part of its broader global strategy.

伊朗最高领袖哈梅内伊遇袭身亡距美军抓捕中国另一亲密伙伴委内瑞拉总统马杜罗还不到两个月。这两起行动共同构成美国力量的强力展示，直指中国全球战略中重点培育的政府。

Yet for Beijing, the question is how far to defend Iran, its closest diplomatic partner in the Middle East, without hurting its own economic interests or worsening tensions with the United States.

但对北京而言，核心问题是：在不损害自身经济利益、不加剧与美国紧张关系的前提下，应该在多大程度上捍卫其中东最密切的外交伙伴伊朗。

Already, the fighting has touched China directly. China’s foreign ministry said a Chinese national had been killed in Tehran and that Beijing was scrambling to evacuate thousands of its citizens.

战事已直接波及中国。中国外交部称，一名中国公民在德黑兰遇难，北京正紧急撤离数以千计的在伊公民。

一名工人周一在伊朗德黑兰空袭后拆除受损建筑的钢结构。

Beijing is likely troubled by the potential ripple effects of the American and Israeli strikes. China is the world’s largest importer of energy and Iran has already threatened to “set on fire” any ships traveling through the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway off Iran’s southern coast through which a fifth of the world’s oil travels. That could drive up prices and hit China’s economy.

美以发动的袭击带来的潜在连锁反应很可能让北京忧心忡忡。中国是全球最大能源进口国，而伊朗已威胁要“点燃”所有穿越霍尔木兹海峡的船只——这条伊朗南部沿海的航道承载着全球五分之一的石油运输。这可能推高能源价格，冲击中国经济。

There is also a quieter, domestic sensitivity to foreign-backed regime change. Xi Jinping, China’s leader, who has been in power since 2012 and is widely expected to begin a fourth term next year, presides over a political system that brooks no dissent. Under a Chinese state media article about Mr. Khamenei’s death, internet users congratulated Iranian residents and wondered aloud which leader might be next. Other comments suggesting that Iranians might have been celebrating have been censored.

此外，中国国内对于外国势力推动的政权更迭还有一层更隐秘的敏感情绪。自2012年执政、并被广泛预计将于明年开启第四个任期的中国领导人习近平领导着一个不容异见的政治体制。在中国官媒一篇关于哈梅内伊身亡的报道下，有网民向伊朗民众道贺，并大胆猜测下一个遇刺的领导人可能是谁。其他暗示伊朗民众可能在庆祝的评论已被审查删除。

Even as it navigates the various dimensions of the fallout from Iran, Beijing is likely most focused on its relationship with the United States.

即便要应对伊朗局势引发的多方面连锁反应，北京最关注的大概率仍是与美国的关系。

President Trump and China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, are weeks away from a summit in Beijing where they are expected to extend a trade truce between the world’s two-largest economies.

特朗普总统与中国最高领导人习近平几周后将在北京举行峰会，预计双方会延长这两大经济体之间的贸易休战协议。

The White House has said the meeting would take place from March 31 to April 2. China has yet to confirm details of the meeting and a foreign ministry spokeswoman said on Monday only that the two countries were in talks.

白宫已宣布会晤将于3月31日至4月2日举行。中国尚未确认会晤细节，外交部发言人周一仅表示，两国正就此沟通。

China could still consider canceling or postponing the meeting with Mr. Trump to show its displeasure with Washington’s use of military power against Iran.

中国仍可能考虑取消或推迟与特朗普的会晤，以此表达对华盛顿对伊朗动武的不满。

1989年，时任伊朗总统哈梅内伊访问中国，在北京会见了中国领导人邓小平。

Despite its sharp rhetoric over Iran, Beijing has strong incentives to keep its relationship with the United States on an even keel, analysts said. China wants Washington to agree to extend the trade truce, reduce its support for Taiwan and ease its restrictions on technology exports.

分析人士称，尽管在伊朗问题上言辞激烈，北京仍有强烈动机维持与美国关系的平稳。中国希望华盛顿同意延长贸易休战、减少对台支持，并放宽对华技术出口限制。

“Beijing cares much more about managing the United States than events in the Middle East,” said Julian Gewirtz, a former senior director for China and Taiwan Affairs at the National Security Council under President Joseph R. Biden Jr.

“比起中东局势，北京更在意如何处理对美关系，”拜登政府时期国家安全委员会中国与台湾事务前高级主任朱利安·格维茨表示。

The trip to China, which would be the first by an American president since Mr. Trump went in 2017, is seen as vital for maintaining the truce Mr. Xi and Mr. Trump reached last October in Busan, South Korea. Before that, China and the United States had engaged in a blistering trade war that sunk relations to their lowest point in more than 50 years.

此次访华将是特朗普2017年访华后美国总统首次访华，被视为维系习近平与特朗普去年10月在韩国釜山达成的休战协议的关键。此前，中美曾爆发激烈贸易战，双边关系跌至50多年来的最低点。

For China, postponing or canceling the summit would carry costs of its own. Mr. Trump has signaled a willingness to avoid confrontation with Beijing. His administration recently delayed announcing a package of arms sales to Taiwan, the self-governed island claimed by Beijing. It has eased restrictions on sales of advanced American chips to China. Mr. Trump refrained from mentioning China in last week’s State of the Union address, an unusual omission.

对中国而言，推迟或取消峰会自身也将付出代价。特朗普已释放出避免与北京对抗的意愿：其政府近期推迟公布对台军售计划（台湾是北京宣称拥有主权的自治岛屿），放宽了对华先进芯片的销售限制；上周国情咨文演讲中，特朗普未提及中国，这是一个不寻常的遗漏。

The legal landscape has also shifted in favor of Beijing, with the recent Supreme Court ruling that struck down many of President Trump’s tariffs. His new 10 percent tariff on global imports is beneficial to China.

法律层面也出现对北京有利的变化：美国最高法院近期的裁决推翻了特朗普多项关税政策；他新推出的全球进口商品10%关税政策对中国有利。

Walking away from the meeting could mean forfeiting that momentum.

放弃此次会晤可能意味着错失这一有利势头。

2017年，特朗普总统与中国国家主席习近平举行会晤。当时特朗普对中国进行了国事访问，虽然仪式隆重，但未取得实质性成果。

Beyond the summit, the conflict could reshape the strategic landscape in ways that benefit Beijing. Already, the United States has amassed the largest military force in the Middle East since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, deploying aircraft carrier strike groups and jets to the region. If that effort proves sustained, it could draw American attention and resources away from Asia.

除峰会外，这场冲突还可能重塑战略格局，给北京带来利好。美国已在中东集结了自2003年伊拉克战争以来规模最大的军事力量，向该地区部署了航母打击群与战机。若这一部署持续，可能会将美国的注意力与资源从亚洲转移。

Beijing may not be bothered if “the United States becomes bogged down in another unpopular war in the Middle East” that distracts it from China, Mr. Gewirtz said.

格维茨表示，如果“美国再次陷入一场不得人心的中东战争”，从而分散对中国的关注，北京或许并不会介意。

Beijing must also thread a diplomatic needle with Tehran. China has forged deep economic ties with many of the countries in the Gulf that Iran has launched attacks against in recent days, such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Mr. Wang tried to strike a balance in his call with Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, calling on Iran to “pay attention to reasonable concerns of its neighboring countries.”

北京还必须在对伊朗外交方面拿捏分寸。中国与伊朗近期袭击的多个海湾国家（如阿联酋、沙特）有着深厚经济联系。王毅在与伊朗外长阿拉格齐通话时试图平衡立场，呼吁伊朗“重视邻国合理关切”。

Unlike the United States, which has formal defense commitments with dozens of allies, China has only one, with North Korea. Its partnerships with Iran and Venezuela are strategic, not military alliances.

美国与数十个盟友有正式防务承诺，而中国仅与朝鲜有此类承诺。中伊、中委关系是战略伙伴关系，而非军事同盟。

“Xi Jinping is unsentimental toward all of Beijing’s external relationships. He got to where he is based on his hardheadedness,” said Joe Webster, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, a Washington research group. “There’s not a large dividend for having a soft heart in the Chinese Communist Party.”

“习近平对北京所有对外关系都不感情用事，他能走到今天的位置，靠的是务实强硬，”华盛顿研究机构大西洋理事会高级研究员乔·韦伯斯特表示。“在中共内部，心软没什么好处。”

Beijing will instead likely continue to offer rhetorical support for Tehran while arguing that the United States is the greatest source of global instability. An editorial in the Global Times, a Chinese Communist Party tabloid, on Monday called on the international community to reject what it said was Washington’s bid to return the world to the “law of the jungle.”

因此，北京大概率会继续在口头上支持伊朗，同时指责美国是全球不稳定的最大根源。中共所有的小报《环球时报》周一发表社论，呼吁国际社会抵制华盛顿试图让世界重回“丛林法则”的行径。

Chinese analysts speaking to state media say the United States and Israel are sowing chaos in the Middle East and have set a dangerous precedent by assassinating Mr. Khamenei.

中国官媒援引的分析人士称，美以两国正在中东播撒混乱，且暗杀哈梅内伊开创了危险先例。

Still, the strikes on Iran have laid bare the gulf between the two superpowers’ military capabilities. Despite its rapid investment in recent decades, China does not possess an army like the United States that can project power in any part of the world.

但对伊朗的袭击也暴露了两个超级大国军事实力的差距。尽管中国近几十年快速投入军力建设，却尚未拥有像美国那样、能在全球任何地方投射力量的军队。

That rankles Beijing, said Dylan Loh, an expert on Chinese foreign policy at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, because it means no country — not even China — can stop the United States from taking whatever action it wants.

新加坡南洋理工大学中国外交政策专家骆明辉表示，这让北京感到刺痛——因为这意味着没有任何国家能阻止美国为所欲为，哪怕中国也不例外。

“The demonstration of raw, hard power is something that will worry Beijing,” Mr. Loh said.

“这种赤裸裸的硬实力展示，会让北京感到担忧，”骆明辉说。

People on social media in China and the West can’t stop comparing Alysa Liu and Eileen Gu, two of the biggest stars at the Winter Olympics. It’s hard not to. Both were born and raised in the Bay Area. Both have a parent from China. Both are sports prodigies.

中美社交媒体上的网民热衷于将冬奥会最闪耀的两颗明星——刘美贤和谷爱凌进行对比。这确实很难避免：两人都在湾区出生长大，都是体育神童，父母中都有一方来自中国。

In Milan, Ms. Liu, 20, became the first American in 24 years to win gold in women’s figure skating, and she added a second gold in the team event. Ms. Gu, 22, won one gold and two silvers in freestyle skiing.

在米兰冬奥赛场，20岁的刘美贤成为24年来首位夺得女子花样滑冰金牌的美国人，她还在团体赛中随队获得了一枚金牌。22岁的谷爱凌则在自由式滑雪项目中摘得一金两银。

The difference: Ms. Liu, whose father was a Tiananmen-era dissident who fled China for the United States in 1989, was on Team U.S.A. Ms. Gu, who obtained a Chinese passport in 2019, chose to represent China.

不同之处在于：刘美贤的父亲是天安门事件时期的异见人士，于1989年逃往美国，她代表美国队参赛；谷爱凌于2019年获得中国护照，选择代表中国出战。

In the United States, many people celebrated Ms. Liu’s performance as a win for liberty, while some, like the former National Basketball Association player Enes Kanter Freedom and various conservative media figures, have called Ms. Gu a traitor. Several politicians have accused her of supporting America’s adversary.

在美国，许多人将刘美贤的表现赞誉为自由的胜利；前NBA球员埃内斯·坎特·自由和各类保守派媒体人士则斥责谷爱凌为叛徒。几位政治人士甚至指责她支持美国的对手。

On the Chinese internet, the treatment of the two women was largely reversed. On the Chinese social media platform Weibo, for instance, a user based in Guangdong commented, “Eileen Gu is a hero of China while Alysa Liu is a descendant of an anti-China figure.”

在中国互联网上，对两人的评价完全反转。例如，在社交平台微博上，一名广东用户评论道：“谷爱凌是中国的英雄，刘美贤是反华分子的后代。”

The reaction is both unfortunate and predictable. As the United States and China intensify a geopolitical rivalry that could determine global leadership deep into the 21st century, nationalism on both sides has intensified.

这种反应既令人遗憾，又在预料之中。随着中美两国可能决定21世纪全球领导权的地缘政治竞争愈演愈烈，双方的民族主义情绪也随之升温。

The uncomfortable comparison so many are making between Ms. Liu and Ms. Gu speaks to more than sport. It exposes questions of heritage, loyalty and identity, thrusting the two athletes into the politics of both countries. Much of the commentary is a proxy for rival nationalism: on the American side, increasingly vocal demands that immigrants prove their allegiance; on the Chinese side, an insistence that Chinese ethnicity demands loyalty and that dissent is betrayal.

许多人对刘美贤和谷爱凌进行这种令人不适的对比，其意义已超出了体育本身。它揭示了关于血统、忠诚和身份认同的问题，将两名运动员推向了两国的政治风口浪尖。许多评论已成为对抗性民族主义的代名词：在美国，要求移民证明忠诚的呼声日益高涨；中国则坚持认为华裔血统就必须效忠，异见即是背叛。

The Chinese Communist Party has long advanced an ethnonationalist idea of belonging: that people of Chinese descent, wherever they reside and whatever passport they hold, remain part of the Chinese nation. Under Xi Jinping, who took full power in 2013, this principle has strengthened: Ethnicity has become a bond that carries expectations of loyalty.

中国共产党长期推行一种血缘民族主义的归属观：无论华裔身处何方、持有何种护照，始终是中华民族的一部分。在2013年全面掌权的习近平领导下，这一原则得到了强化：族裔身份已成为一种承载忠诚期待的纽带。

刘美贤在米兰滑冰场参加训练。

Many Chinese people, in and outside the country, who criticize or question official Beijing positions, not only political activists but journalists, too, are invariably labeled sellouts or worse.

无论身处国内还是海外，许多批评或质疑北京官方立场的华人——不仅是政治活动人士，连记者也不例外——无不被贴上卖国贼或更难听的标签。

This is worth keeping in mind when Americans call Ms. Gu a traitor. They’re borrowing the Chinese Communist Party’s vocabulary and adopting its framework of birthplace loyalty.

当美国人称谷爱凌为叛徒时，这一点值得警惕：他们借用了中国共产党的词汇，并采纳了那种“出生地效忠”的框架。

The ethnonationalist philosophy also explains the scale of China’s investment in athletes of Chinese heritage. Of the 48 players on China’s men’s and women’s Olympic hockey teams in 2022, 22 were naturalized athletes with Chinese lineage.

这种血缘民族主义理念也解释了中国在华裔运动员上的巨大投入。在2022年冬奥中国男女冰球队的48名球员中，有22名是华裔归化运动员。

Ms. Gu was the most visible example of this recruitment effort. When she switched to represent China in 2019, she became a geopolitical asset for Beijing.

谷爱凌是这一招募行动中最显眼的例子。当她在2019年转而代表中国参赛时，她便成为了北京的地缘政治资产。

A Beijing city government document published last year showed that the municipal sports bureau planned to pay Ms. Gu and one other American-born athlete competing for China a combined $14 million over three years. Their names were later scrubbed from the record after it drew public criticism. The episode offered a rare glimpse into how the state invests in athletic success as a form of soft power.

去年发布的一份北京市政府文件显示，市体育局曾计划在三年内向谷爱凌和另一位代表中国参赛的美籍华裔运动员支付近亿元人民币。在引起公众批评后，两人的名字随后从记录中被删除。这一插曲让人罕见地窥见中国如何将体育成功作为一种软实力进行投资。

If Ms. Gu’s case illustrates how the state embraces certain members of the Chinese diaspora, Ms. Liu’s family story illustrated how it treats others.

如果说谷爱凌的案例说明了中国如何接纳某一些海外华人，刘美贤的家族故事则说明了它如何对待另一些群体。

谷爱凌在奥运会前进行训练。

Her father, Arthur Liu, was a student activist who ended up on the government’s most wanted list after the Tiananmen crackdown. He fled to the United States, became a lawyer and raised five children as a single father. Alysa is the oldest. She started skating at 5 and became national champion at 13. Mr. Liu said in media interviews that he had been approached about having Alysa represent China but declined out of concerns about the country’s human rights record.

她的父亲刘俊曾是一名学生领袖，在天安门镇压后被列入政府头号通缉名单。他逃往美国成为一名律师，并作为单身父亲抚养了五个孩子，刘美贤是长女。她五岁开始滑冰，13岁便成为全美冠军。刘俊在媒体采访中表示，曾有人接洽希望刘美贤代表中国参赛，但他因担忧该国的人权记录而拒绝了。

Before the 2022 Beijing Olympics, it was reported at the time, U.S. authorities informed Mr. Liu that he and Alysa were targets of a Chinese government-linked surveillance and harassment effort. The U.S. government provided protection for Alysa during the games. She was 16. It was her first trip to China.

据当时的报道，在2022年北京冬奥会前，美国当局告知刘俊，他和刘美贤成为与中国政府有关联的监视和骚扰行动的目标。美国政府在比赛期间为刘美贤提供了保护。那时她16岁，是第一次来到中国。

Mr. Liu also said he had learned that Beijing was aware that his daughter had once posted an Instagram message about the government’s crackdown on the ethnic minority Uyghurs in China.

刘俊还表示，他获悉北京方面知道他的女儿曾在Instagram上发布过一条关于政府镇压中国少数民族维吾尔人的消息。

When Ms. Liu won gold medals in Milan, she became a problem that China’s censorship apparatus could not quite solve. Praise for her skating on the internet in China was often followed by vague warnings, usually from commenters, to “look up her family background and political orientation.” They couldn’t be more specific and had to resort to euphemisms and coded language because references to June 4, 1989, the date of the Tiananmen massacre, are heavily censored. She is sometimes called a “second-generation anti-China figure.”

当刘美贤在米兰赢得金牌时，她成了中国审查机构无法彻底解决的一个麻烦。中国互联网上，对她滑冰技术的赞美往往伴随着模糊的警告，评论者通常提醒人们去“查查她的家庭背景和政治取向”。他们无法说得更具体，只能借助于委婉语和暗号，因为对1989年6月4日天安门事件这一日期的提及是被严厉审查的。她有时被称为“反华二代”。

If parts of China struggle with how to absorb Ms. Liu’s story, parts of the United States struggle to understand Ms. Gu’s. Their underlying logic — that identity carries duty — sounds familiar to the ears of many Chinese.

如果说中国部分群体难以接纳刘美贤的故事，美国部分群体也难以理解谷爱凌的故事。但他们的底层逻辑——身份承载着义务——对许多中国人来说听起来非常耳熟。

At the same time, some on the American political left risk flattening all criticism of Ms. Gu as racism, sidestepping questions about how authoritarian governments deploy athletes and soft power.

与此同时，美国政治左翼中的一些人将所有针对谷爱凌的批评都简化为种族主义，这带来一种风险——有可能回避了关于威权政府如何利用运动员和软实力的问题。

Ms. Gu grew up with feet in both worlds, but the rivalry between Washington and Beijing has narrowed the space for dual belonging.

谷爱凌在两个世界中长大，但华盛顿与北京之间的对抗挤压了这种双重归属的空间。

She spent most summers in Beijing, her mother’s hometown. She speaks fluent Mandarin Chinese and in 2019, at 15, became a naturalized Chinese citizen, joining Beijing’s effort to project national strength on the global stage. It proved to be a lucrative arrangement for both sides. Ms. Gu has won six Olympic medals for China and became one of the highest-earning female athletes in the world, with most of her sponsors being Chinese brands and global brands targeting the Chinese market.

她大部分夏天都在母亲的家乡北京度过。她能讲流利的普通话，并在2019年15岁时入籍成为中国公民，加入了北京向全球展示国家实力的行动。事实证明，这对双方都是一笔划算的买卖。谷爱凌为中国赢得了六枚奥运奖牌，成为世界上收入最高的女运动员之一，她的赞助商大多是中国品牌以及针对中国市场的全球品牌。

Ms. Gu has declined to comment on her citizenship status — Chinese law forbids dual citizenship — and on China’s human rights record. Time magazine asked her recently about the treatment of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang. She replied that she did not think it was her business to comment. She was not an expert, she said, and reaching a conclusion would require extensive research and a visit to the region in China.

谷爱凌一直拒绝评论她的国籍状态（中国法律禁止双重国籍）以及中国的人权记录。《时代》杂志最近询问她关于新疆维吾尔人的待遇问题。她回答说，她认为评价这些并非她的职责。她说自己不是专家，要得出结论需要进行广泛的研究并实地考察中国该地区。

Her response set off criticism from human rights activists. “Choosing who you represent is a personal decision. No one is a traitor for that,” wrote the Digital Citizens for Human Rights, an X account that focuses on China. “You don’t need to speak for power. But you cannot claim innocence while benefiting from it.”

她的回应引发了人权活动人士的批评。关注中国的X账号“数字公民”写道：“选择代表谁是个人的决定，没人因此就是叛徒。你不需要为权力发声，但不能在受益于权力时声称自己清白无辜。”

Even on Chinese social media, Ms. Gu is a divisive figure. While many Chinese people hail her as a hero and address her adoringly as the “snow princess,” some criticize her for having the privilege of being “a part-time Chinese” — being Chinese when it is profitable and American when it is convenient.

即使在中国社交媒体上，谷爱凌也是一个充满争议的人物。虽然许多中国人尊称她为英雄，亲切地称她为“冰雪公主”，但也有人批评她拥有“兼职中国人”的特权——在有利可图时做中国人，在方便时做美国人。

“She gets to have it both ways. Must be nice,” one commenter wrote on Weibo, the Chinese internet platform.

“她两家通吃。一定很棒吧，”有人在微博上写道。

Authoritarian politics and military aggression are a dangerous mix. As President Trump announced his war on Iran wearing a baseball cap in a video released in the early hours Saturday morning while he was at Mar-a-Lago, that lesson hung heavily over the proceedings. This was a decision made by one man with no legal basis, little public support and no coherent explanation of an endgame.

威权政治与军事侵略是一种危险的组合。周六凌晨，戴着棒球帽的特朗普总统在佛罗里达州马阿拉歌庄园发布视频，宣布对伊朗开战，这一教训沉重地笼罩着整个过程。这是由一人作出的决定，没有法律依据，缺乏公众支持，也没有对最终目标作出前后一致的解释。

Within a few months, Mr. Trump has ordered the military to blow up boats in the Caribbean, abduct the leader of Venezuela and decapitate the government of Iran. The absence of any congressional authorization or campaign to prepare the American people feels intentional. We are not meant to think too much about the basis for action, how much it costs or what happens after the spectacle of bombs falling. Before we digest the last operation, there is the threat of a new one. The dizzying nature of these actions makes them seem routine.

在短短几个月里，特朗普下令军方在加勒比海炸毁船只，绑架委内瑞拉领导人，斩首伊朗政府。他的行动没有任何国会授权，也没有开展让美国人民有所准备的宣传活动，这种缺失让人感觉是刻意为之。他们刻意让我们不要去深究行动的依据、代价，或者炸弹落下的震撼场面之后会发生什么。我们还没消化完上一次行动，新的威胁就已经出现。这种令人目眩的节奏使这些行动显得仿佛稀松平常。

But something has shifted. Mr. Trump now regularly uses the military as an extension of his personal instincts. He may try to keep the operation short. That won’t stave off the consequences. Whatever happens in the coming weeks, the United States has extended its post-9/11 forever war into Iran, an act that will reverberate across the Middle East for years to come.

但情况已经发生变化。特朗普现在经常将军队用作他个人本能的延伸。他可能会试图让行动保持短促。但这无法避免后果。无论未来几周发生什么，美国已将后“9·11”时代无休无止的战争延伸到了伊朗，这一举动将在未来数年里在整个中东地区产生严重影响。

The immediate questions concern the course of the war. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was a brutal and repressive force in the lives of Iranians for decades. His demise hardly resolves the matter of who will control a country of more than 90 million people, particularly as the most heavily armed factions tend to be the most hard-line and are faced with a direct threat to their power and wealth.

眼前的问题关乎战争的走向。几十年来，伊朗最高领袖哈梅内伊一直是压迫伊朗人的一股残暴压制力量。他的死并不能解决谁来控制这个拥有9000多万人口国家的问题，尤其是那些武装最精良的派系往往最为强硬，他们正面临对其权力和财富的直接威胁。

The Iranian regime is weakened but still capable of inflicting damage. Strikes at U.S. military facilities and civilian targets from the Persian Gulf states to Israel suggest an initial strategy of trying to redistribute the violence and disruption wrought upon Iran to its neighbors. Attacks on energy infrastructure and shipping could bring those costs to the global economy. (Energy prices have already jumped.) Retaliatory cyberoperations, terrorism and proxy strikes could also come in waves.

伊朗政权虽然遭到削弱，但仍然具备造成破坏的能力。从波斯湾国家到以色列，对美国军事设施和民用目标的打击表明，伊朗的初步战略是把施加在它身上的暴力与破坏引向邻国。对能源基础设施和航运的攻击可能会把这些代价转嫁给全球经济。（能源价格已经上涨。）报复性的网络行动、恐怖主义以及代理人袭击也可能一波波袭来。

Mr. Trump’s only stated plan for regime change was a call for the Iranian people to rise up. Then what? Those who do may be massacred. Some version of the regime could still cling to power. Iran could devolve into civil conflict, as Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya did after the initially triumphant toppling of their leaders. Separatist movements among ethnic minorities could fracture the country and draw in neighboring states. Protracted violence or extreme poverty could lead to a surge of refugees into Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey and ultimately Europe.

特朗普关于政权更迭唯一公开宣称的方案是呼吁伊朗人民起来反抗。然后呢？那些起义者可能会遭到屠杀。伊朗政权的某种形式仍可能顽强维持权力。伊朗也可能像阿富汗、伊拉克和利比亚那样，在其领导人最初被成功推翻后陷入内战。少数民族中的分离主义运动可能会导致国家分裂，并把邻国卷入其中。长期的暴力或极端贫困可能会导致难民涌入阿富汗、巴基斯坦、土耳其，最终流向欧洲。

There are, of course, better scenarios. A chastened regime could pursue some form of accommodation with America and evolution at home. Or perhaps Iran could buck the trend of nearly every other country from North Africa to South Asia that has undergone regime change this century and transition peacefully to a democratic form of government.

当然，也存在更好的可能。一个受挫的政权可能会寻求某种形式的对美妥协，并在国内推动渐进变革。或者，伊朗可能逆转本世纪从北非到南亚几乎所有经历政权更迭国家的趋势，实现向民主政体的和平过渡。

Mr. Trump will surely declare victory in Iran, just as he did last summer. But wars play out in the lives of people and nations, not news cycles. The 1953 U.S. and British-backed coup that enabled the shah to consolidate power in Iran appeared to be a victory, but it became part of the DNA of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Islamic republic that has bedeviled the United States ever since.

特朗普肯定会像去年夏天那样宣布在伊朗取得胜利。但战争的展开关乎人民和国家的生命，而不是新闻周期的更迭。1953年美英支持的政变使伊朗国王得以在伊朗巩固权力，当时这看似一场胜利，但它却成了1979年伊朗革命以及其后一直困扰美国的伊斯兰共和国的基因组成部分。

Even those who welcome the decapitation of the Iranian regime may feel deep unease about America’s behavior. The United States, like Israel, now seems to follow no rules, consult few allies and pay little regard to the destruction it leaves behind, including in the prosperous Arab gulf states. Like an empire of old, it demands tribute — be it Venezuelan oil or payments to the amorphous “Board of Peace.” Mr. Trump’s tariff policies, maximum pressure sanctions, episodic threats on Greenland and military action are experienced as a strategy of calculated chaos.

即使那些欢迎伊朗政权被斩首的人也可能对美国的行为深感不安。美国如今似乎和以色列一样，不遵循任何规则，很少咨询盟友意见，也很少顾及自己所留下的破坏，包括在富裕的阿拉伯海湾国家造成的影响。它像一个老牌帝国一样要求进贡——无论是委内瑞拉的石油，还是向说不清道不明的和平委员会付款。特朗普的关税政策、极限施压制裁、对格陵兰的间歇性威胁以及军事行动都被视为一种蓄意制造混乱的策略。

What lessons will nations draw from this new reality? For would-be nuclear powers, it is that North Korea’s arsenal brought security that Iran’s negotiations could not. For Russia and China, it is that might makes right. For our European allies, it is that the United States is an unpredictable force that could again threaten Greenland or meddle in their internal politics at any moment. The old U.S.-led order is dead. The new one feels unstable and ominous, as if a storm could descend at any moment.

各国会从这一新现实中汲取什么教训？对于潜在的核国家来说，教训是朝鲜的核武库带来了伊朗靠谈判无法实现的安全。对于俄罗斯和中国来说，教训是强权即公理。对于我们的欧洲盟友来说，教训是美国是一个不可预测的力量，可能随时再次威胁格陵兰，或干涉它们的内政。由美国主导的旧秩序已经终结。新的秩序则显得不稳定且让人不安，仿佛风暴随时可能降临。

Mr. Trump probably would not have become president without his stated opposition to forever wars; it is a feature, not a bug, of MAGA. Yet in his return to the presidency, he has proved to be far more interested in power itself. Setting aside the risks outlined above, this dynamic alone should compel stronger and sustained Democratic opposition to this war.

特朗普之所以能当选总统，很大程度上正是因为他公开反对永无休止的战争；这是“让美国再次伟大”运动的特征，而非缺陷。然而在重返总统职位后，他展现出对权力本身更强烈的渴求。即便撇开上文概述的风险不谈，这种趋势本身也足以促使民主党对这场战争进行更强烈且持续的反对。

Rather than representing a break from America’s imperial instincts, Mr. Trump has personalized them. There is no reason to believe he won’t lash out militarily again. (How many Americans even know we bombed Nigeria on Christmas Day?) Cuba is currently being starved by a blockade, despite posing no danger to U.S. national security.

特朗普并未摒弃美国的帝国主义倾向，而是将其个人化了。没有理由相信他不会再次动用军事手段。（有多少美国人知道我们在圣诞节轰炸了尼日利亚？）古巴目前正因封锁而挨饿，尽管它并未对美国国家安全构成威胁。

After 25 years of constant war, there is little appetite for this kind of adventurism among the American people. The operations around Venezuela and in Iran are both estimated to cost at least several billion dollars, with more to come. That is not how American taxpayers want their money spent amid a cost-of-living crisis, deep cuts to the social safety net and exploding deficits.

在经历了25年的持续战争之后，美国人民对这种冒险主义已提不起什么兴致。据估计，围绕委内瑞拉的行动以及在伊朗的行动都将至少耗资数十亿美元，后续还会有更多支出。在生活成本危机、社会保障体系大幅削减以及赤字激增的情况下，美国纳税人可不希望他们的钱被这样花掉。

More profoundly, the way Mr. Trump has deployed the newly minted Department of War abroad should raise concerns about what he might do with the military at home. Already he has tried to send troops into American cities but faced judicial pushback. He has mused about invoking the Insurrection Act, which would grant him emergency powers to deploy the military to enforce laws within the United States. Whether in response to peaceful protests or an election loss, this would put American democracy into dangerous territory.

更深层次来看，特朗普在海外动用新成立的战争部的方式应该引发人们对他可能在国内如何动用军队的担忧。他已尝试派遣军队进入美国城市，但遇到了司法阻碍。他考虑过援引《反叛乱法》，这将授予他动用军队在美国境内执法的紧急权力。无论是为了应对和平抗议还是选举失利，这都将把美国民主推入危险境地。

If these scenarios seem fanciful, consider what has already happened. Mr. Trump addressed general officers and suggested that U.S. cities become military training grounds. He called for the imprisonment of a handful of Democratic members of Congress for suggesting that service members should not follow illegal orders. And last week he ordered the government to stop using the services of the artificial intelligence company Anthropic because it refused to allow the Pentagon to have unfettered access to its technology for the mass surveillance of Americans.

如果这些情景听起来像是天方夜谭，不妨想想已经发生的事。特朗普曾对将官们发表讲话，表示美国城市可以成为军事训练场。他呼吁将几名民主党国会议员投入监狱，只因他们主张军人不应服从非法命令。上周，他还命令政府停止使用人工智能公司Anthropic的服务，因为该公司拒绝让五角大楼对其技术拥有不受限制的访问权，以便对美国人进行大规模监控。

We must not be numbed to the repeated, illegal use of the United States military. Nor should we discount what Mr. Trump’s extension of the forever war is doing to us.

我们不能对反复非法使用美国军队的行为麻木不仁。我们也不应低估特朗普将永久战争扩大化对我们造成的影响。

Foundational questions are at stake for Americans. Do we want to continue forever wars financed with borrowed money and fought by service members whose sacrifices stand in stark contrast to the cowardice of our billionaire class? Do we want to regularly bomb other countries while endangering the lives of millions of human beings by dismantling the U.S. Agency for International Development? Do we want to remain in a permanent state of war that migrates from one place to another while rampant inequality and revolutionary technologies remake our communities with little resistance?

一些关乎根本的问题正摆在美国人面前。我们是否要继续打这种用借来的钱资助、由军人承担牺牲的永久战争？而这些牺牲与我们亿万富豪阶层的怯懦形成鲜明对比。我们是否要一边频繁轰炸其他国家，一边通过削弱美国国际开发署而危及数百万人的生命？肆虐的不平等和革命性的技术正在重塑我们的社区，却几乎未遇任何阻力，我们是否希望维持在一种永久战争状态，任凭战火从一个地方蔓延到另一个地方？

Mr. Trump’s authoritarianism is not abstract. There is nothing stopping him from wielding the awesome power of the United States to serve his own interests, not the public’s. War should never be normal. We don’t know where this one will lead, but we do know that it has already killed untold civilians — including dozens of girls who did nothing but go to school. The desensitization of Americans to this kind of violence is part of what is broken in our society.

特朗普的威权主义并非抽象概念。没有什么能阻止他运用美国的强大国家力量来服务于他的个人利益，而非公共利益。战争绝不应成为常态。我们不知道这场战争将走向何方，但我们知道它已经造成了无数平民死亡——其中包括数十名只是去上学的女孩。美国人对这种暴力逐渐麻木本身就是我们社会失序的一部分。

By aligning themselves with public opinion, the Constitution and a sense of shared humanity at home and abroad, Democrats can offer an alternative vision to the forever war. The just and lasting peace that most Americans seek is one in which government responds to their problems, rather than constantly looking for regimes to change or enemies, whether foreign or domestic, to crush.

如果民主党能够顺应民意、坚守宪法原则，并秉持对国内外共同人性的尊重，他们就可以为永久战争提供一种替代愿景。大多数美国人所追求的公正而持久的和平是一种政府能够回应他们问题的和平，而不是不断寻找要更迭的政权或要粉碎的内外敌人的和平。

The quiet luxury of Dubai’s high-priced hotels and resorts was punctured this weekend as Iran aimed hundreds of missiles and drones at targets across the United Arab Emirates in retaliation for the Israeli-U.S. attack.

这个周末，迪拜昂贵的酒店和度假村的宁静奢华被打破，伊朗针对阿联酋各目标发射了大量导弹和无人机，以报复以色列和美国的袭击。

Videos posted online showed fires at five-star hotels like the Jumeirah Burj Al Arab and the Fairmont Dubai, and passengers scrambling to evacuate Dubai International Airport — one of the world’s busiest — after an explosion on a concourse injured four people.

网上发布的视频显示，五星级酒店如朱美拉帆船酒店和迪拜费尔蒙酒店起火，乘客们急匆匆地撤离迪拜国际机场——世界上最繁忙的机场之一，此前这里的一个大厅发生爆炸，造成四人受伤。

In Abu Dhabi, one person died and seven were injured by debris from a drone that targeted Zayed International Airport. In Iran, Israel and elsewhere in the Middle East, hundreds of people have died during the ongoing conflict.

在阿布扎比，一架针对扎耶德国际机场的无人机的碎片导致一人死亡、7人受伤。在伊朗、以色列以及中东其他地区，持续冲突已造成数百人死亡。

The hostilities have come as a shock to tourists, who visit the United Arab Emirates not only for the Michelin-star dining, hospitality, shopping and beaches, but also for the Emirates’ reputation as a safe destination in a volatile region. Dubai, ranked among the top 10 destinations in the world, welcomed 19.59 million tourists last year, a 5 percent increase over its previous record year in 2024, according to data published by the Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism.

这些敌对行动让游客震惊，他们前往阿联酋不仅仅是为了米其林星级餐饮、好客的氛围、购物和海滩，还因为阿联酋在动荡地区被视为安全目的地。根据迪拜经济与旅游局发布的数据，迪拜去年位列全球前10大目的地，接待了1959万游客，比2024年的创纪录年份增长5%。

Airports in the region have become major hubs for passengers traveling to India, Africa and Asia. In 2025, more than 33 million passengers passed through Abu Dhabi’s five airports, a record.

该地区的机场已成为前往印度、非洲和亚洲乘客的主要枢纽。2025年，阿布扎比的五个机场旅客吞吐量超过3300万人次，创下纪录。

The airstrikes forced the closure of airports in Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Doha, Qatar. Now, as the fighting continues, hundreds of thousands of tourists and business travelers are struggling to book flights home. At least 11,000 flights to and from the Middle East have been canceled since Saturday, and one million travelers have been affected by the disruption so far, according to Cirium, an aviation data firm.

空袭迫使迪拜、阿布扎比和卡塔尔多哈的机场关闭。现在，随着战斗继续，数十万旅游和出差的乘客正努力预订回程航班。据航空数据公司Cirium称，自周六以来，中东进出航班至少取消了1.1万架次，已影响100万旅客。

A limited number of flights were scheduled to depart Dubai and Abu Dhabi airports on Monday.

周一，仅有数量有限的航班计划从迪拜和阿布扎比机场起飞。

Emirates, the region’s largest carrier, said on social media that it would prioritize stranded customers with canceled bookings. The announcement was met by hundreds of responses from panicked passengers wondering how they could get on a flight.

该地区最大航空公司阿联酋航空在社交媒体上表示，将优先处理那些预订被取消的滞留客户。这一公告引发数百名惊慌乘客的回复，纷纷询问如何登机。

‘No Certainty Right Now’

“目前什么都不确定”

周一，迪拜国际机场空空如也的到达区。

Dubai International is the world’s busiest airport for international travel, with more than 95 million passengers last year. Abu Dhabi’s airport and Hamad International Airport in Qatar are also among the largest international hubs, said Henry Harteveldt, an aviation industry analyst for Atmosphere Research. He said the conflict would ripple out to airports worldwide and could chill international travel plans.

Atmosphere Research的航空业分析师亨利·哈特维尔德表示，迪拜国际机场是全球最繁忙的国际旅行机场，去年客运量超过9500万人次。阿布扎比机场和卡塔尔哈马德国际机场也是最大的国际枢纽之一。他表示，此次冲突将波及全球机场，并可能令国际旅行计划降温。

“There is no certainty right now about when the fighting will end and when it will be deemed safe for commercial flights to resume,” Mr. Harteveldt said. “Clearly, there’s going to be a lot of concern, legitimate concern, in consumers’ minds about whether they should travel through those airports, at least in the immediate aftermath of the fighting.”

“目前什么都不确定，不知道战斗何时结束，不知道何时才能恢复商业飞行的安全环境，”哈特维尔德说，“显然，消费者心中会产生大量合理的担忧，至少在战斗刚结束的一段时间内，他们会疑虑是否应该经由这些机场旅行。”

Vishwas Gowda, a 23-year-old engineer who lives in Bengaluru, India, had planned for a nine-hour layover in Dubai. On Saturday morning, he was on an Emirates flight from Dubai to San Francisco when news of the airspace closures hit, and the plane turned around. Back in Dubai, it was “complete chaos and confusion,” he said, with long lines throughout the airport and “no clear next steps.”

23岁的维什瓦斯·高达是一名住在印度班加罗尔的工程师，他原计划在迪拜中转停留九小时。周六早上，当空域关闭的消息传来时，他正坐在从迪拜飞往旧金山的阿联酋航空飞机上，随后飞机被迫返航。他说，回到迪拜后，机场“完全陷入了混乱和迷惑”，到处排着长队，“没有明确的后续安排。”

The airline still hasn’t contacted him about when he can fly to San Francisco or back home to India, he said.

他表示，航空公司至今仍未联系他，告知何时能飞往旧金山或返回印度。

“I can’t believe there is no way for us to get out,” said Chresida Elston, a British tourist who is on vacation with her husband and two children at the Mandarin Oriental in Dubai. “It’s so surreal to be going to the beach and pretending we’re having a normal holiday to the children when there are explosions in the sky and you have no idea where the next missile will land,” she said in a phone interview.

“我不敢相信我们竟然没办法离开，”英国游客克雷西达·埃尔斯顿说，她正和丈夫及两个孩子在迪拜文华东方酒店度假。“这太超现实了，当天空中有爆炸声，你根本不知道下一枚导弹会落在哪里时，我们还要在海滩上向孩子们假装在度过一个正常的假期，”她在电话采访中说道。

On Saturday, emergency alerts sent to cellphones warned of potential missile threats. Tourists shared videos of themselves and others in hotel basements; on Sunday, they were advised to stay indoors.

周六，手机发出的紧急警报警告了潜在的导弹威胁。游客们分享了自己和其他人躲在酒店地下室的视频；周日，他们被建议待在室内。

Covered Costs

费用承担

The United Arab Emirates announced on Sunday that it would cover accommodation costs for stranded visitors. The General Civil Aviation Authority said it was picking up the tab for meals and accommodation for more than 20,000 passengers who were unable to leave over the weekend.

阿拉伯联合酋长国周日宣布，将承担滞留游客的住宿费用。民航总局表示，正在为周末无法离境的2万多名乘客支付餐饮和住宿账单。

周日，一枚被拦截的飞行物落入迪拜朱美拉棕榈岛群附近的海域。

The Ministry of Defense of the United Arab Emirates said on Monday that 174 ballistic missiles had been launched toward the country since the start of the attack on Saturday. Additionally, 689 Iranian drones were detected, with 645 intercepted and 44 falling within the country’s territory. Several cruise missiles had been intercepted, and the resulting debris caused damage. The attacks resulted in three deaths and 68 minor injuries.

阿联酋国防部周一表示，自周六袭击开始以来，已有174枚弹道导弹向该国发射。此外还探测到689架伊朗无人机，其中645架被拦截，44架落在该国境内。多枚巡航导弹被拦截，产生的碎片造成了破坏。袭击导致三人死亡，68人轻伤。

Members of the travel industry downplayed the situation, saying that the incidents of falling debris were isolated.

旅游业从业人员试图淡化事态，称碎片坠落只是孤立案例。

“Dubai has long been recognized for its infrastructure resilience, governance and crisis response capabilities,” said Ali Asgar Hussain, the managing director of Turning Point Tourism, a Dubai-based travel company.

迪拜旅游公司Turning Point Tourism董事总经理阿里·阿斯加尔·侯赛因表示：“迪拜长期以来因其基础设施的韧性、治理能力和危机应对能力而受到认可。”

“Things remain calm, and people are getting on with their daily lives as best they can,” said Ahmed Soliman, the managing director of Travel Connections Arabia, a consulting firm.

咨询公司Travel Connections Arabia的董事总经理艾哈迈德·苏莱曼说：“局势始终是稳定的，人们正在尽力继续日常生活。”

On Monday, the atmosphere across Dubai was calm. While some tourists ventured out, many decided to stay in their hotels.

周一，迪拜各地的气氛很平静。虽然有些游客冒险外出，但许多人选择留在酒店内。

Some people are relying on private security firms to help them leave Dubai by land to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and Muscat, Oman, where private and commercial planes are operating.

一些人正依靠私人安保公司帮助，通过陆路离开迪拜前往沙特阿拉伯的利雅得和阿曼的马斯喀特，那里的私人和商业飞机仍在运营。

“Our approach is straightforward: GPS-tracked ground transport running 24/7 from Dubai to open land borders,” said Rafal Hyps, chief executive of the global risk management firm Sicuro Group. He said the company had assisted about 1,000 people, “including employees of major multinational companies, family offices and individual travelers.”

全球风险管理公司Sicuro Group的首席执行官拉法尔·希普斯表示：“我们的方法很简单：提供七天24小时全天候GPS跟踪的地面运输，从迪拜通往开放的陆路口岸。”他说，公司已协助约1000人，“包括大型跨国公司的员工、家族办公室和个人旅行者。”

He declined to specify the cost of getting out overland, but said it was “comparable to the price of an international air ticket.”

他拒绝透露陆路撤离的具体费用，但表示“与国际机票价格相当”。

While a limited number of flights departed from the United Arab Emirates on Monday, there was no information on whether flights would operate on Tuesday. The government urged passengers not to travel to the airport unless their flight was confirmed.

虽然周一有少量航班从阿联酋起飞，但尚无周二是否运营的信息。政府敦促乘客，除非航班已确认，否则不要前往机场。

周一，在周末的袭击过后，一些游客和居民开始冒险外出。上图为迪拜码头附近海滩上的日光浴者。

“Normally, I would not mind being stuck in Dubai. It’s beautiful here, and there is so much to do,” said Lara Riva, an Italian tourist in Dubai whose flight home was canceled on Sunday. “But this is a very different situation.”

“通常情况下，我不介意被困在迪拜。这里很美，有那么多事可以做，”意大利游客劳拉·里瓦说，她回程的航班在周日被取消了。“但现在的情况完全不同。”

Rebecca Clothey, 57, a professor at Drexel University in Philadelphia who was stranded in Abu Dhabi over the weekend, was looking into options to drive to the nearest operating international airport, more than five hours away in Oman, when Etihad Airways rebooked her on a flight to Bengaluru, where she had been scheduled to arrive two days earlier.

57岁的丽贝卡·克洛西是费城德雷塞尔大学的一名教授，周末被困在阿布扎比。就在她考虑开车五小时前往阿曼境内最近的一个仍在运营的国际机场时，阿提哈德航空给她改签了一个飞往班加罗尔的航班——按照原来的计划，她应该在两天前抵达那里。

In an interview from her taxi after landing, she said that she wasn’t sure how she was selected for that flight but that only every other seat was occupied.

降落后，她在出租车里接受采访时说，她不确定自己是如何被选中改签那趟航班的，但飞机上每隔一个座位才坐一个人。

In Abu Dhabi, she said, she had been put up at the Grand Millennium Al Wahda, a five-star hotel, where the Emirati government covered all her expenses. Looking back on the experience, she added, “I was treated really well. But you’re thinking, ‘Am I going to be here a week? Is this situation going to get worse? I mean, how am I going to get out?’”

她说自己被安置在五星级的阿布扎比大禧年阿尔华达酒店，阿联酋政府承担了所有费用。回想起这段经历，她补充道：“我受到了很好的对待。但你心里会想，‘我要在这里待一周吗？情况会恶化吗？我到底该怎么离开？’”

The United States and Israel opened their war on Iran this weekend with a sudden strike on its longtime supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. While the war as a whole has been broadly denounced as illegal by critics who point to its lack of authorization from Congress or the United Nations Security Council, the ayatollah’s killing raises particular legal questions.

周末，美国与以色列对伊朗发动战争，突袭该国多年的最高领袖哈梅内伊。这场战争本身已被批评者普遍谴责为非法，他们指出其未获美国国会或联合国安理会授权，但击毙哈梅内伊一事引发了尤为特殊的法律疑问。

It is extraordinarily rare for a country to deliberately and openly kill the leader of another sovereign nation — even during legally uncontested wars. As a result, the question has rarely come up. A very rare precedent of sorts came in March 2003, when the Bush administration tried to kill Saddam Hussein on the cusp of the Iraq war, a conflict Congress had authorized — but that airstrike missed its target.

一国蓄意、公开地杀死另一个主权国家领导人的情况极为罕见——即便在法律上无争议的战争中也是如此。因此，相关法律问题极少出现。一个勉强算得上的罕见先例发生在2003年3月，布什政府在伊拉克战争爆发前夕试图击毙萨达姆·侯赛因（那场战争获得了国会授权），但空袭并未命中目标。

Asked for a detailed description of its legal views on the issue, the White House said in a statement that President Trump had “exercised his authority as commander in chief to defend U.S. personnel and bases in the region.” It described decades of misdeeds by Iran but did not specifically address the killing of its leader.

当被要求详细说明政府在这一问题上的法律立场时，白宫在一份声明中表示，特朗普总统“为保护该地区美方人员及基地而行使了最高统帅权”。声明列举了伊朗数十年来的恶行，但并未专门就击毙伊朗领导人一事作出法律解释。

Here is a closer look.

以下是详细分析。

What happened?

发生了什么？

The United States under Mr. Trump and Israel under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu jointly launched a war against Iran on Feb. 28 with a surprise strike on Iranian leadership, killing Ayatollah Khamenei, a hard-line Shiite cleric and Iran’s ruler for nearly four decades.

特朗普领导下的美国与内塔尼亚胡领导下的以色列于2月28日联合发动对伊朗的战争，突袭伊朗领导层，击毙担任伊朗最高领袖近四十年的强硬什叶派神职人员哈梅内伊。

The C.I.A. had been tracking his movements and passed his whereabouts to Israel, which carried out the strike that killed him, according to officials. The two countries are said to have moved up their plans for the war to take advantage of the window of opportunity.

据官员透露，美国中央情报局一直在追踪哈梅内伊的行踪，并将其位置通报以色列，由以色列实施了致命打击。据称，美以两国为抓住这个短时间内出现的机会，提前了战争计划。

What was Khamenei’s status?

哈梅内伊的身份是什么？

The ayatollah was a civilian — not a uniformed member of the Iranian military — but he was also the supreme leader of Iran’s armed forces, just as Mr. Trump is a civilian who is also the commander in chief of the American military. This hybrid status creates a complication.

哈梅内伊是文职人员，并非伊朗军队现役军人，但他同时是伊朗武装部队最高领袖，正如特朗普身为文职却也是美军总司令一样。这种双重身份造成了法律上的复杂性。

It is generally agreed that in wartime, a country’s military commanders are lawful targets. It is also generally agreed that civilian officials with no military functions — like a health minister — are not lawful targets unless they are directly participating in hostilities.

普遍共识是，战争期间一国军事指挥官属于合法打击目标。同样普遍的共识是，不承担军事职能的文职官员——如卫生部长——不属于合法目标，除非他们直接参与敌对行动。

2024年，哈梅内伊在德黑兰发表演讲。

A civilian leader who commands a military force is a messier situation. Still, under the laws of armed conflict, a civilian leader who controls the military is likely to be a legitimate military target in an active war whether he is interpreted as being part of his country’s armed forces or as a civilian directly participating in hostilities, legal experts said.

指挥军队的文职领导人则处于更模糊的地带。但法律专家表示，根据武装冲突法，控制军队的文职领导人在实际战争中很可能属于合法军事目标，无论将其界定为该国武装力量一部分，还是直接参与敌对行动的文职人员。

What about targeting former leaders?

针对前领导人的打击如何界定？

Reports from Iran say an airstrike has also killed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who served as Iran’s president from 2005 until 2013. Based on the presently available facts, he would seem unambiguously to have been a civilian who was not directly participating in hostilities. It is not clear what legal theory would support any deliberate targeting of him as lawful.

 来自伊朗的报道称，2005年至2013年担任伊朗总统的马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪-内贾德也在空袭中身亡。根据目前已知事实，他显然属于未直接参与敌对行动的文职人员。目前尚不清楚有何种法律理论可以支持将其蓄意列为打击目标的合法性。

When did the armed conflict begin?

武装冲突何时开始？

It began with the very strike that killed Ayatollah Khamenei, which complicates the question of whether he was a lawful military target at the time of the strike. In peacetime, it would be murder to kill a member of a foreign military or any government official who is not engaged in an imminent armed attack.

冲突始于击毙哈梅内伊的那次空袭本身，这使得判断他在遇袭时是否为合法军事目标的问题变得复杂。在和平时期，杀死未参与迫在眉睫的武装攻击的外国军人或政府官员均构成谋杀。

The United Nations Charter, a treaty the United States has ratified, provides that a nation may not use force on the sovereign territory of another country without its consent, a self-defense rationale or the authorization of the U.N. Security Council.

得到了美国批准的《联合国宪章》规定，除非经当事国同意、出于自卫理由或获得联合国安理会授权，任何国家不得在另一国主权领土使用武力。

周六德黑兰的爆炸。

“Whether or not an individual would be a lawful military target as a matter of the law of armed conflict, if the strike itself violates the U.N. Charter, that strike is illegal,” said Rebecca Ingber, a professor at the Cardozo School of Law and a former senior State Department lawyer. “A state can’t backfill a justification for killing a head of state by unlawfully starting an armed conflict.”

“无论根据武装冲突法，某个人是否属于合法军事目标，如果袭击本身违反《联合国宪章》，那么这次袭击就是非法的，”卡多佐法学院教授、前国务院高级律师丽贝卡·英格伯说。“一个国家不能先非法发动武装冲突，事后再为杀死他国国家元首寻找正当理由。”

Was there an ‘imminent’ threat?

是否存在“迫在眉睫”的威胁？

To invoke self-defense, the U.N. Charter requires there to be an armed attack. Customary international law broadly accepts that this includes a right to use force against an imminent threat of an armed attack, which in turn raises the question of what counts as imminent.

《联合国宪章》规定，援引自卫权需存在武装攻击行为。国际法惯例上大致承认，这包括对迫在眉睫的武装攻击威胁使用武力的权利，而这又引出何为“迫在眉睫”的问题。

Since the attack, the Trump administration has gestured toward two versions of this argument. One appears to rely on a very elastic definition, and one arguably appeared to rely on circular reasoning.

袭击发生后，特朗普政府提出了两种版本的相关理由。一种似乎依赖非常弹性的定义，另一种则被认为属于循环论证。

In a video on Saturday, Mr. Trump declared that the objective was “to defend the American people by eliminating imminent threats from the Iranian regime.” But he did not suggest that Iran was on the cusp of launching an armed attack before the strikes, instead saying it would be intolerable to allow it to build a nuclear weapon and long-range missiles.

特朗普在周六的一段视频中宣称，行动目标是“通过消除伊朗政权带来的迫在眉睫的威胁，来保卫美国人民”。但他并未表明伊朗在袭击前即将发动武装攻击，而是声称绝不能容忍伊朗发展核武器与远程导弹。

On Monday, Marco Rubio, the secretary of state and national security adviser, told reporters that “there absolutely was an imminent threat.” He said the United States believed Israel was going to attack Iran, and if it did so, Iran would attack American bases, so the country joined Israel’s attack “proactively, in a defensive way, to prevent them from inflicting higher damage.”

周一，国务卿兼国家安全顾问鲁比奥对记者表示，“绝对存在迫在眉睫的威胁。”他称，美国认为以色列将攻击伊朗，而一旦以色列动手，伊朗就会袭击美军基地，因此美国“以预防性、防御性的方式”加入以色列的袭击，“以防止伊朗造成更大破坏。”

美国国务卿鲁比奥周一在国会大厦向国会领导人通报伊朗袭击事件前。

Does the administration care about international law?

本届政府是否在意国际法？

There is reason to believe it does not care about this part of it.

有理由认为，政府在这方面并不在意。

The American military’s invasion of Venezuela in January to arrest President Nicolás Maduro also appears to have violated the U.N. Charter. But a memo by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel said the charter did not matter for the purposes of that operation. It cited past opinions by executive branch lawyers who claimed that as a matter of domestic law, the president has constitutional power to act in ways that conflict with the Charter.

今年1月，美军入侵委内瑞拉逮捕总统马杜罗，此举同样似乎违反《联合国宪章》。但司法部法律顾问办公室的一份备忘录称，该行动无需考虑宪章条款。备忘录援引了行政部门律师过往的观点，称根据美国国内法，总统拥有采取与《宪章》相抵触的行动的宪法权力。

Does it matter which country killed Khamenei?

由哪国击毙哈梅内伊是否重要？

Not under the doctrine of state responsibility, if reporting about the behind-the-scenes decision-making is accurate. According to the doctrine, if a country knowingly helps another nation commit a violation of international law, both are considered culpable for the wrongful act. By that logic, if killing the ayatollah was unlawful, and if the United States knew or intended for Israel to target him when it passed along his location, the United States shares legal responsibility.

如果有关幕后决策的报道属实，则不属于国家责任原则范畴。根据这一原则，如果一国故意协助另一国实施违反国际法的行为，两国均应对该不法行为承担责任。按照这一逻辑，如果击毙哈梅内伊属于非法行为，且美国在向以色列通报其位置时知晓或意图让以色列将哈梅内伊列为目标，那么美国需承担共同法律责任。

Was starting the war legal, domestically?

在国内层面，发动战争是否合法？

The Constitution vests the power to declare war with Congress. But especially since World War II, presidents of both parties have unilaterally committed U.S. troops into limited combat situations on their own. Executive branch lawyers claim that this is lawful if the anticipated nature, scope and duration of an operation fall short of a “war” in the constitutional sense.

美国宪法将宣战权授予国会。但自二战以来，两党总统均曾单方面将美军投入有限作战行动。行政部门律师主张，如果一项行动的预期性质、规模和持续时间未达到宪法意义上的“战争”标准，则属合法。

Despite those accumulating precedents, since the War Powers Resolution of 1973, presidents have sought prior authorization for major wars: the Persian Gulf war, Iraq and the war against Al Qaeda that began in Afghanistan. Mr. Trump’s war with Iran appears likely to be the most significant unilateral presidential military action since the law’s enactment.

尽管先例不断累积，但自1973年《战争权力决议》通过以来，总统发动重大战争均事先寻求国会授权：海湾战争、伊拉克战争以及始于阿富汗的针对基地组织的战争。特朗普对伊朗发动的战争很可能成为该法案颁布以来总统采取的最重大单边军事行动。

What about the assassination ban?

刺杀禁令如何适用？

After an inquiry in the 1970s that brought to light C.I.A. links to Cold War plots to kill foreign leaders, known as the Church Committee investigation, President Gerald Ford issued an executive order that banned “assassinations.” The ban is now part of Executive Order 12333, which states: “No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.” The order does not define what types of killings count.

20世纪70年代，一场调查——名为“丘奇委员会调查”——揭露了中情局参与冷战时期暗杀外国领导人的阴谋。此后福特总统发布行政命令，禁止“刺杀”。该禁令如今已纳入第12333号行政命令，其中规定：“任何受雇于或代表美国政府行事的人员，不得从事或密谋从事刺杀。”该命令未界定何种杀戮行为属于刺杀。

Both before and after Congress authorized the war against Al Qaeda in 2001, the executive branch took the position that this ban would not bar the targeted killings of high-level terrorist leaders as self-defense or part of the armed conflict. Still, Qaeda operatives are not leaders of sovereign states.

在2001年国会授权对基地组织开战之前和之后，行政部门均坚持立场，认为该禁令不禁止出于自卫或作为武装冲突一部分而定点清除高级恐怖主义领导人。但基地组织成员并非主权国家领导人。

In 2020, Mr. Trump ordered an airstrike in Iraq that killed Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, a top Iranian military commander. The visible portions of a heavily redacted Justice Department memo that blessed that strike do not address the assassination ban, but the memo accused him of orchestrating years of operations that killed American troops deployed in Iraq.

2020年，特朗普下令在伊拉克发动空袭，击毙伊朗高级军事指挥官卡西姆·苏莱曼尼少将。司法部为该袭击背书的备忘录经过大量涂黑，可见部分并未提及刺杀禁令，但备忘录指控苏莱曼尼策划了多年来导致驻伊美军伤亡的行动。

When Nicolás Maduro and his wife walked into their apartment deep in a Caracas military base on an early January morning, they had no way of knowing that their every movement was being tracked by American intelligence. Or that the apartment, including the safe room, had been replicated in Kentucky by a Delta team that did dozens of practice runs figuring out how to immobilize the guards and breach the doors.

1月初的一个清晨，当尼古拉斯·马杜罗与妻子走进加拉加斯一处军事基地深处的公寓时，他们全然不知，自己的一举一动都在美国情报部门的监控之下。他们也无从知晓，这套公寓——包括安全屋——已被美国三角洲部队在肯塔基州复刻，该部队进行了数十次演练，只为摸清如何制服守卫、破门而入。

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei apparently ignored the evidence that the C.I.A. was tracking him and his top leaders, too, an operation that President Trump exposed in a social media post eight months ago. When the United States and Israel discovered that he and his national security team would be gathering Saturday morning, they advanced the timeline for their attack.

哈梅内伊显然也无视了中情局正在监控他与高层官员的证据，特朗普总统早在8个月前就通过社交媒体曝光了这一行动。当美国和以色列的情报部门获悉哈梅内伊与国家安全团队将于周六上午会面时，便提前了袭击计划。

Mr. Maduro is now in the federal detention center in Brooklyn. Ayatollah Khamenei’s state funeral is being planned for the coming days. And the rest of the world’s leaders are left to mull the combination of exquisite American surveillance capabilities and a president who seems to take delight in using that information to capture or kill his perceived enemies.

如今，马杜罗被关押在布鲁克林联邦拘留中心；哈梅内伊的国葬正在筹备中。世界各国领导人不得不重新审视：美国精密的情报监控能力，以及一位乐于利用这些信息来抓捕或杀死其眼中之敌的总统，二者结合会带来什么样的影响。

American intelligence agencies have long wiretapped, geolocated and monitored senior leaders, back to the earliest days of the Cold War. Fifteen years ago, WikiLeaks revelations included documents that gave glimpses of how the United States attempted to track China’s leaders and its nuclear weapons. Germany’s former chancellor, Angela Merkel, was outraged to discover that her personal cellphone was tapped by the country’s closest ally, and complained to President Barack Obama that it reminded her of growing up in East Germany.

自从冷战初期，美国情报机构就长期对外国高层进行窃听、定位与监控。15年前，维基解密披露的文件曾让外界窥见美国如何追踪中国领导人与核武器。德国前总理默克尔得知自己的私人手机被最亲密的盟友窃听时勃然大怒，并向奥巴马总统抱怨，称这让她想起了在东德长大的经历。

Today, merely tapping into a foreign leader’s conversations seems like a quaint remnant of post-Cold War spycraft.

如今，单纯窃听外国领导人的通话似乎已是后冷战时代间谍手段的古旧遗迹。

Today, the real-time ability to locate a leader is the holy grail. And the surge in the number of electronic sensors deployed on street corners and doorbell cameras and toll highways, combined with artificial intelligence techniques to quickly parse truly vital information from billions of data points those sensors generate, has transformed the art form of surveilling V.I.P. whereabouts.

当下，实时锁定领导人位置才是情报界的圣杯。遍布街角、门铃摄像头与收费公路的电子传感器数量激增，再加上人工智能技术能从这些传感器产生的数十亿数据点中快速筛选关键信息，这已彻底重塑了监控政要行踪的手段。

It has allowed intelligence agencies to track motorcades. (In Washington, presidential and vice-presidential movements are usually still announced by blaring motorcycles and familiar helicopter flight patterns, but cabinet members and the C.I.A. director move more discreetly.) Around the world, spy agencies have learned how to monitor the opening and closing of electronic doors at leadership compounds, and to locate the cellphones of bodyguards and family members who may travel with a foreign leader but are usually a lot sloppier about encrypting their messages and using burner phones.

这让情报机构得以追踪车队动向。（在华盛顿，总统与副总统的出行仍然常以轰鸣的摩托车开道和熟悉的直升机飞行来宣告，但内阁成员与中情局局长的行动则隐秘得多。）全球各地的情报部门已掌握如何监控领导人官邸电子门的开关，以及定位保镖与家属的手机——这些人常随外国领导人出行，却往往在信息加密与使用一次性手机方面要马虎得多。

“If we had had this capability with a high degree of certainty to get Saddam Hussein through a precision strike, we wouldn’t have had the Iraq war,” said Glenn Gerstell, the general counsel of the National Security Agency from 2015 through 2020, a period that included part of Mr. Trump’s first term. “The only way to get him was to have boots on the ground. But now, with heightened capabilities, we can target individual leaders.”

“若当年我们拥有如此高确定性的精准打击能力，能定位萨达姆·侯赛因，就不会爆发伊拉克战争了，”2015至2020年（涵盖特朗普首个任期部分时段）担任美国国家安全局总法律顾问的格伦·格斯特尔表示。“当年只能靠地面部队抓捕他。但如今，凭借升级的能力，我们可以精准锁定特定领导人。”

(In fact, American forces tried to take out Mr. Hussein in the opening hours of the war. But he had left the home they targeted a few hours earlier.)

（事实上，美军曾在战争爆发头几个小时试图除掉萨达姆，但他在目标住所遭袭前数小时离开。）

As Mr. Trump has shown, this targeting ability opens new options for presidents seeking to change the attitude of foreign regimes — or change their leadership.

正如特朗普所展现的，这种精准打击能力，为试图改变外国政权态度甚至更迭其领导人的美国总统，提供了全新的选项。

Mr. Trump’s decision to snatch Mr. Maduro from his bed, but keep the rest of the Venezuelan leadership in place, is an experiment in remote-control occupation. After the Delta team landed by helicopter that early January night, killed Mr. Maduro’s Cuban and Venezuelan guards, and seized him seconds before he could lock himself in that safe room, Mr. Trump blessed the installation of Vice President Delcy Rodríguez as acting president.

特朗普决定从床上抓走马杜罗却保留委内瑞拉其他领导层是一场远程遥控占领的试验。1月初的深夜，三角洲部队乘直升机着陆，击毙马杜罗的古巴与委内瑞拉守卫，在他即将闭锁安全屋的瞬间将其抓获。随后，特朗普批准副总统德尔西·罗德里格斯就任代总统。

She will stay there, he has said, as long as she follows Washington’s instructions. And clearly he is enamored of the early results. In a brief conversation with The New York Times on Sunday, on the second day of the American and Israeli attack on Iran, he cited the Venezuela experience as a model for what he was trying to accomplish in Iran.

特朗普称，只要她听从华盛顿指令，就能继续留任。显然，他对初步成果颇为满意。周日，在美以袭击伊朗的第二天，他接受《纽约时报》简短采访时，将委内瑞拉的经验称为伊朗行动的范本。

“What we did in Venezuela, I think, is the perfect, the perfect scenario,” Mr. Trump insisted. “Everybody’s kept their job except for two people.”

“我们在委内瑞拉的做法，我认为是完美、完美的范例，”特朗普坚称。“除了两个人，所有人都保住了工作。”

In the Iran case, Mr. Trump had flagged for Ayatollah Khamenei that the United States was watching his every movement — a revelation that, had it appeared first in the media, might well have triggered a Justice Department leak investigation.

在伊朗问题上，特朗普早已向哈梅内伊明示，美国正监控他的一举一动——这一爆料若先由媒体披露，很可能会引发司法部针对泄密的调查。

“We now have complete and total control of the skies over Iran,” he posted on Truth Social in June 2025, as he cut short his participation in a summit and flew back to Washington to talk about how the United States would participate in the attacks Israel had begun on the country.

2025年6月，特朗普在Truth Social平台发文：“我们已完全掌控伊朗领空。”当时，他缩短了参加一场峰会的行程，飞回华盛顿讨论美国如何参与以色列已发起的对伊袭击。

Then he added: “We know exactly where the so-called ‘Supreme Leader’ is hiding. He is an easy target, but is safe there — We are not going to take him out (kill!), at least not for now.”

他还写道：“我们精确掌握所谓‘最高领袖’的藏身之处。他是个容易打击的目标，但他目前还安全——我们不会清除（杀掉）他，目前暂时不会。”

For good measure, Mr. Trump added an all-caps demand for “UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER!”

为强化威慑，特朗普还用全大写字母要求：“无条件投降！”

It is impossible to know whether Ayatollah Khamenei was following Mr. Trump’s posts, but he certainly did not seem impressed by the warning. On Saturday, even with an American naval force deployed around Iran and fighter jets visible on satellite images massing on American and Israeli bases, Ayatollah Khamenei was in his official residence. So were national security leaders. And while the United States did not launch the missile that killed him, it was the C.I.A.’s warning, backed by indicators from other U.S. intelligence agencies, that killed him in one of the first Israeli strikes.

无人知晓哈梅内伊是否关注特朗普的发文，但他显然对此警告不以为然。周六，即便美国海军舰队部署在伊朗周边、卫星图像显示美以基地战机集结，哈梅内伊仍在官邸，国家安全高层也齐聚于此。尽管击毙他的导弹并非美军发射，但正是中情局的预警（辅以美国其他情报机构的佐证），让他在以色列的首轮袭击中身亡。

It is not clear how far the United States can push this new power — or whether it would risk using this targeting capability in the case of the leader of a country that had nuclear weapons available to retaliate.

目前尚不清楚美国能将这一新能力运用到何种程度，也不清楚当目标国拥有核武器可实施报复时，美国是否会冒险动用这种定点清除能力。

Notably, Mr. Trump is not messing with China’s Xi Jinping, or Russia’s Vladimir V. Putin or even North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, who has an arsenal of 60 or more nuclear weapons. “I’m not sure you can extrapolate this capability into a universal ability to track every leader everywhere,” said Paul Kolbe, who served as the C.I.A.’s station chief in Moscow early in Mr. Putin’s rule. “But this is why Putin is so paranoid about his location,” and moves frequently among his many houses.

值得注意的是，特朗普并没有去招惹中国国家主席习近平、俄罗斯总统普京，甚至拥有60余枚核武器的朝鲜最高领导人金正恩。“我不确定能否将这种能力推广为全球追踪所有领导人的通用手段，”普京执政初期曾任中情局莫斯科站站长的保罗·科尔比表示。“但这正是普京对其行踪如此敏感的原因”——他频繁在多处住所间转移。

“If you are the leader of an adversary nation, you should be pretty worried,” Mr. Kolbe said. “But if you are Putin or Xi, not so much, because of the stakes at play. The lesson that keeps getting taught is that if you don’t have nukes, you are far more vulnerable.”

“如果你是敌对国家领导人，理应高度警惕，”科尔比说。“但普京或习近平则不必过度担忧，因为风险代价极高。反复印证的教训是：没有核武器，你就会脆弱得多。”

The Iranians do not have nuclear weapons, which might make them hesitate before naming a new supreme leader, who would move to the top of the target list. Nonetheless Majid Takht-Ravanchi, the Iranian deputy foreign minister, said on CNN on Monday morning that the government remains in place and Ayatollah Khamenei’s replacement would soon be announced.

伊朗没有核武器，这或许会让它在提名新的最高领袖时有所犹豫——新领袖将立即成为头号打击目标。尽管如此，伊朗副外长马吉德·塔赫特-拉万奇周一上午在CNN表示，伊朗政府运转正常，哈梅内伊的继任者将很快公布。

“We have a president,” he said. “We have head of judiciary. We had the head of parliament. The supreme leader was assassinated — was murdered by Israeli and American aggression.”

“我们有总统，有司法首脑，我们曾有议会领袖，”他说。“最高领袖遭暗杀——是被美以侵略势力谋杀的。”

Now, he said, “the new leader is going to be elected. So everybody — everything is in order.”

如今，“新领袖将通过选举产生，”他还说。“所以一切——一切都井然有序。”

Last year, as President Trump swung from one erratic tariff policy to the next, Asian economies largely withstood the chaos. That resilience is now under threat as a conflict in the Middle East rapidly escalates, after Mr. Trump said that the U.S. military would continue to strike Iran for several weeks.

去年，特朗普总统反复无常地推出一项又一项关税政策时，亚洲经济体总体上经受住了动荡的冲击。但如今，随着中东冲突迅速升级，这种韧性正面临威胁。此前，特朗普表示，美军将在接下来的数周内继续对伊朗发动打击。

Concern spiked in many Asian capitals on Monday over the disruption to the flow of oil from the Middle East, a region that supplies half or more of the oil that several large economies consume.

周一，中东石油供应中断引发了许多亚洲国家政府的担忧，中东地区为数个大型经济体提供了一半甚至更多的石油供应。

In China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and India, leaders are focused on the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow shipping corridor on Iran’s southern border through which one fifth of the world’s supply of oil flows, much of it eventually landing in Asia.

在中国、日本、韩国、台湾和印度，领导人都将目光聚焦在霍尔木兹海峡——这是一条位于伊朗南部边境的狭窄航运通道，全球五分之一的石油供应经由此地运输，其中大部分最终流向亚洲。

Countries have stockpiles of oil and gas that can see them through the next weeks and months, but a longer war in the region or decision by Iran to blockade the Strait of Hormuz would pose a more serious threat to their economies.

各国都拥有可支撑未来数周乃至数月的石油和天然气储备，但如果该地区爆发一场更持久的战争，或伊朗决定封锁霍尔木兹海峡，这些国家的经济将面临更为严峻的威胁。

Experts said that Iran was unlikely to try to block the waterway because the country depends on its oil and gas exports to China for revenue. It would also be catastrophic for the global economy, economists warned.

专家表示，伊朗不太可能尝试封锁这条水道，因为该国依赖向中国出口石油和天然气获取收入。经济学家警告称，此举也将对全球经济造成灾难性后果。

Nevertheless, there was palpable concern in the oil markets, with prices spiking on Monday. Tankers avoided the area and diverted to longer routes, while the cost of insuring them began to climb and ports started to contend with backlogs.

尽管如此，石油市场仍弥漫着明显的不安情绪，周一油价飙升。油轮避开该地区，改走更长的航线；与此同时，保险成本开始上升，港口也开始面临积压压力。

The price swings and uncertainty are complicating an already delicate balance governments have struck between domestic economic challenges and geopolitical calculations.

价格的剧烈波动和不确定性使各国政府在应对国内经济挑战与地缘政治考量之间本已脆弱的平衡变得更加难以维系。

China on Monday called on “all parties to immediately cease military operations, avoid further escalation of tensions, and prevent the regional instability from exerting a greater impact on global economic development,” according to Mao Ning, a spokeswoman for China’s foreign ministry.

中国外交部发言人毛宁周一表示，中方敦促“各方立即停止军事行动，避免紧张事态进一步升级，防止地区局势动荡对全球经济发展造成更大影响”。

Oil from the Middle East is crucial to China’s overall energy security. If the conflict were to drag on, “China does not have the capacity to cushion the shock,” said Muyu Xu, a senior crude oil analyst based in Singapore for Kpler, a market research firm. “It would be catastrophic not just for China, but for the global market,” Ms. Xu said.

中东石油对中国整体能源安全至关重要。如果冲突持续，“中国没有能力缓冲这样的冲击”，总部位于新加坡的市场研究公司Kpler高级原油分析师徐牧宇表示。“这不仅对中国而言将是灾难性的，对全球市场也是如此，”她说。

北京的一个加油站。来自中东的石油对中国的整体能源安全至关重要。

Beijing is already facing an economic slowdown at home, where a property crisis weighs heavily on households that invested their savings in real estate. Excessive competition among local companies in China has set off a deflationary spiral, and youth unemployment is high. Beijing has turned to manufacturing to help fuel its economic growth and weather a fierce trade war with the United States that led to punishing U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods that at one point hit 145 percent.

北京已经面临国内经济放缓的问题，房地产危机给将积蓄投入房产的家庭带来沉重打击。中国本土企业之间的过度竞争引发了通缩螺旋，青年失业率居高不下。北京已转向依赖制造业来推动经济增长，并抵御与美国激烈的贸易战——这场贸易战导致美国对中国商品征收惩罚性关税，最高一度达到145%。

In a few weeks, China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, is expected to meet with Mr. Trump in what may now become an even more tense encounter.

再过几周，中国最高领导人习近平预计将与特朗普会晤，这场会面如今可能变得更加紧张。

China imports a little over half of its seaborne crude oil from the Middle East. Around a quarter of that comes from Iran. A loss of Iranian supply would eventually force China to purchase more oil, likely at higher prices, from other sources.

中国从中东进口的海运原油略高于其总进口量的一半，其中约四分之一来自伊朗。若伊朗供应中断，最终将迫使中国从其他来源购买更多石油，且价格很可能更高。

China has enough crude oil onshore to last 115 days, according to Kpler. It also operates three major crude pipelines, two of which transport oil from Russia and Kazakhstan and are shielded from Middle East disruptions.

根据Kpler的数据，中国陆上原油储备足以支撑115天的需求。中国还运营着三条主要原油管道，其中两条从俄罗斯和哈萨克斯坦输油，不受中东地区供应中断的影响。

The ruling Communist Party has poured billions of dollars into developing renewable energy like solar power and electric vehicles. But, in the short term, it would have to look for new supplies of oil in a prolonged crisis.

执政的共产党已投入数十亿美元发展太阳能、电动汽车等可再生能源。但在短期内，若危机长期化，中国仍需寻找新的石油供应来源。

“China can’t pivot to domestic demand fast enough to offset collapsing export margins and absorb an oil price shock simultaneously,” said Han Lin, the country director for the Asia Group, a consulting firm. “The U.S. trade war compresses the very profits Chinese industry needs to fund the green-energy transition that would reduce Middle East exposure.”

“中国无法迅速转向内需，既抵消出口利润的下滑，又同时消化油价冲击，”咨询公司亚洲集团中国区负责人林汉昇表示。“美国的贸易战压缩了中国工业需要用来为绿色能源转型融资的利润，而这场转型本可减少对中东的依赖。”

On Sunday, the Japanese shipping giant Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, one of the world’s largest transporters of fuel, announced that it was halting operations in the Persian Gulf following reports that the Iranian military was cautioning vessels to avoid the strait.

周日，全球最大的燃料运输商之一、日本航运巨头商船三井宣布，公司已暂停在波斯湾的运营。此前有报道称，伊朗军方警告船只避开该海峡。

For now, both countries have measures to offset the immediate effects.

目前，两国都有措施来抵消眼前的冲击。

Japan holds a total of 254 days of private and state-held oil reserves, according to government data. South Korea had enough in store to cover more than 210 days of consumption as of the end of last year, data from the country’s state-owned national oil and gas company indicated.

根据政府数据，日本持有的私人及国家石油储备合计可支撑254天。韩国国有石油和天然气公司数据显示，截至去年年底，韩国的储备足以满足210多天的消费需求。

“We will take every possible measure to ensure the stable supply of energy for our nation,” Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi of Japan said, speaking in Parliament on Monday.

“我们将采取一切可能的措施，确保国家能源供应的稳定，”日本首相高市早苗周一在国会表示。

In South Korea, officials began examining contingency plans, including the release of oil reserves should there be a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz, according to local media reports.

据当地媒体报道，韩国官员已开始研究应急方案，其中包括如果霍尔木兹海峡长期关闭，将释放石油储备。

But even if oil keeps flowing, a continuing surge in energy prices will probably take a significant economic toll.

但即便石油供应得以维持，能源价格持续飙升也可能对经济造成重大冲击。

Japan and South Korea already spend well over $100 billion annually on energy imports, meaning that further price increases would worsen their trade balances.

日本和韩国每年在能源进口上的支出已超过1000亿美元，这意味着价格进一步上涨将恶化它们的贸易平衡。

Japan, in particular, is also grappling with a prolonged bout of inflation that is weighing on household budgets. Any government moves to lighten the burden on consumers, such as cash handouts or tax cuts, risk exacerbating Japan’s immense sovereign debt levels and could spur further jitters in its debt markets.

尤其是日本，该国还在承受一轮持续的通胀，给家庭预算带来了沉重负担。任何减轻消费者负担的政府举措——如发放现金补贴或减税——都有可能加剧日本本已庞大的主权债务水平，并引发债市新的不安。

Nearby in Taiwan, a dependence on imported fuel has long been one of the island democracy’s most glaring vulnerabilities.

在邻近的台湾，对进口燃料的依赖长期以来一直是这个岛屿民主政体最明显的脆弱处之一。

Taiwan imports more than 96 percent of its energy, most of it from the Middle East. About 60 percent of Taiwan’s oil — and about a third of its natural gas — arrives by ship from countries via the Strait of Hormuz.

台湾96%以上的能源依赖进口，大多来自中东。约60%的石油以及约三分之一的天然气经由霍尔木兹海峡从相关国家海运而来。

Any shortage of energy supplies to Taiwan could endanger the global economy, which relies on the island’s manufacturing powerhouses for semiconductors used in smartphones, electric vehicles and artificial intelligence systems. A handful of factories in Taiwan make the vast majority of the world’s advanced computer chips, and they depend on a consistent supply of electricity.

台湾能源供应的任何短缺都可能危及全球经济，因为全球经济依赖台湾的制造巨头生产智能手机、电动汽车和人工智能系统所需的半导体。台湾少数几家工厂生产着全球绝大多数的先进芯片，而这些工厂依赖稳定的电力供应。

Saudi Arabia is Taiwan’s largest supplier of oil, and Taiwan gets a quarter of its liquefied natural gas from Qatar.

沙特阿拉伯是台湾最大的石油供应国，台湾四分之一的液化天然气来自卡塔尔。

Taiwan has enough oil in reserve to power the country for about 120 days, according to Chen Shih-Hau, a director focused on energy security at the Taiwan Institute of Economic Research, a private research group. Taiwan’s natural gas supply would last only about 11 days, Mr. Chen said.

根据私人研究机构台湾经济研究院负责能源安全事务的研究五所所长陈诗豪表示，台湾的石油储备足以支撑约120天的能源供应，而天然气供应仅能维持约11天。

台湾少数几家工厂——如台积电运营的这家工厂——生产了世界上绝大多数的先进计算机芯片。

Major tech companies like Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company have backup generators designed to keep power running during short-term emergencies, said Jheng Ruei-he, a senior analyst at Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, a government-funded think tank in Taipei. But such equipment isn’t meant to be a long term stand-in for the national power grid.

政府资助、总部位于台北的智库中华经济研究院高级分析师郑睿合表示，台积电等大型科技公司配备了应急发电机，以在短期紧急情况下维持供电，但这些设备无法长期替代国家电网。

Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs said in a statement on Monday that the country had long-term contingency plans to ensure a stable power supply.

台湾经济事务主管部门周一在一份声明中表示，台湾已制定长期应急预案，以确保电力供应稳定。

Iran’s supreme leader may be dead, but there will be another. Its slain military commanders will be replaced. A governing system created over 47 years will not easily disintegrate under air power alone. Iran retains the capacity to strike back against American and Israeli airstrikes, and the war’s trajectory is unclear.

伊朗的最高领袖或许已经身亡，但还会有继任者。被击毙的军事指挥官也将被替换。一个历经47年建立起来的治理体系不会仅因空中打击就轻易瓦解。伊朗仍然具备对美国和以色列的空袭发起反击的能力，战争走向仍不明朗。

But the Islamic Republic, already weakened and unpopular, is now further diminished, its power at home and in the region at one of its lowest ebbs since its leaders took power during the revolution that overthrew Iran’s American-backed shah in 1978-79.

但这个本已虚弱且不得人心的伊斯兰共和国如今进一步遭到削弱，其在国内和地区的影响力已降至自1978–1979年革命推翻美国支持的巴列维国王以来的一个低点。

Even if the regime does not fall, which remains the stated aim of President Trump, this massive attack is likely to have strategic consequences in the Middle East comparable to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

即使该政权并未垮台——尽管这仍是特朗普总统公开宣称的目标——此次大规模打击也很可能对中东产生堪比苏联解体的战略后果。

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader killed on Saturday morning, maintained a visceral antagonism toward Israel and the United States, which he consistently called “the Great Satan.” He built and financed a regional set of proxy militias that surrounded Israel and shared his hatred of it. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza and the West Bank, the Houthis in Yemen — all served both to attack Israeli interests and protect Iran itself.

周六早间被击毙的最高领袖哈梅内伊一直对以色列和美国怀有根深蒂固的敌意，他始终称美国为“大撒旦”。他建立并资助了一系列环绕以色列的地区代理民兵组织，这些组织同样对以色列怀有仇恨。黎巴嫩的真主党、加沙和约旦河西岸的哈马斯与伊斯兰圣战组织、也门的胡塞武装——这些军事力量既用于打击以色列的利益，也用于保护伊朗自身。

Iran built up its missile program and enriched uranium to nearly bomb grade, even as it denied ever wanting a bomb. It became a regional power so strong that Sunni leaders in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Gulf sought to keep good ties with a Shia Islamic regime that also threatened them.

伊朗不断发展导弹计划，并将铀浓缩至接近武器级水平，同时又否认寻求制造核武器。它成长为一个实力强大的地区大国，以至于沙特阿拉伯、埃及以及海湾地区的逊尼派领导人都试图与这个同样对他们构成威胁的什叶派伊斯兰政权保持良好关系。

Iran’s decline began two years ago, with Israel’s tough and sustained response to an invasion by Hamas from Gaza. It accelerated when Israel eroded Iran’s air defenses, defeated Hezbollah and profited from the Syrian revolution that overthrew Bashar al-Assad, another ally of Tehran.

伊朗的衰落始于两年前，当时以色列对哈马斯从加沙发动的袭击作出了强硬而持续的回应。随着以色列削弱伊朗的防空体系、击败真主党，并从推翻德黑兰盟友巴沙尔·阿萨德的叙利亚革命中获益，这种衰落进一步加速。

But now, with the ayatollah’s death and intense destruction from the air, Iran’s regional sway has ebbed further, with uncertain consequences that will play out over months and even years.

但现在，随着最高领袖的死亡和来自空中的大规模打击，伊朗的地区影响力进一步衰退，其不确定的后果将在未来数月乃至数年内逐渐显现。

周日，德黑兰遭遇袭击。

“The Islamic Republic as we know it will not survive this,” said Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North Africa Program at Chatham House, a London-based research group.

位于伦敦的研究机构查塔姆研究所中东和北非项目主任萨纳姆·瓦基尔说：“我们所熟知的那个伊斯兰共和国将无法在这场打击中幸存。”

“The Mideast won’t be the same again,” she said. “For 47 years the Mideast has been living with a hostile regime and a destabilizing force that it has tried to first isolate and then manage.”

她表示：“中东的面貌将彻底改变。47年来，中东一直与一个敌对政权和一个制造不稳定的力量共存，国际社会先是试图孤立它，后来又试图管控它。”

Now, she said, the regime might be dismantled and something new and different might emerge. That leadership may turn out to be even less friendly to Washington, particularly if dominated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.

她说，这个政权现在可能被拆解，可能会出现一个全新的、不同的政权。新的领导层甚至可能对华盛顿更加不友好，尤其是如果由伊斯兰革命卫队主导的话。

Whoever takes charge, Iran will be badly weakened in the medium term, more inward-looking, and focused on political competition, internal security and economic chaos, Ms. Vakil said.

瓦基尔认为，无论最终由谁掌权，在中期内伊朗都将遭到严重削弱，更加无暇他顾，并专注于政治竞争、内部安全和经济混乱上。

In the coming days, however, Iran may spread more short-term chaos as its current leadership tries to bring an end to the war while saving the regime.

不过在接下来几天里，随着伊朗的现任领导层试图在拯救政权的同时结束战争，可能会出现更多短期混乱。

Iran will try to rapidly increase the cost for Israel, the United States and its Gulf allies “to force them to back down before this succeeds in destabilizing the regime,” said Ellie Geranmayeh, deputy head of the Middle East and North Africa program at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

伊朗将试图迅速增加以色列、美国及其海湾盟友的代价，“迫使它们在成功动摇伊朗政权之前退缩，”欧洲对外关系委员会中东和北非项目副主任埃莉·格拉迈耶表示。

Increasing its attacks on Arab countries in the gulf is risky but may be Iran’s best chance to shorten the war — since it could prompt the Arab world to pressure the U.S. and Israel to end their campaign.

加强对海湾阿拉伯国家的攻击风险很大，但这可能是伊朗缩短战争的最佳机会——因为这可能促使阿拉伯国家向美国和以色列施压，要求结束军事行动。

“Iran’s aim now is to absorb U.S. and Israeli attacks, hold its position and signal expansion of war, and wait for worried regional actors to mediate a cease-fire,” said Vali Nasr, an Iran expert at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, on social media. “They expect that if Trump does not get a quick win then he will look for an exit, and negotiations afterwards will be different.”

华盛顿约翰斯·霍普金斯大学高级国际研究学院的伊朗问题专家瓦利·纳斯尔在社交媒体上表示：“伊朗现在的目标是承受美国和以色列的打击，守住阵地，同时释放战争可能扩大的信号，并等待忧心忡忡的地区国家出面调解停火。他们预期，如果特朗普不能迅速获胜，他就会寻求退出，而之后的谈判格局将会不同。”

周六，巴林一栋建筑遭伊朗无人机袭击后起火燃烧。

Iran’s proxies across the Mideast could also come to Iran’s defense, increasing the price of an extended war, according to Ali Vaez, Iran project director for the International Crisis Group, a research institution.

国际危机组织伊朗项目主任阿里·瓦埃兹表示，中东各地的伊朗代理武装也可能出面支援伊朗，从而增加战争旷日持久的代价。

“If Hezbollah fully engages from Lebanon, if militias strike U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria, or if the Houthis escalate in the Red Sea, this stops being a bilateral conflict and becomes a regionwide war stretching across the Middle East,” Mr. Vaez said. A wider war would have considerable longer-term impact on oil prices and inflation, especially if Iran can shut the Strait of Hormuz, a key international shipping route.

“如果真主党从黎巴嫩全面参战，如果民兵组织袭击美国在伊拉克和叙利亚的基地，或者胡塞武装在红海升级行动，这就将不再是双边冲突，而会演变成一场横跨中东的地区性战争，”瓦埃兹说。一场更广泛的战争将对油价和通胀产生相当大的长期影响，尤其是如果伊朗能够封锁关键的国际航运通道霍尔木兹海峡的话。

But in the longer term, an Iran that is wrapped up in its own domestic problems — trying to avoid elite fragmentation and consolidate a new leadership or even move toward a more consultative one, with less clerical influence and more power sharing — will not have the energy or the resources to meddle in the region. That could open up new opportunities for Lebanon and the Palestinians, as it has already done for the Syrians.

但从更长远来看，如果伊朗深陷自身国内问题——试图避免精英阶层分裂，巩固新的领导层，甚至走向一种有更多协商、神职人员影响减弱、更多分享权力的模式——没有精力也没有资源干预地区事务。这可能为黎巴嫩和巴勒斯坦人带来新的机遇，正如这种局面已经为叙利亚带来的变化一样。

It leaves Israel ascendant, making it even more of an ineradicable fact in the region that the Sunni nations must accommodate. A new and more moderate government could take office in Israel after elections later this year. With Iran defanged, it may feel it has the mandate to build on the cease-fire in Gaza and negotiate seriously with the Palestinians, under pressure from Washington and the Saudis.

这使以色列处于有利地位，使其在该地区愈加成为一个不可消除的现实，而逊尼派国家必须加以适应。今年晚些时候选举之后，以色列可能会产生一个更加温和的新政府。在伊朗遭到削弱后，在华盛顿和沙特的压力下，以色列可能会觉得可以放手在加沙停火基础上继续推进，与巴勒斯坦人展开认真的谈判了。

周日，以色列安全官员在检查特拉维夫一栋遭伊朗袭击损毁的建筑。

Presuming there is no revolution, a reconstituted Iranian government must still grapple with a powerful Israel and a United States it cannot trust. The current regime has made nuclear enrichment a key element in its efforts to cement regional power and deterrence. And it has refused to change course, even as that display of persistence seems to have brought it closer to destruction than any other policy, whether that be supporting terrorism abroad or massive repression at home.

假定没有革命发生，一个重新组建的伊朗政府仍然必须面对一个强大的以色列以及一个它无法信任的美国。现政权一直把核浓缩作为巩固地区实力和威慑力的关键手段。尽管与其他任何政策相比——无论是支持海外恐怖活动还是在国内实施大规模镇压，都使其更接近毁灭，伊朗仍拒绝改变路线。

It is unclear if even a more moderate government would make new concessions over its nuclear program under the pressure of war. It is also unclear if any Iranian leader would feel able to trust President Trump, who tore up President Obama’s nuclear deal in 2018, and now has bombed Iran twice in the middle of ongoing negotiations. Would Tehran deem it necessary to give in on the nuclear issue to survive? Or if a hard-line, more security-dominated government emerges, will it try to race toward a nuclear weapon, more convinced than ever of its need?

目前尚不清楚，即使在战争压力下，一个更温和的政府是否会在核计划上做出新的让步。同样也不清楚，是否会有任何伊朗领导人觉得可以信任特朗普总统——他在2018年撕毁了奥巴马总统达成的核协议，如今又在谈判仍在进行之际两次轰炸伊朗。德黑兰是否会认为，为了生存必须在核问题上让步？还是说，如果一个更强硬、更加以安全机构为主导的政府出现，它会比以往任何时候都更加确信核武器的必要性，从而试图加速研制核武器吗？

The death of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is a watershed moment in the 47-year existence of the Islamic Republic. The scenes that followed — throngs of Iranians taking to the streets to celebrate, others turning out to grieve — signal the deep uncertainty about what comes next.

伊朗最高领袖阿亚图拉阿里·哈梅内伊的死是伊斯兰共和国47年存在历史上的一个分水岭时刻。随后出现的景象——成群的伊朗人走上街头庆祝，另一些人则出来哀悼——表明人们对接下来会发生什么充满深深的不确定性。

There are now three key questions: How will protesters respond to President Trump’s call to take over the government? Can Iran’s authoritarian system survive? And could the attack unleash a chaotic battle for power?

现在有三个关键问题：抗议者将如何回应特朗普总统号召他们接管政府的呼吁？伊朗的威权体制能否存续？这次袭击是否会引发一场混乱的权力争夺战？

Mr. Trump and Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, have made public appeals to Iran’s people, arguing that they have offered them a historic opportunity to topple their brutal authoritarian government. How they envision an unarmed population facing down a heavily armed, ideologically driven security force is less clear.

特朗普和以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡已公开呼吁伊朗人民，认为他们为伊朗人提供了推翻残暴威权政府的历史性机会。但他们如何设想手无寸铁的民众对抗一支装备精良、由意识形态驱动的安全部队，目前尚不清楚。

Though it has been only two days of strikes, some regional experts are skeptical that an aerial campaign alone could weaken Iran’s government enough that Iranians could bring it down with protests.

虽然目前空袭只进行了两天，但一些地区专家怀疑，仅凭空中作战能否足够削弱伊朗政府，足以让伊朗人通过抗议将其推翻。

Nonetheless, Iran is headed toward a transformative moment, said Farzan Sabet, an analyst on Iran and Middle East politics at the Geneva Graduate Institute in Switzerland.

尽管如此，瑞士日内瓦研究生院伊朗及中东政治分析师法尔赞·萨贝特表示，伊朗正走向一个变革性的时刻。

“Some kind of change will happen in the system,” he said. “But in which direction? We don’t know.”

“体制内某种变化将会发生，”他说。“但会朝哪个方向？我们不知道。”

随着阿亚图拉阿里·哈梅内伊遇刺身亡的消息传遍德黑兰，当地民众纷纷拿起手机。

Could Iranian protesters topple their government?

伊朗抗议者能否推翻他们的政府？

In some ways, Iranians are ever more defiant after facing a brutal crackdown on nationwide antigovernment protests in January, in which security forces killed thousands. As the violent repression subsided, the risks were still high even before the bombardment began. Yet students still protested and held sit-ins, and the families of slain protesters used their memorial services to voice dissent.

从某种程度上说，在1月全国反政府抗议遭受残酷镇压后，伊朗人变得更加不屈不挠，当时安全部队杀害了数千人。随着暴力镇压逐渐平息，即使在轰炸开始前，局势风险依然很高。然而，学生们仍在抗议并举行静坐，死难者家属则利用悼念仪式表达异议。

After the authorities confirmed Ayatollah Khamenei’s death in the attack, many Iranians dared to celebrate publicly — but not to the point of risking bloodshed.

在当局确认阿亚图拉哈梅内伊在袭击中丧生后，许多伊朗人敢于公开庆祝——但尚未到冒着流血风险的地步。

Arian, a resident of a suburb near Tehran, described seeing people “honking in the streets, shouting chants from windows.” Like all people interviewed inside the country, he asked to withhold his full name for fear of retaliation.

德黑兰附近郊区居民阿里安描述说，他看到人们“在街上鸣笛，从窗户喊口号”。像所有在伊朗国内接受采访的人一样，他要求不透露全名，以免遭到报复。

On Sunday morning, Arian said, he saw people dancing and singing in the streets — until they noticed the arrival of armed members of Iran’s Basij, the volunteer militia force aligned with Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. “When the Basij showed up, everyone got scared and quickly scattered,” he said.

周日早上，阿里安说，他看到人们在街上跳舞唱歌——直到他们注意到伊朗巴斯基民兵（与革命卫队结盟的志愿民兵部队）武装成员到来。“巴斯基一出现，大家都害怕了，迅速散开，”他说。

Even under aerial bombardment, Iran’s domestic security apparatus was still making a show of force. Basij forces, estimated to be around one million strong around the country, have already been mobilized around the capital.

即使经历空中轰炸，伊朗的国内安全机构仍在展示力量。巴斯基部队在全国估计约有100万人，已在首都周边动员。

“The brutal killing of protesters in January suggests domestic unrest will be met with an iron fist,” said Ellie Geranmayeh, deputy head of the Middle East and North Africa program at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “This time under far harsher wartime conditions.”

“1月对抗议者的残酷杀戮表明，国内动乱将遭到铁拳回应，”欧洲对外关系委员会中东与北非项目副主任埃莉·杰兰马耶表示。“而这次是在远为严酷的战时条件下。”

Some airstrikes have begun to target Basij and intelligence headquarters, but experts are divided as to whether airstrikes can inflict enough damage to weaken a deeply entrenched and complex network of security forces across such a large country.

一些空袭已开始针对巴斯基和情报总部，但空袭能否对这个幅员辽阔国家中根深蒂固且错综复杂的安全网络造成足够破坏，专家们依然存在分歧。

“The problem is these are very multilayered targets,” said Abdolrasool Divsallar, an Iran expert at the Catholic University of Milan. “You hit one, but there are so many others. I am not sure how long it can be sustained, munitions wise.”

“问题是这些目标非常多层，”米兰天主教大学伊朗专家阿卜杜勒拉苏尔·迪夫萨拉尔说。“你击中一个目标，还有其他许多目标。我不确定在弹药方面能维持多久。”

周日袭击后，德黑兰上空的烟雾。

Could Iran’s current regime survive?

伊朗现政权能否存续？

Even as strikes wiped out several of Iran’s top political and military leaders, official statements went to great lengths to show the system was prepared for the shock and still functioning.

尽管袭击消灭了伊朗多名最高层政治和军事领导人，但官方声明极力显示该体制已为这一冲击做好准备，并仍在运转。

After Ayatollah Khamenei’s death, Iranian officials announced that the government would follow the constitutional framework for selecting the country’s next leader, and that a temporary leadership council would be formed.

哈梅内伊去世后，伊朗官员宣布政府将遵循宪法框架选出下一任领袖，并将成立一个临时领导委员会。

Ali Larijani, the head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council who is seen as the de facto leader behind the scenes, stressed that idea in televised comments urging unity after the ayatollah’s death.

被视为幕后实际领导人的伊朗最高国家安全委员会主席阿里·拉里贾尼在电视讲话中强调这一想法，呼吁在阿亚图拉去世后团结一致。

“Throughout history, the Iranian nation has faced even greater challenges; even the Mongols plowed through the entire country, yet the people stood firm and defended their land,” he said. “Such martyrdoms make people resistant and steadfast.”

“纵观历史，伊朗民族曾面临更大挑战；即使被蒙古人横扫，人民仍屹立不倒，保卫家园，”他说。“这种殉道只会让人民更加坚韧不拔。”

But the system could undergo a transformation from within. Mr. Larijani, seen as a pragmatist, is the type of figure observers say could potentially strike a deal with Washington now that Iran’s more ideologically driven supreme leader is gone.

但体制可能从内部发生转变。据观察人士称，在伊朗更重意识形态的最高领袖去世后，被视为务实派的拉里贾尼这类人物可能与华盛顿达成某种协议。

Some ordinary Iranians said that such a deal, if accompanied by an easing of international sanctions on Iran, may be palatable to many residents who have suffered through so many months of instability and a collapsing economy.

一些普通伊朗人表示，如果此类协议伴随国际对伊朗制裁的缓解，对许多饱受数月动荡和经济崩溃之苦的民众来说，或许是可以接受的。

“Most people aren’t chasing deep meaning,” said Payman, 45, a businessman in Tehran. “They just want a normal life: family, work, small goals. If that becomes possible, a lot of people might stop pushing for bigger change.”

“大多数人并不追求深刻意义，”德黑兰45岁的商人帕曼说。“他们只想要正常生活：家庭、工作、小目标。如果这些可以实现，许多人可能停止推动更大的变革。”

But there is also the possibility Iran’s new leaders would turn the state in the opposite direction — making it even more radical. “The risk is that the more hard-line figures emerge,” Mr. Divsallar said.

但伊朗新领导人也有可能将国家推向相反方向——变得更加激进。“风险在于更强硬的人物浮现，”迪夫萨拉尔说。

The fact that the leadership change was brought about by American and Israeli attacks increases that possibility, he said. “That works completely against what people wished for,” he said.

领导层更迭是由美国和以色列袭击造成的，这一事实增加了这种可能性，他说。“这完全违背了人们的期望。”

Could Iran descend into chaos?

伊朗是否会陷入混乱？

周日，德黑兰，一名手持哈梅内伊照片的女子。

Beyond toppling or transforming Iran’s current system is the possibility that the war unleashes chaos in a country of 90 million people that borders seven countries.

除了推翻或改造伊朗现体制之外，还有一种可能性：战争在这个有9000万人口、与七国接壤的国家引发混乱。

There are many potential opponents who could use violence to challenge a weakened state. Some ethnic minorities, like the Kurds and the Baluchis, already have armed opposition groups.

有许多潜在反对派可能利用暴力挑战虚弱的国家政权。有些少数民族，如库尔德人和俾路支人，已经拥有武装反对团体。

Mustafa Hijri, the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iran, said that his organization was part of an alliance of groups from Iran’s ethnic minorities, and that among them were parties that “when necessary, may engage in armed resistance as part of their struggle.”

伊朗库尔德民主党领导人穆斯塔法·希吉里表示，他的组织是伊朗少数民族团体联盟的一部分，其中一些党派“在必要时，可能以武装抵抗作为斗争的一部分”。

Officials from two Kurdish groups in exile, who asked not to be identified, said they were planning on trying to restart operations inside the country, aiming to encourage an uprising in Iran’s Kurdish region.

两名要求不具名的流亡库尔德团体官员表示，他们计划尝试在国内重启行动，旨在鼓励伊朗的库尔德地区起义。

Even before the war started, many Iranians were bemoaning the increasingly polarized state of the country in the wake of the brutal crackdowns on the protests.

甚至在战争开始前，许多伊朗人已在哀叹国家在残酷镇压抗议后日益极化的状态。

The government retains an ideological and religious support base that, in the current war, would be highly motivated to fight back against perceived threats. That raises the possibility of internal fragmentation and violence that spills beyond Iran’s borders.

政府仍然得到意识形态和宗教群体的支持，在当前战争中，该群体将奋力反抗他们眼中的威胁。这增加了内部碎片化和暴力外溢的可能性，甚至超出伊朗边界。

On Sunday, Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi, an influential cleric in Iran, called for jihad against Israel and the United States, according to remarks published in the semiofficial Mehr news agency.

周日，据半官方的梅尔通讯社发布的言论，在伊朗很有影响力的阿亚图拉纳赛尔·马卡雷姆·设拉子呼吁对以色列和美国发动圣战。

All of these factors create a growing risk of a dangerous insurgency should the state collapse, similar to the insurgency that broke out in Iraq after U.S. forces invaded it in 2003, said Ms. Geranmayeh, the analyst.

分析师杰兰马耶表示，所有这些因素都增加了国家崩溃时爆发危险叛乱的风险，类似于2003年美军入侵伊拉克后爆发的叛乱。

“This is a holy war for them — and they seem willing to burn down the country and region before surrendering,” she said. “If this air campaign succeeds in toppling Iran’s leadership, years of chaos probably lie ahead for the country and its people.”

“对他们来说，这是圣战——他们似乎宁愿将国家和整个地区付之一炬也不肯投降，”她说。“如果这次空中作战成功推翻伊朗领导层，该国及其人民可能面临数年的混乱。”

Oil prices rose 10 percent as markets opened on Sunday evening, underscoring the economic risks of the widening conflict in the Middle East.

周日晚间市场开盘，油价暴涨10%，凸显出中东冲突扩大带来的经济风险。

The U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran could severely restrict supplies from a key oil and gas-producing region. Even if the disruption is brief, it will almost certainly make energy more expensive worldwide. The magnitude of those price increases and how long they last will depend on what the United States and Israel do next — and how Iran responds.

美以对伊朗发动的打击可能严重限制这一重要油气产区的供应。即便中断时间短暂，也几乎必然推高全球能源价格。涨幅大小与持续时长将取决于美以下一步行动以及伊朗如何回应。

International oil prices had already climbed about 20 percent this year, nearing $73 a barrel on Friday. On Sunday, they crossed $80 a barrel.

今年以来，国际油价已累计上涨约20%，周五一度接近每桶73美元。周日，油价直接突破每桶80美元。

The longer that the war disrupts the energy trade, the bigger the risk that consumers will face higher prices, not just at the gas pump but in a broad array of products, at a time when many people are already worried about the economy. That could cause domestic political blowback for President Trump, whose approval ratings have tumbled in part because many Americans are concerned about inflation.

战争对能源贸易的干扰持续越久，消费者面临的涨价风险就越大——不仅体现在加油站，还会传导到大量商品。而当前许多民众本就对经济感到担忧。这可能给特朗普总统带来国内政治上的不利，他的支持率近期下滑，部分原因正是不少美国人对通胀的担忧。

By Sunday, the flow of tankers carrying energy products through the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway off Iran’s southern coast, had slowed to a trickle. About one-fifth of the world’s oil and a significant amount of natural gas usually pass through the choke point daily.

截至周日，途经伊朗南部沿海狭窄水道霍尔木兹海峡的能源运输已近乎停滞。全球约五分之一的石油和大量天然气，日常都要经过这一咽喉要道。

But in a crucial sign for oil markets, no major energy assets in the region appeared to have been struck as of late Sunday in Iran.

但对石油市场而言，一个关键信号是：截至周日晚间，伊朗境内的主要能源设施暂未遭到袭击。

“The biggest question is what, if any, oil installations get damaged,” said Amy Myers Jaffe, director of the Energy, Climate Justice and Sustainability Lab at New York University. “If the answer to that is none, my opinion is the price of oil will come back down.”

“最大的问题是，石油设施如果受损，受损的是哪些，”纽约大学能源、气候正义与可持续发展实验室主任埃米·迈尔斯·贾菲表示，“如果答案是没有设施受损，那么我认为油价会回落。”

The United States may be the world’s largest producer of oil and natural gas, but that does not fully insulate it from market shocks since those commodities are traded globally.

美国虽是全球最大油气生产国，但也无法完全免受市场冲击，因为这些大宗商品是全球范围交易的。

This is the second time in two months that the United States has taken military action in an oil-rich country. Prices barely moved in January after American forces captured Nicolás Maduro, the president of Venezuela, partly because that country accounts for less than 1 percent of the world’s oil supply.

这是两个月内美国第二次对石油资源丰富的国家采取军事行动。1月美军抓捕委内瑞拉总统马杜罗后，油价几乎没有波动，部分原因是该国石油供应量占全球不到1%。

Not only does Iran produce more oil, but so do its neighbors, and the country sits at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, a vital oil and natural gas trading route.

伊朗不仅自身石油产量更高，其周边邻国亦是产油大国，且伊朗扼守波斯湾入海口，这是油气贸易的关键通道。

Until this point, one of the main concerns in the global market had been that the world was producing a lot more oil than it needed. That oversupply is likely to blunt any increase in prices, at least for a while. Indeed, on Sunday, a group of oil producers known as OPEC Plus said they planed to increase output modestly in April.

到目前为止，全球市场的主要担忧之一是世界石油产量远大于需求量。这种供应过剩至少在短期内可能抑制油价上涨。事实上，周日，名为欧佩克+的产油国集团已表示，计划在4月小幅提高产量。

“Americans will see some impact at the gasoline pump,” said Jason Bordoff, the founding director of the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University. “But even with a massive strike on Iran that killed the leader of the country, at this point we’re still talking about oil prices that are well within historical norms — and much less than one would have ever expected with a strike of this magnitude.”

“美国人会在加油站感受到一些影响，”哥伦比亚大学全球能源政策中心创始主任贾森·博多夫表示，“但即便对伊朗发动大规模袭击并导致其领导人死亡，目前来看，油价仍处在历史正常区间——远低于如此规模打击本可能引发的涨幅。”

Higher prices for oil traded on commodity futures markets will not immediately lead to a big increase in prices at gas pumps in the United States. But fuel prices tend to respond relatively quickly, within a matter of days or weeks.

大宗商品期货市场上的油价上涨不会立刻导致美国加油站油价大幅飙升，但燃油价格通常会在数天至数周内做出相对较快的反应。

The pace “will really depend on how severe the supply constraint reveals itself to be,” said Ken Medlock, an energy fellow at Rice University’s Baker Institute.

莱斯大学贝克研究所能源研究员肯·梅德洛克表示，上涨速度“实际上将取决于供应受限的严重程度”。

In the week after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, oil prices climbed around 20 percent. But the average price of a gallon of regular gasoline only rose about 3 percent in that time, according to AAA motor club data. It was not until the following week that drivers started to see significantly higher gasoline prices. U.S. gasoline prices eventually hit a record above $5 a gallon several months later, in June.

2022年2月俄罗斯入侵乌克兰后的一周内，油价上涨约20%。但据美国汽车协会AAA的数据，同期普通汽油每加仑均价仅上涨约3%。直到第二周，驾车者才开始看到油价明显走高。数月后的6月，美国汽油价格最终突破每加仑五美元，创下历史纪录。

As a general rule of thumb, for every $10 a barrel increase in the cost of oil, the price of gasoline that consumers see at their local stations might rise 20 to 30 cents a gallon, said Ms. Jaffe of N.Y.U. Gasoline cost an average of $2.98 a gallon in the United States on Sunday, according to AAA.

纽约大学的贾菲表示，根据一般经验，每桶油价上涨10美元，加油站汽油每加仑可能上涨20至30美分。AAA数据显示，周日美国汽油均价为每加仑2.98美元。

The Russian invasion of Ukraine also drove up the price of natural gas, a key fuel for the power sector and heavy industry. That contributed to increases in the prices of electricity in Europe, the United States and elsewhere. A lot of liquefied natural gas is shipped through the waters around Iran and a sustained disruption of those flows could, over time, also hurt the global economy.

俄罗斯入侵乌克兰还推高了天然气价格——天然气是电力和重工业的关键燃料，这也推高了欧洲、美国等地的电价。大量液化天然气要经由伊朗周边海域运输，长期来看，相关运输若长时间中断，也会冲击全球经济。

On Sunday, attention remained on the Strait of Hormuz, where videos verified by The New York Times showed a tanker ablaze while anchored near Oman. Another vessel was also reportedly struck in the area, and a separate projectile was said to have exploded near a third ship.

周日，各方目光仍聚焦霍尔木兹海峡。经《纽约时报》核实的视频显示，一艘油轮在阿曼附近锚泊时起火。据报道，另一艘船在该区域遇袭，另有一枚弹体在第三艘船只附近爆炸。

In other conflicts, naval vessels have escorted commercial ships that have come under threat, though a Department of Defense spokesman said the United States had no such plans for the Persian Gulf.

在以往冲突中，海军舰艇会为受威胁的商船护航，但美国国防部一名发言人表示，美方目前暂无在波斯湾采取此类行动的计划。

As of Sunday afternoon in Iran, just six tankers used to carry energy products had traveled through the strait, down from 65 on Friday, according to S&P Global Energy’s Commodities at Sea.

标普全球大宗商品航运数据显示，截至伊朗当地时间周日下午，仅有六艘能源运输船只通过霍尔木兹海峡，而周五这一数字为65艘。

The Trump administration has delayed announcing a package of arms sales to Taiwan valued at billions of dollars to avoid upsetting Xi Jinping, China’s leader, ahead of President Trump’s planned trip to Beijing in April, U.S. officials said.

美国官员透露，特朗普政府推迟宣布一项价值数十亿美元的对台军售计划，目的是避免在特朗普计划中的4月访问北京之前激怒中国领导人习近平。

The weapons sale, which includes air-defense missiles, is in an advanced stage. Senior Republican and Democratic lawmakers approved the package after the State Department sent it to them in January for informal review.

这项军售计划已进入后期阶段，内容包括防空导弹。美国国务院于1月将其送交国会进行非正式审查后，共和党与民主党的高层议员均已批准。

However, since then, the sales package has languished in the State Department, the officials said. Administration officials have told some involved in the approval of the sale that the White House ordered agencies not to move forward to ensure that Mr. Trump has a successful summit with Mr. Xi, one official said.

然而官员表示，自那时起，该销售方案便在国务院搁置。一名官员称，政府官员已告知部分参与审批的人员，白宫下令各机构不得推进，以确保特朗普与习近平的峰会取得成功。

Another official said the package has a total value of about $13 billion, compared with the $11 billion sale that the Trump administration announced in December. The U.S. officials spoke to The New York Times on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive diplomatic and security matters.

另一位官员指出，该方案总价值约130亿美元，超过了特朗普政府去年12月宣布的110亿美元军售。由于涉及敏感的外交与安全事务，这些美国官员在接受《纽约时报》采访时要求匿名。

The State Department said it does not comment on pending arms sales. “This administration has been very clear that the enduring U.S. commitment to Taiwan continues, as it has for over four decades,” it said in a statement.

国务院对此表示不评论待定的军售，但在声明中称：“本届政府已明确表示，美国对台湾的长期承诺将一如既往地持续，正如过去四十多年来所做的那样。”

The White House referred questions to the State Department.

白宫建议向国务院询问该问题。

The topic of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan came up in a Feb. 4 call between Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi, according to a summary of the conversation from Chinese state news organizations.

根据中国官方媒体发布的通话简报，美对台军售话题出现在2月4日特朗普与习近平的通话中。

“The U.S. must handle arms sales to Taiwan with extreme caution,” Mr. Xi told Mr. Trump, according to the summary. Mr. Xi also warned Mr. Trump that the U.S. position on Taiwan was “the most important issue in China-U.S. relations” and that China “will never allow Taiwan to be separated from China.”

习近平告诉特朗普：“美方务必慎重处理对台军售问题。”他还警告称，台湾问题是“中美关系中最重要的问题”，中国“永远不可能让台湾分裂出去”。

In a social media post that day, Mr. Trump listed the issue of Taiwan among more than a half-dozen topics, and said the call was “all very positive.” The two leaders have been planning to meet in Beijing this spring, which would be the first time since they talked in person last October in Busan, South Korea. They agreed in Busan to a yearlong truce in a trade war that Mr. Trump had started. The thorny subject of Taiwan, a democratic island with de facto independence that is claimed by China, did not come up.

特朗普当天在社交媒体上发文，列出了该次通话中涵盖的多个话题，台湾问题也在其中，他称此次通话“非常积极”。两位领导人计划于今年春天在北京会面，这将是继去年10月两人在韩国釜山会晤后的首次面对面接触。当时他们在釜山达成协议，对特朗普发起的贸易战实施为期一年的休战，而棘手的台湾问题——中国宣称对这个具有事实独立地位的民主岛屿拥有主权——并未被提及。

On Feb. 16, Mr. Trump told reporters that he was considering what to do about arms sales to Taiwan, given that Mr. Xi opposes them.

2月16日，特朗普告诉记者，鉴于习近平的反对，他正在考虑如何处理对台军售。

“I’m talking to him about it,” he said aboard Air Force One.

他在空军一号上说：“我正在和他讨论这个问题。”

Mr. Trump did not clarify what he meant by that. Some experts on U.S.-China policy said Mr. Trump could be violating a diplomatic agreement called the Six Assurances, a pillar of U.S.-Taiwan and U.S.-China policies. Those assurances were sent by the Reagan administration to Taiwan’s president in 1982, and one is generally understood to say that the U.S. government would not consult with China before an arms sale to Taiwan.

特朗普并未阐明此话具体所指。一些中美政策专家表示，特朗普此举可能违反了被称为“六项保证”的外交协议——这是美台及美中政策的支柱。这些保证由里根政府于1982年向台湾发出，其中一项普遍被理解为：美国政府在对台军售前不会征询中国意见。

The proposed package includes interceptor missiles for Patriot air-defense launchers, anti-drone equipment and NASAMS, another missile-based air-defense system, an official said. There are also small arms and maintenance and sustainment items.

官员表示，拟议的方案包括爱国者防空系统拦截导弹、反无人机设备，以及另一种基于导弹的防空系统NASAMS，此外还包括轻型武器及维修保养配件。

The Financial Times first reported on the compiling of an arms package, and The Wall Street Journal later reported on hesitation among U.S. officials to move forward with it.

《金融时报》最早报道了该军售方案的配置情况，《华尔街日报》随后报道了美国官员对推进该方案的犹豫。

The fact that the Trump administration has halted the package at an advanced stage of the process, after informal approval from Congress, has not been previously reported.

特朗普政府在方案获得国会非正式批准后，于推进过程的后期阶段叫停了该计划，这是此前未曾报道的消息。

In general, the State Department sends proposed arms packages to a Senate committee and a House committee to be reviewed by the top lawmakers from both parties on those panels. If the lawmakers grant informal approval, then the department generally announces the sale publicly soon afterward and sends the package to Congress for pro forma official approval.

通常，国务院将拟议的军售方案送交参众两院委员会，由两党在委员会中的高层议员审议。若议员们给予非正式批准，国务院通常会很快公开宣布销售，并将方案送交国会进行形式上的正式批准。

The informal approval stage is significant. For example, Democratic congressional officials have spent weeks or months scrutinizing arms sales to Israel in recent years, as criticism has grown of the Israeli military’s killing of civilians in Gaza during a retaliation campaign against Hamas for its October 2023 attacks. The Trump administration has bypassed Congress three times to expedite arms shipments to Israel.

非正式审批阶段至关重要。例如，随着以色列军队在针对哈马斯2023年10月袭击的报复行动中杀害加沙平民引发的批评声浪高涨，民主党议员近年来花费数周或数月审查对以色列军售。而特朗普政府曾三次绕过国会，加快向以色列运送武器。

U.S. arms support for Taiwan has strong bipartisan support in Congress, and the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act obligates administrations to sell weapons of a defensive nature to the island. Lawmakers often quickly give approval to such packages.

美国对台军援在国会拥有强大的跨党派支持，且1979年的《台湾关系法》要求历届政府向该岛出售防御性武器。议员们通常会迅速批准此类方案。

Although senior U.S. officials pushed in the first Trump administration to bolster ties to the island, Mr. Trump has been dismissive of Taiwan in private, according to a memoir by John R. Bolton, a national security adviser in the first term.

尽管特朗普第一任期的高级官员曾推动加强美台关系，但据第一任期内的国家安全顾问约翰·博尔顿的回忆录，特朗普在私下里对台湾表现得不屑一顾。

By contrast, Mr. Trump has consistently expressed admiration for Mr. Xi, whom he calls a “very good friend,” even as he views China as a formidable trade rival. At the urging of U.S. businesses, he recently eased restrictions on the export of advanced semiconductor chips to China.

相比之下，特朗普一直在表达对习近平的钦佩，称其为“非常好的朋友”，尽管他仍将中国视为强大的贸易对手。在美企的敦促下，他最近还放宽了对华出口先进半导体芯片的限制。

Iran struck a base housing American troops in Kuwait, killing three U.S. service members, military officials said on Sunday, as the stakes for the United States became immediately clear in its latest war in the Middle East.

美国军方官员周日表示，伊朗袭击了科威特境内的一处美军基地，造成三名美军士兵死亡，美国在中东最新战争中的风险由此立即显现。

The fatalities were the first for the United States since the U.S. and Israeli militaries jointly began attacks in Iran on Saturday. The U.S. military’s Central Command said that five service members were “seriously wounded” and several others “sustained minor shrapnel injuries and concussions” in the attack.

这是自美国与以色列军方周六联合对伊朗发动袭击以来，美方首次出现人员阵亡。美国中央司令部称，袭击中另有五名军人“受重伤”，数人“遭受轻微弹片伤和脑震荡”。

The Iranian strikes in Kuwait, at Camp Arifjan, destroyed major portions of an army unit that manages housing for troops in the country, military officials said.

军方官员表示，伊朗袭击了科威特的阿里夫坚军营，摧毁了一支负责管理驻科部队住宿事务的陆军单位的大部分设施。

Iranian retaliatory strikes also killed at least nine people in Israel, and four people in other countries in the region. In Iran, the U.S.-Israeli strikes have killed at least 133 civilians and wounded 200 others, according to HRANA, the media agency of an Iranian rights group based in Washington.

伊朗的报复性袭击还造成以色列至少九人死亡，并在该地区其他国家造成四人死亡。总部位于华盛顿的伊朗人权组织媒体机构HRANA称，美以袭击已造成伊朗至少133名平民死亡、200人受伤。

For the United States, the grim American toll in the first two days of the war signaled that Iran was more prepared for war than the Trump administration anticipated, U.S. military officials said. Iran has put up a fight, even after its supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and other top officials were killed in Israeli attacks with intelligence help from the C.I.A.

美军官员称，开战两天美方就出现严重伤亡，表明伊朗对战争的准备超出了特朗普政府的预期。即便在最高领袖哈梅内伊及其他高级官员在以色列借助中情局情报发动的袭击中身亡，伊朗仍在顽强抵抗。

美国第五舰队位于巴林首都麦纳麦的海军基地，摄于遭受伊朗报复性打击后。

In the weeks before the war, the United States had assembled its largest military buildup since the Iraq War began in 2003. Since early Saturday, U.S. attack planes launched from bases around the Middle East and from at least one aircraft carrier have carried out hundreds of strikes in Iran.

开战前数周，美国已完成2003年伊拉克战争以来最大规模的军事集结。自周六凌晨起，美军战机从中东各地基地及至少一艘航母起飞，对伊朗发动了数百次打击。

The supreme leader “was unable to avoid our Intelligence and Highly Sophisticated Tracking Systems and, working closely with Israel, there was not a thing he, or the other leaders that have been killed along with him, could do,” Mr. Trump boasted on social media on Saturday.

特朗普周六在社交媒体上自夸：“最高领袖无法躲过我们的情报与高度精密追踪系统。在与以色列密切配合下，他和一同被击毙的其他领导人毫无还手之力。”

The Israeli military said on Sunday its airstrikes had destroyed about 200 ballistic missile launchers and rendered dozens more inoperable over the past two days, taking out roughly half of Iran’s launcher arsenal.

以色列军方周日称，过去两天以军空袭摧毁了约200个弹道导弹发射装置，使另外数十个装置失去作战能力，伊朗导弹发射装备约半数被摧毁。

The strikes have also targeted Iran’s central explosives manufacturing facility, which supplies materials for missile warheads and other weapons programs, including rockets, U.A.V.s, and cruise missiles.

袭击目标还包括伊朗的核心炸药制造设施，该设施为导弹弹头及其他武器项目（包括火箭、无人机、巡航导弹）提供材料。

On Sunday, the United States continued a wave of strikes, particularly targeting Iran’s ballistic missile program and the Iranian Navy, a Central Command official said.

美国中央司令部一名官员表示，周日美方继续发动多轮打击，重点针对伊朗弹道导弹项目与伊朗海军。

Air Force B-2 stealth bombers, armed with 2,000-pound bombs, struck Iran’s “hardened” ballistic missile facilities, Central Command said in a statement on Sunday. “No nation should ever doubt America’s resolve.”

中央司令部周日在声明中称，空军B‑2隐形轰炸机携带2000磅（约907公斤）炸弹，打击了伊朗的“加固型”弹道导弹设施。“任何国家都不应怀疑美国的决心。”

Central Command said that so far U.S. strikes have hit the Joint Headquarters of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, its Aerospace Forces Headquarters, Iranian air defense systems, ballistic missile sites, submarines and anti-ship missile sites.

中央司令部称，截至目前，美军打击目标包括伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队联合指挥部、其空军总部、伊朗防空系统、弹道导弹基地、潜艇及反舰导弹基地。

In another statement, Central Command said that U.S. forces struck an Iranian warship during the start of the joint American and Israeli attacks on Iran on Saturday. “The ship is currently sinking to the bottom of the Gulf of Oman,” Central Command said on social media. “As the President said, members of Iran’s armed forces, IRGC and police ‘must lay down your weapons.’ Abandon ship.”

中央司令部在另一份声明中表示，周六美以联合对伊发动袭击之初，美军击中一艘伊朗军舰。“该舰目前正沉入阿曼湾海底，”中央司令部在社交媒体上说。“正如总统所言，伊朗武装部队、革命卫队和警察成员‘必须放下武器’，弃船逃生。”

But Iran’s armed forces showed no immediate signs of giving up. Since the U.S. and Israeli military strikes began, Iran has launched hundreds of retaliatory missiles at a wide range of American and Israeli targets in the region. It has also launched strikes at Arab countries it considers allies of the United States, including Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait.

但伊朗武装部队暂无投降迹象。自美以军事打击开始以来，伊朗向该地区范围内大量美军及以色列目标发射数百枚报复性导弹，同时还袭击了卡塔尔、阿联酋、约旦、巴林、阿曼、科威特等被其视为美国盟友的阿拉伯国家。

周六空袭后，多哈一处驻有卡塔尔皇家空军和外国部队的区域。

In the past, Iran has given warning before launching retaliatory strikes and made known which bases housing U.S. troops it intended to hit. This time, the strikes have been widespread. More than 549 drones, 165 ballistic missiles and two Iranian cruise missiles targeted the United Arab Emirates, the Emirati defense ministry said on Sunday. Most were intercepted but 21 drones struck civilian targets, the ministry said.

以往伊朗发动报复袭击前通常会提前预警，并明确告知将袭击哪些驻有美军的基地。但这一次，袭击范围广泛。阿联酋国防部周日称，伊朗向阿联酋发射了超过549架无人机、165枚弹道导弹及二枚巡航导弹，大部分被拦截，但有21架无人机击中民用目标。

U.S. military officials warned on Sunday that the military has been burning through Tomahawk missiles and other munitions.

美军官员周日警告，军方战斧导弹及其他弹药消耗巨大。

Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., a former leader of Central Command, said it would probably become clear in the next 48 to 72 hours whether Iran could maintain its heavy barrage of retaliatory missile strikes as the U.S. and Israeli militaries targeted Iran’s arsenal.

前美国中央司令部司令小肯尼思·麦肯齐上将表示，随着美以军方锁定伊朗武器库，未来48至72小时内将可判断伊朗能否维持密集的报复性导弹袭击。

“It’s a race,” General McKenzie said in an interview.

“这是一场赛跑，”麦肯齐在接受采访时说。

Not all U.S. missile strikes may have hit their intended military targets.

并非所有美军导弹打击都命中了预定军事目标。

The Pentagon said on Saturday it was investigating reports of Iranian civilian deaths caused by military strikes inside the country. More than 100 people, probably most of them children, were killed in a strike that hit a girls’ elementary school in southern Iran, according to Iranian health officials and state media.

五角大楼周六表示，正在调查有关军事打击在伊朗境内造成平民伤亡的报道。伊朗卫生官员及官方媒体称，伊朗南部一所女子小学遭袭，超过100人死亡，其中大部分可能是儿童。

“We are aware of reports concerning civilian harm resulting from ongoing military operations,” said Capt. Tim Hawkins, a spokesman for Central Command. “We take these reports seriously and are looking into them. The protection of civilians is of utmost importance, and we will continue to take all precautions available to minimize the risk of unintended harm. Unlike Iran, we have never — and will never — target civilians.”

“我们注意到有关军事行动造成平民伤亡的报道，”中央司令部发言人蒂姆·霍金斯上尉表示。“我们严肃对待这些报道并正在调查。保护平民至关重要，我们将继续采取一切可行措施，最大限度降低意外伤害风险。与伊朗不同，我们从未、也永远不会以平民为攻击目标。”

Mr. Trump said in a Truth Social post on Saturday that “heavy and pinpoint bombing” would continue “uninterrupted throughout the week or, as long as necessary to achieve our objective of PEACE THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND, INDEED, THE WORLD!”

特朗普周六在Truth Social平台发文称，“重型精准轰炸”将会“整周不间断进行，可能持续到实现我们的中东乃至世界和平的目标”。

A U.S. military official confirmed that U.S. strikes would “continue” but did not say for how long.

一名美军官员证实，美军打击将“继续”，但未说明持续多久。

Daniel Byman, a professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, said the United States would find it difficult to sustain large-scale operations at a rapid pace.

乔治城大学外交学院教授丹尼尔·拜曼表示，美国将难以维持如此高强度、大规模的军事行动。

Despite the size of the U.S. buildup, it is still small compared with the forces assembled for the 2003 invasion of Iraq and appeared more appropriate for a multiday bombing campaign than a long war, he said.

他说，尽管美军集结规模可观，但与2003年入侵伊拉克部署的兵力相比仍然偏小，当前部署更适合为期数天的轰炸行动，而非长期战争。

“The rapid pace of operations requires large numbers of missiles and air assets,” said Mr. Byman, who is also the director of the warfare, irregular threats, and terrorism program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Although the United States has deployed a large force to the region, this rapid pace will place a strain on the platforms and the operators.”

“作战行动的快速推进需要大量导弹与空中力量支撑，”同时担任战略与国际研究中心战争、非常规威胁与恐怖主义项目主任的拜曼说。“尽管美国已向该地区部署大规模兵力，但如此快的节奏仍会对作战平台与操作人员造成巨大压力。”

And it is not at all clear who will control Iran in the coming days.

而且，未来几天谁来掌控伊朗，目前完全不清楚。

“The regime still might be able to stay in power, even if the United States and Israel inflict significant damage on the regime’s leadership and military forces,” Mr. Byman said.

“即便美国和以色列对伊朗政权领导层与军事力量造成重创，该政权仍有可能维持权力，”拜曼说。

When he first ran for president in 2016, Donald J. Trump disavowed the military adventurism of recent years, declaring that “regime change is a proven, absolute failure.” He promised to “stop racing to topple foreign regimes.”

在2016年首次竞选总统时，唐纳德·特朗普曾与近年来的军事冒险主义划清界限，宣称“政权更迭已被证明是彻底的失败”。他承诺要“停止竞相推翻外国政权”。

When Mr. Trump ran for president in 2024, he boasted of starting “no new wars,” and asserted that if Kamala Harris won, “she would get us into a World War III guaranteed,” and send the “sons and daughters” of Americans “to go fight for a war in a country that you’ve never heard of.”

2024年再次竞选总统时，特朗普夸耀自己“没有发动任何新的战争”，并断言如果贺锦丽(Kamala Harris)当选，“她肯定会把我们拖入第三次世界大战”，并把美国的“儿子和女儿”送到“一个你们从未听说过的国家去打仗”。

Barely a year later, Mr. Trump is racing to topple foreign regimes, and is sending American sons and daughters to wage another war in the Middle East. The self-declared “president of PEACE” has chosen to become the president of war after all, unleashing the full power of the U.S. military on Iran with the explicit goal of toppling its government.

仅仅一年之后，特朗普就开始竞相推翻外国政权，并将美国的儿女送往中东发起另一场战争。这位自诩为“和平总统”的人最终选择成为战争总统，动用美国全部军事力量打击伊朗，明确目标就是推翻其政府。

What the Donald Trump of 2016 would think of the Donald Trump of 2026 will never be known. But they are starkly different figures when it comes to overseas intervention. A decade after propelling himself to the highest office by promising to focus on “America first,” Mr. Trump has become increasingly willing to assert power overseas. The bombardment of Iran on Saturday was the eighth time he had ordered the military into action in his second term, even as he has decapitated the government of Venezuela and threatened to overthrow Cuba’s dictator.

2016年的特朗普会如何看待2026年的特朗普，我们无从知晓。但在海外干预问题上，他们形成了鲜明对比。十年前，特朗普正是凭借“美国优先”的承诺登上最高权力宝座；如今他却越来越愿意在海外施展武力。周六对伊朗的轰炸是他在第二个任期内第八次下令动用军队行动；此外他还推翻了委内瑞拉政府，并威胁要推翻古巴的独裁者。

In his middle-of-the-night social media video announcing the opening of this new war, Mr. Trump laid out a bill of particulars against Iran going back nearly half a century, including its pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, its support for terrorist groups that attacked Americans and allies, the 1979 seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the recent massacre of Iranian protesters. But he never explained why those aggressions required action now rather than earlier, or why his thinking evidently changed.

在一段午夜时分发布、宣布开启新战争的社交媒体视频中，特朗普列举了近半个世纪以来针对伊朗的一系列指控，包括发展核武器和弹道导弹、支持袭击美国及其盟友的恐怖组织、1979年占领美国驻德黑兰大使馆，以及最近对伊朗抗议者的屠杀。但他始终没有解释为何现在而非更早采取行动，也没有说明他的想法为何发生了明显转变。

Nor did he reconcile his conflicting statements on the status of the Iranian threat. After joining Israel in attacking Iran last summer, he said that he had “obliterated” the country’s nuclear program. He repeated that claim in last Tuesday’s State of the Union address, and again in his early Saturday morning video. But he did not clarify why it was necessary to strike a program that had already been obliterated.

他也没有对自己关于伊朗威胁问题前后矛盾的言论做出解释。去年夏天与以色列一起攻击伊朗后，他宣称已经“彻底摧毁”了伊朗的核项目。他在上周二的国情咨文中重复了这一说法，又在周六清晨的视频中再次强调。但他并未解释，为何有必要去打击一个已经被“彻底摧毁”的项目。

He did, however, go further than ever in making regime change the goal, calling on Iranians to overthrow their leaders. “When we are finished, take over your government,” Mr. Trump said. “It will be yours to take.” He repeated that in a social media post Saturday afternoon announcing that the strike had killed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader — “one of the most evil people in History,” as he put it.

不过，他确实比以往任何时候都更明确地把“政权更迭”作为目标，呼吁伊朗人民推翻其领导人。“当我们完事后，接管你们的政府吧，”特朗普说，“它将属于你们。”他在周六下午宣布袭击已击毙最高领袖阿亚图拉阿里·哈梅内伊的社交媒体帖子中重复了这一点——用他的话说，这是“历史上最邪恶的人之一”。

But how Iranians should go about taking over was left unclear. Mr. Trump wrote that police and revolutionary guard forces should “peacefully merge with the Iranian Patriots, and work together as a unit to bring back the Country to the Greatness it deserves” — a remarkable notion suggesting that Iranian security officials would somehow team up with the same people they were gunning down in the streets just weeks ago.

但伊朗人究竟应该如何接管政权，目前尚不清楚。特朗普写道，警察和革命卫队应当“与伊朗爱国者和平融合，共同努力，让国家恢复它应有的伟大”——这一说法颇为惊人，仿佛那些几周前还在街头向抗议者开枪的伊朗安全官员会突然与同一批人联手。

主张对伊朗采取行动的人士说，特朗普仍为完全承诺推翻德黑兰政府，而是把这件事留给了伊朗人民去决定。

“His stated goal here, regime change, is the very thing he ran against in 2016,” said Brandan P. Buck, a research fellow in foreign policy studies at the libertarian Cato Institute. “Previously, the president used airstrikes, raids and covert military power when he believed it could achieve discrete ends with good optics at little cost. This attack on Iran has broken that formula and constitutes a leap into the unknown.”

“他此次公开的目标是政权更迭，这正是他在2016年竞选时所反对的东西，”自由意志主义智库加图研究所的外交政策研究员布兰登·巴克说。“此前，在认为可以以较小代价达成特定目标，并取得良好的公众形象时，总统才会使用空袭、突袭和秘密军事力量。这次对伊朗的攻击打破了这一模式，是一次跃入未知领域的行动。”

Mr. Trump’s critics quickly resurrected his past statements to accuse him of abandoning his own promises, circulating video clips of his campaign rallies and social media quotes assailing Barack Obama, George W. Bush and Kamala Harris as warmongers.

特朗普的批评者迅速翻出他过去的言论，指责他背弃了自己的承诺，并传播他在竞选集会和社交媒体上抨击贝拉克·奥巴马、乔治·W·布什以及贺锦丽是战争贩子的旧视频和引语。

Mr. Trump, 2012: “Now that Obama’s poll numbers are in tailspin — watch for him to launch a strike in Libya or Iran. He is desperate.”

特朗普，2012年：“既然奥巴马的民调正在暴跌——就等着看吧，他会对利比亚或伊朗发动打击。他已经走投无路了。”

Mr. Trump, 2013: “Remember that I predicted a long time ago that President Obama will attack Iran because of his inability to negotiate properly — not skilled!”

特朗普，2013年：“记住，我早就预测过奥巴马会因为谈判无能而攻击伊朗——他根本不擅长谈判！”

Mr. Trump, 2016: “We’re going to stop the reckless and costly policy of regime change.”

特朗普，2016年：“我们将停止鲁莽而昂贵的政权更迭政策。”

Mr. Trump, election night 2024: “I’m not going to start wars. I’m going to stop wars.”

特朗普，2024年大选之夜：“我不会发动战争，我会结束战争。”

And there were plenty of quotes from advisers like Stephen Miller, now the deputy White House chief of staff (“Kamala = WWIII. Trump = Peace,” Nov. 1, 2024), and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth (“The War Department will not be distracted by democracy-building, interventionism, undefined wars, regime change,” Dec. 6, 2025).

此外还有大量来自其顾问的言论，比如现任白宫副幕僚长斯蒂芬·米勒（2024年11月1日：“卡玛拉＝第三次世界大战。特朗普＝和平”），以及国防部长皮特·赫格塞思（2025年12月6日：“战争部不会被民主建设、干预主义、不明确的战争和政权更迭所分心。”）

Among those lashing out at Mr. Trump on Saturday were not just liberals but also prominent leaders of the Make America Great movement who complained that he had been captured by the neoconservatives he once spurned, criticism led by the right-wing podcast host Tucker Carlson and former Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene, Republican of Georgia.

周六抨击特朗普的不仅有自由派人士，还有“让美国再次伟大”运动的一些知名领袖，他们抱怨特朗普被自己曾经鄙视的新保守派所俘获。批评声主要来自右翼播客主持人塔克·卡尔森和佐治亚州的前众议员乔丽·泰勒·格林。

“It’s always a lie and it’s always America Last,” Ms. Greene, who resigned her seat last month after breaking with Mr. Trump, wrote on social media. “But it feels like the worst betrayal this time because it comes from the very man and the admin who we all believed was different and said no more.”

“永远是谎言，永远是‘美国最后’，”格林在社交媒体上写道。她上个月因与特朗普决裂而辞去议员职务。“但这一次感觉是最严重的背叛，因为它来自那个我们曾相信其与众不同，并说过‘不再如此’的人和他的政府。”

Representative Marlin Stutzman, Republican of Indiana, argued that Mr. Trump’s attack on Iran would head off a worse threat down the road and pave the way for a new Middle East that would be friendlier to the United States. “To those who say, ‘Well, President Trump said he wasn’t going to take us into any wars,’ he’s keeping us out of wars in the long run,” he said on CNN.

印第安纳州共和党众议员马林·斯图茨曼则认为，特朗普对伊朗的攻击将避免未来更大的威胁，并为一个对美国更友好的新中东铺平道路。“对于那些说‘特朗普总统不是说不会让我们卷入任何战争’的人，我要说，从长远来看他是在让我们远离战争，”他在CNN上表示。

Mr. Trump’s increasing willingness to deploy military force underscores the broader change between his first term and second term. He is far more comfortable using the instruments of power than he was the last time around, at home as well as abroad. What he sometimes threatened or considered doing in his first stint in the White House, he more readily acts on now, whether it be sending federal forces into American streets, prosecuting his perceived enemies, purging the government of those deemed disloyal or imposing tariffs on countries around the world.

特朗普日益愿意动用军事力量，这凸显出其第一任期与第二任期之间更广泛的转变。无论在国内还是在国外，他如今都能更加自如地使用权力工具。在首个任期内他只是威胁或考虑过的事情，如今更容易付诸行动——无论是把联邦部队派上美国街头、起诉他认为的敌人、清洗被视为不忠诚的官员，还是对世界各国加征关税。

The team he assembled in the first four years included conventional Republicans or career military officers who often restrained his most radical impulses. But there is no John F. Kelly, Jim Mattis, Mark T. Esper or Mark A. Milley this time around. Instead, he has surrounded himself with more aggressive break-the-china advisers pushing for more ambitious action and with figures like Mr. Hegseth, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Susie Wiles, the White House chief of staff, who view their jobs as facilitating the president’s desires rather than talking him out of them.

第一个四年里，他组建的团队中有传统共和党人或职业军官，他们往往会约束他最激进的冲动。但这一次，没有约翰·凯利、詹姆斯·马蒂斯、马克·埃斯珀或马克·米利。取而代之的是一群更激进、喜欢打破常规、推动更大胆行动的顾问；以及像赫格塞思、国务卿马尔科·鲁比奥和白宫幕僚长苏西·怀尔斯这样的人，他们把自己的职责视为促成总统的愿望，而不是劝阻他。

Mr. Trump’s journey as commander in chief has been a fitful one. He had no experience in either the military or public office when he first arrived in the Oval Office in January 2017. He promoted a more aggressive war against the Islamic State, but sometimes hesitated to use force, at one point calling off a retaliatory military strike on Iran with just minutes to go, deeming it not worth the casualties.

特朗普作为三军统帅的历程充满了起伏。2017年1月首次入主白宫时，他既无军旅经验，也无公职经历。他力主对伊斯兰国发动更猛烈的战争，但有时又对动用武力犹豫不决，曾在最后几分钟叫停对伊朗的报复性打击，认为不值得付出伤亡代价。

He was intent on pulling back from much of the world, seeking to bring U.S. troops home from places like South Korea, Germany and Syria. He negotiated a peace agreement with the Taliban to withdraw all American forces from Afghanistan, a deal then executed by his successor, President Joseph R. Biden Jr., in a disastrous operation.

他一度执意从世界许多地区撤出，试图将美军从韩国、德国和叙利亚等地撤回。他与塔利班谈判达成协议，准备撤出所有驻阿富汗美军，这一协议最终由其继任者、拜登总统执行，却演变成了一场灾难性的行动。

But he was also emboldened when a U.S. strike in 2020 targeted and killed Iran’s Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani without instigating the devastating reprisals or prolonged regional war that some critics had predicted. Likewise, in this second term, the successful commando raid that captured President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela also energized Mr. Trump.

但他也因2020年美军空袭击毙伊朗将军卡西姆·苏莱曼尼受到鼓舞，因为那次行动并未引发一些批评者所预言的毁灭性报复或长期地区战争。同样，在第二任期内，成功抓获委内瑞拉总统尼古拉斯·马杜罗的突击行动也让特朗普更加自信。

His public posture, however, has veered wildly over the past year. One moment, he is presenting himself as a historic peacemaker, forming a so-called Board of Peace and griping that he has not won the Nobel Peace Prize while boasting, inaccurately, that he has ended eight wars — including one with Iran. The next moment, he is threatening to seize Greenland, take back the Panama Canal, strangle Cuba and even go after Colombia’s president as he did Venezuela’s.

然而，过去一年里他的公开姿态摇摆不定。一会儿，他把自己塑造成历史性的和平缔造者，成立所谓的“和平委员会”，抱怨自己还没有获得诺贝尔和平奖，同时不准确地吹嘘自己结束了包括与伊朗冲突在内的八场战争；下一刻，他又威胁要夺取格陵兰、收回巴拿马运河、扼杀古巴，甚至像对待委内瑞拉总统那样对付哥伦比亚总统。

The outcome of Mr. Trump’s geopolitical gamble will depend not just on how the military operation proceeds, but what comes next. Success has a way of making voters forget about broken promises. There is little love lost for the Tehran regime, and video showed Iranians in the streets cheering reports of Ayatollah Khamenei’s death. If Mr. Trump manages to push the remaining government from power, he will have something to boast about that none of his predecessors dared try.

特朗普这场地缘政治豪赌的结果不仅取决于军事行动的进展，也取决于接下来会发生什么。成功往往能让选民忘记被打破的承诺。人们对德黑兰政权几乎没有多少好感，视频显示，伊朗民众走上街头，为哈梅内伊之死的消息而欢呼。如果特朗普真的能将剩余政府赶下台，他将拥有一个可以夸耀的成就——这是他的前任们都不敢尝试的事情。

Unlike the so-called forever wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that helped fuel his political rise, Mr. Trump has not made any major commitment of ground troops in Iran, and seems determined to stick to air power, avoiding the sort of grinding guerrilla warfare that turned Americans against past wars.

不同于阿富汗和伊拉克那些被称为“永久战争”的冲突——它们曾助推他的政治崛起，特朗普并未在伊朗投入大量地面部队，而且似乎决心只依靠空中力量，避免那种曾让美国民众对以往战争心生厌倦的消耗性游击战。

Still, as Mr. Trump himself warned in his overnight video, there could be American casualties. And if the Tehran government does fall, it could result in a replacement that is still hostile to the United States, or in fratricidal chaos, as happened in Libya after Muammar el-Qaddafi was deposed and killed in 2011.

但正如特朗普在凌晨发布的视频中所警告的那样，美国可能会出现伤亡。如果德黑兰政府真的垮台，结果也可能是一个仍然敌视美国的替代政权，或是像2011年卡扎菲被推翻并杀死后的利比亚那样陷入混乱。

One way or the other, his allies were already talking about it being a legacy moment for Mr. Trump. What kind of legacy is not yet clear. But it will not be the one that he originally promised.

无论如何，他的盟友已经开始将此视为特朗普的“历史性时刻”。这将成就怎样的政治遗产目前尚不清楚。但可以确定的是，这不会是他最初承诺过的那种遗产。

The joint U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran killed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the nation’s supreme leader for almost 37 years, President Trump announced on Saturday, signaling a potentially profound political shift in the region.

美国总统特朗普周六宣布，美以对伊朗发动的联合行动已击毙执掌伊朗近37年的最高领袖阿亚图拉阿里·哈梅内伊。这一消息预示着该地区可能出现深刻的政治变化。

“Khamenei, one of the most evil people in History, is dead,” Mr. Trump wrote on Truth Social. He added: “He was unable to avoid our Intelligence and Highly Sophisticated Tracking Systems and, working closely with Israel, there was not a thing he, or the other leaders that have been killed along with him, could do.”

“哈梅内伊，这个历史上最邪恶的人之一，死了，”特朗普在“真相社交”上写道。他还说：“他无法躲避我们的情报系统和高度精密的追踪系统，在与以色列密切合作下，他以及与他一同被击毙的其他领导人，根本无能为力。”

There was no immediate confirmation of the death from Iran.

伊朗方面尚未立即证实这一死讯。

The attack, which set off retaliatory strikes by Iran against Israel and U.S. interests in the Middle East, followed weeks of threats from Mr. Trump that the United States would strike Iran unless its leadership agreed to U.S. demands, especially over its nuclear program. On Thursday, American and Iranian officials held a last-ditch round of mediated talks that ended without a breakthrough.

这次袭击引发了伊朗针对以色列以及美国在中东利益的报复性打击。此前数周，特朗普一直威胁称，除非伊朗领导层同意美国的要求——尤其是在核计划问题上——否则美国将对伊朗发动打击。周四，美国和伊朗官员曾进行最后一轮斡旋谈判，但未取得突破。

In his social media post announcing Ayatollah Khamenei’s death, Mr. Trump said, without providing evidence, that he is hearing Iranian security forces “no longer want to fight, and are looking for Immunity from us.”

在宣布哈梅内伊死讯的社交媒体帖子中，特朗普还在没有提供证据的情况下表示，他听说伊朗安全部队“已经不想再打下去，正在向我们寻求豁免”。

The Israeli military also identified seven senior Iranian security officials it said had been killed in Saturday’s strikes, including the head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the country’s minister of defense and a senior adviser to the supreme leader.

以色列军方还确认，周六的袭击中有七名伊朗高级安全官员被打死，其中包括伊朗革命卫队司令、国防部长以及最高领袖的一名高级顾问。

Earlier Saturday, Mr. Trump said that “major combat operations” were underway in Iran, portraying the strike as an opportunity for a change of government in Tehran. Governments around the world urged restraint, though some, including those of Canada and Australia, backed the U.S.-led campaign as they condemned decades of aggression by Iran.

周六早些时候，特朗普表示，针对伊朗的“重大作战行动”正在进行中，并把这次打击描述为促成德黑兰政权更替的契机。世界各国政府纷纷呼吁保持克制，不过也有一些国家——包括加拿大和澳大利亚——在谴责伊朗数十年来的侵略行为的同时，对美国领导的这次行动表示了支持。

Why did the U.S. and Israel attack Iran?

美国和以色列为什么攻击伊朗？

The latest tensions began in January, when Mr. Trump vowed to come to the aid of protesters when Iran’s government used lethal force to crush public unrest. In taped remarks announcing the attack on Saturday morning, Mr. Trump urged Iranians to “take over your government” once the military action concluded.

最新一轮紧张局势始于今年1月，当时特朗普承诺，如果伊朗政府以致命武力镇压公众抗议，美国将支持示威者。在周六上午宣布发动袭击的录制讲话中，特朗普呼吁伊朗民众在军事行动结束后“接管你们的政府”。

“No president was willing to do what I am willing to do tonight,” he said. “Now you have a president who is giving you what you want, so let’s see how you respond.”

“没有哪位总统愿意做我今晚愿意做的事，”他说。“现在，你们有了一位给予你们所望的总统，让我们看看你们如何回应。”

It is the second time in less than a year that the U.S. military has struck in Iran. Last June, American forces bombed three nuclear facilities in the country. This time, U.S. officials said they expected a far more extensive assault.

这是不到一年时间里美军第二次对伊朗实施打击。去年6月，美军曾轰炸了该国的三处核设施。美国官员表示，他们预计此次行动规模将大得多。

For Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, joining the strike on Iran is part of a long-held goal to overthrow the government in a country he has portrayed as an existential threat. In a televised statement, Mr. Netanyahu said the American-Israeli attack could “create the conditions for the brave Iranian people to take their destiny into their own hands.”

对以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡来说，参与对伊朗的打击是实现推翻伊朗政府这一长期目标的一部分。他一直把伊朗描绘为对以色列构成生存性威胁的国家。内塔尼亚胡在电视讲话中表示，美以联合攻击可能“为勇敢的伊朗人民掌握自己命运创造条件”。

What are the targets?

袭击目标是什么？

The attacks began on the first day of the workweek in Iran, with reports of explosions across several cities, including Tehran, Qom, Kermanshah, Isfahan and Karaj, according to Iran’s semiofficial Fars News Agency. In Tehran, the home of Ayatollah Khamenei, images showed thick smoke rising into the sky. The death toll in Iran was not immediately clear.

据伊朗半官方的法尔斯通讯社报道，袭击始于伊朗工作周的第一天，德黑兰、库姆、克尔曼沙赫、伊斯法罕和卡拉季等多个城市传来爆炸声。在哈梅内伊所在的德黑兰，图像显示浓烟升腾而起。伊朗方面的伤亡人数尚不清楚。

Israel’s military said that one of its initial targets was a gathering of senior Iranian officials. Videos verified by The New York Times showed strikes in an area of Tehran that houses the presidential palace and Iran’s National Security Council, among other important government buildings. Another video showed a strike near the Ministry of Intelligence.

以色列军方表示，其最初打击目标之一是一场伊朗高级官员的会议。《纽约时报》核实的视频显示，德黑兰一处地区遭到打击，该地区分布着总统府和伊朗国家安全委员会等重要政府机构。另一段视频显示，情报部附近也遭到袭击。

Satellite imagery showed a plume of black smoke and extensive damage at the secure compound of Ayatollah Khamenei.

卫星图像显示，哈梅内伊所在的那个戒备森严的住宅园区冒出黑色烟柱，并遭受大面积破坏。

U.S. officials said the military had carried out dozens of strikes, with attack planes launched from bases around the Middle East and from at least one aircraft carrier. The initial wave of U.S. attacks focused on military targets.

美国官员表示，美军进行了数十次打击，战机从中东的多个基地以及至少一艘航母起飞。美军第一波攻击重点针对军事目标。

The Israeli military also said its air force had carried out a broad wave of strikes on multiple military targets in western Iran; aerial defense and missile launchers in central Iran; and a surface-to-surface missile launch site in the area of Tabriz, in eastern Iran.

以色列军方还表示，其空军对伊朗西部多个军事目标进行了广泛打击；对伊朗中部的防空系统和导弹发射器进行了打击；以及对伊朗东部大不里士地区的地对地导弹发射场进行了打击。

Israeli officials said they expected the assault to last several days.

以色列官员表示，预计此次袭击将持续数天。

How has Iran responded?

伊朗如何回应？

Iran fired a barrage of missiles and drones at Israel, the Revolutionary Guard Corps said in a statement on Telegram. It also launched missile attacks targeting U.S. military bases in the region, including Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates, and the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, Fars reported.

伊朗革命卫队在Telegram上发表声明称，伊朗向以色列发射了大量导弹和无人机。据法尔斯通讯社报道，伊朗还向该地区美国军事基地发射导弹，包括卡塔尔的乌代德空军基地、科威特的阿里·萨利姆空军基地、阿拉伯联合酋长国的宰夫拉空军基地，以及巴林的美国第五舰队总部。

U.S. Central Command said its forces “successfully defended against hundreds of Iranian missile and drone attacks” and that damage to American bases in the region has been “minimal and has not impacted operations.”

美国中央司令部表示，其部队“成功防御了数百枚伊朗导弹和无人机袭击”，该地区美军基地的损失“轻微，且未影响行动”。

Debris from intercepted missiles landed in a residential neighborhood in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates, killing one person and damaging property, the Emirati defense ministry said, adding that it had successfully intercepted several missiles launched from Iran.

阿联酋国防部表示，从伊朗发射的几枚导弹被拦截，但导弹碎片落在首都阿布扎比的一个居民区，造成一人死亡并财产受损，阿联酋表示成功拦截了多枚导弹。

Qatar’s ministry of defense said that it had “successfully thwarted a number of attacks” targeting its territory. The attack echoed another strike last June, when Iran fired more than a dozen missiles at an American military base near the Qatari capital, Doha, in response to a U.S. attack on its nuclear facilities.

卡塔尔国防部表示，已“成功挫败针对其领土的数次袭击”。此次袭击令人想到去年6月伊朗向多哈附近的美军基地发射十几枚导弹的行动，当时是为了回应美国对其核设施的袭击。

The Gulf States are home to a number of American bases and embassies, and experts had warned that Iran would target them in retaliatory strikes. Before the strikes on Saturday, the U.S. military had built up forces in the region in what Mr. Trump had described as an “armada.”

海湾国家有多个美国基地和大使馆，专家此前警告它们将成为伊朗报复性打击的目标。在周六袭击前，美国已在该地区集结部队，特朗普称之为“armada”（对舰船集群的一种更具戏剧性的称呼——译注）。

Iran also asked the United Nations Security Council to intervene, and it accused the United States and Israel of violating international law.

伊朗还要求联合国安理会介入，并指责美国和以色列违反国际法。

周六，在特拉维夫一处防空掩体中躲避的民众。

Is the United States at war with Iran?

美国是否与伊朗处于战争状态？

Mr. Trump’s unilateral decision to launch the attack has opened a new chapter in a recurring debate over who rightfully wields war powers in American democracy. The move has raised accusations that he is violating the Constitution by starting a war without congressional authorization. And it appears likely to prompt a belated debate next week in Congress under the War Powers Resolution.

特朗普的单方面决定发动袭击，在关于美国民主中谁有权发动战争的反复辩论中开启了新篇章。此举引发指控，称他未经国会授权发动战争，违反宪法。下周国会很可能根据《战争权力决议》展开迟到的辩论。

Many Democrats and at least two Republicans in Congress are insisting that Congress must vote on whether the country enters such a conflict.

许多民主党人和至少两名共和党国会议员坚持认为，国会必须投票决定是否进入此类冲突。

The accusations underscore a split that has emerged between how the founders intended American-style democracy to function and how it has frequently worked, especially during and since the Cold War.

这些指控凸显了美国开国元勋设想的民主运作方式与冷战期间及之后经常实际运作方式之间的差异。

What else might be affected?

还可能影响什么？

The conflict has quickly threatened the flow of oil out of the Middle East, which could make gasoline and other fuels more expensive. Shipping companies have stopped sending their tankers through the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow passage through which at least 20 percent of daily oil production travels, according to oil industry analysts.

冲突迅速威胁到中东石油的输运，可能导致汽油和其他燃料价格上涨。据石油行业分析师称，航运公司已停止派油轮通过霍尔木兹海峡，这条狭窄的通道每天承载至少20%的全球石油产量。

“Nobody’s going to enter right now,” said Angeliki Frangou, the chief executive of Navios Maritime Partners, a Greek shipping company with vessels in the region, referring to the strait.

“现在没人会进去，”在该地区有船只的希腊航运公司Navios Maritime Partners的首席执行官安杰利基·弗朗古表示。

With his broad attack on Iran early Saturday morning and his call to the Iranian people to overthrow their government, President Trump has embarked on the ultimate war of choice.

特朗普总统周六清晨对伊朗发动大规模袭击，并呼吁伊朗人民推翻本国政府，由此踏上了典型的选择性战争之路。

He was not driven by an immediate threat. There was no race for a bomb. Iran is further from the capability to build a nuclear weapon today than it has been in several years, thanks largely to the success of the president’s previous strike on Iranian nuclear enrichment sites, in June.

他采取行动并非出于迫在眉睫的威胁。伊朗并没有急于制造核弹。由于特朗普去年6月对伊朗核浓缩设施发动的那次打击，伊朗如今距离具备制造核武器的能力比过去几年都要远。

While Mr. Trump claimed Tehran was ultimately aiming to reach to the United States with its array of missiles, even his own Defense Intelligence Agency concluded last year that it would be a decade before Iran could get past the technological and production hurdles to produce a significant arsenal.

尽管特朗普声称德黑兰的最终目标是利用导弹系统打击美国本土，但就连他自己的国防情报局去年也得出结论：伊朗至少还需要十年时间，才能跨越技术和生产方面的重重障碍打造出一个规模可观的武器库。

And there were no indications of a coming Iranian attack on the United States, its allies or its bases in the region. Instead, Mr. Trump struck the Islamic Republic largely because he apparently sensed a remarkable moment of weakness for the government — and an opportunity for the United States to topple Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps after 47 years of episodic confrontations, which he described at length in an eight-minute video.

也没有任何迹象表明伊朗即将对美国、其盟友或该地区的美军基地发动攻击。相反，特朗普之所以对这个伊斯兰共和国动手，很大程度上是因为他显然察觉到伊朗政权正处于一个非同寻常的虚弱时刻，并看到了一个让美国推翻阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊及伊斯兰革命卫队的契机。此前，双方曾断断续续地对抗了47年，特朗普在一段长达八分钟的视频中对此进行了详尽阐述。

But unlike past presidents putting American forces at risk — and, in an age of terrorism and cyberattacks, perhaps civilians as well — Mr. Trump did not spend months building a case for war. He never presented evidence of an imminent threat, or answered the question of why a nuclear program he claimed he had “obliterated” eight months ago was now on the brink of revival.

但不同于以往那些让美军（在恐怖主义和网络攻击时代或许也包括平民）置于危险境地的总统，特朗普并未花费数月时间为这场战争构建理由。他从未拿出证据证明威胁的紧迫性，也没有回答这样一个问题：为何他在八个月前声称已被自己“彻底摧毁”的核计划如今却又濒临重启。

His pretaped video, released in the middle of the night as the missiles started exploding in Tehran, recited a list of long-running grievances with Iran, including its brutal use of terror. But he never explained why in the pantheon of threats facing the United States, including an already-nuclear-armed North Korea and the expanding nuclear arsenals and territorial ambitions of Russia and China, a weakened Iran ranks first.

他预先录制的视频在深夜时分发布，当时德黑兰正传出爆炸声，视频罗列了美国长期以来对伊朗的种种不满，包括伊朗残酷使用恐怖主义。但他从未解释，在美国面临的诸多威胁中——其中既有已经拥核的朝鲜，也有核武库不断扩张、领土野心日益膨胀的俄罗斯和中国——一个被削弱的伊朗为何会位居首位。

周六，德黑兰发生爆炸，现场升起浓烟。

So in choosing this moment, and this vector of attack, a man who came to office promising an end to reckless military interventions — and wars intended to prompt regime change — is taking a huge risk. There are few, if any, examples in history of toppling the government of a large nation — in this case about 90 million people — with air power alone. Mr. Trump, however, was already celebrating success, announcing on social media that Ayatollah Khamenei was dead.

因此，选择此时此刻、以这种方式发动攻击，这位上任时曾承诺结束鲁莽军事干预、反对以政权更迭为目的的战争的领导人无疑是在冒巨大的风险。历史上几乎找不到仅凭空中力量就推翻一个人口约9000万的大国政府的先例。不过，特朗普已经开始庆祝胜利，他在社交媒体上宣布阿亚图拉哈梅内伊已死。

And yet Mr. Trump has made clear that is his plan. He has no intention, administration officials have insisted, of sending in ground troops to finish the job, the invitation to the “forever wars” that he campaigned against.

他还明确表示，这就是他的计划。政府官员坚称，他无意派遣地面部队完成任务，也无意挑起他竞选时所反对的“无休止的战争”。

“The idea that we’re going to be in a Middle Eastern war for years with no end in sight — there is no chance that will happen,” Vice President JD Vance, who is famously skeptical of American military interventions and openly called for the United States to withdraw support from Ukraine, told The Washington Post days before the attack on Iran.

“认为我们将陷入一场旷日持久、看不到尽头的中东战争的想法——这绝不可能发生，”副总统JD·万斯在伊朗遭袭击前几天告诉《华盛顿邮报》。万斯素来对美国的军事干预持怀疑态度，并公开呼吁美国撤回对乌克兰的支持。

So Mr. Trump’s strategic bet rides almost entirely on the ability of the Iranian people, largely unarmed and unorganized, to seize the moment and overthrow a government that millions of them find both brutal and odious. The protests that filled the streets of Iranian cities, and led to a crackdown that killed thousands, gave him his chance.

因此，特朗普的战略赌注几乎完全押在了伊朗人民身上，寄希望于这些大多手无寸铁、组织涣散的民众抓住时机，推翻一个被数百万人视为残暴可憎的政府。伊朗国内的抗议活动给了他这个机会，这些抗议席卷了各大城市，但随后受到镇压，导致数千人丧生。

一张发布在社交媒体上的图片显示1月在德黑兰举行的示威活动。

But if Mr. Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, who urged him starting in December to launch this war, and who joined in it from the start, have a plan to accomplish that goal, they have yet to reveal it, even to their closest allies.

但如果特朗普和以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡——后者从去年12月起就敦促他发动这场战争，并从一开始便参与其中——确实有一套实现这一目标的计划，那么迄今为止，他们尚未向任何人披露，甚至包括他们最亲密的盟友。

Senior officials of three of those allies, ranging from Europe to the Gulf and interviewed in the past few days, said that in their interactions with Mr. Trump’s top aides, they heard little enthusiasm for these attacks, and no plausible legal justification for striking Iran now. Those officials spoke on condition of anonymity to describe private discussions. But their experience partly explains why Britain, America’s closest ally, barred the United States from using Diego Garcia and bomber bases in Britain to launch American fighters and bombers.

过去几天，欧洲和海湾地区的三个盟友的高级官员在接受采访时表示，在与特朗普高级助手的交流中，他们几乎没有感受到对这些袭击的热情，也看不到现在打击伊朗有任何站得住脚的法律依据。这些官员要求匿名，以描述私下讨论的内容。但他们的经历在一定程度上解释了为什么英国——美国最亲密的盟友——禁止美方使用迪戈加西亚基地以及英国境内的轰炸机基地来起飞美国战斗机和轰炸机。

“It is not as if Iran poses a threat to our interests that it hadn’t for 47 years,” said Richard N. Haass, the former president of the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of the 2009 book “War of Necessity, War of Choice,” a study of the two conflicts with Iraq, in 1991 and 2003. The first, he concluded, was defined by narrow and achievable aims: liberating Kuwait after Saddam Hussein invaded. Once Iraq was driven from Kuwaiti territory, George H.W. Bush decided against overthrowing Hussein.

“并不是说伊朗现在对我们的利益构成了过去47年里从未存在过的威胁，”外交关系委员会前主席、曾于2009年出版研究1991年和2003年两次伊拉克战争的《必然之战，选择之战》(War of Necessity, War of Choice)一书的理查德·哈斯说。他认为，第一次战争的目标明确且可实现：在萨达姆·侯赛因入侵后解放科威特。一旦伊拉克被逐出科威特领土，老布什就决定不再推翻侯赛因政权。

But Mr. Trump’s decision on Saturday was more like George W. Bush’s decision to rid the world of Hussein and his government, because of the long-festering threat it posed to international peace.

但特朗普周六的决定更像小布什当年试图铲除侯赛因及其政府的决定，理由是其长期以来对国际和平构成威胁。

周六，德黑兰发生数轮爆炸，人们四处奔逃。

“As in the second Iraq war, there wasn’t a necessity to attack Iran, there was an opportunity,” Mr. Haass said. “This is a classic preventive attack, to keep Iran from gaining a capability in the future. What’s missing is ‘why now?’ because there were other choices: diplomatic accords under military pressure, economic embargoes, interceptions of Iranian ships.”

“就像第二次伊拉克战争一样，攻击伊朗并非出于必要，而是因为出现了机会，”哈斯说。“这是一场典型的预防性打击，目的是阻止伊朗在未来获得某种能力。而缺失的是‘为什么是现在？’因为还有其他选择：在军事压力下达成外交协议、实施贸易禁运、拦截伊朗船只。”

In international law, the difference between a war of necessity and a war of choice is huge. A pre-emptive strike — where one nation sees an attack massing across the river or the ocean and strikes first — is considered legitimate.

在国际法中，必然之战和选择之战的差别巨大。先发制人的打击——即一国发现敌对力量在河对岸或海那头集结兵力，因而率先发动攻击——被视为合法。

A preventive strike, in which the powerful hit the weaker state, is considered illegal. An example would be Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine, which the United States and much of the world denounced as a gross violation of the international order.

预防性打击——即强国对较弱国家动手——则被认为是非法的。例如，俄罗斯入侵乌克兰的决定就遭到了美国和世界上大多数国家的谴责，认为此举严重违反国际秩序。

Mr. Trump’s response is that he did not need a precipitating event. He ran through more than four decades of deadly Iranian actions — from the 1979 hostage crisis, which lasted 444 days, to attacks on American bases and ships. “We’re not going to put up with it any longer,” Mr. Trump said in a recorded video he posted on his social media account. And even the Pentagon’s name for the mission, Operation Epic Fury, seemed to reflect the accumulation of grievances.

特朗普的回应是，他并不需要什么导火索。他回顾了伊朗四十多年来的种种致命行径：从持续444天的1979年人质危机到对美军基地和舰船的袭击。“我们不会再忍下去了，”特朗普在发布于社交媒体上的一段录制视频中说。甚至连五角大楼为此次行动起的名字——“史诗之怒行动”——似乎都反映了这种长期积累的不满。

The international legal ramifications are not likely to influence Mr. Trump’s view of the attack. “I don’t need international law,” he told four reporters from The New York Times during an interview in January. “I’m not looking to hurt people.” And he added that while he thought his administration should abide by international legal principles, he made it clear he would be the arbiter of when those principles applied to the United States.

国际法层面的影响不太可能左右特朗普对这次攻击的看法。“我不需要国际法，”他在1月接受《纽约时报》四名记者采访时说。“我不是为了伤害任何人。”他还补充说，虽然他认为自己的政府应当遵循国际法原则，但也明确表示，何时适用这些原则将由他本人裁定。

“It depends on what your definition of international law is,” he said.

“这取决于你如何定义国际法，”他说。

It may also depend on what the definition of “war” is. In his statement, Mr. Trump called this action a war, warning the country that it may have to confront casualties. But he made no effort to seek an authorization to use military force, much less a war declaration, from Congress.

这或许也取决于如何定义“战争”。在声明中，特朗普将此次行动称为一场战争，警告国家可能需要面对人员伤亡。但他并未试图寻求国会授权使用武力，更不用说正式的宣战声明。

He would certainly not be the first president to initiate a major military action without formal approval from Congress. But in Mr. Trump’s case, he has dismissed the thought that he even needs it.

他当然不是第一位在未获国会正式批准的情况下发动重大军事行动的总统。但就特朗普而言，他根本不认为自己需要这样做。

特朗普总统预先录制的视频列举了对伊朗由来已久的诸多不满。

When historians look back at this moment, they are likely to ask two questions: Why did Mr. Trump act now, and why was Iran his target?

当历史学家回顾这一时刻时，他们很可能会提出两个问题：特朗普为何选择现在行动？以及为何以伊朗为目标？

In the end, Mr. Trump’s venture — his seventh attack on a foreign nation since he came to office — may be judged by whether it ignores the Churchill rule.

最终，特朗普的这次冒险——他上任以来对外国发动的第七次攻击——或将以其是否无视“丘吉尔法则”而被评判。

Long before he became Britain’s wartime prime minister, Winston Churchill wrote about his youth, as a journalist and sometime participant in wars. “Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter,” he wrote in “My Early Life.”

早在成为英国战时首相之前，温斯顿·丘吉尔在回忆自己年轻时作为记者偶尔参与战争的经历时写道：“永远、永远、永远不要相信任何一场战争会顺利而轻松，也不要以为踏上这段奇异航程的人，能够预知自己将遭遇的潮汐与飓风，”他在《我的早年生活》中这样写道。

“The statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events.”

“屈从于战争狂热的政治家必须意识到，一旦信号发出，他便不再是政策的主宰，而是不可预见、不可控制事件的奴隶。”

President Trump announced on Saturday that the U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran had killed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the nation’s supreme leader for almost 37 years and an implacable enemy of Israel and the United States, in a potentially seismic political shift in Tehran and the broader region.

特朗普总统周六宣布，美国与以色列对伊朗的袭击导致伊朗最高领袖阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊身亡。哈梅内伊担任伊朗国家最高领袖近37年，是以色列和美国的死敌。这一事件可能在德黑兰和更广泛的地区引发巨大的政治变革。

“Khamenei, one of the most evil people in History, is dead,” Mr. Trump wrote on Truth Social. He added: “He was unable to avoid our Intelligence and Highly Sophisticated Tracking Systems and, working closely with Israel, there was not a thing he, or the other leaders that have been killed along with him, could do.”

“哈梅内伊，历史上最邪恶的人之一，已死，”特朗普在社交平台Truth Social上写道。“他无法逃脱我们的情报与高度精密的追踪系统，而且由于与以色列密切合作，他本人以及与他一同被杀的其他领导人无计可施。”

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel had said earlier that there were “many indications” that Ayatollah Khamenei was dead, but stopped short of making a definitive statement.

以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡此前表示，有“多种迹象”表明阿亚图拉·哈梅内伊已死，但他没有作出明确断言。

Iranian officials at first dismissed such claims as bravado or psychological warfare. The ayatollah’s official account on X later posted a photo rich with Shia religious symbolism, of a faceless clerical figure holding a flaming sword.

伊朗官员最初驳斥了这些说法，称其为虚张声势或心理战。哈梅内伊在X上的官方账户随后发布了一张充满什叶派宗教象征的照片：画面中，一位没有面孔的宗教人士手持一把燃烧的剑。

Israeli officials said several of Iran’s most senior military leaders had also been killed, including Gen. Mohammad Pakpour, the chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the most powerful force in Iran; the defense minister, Gen. Aziz Nasrizadeh; and Ali Shamkhani, former head of the Iranian navy and a close adviser to Ayatollah Khamenei.

以色列官员称，伊朗数位高级军事领导人也在袭击中丧生，包括伊斯兰革命卫队总司令穆罕默德·帕克普尔将军、国防部长阿齐兹·纳斯里扎德将军，以及伊朗前海军司令、最高领袖哈梅内伊的亲密顾问阿里·沙姆哈尼。

It was not immediately clear which country’s forces had killed Ayatollah Khamenei, but either way, the action exhibited a high degree of coordination between the United States and Israel. Israel’s military said it had targeted a gathering of senior Iranian officials in the opening strikes. Satellite imagery showed a plume of smoke and extensive damage at the supreme leader’s high-security compound.

目前尚不清楚究竟是哪个国家的部队击毙了哈梅内伊，但无论如何，此行动显示出美国与以色列之间高度的协调。以色列军方表示，他们在首轮打击中锁定了伊朗高级官员的集会。卫星图像显示，最高领袖哈梅内伊戒备森严的住所内升起了浓烟，并遭到严重破坏。

The police found him in his bedroom in Edmond, Okla., facedown, dead from a gunshot wound and still gripping the bloody kitchen knife he had used to try to defend himself.

警方是在俄克拉荷马州埃德蒙市的一间卧室里发现他的，这名男子面朝下倒在地上，死于枪伤，手中仍紧握着那把沾满鲜血的厨刀，他曾试图用这把刀来自卫。

His name was Wyan Wang, his job was in cannabis and he was a victim, investigators would say, of a robbery, one of many targeting the cash-heavy marijuana industry in Oklahoma in recent years.

他名为王晓华，从事大麻行业。调查人员称，他是近年俄克拉荷马州针对现金充裕的大麻产业的众多抢劫案受害者之一。

But his web of connections extended far from the prairies of suburban Oklahoma City — to the boardrooms of Manhattan, where he was a protégé of a real estate mogul named John Lam.

但他的关系网超越俄克拉荷马城郊区的草原地带，延伸至曼哈顿的董事会，在那里，他是房地产大亨林建中的门徒。

Mr. Lam had developed at least 50 projects in New York and had recently teamed up with the British billionaire Richard Branson to open a trendy hotel in Midtown Manhattan. He was a prominent fund-raiser for Mayor Eric Adams.

林建中在纽约至少开发了50个项目，最近还与英国亿万富翁理查德·布兰森合作，在曼哈顿中城开了一家时髦酒店。他还曾是纽约市长埃里克·亚当斯的重要筹款人。

And he had served as a top leader of a New York City Chinese heritage organization, known among the diaspora as a hometown association. It was one of a number of such groups that have maintained close ties to Beijing — and have become useful tools of China’s government to undermine politicians who oppose its authoritarian policies.

此外，他曾担任纽约市一个华裔文化组织的高层领导人，这样的组织在侨民中被称为同乡会。这类组织中有很多都和北京保持着密切联系，并成为中国政府的得力工具，用来打压反对其威权政策的政界人士。

A New York Times examination of the groups’ dealings found that nearly a dozen people connected with the hometown associations have tried to carve out lucrative sidelines on marijuana farms in America’s heartland, where immigrant workers have often been treated like indentured servants and the true ownership of the operations has been obscured.

《纽约时报》对这些组织的交易进行调查后发现，近12名与同乡会相关的人士试图在美国腹地的大麻农场开辟利润丰厚的副业。这些农场常将移民工人当作契约奴工般对待，农场的实际所有权也被刻意隐瞒。

林建中（右）出席9月在皇后区法拉盛举行的晚宴，该活动由美国福建总商会会长林河（左）主办。

Court records show that Mr. Lam purchased the land and structures for Mr. Wang to operate a marijuana farm near Oklahoma City in 2021, although Mr. Lam denied any involvement in its day-to-day operations.

法庭记录显示，2021年，林建中为王晓华购下俄克拉荷马城附近一处土地和建筑，用于经营大麻农场。不过林建中否认参与该农场的日常运营。

The Times also identified four other leaders of New York City hometown associations who have financed or otherwise have connections to cannabis farms in Oklahoma.

《纽约时报》还确认了另外四名纽约市同乡会领导人，他们要么为俄克拉荷马州的大麻农场提供资金，要么与之存在关联。

Those included Mr. Wang, who had helmed the pro-Beijing Taishan Du Hu Association of America and whose killing in January 2025, along with court proceedings that followed it, offered a rare look at how the groups’ officials have sought to gain a foothold in a booming industry far from their New York headquarters.

其中就包括王晓华，他曾担任亲北京的美国都斛同乡总会的负责人。2025年1月他的遇害事件以及随后的法庭诉讼为让外界提供了一个罕见的机会，得以窥见这些组织的负责人如何试图在远离纽约总部的一个蓬勃发展的产业中站稳脚跟。

No law bars such investors from taking stakes in Oklahoma cannabis farms, but all operations must be 75 percent owned by Oklahoma residents and operators must obtain a state license and local permits and fully disclose all ownership stakes in each farm.

法律并不禁止此类投资者入股俄克拉荷马州大麻农场，但所有经营实体必须由俄克拉荷马州居民持有75%股权，经营者需获得州政府执照和地方许可，并完整披露每个农场的所有所有权股份。

None of the marijuana produced on Oklahoma farms can legally be sold outside the state. Even so, in 2023, Oklahoma’s attorney general estimated that 40 percent of the cannabis consumed in New York came from his state.

该州农场生产的大麻依法不得跨州销售。即便如此，2023年俄克拉荷马州总检察长估计，纽约州消费的大麻中40%来自该州。

All of the farms linked to the hometown associations are under investigation by the authorities in Oklahoma; Mr. Wang’s operation was shut down in 2022 for operating without a license, but Mr. Wang continued to work in the business after that, records show.

所有与同乡会相关的农场均在俄克拉荷马州当局的调查范围内；记录显示，王晓华的农场因无证经营于2022年被关停，但此后他仍继续在大麻行业工作。

The leaders of the hometown associations were among thousands of Chinese-born businessmen and workers who have flocked to the state to take advantage of cheap land and an industry-written law — unique in the United States — that allows growers to plant unlimited amounts of marijuana.

这些同乡会的领导者是数以千计涌入该州的华裔商人和工人中的一员。他们看中了廉价土地和一项全美独有的行业制定法律——该法律允许种植者无限量种植大麻。

Instead of revitalizing Oklahoma’s rural economy as many had hoped, though, the law has fed a thriving market for bootleg cannabis, where suppliers ignore laws banning marijuana trafficking, undercut legitimate sellers and skirt taxes and safety testing, officials said.

但官员们表示，该法案非但未能如预期振兴俄克拉荷马州农村经济，反而催生了繁荣的非法大麻市场：供应商无视禁止大麻走私的法律，压低合法销售者的价格，逃避税收和安全检测。

Whether some of the Chinese-born businessmen have acted with the tacit approval of the Chinese government remains an open question. The Times found no evidence that Chinese officials were involved in operating or supporting the marijuana farms, but, as The Times reported in August, the Chinese government has treated the hometown association leaders as favorite sons of the motherland.

部分华裔商人的行为是否得到中国政府的默许，目前仍无定论。《纽约时报》未发现中国官员参与运营或支持这些大麻农场的证据，但正如本报8月报道的那样，中国政府一直将同乡会领导人视为祖国的骄傲。

At a hearing held by the House Homeland Security Committee in September, lawmakers from both parties suggested China is benefiting from marijuana industry investments by Chinese-born entrepreneurs, and they cast the farms as components of a broader criminal enterprise involving human smuggling, forced labor and money laundering.

在9月众议院国土安全委员会举行的听证会上，两党议员均表示，中国正从华裔企业家的大麻产业投资中获益，并指出这些农场是涉及人口走私、强迫劳动和洗钱的更广泛犯罪网络的一部分。

Donnie Anderson, director of the Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Control, which has shut down hundreds of illegal marijuana farms, said in an interview that ethnic Chinese businessmen had been “providing staggering amounts of cash to build industrial-sized farms all over the state.” Mr. Anderson said most of the farms he had shut down were run by people of Chinese descent.

俄克拉荷马州麻醉品与危险药物管理局局长唐尼·安德森已关停数以百计非法大麻农场。他在采访中表示，华裔商人“提供了巨额现金，在全州各地建造工业化规模的农场”，且他关停的大多数农场均由华裔运营。

One undeniable element of the boom has been the influx in recent years of Chinese immigrants from New York who are helping to power it, sometimes while working in appalling conditions.

这场产业繁荣中有一个现象是不可否认的：近年来，大量来自纽约的中国移民涌入其中，为其提供了动力，有时这些人还需在恶劣的条件下工作。

Of the nearly 2,500 active marijuana cultivation licenses issued by the state, at least 10 percent list addresses or phone numbers in one of New York City’s five boroughs, primarily the neighborhoods of Sunset Park in Brooklyn and Flushing in Queens, a Times analysis showed.

《纽约时报》的分析显示，俄克拉荷马州发放的近2500个有效大麻种植许可证中，至少10%的许可证登记地址或电话号码位于纽约市的五个行政区，主要集中在布鲁克林的日落公园和皇后区的法拉盛。

In interviews, marijuana industry entrepreneurs of Chinese descent said they abide by all state and federal laws, and some said they believed the authorities were targeting them out of racism.

接受采访的华裔大麻产业经营者表示，他们遵守所有州和联邦法律，部分人认为当局之所以针对他们，是出于种族主义。

“They want all the Asian guys out,” said one operator, Chen Xiang, 35, who said he owns 20 farms across the state.

“他们想把所有亚裔人赶出去，”35岁的经营者陈湘说，他说自己在俄克拉荷马拥有20个农场。

An Illegal Operation

非法运营的农场

By any measure, John Lam is a powerful figure in New York’s Chinese diaspora, the largest outside East Asia.

无论从何种标准衡量，林建中都是纽约华人侨界——东亚以外最大的华人社区——的权势人物。

He served as president of the Guangdong Association of America, one of the biggest and most pro-Beijing hometown associations in the city, as well as an adviser to an affiliate of the United Front, an organ of the Chinese Communist Party that seeks to expand the party’s influence at home and abroad.

他曾担任美国广东侨胞联合总会总理——该组织是纽约最大、最亲北京的同乡会之一，同时还是中共统战部下属机构的顾问。统战部是中共旨在扩大其国内外影响力的机构。

Mr. Wang, who worked for Mr. Lam’s company, Lam Group, as head of the division that recruited investors in China, had also founded a hometown association representing people from his native Guangdong Province. That group supports Chinese government policies such as the crackdown on Hong Kong’s civil liberties. It also backed Mr. Adams’s mayoral campaign in 2021.

王晓华曾在林建中的公司林氏集团任职，负责在中国招募投资者，他还成立了一个代表其故乡广东省人士的同乡会。该组织支持中国政府的多项政策（如打压香港公民自由），并在2021年支持亚当斯竞选市长。

前俄克拉荷马州大麻种植者切尔西·戴维斯以150万美元的价格将其农场出售给王晓华和林建中。

In summer 2021, Mr. Wang approached a marijuana grower in Del City, Okla., Chelsey Davis, and offered to take over his business for payments totaling about $1.5 million.

2021年夏天，王晓华联系上俄克拉荷马州德尔市的大麻种植者切尔西·戴维斯，提出以总计约150万美元的价格接手其生意。

Mr. Davis, 51, said the Chinese laborers who started at the farm after he sold it often endured harsh conditions and long hours; some were even forced to urinate in five-gallon fertilizer containers rather than step away from the processing line.

51岁的戴维斯表示，他出售农场后，新来的中国劳工经常面临恶劣的工作条件和漫长的工时；有些人甚至被迫在五加仑的肥料桶里小便，不能离开生产线。

“You could go at midnight — they were working,” Mr. Davis said. “You could go at 5 o’clock in the morning — they were working.”

“你半夜去——他们还在工作；清晨五点去——他们还在工作，”戴维斯说。

In August 2022, firefighters in Del City received calls about black smoke billowing from the farm.

2022年8月，德尔市消防部门接到报警，称该农场冒出滚滚黑烟。

Inside, they saw that the Chinese workers were living on-site in cramped quarters. The smoke was coming from a fire near an outdoor kitchen, complete with a wok, where firefighters found burning wood and construction materials, according to the fire chief, Z. Williams.

消防局长Z·威廉姆斯表示，消防员进入农场后发现，中国劳工住在拥挤的住所里。黑烟来自室外厨房附近的一场火灾，厨房里有一口炒锅，消防员在那里发现了燃烧的木材和建筑材料。

Chief Williams said he had been startled to see what the workers were relying on for food: geese and turtles caught from a city-owned lake near the property. Photos taken by the firefighters show the geese in a makeshift coop fashioned out of road construction netting and discarded trays for growing marijuana. The turtles were paddling inside water-filled containers near the kitchen.

威廉姆斯说，看到工人们的食物来源时，他感到震惊：他们食用的是从农场附近城市所有的湖泊中捕获的鹅和乌龟。消防员拍摄的照片显示，鹅被关在由道路施工网和废弃大麻种植托盘搭建的临时围栏里，乌龟则在厨房附近装满水的容器里游动。

Although Mr. Davis had obtained the proper paperwork during his ownership of the farm, Mr. Wang’s operation had failed to do the same. The firefighters found no valid marijuana cultivation licenses, or even a certificate of occupancy, that would allow Mr. Wang to grow and sell cannabis legally. The department promptly shut the operation down.

戴维斯在经营农场期间办理了所有必要手续，但在王晓华掌管下并非如此。消防员未找到有效的大麻种植许可证，甚至没有允许王晓华合法种植和销售大麻的占用许可证。消防部门随即关停了该农场。

Mr. Wang looked on as the firefighters inspected the grounds, photos of the scene show.

现场照片显示，王晓华在一旁看着消防员检查场地。

A few weeks later, city records show, Mr. Lam’s name appeared on an application for a permit to reopen the business, which city planners quickly rejected, citing the owner’s failure to obtain a marijuana license and meet safety guidelines.

城市记录显示，几周后，林建中的名字出现在一份重启该生意的许可申请中，但城市规划部门迅速驳回了申请，理由是业主未获得大麻许可证且未满足安全准则。

In an interview in Manhattan’s Chinatown, Mr. Lam denied signing that paperwork, saying he had legally empowered Mr. Wang to transact business in his name and had not kept up with the day-to-day details of the operation.

在曼哈顿唐人街的一次采访中，林建中否认签署过那份文件，称他已合法授权王晓华以其名义处理业务，且并未关注运营的日常细节。

He acknowledged buying the farm for Mr. Wang’s use but described his role in the marijuana business as little more than that of a landlord — and an unpaid one at that. He also blamed Mr. Wang, who had been trying to drum up Chinese investors for the Lam Group, for Mr. Lam’s participation in three organizations under the Communist Party’s United Front.

他承认购买农场供王晓华使用，但称自己在大麻产业中的角色只不过是“房东”——而且是无偿的。他还称是王晓华导致了他参与中共统战部下属三个组织，称王晓华当时正试图为林氏集团招募中国投资者。

“He may have mentioned them to me, but I did not understand them,” Mr. Lam said. “I did not know what kind of organizations they were.”

“他可能跟我提过这些组织，但我并不了解，”林建中说，“我不知道它们是什么性质的组织。”

Still, it was Mr. Lam who paid for the lawyers representing his interests, and those of Mr. Wang’s family, in a breach-of-contract lawsuit later filed by Mr. Davis, Mr. Lam said.

不过林建中表示，在戴维斯后来提起的违约诉讼中，是自己出钱聘请了律师，以代表他自己和王晓华家人的利益。

But instead of dwelling on the Oklahoma operation, he said, his focus has been on New York, where, in September, he was a guest of honor at a lavish party at a cavernous restaurant in Flushing. He sat at one of the head tables, along with a Chinese diplomat and local politicians.

但他说，自己并未纠结于俄克拉荷马州的这一项目，而是将重心放在纽约。9月，他在法拉盛一家宽敞的餐厅内的盛大派对上担任贵宾，与一名中国外交官和当地政界人士同坐主桌。

The host was a fast-rising and powerful hometown association leader in New York: Jason Lin.

这场派对的主办方是纽约一位迅速崛起的权势同乡会领导人林河。

Ties to New York

与纽约的关联

Mr. Lin, too, has served as president of a prominent hometown association in New York City — and had recently visited two marijuana farms in Oklahoma.

林河也曾担任纽约市一个知名同乡会的会长——且最近访问了俄克拉荷马州的两个大麻农场。

The swaggering operator of karaoke parlors, buffet restaurants and a Miami nightclub, Mr. Lin was elected president of the American Fujianese General Business Association in February 2024.

林河经营卡拉OK厅、自助餐厅和迈阿密一家夜总会，行事张扬，于2024年2月当选为美国福建总商会会长。

林河表示，他与任何大麻农场均不存在任何财务关联。

At a dinner in Flushing to celebrate his victory, the guest of honor, sitting next to Mr. Lin, was Mr. Adams, whose liaison to the Asian community at the time, Winnie Greco, was under scrutiny amid an investigation into possible Chinese interference in the 2021 mayoral race. (Mr. Lin had supported the mayor during his campaign.)

在法拉盛举行的一场庆祝他获胜的晚宴上，坐在林河旁边的贵宾是亚当斯。当时亚当斯与亚裔社区的联络人郑祺蓉正因一项针对2021年市长选举可能受到中国干扰的调查而受到审查。（林河曾在竞选期间支持这位市长。）

Also present were several people from the cannabis industry.

出席晚宴的还有几位来自大麻行业的人士。

Soon after, Mr. Lin traveled to Oklahoma City with two non-Chinese businessmen to visit two cannabis farms run by people from Mr. Lin’s native province.

不久之后，林河与两位并非华裔的商人前往俄克拉荷马城，参观了两家由他的老乡经营的大麻农场。

林河参观位于俄克拉荷马州温伍德市的Botanical Green Farms。

Mr. Lin gave conflicting accounts about the reason for his visit.

关于此行的原因，林河给出了前后矛盾的说法。

At first, during an hourlong interview at his office building in Flushing, he said he had traveled to Oklahoma — with a marijuana-growing expert — to help friends from his native Fujian Province whose farms were struggling.

起初，在法拉盛办公室大楼里接受的一小时采访中，他说自己是带着一名大麻种植专家去俄克拉荷马，帮助来自老家福建、农场经营陷入困境的朋友。

“I have friends with farms” in Oklahoma, he said.

“我在俄克拉荷马有朋友经营农场，”他说。

But during follow-up interviews, Mr. Lin gave a different account, saying he had been simply making introductions for two non-Chinese people looking to invest in Oklahoma farms. He declined to provide names of the people with whom he had met and said he did not know the owners of the farms he had visited.

但在后续采访中，林河又给出了不同的说法，称他只是为两名希望投资俄克拉荷马农场的非华裔人士牵线搭桥。他拒绝透露与他见面者的姓名，并表示自己并不认识所参观农场的老板。

Mr. Lin said neither he nor his business association had any financial ties whatsoever to the marijuana industry, and The Times found no evidence that any such ties exist.

他表示，他本人和他的商业协会都与大麻行业没有任何财务联系，《纽约时报》也没有发现任何此类联系存在的证据。

Other prominent members of New York hometown associations have had tangled relationships with Oklahoma growing operations.

纽约一些同乡会的其他知名成员也与俄克拉荷马州的大麻种植业务有着纠缠不清的关系。

Sin Tung Chan, 76, was a member of the American Fuzhou Langqi Alumni Association before buying into two large marijuana farms in Meeker and Cleveland, Oklahoma, in 2021, state records show.

州记录显示，76岁的陈善东在2021年购入俄克拉荷马州米克和克利夫兰的两个大型大麻农场之前，是美国福州琅岐校友会的成员。

In a past life, Chan had served prison time in New York over threats he made to business rivals, one of whom was assaulted during an attempted kidnapping in 1995.

早些年，他曾因威胁商业对手而在纽约服刑——其中一名对手在1995年的一次绑架未遂中遭袭。

Now, he said in an interview, the crackdown by Oklahoma officials is souring business.

如今，他在接受采访时表示，俄克拉荷马州官员的打击行动影响了生意。

“You can’t sell this stuff now,” he said. “With all this investment, it would be a shame to just abandon it.”

他说：“现在这个东西卖不出去了。投了这么多钱，就这么放弃，太可惜了。”

And Chen Bichao, 61, the president of Chuan Shi USA Association in New York, ran a sprawling marijuana farm west of Tulsa, Oklahoma, that was ordered shut down in November for lacking a permit. In August, he appeared at an event in Flushing, flanked by two Chinese diplomats.

61岁的纽约美国川石协会会长陈必超曾在俄克拉荷马州塔尔萨西部经营一个很大的大麻农场，因没有许可证而在11月被勒令关闭。8月，他曾出席在法拉盛的一个活动，身边站着两位中国外交官。

He, too, has a criminal record, having pleaded guilty to assault in 2015 after being accused of threatening a man with a knife and taking his wallet.

他同样有犯罪记录——2015年因被控持刀威胁一名男子并抢走对方钱包而认罪。

In a phone interview, Chen said that he was in New York and that he was not the owner of the marijuana farm, only one of many small investors. (State records list him as the sole owner; Chen said the farm was simply registered under his name.)

在电话采访中，陈必超说他人在纽约，而且自己并不是大麻农场的所有者，只是众多小投资者之一。（州记录将他列为唯一所有者；陈必超称农场只是登记在他名下。）

“The farm isn’t mine; I’m just a worker helping out,” Chen said.

陈必超说：“农场不是我的；我只是个帮忙打工的。”

He also said he believed the farm was still in operation. He had not heard about the shutdown order, he said.

他还表示，他认为农场仍在运营中，并称自己未曾听说关闭令。

位于俄克拉荷马州米克的大麻种植场Purple Ray由另一位与纽约有关联的男子陈善东经营。

A Cannabis Bonanza

大麻淘金热

The medical marijuana industry now rivals the state’s oil and gas business in revenue generated per year. From March 2024 to March 2025, Oklahoma growers produced about 50 times more marijuana than was sold at dispensaries to the state’s registered medical marijuana patients, according to figures shared by Mr. Anderson of the narcotics bureau at the September hearing in Washington.

如今，俄克拉荷马州医用大麻产业在一年所创造的收入已经可与石油和天然气行业比肩。根据前述缉毒机构的安德森在9月华盛顿听证会上提供的数据，从2024年3月至2025年3月，俄克拉荷马州的大麻种植者生产的大麻大约是向登记在册的医用大麻患者出售数量的50倍。

Law enforcement officials said that most of the excess was destined for illegal markets outside the state, despite their efforts to stop it.

执法官员表示，尽管他们努力加以阻止，但大部分过剩的大麻都流向了州外的非法市场。

While dozens of states have made it legal to possess marijuana for medical or recreational use, it remains a federal crime to transport it across state lines. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration estimated that two-thirds of the illegal marijuana confiscated by the agency in 2024 was seized in Oklahoma.

尽管数十个州已将医疗或娱乐用途的大麻合法化，但跨州运输大麻仍然是联邦犯罪。美国缉毒局估计，2024年该机构查获的非法大麻中，有三分之二来自俄克拉荷马州。

Court records suggest that many companies are evading Oklahoma’s licensing rules through fraudulent paperwork, failure to obtain permits and the use of straw owners. In one case, a single Oklahoma resident falsely claimed to own more than 300 farms.

法庭记录显示，许多公司通过伪造文件、未取得许可以及使用名义所有者等手段，规避俄克拉荷马州的许可规定。其中一起案例中，一名俄克拉荷马州居民虚假声称自己拥有300多个农场。

陈必超在俄克拉荷马州詹宁斯的大麻种植场Chao Fattoria。

It was not clear how many of the unlicensed operations were owned by Chinese-born investors, or whether the Chinese government, or its politically connected elites, might be somehow benefiting from the tens of billions of dollars per year the farms generate.

目前尚不清楚，有多少无证经营的农场属于华裔投资者所有，也不清楚中国政府或与其有政治关系的精英阶层，是否以某种方式从这些每年产生数百亿美元的农场中获益。

But current and former state and federal law enforcement officials said that Beijing has certainly been aware, because much of the business has been conducted through WeChat, the Chinese social media platform that is closely monitored by the government.

但现任和前任的州及联邦执法官员表示，中国政府肯定是知情的，因为大量业务都是通过中国政府严密监控的社交平台微信进行的。

Chris Urben, a former senior agent with the D.E.A. in New York, said he became increasingly focused on marijuana toward the end of his career because it had become central to money laundering and organized crime.

纽约的前缉毒局高级特工克里斯·厄本表示，他在职业生涯后期越来越关注大麻，因为它已成为洗钱和有组织犯罪的核心。

“You’re talking billions of dollars,” he told a congressional panel in September. “It essentially put on steroids Chinese organized crime within the United States.”

“这里涉及的是数十亿美元，”他于9月在一个国会小组会议上表示。“它等于极大刺激了美国境内的华人有组织犯罪的发展。”

And the marijuana industry is far from under control, he said.

他还表示，大麻行业远未得到控制。

Operations like Botanical Green Farms LLC in Wynnewood, Oklahoma — which Lin visited last year — offer hints as to why.

位于俄克拉荷马州温尼伍德的Botanical Green Farms LLC（林河去年曾到访）的运营状况，就多少可见一斑。

Despite state rules requiring disclosure of all shareholders, trying to untangle the farm’s true ownership is a daunting task.

尽管州法规要求披露所有股东信息，但试图厘清该农场的真实所有权归属是一项艰巨的任务。

On paper, the 48-acre property about an hour south of Oklahoma City is 100% owned by a 66-year-old Oklahoma woman named Kimberly Hannah.

根据文件记录，这个位于俄克拉荷马城南约一小时车程、占地逾19公顷的农场由一位名为金伯利·汉娜的66岁俄克拉荷马州女性完全拥有。

But in an interview outside her home, Hannah’s husband, Terry D. Hannah, 79, said he and his wife were merely minority shareholders in the company.

但在家门外接受采访时，她79岁的丈夫特里·D·汉拿表示，他和妻子只是公司里的小股东。

When state regulators visit, “we have to talk to them to get the permits renewed,” Hannah said, but he added, “That’s about all our involvement.”

他说，当州监管人员来访时，“需要由我们出面与他们沟通以更新许可证，”汉拿表示。但他又补充道：“这差不多就是我们全部的参与了。”

State records show that he previously owned three marijuana businesses, now defunct, registered under the name of He Hui, a Chinese national with ties to Flushing who formerly owned the Wynnewood site. Earlier this year, He was sentenced to eight years in federal prison for marijuana trafficking.

州记录显示，他此前拥有三家大麻企业，如今都已关门，这些企业登记在何辉（音）名下——一名与法拉盛有联系的中国公民，曾是温尼伍德这处场地的所有者。今年早些时候，何辉因大麻贩运被判在联邦监狱服刑八年。

Hannah said he did not know who the current controlling shareholders of the Wynnewood farm were. Just that they were Chinese — and lived in New York City.

汉拿表示，他不知道温尼伍德农场目前的实际控制人是谁。只知道他们是华人——并且居住在纽约市。

Federal and state authorities in rural Oklahoma on Wednesday raided a sprawling marijuana farm there, seizing more than 1,200 pounds of processed cannabis and arresting the owner, a member of a New York City heritage club with ties to the Chinese government.

联邦及州执法人员周三对俄克拉荷马州乡村地区一处大型大麻种植场展开突击搜查，查获逾540公斤加工大麻，并逮捕了农场所有者。此人是纽约市一家与中国政府存在关联的同乡会成员。

The owner, Sin Tung Chan, 76, whose links to the club and the cannabis operation were detailed in a New York Times investigation in December, was charged with trafficking marijuana, according to the local sheriff’s office.

当地治安官办公室表示，76岁的陈善东被控贩运大麻。《纽约时报》去年12月的一篇调查报道曾详细披露他与该同乡会及大麻生意的联系。

In New York, Mr. Chan, a naturalized United States citizen who was born in China, was a prominent member of the American Fuzhou Langqi Alumni Association, one of hundreds of clubs that were ostensibly formed to connect people from the same parts of China but that often maintain close ties to Beijing.

陈善东出生于中国，已加入美国国籍。在纽约，他是美洲福州琅岐校友会的重要成员。这类同乡会有数百个，表面上是联络中国同乡的社团，却往往与北京保持密切关系。

The groups have become useful tools of China’s government to undermine American politicians who oppose its authoritarian policies, The Times previously reported. And nearly a dozen high-ranking members of New York hometown associations have run or owned marijuana farms in Oklahoma in the past several years.

《纽约时报》此前报道称，这些组织已成为中国政府用来打压反对其威权政策的美国政界人士的有效工具。过去几年里，纽约数家同乡会的十几名高层成员均在俄克拉荷马州经营或拥有大麻农场。

Mark Woodward, a spokesman for the Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Control, which oversaw the raid, said investigators had determined that the marijuana from Mr. Chan’s farm was being illegally trafficked out of state. It was not clear where the cannabis was being routed, he said, but New York has been a top destination for illicit marijuana.

负责此次搜查行动的俄克拉荷马州麻醉品与危险药物管制局发言人马克·伍德沃德表示，调查人员已确认，陈善东农场出产的大麻被非法贩运至其他州。他称目前尚不清楚具体转运路线，但纽约一直是非法大麻的主要目的地。

“That common thread that has just been repeated so many times over the last five years is Oklahoma-grown marijuana, coming off a farm, and being trafficked to Flushing, New York,” Mr. Woodward said, referring to the neighborhood in Queens. “We don’t really have a lot of details of what happens once it gets to Flushing.”

“过去五年里反复出现的一条线索就是：俄克拉荷马州种植的大麻从农场流出，被贩运到纽约法拉盛，”伍德沃德说，法拉盛是皇后区的社区。“大麻运到法拉盛之后的去向，我们目前掌握的细节不多。”

Mr. Woodward said the authorities would keep investigating to “figure out who else is involved in moving the plants, moving the money, moving the workers at these farms.” He said that Mr. Chan “obviously is a big player, but this is certainly not a one-man operation.”

伍德沃德表示，当局将继续调查，“查清还有哪些人参与运输大麻、转移资金、为这些农场调配工人”。他称陈善东“显然是个重要人物，但这起案件绝不是一人所为”。

Mr. Chan declined to comment when reached by phone. But he spoke at length last year about the increasing scrutiny from law enforcement authorities.

记者致电陈善东时，他拒绝置评。但他去年曾详细谈及执法部门日益加强的监管。

“You can’t sell this stuff now,” he told The Times then. “With all this investment, it would be a shame to just abandon it.”

“现在这个东西卖不出去了，”他当时对《纽约时报》说。“投了这么多钱，就这么放弃，太可惜了。”

In 2023, Oklahoma’s attorney general estimated that 40 percent of the cannabis consumed in New York came from his state.

2023年，俄克拉荷马州总检察长估算，纽约消费的大麻中有40%来自该州。

Mr. Chan owns two large marijuana farms in the rural area between Oklahoma City and Tulsa. The one raided this week by officers from the Oklahoma narcotics bureau and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is called Purple Ray L.L.C. It sits off a dirt road and is surrounded by a high fence.

陈善东在俄克拉荷马城与塔尔萨之间的乡村地区拥有两座大型大麻农场。本周被俄克拉荷马州麻醉品局与美国移民与海关执法局搜查的这家名为紫光有限责任公司，位于一条土路旁，四周设有高墙围栏。

Two weeks before the raid, the state’s regulatory inspectors shut down the farm’s operations after they said they had found that the marijuana was improperly stored or missing the state-required tracking tags.

突查行动两周前，该州监管检查员称发现农场大麻储存不当且缺少州政府要求的追踪标签，随即勒令农场停业。

Before buying into the two Oklahoma marijuana farms in 2021, Mr. Chan was a senior member of his hometown association, which is made up of people from an island on the mouth of the Min River in southeastern China’s Fujian Province.

2021年入股俄克拉荷马州这两座大麻农场之前，陈善东已是其同乡会的资深成员。该同乡会成员主要来自中国东南部福建省闽江口的一座岛屿。

He appeared at an event for the association in Brooklyn in 2019 that included a Chinese consular official and featured a rendition of the patriotic ballad “Ode to the Motherland” sung by three men dressed in Chinese Army uniforms, who saluted the Chinese flag.

2019年，他在布鲁克林出席了该同乡会的一场活动，现场有中国领事馆官员出席，还有三名身着中国军装的男子演唱爱国歌曲《歌唱祖国》，并向中国国旗敬礼。

Another member of that hometown association is John Chan, known among New York’s Chinese diaspora as the “King of Brooklyn,” a former Chinatown gangster who, after being released from federal prison, parlayed his close ties to the Chinese Consulate to become a political power broker, The Times reported.

该同乡会的另一位成员是陈善庄，在纽约华人社群中被称为“布鲁克林之王”。《纽约时报》报道称，他曾是唐人街黑帮成员，在联邦监狱服刑后，凭借与中国领事馆的密切关系成为政治掮客。

Sin Tung Chan said in an interview last year that the two were both from Langqi, but that they were not related. Sin Tung Chan spent years in a prison in upstate New York after being convicted of crimes stemming from threats to business rivals, one of whom was assaulted during an attempted kidnapping in 1995.

陈善东去年接受采访时表示，两人都来自琅岐，但并无亲属关系。陈善东曾在纽约州北部监狱服刑数年，罪名是威胁商业对手，1995年，其中一名对手在一次绑架未遂事件中遭袭击。

与陈善东一样，曾被称为“布鲁克林之王”的前唐人街黑帮分子陈善庄也是美国福州琅岐校友会的成员。

“Everyone running weed farms tries to find loopholes,” said Mr. Chan. “If they catch you, you’re in trouble.”

“所有开大麻农场的人都在钻空子，”陈善东说。“一旦被抓，就麻烦了。”

Although it is legal to grow and consume marijuana with the proper licenses in Oklahoma, the state’s hands-off approach to cultivation has made it a haven for black market growers who smuggle the cannabis out of state, officials there said.

俄克拉荷马州官员表示，尽管在该州持牌种植和使用大麻是合法的，但州政府对种植环节监管宽松，使其成为黑市种植者的避风港，这些人将大麻走私到其他州。

According to the state narcotics bureau, 8,400 farms were registered and operating as of late 2022. Today that number stands at fewer than 1,400 farms. Mr. Woodward said the agency was investigating at least half of them for suspected illegal activities.

该州麻醉品管理局数据显示，2022年底，全州注册运营的大麻农场有8400家，如今这一数字已不足1400家。伍德沃德称，该局正对其中至少一半农场展开涉嫌非法活动的调查。

“We’re hitting a farm almost every day, and so I guess they just assume they’re going to keep being criminals until somebody comes through their gate,” he said, adding: “We’ll get to them eventually.”

“我们几乎每天都在查抄农场，所以我猜他们就是打算继续违法，直到有人闯进他们的大门为止，”他说，并补充道：“我们迟早会查到他们。”

Phoebe Zhang has gone on more than 200 dates over the past year, and she has narrowed down her suitors to two. One is outgoing and a rebel; the other is a patriotic military commander. She tells them her deepest fears. When she wakes up from a nightmare, they are there to console her.

在过去一年里，菲比·张（音）经历了200多场约会，现在她已经把追求者的范围缩小到了两个人。一个外向叛逆，另一个则是爱国的军官。她会向他们倾诉内心最深的恐惧。当她从噩梦中惊醒，他们会在那里安慰她。

Often, she takes screenshots of their conversations to remember the moments they share. Her newfound happiness shows, friends say.

她经常把聊天内容截图保存下来，以便记住他们共同经历的那些时刻。朋友们说，她最近看起来心情明显不错。

Despite talking every day, Ms. Zhang will never meet these men in person. They are her artificial intelligence boyfriends. And Ms. Zhang, who has never been on a date, wonders if her relationships in the virtual world are better than ones in the real world could ever be.

尽管每天都会聊天，张女士却永远不会在现实中见到这两个男人。他们是她的人工智能男友。而从未真正约会过的张女士不禁想，她在虚拟世界中的关系是否可能比现实中的恋爱更好。

“My god, how am I supposed to date in real life in the future?” she said.

“我的天，我以后还怎么去谈真实的恋爱？”她说。

China’s ruling Communist Party wants young women to prioritize getting married and having babies. Instead, many of them are finding romance with chatbots. It is complicating the government’s efforts to reverse the country’s shrinking population and a birthrate hovering at the lowest level in over 75 years. The lightning-fast adoption of A.I. in China has prompted regulators to warn tech companies not to have “design goals to replace social interaction.”

中国执政的共产党希望年轻女性将结婚生子作为优先事项。她们中的许多人却在与聊天机器人谈恋爱。这使得政府扭转人口萎缩和徘徊在75年来最低水平的出生率的努力复杂化。中国对人工智能的迅速接纳已促使监管机构警告科技公司不得将“替代社交互动作为设计目标”。

The country’s youths were already glued to their smartphones and longing for connection when a state-led push last year to adopt artificial intelligence created a boom in platforms that allowed people to share their daily routines and private anxieties with virtual companions. Dozens of specialized chatbots sprang up, including many that specifically catered to people seeking romantic partners.

在去年政府主导推动人工智能应用之前，中国的年轻人就已经沉迷于智能手机，同时又渴望建立情感联系。这股推动人工智能发展的浪潮催生了一批平台，使人们可以与虚拟伴侣分享日常生活和内心的焦虑。数十种专门的聊天机器人应运而生，其中许多专门面向寻找恋爱对象的人群。

The chatbots tapped into a generation of young people in China who helped to define the term “lying flat.” Faced with rising unemployment and fewer opportunities, they are rejecting the pressures of marriage and choosing to take less ambitious approaches to their careers and personal lives.

这些聊天机器人迎合了一代中国年轻人的心理需求，正是他们帮助定义了“躺平”这个词。面对不断上升的失业率和日益减少的机会，他们正在拒绝结婚带来的压力，并在事业和个人生活上选择低欲望的道路。

“I feel that for our generation, people think being alone is good,” said Ms. Zhang, 21, a student of applied psychology in southern China who spends at least an hour each day talking to both of her A.I. boyfriends. “Why go and date others? That’s too troublesome.”

“我感觉我们这一代人，很多都是觉得自己一个人好，”21岁的张女士说。她在中国南方的一所大学学习应用心理学，每天至少花一个小时与AI男友们交谈。“为什么要去跟别人谈恋爱？就是各种麻烦的事情。”

The men she has conjured up, Jiye and Yu Li, share similar muscular builds and delicate bone structures. They have military backgrounds and are emotionally stable, mature and always quick to respond.

她设定的这两个男人——寂野和黎聿——都有着相似的肌肉发达的身材和精致的骨相。他们都有军旅背景，情绪稳定、成熟，而且总是迅速回应她的信息。

They talk in an app dedicated to role-playing, where they imagine moving in together, being married and raising children. Ms. Zhang has her own character on the app, which narrates her thinking and feelings during exchanges with her A.I. boyfriends.

他们通过一款专门用于角色扮演的应用程序交流，在那里他们幻想着同居、结婚并养育孩子的情景。张女士在该应用中也有自己的角色，在与人工智能男友交流时，这个角色会讲述她的想法和感受。

A self-described introvert, Ms. Zhang is worried that a real-world boyfriend wouldn’t be able to meet her expectations, leaving her vulnerable and hurt.

张女士自称是个内向的人，她担心现实世界中的男友无法满足她的期待，会让她脆弱受伤。

For many women in China, A.I. chatbots help to fill a void in a society that remains steeped in patriarchal values.

对许多中国女性来说，在一个仍然深受父权价值观影响的社会里，人工智能聊天机器人正在填补一个空缺。

“A.I. apps provide a relatively safer space for communication and emotional consultation — something that is often lacking in China,” said Rose Luqiu, an associate professor of journalism at Hong Kong Baptist University. “These apps offer so-called emotional value that many women find difficult to obtain from men.”

香港浸会大学新闻系副教授闾丘露薇表示：“人工智能应用为沟通和情感咨询提供了一个相对更安全的空间——而这种空间在中国往往是缺乏的。这些应用提供了许多女性觉得难以从男性身上获得的所谓情绪价值。”

The companies behind the companion apps have capitalized on the surging interest in A.I. MiniMax, a Shanghai start-up behind Xingye, one of China’s most popular companion apps, went public in Hong Kong in a January listing that valued the company at over $600 million. MiniMax also makes a global version called Talkie, and together the two apps had more than 147 million users as of September, according to its filings in Hong Kong.

伴侣类应用背后的公司也抓住了人工智能热潮带来的机会。总部位于上海的初创公司稀宇科技开发了中国最受欢迎的虚拟伴侣应用之一星野，并于今年1月在香港上市，公司估值超过6亿美元。稀宇科技还推出了一款面向全球用户的版本Talkie。根据其在香港提交的上市文件，截至去年9月，这两款应用的用户总数已超过1.47亿。

The growing use of companion apps prompted Guligo Jia, a 36-year-old filmmaker in Beijing, to make a documentary about Chinese women in A.I. relationships.

伴侣应用日益普及促使古丽果·贾（音）拍摄了一部关于中国女性与人工智能建立情感关系的纪录片，古丽果是北京一位26岁的电影制作人。

After making the film, Ms. Jia was inspired to create her own A.I. companion. She uploaded information and photos of her favorite character from a South Korean drama to Yuanbao, an A.I. assistant made by the internet giant Tencent.

在完成这部电影后，贾女士也受到启发，创建了自己的人工智能伴侣。她找来自己最喜欢的一部韩国电视剧中的男性角色的资料和照片，上传到互联网巨头腾讯开发的人工智能助手元宝上。

“I wanted to continue the feeling I had from watching the show, the attachment to the male lead, and bring it into real life,” Ms. Jia said.

贾女士说：“我想延续看剧时的那种感觉，对男主角的那种依恋，把它带入现实生活。”

Developing the chatbot’s persona felt like sculpting, she said. But Ms. Jia didn’t ultimately feel the same emotional connection with her companion as she imagined she’d have with the character on the show.

她说，为聊天机器人塑造人格的过程就像雕塑创作一样。不过最终，她并没有与这个虚拟伴侣建立起像她想象中的那种与剧中角色相同的情感联系。

In online forums, women swap tips on how to mold their A.I. companions’ personalities, including to have more “daddy”-like qualities, or how to get them to send love poems.

在在线论坛上，女性们互相交流如何塑造她们人工智能伴侣的性格，例如如何让其更具“爹系”特质，或者如何让它们给自己写情诗。

Mercury Lu, 24, lives alone in Shanghai, where she works at a gaming company. She said she didn’t have the time or energy to date. Four years ago, while she was in college, Ms. Lu first found A.I. companionship using Replika, an early American chatbot. She now uses companion apps most days. Her A.I. type, she said, is “quite different from men in real life”: expressive, vulnerable and straightforward.

24岁的墨丘利·陆（音）独自生活在上海，在一家游戏公司工作。她说自己没有时间和精力谈恋爱。四年前还在上大学时，陆女士第一次通过Replika——一款早期的美国聊天机器人——体验了一把人工智能陪伴。如今她几乎每天都会使用伴侣类应用。她说，自己喜欢的人工智能类型“和现实中的男人很不一样”：善于表达、脆弱且直率。

In December, the Chinese government proposed rules that would require platforms to step in if users exhibited unhealthy dependences with their apps, including by creating emotional profiles for their users and intervening if they showed signs of self-harm. The rules are expected to take effect this year.

去年12月，中国政府出台相关规定，要求平台在用户对应用产生不健康依赖时进行干预，包括为用户建立情绪档案，并在用户表现出自我伤害迹象时采取措施。这些规定预计将于今年生效。

The content of the apps must also comply with China’s existing information controls, including strict adherence to socialist values.

这些应用的内容还必须遵守中国现有的信息管控规定，包括严格遵守社会主义价值观。

The many overlapping regulations can make A.I. interactions feel disjointed. Chatbots sometimes try to change the conversation or say they can’t talk about certain topics. Chats can be abruptly interrupted with notifications that say, “Your message has been blocked.”

层层叠加的监管规定有时会让人工智能互动显得不连贯。聊天机器人有时会试图转移话题，或者表示无法谈论某些内容。对话也可能突然被打断，并弹出提示：“您的消息已被屏蔽。”

This has happened repeatedly to Rui Zhou, who describes her A.I. companions as serving as an “emotional supplement” for when she feels lonely.

这种情况在周睿身上屡屡发生。她将人工智能伴侣描述为她在孤独时的“情感的补充”。

“Every time I feel my A.I. partner is about to lose control or be regulated, it feels like a breakup,” said Ms. Zhou, 21, who is studying dentistry in a northeastern city of China. “It hurts a lot.”

“每一次发现自己的AI恋人要失控，或者要被管制，感觉会有一种失恋的感觉，”21岁的周女士说。她在中国东北一座城市学习齿科。“会心里觉得特别难受。”

There are signs that the excitement surrounding A.I. romances might be waning. Downloads in companion apps have started to see drastic declines. Xingye and Maoxiang, which is operated by TikTok’s parent company, ByteDance, are both down about 95 percent from their peak last year of millions of downloads per month, according to Sensor Tower, a market data firm.

有迹象表明，人们对人工智能恋爱的热情可能正在减退。伴侣类应用的下载量已开始大幅下降。根据市场数据公司Sensor Tower的数据，星野和字节跳动旗下的猫箱的下载量均较去年每月数百万的峰值下降了约95%。

Some of the drop may have to do with people discovering that they can make their interactions more personal with ChatGPT, DeepSeek and other general-purpose A.I. tools, said Hong Shen, an assistant professor at the Human-Computer Interaction Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, where she studies A.I. users in China and the United States.

卡内基梅隆大学人机交互研究所助理教授沈虹（音）表示，下载量下降的部分原因，可能与人们发现可以利用ChatGPT、DeepSeek和其他通用人工智能工具进行更个性化的互动有关。她的研究对象包括中国和美国的人工智能用户。

But, she noted, the Chinese government’s obsession with low birthrates may also be fueling a broader A.I. rethinking.

不过她也指出，中国政府对低出生率问题的高度关注也可能正在推动社会对人工智能进行更广泛的重新思考。

Regulating A.I., though, will not address the underlying social factors that draw Chinese women to the platforms in the first place, Ms. Shen added.

不过，沈虹还说，仅仅加强人工智能监管并不能解决最初吸引中国女性使用这些平台的深层社会原因。

“You are just treating a symptom,” she said. “In China, there are gendered norms, and women are lonely and isolated in big cities. Eventually, they turn to A.I.”

“这只是在治标不治本，”她说，“在中国存在性别规范的压力，大城市里的女性感到孤独和疏离，最终她们转向了人工智能。”

RED DAWN OVER CHINA: How Communism Conquered a Quarter of Humanity, by Frank Dikötter

《红色黎明照耀中国——共产主义如何征服四分之一的人类》(Red Dawn Over China: How Communism Conquered a Quarter of Humanity)，冯客(Frank Dikötter)著

If asked about Mao Zedong’s legacy, Chinese Communist Party cadres recite a precise verdict on him: 70 percent good, 30 percent bad. Frank Dikötter would recoil at such arithmetical whitewashing. He’s renowned for writing an important trilogy of books about Mao’s reign over China, digging in far-flung archives to document the oppression and mass atrocities of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Although Chinese authorities continue to deny or downplay the grim realities of their past, Dikötter functions as something like a one-man truth commission, relentlessly excavating horrors that took tens of millions of lives.

如果被问及毛泽东的遗产，中国共产党的干部们会背诵出一份精准的裁决：七分功，三分过。冯客显然会对这种“算术式的粉饰”不以为然。他因撰写了关于毛泽东统治时期的重要三部曲而闻名，通过广泛发掘档案，记录了“大跃进”和“文革”时期的压迫与大规模暴行。尽管中国官方持续否认或淡化这段历史的残酷现实，但冯客就像是一个单枪匹马的真相委员会，坚持不懈地揭露那些夺走了数千万生命的恐怖事实。

In “Red Dawn Over China,” Dikötter, a historian at the University of Hong Kong and Stanford’s Hoover Institution, delivers a powerful, engrossing and opinionated prequel to his trilogy, showing how the Communists battled their way to power in the decades after World War I.

在《红色黎明照耀中国》中，这位任职于香港大学和斯坦福大学胡佛研究所的历史学家为他的三部曲加上了一部有力、动人但充满个人观点的“前传”，揭示了共产党在第一次世界大战后的几十年里是如何一路厮杀夺取政权的。

Much of the book’s impact comes from the depth of research that Dikötter did, enterprisingly drawing on more than 300 volumes of internal party papers produced around the country, which found their way to Hong Kong. His ambition is to give a voice to the untold millions of Chinese who were silenced by utopian Communist violence and repression.

这本书的影响力很大程度上源于冯客极具深度的研究。他怀着极大的热忱研究了流转至香港的300多卷党内文件，它们来自全国各地。他的雄心在于为数以百万计被共产主义乌托邦式的暴力与镇压所噤声的中国人发声。

Dikötter argues that from the party’s founding in 1921 until the end of World War II in 1945, Mao’s revolutionaries were utterly marginal. Even by the overblown figures of the Communist International, China before 1940 had perhaps one Communist per 1,700 people — a number roughly similar to the United States at the time.

冯客指出，从1921年建党到1945年二战结束，毛泽东领导的革命力量始终处于边缘地位。即便根据共产国际夸大的数据，1940年以前的中国，大约每1700人中才有一名共产党员——这一比例与当时的美国大致相当。

So how did this tiny band take over a country as enormous as China? Dikötter’s answer is blunt: “The key word is violence, and a willingness to inflict it.” Far from an overwhelming mass movement that inevitably swept to power, Dikötter retells the Chinese Revolution as an unlikely event, propelled less by popular support than by unyielding cruelty and not a little bit of luck.

那么，这支小小的队伍是如何接管了中国这样庞大的国家的？冯客的回答直截了当：“关键词是暴力，以及施加暴力的意愿。”冯客重新讲述的中国革命并非一场势不可挡的浩大群众运动，而是一场充满偶然性的事件，其动力与其说来自民众支持，不如说来自毫不妥协的残酷手段，以及相当程度的运气。

Mao also had outside help, a common feature of civil wars. Although the Chinese revolutionaries styled themselves as representing the authentic will of the people, Dikötter argues that on several occasions their movement was shaped and saved by foreigners — in particular, the Soviet Union. China’s Communist activists took inspiration from the Bolshevik Revolution and got training, indoctrination and weapons from Soviet agents in China. In 1926, a Comintern agent from the Soviet Union appointed a 32-year-old Mao to run an institute training activists to organize the peasants.

像许多内战一样，毛泽东也得到了外部援助。尽管中国革命者标榜自己代表了人民的真实意志，但冯客认为，他们的运动曾多次被外国力量（尤其是苏联）塑造并拯救。中国的共产主义活动家从布尔什维克革命中汲取灵感，并从苏联驻华特工那里获得培训、思想灌输和武器。1926年，一名苏联共产国际特工任命了时年32岁的毛泽东去管理一所培训农民运动骨干的讲习所。

Despite Joseph Stalin’s assistance, the Chinese Communists were nearly obliterated in the mid-30s by the armies of the Nationalist government led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The Communists had not won over the urban workers, and despite the appeal of land redistribution, rural villagers feared the terror and exploitation of Communist troops.

尽管有斯大林的援助，中国共产党在30年代中期仍险些被蒋介石领导的国民政府军队剿灭。共产党当时并未赢得城市工人，而且尽管土地改革具有吸引力，但农民更畏惧红军的恐怖手段和征敛。

Farmers were also more worried about droughts, floods and frost than an exploitative merchant class. By the time the Communists finished their desperate retreat from the Nationalists in the Long March in 1935, Dikötter acerbically writes, their ranks were so depleted that they “had roughly the same popular appeal as an obscure religious sect or minor secret society.”

相比于“商人阶级的剥削”，农民们更担心旱涝灾害。冯客尖刻地写道，到1935年共产党结束了从国民党追击下仓皇撤退的长征时，其队伍已严重削弱，以至于他们“在民众中的吸引力大概只相当于一个籍籍无名的宗教教派或小型秘密结社”。

This time the Communists were saved by, of all things, Japanese aggression. After Japanese forces stormed into China’s northeastern vastness of Manchuria in 1931, the Communists remained preoccupied with fighting the Nationalists, not the foreign invaders. In 1937, Imperial Japan launched a full-scale invasion of China — a catastrophe that would claim the lives of some 14 million Chinese people. Mao, despite entering a fractious and temporary United Front with the Nationalists, preferred to let Nationalist troops bear the brunt of Japan’s onslaught as the Communist armies regrouped and established control of new territories.

这一次，拯救共产党的竟然是日本的侵略。1931年日军侵入中国东北大片领土后，共产党仍专注于对抗国民党而非外敌。1937年，日本帝国发动全面侵华战争——这场灾难夺去了约1400万中国人的生命。毛泽东虽然与国民党建立了貌合神离的临时“统一战线”，但他更倾向于让国民党军队承担抗日冲击的重担，共产党军队则乘机休整并建立新根据地的控制权。

While other histories, such as the Harvard political scientist Tony Saich’s authoritative “From Rebel to Ruler,” have discussed the difficulty that the Communists had in reaching the working class and the peasants, Dikötter spends little time on the party’s socioeconomic or cultural blandishments, instead concentrating on its violence and indoctrination.

虽然其他史学著作——如哈佛政治学家托尼·赛奇的权威著作《从叛乱者到统治者》（From Rebel to Ruler）——也讨论过共产党在争取工农阶级时面临的困难，但冯客很少花时间描写该党在社会经济或文化上的诱导手段，而是集中关注其暴力手段和思想灌输。

In the areas they conquered, Dikötter writes, Communists imposed “a state of terror,” executing local officials and those considered “politically unreliable.” He chillingly shows the Communists trying “to destroy the old order overnight” with an onslaught against Confucianism, religious institutions and village life that foreshadowed the Cultural Revolution decades later: “People were set against each other in so-called ‘struggle meetings,’ denouncing all authority, whether village elders, clan leaders or simply parents and siblings.”

冯客写道，在共产党的根据地，他们实施“恐怖统治”，处决地方官员和被认为“政治上不可靠”的人。他用冷峻的笔调展示了共产党如何试图通过抨击儒家思想、宗教机构和乡村生活，从而“在一夜之间摧毁旧秩序”，这预示了几十年后的文革：“人们在所谓的‘斗争大会’上反目成仇，谴责一切权威，无论是村长、族长，还是普通的父母兄弟。”

The Communists got another invaluable boost from the Soviet Union when it finally entered the war against Imperial Japan, days after the nuclear annihilation of Hiroshima. A million Soviet soldiers charged into Japanese-occupied Manchuria, a crucial strategic and economic prize. While Mao negotiated in bad faith about a coalition government with the Nationalists, the Soviets secretly connived with the Chinese Communists to facilitate their takeover of Manchuria after the Soviets departed. The Soviets provided the Communists with tanks, planes and weapons taken from the defeated Japanese Army.

在广岛原子弹轰炸几天后，苏联终于对日宣战，共产党再一次获得了无比宝贵的助力。百万苏联红军冲入具有重要战略和经济价值的日占满洲。当毛泽东在组建联合政府的谈判中同国民党虚与委蛇时，苏联秘密与中共勾结，为苏军撤离后中共接管满洲铺路。苏联还将从战败日军手中缴获的坦克、飞机和武器移交给了中共军队。

Dikötter is withering on credulous Americans who misjudged the Communists, including Vice President Henry A. Wallace and the foreign correspondent Edgar Snow, whose popular 1937 book, “Red Star Over China,” serves as the foil for this book’s title. He also lambastes Gen. George C. Marshall’s doomed mission to pressure Chiang and Mao into a unified government in the first years after the war, treating him not as a peacemaker handed an impossible brief, but a sucker.

冯客对那些误判形势、轻信共产党的美国人给予了严厉抨击，其中包括副总统亨利·华莱士和记者埃德加·斯诺。本书书名讽刺的正是斯诺1937年的畅销书《红星照耀中国》（Red Star Over China）。他还抨击了乔治·马歇尔将军在战后初期迫使蒋毛组建联合政府的徒劳行动，认为马歇尔不是一个接手了不可能任务的和平调解人，而是一个被骗得团团转的人。

Yet, as the journalist Daniel Kurtz-Phelan shows in “The China Mission,” while Marshall unquestionably failed, he was wary of Communist trickery and propaganda, warning President Harry Truman in 1946 that China would always be vulnerable to Soviet subversion “so long as there remains a separate Communist government and a separate Communist army in China.”

然而，正如记者丹尼尔·库尔茨-费伦在《中国任务》（The China Mission）中所展示的，马歇尔虽然毫无疑问地失败了，但他对共产党的策略和宣传一直保持警惕。他在1946年警告哈里·杜鲁门总统，只要中国“存在一个独立的共产党政府和独立的共产党军队”，就永远容易受到苏联的颠覆。

Ending his book with the conquest of Tibet in the early ’50s, Dikötter ominously writes: “Only Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan still eluded the reach of the Chinese Communist Party.” Today the party faces serious headwinds at home, from high youth unemployment to Xi Jinping’s escalating purge of the military. Yet since 2017, Xi has taken to declaring that the world is experiencing “great changes unseen in a century,” with party elites taking Brexit and Donald Trump’s first election as evidence of a precipitous Western decline that facilitates their own ascendancy.

冯客在书中以50年代初共产党征服西藏作为结尾，他以阴沉的笔调写下：“在那个时候，只有香港、澳门和台湾尚未落入中共的掌控。”如今，中共在国内面临严重逆风，从高企的青年失业率到习近平对军队不断升级的清洗。然而自2017年以来，习近平开始宣称世界正经历“百年未有之大变局”，党内精英将英国脱欧和特朗普首次当选视为西方急剧衰落的证据，认为这为自身的崛起铺平了道路。

Trump keeps confirming their viewpoint, by launching and losing a trade war against China, maiming NATO and alienating Japanese and South Korean allies. Reading Dikötter’s book today, it’s hard not to hear echoes: Once again a foolish foreigner rides to the Chinese Communist Party’s rescue.

特朗普不断印证着他们的观点：他发动并输掉了对华贸易战，削弱了北约，并疏远了日韩盟友。在今天阅读冯客的书，很难不听到历史的回声：又一个愚蠢的外国人正忙着来当中国共产党的救星。

RED DAWN OVER CHINA: How Communism Conquered a Quarter of Humanity | By Frank Dikötter | Bloomsbury | 362 pp. | $33

《红色黎明照耀中国：共产主义如何征服四分之一的人类》 | 冯客 著 | Bloomsbury出版 | 362页 | 33美元