Ever since its defeat in World War II, Japan’s place in the world has been shaped by a deliberate policy of restraint.

自二战战败以来，日本在世界上的定位一直由一项刻意奉行的克制政策所塑造。

Under its pacifist postwar Constitution, Japan has for decades kept its military budget modest, sheltered under the U.S. security umbrella, and has avoided directly provoking an increasingly assertive China. Japan’s people, scarred by the trauma of World War II, supported that approach.

根据战后和平宪法，日本数十年来一直维持有限的军事预算，置身于美国的安全保护伞之下，并避免直接挑衅日益强硬的中国。饱受二战创伤的日本民众也支持这一路线。

But this month’s landslide electoral victory by the hard-line Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi — who openly advocates a tougher approach to China and a more robust Japanese military — suggests that era may be ending. The implications for the region could be profound.

但本月，强硬派首相高市早苗以压倒性优势赢得大选——她公开主张对中国采取更强硬立场、建设更强大的日本军事力量——这表明这个时代或许即将终结。这对地区局势可能产生深远影响。

Caught between a more aggressive China and a less predictable United States, the realization has dawned in Japan that caution is no longer enough to guarantee its security. If this trajectory continues, it is likely to result in a U.S. ally that is more assertive, militarily capable — and central to deterring China. It is crucial that the United States encourages this evolution while ensuring that it strengthens, rather than weakens, regional stability.

夹在日益咄咄逼人的中国与更难预测的美国之间，日本逐渐意识到，仅靠谨慎已不足以保障自身安全。如果这一趋势持续，日本这一美国盟友很可能变得更加强势、更具军事能力，并成为威慑中国的核心力量。美国必须鼓励这一转变，同时确保其加强而非削弱地区稳定，这一点至关重要。

The changing Japanese mind-set did not begin with Ms. Takaichi.

日本心态的转变并非始于高市早苗。

It has been years in the making, as the global landscape has shifted, particularly with China’s rise as an assertive military power. China increasingly sends ships into Japan-administered islands in the East China Sea and carries out threatening military maneuvers around Taiwan. Chinese expansionism or a conflict in the region would endanger the sea lanes and supply chains upon which Japan’s trade-dependent economy relies.

这一转变已酝酿多年，全球格局已经变化、尤其是中国已经崛起为强势军事大国。中国越来越频繁地派遣船只进入日本管辖的东海岛屿附近，并在台湾周边开展具有威胁性的军事演习。中国的扩张主义或该地区暴发冲突将危及依赖贸易的日本经济所仰仗的航道与供应链。

With these threats in mind, Japan, under former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, reinterpreted its Constitution in the mid 2010s to broaden the circumstances under which it could use military force. Mr. Abe also created a National Security Council to strengthen decision-making on military matters and increased defense ties across the Indo-Pacific region. His successors, especially Fumio Kishida, continued this arc, approving the largest defense buildup in the postwar era and endorsing Japan’s ability to strike back if attacked — a shift once considered politically unthinkable.

出于对这些威胁的考量，日本在前首相安倍晋三的领导下，于2010年代中期重新解释宪法，扩大了行使武力的适用范围。安倍还设立了国家安全保障会议，强化军事决策机制，并加强与印太地区各国的防务合作。他的继任者，尤其是岸田文雄，延续了这一轨迹，批准了战后规模最大的防务扩张，并支持发展日本遭受攻击时的反击能力——这一转变在政治上曾被认为不可想象。

Ms. Takaichi has indicated a willingness to take things even further.

高市早苗已表示愿意推进这一进程。

In November, she implied that Japan could intervene militarily if China attacked Taiwan, the self-governing island democracy that Beijing claims as its territory. It was one of the clearest public signals by a Japanese leader in years that the country could come to Taiwan’s aid, and Beijing responded angrily with punitive economic measures.

去年11月，她暗示，如果中国攻击北京宣称拥有主权的自治民主地区台湾，日本可能进行军事干预。这是多年来日本领导人最明确的公开信号之一，表明日本可能援助台湾。北京愤怒回应，采取了惩罚性经济措施。

Japanese voters were not intimidated, handing Ms. Takaichi and the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party a supermajority of two-thirds of the seats in the 465-member lower house of Parliament earlier this month — the first political party to achieve that in the postwar era. That represents a historic mandate in a country whose prime ministers typically govern with narrow margins and must make deep compromises to their agenda to appease party or coalition factions.

日本选民并未因此退缩。本月早些时候，高市早苗及长期执政的自民党在选举中以三分之二的席位优势赢得465个议席中的绝对多数——这是战后日本首次有政党实现这一成绩。在日本，首相通常仅以微弱优势执政，必须为安抚党派或联盟派系而大幅妥协议程，此次胜选堪称历史性的政治授权。

Ms. Takaichi may now have the political leverage needed to succeed where Mr. Abe — her mentor — fell short: revising Japan’s Constitution to loosen constraints on its military. Article 9 of the Constitution renounces war and forbids maintaining a “war potential.” Japan has, in fact, built highly capable Self-Defense Forces over the decades, but Article 9 long served as a political guardrail, sustaining informal limits on military spending, offensive capabilities and overseas deployments.

高市早苗如今可能拥有所需的政治筹码，完成其导师安倍晋三未能实现的目标：修改宪法，放宽对军队的限制。宪法第九条规定放弃战争，禁止维持“战争潜力”。事实上，日本数十年来已建成能力极强的自卫队，但第九条长期充当政治护栏，对军费、进攻能力和海外部署维持着非正式的限制。

Revising the Constitution wouldn’t mean an overnight change. But the eventual consequences could be far-reaching — formally recognizing a more conventional role for the military and clearing the way for higher spending and expanded operations beyond Japan’s shores.

修宪并不意味着一夜之间发生剧变。但其最终影响可能深远：这将正式承认军队更常规的角色，为增加军费和日本扩大海外行动扫清障碍。

I’ve spent years talking to policymakers in Japan, where revision of Article 9 was always discussed cautiously as a distant, future aspiration. Now, in the wake of Ms. Takaichi’s election win, there is a different feeling. In meetings across Tokyo that I took part in last week, Liberal Democratic Party lawmakers and cabinet officials spoke about constitutional revision as a plausible near-term objective. Japanese television commentators who once treated the topic as an abstraction now debate timelines.

多年来，我一直在与日本政策制定者交流，修改第九条在过去总是被谨慎地当作遥远的未来目标。如今，在高市早苗胜选后，气氛已然不同。我于上周在东京参加的多场会议中，自民党议员与内阁官员都将修宪视为短期内可能实现的目标。曾经将这一议题当作抽象概念的日本电视评论员如今开始讨论时间表。

Ms. Takaichi still must tread carefully, given lingering political sensitivity over the issue. Her room for maneuver could narrow further if her expansionist economic plans add to rising inflation. But the tone in Tokyo has clearly shifted.

鉴于该议题仍存在政治敏感性，高市早苗仍须谨慎行事。如果她扩张性的经济计划会加剧通胀，她的操作空间可能进一步收窄。但东京的基调显然已经转变。

A normalized Japanese defense posture would force Beijing to reassess its behavior in the region, including its coercive activities aimed at Taiwan. Up to now, China has felt free to increasingly flex its muscles, knowing that one of America’s closest allies — and one of the world’s richest economies and most advanced democracies — was constitutionally prevented from exercising its full military potential.

日本国防态势正常化将迫使北京重新评估自身在该地区的行为，包括针对台湾的胁迫活动。迄今为止，中国之所以能够肆无忌惮地不断展示实力，是因为它知道，美国最亲密的盟友之一、全球最富裕的经济体与最先进的民主国家之一，受宪法限制而无法充分发挥军事潜力。

No one in Asia is eager for an arms race, and a more militarily capable Japan will inevitably stir painful memories in places that suffered under Japanese wartime occupation, particularly China and the Korean Peninsula. But today’s strategic choices must be governed by present geopolitical realities.

亚洲没有人渴望军备竞赛，而一个军事能力更强的日本不可避免地会在战时遭日本占领的地区唤起痛苦的记忆，尤其是在中国和朝鲜半岛。但当今的战略选择必须立足当前地缘政治现实。

A constrained Japan may have been in America’s interest in the decades following World War II, but not anymore. A Japan that is willing to share more of the responsibility and cost of ensuring security in its neighborhood is likely to be welcomed by President Trump, who has pushed for U.S. allies to do just that. This is especially important at a time when American power is stretched by threats to peace around the globe and the nation is politically divided. Washington should embrace the potential for greater Japanese strategic autonomy as a sign of an alliance adapting to modern realities.

二战后几十年里，一个受约束的日本或许符合美国利益，但如今已不再如此。一个愿意分担更多地区安全责任与成本的日本很可能受到特朗普总统欢迎，他一直在推动美国盟友这样做。在美国实力因全球和平威胁而分散、国内政治分裂之际，这一点尤为重要。华盛顿应将日本提升战略自主性的可能性视为同盟适应当下现实的信号。

A stronger Japan is not a cure-all. If accompanied by nationalist rhetoric or provocative actions, it could unsettle the region rather than steady it. The aim should instead be to project quiet, credible strength. This will require restraint in Tokyo, discipline in Washington, and close, careful coordination between the two allies.

一个更强大的日本并非万能良药。如果伴随民族主义言论或挑衅行为，它可能扰乱而非稳定地区局势。目标应是展现低调而可信的实力。这需要东京保持克制、华盛顿保持自律，以及两国盟友之间紧密审慎的协调。

An early chance to display unity will come in March, when Ms. Takaichi is expected to make her first visit to the White House for talks with Mr. Trump. That trip will come ahead of a planned visit to China by Mr. Trump later in the month. The two leaders already have hit it off — Mr. Trump offered his “total endorsement” of Ms. Takaichi before her Feb. 8 snap election win — and a strong show of solidarity in Washington should be used to make clear to Beijing the emerging new realities.

最近的一个展现团结的机会将在3月到来，届时高市早苗预计将首次访问白宫与特朗普会谈。此行将早于特朗普当月晚些时候计划中的访华行程。两国领导人已建立良好关系——特朗普在2月8日日本提前大选前便对高市早苗表示“全力支持”。双方应在华盛顿展现强劲团结姿态，向北京传递一个正在形成的新现实。

The question is not whether Japan will act more like the power it already is — global changes are already pushing it in that direction — it is how that momentous change is managed in Tokyo, Washington and across the region.

问题不在于日本是否会更像它已然成为的大国那样行事——全球变化已在推动它朝此方向发展——而在于东京、华盛顿及整个地区如何管控这一重大转变。

On Wednesday in Beijing, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz criticized Chinese trade policies that hurt German companies.

周三，德国总理默茨在北京批评了损害德国公司利益的中国贸易政策。

The next day, he visited the Beijing operations of an iconic German automaker, rode in its new luxury sedan and listened politely as its chief executive extolled innovation opportunities in China.

次日，他参观了一家标志性德国车企的北京分部，乘坐了其新款豪华轿车，并礼貌地聆听了该公司首席执行官盛赞中国的创新机遇。

The juxtaposition showed a disconnect between Mr. Merz and the 30-some captains of German industry who accompanied him on his quick trip to China this week, a disconnect that is not limited to Beijing.

这种并存凸显出默茨与本周随他短暂访华的三十余位德国工业巨头之间的立场分歧，而这种分歧并非只限于同北京有关的问题。

Mr. Merz, arguably his continent’s most powerful politician, wants Europe to become less dependent on China and the United States, economically and militarily. He has warned both countries — and his European friends — of the dangers of a world in which great powers bully their way to whatever they want on the global stage.

作为堪称欧洲最具影响力的政治人士之一，默茨希望欧洲在经济与军事上减少对中国和美国的依赖。他已向这两个国家以及欧洲盟友发出警告，称大国在全球舞台上恃强凌弱、为所欲为的世界格局充满危险。

Europe’s business leaders are, at least publicly, far more constrained. They have avoided ruffling feathers in the world’s two largest economies, eager to tune out politics and focus on profits.

欧洲商界领袖至少在公开场合则要克制得多。他们避免触怒全球两大经济体，一心想抛开政治、专注盈利。

In a meeting this week with Xi Jinping, China’s leader, Mr. Merz raised concerns over Chinese factory subsidies and its weak currency, which he said impeded economic cooperation.

本周与中国国家主席习近平会晤时，默茨对中国的工厂补贴与人民币汇率偏低表达了担忧，称这些因素阻碍了经济合作。

Yet in interviews broadcast from the sidelines, executives talked mostly about exciting new technological partnerships with Chinese companies and opportunities to increase sales and innovation in the country.

但在会场外播出的采访中，企业高管们大多谈论的是与中国企业激动人心的新技术合作，以及在华扩大销售与创新的机遇。

Europe’s political leaders are reacting differently than its business elites are to the efforts by Mr. Xi and President Trump to bend the world to their will through economic and military might, said Lauren Goodwin, the chief market strategist for New York Life Investment Management.

纽约人寿投资管理公司首席市场策略师劳伦·古德温表示，面对习近平与特朗普试图通过经济与军事实力让世界屈服于其意志的努力，欧洲政治领袖与商界精英的反应截然不同。

Politicians and business leaders caught between the great powers “have the same things they have to worry about,” Ms. Goodwin said. “Just in a really different way.”

古德温称，夹在大国之间的政界人士与商界领袖“担忧的是同样的事情”，“只是应对方式截然不同”。

National leaders like Mr. Merz, Prime Minister Keir Starmer of Britain and President Emmanuel Macron of France have called for ambitious steps to make Europe more capable in defense and more self-reliant economically. They want to keep ties with America and China, but rely on them less.

默茨、英国首相斯塔默、法国总统马克龙等国家领导人呼吁采取大胆举措，提升欧洲的国防能力与经济自主性。他们希望维持与美中的联系，但减少对两国的依赖。

Some corporate leaders have rejected that strategy, which is sometimes called de-risking. They worry it could upend longstanding investments and economic relationships across borders that have grown highly entwined.

部分企业领袖反对这种有时被称为“去风险”的战略。他们担心这会颠覆已高度交织的长期跨境投资与经济关系。

默茨周四在中国东部杭州的宇树科技产品展厅参观。

“The idea of de-risking seems like a good concept,” Bill Anderson, the chief executive of pharmaceutical titan Bayer, told Table.Media, a Berlin-based news outlet, in a video interview as he accompanied Mr. Merz to China this week. “But I think we then have to get grounded right back in reality, which is that the global supply chains that have been established over the last four to five decades have been enormously beneficial.”

“去风险的想法听起来不错，”制药巨头拜耳的首席执行官比尔·安德森本周随默茨访华期间，在接受柏林媒体Table.Media视频采访时表示。“但我认为我们必须回归现实——过去四五十年建立的全球供应链带来了巨大益处。”

Some executives, while offering careful support for Mr. Merz’s efforts this week, took pains to praise China as a market opportunity.

部分高管在谨慎支持默茨本周努力的同时，刻意称赞中国市场带来的机遇。

“Anyone who is serious about driving transformation in key sectors — from mobility to renewable energy — cannot look past China,” Ralf Brandstätter, the chief executive of Volkswagen Group China, said in a social media post this week. “At the same time, Europe, and Germany in particular, has every reason to articulate and pursue its interests with confidence.”

“任何真正致力于推动从出行到可再生能源等关键领域转型的人，都无法忽视中国，”大众汽车集团中国首席执行官贝瑞德(Ralf Brandstätter)本周在社交媒体发文称。“与此同时，欧洲，尤其是德国，完全有理由自信地阐明和追求自身利益。”

Some executives, like Ola Källenius, the Swedish-German chief executive of Mercedes-Benz, have increased their bets on America and China.

梅赛德斯-奔驰的瑞典裔德国首席执行官康林松(Ola Källenius)等部分高管正在加大对美国与中国的投资力度。

“We are on an investment offensive in the United States,” Mr. Källenius told me last month at his headquarters, during an interview in which he repeatedly praised Mr. Trump’s economic policies and declined to criticize China.

“我们正在美国大举投资，”康林松上月在公司总部接受笔者采访时表示，他在采访中多次称赞特朗普的经济政策，且拒绝批评中国。

Mercedes is a case study in the challenges facing German companies in reducing dependence on both those countries, which remain crucial markets for their products.

梅赛德斯-奔驰是德国企业在减少对中美依赖时所面临困境的典型案例——这两个国家仍是德企产品的重要市场。

Mercedes and other large multinational companies — particularly European automakers — have been playing defense against a blitz of change to the global economic order, largely wrought by Mr. Xi and Mr. Trump.

梅赛德斯-奔驰等大型跨国企业，尤其是欧洲车企，正竭力应对由习近平与特朗普主导的全球经济秩序剧变。

9月，德国慕尼黑车展上的梅赛德斯-奔驰展台。

China’s hefty state subsidies have helped it flood global markets with low-priced Chinese vehicles that are eating into German automakers’ market share. Mr. Trump’s tariffs on European exports have begun driving up the price of the cars Mercedes makes in Germany and ships to America, while his opposition to clean energy has clouded Mercedes’ plan to turn its fleet electric.

中国的巨额国家补贴使该国的低价汽车充斥全球市场，蚕食了德国车企的市场份额。特朗普对欧洲出口加征的关税推高了梅赛德斯-奔驰在德国生产并销往美国的汽车价格；而他反对清洁能源的立场则为该公司的全面电动化转型计划蒙上阴影。

Mr. Källenius is not a fan of tariffs, and has said so repeatedly; the company reported its profits were halved last year from the year before, and Mr. Trump’s levies were a major cause.

康林松对关税政策持反对态度，且已多次表态；该公司去年利润较前年减半，特朗普的关税是主要原因之一。

But when I asked him if any recent events or policies in the United States, including actions by the Trump administration that have alarmed Europe’s leaders and citizens, had changed his views on investing there, his answer was short.

但当我问他，近期美国发生的事件或政策，包括已引发欧洲领导人和民众警惕的特朗普政府的行动，是否改变了他对在美投资的看法时，他的回答很简短。

“No,” he said.

“没有，”他说。

On the rainy afternoon I visited Mr. Källenius in Stuttgart late last month, diplomats in Berlin were consumed with the fallout from Mr. Trump’s attempts to gain ownership of Greenland, the Danish territory he covets. German officials were privately expressing horror over the behaviors of federal immigration and customs officers in Minneapolis; coverage of the violence there dominated the German press.

上月末一个雨天的下午，我在斯图加特拜访康林松时，柏林的外交官们正忙于应对特朗普试图吞并他所觊觎的丹麦领土格陵兰的后续影响。德国官员私下对明尼阿波利斯联邦移民与海关官员的行为表示震惊；德国媒体铺天盖地地报道了那里的暴力事件。

I asked Mr. Källenius how he reacted to calls for business leaders to denounce the administration’s actions in Minneapolis. “I think before you pass judgment on anything, you really need to understand what’s going on,” he said. “And I would say a European business leader is not the right person to judge a situation anywhere in the world where you don’t have the local information.”

我问康林松，有人呼吁商界领袖谴责特朗普政府在明尼阿波利斯的行动，他对此作何反应。“我认为在评判任何事情之前，必须真正了解情况，”他说。“我想说的是，在不掌握当地信息的情况下，一个欧洲商界领袖并不是判断世界上任何地方局势的合适人选。”

When I asked about doing business in China, or other authoritarian countries, he said Mercedes sells into every country where Germany has diplomatic relations — 150 in all.

当我问及在中国或其他威权国家做生意的情况时，他表示，梅赛德斯-奔驰在所有与德国建交的国家销售产品——共计150个国家。

“If you would limit yourself to the places in the world that have exactly a mirror image of your society or your system down to the last bit and byte,” he said, “that would be a small group.”

“如果把业务局限于那些社会或制度和本国完全一致、如同镜像的地方，”他说，“那范围就太小了。”

德国总理默茨周三在北京与中国国家主席习近平会晤。

Mr. Källenius was relaxed, in a brown turtleneck and sport coat, in a conference room at company headquarters. He was soon to unveil the new S-class sedan — the same model Mr. Merz would later inspect in Beijing.

康林松身着棕色高领毛衣与休闲西装，在公司总部的会议室里显得从容放松。他很快将发布新款S级轿车——正是默茨后来在北京参观的同款车型。

When I asked about regulation from Brussels, Mr. Källenius offered an extended critique of European rules that he and Mr. Merz both say hinder competitiveness and growth.

当我问及欧盟监管时，康林松对欧洲的法规进行了长篇批评，他与默茨均认为这些法规阻碍了竞争力与增长。

In talking about the United States, Mr. Källenius was effusive in his praise for Mr. Trump’s administration, including its low energy costs and relaxed regulations. He described a phone call he took last year from Howard Lutnick, the American billionaire who was soon to be confirmed as the U.S. commerce secretary at the start of Mr. Trump’s second term.

谈及美国时，康林松对特朗普政府赞不绝口，包括其低廉的能源成本与宽松的监管。他提到去年接到美国亿万富翁霍华德·卢特尼克的电话——不久后，卢特尼克在特朗普第二任期伊始被任命为美国商务部长。

In the call, Mr. Lutnick pushed Mr. Källenius to move the automaker’s headquarters from Stuttgart to the United States.

在通话中，卢特尼克力劝康林松将梅赛德斯-奔驰总部从斯图加特迁至美国。

Mr. Källenius declined, but he went out of his way to explain to me that decision was a function of Mercedes’ 140-year history in Germany, and not a reflection on Mr. Lutnick’s investment pitch.

康林松拒绝了这一提议，但特意向我解释，这一决定源于梅赛德斯-奔驰在德国140年的历史，而非对卢特尼克投资提议的否定。

“He did a phenomenal job presenting the U.S. as an investment case for any multinational company,” Mr. Källenius recalled. “And I’m sold on that, except for the headquarters.”

“他极具说服力地向跨国企业展示了美国作为投资地的优势，”康林松回忆。“除了总部搬迁的事，我完全认同他。”

“There,” Mr. Källenius said, “the roots are too deep.”

“在这里，”康林松说，“根基非常深。”

China’s leader, Xi Jinping, tried to sell Germany on a future less tied to the United States and anchored instead in Chinese markets and technology.

中国领导人习近平试图向德国推销一种未来愿景：减少对美国的依赖，转而更多锚定在中国市场和技术上。

Mr. Xi pledged that China would continue to “share development opportunities with Germany and the wider world” in his meeting with Chancellor Friedrich Merz of Germany, who was on a visit to Beijing that seemed curated to highlight such opportunities. On Thursday, Mr. Merz tried out a new Mercedes-Benz in Beijing, then flew to the eastern city of Hangzhou to tour a Chinese robotics company.

习近平在与到访的德国总理默茨会晤时承诺，中国将继续“同包括德国在内的世界各国分享发展机遇”。默茨此次北京之行似乎经过精心安排，旨在突出这些机遇。周四，默茨在北京试驾了一辆新型梅赛德斯-奔驰汽车，随后飞往东部城市杭州，参观一家中国机器人公司。

But for all the pageantry, the visit has also laid bare the limits of that sales pitch.

然而，尽管场面盛大，此次访问也暴露了这一推销说辞的局限性。

Unlike other Western leaders who have met with Mr. Xi in recent weeks, Mr. Merz was publicly pointed. He paired pledges of cooperation with an accounting of how a flood of Chinese exports and an unfair playing field are harming German businesses and contributing to the loss of thousands of jobs in his country each month.

与近几周跟习近平会面的其他西方领导人不同，默茨公开表达了不满。他一方面承诺合作，另一方面也列举了中国出口倾销和不公平竞争环境如何损害德国企业，并导致德国每月损失数千个工作岗位。

“Competition between companies must be fair,” Mr. Merz said in a statement after he met with Mr. Xi on Wednesday, describing what it would take for Germany’s relationship with China to succeed moving forward. “We need transparency, we need reliability, and we also need adherence to jointly established rules.”

“企业之间的竞争必须公平，”默茨在周三与习近平会晤后发表声明，阐释德中关系未来成功所需的条件。“我们需要透明度，需要可靠性，也需要遵守共同制定的规则。”

Such demands show that Mr. Xi’s courtship of the West — an effort aided by President Trump’s alienation of U.S. allies — falls short of addressing the grievances that have long divided China and the West. Chief among them are an artificially weak Chinese currency; unequal access for foreign companies in China; state subsidies that make Chinese exports appear cheaper; and Beijing’s use of its dominance over critical minerals as leverage.

这些要求表明，习近平对西方的示好努力——特朗普总统对美国盟友的疏远是一种助力——并未触及长期以来中西方分歧的核心问题。其中的主要问题包括：中国人为压低的人民币汇率；外国企业在华市场准入不平等；国家补贴使中国出口产品看起来更便宜；以及北京将关键矿产上的主导地位作为筹码。

Even China’s sweeteners have been modest. Mr. Merz, who brought with him more than two dozen German business leaders, said China pledged to buy more Airbus planes. Prime Minister Mark Carney of Canada said last month that China would slash tariffs on imports of Canadian canola products. Both moves amount to tactical gifts rather than real reforms.

即便中国给出的甜头也相当有限。默茨此次率领二十多名德国商界领袖访华，他表示中方承诺将购买更多空客飞机。加拿大总理马克·卡尼上个月称，中国将大幅降低对加拿大油菜籽产品的进口关税。这些举措都属于战术性让利，而非真正改革。

China’s current playbook “drives a wedge between Washington and its allies without requiring Beijing to compromise on internal priorities,” said Yanzhong Huang, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Yet it does nothing to address the underlying frictions stoking Western frustration.”

中国目前的策略是“在不牺牲北京内部优先事项的前提下，离间华盛顿与其盟友”，美国外交关系委员会高级研究员黄严忠表示。“然而，这丝毫没有解决引发西方不满的根本摩擦。”

If anything, Mr. Huang said, Mr. Xi is set to double down on his vision next month when he releases details of China’s 15th five-year plan. The plan is likely to pour even more state resources into the very industries — electric vehicles, robotics, clean energy — that are undercutting Western competitors, while tightening China’s grip on the supply chains they depend on.

黄严忠认为，如果说有什么变化的话，习近平下个月公布中国“十五五”规划细节时，很可能会加倍推进其愿景。该规划很可能将更多国家资源投入到那些正在削弱西方竞争对手的行业——电动汽车、机器人、清洁能源，同时加强对这些行业所依赖的供应链的控制。

中国领导人习近平周三在北京会见默茨时，敦促德国以客观、理性的态度看待中国的崛起。

“European leaders will continue to arrive with complaints and depart with narrow wins,” Mr. Huang said.

“欧洲领导人将继续带着抱怨而来，带着有限的收获离开，”黄严忠说。

China has little incentive to change course. Exports are the only major engine keeping China’s economy growing as it struggles through a yearslong property crisis.

中国没有什么改弦更张的动力。出口是中国经济在持续数年的房产危机中唯一仍保持增长的主要引擎。

Beijing is pitching Germany on the idea that it can find prosperity by tapping into China’s growth, particularly in emerging fields like clean energy and robotics. In Hangzhou, Mr. Merz visited the humanoid robot start-up Unitree Robotics where he watched robots perform synchronized back-flips and other martial arts-inspired moves.

北京向德国推销的理念是：德国可以通过融入中国的增长——尤其是在清洁能源和机器人等新兴领域——找到繁荣。在杭州，默茨参观了人形机器人初创企业宇树科技，观看了机器人表演同步的后空翻和其他武术动作。

Mr. Xi, in his official statement, made no direct mention of Mr. Merz’s concerns. He said China would continue to provide economic opportunities, but urged Germany to view China’s rise “objectively and rationally,” and to adopt a “positive and pragmatic policy” — language that amounted to a request to stop treating Beijing as a threat.

习近平在官方声明中并未直接提及默茨的关切。他表示中国将继续提供经济机遇，但敦促德国“客观理性”看待中国崛起，并采取“积极、务实”的对华政策——这些措辞实际上是在要求德国停止将北京视为威胁。

Beijing’s ultimate goal is to pull Berlin away from Washington and weaken what China sees as a Western campaign to contain China’s rise.

北京的终极目标是令柏林远离华盛顿，削弱中国所认为的西方遏制中国崛起的阵营。

This month, Chinese state media published editorials calling for Germany to withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, arguing that the U.S.-led security alliance undermines Berlin’s autonomy. The People’s Daily, the Chinese Communist Party’s mouthpiece, said in an editorial that the only way for Germany to “de-risk” from global threats was to “de-Americanize.”

本月，中国官方媒体刊登社论，呼吁德国退出北大西洋公约组织，称美国主导的安全联盟损害了柏林的自主性。中共喉舌《人民日报》在一篇社论中表示，德国要“去风险”应对全球威胁，唯一途径就是“去美国化”。

Mr. Merz, like other European leaders, has his own frustrations with the United States, such as over tariffs and support for Ukraine’s defense against Russia. But Mr. Merz said at a conference of his center-right Christian Democrats earlier this month that the trans-Atlantic alliance would likely endure because of shared values like freedom of expression, freedom of religion and freedom of the press.

与其他欧洲领导人一样，默茨对美国也有自己的不满，例如在关税以及支持乌克兰抵御俄罗斯的问题上。但默茨本月早些时候在其所在的中右派政党基督教民主联盟的大会上表示，这个跨大西洋联盟很可能因共享价值观——言论自由、宗教自由和新闻自由——而持续存在。

Even some Chinese analysts are skeptical that Beijing’s outreach will pay off.

甚至一些中国分析人士也对北京的示好能否奏效持怀疑态度。

Li Xing, the director of European studies at Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, said he worried that President Trump would find new ways to punish U.S. allies that get too close to Beijing. (Mr. Trump has warned Canada and Britain that increasing trade with China was “dangerous.”)

广东外语外贸大学欧洲研究中心主任李形表示，他担心特朗普会找到新办法惩罚那些与北京走得太近的美国盟友。（特朗普曾警告加拿大和英国，增加对华贸易是“危险的”。）

“Trump’s trade war has caused many European countries a great deal of trouble, driving them to turn toward us,” Mr. Li said. “However, my concern lies in how much persistence these countries truly have. They come to China and speak in favor of us, but if Trump brandishes his trade stick, can these countries hold their ground?”

“特朗普的贸易战给许多欧洲国家带来了很大麻烦，促使它们转向我们，”李形说。“然而，我担心的是这些国家能不能坚持住。他们来中国，说一些偏向我们的话，但如果特朗普挥舞贸易大棒，这些国家还能站得住吗？”

Tesla’s factory in Shanghai produces far more cars per worker than its plant in California. The gap reflects something unsettling about China’s broader edge in manufacturing: It has figured out how to organize production around large-scale deployment of automation, robotics and artificial intelligence. The United States has not.

特斯拉上海工厂的人均汽车产量远超其加利福尼亚州的工厂。这一差距反映出中国在制造业方面更广泛优势中令人不安的一点：中国已摸索出如何围绕自动化、机器人和人工智能的大规模部署来组织生产。而美国尚未做到这一点。

Reindustrialization is one of the few economic goals that now commands bipartisan support. Successive administrations — first Joe Biden’s, now President Trump’s — have made rebuilding American manufacturing a priority. In Washington, the gap between American factories and global competitors is often explained as the product of unfair subsidies, distorted markets or other forms of cheating.

再工业化如今是少数能够获得两党支持的经济目标之一。从拜登开始到现在的特朗普，几届政府都把重建美国制造业作为优先事项。在华盛顿，人们往往把美国工厂与全球竞争对手之间的差距解释为不公平补贴、市场扭曲或其他形式的作弊所导致的结果。

Those factors matter, as does the power of China’s political structure to command fast change from the top down. But the central challenge for the United States is not that China bends the rules. Around the world, modern manufacturing no longer resembles the mid-20th-century factory floor. Robotics, automation and A.I. now make it possible to produce more with fewer human workers, though those who remain are more skilled and better paid. Unlike China, America has failed to reckon with this reality and organize manufacturing in ways that turn its own technological strengths into comparable gains.

这些因素固然重要，但中国的政治体制自上而下迅速推动变革的能力同样关键。而美国面临的核心挑战也并非中国破坏规则。放眼全球，现代制造业已不再像20世纪中叶的工厂车间。如今，机器人技术、自动化和人工智能使得企业能够用更少的劳动力生产更多的产品，而留下的工人技术更好、收入也更高。与中国不同，美国未能正视这一现实，也没有建立起一种能够把自身技术优势转化为同等生产率提升的制造体系。

Washington talks about A.I. as if it lives in research labs, venture capital portfolios and data centers. China treats it as factory work. Today, A.I. is embedded into China’s efforts to accelerate automation — guiding machines, scheduling work and detecting problems in real time. China has built more than 30,000 smart factories. More than half of all new industrial robots installed worldwide in 2024 went into Chinese factories. Research from Weijian Shan, an investor and economist based in Hong Kong, has found that, from sectors ranging from steel to shipbuilding, these factories now produce more per worker than comparable U.S. plants.

华盛顿在谈论人工智能时，仿佛它只存在于研究实验室、风险投资项目和数据中心里。中国则将人工智能视为工厂里实实在在的生产工具。如今，人工智能已深度融入中国加速自动化的进程——用于引导机器运行、安排生产进度并实时发现问题。中国已建成3万多家智能工厂。2024年全球新安装的工业机器人中超过一半在中国的工厂里。香港投资人和经济学家单伟建的研究发现，从钢铁到造船等多个行业，这些工厂如今的人均产出已超过美国同类工厂。

The shift is visible on the shop floor. By last year, the Chinese electric vehicle company Zeekr had over 800 robots in its factory in Ningbo. The company even experimented with putting humanoid robots to work on its factory floor lifting boxes, assembling components and performing quality checks. Rather than following fixed instructions, the robots use cameras, sensors and A.I. to respond to conditions on the line, much like driver-assistance systems that adjust to traffic. That flexibility can allow them to handle variation, work safely alongside human workers and absorb routine changes that would otherwise force production to stop. These are the kind of efficiency gains that can eventually increase productivity per worker and help ease shortages of skilled labor.

这种转变在生产车间里清晰可见。截至去年，中国的电动车企业极氪在宁波的工厂部署了超过800台机器人。该公司甚至尝试使用人形机器人参与生产，比如搬运箱子、组装零部件和执行质检工作。这些机器人不再只是遵循固定指令，而是利用摄像头、传感器和人工智能对生产线上的状况做出响应，就像能根据路况做出调整的辅助驾驶系统一样。这种灵活性使它们能够处理变化，与人类工人安全协作，并适应那些原本会导致生产中断的常规变化。此类效率提升最终将提高人均生产力，并有助于缓解熟练劳动力短缺问题。

These gains are not limited to experimental systems. At Midea, one of the world’s largest home appliance manufacturers, an A.I.-driven control system coordinates robots, sensors and machines at its Jingzhou plant. A company official said the system has reduced response times from hours to seconds.

这些成果并非仅限于实验性系统。在全球最大的家电制造商之一美的集团位于荆州的工厂里，一个由人工智能驱动的控制系统协调着机器人、传感器和各类机器设备。公司的一位管理者表示，该系统将响应时间从几小时缩短到了几秒。

Productivity gains come from multiple forms of A.I. Software can analyze camera feeds so that defects can be removed from production. Scheduling algorithms can automatically balance production, inventory and logistics — Lenovo, for example, says it has used such systems to cut production scheduling times from hours to minutes. A.I. can also analyze streams of production data in real time and highlight small inefficiencies before they slow the entire line. The technology company Xiaomi says it used smart manufacturing and over 700 robots to produce a car every 76 seconds on average in its Beijing plant.

生产率提升来自多种形式的人工智能。软件可以分析摄像头画面，从而把有缺陷的产品从生产过程中剔除。调度算法能够自动平衡生产、库存和物流——例如，联想集团表示，它利用此类系统把生产调度时间从数小时缩短到了几分钟。人工智能还可以实时分析源源不断的生产数据，在小问题拖慢整条生产线之前将其识别出来。科技公司小米表示，依靠智能制造和700多台机器人，其北京工厂平均每76秒就能生产一辆汽车。

For a decade, Beijing has pursued factory modernization as a national project, driven by all levels of the government, beyond flagship factories like Zeekr and deep into China’s manufacturing supply chains.

十年来，北京一直将工厂现代化作为国家工程来推进，各级政府参与其中，其范围不仅限于极氪这样的旗舰工厂，而是深入中国制造业的供应链之中。

Provinces fund local companies developing A.I and automation technologies. Government ministries coordinate standards so that suppliers and manufacturers can share data and solutions. The government promotes programs to train workers to use these technologies. Smaller manufacturers can plug into shared, government-supported digital networks that collect production data, coordinate schedules and monitor equipment, allowing them to adopt A.I. tools without building from scratch.

各省为开发人工智能和自动化技术的本地企业提供资金支持。国家部委协调技术标准的制定，以便供应商和制造商能够共享数据和解决方案。政府还推动培训项目，帮助工人掌握这些技术。规模较小的制造商可以接入由政府支持的共享数字网络，这些网络收集生产数据、协调生产调度并监控设备，使它们无需从零开始就能采用人工智能工具。

On the other side of the Pacific, U.S. policy on A.I. emphasizes frontier research in A.I. and large language model development. While America leads in these fields, this focus neglects other practical areas for using A.I. and automation, leaving American manufacturers struggling to use digital tools on the factory floor. Only 18 percent of manufacturers surveyed by the Manufacturing Leadership Council said they have formal A.I. strategies for their operations; two-thirds said they were struggling to scale A.I. test projects into production.

而在太平洋另一侧，美国的人工智能政策则强调前沿研究以及大语言模型的开发。虽然美国在这些领域处于领先地位，但这种侧重忽略了对人工智能和自动化的其他实际应用，导致美国制造商在工厂车间使用数字化工具时举步维艰。制造业领导力委员会的一项调查显示，只有18%的制造商表示他们为运营制定了正式的人工智能战略；三分之二的企业表示，他们难以把人工智能试验项目推广到实际生产中。

Some American manufacturers are experimenting with similar tools. Auto manufacturers like Ford are experimenting with A.I.-enabled visual detection systems to identify defects on assembly lines. They also investing in systems that can detect equipment problems before they shut down production lines. Yet these efforts remain fragmented.

一些美国制造商正在尝试类似的工具。福特等车企正在试验基于人工智能的视觉检测系统来识别装配线上的缺陷。他们也在投资那些能在设备故障导致生产线停工前发现问题的系统。然而，这些努力仍然零散，不成体系。

The barriers are practical rather than technological, especially for small and midsize companies. In many factories, production data is incomplete or still recorded manually, making it impossible to use digital tools that rely on continuous information. Three-quarters of manufacturers surveyed struggle to connect older machines to systems that could help them run more efficiently. And eight in 10 report shortages of workers who can use A.I.-powered manufacturing tools. More than half say the upfront cost of A.I. projects is prohibitive.

障碍更多来自实操层面，而非技术本身，尤其是对中小企业而言。在许多工厂，生产数据不完整或者仍依靠人工记录，使得依赖持续数据流的数字化工具难以投入应用。调查显示，四分之三的制造商难以将旧设备连接到能够提高效率的系统中；此外，八成企业表示缺乏能够操作基于人工智能的制造工具的工人。超过半数企业表示，人工智能项目的初期投入成本过高，难以承受。

Yet the U.S. policy response to China’s rise in manufacturing targets trade flows rather than factory performance. A familiar mix of tariffs, trade investigations and restrictions on imported components and technologies looks tough but does little to close the productivity gap.

然而，美国针对中国制造业崛起的政策回应主要瞄准的是贸易流动，而不是工厂本身的生产效率。关税、贸易调查以及对进口零部件和技术的限制组成的惯用手段，看似强硬，但对缩小生产率差距几乎没有帮助。

These policies actually leave American manufacturers in a bind. When they attempt to automate, they often rely on imported robotics, sensors and machinery. Yet the Trump administration has opened a national security investigation into these robotics supply chains, potentially leading to tariffs that would raise the cost of such modernizing equipment.

这些政策实际上让美国制造商陷入了两难境地。当他们尝试进行自动化改造时，往往依赖进口的机器人、传感器和机械设备。然而，特朗普政府已对这些机器人供应链启动了国家安全调查，这可能导致加征关税，从而提高此类现代化设备的成本。

If the goal is to bring manufacturing back from overseas, American policymakers should focus less on protection and more on helping manufacturers deploy digital tools. That means connecting legacy equipment to digital systems so they can generate usable data. It means modernizing older plants so equipment can integrate with sensors, software and analytics. It means investing in work force training so employees can use A.I. tools. And it means federal and state governments supporting shared digital infrastructure that allows small and midsize manufacturers to adopt advanced tools.

如果目标是真正把制造业从海外带回美国，那么美国的决策者就应该少强调保护主义，多帮助制造商部署数字化工具。这意味着要把传统设备接入数字系统，使其能够产生可用的数据；要改造老旧工厂，让设备能够与传感器、软件和数据分析系统整合。这意味着要投资劳动力培训，使员工能够掌握人工智能工具。这还意味着联邦和州政府需要支持共享的数字基础设施，使中小型制造商也能够采用先进工具。

This is what China is doing. And other advanced economies in Germany, Japan, South Korea and elsewhere are responding with similar strategies.

这正是中国正在做的事情。而德国、日本、韩国等其他发达经济体也正在以类似的战略作出回应。

America has emphasized invention and breakthroughs over deployment. But sometimes, technology needs to be treated as factory work — unsexy and perhaps boring, but essential for being competitive.

美国历来重视发明和突破，而轻视技术的应用。但有时，技术需要被当作工厂里的平常工作来对待——也许不光鲜，甚至有些枯燥，却是保持竞争力所必不可少的。

China has been good at a lot of things: manufacturing cheaply, catching up on A.I., dominating renewable energy, building hard power. What it’s been less good at is soft power. But that seems to be changing. Have you heard about Chinamaxxing? Read on.

中国有很多强项：低成本制造、在人工智能领域迎头赶上、称霸可再生能源、打造硬实力。它一直不太擅长的是软实力。但情况似乎正在改变。你听说过“Chinamaxxing”吗？接着往下看。

Today, my colleague Vivian Wang in Beijing writes about how China is suddenly winning hearts and minds. (Spoiler alert: It might not actually have that much to do with China itself.)

今天，我在北京的同事王月眉(Vivan Wang)撰文讲述中国为何突然开始赢得人心。（剧透：这或许其实和中国本身关系不大。）

Cool China

酷中国

By Vivian Wang

作者：王月眉

Last week, my colleague Yan Zhuang wrote about a funny trend: young people on TikTok who are “becoming Chinese” by embracing stereotypically Chinese behaviors — drinking hot water, wearing slippers, eating congee.

上周，我的同事Yan Zhuang报道了一个有趣的潮流：TikTok上的年轻人通过刻板印象中的中国生活方式——喝热水、穿拖鞋、喝粥——来“成为中国人”。

“Becoming Chinese” (or “Chinamaxxing,” if that’s your preferred term) may just be a TikTok fad. But it fits into something I’ve noticed recently: To a growing number of people around the world, China seems to be getting cooler.

“成为中国人”（或是你更习惯说的“Chinamaxxing”）或许只是TikTok上的一阵风潮。但这契合了我最近注意到的一个现象：在全球各个角落，越来越多人眼中，中国似乎正变得越来越酷。

Major American influencers, like the YouTuber IShowSpeed and the streamer Hasan Piker, have traveled to China, where they raved about its high-speed trains and LED light shows. The N.B.A. star Victor Wembanyama spent 10 days meditating at a Shaolin temple. A new Adidas jacket inspired by the historical Tang suit was a viral fashion hit. And of course, there was the Labubu.

视频博主IShowSpeed和主播哈桑·派克等美国著名网红都曾到访中国，对中国的高铁和LED灯光秀赞不绝口。NBA球星维克托·文班亚马曾在少林寺冥想修行十天。一款以唐装为灵感的新款阿迪达斯夹克成为爆款时尚单品。当然，还有Labubu。

Over the course of its decades-long ascent, China has been good (and is getting better) at many things: developing technology, dominating supply chains, building up military power. What it has not been great at is winning hearts and minds, especially in the West — until, seemingly, now. So what changed? It might not actually have that much to do with China itself.

在数十年的崛起过程中，中国在很多领域都表现出色（且正变得更强）：发展技术、主导供应链、壮大军事力量。它一直不擅长的是赢得人心，尤其是在西方——直到如今，情况似乎变了。那么，究竟是什么变了？答案或许其实和中国本身关系不大。

Savvier outreach and glittering infrastructure

更精明的对外传播与亮眼的基础设施

China’s struggles with soft power have usually boiled down to its authoritarian government, which has hurt the country’s image abroad in multiple ways. (Just last week, a Hong Kong court sentenced the pro-democracy media mogul Jimmy Lai to 20 years in prison.)

中国在软实力上的困境通常可以归结为它的威权政府，这在多个方面损害了国家的海外形象。（就在上周，香港一家法院判处民主派传媒大亨黎智英20年监禁。）

Government censorship has also limited many outsiders from seeing the full range of Chinese creativity. Instead, the government has tried too hard to manufacture a state-sanctioned version of Chinese cool, with heavy-handed movies. (Remember the film “The Great Wall,” starring Matt Damon? Most people don’t.)

政府审查也让许多外界人士难以了解中国创造力的全貌。相反，政府用力过猛，试图通过手法生硬的电影，打造官方认可的“酷中国”。（还记得马特·达蒙主演的电影《长城》吗？大多数人早就忘了。）

The authoritarianism hasn’t changed, but the government has gotten savvier in its outreach efforts — for example, making it easier for foreign tourists to visit China. Most casual tourists won’t encounter the more suffocating political controls here, and they get to interact with ordinary Chinese people, in all their diversity. Visitors often say they’re surprised by how normal everyday life seems.

威权体制并未改变，但政府的外宣手段变得更精明了——比如，简化外国游客来华手续。大多数普通游客不会接触到这里令人窒息的政治管控，反而能与形形色色的普通中国人交流。访客常惊叹于这里日常生活的平凡景象。

But the biggest reason for China’s sudden appeal may have little to do with China itself. Polls show that opinions of China in the West are still, on the whole, mostly negative. It’s just that America, to many people around the world, is looking bad, too. And according to scholars, if people are looking for an alternative to the United States, China may be the most obvious place to turn.

但中国突然走红的最大原因或许和中国本身基本无关。民调显示，总体而言，西方对中国的看法仍以负面居多。只不过，在全球许多人眼中，美国同样形象不佳。学者认为，如果人们想要寻找美国之外的另一个选择，中国可能是最显而易见的去处。

Even aside from the most drastic actions by the Trump administration — its threats to take Greenland, its defense of killings by federal agents in Minneapolis — there’s a sense that the U.S. has failed to provide basic things, like functioning infrastructure. China’s gleaming trains look appealing in comparison.

即便抛开特朗普政府最极端的举动——威胁吞并格陵兰、为明尼阿波利斯联邦特工的杀人行为辩护——外界也普遍感到，美国连基础设施正常运转这类基本的事都做不到。相比之下，中国崭新的高铁就显得格外有吸引力。

The political and cultural fracturing of America has “significantly weakened the appeal of the U.S.,” Ying Zhu, a film studies scholar who has studied Chinese soft power, told me. “The appeal of China at the moment is more of a reaction” to that than real enthusiasm for China itself, she said.

研究中国软实力的电影研究学者朱影（音）告诉我，美国的政治与文化分裂“大幅削弱了美国的吸引力”。她说：“中国当下的吸引力更多是对这种局面的反应”，而不是对中国本身的真正热忱。

Can the vibe shift last?

这种氛围转变能持续吗？

Still, these shifting attitudes — regardless of what’s behind them — could have real implications for how other countries approach China. Many Western leaders have visited Beijing recently, promoting trade and cultural exchange, despite blowback from China hawks at home. If there was less domestic pressure, those types of visits could become easier and more frequent. And there would probably be less appetite for moves against China, as we saw in the opposition from many young Americans to the TikTok ban.

尽管如此，无论背后原因是什么，这种态度转变都可能对其他国家的对华政策产生切实影响。尽管面临国内对华鹰派的反对，许多西方领导人近期仍访问北京，推动贸易与文化交流。如果国内压力减小，此类访问可能会变得更轻松、更频繁。正如我们看到许多美国年轻人反对禁用TikTok那样，针对中国的举措也可能失去更多支持。

A recent survey by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace found that most Americans, especially younger ones, were not very worried about what would happen if China surpassed the U.S. in global influence. That “casts doubt on whether the American public would be willing to bear significant costs to maintain a power position superior to China’s,” the authors wrote.

卡内基国际和平基金会近期一项调查发现，大多数美国人，尤其是年轻人并不太担心中国在全球影响力上超越美国。报告作者写道，这“让人怀疑美国公众是否愿意付出巨大代价，以维持对中国的优势地位”。

An important question is whether this vibe shift can last. Zhu was skeptical. “Cultural trends come and go,” she said. “Fashion and fads are sensitive to the shifting geopolitical dynamic.” She noted that, despite viral trends and Labubus, China had yet to produce, say, a global hit movie.

一个关键问题是，这种氛围转变能否持续。朱影对此表示怀疑。“文化潮流来去匆匆，”她说。“时尚和风潮对地缘政治局势的变化十分敏感。”她指出，即便有网络爆款潮流和Labubu，中国至今仍未推出一部真正的全球卖座电影。

Parts of the Chinese government, too, seem worried that other countries’ soft power is still stronger. The Ministry of State Security last month published a warning, seemingly directed at Chinese influencers, about posts showing off glossy lives outside China.

中国部分政府部门似乎也担心自己的软实力不如人。国家安全部上月发布一则警示，矛头似乎指向国内网红在网上炫耀国外光鲜生活的行为。

“They one-sidedly showcase the glamorous aspects of foreign countries. Even worse, some have selectively ignored China’s development achievements,” the post said. “That provides an opportunity for the ‘soft aggression’ of Western ideology.”

“（他们）片面展示国外的光鲜侧面，更有甚者对国内发展成就选择性失明，”文章写道。“为西方意识形态的‘软侵略’提供可乘之机。”

At a conference at Tsinghua University in Beijing in January, a group of the most influential executives and founders working in artificial intelligence in China gathered to discuss the state of their industry. The mood was bullish. One of the companies in the room, which included people from Tencent, Alibaba and Zhipu AI, could soon lead the world, they agreed.

今年1月，在位于北京的清华大学举行的一场会议上，一批中国人工智能领域最具影响力的企业高管与创始人齐聚一堂，探讨行业现状。现场气氛乐观高昂。与会者包括来自腾讯、阿里巴巴、智谱AI等企业的人士，他们一致认为，在座的某家公司很快有望领跑全球。

But one thing was holding them back: They needed more superfast semiconductors.

但有一件事在拖后腿：他们需要更多超高速半导体。

This year, Chinese chip makers are likely to produce a small fraction of the number of advanced chips made by foreign firms. Huawei, the telecommunications and electronics company leading China’s chip charge, has said it will need almost another two years to make chips that can perform as well as the current offerings from Nvidia of Silicon Valley.

今年，中国芯片制造商的先进芯片产量可能仅为外国公司的一小部分。作为中国芯片产业的领军企业，电信和电子公司华为表示，还需要近两年时间，才能造出性能与当前硅谷英伟达产品相当的芯片。

“Even the national champion is fighting an uphill battle,” said Xiaomeng Lu, a director with Eurasia Group, a political consultancy and research group in Washington.

“即便是国家领军者，也在艰难奋战，”华盛顿政治咨询与研究机构欧亚集团总监鲁晓萌表示。

Still, while Chinese chip companies make fewer, slower chips — in large part because U.S. policies have prevented them from importing key tools — there is no shortage of momentum in the country’s A.I. industry.

然而，尽管中国芯片企业因美国政策阻碍它们进口关键设备，导致产量有限且性能落后，但国内人工智能产业的发展势头依然强劲。

While Washington’s export controls have slowed China’s chip development, they have added fuel to Beijing’s decade-long push to make strategic technologies like semiconductors and A.I. entirely at home.

美国的出口管制虽然放缓了中国芯片的发展速度，却为北京持续十年的战略技术自主化进程——包括半导体与人工智能领域——注入了强劲动力。

Government and private money has been pouring into the development of Chinese artificial intelligence. Chinese tech stocks have made huge gains — Alibaba soared more than 94 percent last year. A stream of Chinese A.I. start-ups are going public. Last month, two of China’s most promising A.I. companies raised more than $1 billion in Hong Kong listings.

政府与民间资金正大量涌入中国人工智能领域。中国科技股大幅上涨——阿里巴巴去年涨幅超过94%。一批中国人工智能初创企业陆续上市。上月，中国两家最具潜力的人工智能公司在香港上市，融资超10亿美元。

The gap between the money flowing into China’s A.I. sector and the reality that Chinese companies produce fewer chips than the country needs underlines the urgency of Beijing’s self-sufficiency efforts, and how much the Chinese A.I. industry still depends on foreign chips.

涌入中国人工智能领域的资金规模与中国企业芯片产量仍无法满足国内需求的现实之间存在巨大反差。这既凸显了北京推动芯片自主的紧迫性，也显示出中国人工智能产业对国外芯片的依赖程度之深。

In December, President Trump extended China a lifeline when he allowed Nvidia to sell some of its advanced chips to Chinese companies, reversing years of U.S. policy. But whether China will get broad access to those chips remains an open question ahead of Mr. Trump’s planned visit to Beijing next month.

去年12月，特朗普总统为中国送上救命稻草，允许英伟达向中国企业出售部分先进芯片，扭转了美国执行数年的政策。但在下月特朗普计划访华之前，中国能否大范围获得这类芯片，仍是未知数。

英伟达首席执行官黄仁勋，摄于1月。此前一个月，特朗普总统表示将允许英伟达向中国公司出售部分先进芯片。

The Memory Chip Lag

存储芯片的落后

The Chinese government’s push to make cutting-edge chips at home began more than a decade ago. And it has spent more than $150 billion on the drive.

中国政府推动本土制造尖端芯片的努力始于十多年前，已为此投入超过1500亿美元。

China’s biggest tech companies, including Huawei, Alibaba and the TikTok parent company ByteDance, have started chip design businesses. Chip makers, many working with Huawei, are building dozens of factories and have hired top engineers from Taiwan and South Korea.

包括华为、阿里巴巴以及TikTok母公司字节跳动在内的中国大型科技企业均已启动芯片设计业务。各家芯片厂商——其中多家与华为合作——正在兴建数十座工厂，并从台湾和韩国引进顶尖工程师。

But the task of catching up has gotten progressively more difficult. While Chinese companies have been building their own supply chain for chip making, officials in Washington have tried to hold them back. Three presidential administrations have used export controls to keep Chinese companies from buying advanced chips and the tools to make them, over concerns the technology could fuel China’s economic and military power.

但追赶的难度越来越大。在中国企业搭建本土芯片供应链的同时，华盛顿则在竭力遏制。三届美国政府均通过出口管制阻止中国企业购买先进芯片及制造设备，担心这类技术会增强中国的经济与军事实力。

The restrictions have kept Chinese companies from buying equipment made by the Dutch company ASML that performs a crucial step in the chip making process. The lack of access to these machines, which are the size of school buses, is one reason Chinese companies are making chips that lag the performance of the top of the line from Nvidia.

这些限制令中国企业无法购买荷兰阿斯麦公司生产的芯片制造关键设备。这种设备体积接近校车，无法获得这类机器是中国芯片性能落后于英伟达顶级产品的原因之一。

Those are the kinds of chips that power artificial intelligence systems. Chinese companies will most likely make just 2 percent as many A.I. chips as foreign firms do this year, said Tim Fist, a director at the Institute for Progress, a think tank in Washington.

这类芯片正是驱动人工智能系统的核心。华盛顿智库进步研究所总监蒂姆·菲斯特表示，今年中国企业生产的AI芯片数量大概率仅为外国企业的2%。

The production gap between Chinese and foreign manufacturers is especially big for memory chips, which are essential for the large calculations done by A.I.

中外厂商在存储芯片上的产量差距尤其巨大，而存储芯片对AI的大规模计算至关重要。

Companies outside China will make 70 times as much memory storage capacity this year as Chinese chip makers will, Mr. Fist said.

菲斯特称，今年中国境外公司的存储芯片产能将达到中国芯片制造商的70倍。

The leading makers of memory chips are the South Korean conglomerates Samsung and SK Hynix. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, the world’s biggest chip producer, dominates production of the most advanced chips.

全球领先的存储芯片厂商是韩国企业三星和SK海力士。而全球最大芯片生产商台积电则垄断了最先进芯片的制造。

去年上海一场会议上的华为展台。特朗普上任后便着手推动各国停止在其电信基础设施中使用华为设备。

Huawei’s Pivot

华为的转型

In 2014, China was the world’s largest market for semiconductors. But 90 percent of the chips its companies used were made outside the country.

2014年，中国已是全球最大半导体市场，但其企业使用的芯片中有90%依赖进口。

Concerned about that dependency, the State Council, China’s top governing body, approved a plan to spend billions and made a vow: China would be making every part of its semiconductor supply chain at home by 2030.

出于对这种依赖的担忧，中国最高行政机构国务院批准了一项耗资相当于数十亿美元的计划，并立下目标：到2030年，中国将实现半导体供应链所有环节的本土化生产。

Policymakers had reason to be concerned about the risks that foreign technology posed to Chinese infrastructure. Earlier that year, documents provided by the former National Security Agency contractor Edward J. Snowden had disclosed that the U.S. government had monitored the communications of top executives at Huawei.

政策制定者有充分理由担忧外国技术对中国基础设施构成的风险。当年早些时候，前美国国家安全局雇员爱德华·斯诺登披露的文件显示，美国政府曾监控华为高管的通讯。

Then in 2017, President Trump fined the Chinese telecommunications giant ZTE for allegedly violating U.S. sanctions on Iran, crippling its business overnight. Although ZTE does not manufacture chips, the action gave China another lesson in its need for self reliance.

2017年，特朗普政府以涉嫌违反美国对伊朗制裁为由，对中国电信巨头中兴通讯处以罚款，一夜之间使其业务陷入瘫痪。尽管中兴并不生产芯片，但这一事件让中国再次意识到自给自足的必要性。

Next came Huawei. The first Trump administration embarked on a global campaign to get countries to stop using Huawei’s equipment in their telecommunications infrastructure. Huawei responded by offloading that business line and getting in step with Beijing’s self-sufficiency program.

随后轮到华为。第一届特朗普政府全发起全球行动，要求各国停止在电信基础设施中使用华为设备。华为的应对是剥离相关业务线，并紧跟北京的自给自足战略。

“Huawei was unique in its capabilities and its alignment with China’s national goals,” said Kyle Chan, a fellow at the Brookings Institution who studies Chinese industrial policy. “Huawei’s experience was a microcosm of China’s broader experience: suddenly being cut off and now scrambling to build its own.”

“华为在技术能力和与国家目标的契合度方面独一无二，”研究中国产业政策的布鲁金斯学会研究员陈凯欣表示。“华为的经历是中国更广泛处境的缩影：供应突然被切断，如今正全力自主研发。”

Beijing also pushed foreign companies to turn over technology as a price of admission to the China market. Qualcomm, a San Diego tech giant, entered into a joint venture with Huaxintong Semiconductor in 2016. The Chinese government provided land and financing, and Qualcomm offered the technology and about $140 million in initial funding.

北京还推动外国企业以转让技术作为进入中国市场的条件。总部位于圣地亚哥的科技巨头高通，2016年与华芯通半导体成立合资公司。中国政府提供土地与资金支持，高通则提供技术和约1.4亿美元初始资金。

During this time, Huawei became one of China’s most popular smartphone makers. And it started working closely with chip factories to make chips for smartphones and A.I. systems.

在此期间，华为成为中国最受欢迎的智能手机厂商之一，并开始与芯片工厂紧密合作，为手机和AI系统制造芯片。

Huawei has come out with a line of chips that are comparable to some of Nvidia’s older models. But analysts said those chips contained key components that foreign rivals like TSMC and Samsung had made.

华为已推出一系列芯片，性能可与英伟达部分旧款产品媲美。但分析师表示，这些芯片仍包含台积电、三星等外国竞争对手生产的关键组件。

自美国官员牵头游说荷兰政府阻止向中国出口设备以来，中国企业便无法购得阿斯麦最先进的制造设备。

Clouds and Clusters

云服务与算力集群

The inability to get essential tools from ASML has been a major chokehold for Chinese chip makers. Since U.S. officials led an effort to lobby the Dutch government to block shipments to China, no Chinese company has been able to buy ASML’s most advanced tools.

无法从阿斯麦获得核心设备是中国芯片厂商的主要瓶颈。自美国官员牵头游说荷兰政府禁止向中国出口设备以来，没有任何一家中国企业能买到阿斯麦最先进的设备。

Instead, Chinese chip makers have recruited engineers with experience using those machines at TSMC, the world’s top chip maker. And now, Chinese start-ups are trying to make their own chip manufacturing equipment.

作为应对，中国芯片厂商从全球顶级芯片制造商台积电挖来有相关设备操作经验的工程师。如今，中国初创企业也在尝试自主研发芯片制造设备。

A.I. systems require an immense amount of computing power to learn. China’s A.I. companies are trying to get the computing power they need by strapping together numerous less powerful chips. Huawei has taken such an approach, and the Chinese government has built what it calls “intelligent computing clusters” that are essentially state-run data centers.

人工智能系统学习需要海量算力。中国人工智能企业正尝试将大量性能较弱的芯片集群组网，以获得所需算力。华为已采用这一路线，中国政府也建成了所谓“智能算力集群”，本质上是政府运营的数据中心。

But those clusters need a lot of chips. Experts and people who work in the industry say China’s most advanced chip maker, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Company, which does some work for Huawei, has struggled to produce enough chips. The chips it does produce are prone to defects and use more electricity than cutting-edge foreign ones. SMIC did not respond to a request for comment.

但这些集群需要大量芯片。业内专家与相关人士表示，为华为提供部分服务的中国最先进芯片厂商中芯国际一直难以保证足够产量。其生产的芯片良品率偏低、功耗高于国外尖端产品。中芯国际未回应置评请求。

“Manufacturing volume is going to be an issue,” said Kendra Schaefer, a partner at Trivium China, a research and advisory firm.

“制造产能会是个问题，”咨询机构Trivium China合伙人肯德拉·谢弗表示。

Nonetheless, multiple Chinese A.I. researchers have reported breakthroughs in finding new ways to link chips together for maximum efficiency. Zhipu said last month that it had built its latest model entirely using Huawei’s chips and software.

尽管如此，多位中国人工智能研究者已报告在芯片高效组网方面取得突破。智谱AI上月表示，其最新大模型已完全基于华为芯片与软件构建。

So far, the efficiency gains have been limited and have not helped Chinese companies escape the fact that A.I. demands huge quantities of chips.

到目前为止，这类效率提升仍有限，并未能帮助中国企业摆脱AI对海量芯片的需求困境。

Another way China’s A.I. companies are getting the computing power they need is by paying cloud providers like Alibaba and Amazon for remote access to massive data centers stocked with powerful chips.

中国AI企业获取算力的另一种方式是向阿里云、亚马逊等云服务商付费，远程接入搭载高性能芯片的大型数据中心。

But the strategy is expensive.

但这一策略成本高昂。

Documents filed by Zhipu and Minimax, another Chinese A.I. start-up, with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange last month show that the two companies are spending a lot more buying cloud services than they are earning in revenue.

智谱AI与另一家中国人工智能初创公司稀宇科技上月在港交所提交的文件显示，两家公司购买云服务的支出远超营收。

China on Tuesday said it would restrict exports to Japanese companies with ties to the defense industry, the latest escalation in Beijing’s monthslong feud with Tokyo over Taiwan.

中国周二宣布将限制向与国防工业有关联的日本企业出口商品，这是北京与东京围绕台湾问题持续数月争端的最新升级。

China’s commerce ministry said in a statement that it would block the export of all “dual-use” items to 20 entities, including Mitsubishi Heavy Industries; JAXA, the Japanese space agency; and the National Defense Academy of Japan, a military training university. Dual-use products are those that have both civilian and military purposes.

中国商务部在声明中表示，将禁止向包括三菱重工、日本宇宙航空研究开发机构及军事培训院校日本防卫大学在内的20家实体出口所有“两用”物品。两用产品指兼具民用和军用功能的商品。

The restrictions are meant to thwart Japan’s efforts to expand its military as well as to exert economic pressure. Beijing has ratcheted up pressure on Tokyo since November, when Japan’s prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, said that Japan could help defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion. China considers Taiwan, a self-governing democracy, part of its territory.

此举旨在阻挠日本扩军计划并施加经济压力。自去年11月日本首相高市早苗宣称若中国入侵台湾可协助台湾防卫以来，北京持续对东京施压。中国视实行自治的民主政体台湾为其领土的一部分。

China’s restrictions could include rare earths, metals that are used in devices ranging from electric vehicle motors to missile systems. During a territorial dispute in 2010, Beijing stopped the export of rare earths to Japan for a couple of months, rattling its economy.

中国的限制措施可能涉及稀土，这种金属广泛应用于电动汽车电机至导弹系统等设备。2010年领土争端期间，北京曾暂停对日稀土出口数月，对日本经济造成了冲击。

China’s commerce ministry said it was targeting the Japanese entities because they “participate in enhancing Japan’s military capabilities.” The ministry said another 20 Japanese firms, including the automaker Subaru, would be added to a watch list, making it more difficult to obtain Chinese goods.

中国商务部称，之所以针对这些日本实体，是因为它们“参与提升日本军事能力”。该部表示，包括汽车制造商斯巴鲁在内的另外20家日本企业将被列入观察名单，这将使它们更难获得中国商品。

“These measures aim to prevent Japan’s ‘re-militarization’ and nuclear ambitions and are fully justifiable, reasonable and lawful,” the ministry said in a statement.

该部在一份声明中说，这些措施“目的是制止日本‘再军事化’和拥核企图，完全正当合理合法”。

The Japanese government said that China’s export controls “deviate significantly from international practice and are absolutely unacceptable.”

日本政府表示，中国的出口管制“严重背离国际惯例，是绝对不可接受的”。

“We have strongly protested these measures and demanded their withdrawal,” Kei Sato, a cabinet official, said at a news conference in Tokyo.

“我们已强烈抗议这些措施并要求撤销，”内阁官员佐藤启在东京的新闻发布会上说。

In Japan, Subaru and Mitsubishi also produce aircraft and machinery and they have contracts with Japan’s military, the Self-Defense Forces.

在日本，斯巴鲁和三菱也生产飞机和机械，并与日本自卫队签订了合同。

The restrictions come at a tense geopolitical moment in Asia. Ms. Takaichi, an outspoken critic of China, has promised to raise Japan’s military spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product this spring. Japan believes that it must modernize its forces to keep up with China’s rising military clout in the region.

此番限制出台之际，亚洲地缘政治局势正趋紧张。直言批评中国的高市早苗承诺，在今年春季将日本军费开支提高到国内生产总值的2%。日本认为必须实现军队现代化，才能跟上中国在该地区日益增强的军事影响力。

China has denounced Japan’s defense buildup. In appealing to Western nations, Chinese officials have invoked Japan’s aggression during World War II, saying that it must be contained.

中国谴责日本的国防建设。在向西方国家发出呼吁时，中国官员援引日本在二战期间的侵略历史，称日本必须受到遏制。

Jean-Pierre Cabestan, a researcher at the Asia Center in Paris, said China’s restrictions were aimed at showing that Beijing would not back down. Chinese officials are working to put pressure on Ms. Takaichi, who recently won a sweeping mandate from voters for her hard-line agenda, ahead of her visit next month to Washington to meet with President Trump, he said.

巴黎亚洲中心研究员让-皮埃尔·卡贝斯坦说，中国的限制措施旨在表明北京不会退让。他说，中国官员正努力在高市早苗下月访问华盛顿与特朗普总统会晤之前向她施压，她最近因其强硬议程赢得了选民的压倒性支持。

“China is making a big fuss over the militarization of Japan, which is nothing new or unusual,” he said. “Takaichi is just increasing some of the expenditures to make the Japanese Self-Defense Forces more credible.”

“中国围绕日本军事化小题大做，这不是新鲜事，也不稀奇，”他表示。“高市早苗只是增加部分开支，以提升日本自卫队的可信度。”

Mr. Cabestan said that Chinese officials were also appealing to a domestic audience. Targeting Japan’s defense industry is an easy way to fan nationalism, he said, and can help “glue everyone together around the Communist Party and the leadership.”

卡贝斯坦指出，中国官员也在迎合国内受众。他指出，针对日本国防工业是煽动民族主义的便捷手段，有助于“将所有人团结在共产党和领导层周围”。

Beijing has in recent months restricted Japanese seafood imports, discouraged tourism to Japan and canceled mainland performances by Japanese artists.

近月来，北京限制日本海产品进口、打压赴日旅游，并取消日本艺人在中国大陆的演出。

One was a general who had commanded Chinese forces arrayed against Taiwan. Another was an officer who had led the People’s Liberation Army’s training department and been praised for modernizing combat drills. A third had long served as the chief military aide to China’s leader, Xi Jinping.

一位将军曾指挥过针对台湾部署的军队。另一位将军曾领导解放军训练部门，因推动作战训练现代化而备受赞誉。第三位将军则长期担任中国国家主席习近平的首席军事助理。

These men are among dozens of once-rising senior military officers who have been detained, dismissed or simply disappeared from view without explanation over the last four years. Their downfall, documented in a study released Tuesday, reveals the staggering extent of Mr. Xi’s campaign to shake up the People’s Liberation Army, which culminated last month in the removal of the topmost general, Zhang Youxia.

在过去四年中，有数十名一度崛起的高级军官在没有任何解释的情况下被拘留、解职，或干脆从人们的视线中消失，这三人就属其列。周二发布的一份研究报告记录了他们的陨落轨迹，凸显出习近平整顿解放军的运动规模之巨，这场运动在上个月以最高将领张又侠被撤职而达到顶峰。

The purge has stripped the military of its most experienced commanders and raised doubts about its readiness to go to war, including over Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its territory, according to data compiled by researchers at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, or C.S.I.S., a research group in Washington.

根据华盛顿智库战略与国际研究中心研究员汇编的数据，这场清洗行动使得军队失去了最富经验的指挥官，引发外界对其战争准备能力的质疑，包括针对中国宣称是其领土的台湾地区。

“In the near term, given the significant vacancies, it would be incredibly difficult for China to launch large military campaigns against Taiwan,” Bonny Lin, the director of the China Power Project at the center, wrote in an assessment of the findings. “Even below that threshold, there is evidence that the purges have negatively impacted China’s exercises around Taiwan in 2025.”

“短期内，鉴于存在大量空缺，中国发动大规模军事行动攻台将极其困难，”该中心中国力量项目主任林洋(Bonny Lin)在评估报告中指出。“即便降低一些标准，也有证据表明，此次清洗已对2025年中国在台湾周边的军事演习都产生了负面影响。”

Since 2022, around 100 officers in the military’s top two ranks — general or lieutenant general — have been dismissed or sidelined, the study estimated. The tally includes about 11 officers who were purged even after retirement.

据该研究估计，自2022年以来，约有100名军队最高两个级别（上将或中将）的军官被解职或边缘化。其中包括约11名军官在退休后仍被清洗。

Those eliminated represented about half of the military’s senior leadership, spanning the top commanders as well as the leaders and deputy leaders of central departments and all of China’s five military theater regions, said M. Taylor Fravel, a professor and expert on the Chinese military at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who examined the data.

美国麻省理工学院教授、中国军事问题专家傅泰林(M. Taylor Fravel)研究了这些数据，他说，这些被清除的人员约占军队高级领导层的一半，包括最高指挥官、中央部门和中国五大战区的正副领导。

Replacing them will not be easy. The purges have shrunk the pool of candidates who would have the right combination of skills, experience and ironclad loyalty to Mr. Xi and the Communist Party. An officer must also usually have served three to five years in his or her current grade to be considered for promotion, Professor Fravel said.

取代他们并非易事。清洗行动已大幅缩减具备综合素质的候选人储备——这些人才需兼具专业能力、丰富经验及对习近平和中共的绝对忠诚。傅泰林说，军官通常需在现职军衔任职三至五年方有晋升资格。

“Xi has purged all of these people and, obviously, it’s framed as their lack of loyalty to Xi and to the party,” he said in an interview. “But he also needs expertise to have the military he wants — loyalty as well as expertise — and how will he find those people? That’s going to be harder now.”

“习近平已经清洗了所有这些人，表面理由是他们对习近平和党缺乏忠诚，”他在接受采访时说。“但他也需要专业人才来组建他理想中的军队——既要忠诚，也要专业能力——他要如何找到这些人呢？现在这将变得更加困难。”

The removals began as a trickle, with a single senior officer disappearing in 2022. That grew to 14, dismissed or disappeared, in 2023, and 11 more in 2024. By last year the purge was a deluge: About 62 were removed, many in the latter half of the year.

撤职一开始只是零星发生，2022年，仅有一名高级官员消失。2023年，被解职或失踪的官员增至14人，2024年又增加了11人。到去年，这场清洗已如洪水般汹涌：约62人被撤职，其中多数发生在下半年。

This year about 11 officers have been absent from meetings that they would usually be expected to attend, suggesting that at least some of them could also be in serious trouble. The downfall of General Zhang could set off yet more investigations into officers linked to him.

今年，约有11名军官缺席了他们通常应出席的会议，这表明其中至少部分人可能也遇到了严重的麻烦。张又侠的倒台可能引发针对与他关联军官的更多调查。

“You can think of the purge of Zhang Youxia as just completing the first phase, with more turbulence to come,” said Professor Fravel.

傅泰林指出：“可以认为张又侠的清洗仅是第一阶段的收尾，接下来还会有更多的动荡。”

Some of the dismissed or disappeared officers owed their rise to Mr. Xi himself; others were stars whose credentials marked them as the future of the high command.

部分遭撤职或失踪的将领曾受习近平提拔；还有一些是军中明星人物，其资历标志着他们本应成为未来高层。

Among them: Lt. Gen. Wang Peng, who had earned a reputation for modernizing troop training; Lt. Gen. Zhong Shaojun, who had served as Mr. Xi’s chief aide for managing the People’s Liberation Army; and Gen. Lin Xiangyang, the commander who would have been at the forefront of any Chinese attack on Taiwan.

其中包括以部队训练现代化著称的王鹏中将；曾是习近平管理解放军的首席助手的钟绍军中将；以及本应在中国对台军事行动中担任前线指挥官的林向阳上将。

While there are other officers who could fill the vacancies, the wave of removals could have a cascading effect through the ranks. As investigations expand, any promotions will likely be subjected to microscopic scrutiny. Of 52 key military leadership positions examined in the study, only around 11 are officially filled, said Dr. Lin.

虽然还有其他官员可以填补空缺，但免职潮可能在各级军官中引发连锁反应。随着调查范围的扩大，任何晋升都可能面临极其严格的审查。林洋说，在本研究调查的52个重要军事领导职位中，只有约11个是正式的补缺。

In the Chinese military, “for every senior officer, there are tens, if not hundreds, of lower officers whose careers have been tied to the senior officer,” said John Culver, a former Central Intelligence Agency analyst who is now a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. “I think this will ripple for at least two or three years.”

在中国军队中，“每一名高级军官背后都牵动着数十名甚至数百名下级军官的职业生涯，”前中央情报局分析师、现布鲁金斯学会非常驻高级研究员约翰·卡尔弗说。“我认为影响至少会持续两三年。”

So far, the tempo of China’s military modernization does not appear slowed by the purges, but the command bottlenecks may hinder some operations. The researchers at C.S.I.S. noted that China may have decreased, delayed and simplified some military exercises last year, including near Taiwan, because of the loss of skilled leaders.

到目前为止，中国军事现代化的步伐似乎并没有因为大清洗而放缓，但指挥瓶颈可能会阻碍部分行动。战略与国际研究中心研究人员指出，由于资深领导人的流失，中国去年可能减少、推迟和简化了一些军事演习，包括在台湾附近的演习。

Mr. Xi patched some holes in the military leadership late last year, when he promoted new commanders to the Eastern Theater Command, which oversees Taiwan, and the Central Theater Command, which helps protect Beijing. There is no sign yet of when he may install new commanders into the Central Military Commission, the apex body that controls the military.

去年末，习近平通过提拔新指挥官填补了东部战区（负责台湾事务）和中部战区（参与北京守备）的部分领导层空缺。目前还没有迹象表明他何时会为掌控军队的最高机构中央军委任命新的指挥官。

Chancellor Friedrich Merz of Germany has spent the opening months of this year sketching out a new vision for Europe in a world increasingly shaped by the bullying behavior of superpowers.

在今年开年数月间，德国总理弗里德里希·默茨勾勒出了一个在超级大国霸凌行为日益主导的世界中欧洲的新愿景。

His idea is roughly this: Europe should cut its dependence on China and the United States to avoid being pushed around on the global stage — but it should not cut them off entirely.

他的核心主张大致如下：欧洲应减少对中美两国的依赖，避免在全球舞台上受制于人——但不应完全切断与中国和美国的联系。

This week, Mr. Merz will road-test that idea on a trip to Beijing and Hangzhou, China. It will be his first visit to the country since he became chancellor last year, challenging his ability to address tensions between Berlin and Beijing — on trade, Taiwan, Ukraine and a host of other issues — without further inflaming them.

本周，默茨将前往中国北京和杭州，对这一想法进行实地考察。这是他去年就任总理后首次访华，将考验他能否应对柏林与北京之间在贸易、台湾、乌克兰等诸多议题上的紧张关系，同时避免进一步激化矛盾。

German officials suggest Mr. Merz will seek to minimize conflict with China’s top leader, Xi Jinping. But they also say he will push Mr. Xi on sore spots in the countries’ relationship, including Chinese economic policies that hurt German manufacturers and Beijing’s backing for President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia four years after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

德国官员透露，默茨将力求避免与中国最高领导人习近平发生冲突。但他们同时表示，默茨将就两国关系中的敏感议题向习近平施压，包括损害德国制造商利益的中国经济政策，以及在俄罗斯全面入侵乌克兰四年后北京仍支持俄罗斯总统普京等问题。

Mr. Merz is expected to stress that Germany and Europe are strengthening their military defense capability and economic competitiveness — effectively, a vision for how Europe can build its own power to rival China and America.

默茨预计将强调德国和欧洲正在增强军事防御能力和经济竞争力——实质上是在阐述欧洲如何建立自身实力以与中美抗衡的愿景。

And while Mr. Merz will emphasize the need for improved ties with China, he has made clear that he still sees the United States as Germany’s more natural ally.

虽然默茨将强调改善与中国关系的必要性，但他已明确表示，相比之下美国仍是德国更天然的盟友。

At a conference of his center-right Christian Democrats last weekend, the chancellor said China was “claiming the right to define a new multilateral order according to its own rules. Freedom of expression, freedom of religion and freedom of the press are not part of this understanding.”

在上周末举行的中右翼政党基督教民主党会议上，这位德国总理说，中国“声称有权按照自己的规则定义新的多边秩序。表达自由、宗教自由和新闻自由都不在这一范畴之列”。

Given that, Mr. Merz added, “wouldn’t it be right that we Europeans, together with the Americans, have something better to offer in response to our shared understanding of freedom, indeed our shared image of humanity?”

有鉴于此，默茨补充说，“我们欧洲人和美国人一起，难道不应该提供一些更好的东西，来呼应我们对自由的共同理解，乃至我们对人类共同形象的理解？”

The chancellor’s trip will be the fifth to China by the leader of a U.S. ally since December. Chinese officials appear eager to cast the visit as yet another important country turning toward Beijing for stability amid the uncertainty unleashed by President Trump. His administration has disrupted global trade with a flurry of tariffs, while pulling back on America’s longstanding security guarantees for Europe.

这是自12月以来第五位美国盟国领导人访华。中国官员似乎急于将此次访问描绘成又一个重要国家在特朗普总统带来的不确定性中转向北京寻求稳定。特朗普政府通过一系列关税措施扰乱了全球贸易，同时收回了美国对欧洲的长期安全保证。

2022年，梅赛德斯-奔驰在中国的生产线。尽管面临中国竞争对手日益增长的威胁，默茨仍将中国视为德国工业的关键市场。

In seeking closer ties with Germany, the world’s third-largest economy and the industrial heart of Europe, Mr. Xi is attempting to further splinter the United States from its historical allies. Mr. Xi has already reset ties with Canada and Britain during their leaders’ visits to Beijing this year.

在寻求与德国——世界第三大经济体和欧洲的工业中心——建立更密切的关系时，习近平正试图进一步分裂美国与其历史盟友的关系。在加拿大和英国领导人今年访问北京期间，习近平与这两个国家重新建立了纽带。

China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, recently signaled at the Munich Security Conference that Beijing wanted to draw Berlin closer, and called on the two countries to upgrade bilateral ties to a “new level.” Mr. Wang also said China supported Berlin’s “strategic autonomy,” which Beijing understands to mean the weakening of American influence over Germany.

中国最高外交官员王毅近日在慕尼黑安全会议上表示，北京希望拉近与柏林的关系，并呼吁两国将双边关系“迈上新水平”。王毅还表示中国支持柏林的“战略自主”，北京将其理解为削弱美国对德国的影响力。

“The aim of China’s leadership is quite simple,” said Noah Barkin, an expert on European-Chinese relations at Rhodium Group, a research firm. “It wants to present itself as a guarantor of stability in a world rocked by U.S. unilateralism and aggression. The sequence of European visits are meant to underline this message and reinforce a narrative of trans-Atlantic division.”

“中国领导层的目标很简单，”研究机构荣鼎咨询的欧中关系专家诺亚·巴尔金表示，“在一个被美国单边主义和侵略所震撼的世界中，中国希望将自己塑造成一个稳定的保障者。一连串的欧洲领导人访问旨在强调这一信息，并强化跨大西洋关系的分裂叙事。”

But there is still plenty of division between Germany and China, particularly on economic issues. After decades of courtship by German industry and chancellors, including Angela Merkel, the country’s former leader and Mr. Merz’s longtime intraparty rival, China was Germany’s top trading partner last year.

但德中之间仍存在诸多分歧，尤其在经济领域。经过德国工业界及历任总理（包括默茨在党内的老对手、前总理默克尔）数十年的拉拢，中国去年已成为德国最大贸易伙伴。

Mr. Merz still sees China as a crucial export market and an incubator of innovation for German companies with significant operations there. He will visit two of those companies’ operations — Mercedes-Benz and Siemens, as well as China’s Unitree Robotics — on his trip, along with a delegation of 30 German business leaders.

默茨依然视中国为德国企业的关键出口市场和创新孵化器，这些企业在华业务规模可观。他此行将率领30位德国商界领袖组成的代表团，并将考察梅赛德斯-奔驰和西门子两家企业，以及中国的宇树科技。

But he appears more candid than Ms. Merkel was a decade ago about the need to protect German industry from Chinese competition, and he is already eyeing alternative sources of consumer demand for German products. Notably, Mr. Merz visited India before he visited China as chancellor.

但他似乎比十年前的默克尔更加坦率地表示，需要保护德国工业免受中国竞争的冲击，并已着手开拓德国产品的替代消费市场。值得注意的是，默茨在以总理身份访华之前，先访问了印度。

In Beijing, Mr. Merz is expected to raise concerns with Chinese officials over their subsidies for domestic manufacturing and the artificially low value of its currency, the renminbi. Both are being used to help China flood European markets with low-cost products that Mr. Barkin estimates are contributing to the loss of nearly 10,000 German industrial jobs a month.

在北京，预计默茨将向中国官员提出的关切包括中国对国内制造业的补贴，以及人为压低人民币币值问题。这两项措施都在助推中国向欧洲市场倾销低价产品，据巴尔金估计，这导致德国每月损失近万工业就业机会。

Officials from both sides have expressed hope that the discussions could yield modest agreements, perhaps in opening some trade in agriculture. But many analysts say Mr. Merz’s primary goal should be striking a new tone with Mr. Xi.

双方官员都表示希望讨论能达成一些小的协议，例如在农产品贸易领域实现部分开放。但许多分析人士表示，默茨的首要目标应该是与习近平达成新的对话基调。

“There is very little to be secured from the Chinese side right now,” said Thorsten Benner, co-founder and director of the Global Public Policy Institute, a Berlin-based think tank. “The most important thing is that he sends a clear message about defending Germany’s economic interests.”

柏林智库全球公共政策研究所联合创始人兼所长托尔斯滕·本纳表示：“目前中方能提供的保障寥寥无几。最重要的是，他要发出明确信号，表明将捍卫德国的经济利益。”

Beijing has urged Mr. Merz to further open Germany’s and Europe’s market to Chinese exports. That includes for Chinese electric vehicles, which pose a direct threat to Germany’s legacy auto industry.

北京敦促默茨进一步向中国出口产品开放德国及欧洲市场，包括对德国传统汽车工业构成直接威胁的中国电动汽车。

Mr. Xi has some leverage in the discussions. Germany’s 40 leading blue-chip companies rely on China for more than 10 percent of their revenues, according to research from Deutsche Bank. Many German manufacturers would grind to a halt without vital Chinese industrial inputs like rare earth minerals. Mr. Xi has already demonstrated he is willing to throttle supplies when Chinese interests are threatened.

习近平在讨论中有一定的筹码。据德意志银行研究，德国40家蓝筹企业逾10%营收依赖中国市场。若失去稀土等关键工业原料供应，众多德国制造商将陷入停滞。习近平已表明，当中国利益受损时，他会毫不犹豫地实施供应限制。

Chinese officials are likely to push Mr. Merz to support Beijing’s claim to the self-governed island of Taiwan. Germany does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country, but it maintains diplomatic relations with the territory. China rebuked Germany’s foreign minister, Johann Wadephul, last year after he criticized Beijing for its “increasingly aggressive behavior” in the Taiwan Strait.

中方官员可能敦促默茨支持北京对自治岛屿台湾的主权主张。德国虽不承认台湾主权国家地位，但与该地区保持外交关系。去年德国外交部长瓦德普尔批评北京在台湾海峡采取“日益咄咄逼人的行为”，后遭到中方斥责。

Mr. Merz, in turn, is likely to push Mr. Xi to pressure Mr. Putin to end the war in Ukraine, though in careful language. Mr. Merz sometimes says there are three men who could force the war to an immediate end: Mr. Putin, Mr. Xi and Mr. Trump.

反过来，默茨也可能推动习近平向普京施压，迫使普京结束乌克兰战争，尽管默茨的措辞会很谨慎。默茨曾说，有三个人可以迫使战争立即结束：普京、习近平和特朗普。

The chancellor will see two of the three in the span of a week. A few days after returning to Berlin from China, he is scheduled to fly to Washington to visit Mr. Trump.

这位总理将在一周内见到这三个人中的两个。从中国返回柏林几天后，他将飞往华盛顿拜访特朗普。

Federal officials have for years tried to wean Silicon Valley from its dependence on Taiwan, an island democracy roughly the size of Maryland that makes 90 percent of the world’s high-end computer chips.

多年来，联邦政府一直试图让硅谷摆脱对台湾的依赖。这个面积与马里兰州大致相当的民主岛屿制造了全球90%的高端计算机芯片。

In secret briefings held in Washington and Silicon Valley, national security officials warned executives from companies like Apple, Advanced Micro Devices and Qualcomm that China was making plans to retake Taiwan, which Beijing has long considered a breakaway territory. A Chinese blockade of Taiwan, the officials said, could choke the supply of computer chips made on the island and bring the U.S. tech industry to its knees.

在华盛顿和硅谷举行的多次秘密简报会上，国家安全官员警告苹果、AMD、高通等公司的高管，中国正计划收复台湾——北京长期以来一直视台湾为其分离出去的领土。官员们表示，中国对台湾的封锁可能会切断该岛制造的计算机芯片供应，从而使美国科技业陷入困境。

Two presidents have tried persuading the industry to change. President Joseph R. Biden Jr. offered financial grants worth billions to improve the domestic production of chips. After that didn’t work, President Trump threatened billions in tariffs to essentially accomplish the same thing.

两任总统试图说服该行业做出改变。拜登总统提供数十亿美元的财政补贴，以提升美国国内的芯片生产能力。在这一努力未能奏效之后，特朗普总统又威胁征收数十亿美元的关税，实质上也是为了实现同样的目标。

But warnings, gifts and threats have made little difference. The U.S. tech industry has stubbornly refused to shift where it gets most of its chips, which power things like smartphones, laptops and the giant data centers that run artificial intelligence.

但警告、补贴还是威胁都收效甚微。美国科技行业依然固执地拒绝改变其大部分芯片的来源地，这些芯片是驱动智能手机、笔记本电脑以及运行人工智能的大型数据中心等设备的关键部件。

Now, there is increasing concern that inaction by some of Silicon Valley’s most important companies risks destabilizing the global economy. Those worries, drawn into focus by recent live-fire drills conducted by the Chinese military in waters surrounding Taiwan, have prompted dire warnings from White House officials.

如今，人们越来越担心，硅谷一些最重要公司的无所作为可能会破坏全球经济的稳定。中国军队近期在台湾周边海域进行的实弹演习更加凸显出这些担忧，并促使白宫官员发出了严厉警告。

“The single biggest threat to the world economy, the single biggest point of single failure, is that 97 percent of the high-end chips are made in Taiwan,” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said last month at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, slightly overstating industry estimates. “If that island were blockaded, that capacity were destroyed, it would be an economic apocalypse.”

美国财长斯科特·贝森特上个月在瑞士达沃斯举行的世界经济论坛上表示：“对世界经济最大的单一威胁、最大的单点失效风险在于，97%的高端芯片是在台湾生产的。”他的这一说法略高于行业估计。“如果这个岛屿遭到封锁，生产能力被摧毁，那将是一场经济末日。”

经过数十年的投资，台湾成为了世界半导体产业的中心。

If Taiwan is lost, the tech industry won’t be able to say it wasn’t warned. A New York Times investigation found that executives were so focused on winning in their hypercompetitive markets and maintaining big profit margins that facing up to the Taiwan problem was an afterthought. And now it will be years before the steps some companies are finally taking make a difference.

如果台湾失守，科技行业并不能说自己没有得到过警告。《纽约时报》的一项调查发现，高管们过于专注于在高度竞争的市场中取胜并维持高利润率，以至于将正视台湾问题置于次要位置。如今一些公司终于开始采取行动，但这些措施要见到成效还需数年时间。

A confidential report commissioned in 2022 by the Semiconductor Industry Association for its members, which include the largest U.S. chip companies, said cutting the supply of chips from Taiwan would lead to the largest economic crisis since the Great Depression. U.S. economic output would plunge 11 percent, twice as much as the 2008 recession. The collapse would be even more severe for China, which would experience a 16 percent decline.

2022年，半导体工业协会受委托为其成员（包括美国最大的芯片公司）撰写的一份机密报告称，如果来自台湾的芯片供应被切断，将引发自大萧条以来最严重的经济危机。美国经济产出将暴跌11%，相当于2008年金融危机跌幅的两倍。对中国来说，冲击将更加严重，经济将萎缩16%。

Many of the biggest U.S. tech companies would have enough semiconductors to operate for several months before their businesses broke down, according to the report, which was reviewed by The Times and has not been previously reported.

根据报告，在业务中断之前，许多美国大型科技公司的半导体库存仅够维持数月运营。《纽约时报》获得了这份此前未见相关报道的报告。 

The report, which was written at the encouragement of Biden administration officials, illustrated how Washington has been forced to reconsider its position on Taiwan. For decades, America’s commitment to the island was based on geopolitics, respect for democracy and containing China. It was viewed as a lopsided arrangement that was good for Taiwan and risky for the United States.

报告是在拜登政府官员的鼓励下撰写的，它表明了华盛顿如何被迫重新考虑对台湾问题的立场。几十年来，美国对该岛的承诺是基于地缘政治、对民主制度的尊重以及遏制中国的需要。这被视为一种不对称的安排，对台湾有利，对美国则充满风险。

But now, more than ever, it has become clear that Taiwan is critical to America’s economic survival, especially as artificial intelligence — which is built using chips made in Taiwan — drives the U.S. stock market and fuels economic growth.

但如今，比以往任何时候都更加明显的是，台湾对美国的经济生存至关重要，尤其是在人工智能推动美国股市上涨并带动经济增长的背景下，人工智能离不开台湾制造的芯片。

The Trump administration has been cleareyed about the risk. While some of Mr. Trump’s tariffs have appeared to be driven by impulse or retribution, he has persistently used the threat of tariffs on semiconductors to bully tech companies to buy more of their chips from U.S. factories.

特朗普政府对这一风险有着清醒的认识。虽然特朗普的一些关税举措看似出于冲动或报复，但他一直持续利用对半导体征收关税的威胁来逼迫科技公司从美国本土工厂采购更多芯片。

That arm-twisting recently led Nvidia, the world’s most valuable company, to commit to buying chips from new plants in Arizona being built by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation, a Taiwanese company that is the world’s dominant chip manufacturer.

这种施压最近促使全球市值最高的公司英伟达承诺，从台积电在亚利桑那州新建的工厂采购芯片。台积电是一家台湾公司，也是全球占主导地位的芯片制造商。

台积电正在扩建其位于菲尼克斯的制造工厂。

It was a step toward solving an intractable problem: New plants won’t be built in the United States unless companies agree to buy the chips produced in them, which would be more expensive and cut into profits. It has been a Catch-22 that federal intervention has struggled to solve.

这是朝着解决一个棘手难题迈出的一步：如果没有企业承诺购买在本土生产的芯片，美国就不会建设新的工厂；但购买本土芯片成本更高，会削减企业利润。这形成了联邦政府一直难以破解的“先有鸡还是先有蛋”的困局。

“Reshoring manufacturing that’s critical to our national and economic security is a top priority for President Trump, and the Trump administration is implementing a nuanced and multifaceted policy approach to deliver,” said Kush Desai, a White House spokesman.

白宫发言人库什·德赛表示：“将对国家安全和经济安全至关重要的制造业迁回美国，是特朗普总统的首要任务之一，特朗普政府正在实施一套细致入微、多管齐下的政策方法来实现这一目标。”

Other new commitments to U.S. chip making are trickling in. The United States is on track to spend $200 billion on semiconductor plants through 2030, enough to increase chip production capacity 50 percent, according to SEMI, a global chip industry association.

其他对美国芯片制造业的新投资承诺也正在陆续出现。根据全球芯片行业协会SEMI的数据，到2030年，美国将在半导体工厂上投入2000亿美元，足以将芯片产能提升50%。

But with Taiwan, China and other countries also pouring billions into semiconductor plants, the United States would still account for only 10 percent of the world’s semiconductor production in 2030 — much as it did in 2020 when the government stepped up its calls for change.

但随着台湾、中国和其他国家也在向半导体工厂投入巨资，到2030年，美国在全球半导体产量中的占比仍将只有约10%，这与2020年政府开始大力呼吁改变时的占比基本持平。

“The whole industry has to say, ‘We’re all going to do this,’” said Bill Wiseman, global co-leader of the semiconductor practice at McKinsey, the consulting firm. Instead, he said, executives think, “If we’re screwed, everyone else is screwed,’ so they don’t take action.”

“整个行业必须一致认为，‘我们都要这样做，’”咨询公司麦肯锡半导体业务全球联合负责人比尔·怀斯曼表示。但他指出，企业高管往往认为，“‘如果我们完蛋了，其他人也都会完蛋’，所以他们不会采取行动。”

The Countdown Begins

倒计时开始

In March 2021, Adm. Philip S. Davidson delivered a warning to the Senate Armed Services Committee about geopolitical conflict over Taiwan.

2021年3月，海军上将菲利普·戴维森就台湾问题可能引发的地缘政治冲突向参议院军事委员会发出警告。

“The threat is manifest during this decade,” said Admiral Davidson, who was the commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, which is responsible for the Asia-Pacific region. “In fact, in the next six years.”

“这种威胁在这个十年内就会显现，”戴维森表示，他当时是负责亚太地区事务的美国印太司令部司令。“实际上，就在未来六年内。”

It was the first time a senior U.S. military official had told Congress that the armed services believed President Xi Jinping of China wanted his army to be ready to take Taiwan by 2027, though many defense planners are skeptical such a move could happen that quickly.

这是美国军方高层首次向国会表示，军方认为中国国家主席习近平希望解放军在2027年前具备攻占台湾的能力，不过许多国防规划人员对这一行动是否会如此快地实现仍持怀疑态度。

Jake Sullivan, Mr. Biden’s national security adviser, ranked the U.S. reliance on Taiwan for semiconductors as one of America’s greatest vulnerabilities. He wanted the industry to recognize the risk and support construction of U.S. manufacturing plants. Mr. Biden also wanted to provide $50 billion in government subsidies to build semiconductor plants domestically.

拜登的国家安全顾问杰克·沙利文将美国在半导体方面对台湾的依赖列为美国最大的弱点之一。他希望业界能够认识到这一风险，并支持在美国本土建厂。拜登还希望提供500亿美元的政府补贴，用于在美国国内建设半导体工厂。

“We were saying: ‘This is crazy. We have to do something about it,’” Mr. Sullivan said in an interview.

“我们当时在说：‘这太疯狂了。我们必须采取行动，’”沙利文在接受采访时表示。

Change required uprooting a deeply entrenched business. Taiwan spent 50 years turning itself into the world’s semiconductor factory and becoming a leader in semiconductor research and development. It became a manufacturing hub for the chips in every iPhone and a third of the basic chips that power cars, tractors, cellphone towers and pacemakers.

要改变现状，就意味着要动摇一个根深蒂固的产业格局。台湾用了50年的时间把自己打造成为世界半导体工厂，并成为半导体研发领域的领导者。它已成为每一部iPhone所用芯片的制造中心，同时还生产了全球约三分之一用于汽车、拖拉机、通信基站和心脏起搏器等设备的基础芯片。

There were clear business reasons for the industry’s hesitation to shift from Taiwan. Chips made in the United States were more than 25 percent more expensive, industry executives said, because of higher material, labor and permitting costs. TSMC was widely considered better at building cutting-edge chips than American companies like Intel. And U.S. businesses were more focused on quarterly profits than geopolitical threats.

业界摆脱对台依赖的犹豫不决有其明确的商业原因。行业高管表示，由于材料、劳动力及审批成本更高，美国制造的芯片价格要高出25%以上。人们普遍认为，台积电在制造尖端芯片方面比英特尔等美国公司更胜一筹。而且，美国企业更关注财季利润，而非地缘政治威胁。

对台湾的封锁可能会切断台积电在该岛生产的电脑芯片的供应。

In the fall of 2021, the White House summoned top semiconductor executives to Washington for a classified briefing on Taiwan, said seven people familiar with the gathering.

据七名知情人士透露，2021年秋天，白宫召集主要半导体企业高管前往华盛顿，参加一场关于台湾问题的机密简报会。

Pat Gelsinger of Intel and other chief executives filed into a White House briefing room and listened as officials warned that a blockade or invasion could halt chip manufacturing.

英特尔的帕特·基辛格和其他首席执行官走进白宫的简报室，听取官员们警告：一旦发生封锁或入侵，芯片制造可能会陷入停顿。

The executives were skeptical. Media outlets had previously reported much of the information the government shared. They also questioned why Mr. Xi would take Taiwan, since it would damage China’s economy.

这些高管对此持怀疑态度。政府所提供的大部分信息此前已被媒体广泛报道。他们还质疑习近平为何要攻占台湾，因为这样做会损害中国的经济。

By February 2022, that argument had been undermined by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. During a White House call with executives about new rules limiting chip sales to Russia, Mr. Sullivan said Russia’s action showed countries would seize territory even if it harmed their economy.

到了2022年2月，这种观点被俄罗斯入侵乌克兰的行动削弱了。在白宫与企业高管讨论限制向俄罗斯出售芯片新规的一次电话会议中，沙利文表示，俄罗斯的行动表明，一些国家即使明知会损害本国经济，也仍然可能采取领土扩张行动。

“If you had doubts about autocrats taking on water for adventures, you may want to reconsider,” he said. He encouraged the industry to study its Taiwan risk.

“你真以为独裁者会因为担心受损失而不敢冒险吗，醒醒吧，”他说。他鼓励业界对面临的台湾风险做出评估。

After the call, the Semiconductor Industry Association hired McKinsey to take a look. They started with a basic question: What would happen if companies couldn’t get chips from the island?

那次电话会议后，美国半导体行业协会聘请麦肯锡进行调查。他们从一个基本问题开始：如果公司无法从该岛获得芯片，会怎么样？

A summary of the resulting report opened with a map of Taiwan detailing how integral the island is to the global economy. Taiwan enabled roughly $10 trillion of the world’s gross domestic product. It made chips for iPhones and more than half of so-called memory chips for cars, and it led in assembling A.I. chips.

最终报告的摘要以一张详尽的台湾地图开头，阐述了该岛对全球经济是多么不可或缺。台湾支撑着全球约10万亿美元的国内生产总值。它生产iPhone芯片，制造了超过一半的汽车存储芯片，并在人工智能芯片封装方面处于领先地位。

The island’s semiconductor manufacturing is mainly in Hsinchu, an area where Taiwan’s government discouraged manufacturing after World War II because it is next to the sloping beaches that are the best place for an amphibious assault against the island.

该岛的半导体制造业主要集中在新竹。二战后，台湾当局曾不鼓励在该地区发展制造业，因为它紧邻坡度平缓的海滩，那是发动两栖登陆的最佳地点。

If Taiwan’s factories were knocked offline, the impact would be immediate, the roughly 20-page report said. Economies would flounder. In China, the gross national product would fall by $2.8 trillion; in the United States, the drop would be $2.5 trillion.

这份约20页的报告称，如果台湾工厂停产，影响将是立竿见影的。各国经济将陷入困境。中国的国民生产总值将下降2.8万亿美元；美国的降幅将达到2.5万亿美元。

Other reports, including one by Bloomberg Economics, a research service, estimate a conflict would cost the global economy more than $10 trillion.

其他报告，包括研究服务机构彭博经济研究的一份报告，估计台海冲突将使全球经济损失超过10万亿美元。

Build It and Hope They Will Come

筑巢引凤

In August 2022, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo beamed on the White House South Lawn as Mr. Biden signed into law the CHIPS Act. It gave Ms. Raimondo $50 billion in subsidies for semiconductor investments and factories.

2022年8月，当拜登在白宫南草坪签署《芯片法案》使其成为法律时，商务部长吉娜·雷蒙多喜笑颜开。该法案给了雷蒙多500亿美元的补贴，用于半导体投资和工厂建设。

2022年，拜登总统在白宫南草坪签署《2022芯片与科学法案》。

But Ms. Raimondo still needed to persuade chip manufacturers to build plants, and persuade tech companies to have their chips built in them.

但雷蒙多仍需要说服芯片制造商建厂，同时争取科技公司将芯片生产订单交给这些新工厂。

The first part was easy. TSMC committed more than $50 billion to building a second and third plant in Arizona, two years after announcing its first facility during Mr. Trump’s first term. Intel promised to expand in Arizona and invest as much as $100 billion in an Ohio campus. Samsung pledged $45 billion for two factories in Taylor, Texas.

第一部分相对容易。在特朗普第一任期内宣布建立第一座工厂两年后，台积电承诺投入500多亿美元在亚利桑那州建设第二和第三座工厂。英特尔承诺扩大在亚利桑那州的业务，并向俄亥俄州的一个园区投资高达1000亿美元。三星则承诺投入450亿美元在得克萨斯州泰勒市建设两座工厂。

Ms. Raimondo said the plants would give the United States the capacity to produce a fifth of the world’s advanced semiconductors by 2030. But she needed tech companies to pay for U.S. chips.

雷蒙多表示，这些工厂将使美国在2030年前有能力生产全球五分之一的先进半导体。但她需要科技公司为美国制造的芯片埋单。

TSMC had commitments from Apple, Nvidia and others to buy enough chips to justify building three factories in Arizona. But the company hadn’t secured enough orders to build its planned complex, which would include three additional plants, said three people familiar with the plans. Customers were reluctant buy chips that cost more than 25 percent more and were a generation behind those made in Taiwan, where the government has an unofficial rule requiring TSMC to put its most cutting-edge technology on the island first.

台积电得到了苹果、英伟达等公司的承诺，购买足以支撑其在亚利桑那州建设三座工厂的芯片。但三位知情人士表示，该公司尚未获得足够的订单来建设其计划中的建筑群（包括另外三座工厂）。客户不愿购买价格高出25%以上且技术比台湾产品落后一代的芯片——在台湾，当局有一项非正式规定，要求台积电必须将最尖端的技术首先留在岛内。

Intel and Samsung, despite their pledges to expand production, didn’t have any commitments. Their technology had fallen behind TSMC’s, and the industry doubted they could catch up.

英特尔和三星承诺扩大生产，但它们还没有得到任何订单承诺。它们的技术已经落后于台积电，业界怀疑它们能否追赶上来。

Ms. Raimondo and her staff struggled to persuade companies to buy chips from Intel or Samsung. Without those plants, the U.S. share of global chip production would drop short of the administration’s goal of as much as 20 percent of global capacity by 2030.

雷蒙多及其幕僚在说服公司从英特尔或三星购买芯片方面陷入苦战。如果没有这些工厂，美国在全球芯片生产中的份额将无法达到政府设定的2030年占比20%的目标。

Frustrated, Ms. Raimondo asked William J. Burns, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Avril Haines, the director of national intelligence, to give a classified briefing with the latest intelligence about China and Taiwan, said five people familiar with the briefing, which has not been reported.

五位知情人士说，面对这些困难，雷蒙多请求中央情报局局长威廉·伯恩斯和国家情报总监埃夫丽尔·海恩斯就中国和台湾的最新情报进行了机密简报，此事此前未见报道。

In July 2023, three prominent chief executives, Tim Cook of Apple, Jensen Huang of Nvidia and Lisa Su of Advanced Micro Devices, entered a secure briefing room in Silicon Valley. Cristiano Amon, the chief executive of Qualcomm, joined by video. They listened as Mr. Burns and Ms. Haines said China’s military spending could mean a move on Taiwan in 2027.

2023年7月，三位显赫的首席执行官——苹果的蒂姆·库克、英伟达的黄仁勋和AMD的苏姿丰走进硅谷的一个安全简报室。高通首席执行官克里斯蒂亚诺·安蒙通过视频参加。他们听取了伯恩斯和海恩斯的简报，称中国的军事开支意味着其可能在2027年对台湾采取行动。

Afterward, Mr. Cook told officials that he slept “with one eye open.”

会后，库克告诉官员们，他现在睡觉都“睁着一只眼”。

But the companies still didn’t place significant new orders for U.S. chips, six people close to the industry said. Their lack of interest meant Intel and Samsung couldn’t fulfill their CHIPS Act contracts, which required them to have customers. The government reduced Intel’s and Samsung’s grants by a combined $2.3 billion.

但据六位熟悉该行业的人士称，这些公司仍然没有发出美国芯片大订单。由于缺乏兴趣，英特尔和三星无法履行《芯片法案》的合同，因为合同要求它们必须拥有客户。政府随后将英特尔和三星的拨款总额削减了23亿美元。

2022年，拜登在台积电位于菲尼克斯的工厂。台积电已获得苹果、英伟达等公司的承诺，将购买足够数量的芯片，以支撑其在亚利桑那州建造两座工厂的计划。

The setback came as Intel, the last U.S. manufacturer of leading-edge chips, grappled with falling sales and profits. In December 2024, Mr. Gelsinger, its chief executive, was forced out.

这一挫折发生时，作为美国最后一家领先芯片制造商的英特尔正面临销量和利润下滑的局面。2024年12月，首席执行官基辛格被迫辞职。

Worried about Intel’s future, Ms. Raimondo sent Intel and TSMC a letter before she left office saying the U.S. government would support their working together, which might help Intel survive, two people familiar with the letter said.

据两位知情人士透露，出于对英特尔未来的担忧，雷蒙多在离职前致信英特尔和台积电，表示美国政府将支持双方合作，这可能有助于英特尔生存。

Then she warned her successor, Howard Lutnick: Intel needed help.

随后她警告她的继任者霍华德·卢特尼克：英特尔需要帮助。

Too Reliant on Taiwan

过度依赖台湾

In Washington’s Foxhall neighborhood along the Potomac River, Mr. Lutnick, a former Wall Street bond broker, welcomed Mr. Trump’s decision to name him commerce secretary in November 2024 by buying a $25 million French-style estate.

在华盛顿波托马克河畔的福克斯霍尔社区，前华尔街债券经纪人卢特尼克买下了一座价值2500万美元的法式庄园，以此庆祝特朗普在2024年11月任命他为商务部长的决定。

Two months later, he received Intel’s leadership team there. The group, which included Frank Yeary, the company chairman, and David Zinsner, its finance chief, wanted help with their ailing business, three people familiar with the meeting said.

两个月后，他在这座庄园接待了英特尔高管团队。据三位知情人士透露，英特尔董事长弗兰克·亚里和首席财务官戴维·津斯纳等人希望为陷入困境的公司寻求帮助。

The tech industry’s reluctance to buy more U.S.-made chips was shaping up to be one of Mr. Lutnick’s biggest challenges. He would have to persuade chip makers and customers to spend more.

科技行业不愿更多采购美国本土芯片即将成为卢特尼克面临的最大挑战之一。他必须说服芯片制造商和客户加大投入。

The Intel team said it hoped to separate the company’s manufacturing operations from its business designing and selling chips. But Intel needed $50 billion to $70 billion and suggested the federal government provide about $25 billion, perhaps through a loan. The remainder would come from tech and finance companies.

英特尔团队表示，希望将公司的制造业务与芯片设计和销售业务分拆。但英特尔需要500亿至700亿美元资金，并提议由联邦政府提供约250亿美元，可能以贷款形式提供，剩余部分由科技和金融企业出资。

英特尔在亚利桑那州奥科蒂洛的工厂。去年8月，英特尔决定将公司业务10%的股份出售给美国政府。

Mr. Lutnick turned that idea into a bargaining chip with other companies.

卢特尼克将这一想法变成了与其他公司谈判的筹码。

Late that month, he met TSMC’s chief executive, C.C. Wei, in the office of his New York financial firm, Cantor Fitzgerald, two people with knowledge of the meeting said. Mr. Lutnick gave Mr. Wei a choice: TSMC could invest in Intel and operate Intel’s chip factories, or it could build more TSMC plants in the United States.

据两位知情人士称，当月晚些时候，他在自己位于纽约的金融公司坎托·菲茨杰拉德的办公室会见了台积电首席执行官魏哲家。卢特尼克给了魏哲家两个选择：台积电可以投资英特尔并运营其芯片工厂，或者在美国增建台积电工厂。

Getting TSMC to increase its U.S. production was essential. While Nvidia had become the world’s most valuable company because of its A.I. chips, it does not make those chips. That work is done by TSMC, mostly in its Taiwanese plants.

促成台积电扩大在美生产至关重要。尽管英伟达凭人工智能芯片成为全球市值最高的公司，但它并不生产这些芯片，这项工作主要由台积电在台湾的工厂完成。

Mr. Lutnick’s proposal occurred as Mr. Trump welcomed Mr. Huang of Nvidia to the White House for the first time. In an Oval Office meeting, the president told Mr. Huang that he planned to put tariffs on semiconductors because making them in Taiwan was risky, two people familiar with the meeting said.

卢特尼克提出这一方案之际，特朗普首次在白宫接待了英伟达创始人黄仁勋。据两位知情人士透露，在椭圆形办公室的会议上，特朗普告诉黄仁勋自己计划对半导体征收关税，因为在台湾生产芯片存在风险。

Mr. Trump told Mr. Huang that when he spoke with Mr. Xi about the island, China’s leader would breathe heavily, said one of these people who was briefed on the conversation. The president didn’t like it. He urged Mr. Huang to make chips in America.

据其中一位听取了谈话内容的人士称，特朗普告诉黄仁勋，当他与中国领导人谈及台湾时，对方的呼吸会变得急促起来。总统觉得不妙，并敦促黄仁勋在美国本土生产芯片。

Mr. Wei and Mr. Huang, who are close, spoke with each other about their companies’ dilemmas, two people familiar with their conversations said. For Mr. Wei, Intel’s operations would be burdensome. For Mr. Huang, tariffs would hurt profits. They agreed the solution was for Nvidia to buy more chips made in Arizona, which would let TSMC build additional plants.

据两位知情人士称，关系密切的魏哲家和黄仁勋曾就各自公司的困境进行沟通。对魏哲家而言，英特尔的业务将构成沉重负担；对黄仁勋来说，关税会损害利润。两人达成共识：解决方案是英伟达采购更多亚利桑那州生产的芯片，这样台积电就能扩建新厂。

TSMC and Nvidia declined to comment.

台积电和英伟达均拒绝置评。

Within a few weeks, Mr. Wei told Mr. Lutnick that TSMC would increase its U.S. investment by $100 billion and build four additional chip factories by 2028, two years ahead of its plans.

几周内，魏哲家告知卢特尼克，台积电将在美国增投1000亿美元，并在2028年前新建四座芯片工厂，比原计划提前两年。

‘Horrible, Horrible Thing’

“糟糕透顶的法案”

With TSMC’s commitment in hand, Mr. Trump turned up the pressure on the semiconductor industry.

获得台积电的承诺后，特朗普加大了对半导体行业的施压。

He called the CHIPS Act “a horrible, horrible thing” in his State of the Union address last year and urged Congress to get rid of it. He wanted to replace subsidies with tariffs that could penalize the tech companies. It was a reversal of Mr. Biden’s approach, and the start of major market interventions.

他在去年的国情咨文中称《芯片与科学法案》是“糟糕透顶的法案”，并敦促国会废除该法案。他希望用关税取代补贴，以此惩罚科技企业。这与拜登政府的做法完全相反，也标志着美国开始大规模干预市场。

In April, Mr. Trump announced tariffs for every country. The rate for Taiwan was 32 percent. The administration said it would exclude semiconductors, which would have tariff rates set separately.

4月，特朗普宣布对所有国家征收关税，对台湾的税率为32%。政府表示，半导体将获得豁免，关税税率另行设定。

Soon after, Taiwanese officials visited Washington to find out how to reduce their tariff rate, said a former U.S. official who later met with the group. Mr. Lutnick suggested that Taiwan encourage TSMC to further increase its U.S. investments or operate Intel’s plants.

一位后来与台湾代表团会晤的前美国官员透露，不久后，台湾官员到访华盛顿，试图寻求降低关税的办法。卢特尼克建议台湾鼓励台积电进一步扩大在美投资，或运营英特尔工厂。

The request showed Mr. Lutnick wasn’t satisfied with TSMC’s $100 billion commitment in Arizona. He intended to squeeze the company for additional concessions.

这一要求表明，卢特尼克并不满足于台积电在亚利桑那州1000亿美元的投资承诺，他打算逼迫该公司做出更多让步。

The Taiwanese group balked because TSMC is a private company. But when Mr. Lutnick persisted, Taiwanese officials met with TSMC executives and asked the company to help, two people familiar with the conversations said.

台湾代表团起初表示反对，因为台积电是私营企业。但据两位知情人士称，在卢特尼克的坚持下，台湾官员与台积电高管会面，请求该公司协助。

TSMC was open to investing more. But it wanted nothing to do with Intel.

台积电愿意追加投资，但不愿与英特尔有任何关联。

By last summer, the Trump administration decided to directly intervene in the chip market.

去年夏天，特朗普政府决定直接干预芯片市场。

Intel’s problems provided an opening. In July, it reported a $2.9 billion loss. Then, the U.S. government said the company’s new chief executive, Lip-Bu Tan, had previously led a company that illegally sold chip technology to a Chinese university with military ties.

英特尔的困境提供了契机。7月，英特尔公布亏损29亿美元。随后，美国政府称，该公司新任首席执行官陈立武此前领导的公司曾向一家向有军方背景的中国大学非法出售芯片技术。

The next month, Mr. Trump demanded Mr. Tan’s resignation on social media, saying Mr. Tan was “highly CONFLICTED.” He then turned the attack into a negotiating tool.

次月，特朗普在社交媒体上要求陈立武辞职，称其存在“严重利益冲突”，并将这次攻击变成了谈判筹码。

Mr. Trump met with Mr. Tan days later and suggested that Intel give the United States 10 percent of Intel’s business. The chief executive agreed to the unorthodox request, even though some argued it was on shaky legal ground. Intel gave the government equity in exchange for the $8.9 billion it had been promised from the CHIPS Act.

几天后，特朗普与陈立武会面，提议英特尔将10%的业务交给美国政府。这位首席执行官同意了这一非常规要求，尽管有人认为此举法律依据不足。英特尔向政府出让股权，以换取《芯片法案》承诺的89亿美元资金。

The deal helped Intel secure its federal subsidies, without having to meet financial benchmarks to qualify for the money.

这笔交易帮助英特尔获得了联邦补贴，无需达到财务指标即可申领。

Intel’s business predicament looked worse after Samsung signed a deal in July to manufacture chips in Taylor, Texas, for Tesla, the plant’s first customer. Elon Musk, Tesla’s chief executive, had pursued the deal after leaving the Trump administration because he was concerned about a potential attack on Taiwan, three people familiar with the deal said.

7月，三星与特斯拉达成协议，在得克萨斯州泰勒市为特斯拉生产芯片，特斯拉成为该工厂的首个客户。此举令英特尔的经营困境雪上加霜。三位知情人士称，特斯拉首席执行官埃隆·马斯克在离开特朗普政府后推动了这笔交易，因为他担心台湾可能遭受攻击。

“People maybe are underweighting some of the geopolitical risks that are going to be a major factor in a few years,” Mr. Musk later said in a call with Wall Street analysts.

马斯克后来在与华尔街分析师的电话会议中表示：“人们可能低估了未来几年将成为主要因素的一些地缘政治风险。”

After the Trump administration’s investment, Intel began making headway. Nvidia invested $5 billion in Intel and agreed to team up on A.I. chips. Apple began holding all-day engineering meetings with Intel to evaluate its manufacturing, three people familiar with the discussions said.

在特朗普政府注资后，英特尔开始取得进展。英伟达向英特尔投资50亿美元，并同意在人工智能芯片领域展开合作。据三位知情人士透露，苹果开始与英特尔举行全天工程会议，评估其制造能力。

Sophie Metzger, an Intel spokeswoman, said the company had been “encouraged by early feedback” from potential customers and shared the Trump administration’s goal to have “a leading American semiconductor manufacturer.”

英特尔发言人索菲·梅茨格表示，公司对潜在客户的“初步反馈感到鼓舞”，并认同特朗普政府打造“美国领先半导体制造商”的目标。

Last summer, Mr. Cook visited the Oval Office and promised to invest another $100 billion in the United States, which would support TSMC and other chip manufacturers. Ms. Su of Advanced Micro Devices and Mr. Amon of Qualcomm also promised to manufacture more chips in America.

去年夏天，库克到访椭圆形办公室，承诺再向美国投资1000亿美元，用于支持台积电等芯片制造商。AMD的苏姿丰和高通的安蒙也承诺在美国扩大芯片生产。

Mr. Lutnick is eager for more deals. His goal is to have 40 percent of Taiwan’s semiconductor manufacturing in the United States.

卢特尼克渴望达成更多交易，他的目标是将台湾40%的半导体产能转移到美国。

In September, he arrived at the Hay-Adams Hotel in Washington with a plan to persuade companies to give U.S. chip factories more business.

9月，他带着一项计划来到华盛顿的海–亚当斯酒店，试图说服企业把更多订单交给美国芯片工厂。

He told top chip executives, who had gathered for a Semiconductor Industry Association meeting, that the administration wanted them to buy 50 percent of their semiconductors from American plants, four people who attended said. Companies that didn’t would pay a 100 percent tariff.

据四位与会人士称，他在半导体行业协会会议上向芯片企业高管表示，政府要求他们从美国工厂采购50%的半导体，不遵守的企业将被征收100%关税。

Afterward, Mr. Lutnick used those same tariff threats to squeeze Taiwan and TSMC for more investments. He struck a deal to let Taiwanese chip companies avoid some U.S. tariffs, provided the companies planned to produce in the United States.

会后，卢特尼克再次以关税威胁向台湾和台积电施压，要求其追加投资。他达成协议：允许台湾芯片企业免除部分美国关税，前提是这些企业计划在美国本土生产。

TSMC agreed to buy land in Phoenix for at least five more plants, roughly doubling its Arizona plants, as part of a commitment by Taiwanese semiconductor and tech companies to invest an additional $150 billion in the United States. And Taiwan committed to $250 billion in credit guarantees to help move semiconductor and technology manufacturing to America.

台积电同意在菲尼克斯至少再购置五座工厂的用地，使其在亚利桑那州的工厂数量大致翻倍。这是台湾半导体和科技企业向美国再追加1500亿美元投资承诺的一部分。台湾还承诺提供2500亿美元的信贷担保，助力半导体和科技制造业迁往美国。

“We are unquestionably in a better position now than we were a few years ago, but this was never going to be solved overnight given the time it takes to get new chip manufacturing facilities up and running,” said John Neuffer, chief executive of the Semiconductor Industry Association.

半导体行业协会首席执行官约翰·诺伊弗表示：“与几年前相比，我们的处境无疑已有所改善。但考虑到新建芯片工厂所需的时间，这绝不可能一蹴而就。”

去年10月，英伟达首席执行官黄仁勋在台积电菲尼克斯工厂发表演讲后，为台积电工人签名。此次活动是为了发布美国制造的首个人工智能芯片晶圆。

In October, Mr. Huang flew to Phoenix to visit TSMC’s factory, which had made Nvidia’s first A.I. chip in the United States. He called it a “historic moment” and a major step for U.S. manufacturing.

10月，黄仁勋飞往菲尼克斯参观台积电工厂，该厂生产出了英伟达在美国本土制造的首款人工智能芯片。他称这是一个“历史性时刻”，也是美国制造业的重要一步。

Mr. Huang didn’t mention that the chip wasn’t finished. To become a leading A.I. chip, it needed to be connected with other chips. The process, known as packaging, requires shipping the American-made chip to a factory in Taiwan.

黄仁勋没有提及的是，这款芯片并未完成最终制造。要成为顶级人工智能芯片，它还需要与其他芯片进行连接，而这一被称为封装的工序，需要将美国制造的芯片运往台湾的工厂完成。

Chancellor Friedrich Merz of Germany arrived in China on Wednesday with an outstretched hand and a list of complaints for his hosts, asking for closer diplomatic ties but also relief from economic policies that he said were impeding “fair competition.”

德国总理默茨周三抵达中国，他向东道主伸出橄榄枝，同时也列出了一系列不满，一方面呼吁深化外交关系，同时也要求中国调整他所称的阻碍“公平竞争”的经济政策。

Mr. Merz, who took pains before the trip to say he would not be “lecturing” Beijing, laid out his critiques in a speech at a meeting of the Advisory Council of German-Chinese Business, to an audience that included Premier Li Qiang, China’s second-highest ranking official.

默茨在出访前特意强调，不会对北京“说教”，但在中德经济顾问委员会座谈会上，他直面包括中国第二号人物、国务院总理李强在内的听众，阐述了批评意见。

The chancellor was more blunt and more specific in his criticism than other western leaders, including the prime ministers of Britain and Canada, who have recently trekked to Beijing to reset relations with China amid the turmoil caused by President Trump.

相较于近期因特朗普政府引发的动荡、纷纷访问北京试图重启对华关系的英国、加拿大等国领导人，默茨的批评更为直率、具体。

Mr. Merz called on China to reduce subsidies for its domestic manufacturers, to allow the value of its currency, the renminbi, to rise, and to ensure continued exports of raw materials, such as critical minerals — all of which would benefit German industry. Doing so, he said, would allow Germany and China to forge a tighter bond.

默茨呼吁中国减少对本国制造商的补贴、允许人民币升值、保障关键矿产等原材料的持续出口——这些举措均将惠及德国工业。他表示，这些举措将使得德中两国缔结更紧密的纽带。

“In view of the uncertainties caused by customs policy that we see around the world,” Mr. Merz said, addressing Mr. Li directly, “we can now set a different example in our bilateral relations, through the reliability and security of the economic relations between our two countries.”

“鉴于全球范围内关税政策带来的不确定性，”默茨直接对李强说道，“我们如今可以通过两国经济关系的可靠性与安全性，在双边关系中树立全新典范。”

Following a series of discussions with Mr. Li and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, the chancellor appeared pleased. He announced a Chinese pledge to order up to 120 new aircraft from the European aerospace giant Airbus, and said more deals could follow.

在与李强及中国国家主席习近平举行一系列会谈后，这位德国总理显得心情愉悦。他宣布，中方承诺向欧洲航空巨头空客订购多达120架新飞机，并表示后续可能还将达成更多协议。

“After today, I am very optimistic,” Mr. Merz said. “This is a good path for German-Chinese relations, both in the coming months and years.”

“今日之后，我十分乐观，”默茨称。“对德中关系来说，未来数月乃至数年，这都是一个好的发展路径。”

Mr. Merz’s approach in China bore similarities to his visit to Washington last year. There, he praised Mr. Trump and stressed the importance of Germany’s alliance with the United States, even as he pushed the president to bend toward Mr. Merz’s position on support for Ukraine and other issues.

默茨此次访华策略，与去年访美时的做法如出一辙。当时他既赞扬特朗普，强调德美同盟的重要性，同时也推动美国总统在支持乌克兰等议题上向自己的立场靠拢。

2025年，中国嘉兴的一家家具厂。默茨呼吁中国削减对国内制造商的补贴，称此举不公平地影响了竞争。

Mr. Xi, in his own remarks, offered sweeping language about the partnership and their shared destiny, while avoiding mentioning the specific trade frictions Mr. Merz and other German leaders have long raised.

在讲话中，习近平用宏大笼统的措辞谈及两国伙伴关系与共同命运，却未提及默茨及其他德国领导人长期以来提出的具体贸易摩擦问题。

“The more the world becomes chaotic and intertwined, the more China and Germany must strengthen their strategic communication and enhance strategic mutual trust,” Mr. Xi told Mr. Merz at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing.

“世界越是变乱交织，中德两国越要加强战略沟通、增进战略互信，”习近平在北京钓鱼台国宾馆对默茨表示。

Mr. Xi has been working to solidify ties with Washington’s closest partners at a time when many of them are feeling alienated by the Trump administration. Mr. Merz is the latest Western leader to visit Mr. Xi since December, following the president of France, and the prime ministers of Canada and Britain.

当前，美国诸多亲密伙伴因特朗普政府而感到与美国疏离，习近平正着力巩固与它们的关系。自去年12月以来，继法国总统、加拿大与英国首相之后，默茨是最新一位访华的西方领导人。

默茨与中国第二号人物李强总理周三在北京会晤。

Wednesday’s meeting took place as tensions between Europe and the United States are under growing pressure. European Union officials said on Monday that they would pause work on implementing their trade deal with the United States after the Supreme Court ruled last week that Mr. Trump’s tariffs were unlawful. Many of the levies agreed in that deal are higher than the 10 percent duties that the president has since imposed on global imports.

周三会谈举行之际，欧美关系正面临日益加剧的压力。欧盟官员周一表示，在美国最高法院上周裁定特朗普关税违法后，欧盟将暂停推进与美国的贸易协定落地。该协定中约定的多项关税，高于特朗普此后对全球进口商品征收的10%关税。

Mr. Trump will likely be watching to see how close Mr. Merz draws to Mr. Xi. Mr. Trump had warned that it was “dangerous” for Britain and Canada to look to China as the answer to their economic woes, after their prime ministers’ recent visits to Beijing

特朗普很可能会密切关注默茨与习近平的亲近程度。此前英加领导人访华后，特朗普曾警告，两国将中国视为解决经济困境的出路是“危险的”。

Mr. Merz was accompanied on his two-day visit by the heads of more than two dozen German companies, including Volkswagen, BMW and Siemens. He was to meet with executives at Mercedes-Benz in Beijing on Thursday before traveling south to the city of Hangzhou to visit the headquarters of a Chinese robotics firm, Unitree Robotics, and meet with the chairman of Siemens Energy in China.

默茨此次为期两天的访华行程，有大众、宝马、西门子等20余家德国企业负责人随行。周四，他将在北京与梅赛德斯-奔驰高管会面，随后南下杭州，参观中国机器人企业宇树科技的总部，并与西门子能源中国的董事长会谈。

Germany’s relations with China have become strained in recent years over complaints that Beijing was employing unfair practices that had contributed to a growing trade imbalance that has led to a flood of Chinese exports into Europe. In 2023, Germany defined China as a “partner, competitor and systemic rival,” and it has moved to reduce its dependency on Chinese goods and tightened export controls.

近年来，德中关系因北京被指采取不公平做法而趋于紧张，这些做法加剧了贸易失衡，导致中国商品大量涌入欧洲。2023年，德国将中国定义为“伙伴、竞争者与系统性对手”，并着手降低对华商品依赖、收紧出口管制。

Ties have also been tense because of Beijing’s support for Russia during the war in Ukraine.

此外，北京在俄乌冲突中对俄罗斯的支持，也令两国关系紧张。

Mr. Xi and Mr. Merz discussed the war, according to an official Chinese summary of their meeting, which referred to the conflict as a “crisis.” The exchange appeared to break little ground, according to the report of the discussion in Chinese state media, though Mr. Merz said afterward that he welcomed China’s “commitment to peace in the region.”

根据中方发布的会谈官方摘要，习近平与默茨就俄乌冲突展开讨论，中方将这场冲突称为“危机”。中国官媒的报道显示，此次交流似乎未取得实质性突破，但默茨事后表示，欢迎中国“对地区和平的承诺”。

Mr. Xi reiterated China’s longstanding position that the conflict should be resolved through “dialogue and negotiation” and that the “legitimate concerns of all parties” should be addressed — language that has frustrated European leaders because it avoids assigning blame to Russia and implicitly validates Moscow’s justifications for the full-scale invasion.

习近平重申了中方一贯立场，称冲突应通过“对话谈判”解决，兼顾“各方合理关切”——这一措辞令欧洲领导人不满，因其回避谴责俄罗斯，并默许了莫斯科全面入侵的借口。

Germany has hoped that China could use its influence over Russia to help work toward a peace agreement.

德国曾希望中国能利用对俄影响力，协助推动达成和平协议。

Mr. Merz also said on Wednesday that he told Mr. Xi that Germany opposed any effort by China to use military force against Taiwan.

默茨周三还表示，他已告知习近平，德国反对中国采用武力针对台湾。

Beijing is hoping to persuade Berlin to stop labeling China as a “systemic rival” and abandon its efforts to “de-risk,” or distance German businesses from China.

北京则希望说服柏林，停止将中国贴上“系统性对手”的标签，并放弃让德国企业与中国保持距离的“去风险”努力。

Chinese officials and state media have portrayed Mr. Merz’s visit as long overdue and a reset in ties that is beneficial for both countries. Beijing also needs Europe to keep its markets open to China’s exports, a major driver of growth in a Chinese economy hobbled by a yearslong property crisis.

中国官员和官方媒体将默茨的此次访问描述为一场迟来的、对两国都有益的双边关系重启。中国经济因持续多年的房地产危机陷入困境，出口是其增长的重要动力，北京也需要欧洲向中国出口产品保持市场开放。

2024年中国武汉某住宅地产开发项目。由于国内经济仍受房地产危机拖累，北京需要欧洲保持市场对中国出口产品的开放。

China is “concerned about trade protectionism, not only from Trump, but also from Europe, which may impose restrictions on Chinese products,” said Zhu Feng, a professor of international relations at Nanjing University.

南京大学国际关系教授朱锋表示：“中国担忧贸易保护主义，不仅来自特朗普，也来自可能对中国产品设限的欧洲。”

Yet China no longer presents the same opportunities to Germany that it once did. German firms have seen their profits in the country steadily erode as Chinese companies have gained market share. The same is happening globally for the likes of German carmakers, chemical producers and machinery manufacturers that are trying to compete with Chinese rivals, resulting in the loss of thousands of industrial jobs in Germany each month.

然而，如今的中国已不再能为德国提供昔日那样的机遇。随着中国企业抢占市场份额，德国企业在华利润持续缩水。德国车企、化工企业、机械制造商等在全球范围内与中国竞争对手竞争时也面临同样的局面，导致德国每月流失数以千计的工业岗位。

“China was a driver of German prosperity in past decades,” said Noah Barkin, an expert on European-Chinese relations at Rhodium Group, a research firm. “Now it represents the biggest external threat to Germany’s economic well-being.”

研究机构荣鼎集团的欧中关系专家诺亚·巴金称：“过去几十年，中国是德国繁荣的引擎。如今，它却成为德国经济福祉最大的外部威胁。”

Japan’s shopping districts, restaurants, temples and ski resorts would normally be teeming with Chinese tourists right now as they celebrate the Lunar New Year holiday.

日本的购物区、餐馆、寺庙和滑雪胜地这个时期通常会挤满过春节假期的中国游客。

Instead, in cities like Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto, business owners say visitors from China have been scarcer this year.

然而在东京、大阪和京都等城市，商家表示今年中国游客明显减少。

The Chinese government, drawing on falsehoods and exaggerations, is aggressively discouraging its citizens from visiting Japan as part of a campaign to punish Tokyo for its support for Taiwan, a self-governing democracy that Beijing considers part of its territory.

通过散布虚假信息和夸大其词，中国政府大力劝阻本国公民赴日旅游，以此惩罚东京支持台湾——这个自治的民主地区被北京视为领土一部分。

In recent government statements and state media commentaries, Beijing has portrayed Japan as a land where people live under the constant threat of earthquakes, crime, traffic accidents and attacks by bears — and where Chinese travelers, in particular, are targeted.

在近期政府声明及官方媒体评论中，北京将日本描绘成地震、犯罪、交通事故和熊袭击威胁常在的国度——尤其中国游客在那里成了袭击的目标。

“Chinese citizens face serious security threats in Japan,” China’s foreign ministry said ahead of this week’s Lunar New Year holiday, China’s peak travel season.

“中国公民在日本面临严重安全威胁，”中国外交部在中国旅游旺季春节假期前夕如此宣称。

Beijing’s strategy of undermining Japan’s image in China as one of the world’s safest travel destinations may be working. The number of Chinese travelers to Japan has sharply declined in recent months, falling 61 percent in January from a year earlier (though the data is somewhat skewed by the timing of the Lunar New Year, which began in January last year and in February this year). Arrivals had fallen 45 percent in December.

北京旨在削弱日本作为全球最安全旅游目的地形象的策略或许正在奏效。近几个月来，赴日中国游客数量急剧下滑，1月同比下降61%（尽管数据因农历新年时间差异存在偏差——去年春节在1月，今年则在2月）。12月入境游客量下降45%。

Here’s a look at Beijing’s claims.

下面是北京的说法。

Earthquakes

地震

China has repeatedly pointed to the frequency of earthquakes in Japan to deter travel there. In December, after a powerful earthquake in northern Japan, the Chinese foreign ministry said people should avoid the country because of the risk of a tsunami or a so-called mega quake.

中国多次以日本地震频发为由劝阻民众赴日旅行。去年12月，日本北部发生强烈地震后，中国外交部表示，由于存在海啸或所谓特大地震的风险，人们应避免前往日本。

Yes, Japan sits along the Pacific “Ring of Fire,” a chain of seismologically active faults encircling the Pacific Ocean, making it one of the world’s most earthquake-prone countries. But Japan is also a global leader in dealing with earthquakes, with early warning systems and strict construction standards.

日本的确位于太平洋“火环带”沿线，这条环绕太平洋的地震活跃断层使日本成为全球地震高发国之一。但日本在应对地震方面也处于全球领先地位，拥有地震早期预警系统和严格的建筑标准。

By seizing on earthquakes, analysts said, the Chinese government is attempting to signal that its central concern is safety — not politics. In these warnings, the government rarely mentions its fierce opposition to Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s stance that Japan could help defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion.

分析人士说，中国抓住地震问题不放，旨在发出信号，表明其关注的核心是安全而非政治。在这些警告中，中国政府很少提及对日本首相高市早苗若中国入侵可协助防卫台湾这一立场的强烈反对。

“A safety narrative feels more neutral and reversible, giving the Chinese government room to signal displeasure while keeping diplomatic flexibility,” said Xiao Qiang, a specialist in Chinese propaganda at the University of California, Berkeley.

加利福尼亚大学伯克利分校的中国宣传研究专家萧强说：“安全议题给人的感觉更中立、更可逆，它给了中国政府表达不满的空间，同时又保持了外交上的灵活余地。”

Targeting of Chinese Citizens

针对中国公民的袭击

China has argued that its citizens risk being targeted in Japan, tapping into a longstanding nationalist narrative rooted in the two countries’ bitter World War II history and Japan’s record of wartime atrocities.

中国指出其公民在日本有可能成为袭击目标，这植根于两国源于二战的惨痛历史，以及日本战时暴行记录的民族主义论调。

China has highlighted attacks on its citizens, including an incident reported by Japanese media this week in which a man attacked a Hong Kong resident on the head with a beer bottle in the northern city of Sapporo. China has also said, without providing specifics, that there have been cases of “unprovoked verbal abuse and physical assault” against its citizens in Japan.

中国多次强调本国公民遭遇袭击事件，其中包括日本媒体本周报道的一起事件：在日本北部城市札幌，一名男子用啤酒瓶袭击了一名香港居民的头部。中国还表示，在日本发生了针对中国公民的“无端辱骂殴打”事件，但未提供具体细节。

There is no evidence of a surge in crime or discrimination against Chinese citizens in Japan. In fact, the number of murders, robberies and arsons involving Chinese victims has declined over the past several years, according to official Japanese statistics.

没有证据表明在日本的中国公民受到的犯罪或歧视激增。事实上，根据日本官方统计，过去几年涉及中国受害者的谋杀、抢劫和纵火案数量有所下降。

China’s attempts to heighten a sense of prejudice might resonate domestically because of the emotions people still feel about World War II, said Kurt Tong, a managing partner at the Asia Group and former American diplomat.

亚洲集团管理合伙人、前美国外交官唐伟康(Kurt Tong)指出，中国试图强化偏见的做法可能在国内引发共鸣，因为民众对二战的记忆犹存。

“These emotional, interpersonal arguments could have more resonance with the Chinese public,” he said. “It plays into the nationalist idea that they’re being disrespected as a people.”

“这类诉诸情感的个人化论调更容易引起中国公众的共鸣，”他表示。“这迎合了他们作为一个民族不被尊重的民族主义思想。”

Crime, Accidents and Bears

犯罪、事故和熊

Japan has one of the lowest crime rates in the world. But you wouldn’t know that by reading Chinese media reports.

日本是世界上犯罪率最低的国家之一。但从中国媒体的报道中，你可能无从知晓这一点。

Beijing has seized on random incidents of violence in Japan as evidence of a broader safety problem, pointing, for example, to the stabbing of three teenagers this month in Osaka.

中国政府抓住日本偶然发生的暴力事件，将其作为更广泛的安全问题的证据，例如本月大阪三名青少年遭刺伤的案件。

“The security environment in some areas of Japan has been unstable, and similar vicious cases have been occurring frequently,” the Chinese consulate in Osaka said in a statement that warned citizens against traveling to Japan.

“日本部分地区治安环境不靖，类似恶性案件多发频发，”中国驻大阪领事馆在一份声明中说，该声明警告公民不要前往日本。

China has also suggested that Japan has a road safety problem, even though traffic fatalities are relatively low in the country.

中国还暗示日本存在道路安全问题，尽管该国的交通死亡事故相对较低。

Last month, the Chinese authorities highlighted an incident in which a car rammed into pedestrians along a street in Tokyo’s popular Shinjuku neighborhood. Beijing said that two Chinese nationals were seriously injured.

上个月，中国当局强调了东京著名的新宿街区发生的一起汽车冲撞行人事件。北京称，两名中国公民受重伤。

The Chinese Embassy in Japan even issued a warning about a record surge in bear attacks in the country.

中国驻日本大使馆甚至就日本熊袭击事件创纪录激增发出警告。

Experts said that Beijing would have to work hard to convince the public to forgo trips to Japan, given the love in the mainland for Japanese food, culture and products.

专家表示，鉴于中国大陆民众对日本美食、文化和产品的喜爱，北京方面需付出巨大努力才能说服公众放弃赴日旅行。

“They’re reaching for the stuff they think might get people’s attention,” Mr. Tong said. “But Japan is such an attractive place to visit. In the long term, they might not be able to keep people away.”

“他们正在寻找他们认为可能吸引人们注意的东西，”唐伟康说。“但日本是一个极具吸引力的旅游胜地。从长远来看，他们可能无法阻止民众前往。”

The procession of Western leaders flocking to Beijing in recent weeks has been impressive. Last month, Mark Carney went, the first Canadian leader to visit in almost a decade. He signed a strategic partnership with a country that has imprisoned Canadian nationals and was accused of meddling in Canada’s elections.

近期西方领导人纷纷前往北京的景象令人瞩目。上个月，马克·卡尼出访中国，成为近十年来首位访华的加拿大领导人。他与一个关押着加拿大公民、被指干预加拿大选举的国家签署了战略伙伴关系协议。

Next up was Keir Starmer, reversing years of frosty relations in the first visit by a British leader since 2018. This week, it’s the German chancellor’s turn. More than a million German jobs depend on exports to China.

紧随其后的是基尔·斯塔默，这是2018年以来英国领导人首次访华，标志着多年来两国冷淡关系的逆转。本周轮到德国总理登场。超过100万个德国就业岗位依赖对华出口。

Not so long ago, Western countries talked about diversifying away from China. Now the opposite is happening. I called my colleague David Pierson, who covers China, to understand why.

就在不久前，西方国家还在谈论要减少对中国的依赖，实现多元化布局。如今情况却正好相反。我向报道中国事务的同事戴维·皮尔森请教，以便了解个中缘由。

No longer distancing from China

不再与中国保持距离

David, Western leaders have always flocked to China with their C.E.O.s. What’s different about the current stream of visitors?

戴维，西方领导人过去也常常带着本国企业高管涌向中国。那么，当前这波访问潮有何不同？

It’s the context, right? You’ve seen tensions grow between the United States and Europe. Not long ago, Western leaders were looking for ways to “de-risk,” or distance themselves from China to reduce their countries’ reliance on its supply chains and market. Now, they are moving back toward China again — because they’re de-risking from a more unreliable United States.

关键在于背景，对吧？大家可以看到，美国与欧洲之间的紧张关系正在加剧。不久前，西方国家还在想方设法寻求“去风险”，也就是与中国保持距离，以减少本国对其供应链和市场的依赖。而现在，他们又重新向中国靠拢——因为他们正在针对一个更加不可靠的美国进行“去风险”。

But how reliable a partner is China? There’s a reason people wanted to diversify away from China, right?

但中国作为伙伴究竟有多可靠？人们当初想要减少对中国依赖是有原因的，对吧？

That’s the thing. As I wrote recently, China hasn’t changed. It still threatens to close its markets to imports or restrict the sale of valuable exports like critical minerals when it’s unhappy with another country. And China has done nothing to pull back its economic and diplomatic support for Russia and its war in Ukraine despite all the protestations from Europe.

问题就在这里。正如我最近写的，中国并没有改变。当它对他国不满时，仍然会威胁关闭市场、限制进口，或者限制关键矿产等重要出口商品的销售。而且，尽管欧洲一再抗议，中国并未撤回在经济和外交层面上对俄罗斯及其在乌克兰的战争的支持。

The bottom line is, China doesn’t actually need to offer incentives to these Western leaders. It’s just an alternative to the U.S. at a time when countries are scrambling to rebalance.

归根结底，中国其实并不需要向这些西方领导人提供什么好处。在各国匆忙重新平衡对外关系之际，它只是美国之外的一个替代选择。

What leverage do Western countries have left on things they care about? Like China dumping huge amounts of products on global markets?

在西方国家关心的问题上，比如中国向全球市场大量倾销产品，他们还有什么筹码吗？

Honestly, not a lot. Britain and Canada do not export many valuable things to China. They just don’t have the same leverage that they used to over China. Germany is in a very, very tough spot. Chancellor Friedrich Merz is going over there to preserve the business that still exists for German companies, but the reality is, there is very little he can do to slow Chinese firms from replacing German ones in the global market

说实话，不多了。英国和加拿大并没有向中国出口很多有价值的商品。他们已经没有像过去那样能对中国施压的影响力了。德国的处境非常、非常艰难。总理弗里德里希·默茨此行是为了保住德国企业目前尚存的业务，但现实是，他几乎无力阻止中国企业在全球市场上取代德国企业。

Meanwhile, China has shown that it can go toe to toe with the most powerful country in the world. President Trump took the fight to China, and President Xi Jinping stood up to him and turned it around by using its trump card (no pun intended!): its monopoly over the supply and processing of rare earth minerals that are used in everything from computer chips and batteries to wind turbines and missiles. So China is emboldened on the world stage. Say what you will about Xi Jinping, he never underestimates his leverage. Many analysts think that he’s played this quite well.

与此同时，中国已经证明了自己能与世界上最强大的国家一较高下。特朗普总统曾主动向中国发起挑战，而习近平主席顶住了压力，并打出自己的王牌来扭转局势：那就是中国在稀土供应和加工方面的垄断地位。稀土被广泛应用于从芯片、电池到风力涡轮机和导弹等各种产品之中。因此，中国在世界舞台上更有底气了。无论你怎么评价习近平，他从不低估自己的筹码的威力。许多分析人士认为，他在这方面的表现相当出色。

So China looks strong. But China also has a lot of problems at home. How do these two things interact?

所以中国看起来很强大。但中国国内也有很多问题。这两方面是如何相互作用的？

It’s a split screen. On foreign policy, China is in a pretty solid position. But domestically, they’re on very shaky ground. They’ve been dealing with a very sluggish economy, because of a collapsing property market. And there’s just no easy way out of it. And it’s having repercussions for the rest of the world, because the only thing that’s working for China right now economically is exports. They’re making all this stuff, but they don’t have enough money at home to buy it, and so they’re just dumping it on the rest the world.

这就像分屏画面。一方面，在外交政策上，中国处于相当稳固的位置；但在国内，他们的处境非常不稳。由于房地产市场崩溃，他们一直在应对极度低迷的经济。而且这个问题没有简单的解决之道。这种局面也正在对世界其他地区产生影响，因为目前中国经济中唯一运转良好的就是出口。他们生产了大量商品，但国内缺乏足够的消费能力来吸收这些产品，于是只能把它们倾销到全球市场。

The other thing is that they’ve had this far-reaching purge in the military hierarchy. All these generals have just been kicked out, and it’s unclear what this means for China’s ability to go to war. Is its ability to take Taiwan delayed by years — or somehow accelerated by getting rid of corrupt generals? It’s just so difficult to look into elite Chinese politics, and so we’re just kind of left guessing what that means.

另一个问题是军队高层的大规模清洗。许多将领被撤职，目前还不清楚这对中国的作战能力有什么影响。这会让中国对台军事行动推迟数年，还是因为清除了腐败将领反而加速？要窥探中国的高层政治实在太过困难，因此外界只能揣测这些变动的真实影响。

Where does all this lead? Are these deals with China the beginning of a longer-term shift away from U.S. dominance?

这一切最终会走向哪里？与中国达成的这些协议，是否标志着一个长期削弱美国主导地位的转折点？

Short-term, it’s more symbolic than real because, if you actually look at the meetings, there’s not that much substance. Britain allowing China to open an embassy in London? Not exactly a big deal. I mean, you could argue that there’s a security risk, but Britain’s own security service said it can be managed. On Canada, yes, they lowered the tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, but there’s still a quota, and it’s a tiny quota.

短期来看，这更多是象征意义而非实质性的。因为如果你仔细分析这些会晤，就会发现其实并没有多少实质性成果。英国允许中国在伦敦建新的大使馆？这并非什么重大举措。你当然可以说存在安全风险，但英国自己的情报机构表示风险是可以管控的。再看加拿大，虽然降低了中国电动车的关税，但仍设有配额限制，且配额非常小。

The symbolism alone is of course a huge win for China. They can turn around to their people and say: “Look, we’re doing great. You get all these countries coming and paying their respects to us.” This helps to paper over domestic problems.

仅就象征意义而言，这无疑是中国的一大胜利。他们可以告诉国内民众：‘看，我们做得很好，这么多国家都来向我们示好。’这有助于掩盖国内问题。

Long-term, it’s harder to say. One thing is clear: We’ve seen an erosion of American legitimacy in the last year. Everyone now has doubts about America as a reliable partner. You’ve seen how things just turn on a dime, depending on who enters the White House now.

从长期来看，就更难判断了。有一点是明确的：过去一年里，美国的公信力在持续下降。如今，所有人都对美国是否是一个可靠的伙伴产生了怀疑。我们也看到了，这一切是可以随时转向的，取决于入主白宫的是谁。

Whether China can fill that vacuum in bigger ways is impossible to know. They’re trying very hard, but it’s unclear if they’re doing it for anything other than their own interests.

至于中国是否能够在更大的层面填补这个空缺，目前无法判断。他们确实在非常努力地尝试，但尚不清楚这种努力除了自身利益外是否还有其他考量。

By almost every metric, the Chinese carmaker BYD looks unstoppable.

从几乎所有指标来看，中国汽车制造商比亚迪都势不可挡。

After a decade of struggling to establish itself in the automobile industry, BYD has surpassed Tesla to become the world’s largest electric vehicle manufacturer. The company’s sales are rapidly expanding in Europe and Latin America, and new and potentially lucrative markets like Canada could soon open to it.

在汽车行业艰难打拼十多年以站稳脚跟后，比亚迪如今已超越特斯拉，成为全球最大的电动汽车生产商。该公司在欧洲和拉丁美洲的销量迅速扩张，加拿大等新兴且利润潜力巨大的市场也可能很快向其敞开大门。

But investors are cooling on BYD’s ascent from a little-known battery maker to the top of the automotive world’s fast-growing segment. The company’s stock has fallen roughly 40 percent from its peak last May, making it among the hardest-hit names in a broader sell-off in Chinese E.V. stocks that accelerated last week after companies reported weak sales numbers for January.

比亚迪从一家默默无闻的电池厂商一路攀升至汽车行业这一高速增长赛道的顶端，投资者对它的热情却在降温。该公司股价较去年5月的高点已下跌约40%，成为此轮中国电动汽车股票全面抛售潮中受冲击最严重的公司之一。上周多家企业公布1月销量疲软数据后，抛售势头进一步加剧。

Intense competition is crushing profit margins, government subsidies are vanishing, and faster production cycles mean that no company can hold a lead for long.

激烈的竞争正在挤压利润空间，政府补贴逐步消失，而更快的生产周期意味着没有哪家企业能长期保持领先。

BYD is emblematic of how Chinese electric vehicle companies are becoming victims of their own success. The domestic market, fueled partly by government subsidies, has grown rapidly, but Chinese companies are “maxing out the number of people for whom it makes sense” to buy one, said John Paul MacDuffie, a professor at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.

比亚迪的处境象征了中国电动汽车企业如何成为自身成功的受害者。宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院教授约翰·保罗·麦克杜菲表示，在政府补贴推动下，中国国内市场快速扩张，但中国企业已经“把有合理需求的人群开发到了极限”。

Sales are concentrated in major cities where charging infrastructure is more developed, while owning an electric vehicle simply isn’t practical in much of the rest of the country. Now, BYD and other carmakers must convert one-time buyers into repeat customers, building the kind of long-term brand relationships that more established automakers have relied on.

电动汽车销量主要集中在充电基础设施更完善的大城市，而在国内其他大部分地区，拥有电动汽车并不现实。如今，比亚迪和其他车企必须把一次性买家转化为复购客户，建立起成熟车企所依赖的长期品牌黏性。

“BYD has grown so fast that they’re running out of new domestic customers,” Mr. MacDuffie said.

“比亚迪增长太快，国内新增客户即将枯竭，”麦克杜菲说。

The challenges of China’s E.V. market started to surface last month. After growing 28 percent last year, BYD’s electric vehicle deliveries in January fell about 33 percent from a year earlier. Overall sales of new electric vehicles fell nearly 20 percent, according to the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers.

中国电动汽车市场的挑战在上个月开始显现。在去年增长28%之后，比亚迪1月电动汽车交付量同比下降约33%。据中国汽车工业协会数据，全国新能源汽车整体销量下降近20%。

BYD did not respond to a request for comment. The company attributed the decline to weak domestic demand, according to a statement posted on WeChat.

比亚迪未回应置评请求。该公司在微信发布的一份声明中将销量下滑归因于国内需求疲软。

The slowing growth coincides with a reduction in Chinese government subsidies. For years, Beijing waived its 10 percent tax on new car purchases. But this year, it reimposed the tax at half the original rate. The full tax is expected to return after 2027.

增长放缓与中国政府补贴收紧同步出现。多年来，中国政府对新车购置免征10%的购置税，但今年恢复征收原税率一半的税额，全额购置税预计将在2027年后恢复。

Another factor is the constant influx of new competition. In 2025, nearly 400 electric vehicle models were for sale in China, more than double the number in 2019, according to JATO, an automotive market research firm. More than 100 of those were released in the past two years.

另一个因素是新竞争者不断涌入。汽车市场研究机构JATO数据显示，2025年中国市场在售电动汽车车型近400款，较2019年翻了一倍多，其中逾百款是过去两年推出的。

Scott Kennedy, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank in Washington, said the industry was entering a wartime period. The number of car companies will have to shrink from hundreds to just a handful for the industry to be sustainable in the long run, he said.

华盛顿智库战略与国际问题研究中心高级顾问斯科特·肯尼迪表示，该行业正进入一种战争状态。他称，要实现行业长期可持续发展，车企数量必须从数百家缩减到寥寥数家。

中国宁波的一家吉利工厂。中国汽车制造商建造大型工厂，接连推出新车型，寄望于最终能用规模弥补利润萎缩的缺口。

Fierce competition among carmakers has pushed prices into a downward spiral known in China as “involution,” in which companies keep cutting costs and adding features just to survive, even when it hurts everyone’s bottom line. Carmakers built huge factories and rolled out one new model after another, betting that volume would eventually make up for shrinking profits.

车企间的激烈竞争将价格推入下行螺旋，也就是中国所说的“内卷”：企业为求生存不断削减成本、增加配置，即便这会损害所有人的利润。车企们建造巨型工厂，一款接一款推出新车型，指望最终能用规模弥补利润萎缩的缺口。

The country is building a new kind of automotive industry, said Tu Le, a transportation and technology analyst — one that looks less like Detroit and more like Silicon Valley.

交通与科技分析师涂乐表示，中国正在打造一种全新的汽车产业——它更像硅谷，而不是底特律。

Automotive cycles now resemble those of consumer electronics, with new models and feature changes released every year. While Ford Motor’s F-series truck has been the best-selling vehicle in America for the past 40 years, the top spot in China over the past few years has been held by either BYD, Geely or Tesla. When preferences change that fast, factories built for boom times don’t scale back as quickly, leaving excess capacity.

汽车迭代周期如今已接近消费电子产品，每年都会推出新车型和新功能。福特F系列皮卡过去40年蝉联美国最畅销车型，中国市场近几年的销量冠军则在比亚迪、吉利、特斯拉之间轮换。消费偏好变化如此之快，为繁荣时期建造的工厂难以快速收缩，进而造成产能过剩。

Mike Smitka, an automotive industry expert and emeritus professor at Washington and Lee University, estimated that 40 percent of China’s automotive production capacity was unused.

华盛顿与李大学荣休教授、汽车行业专家迈克·斯密特卡估计，中国汽车产能中有40%处于闲置状态。

Those idle factories have further contributed to a glut of new models. Companies can commission existing factories to build their cars instead of establishing their own plants. Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications giant, sells numerous electric vehicles, but it does not produce the cars itself.

这些闲置工厂进一步加剧了新车型的泛滥。企业可以委托现有工厂代工生产，而不必自建厂房。中国电信巨头华为销售多款电动汽车，但自身并不造车。

But even under strain, Chinese carmakers pose a threat to American automakers, which are doubling down on gas-powered trucks and sport utility vehicles rather than continuing to spend on electric vehicles. Ford and Stellantis each recorded multibillion-dollar losses after scaling back their electric vehicle plans this year. And even Tesla ceded its early advantage in electric vehicles to BYD last year.

即便身处压力之下，中国车企仍对美国车企构成威胁。美国车企正加大对燃油皮卡和SUV的投入，而非继续在电动汽车上投入资金。福特、斯特兰蒂斯今年缩减电动车计划后均录得数十亿美元亏损。就连特斯拉去年也失去了在电动车领域的先发优势，被比亚迪超越。

So far, 100 percent tariffs have kept Chinese electric vehicles out of the United States.

迄今为止，100%的关税将中国电动汽车挡在了美国市场之外。

But Mr. Le said it was only a matter of time. The rest of the world has already started the shift to electric, but “the U.S. just hasn’t gotten that memo yet.”

但涂乐表示，这只是时间问题。世界其他地区已经开始向电动化转型，而“美国对此仍然充耳不闻”。

The San Francisco artificial intelligence start-up Anthropic has accused three Chinese companies of improperly harvesting large amounts of data from its A.I. technologies in an effort to accelerate the development of their own systems.

旧金山人工智能初创企业Anthropic指控三家中国公司通过不当手段大量抓取其人工智能技术数据，以加速自研系统开发。

Anthropic said in a blog post on Monday that DeepSeek, Moonshot and MiniMax — three prominent Chinese start-ups — had used about 24,000 fraudulent accounts to generate over 16 million conversations with its Claude chatbot that could be used to teach skills to their own chatbots.

Anthropic周一在一篇博客文章中表示，中国三家知名初创企业深度求索、月之暗面和稀宇科技利用约2.4万个虚假账号，与Anthropic的Claude聊天机器人产生了超过1600万次对话，这些数据可用于训练三家公司自己的聊天机器人。

Using data from one A.I. system to train another — a process called distillation — is common in A.I. work. But Anthropic’s terms of service forbid anyone to surreptitiously harvest data for distillation and do not allow its technologies to be used in China.

利用一个人工智能系统的数据训练另一个系统的过程被称为知识蒸馏，在人工智能领域较为常见。但Anthropic的服务条款禁止任何人以秘密方式抓取数据用于蒸馏，同时不允许其技术在中国境内使用。

OpenAI, Anthropic’s primary rival, has also accused Chinese companies of lifting large amounts of data from its chatbot, ChatGPT, for similar proposes.

Anthropic的主要竞争对手OpenAI也指控中国公司从其聊天机器人ChatGPT中大量提取数据用于类似目的。

In a memo sent to the House Select Committee on China last week, OpenAI said DeepSeek and other Chinese start-ups were using new and “obfuscated” distillation methods as part of their “ongoing efforts to free-ride” on technologies developed by OpenAI and other U.S. companies.

在上周致美国国会众议院中国问题特设委员会的一份备忘录中，OpenAI称，深度求索等中国初创企业正采用新型的“混淆式”蒸馏手段，“持续搭便车”使用OpenAI及其他美国公司开发的技术。

Like OpenAI, Anthropic said the practice was a national security risk, adding that it could allow China to build A.I. technologies to create bioweapons or tools for mass surveillance. The start-up has guardrails on its technologies designed to prevent them from being used in those ways, but the guardrails can be stripped away during distillation.

与OpenAI一样，Anthropic称此类行为构成国家安全风险，并表示这可能让中国得以开发用于制造生物武器或大规模监控工具的人工智能技术。Anthropic已为其技术设置安全防护机制，防止被用于此类用途，但这些防护措施在蒸馏过程中可能被剥离。

Anthropic called on government officials and other A.I. companies to help prevent Chinese companies from distilling American models.

Anthropic呼吁政府官员及其他人工智能企业共同阻止中国公司对美国模型进行蒸馏。

“These campaigns are growing in intensity and sophistication,” Anthropic said in its post. “The window to act is narrow, and the threat extends beyond any single company or region. Addressing it will require rapid, coordinated action among industry players, policymakers and the global A.I. community.”

“此类行动正变得愈发激烈且手段更趋复杂，”Anthropic在文章中表示，“可供采取行动的时间窗口正迅速缩小，且威胁已超出单一企业或地区范围。应对这一问题，需要行业参与者、政策制定者及全球人工智能界迅速采取协同行动。”

DeepSeek, Moonshot and MiniMax did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

深度求索、月之暗面、稀宇科技三家公司暂未回应置评请求。

Anthropic published its post amid a tussle with the Defense Department over the Pentagon’s use of its technologies. The Pentagon has approved Anthropic’s technologies for use with classified tasks, but it is threatening to sever ties with the start-up because Anthropic does not want its technologies used in situations involving autonomous weapons or domestic surveillance.

此文发布之际，Anthropic正与美国国防部就五角大楼对其技术的使用陷入争执。五角大楼已批准将Anthropic的技术用于涉密任务，但因该初创公司不希望其技术被应用于自主武器或国内监控领域，五角大楼威胁要终止双方的合作关系。

Last year, DeepSeek spooked Silicon Valley tech companies and sent the U.S. financial markets into a tailspin after releasing A.I. technologies that matched the performance of anything else on the market.

去年，深度求索推出了性能与全球市场同类产品相当的人工智能技术，令硅谷科技企业震惊，并引发美国金融市场剧烈震荡。

Until then, the prevailing wisdom in Silicon Valley had been that the most powerful systems could not be built without billions of dollars in specialized computer chips. But DeepSeek said it had created its technologies using far fewer resources.

在此之前，硅谷的普遍观点是：没有数十亿美元的专用计算机芯片，就无法打造出最强大的人工智能系统。但深度求索表示，打造其技术所耗费的资源远少于此。

Like U.S. companies, DeepSeek, Moonshot and MiniMax build their A.I. technologies using computer code and data corralled from across the internet. A.I. companies across the globe lean heavily on a practice called open sourcing, which means they freely share the code that underpins their technologies and reuse code shared by others. They see this is as way of accelerating technological development.

与美国企业一样，深度求索、月之暗面、稀宇科技均通过从互联网搜集的计算机代码和数据构建人工智能技术。全球人工智能企业都高度依赖开源模式——即免费共享支撑其技术的代码，并复用他人分享的代码。它们认为这是加速技术发展的一种途径。

A.I. companies also need enormous amounts of online data to train their A.I. systems. The leading systems learn their skills by analyzing just about all of the text on the internet.

人工智能企业还需要海量网络数据来训练系统。顶尖人工智能系统通过分析互联网上几乎所有文本习得相关能力。

Distillation is often used to train new systems. This is often allowed by open source technologies. But if a company takes data from proprietary technology, the practice may be legally problematic.

知识蒸馏常被用于训练新系统，开源技术通常允许这一做法。但如果一家公司从专有技术中提取数据，则可能涉嫌违法。

Anthropic, which is now valued at $380 billion, is facing multiple lawsuits accusing it of illegally using copyrighted internet data to train its systems. In September as part of a landmark legal settlement, Anthropic agreed to pay $1.5 billion to a group of authors and publishers after a judge ruled it had illegally downloaded and stored millions of copyrighted books. It was the largest payout in the history of U.S. copyright cases.

目前估值达3800亿美元的Anthropic正面临多起诉讼，它被控非法使用受版权保护的网络数据训练系统。去年9月，在一桩具有里程碑意义的法律和解中，法官裁定Anthropic非法下载并存储数以百万计受版权保护的书籍，该公司同意向一批作者和出版商支付15亿美元赔偿金。这是美国版权案史上金额最高的赔偿。

OpenAI and other A.I. companies face similar suits, including a lawsuit brought by The New York Times against OpenAI and its partner Microsoft. That suit contends that millions of articles published by The Times were used to train automated chatbots that now compete with the news outlet as a source of reliable information. Both OpenAI and Microsoft deny the claims.

OpenAI及其他人工智能企业也面临类似诉讼，其中包括《纽约时报》对OpenAI及其合作伙伴微软提起的诉讼。该诉讼称，《纽约时报》数以百万计的文章被用于训练自动聊天机器人，而这些机器人如今已成为一个与时报构成竞争关系的可靠信息来源。OpenAI和微软均否认相关指控。

President Trump’s summit with President Xi Jinping in China this April is expected to be a grandiose affair, although friction over trade, Taiwan and technology could upset the bonhomie.

特朗普总统今年4月在中国与习近平主席举行的峰会预计将是一场盛大的活动，尽管围绕贸易、台湾和科技问题的摩擦可能会破坏友好氛围。

Mr. Trump is scheduled to travel to China on March 31 for a three-day trip, a White House official confirmed on Friday. The Chinese government, which tends to hold off from revealing plans for major visits, has not confirmed the dates, but Mr. Trump already appears exuberant about his trip.

白宫官员周五证实，特朗普预计于3月31日前往中国，展开为期三天的访问。中国政府通常不会提前公布重大访问安排，目前尚未证实相关日期，但特朗普似乎已对这次行程充满兴奋。

“I have a very good relationship with President Xi. I’m going to be going to China in April,” Mr. Trump said last week. “That’s going to be a wild one.”

“我和习近平主席关系非常好。我将在4月去中国，”特朗普上周说，“那将是一趟非常精彩的行程。”

He said his latest summit with Mr. Xi should “put on the biggest display you’ve ever had in the history of China.” Mr. Trump also noted the ceremonial troops he saw during his last visit to Beijing in 2017, saying, “I never saw so many soldiers all the same height.”

他表示，他与习近平的最新一次峰会将“展现中国历史上最盛大的场面”。特朗普还提到他2017年上次访问北京时看到的仪仗队，说：“我从来没见过这么多身高一模一样的士兵。”

For China, a grandiose reception for Mr. Trump will convey a message to the world, especially to its Asian neighbors, said Julian Gewirtz, a former senior director for China and Taiwan Affairs at the National Security Council under President Joseph R. Biden Jr.

曾在拜登政府担任国家安全委员会中国与台湾事务高级主任的朱利安·格维茨表示，对中国而言，为特朗普举行盛大的接待仪式将向世界——尤其是向其亚洲邻国——传递一个信号。

“Xi is sending a global signal that he has successfully managed the U.S. through a year of resistance” to Mr. Trump’s trade war, said Mr. Gewirtz, who is now a senior research scholar at Columbia University. China would want Mr. Trump’s presence to show “that even the most powerful country in the world has decided that the risks outweigh the benefits of standing up to China,” Mr. Gewirtz said.

“习近平正在向全球发出信号，在应对特朗普的贸易战中，他通过一年的抵制成功拿捏了美国，”现任哥伦比亚大学高级研究学者的格维茨说。他表示，中国希望借助特朗普的到访展示，“即便是世界上最强大的国家也已经认定，与中国对抗的风险大于收益。”

The White House has not released details about precisely when and where Mr. Trump will hold talks with Mr. Xi.

白宫尚未公布特朗普与习近平举行会谈的具体时间和地点等细节。

The United States and China have many points of contention that could ruffle, or at worst derail, the summit. And Mr. Trump’s bargaining power over Mr. Xi ahead of their meeting may be partly clipped by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision that declared parts of his tariffs illegal.

美国与中国之间存在诸多争议点，这些分歧可能会给峰会蒙上阴影，甚至在最坏情况下导致峰会受挫。而在会晤前，特朗普在与习近平博弈中的谈判筹码可能会因美国最高法院裁定其部分关税非法而受到一定削弱。

Last week, the Supreme Court struck down a large part of the tariffs that Mr. Trump has imposed on many countries, including China. The White House has said that it would keep the tariffs going under new legal justifications, and Mr. Trump has already announced a new 15 percent import tax.

上周，最高法院推翻了特朗普对包括中国在内的许多国家征收的大部分关税。白宫表示，将以新的法律依据继续维持这些关税，而特朗普已宣布征收新的15%进口税。

Even so, the legal setback for Mr. Trump may bolster Mr. Xi’s confidence that he has gained more of the initiative in his country’s rivalry with the United States, said Chinese and American analysts.

即便如此，中国和美国的分析人士认为，这一法律挫折可能仍会增强习近平的信心，让他相信自己在与美国的竞争中已获得更多主动权。

“I think this will put China in a more advantageous position in the forthcoming trade talks with the U.S., and China can also push the U.S. on other fronts,” said Prof. Wu Xinbo, the director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai.

“我认为这将使中国在即将到来的中美贸易谈判中处于更有利的位置，而且中国也可以在其他领域向美国施压，”上海复旦大学美国研究中心主任吴心伯教授说。

Mr. Trump will go to China focused on securing business and investment agreements, his previous statements suggest. The Trump administration has also pressed Mr. Xi to stop restricting sales of rare earths as a lever against other countries, a step that Beijing used last year to retaliate against U.S. export controls and tariffs.

从特朗普此前的表态来看，他此行将着力争取商业和投资协议。特朗普政府还敦促习近平停止限制稀土销售，以此作为对他国施压的杠杆；去年，北京正是以此反制美国的出口管制和关税措施。

中国广州的一家服装作坊，摄于去年7月。

“China had already turned the tables on the U.S. with its effective use last year of rare earth restrictions to force the U.S. to have reduced tariffs and limit its export controls,” said Scott Kennedy, a researcher on the Chinese economy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

“中国去年通过有效利用稀土出口限制，已经在与美国的博弈中实现了反转，迫使美国降低关税并收紧其出口管制，”华盛顿战略与国际问题研究中心中国经济研究员甘思德(Scott Kennedy)表示。

Mr. Xi’s main hope from the summit may be less specific: an extended period of stability in dealings with the United States. Much of China’s economy is in poor shape, despite a record trade surplus. Mr. Xi has also overseen purges and investigations in the Chinese military. Late last year, these brought down Zhang Youxia, the most senior general of the People’s Liberation Army, or P.L.A., who was accused of corruption and disloyalty.

习近平对此次峰会的主要期望或许并不那么具体，他希望中美关系能够长期保持稳定。尽管贸易顺差创下纪录，中国经济的整体状况仍然不佳。习近平还主持了对中国军队的清洗和调查。去年年底，中国人民解放军最高将领张又侠因涉嫌腐败和不忠而落马。

“At a broad level, I think Xi wants time and stability in relations,” said Evan S. Medeiros, a professor at Georgetown University who worked as director for China in the National Security Council under President Obama.

“从总体上看，我认为习近平希望在双边关系中获得时间和稳定，”曾在奥巴马总统任内担任国家安全委员会中国事务主任的现乔治城大学教授麦艾文(Evan S. Medeiros)说。

Mr. Xi “needs time to make the economy more resilient and put it in a long term pathway to growth,” said Professor Medeiros. “He needs time to sort out the P.L.A. And he thinks time with Trump in office will help him diplomatically.”

习近平“需要时间来增强经济韧性，并使其走上长期增长的道路”，麦艾文教授说。“他需要时间来整顿解放军。而且他认为，特朗普执政期间将有助于中国在外交领域取得进展。”

Mr. Xi will also probably seek concessions from Mr. Trump on restrictions of Chinese purchases of technology, as well as on Chinese investments into the United States, said Professor Wu, the researcher in Shanghai.

复旦大学学者吴心伯表示，习近平也可能寻求特朗普在限制对华技术出口及中国对美投资方面作出让步。

Mr. Xi’s greatest goal may be to persuade Mr. Trump to dilute U.S. support — rhetorical, diplomatic and military — for Taiwan, the island-democracy that has for decades rejected Beijing’s claims of sovereignty.

习近平最大的目标或许是说服特朗普削弱美国对台湾在言辞、外交和军事上的支持。台湾这个岛屿民主政体几十年来一直拒绝北京的主权主张。

China’s leaders hope that, for a start, Mr. Trump will state that the United States opposes Taiwan seeking independence, said Prof. Xin Qiang, the director of the Center for Taiwan Studies at Fudan University. If Mr. Trump makes such a statement, that could suggest that he sees Taiwan as troublesome. Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te, has said the island is already in reality independent, while implicitly ruling out declaring formal independence.

复旦大学台湾研究中心主任信强教授说，中国领导人希望，首先特朗普能表态称美国反对台湾寻求独立。如果特朗普作出这样的表态，可能意味着他将台湾视为一个麻烦。台湾总统赖清德表示，台湾实际上已经独立，但同时又含蓄地排除了正式宣布独立的可能。

2023年，台湾军队在台湾八里进行演习。

Chinese officials probably see little chance of Mr. Trump making a drastic shift in U.S. policy on Taiwan, but hope to work on him over the coming year, when the two leaders will have two or three more opportunities to meet, said Professor Xin.

信强说，中国官员大概认为特朗普不太可能在对台政策上作出重大改变，但希望在未来一年里对他施加影响，期间中美领导人还将有两到三次会面机会。

If, on the other hand, Mr. Trump approves a new package of arms sales to Taiwan, following U.S. approval of $11 billion in weapons sales in December, that could send relations into another downward spin and even derail the summit, Professor Xin said.

信强还表示，特朗普在去年12月批准110亿美元对台军售之后，如果再次批准新的对台军售方案，可能会令两国关系再度恶化，甚至破坏这次峰会。

“The arbitrariness and uncertainty of President Trump’s decision-making make it very hard to predict,” Professor Xin said of what may happen over talks about Taiwan. “But I have always believed that he will not make concessions on major strategic areas.”

“因为特朗普总统决策的随意性和不确定性是很难预测的，”信强在谈到关于台湾问题的谈判前景时说。“但是我始终相信他不会在一些重大的、战略性的地方作出让步。”

Mr. Xi could also retaliate if Mr. Trump moves to replace the tariffs outlawed by the Supreme Court with similar tariffs under new legal justifications.

如果特朗普采取行动，用具有新法律依据的类似关税来取代被最高法院否决的关税，习近平也可能采取报复措施。

China’s exports to the United States have come under a range of tariffs, and the United States mostly treats these separate duties as stackable, so they can add up on top of each other. The Supreme Court’s decision stripped back some layers of this stack, including a 10 percent general tariff as well as a 10 percent tariff that Mr. Trump put on China for failing to prevent fentanyl and its precursor chemicals from flowing to the United States.

中国对美国的出口商品一直被征收多种关税，而美国通常将这些不同的关税视为可叠加的，因此它们可以层层加码。最高法院的裁决取消了部分叠加关税，其中包括10%的一般关税，以及特朗普因中国未能阻止芬太尼及其前体化学品流入美国而对中国加征的10%关税。

If Mr. Trump revives the outlawed tariffs under new legal justifications, China could cut orders of farm produce from the United States, said Professor Wu, the scholar in Shanghai.

上海的吴心伯教授说，如果特朗普以新的法律依据重新实施被否决的关税，中国可能会减少从美国订购农产品。

When Xi Jinping rang in the new year from Beijing, he called on China to remember the legacy of Yan’an, the rural stronghold where Mao Zedong transformed revolutionary guerrilla fighters into a disciplined force under his command that would go on to take the country.

习近平在北京迎接新年的到来时，呼吁中国铭记延安精神。当年在这个农村根据地，毛泽东将革命游击队战士锻造成一支纪律严明、听他指挥的部队，最终夺取了全国政权。

It may have been a hint of what was to come. Yan’an was also where Mao Zedong launched his party’s first major “rectification,” a campaign of political terror that eliminated rivals and cemented his absolute authority over the party. Three weeks after Mr. Xi’s speech, China effectively purged the military’s top commander Gen. Zhang Youxia, who had once been seen as a confidant of Mr. Xi’s.

这或许预示了接下来会发生的事情。延安也是毛泽东发起中共党内第一次大规模“整风”之地——这场政治恐怖运动消灭了党内对手，巩固了毛泽东在党内的绝对权威。习近平讲话三周后，中国对军队最高指挥官、曾被视为习近平亲信的张又侠上将进行了实质上的清洗。

Like Mao, Mr. Xi is pursuing a kind of spiritual renewal of the party and the military he commands, what he calls constant “self revolution.” And like Mao, that has taken the form of constant purging of enemies, associates and now, those in his inner circle, too. It is a new level of ruthlessness for a man who has already concentrated power in himself to a degree not seen since Mao.

与毛泽东相似，习近平正推动对他统领的党与军队进行一种精神层面的革新，他称之为不断的“自我革命”。与毛泽东一样，他也采取了不断清除敌人和盟友的形式，现在又开始清除核心圈子的成员。对于这位已将权力集中到毛泽东时代以来前所未有程度的领导人而言，这显现出更甚以往的残酷性。

Over the past three years, Mr. Xi has essentially ousted five of the six generals in China’s top military body, the Central Military Commission, which controls China’s armed forces. Only two members are left: Mr. Xi himself and a vice chairman who has overseen Mr. Xi’s purges.

过去三年间，习近平已基本将中央军委六位将军中的五位逐出这个掌控中国军队的最高军事决策机构。现仅剩两名委员：习近平本人及负责清洗行动的副主席。

“It is quite astonishing,” said Yue Gang, a retired colonel of the People’s Liberation Army.

中国人民解放军退役上校岳刚说：“这个确实比较震惊。”

中国军队最高指挥官张又侠上将（中）曾被视为习近平的亲信，但他在今年早些时候遭到调查。

In the weeks after, Chinese officials have offered little explanation as they sought to project normalcy. Mr. Xi hosted foreign leaders in Beijing and convened a meeting with party officials on policy work. On Wednesday, he met with military units by video conference and conveyed his greetings for the Lunar New Year. Acknowledging that the past year had been “very unusual and very extraordinary,” Mr. Xi sought to show that the rank-and-file were loyal to him, saying that the troops were still “completely reliable and trustworthy.”

在随后的几周里，中国官方几乎没有作出解释，同时努力营造一种一切如常的氛围。习近平在北京接待了外国领导人，并召集党内官员召开政策工作会议。周三，他通过视频会议与军队官兵会面，并致以新春问候。习近平承认过去的一年“很不寻常、很不平凡”，他试图表明基层官兵对他的忠诚，称部队仍然“完全过得硬、信得过”。

Online discussion has been restricted as social media platforms filter search results and comments related to General Zhang.

社交媒体平台过滤与张又侠有关的搜索结果和评论，网上讨论受到限制。

The few official editorials released on the subject hark back to the campaign of ideological cleansing first modeled at Yan’an and suggest that at the heart of the ouster is Mr. Xi’s control over the military, a powerful empire within the party.

为数不多的官方社论回溯了在延安时期开创的思想整风运动，并暗示此次清洗的核心关乎习近平对军队这个党内强大帝国的控制权。

A front-page editorial in the People’s Liberation Army Daily characterized the investigation as a necessary hygiene, a process of “uprooting sick trees” and “removing hidden cancer” so that the military would be “reforged and reformed.” Another editorial in the same paper described Mr. Xi’s leadership as the “the source of strength, direction, and future” for the military.

《解放军报》头版社论将此次整肃比作必要的清洁工程，称其是“肃流毒”“清积弊”的过程，旨在使军队得到“重塑”。该报另一篇社论则将习近平的领导力描述为军队的“力量所在、方向所在、未来所在”。

身着红军制服的游客在延安革命纪念馆毛泽东雕像旁合影。

“Mr. Xi believes he needs to build a foundation of absolute ideological unity and personal loyalty for future battles,” wrote John Garnaut, a founder of Garnaut Global, a geopolitical risk advisory firm. He noted that the language used by the party showed that Mr. Xi was drawing on Maoist and Stalinist playbooks absorbed in his youth as the son of a revolutionary fighter.

地缘政治风险咨询公司Garnaut Global创始人高安西(John Garnaut)指出：“习近平认为他需要为未来的战斗建立绝对的思想统一和个人忠诚的基础。”他指出，中共使用的措辞表明，习近平正借鉴他青年时期作为革命者之子所吸收的毛泽东主义和斯大林主义理论。

Over his 13 years in power, Mr. Xi has often cited Yan’an, the Communist Party’s main revolutionary base until 1948, as inspiration for his own culling of cadres as well as a way to signal his own supreme authority in the party in the tradition of Mao. After Mr. Xi secured a third term as head of the party, breaking with precedent, he visited the city with his top officials.

在他掌权的13年里，习近平屡屡提及延安——直到1948年，这里一直是中共的主要革命根据地——把它作为自己整肃干部的灵感来源，并以此延续毛泽东传统，彰显自己在党内至高无上的权威。在打破惯例实现党内第三次连任后，他率领高层官员重访延安。

He and General Zhang also made the pilgrimage to Yan’an in 2024 for a meeting, heavy with symbolism, on “political work” in the Chinese military. Mr. Xi exhorted the senior military officers, which included three other senior generals that he would later also purge, to remember their original revolutionary mission.

2024年，他与张又侠再次前往延安，举行关于中国军队“政治工作”的会议，这次会议带有浓厚的象征意义。习近平敦促军方高层（其中包括后来也被他清除的另外三名高级将领），要牢记初心使命。

Visiting the former residences of revolutionary leaders like Mao and Zhou Enlai on that trip, he declared the importance of the party’s “absolute leadership over the military.”

那次访问中，他参观了毛泽东和周恩来等革命领袖的故居，宣布了党“对军队的绝对领导”的重要性。

“For Xi Jinping, he sees that legacy and that kind of campaign as one of the party’s greatest treasures. He wants to go back to history and use those methods,” said Joseph Torigian, a historian of the Chinese Communist Party at American University in Washington. “He thinks he can do it right.”

“对习近平来说，这种政治遗产和这种运动是党的最大财富之一。他想回到历史经验，并运用这些手段，”华盛顿美利坚大学中共党史专家唐志学(Joseph Torigian)说。“他认为自己可以正确运用。”

Securing control over the People’s Liberation Army has been the key challenge of every leader since Mao, who immortalized its importance by declaring that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Colonel Yue argued that Mr. Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, struggled to manage the military and had been outmaneuvered by two vice chairmen of the commission.

自毛泽东时代以来，确保对人民解放军的掌控始终是历任领导人的核心挑战，毛泽东曾宣称“枪杆子里面出政权”，将这一原则的重要性永载史册。岳刚认为，习近平的前任胡锦涛在掌控军队方面力不从心，曾被军委的两位副主席架空。

根据中国官方媒体发布的照片，习近平于2024年与张又侠一同前往延安视察，其间他强调了党对军队“绝对领导”的重要性。

“We’ve had this lesson before,” Colonel Yue said, who argued that General Zhang may have tried and failed to weaken Mr. Xi’s hold over the military. The “smooth” takedown of General Zhang, he said, shows how “impossible it is to shake the leadership of Xi Jinping.”

“因为这个前面有教训，”岳刚说，他认为张又侠可能曾试图削弱习近平对军队的控制，但没有成功。他说，张又侠被“平稳地顺利地”拿下，表明动摇习近平的领导地位“是不可能的”。

“The attempt to undermine the power didn’t succeed. Instead, it resulted in a disastrous outcome,” he said.

“你这个架空也没有得逞，反而可以说碰到头破血流，”他说。

Since Mr. Xi came to power in 2012 he has overseen an intense campaign to clean up the military, where corruption had been on the rise since market reforms in the 1980s and as military spending soared. He sees absolute loyalty as vital to one of his key goals of building a 21st-century, combat-ready force capable of defending China’s interests — like its claim over Taiwan.

自2012年上台以来，习近平主导了对军队的严厉整肃。自20世纪80年代市场化改革以来，随着军费开支激增，军队腐败现象一直呈上升趋势。习近平认为绝对忠诚对于实现他的核心目标至关重要——打造一支具备21世纪作战能力的军队，以捍卫中国利益，例如对台湾的主权主张。

And as Beijing competes more directly with the United States, ensuring the military’s loyalty in times of crisis and possible conflict is even more important.

随着北京与美国的竞争日益直接，在危机甚至可能发生冲突的情况下确保军队的忠诚显得尤为重要。

“The party must always command the gun, never the other way around,” said the Chinese military expert Song Zhongping.

 “要让党指挥枪，不是枪指挥党，”中国军事专家宋忠平说。

When Mr. Xi talks about the spirit of Yan’an, he glosses over details of the purging of thousands of party members at Yan’an through psychologically brutal sessions of self-criticism that led some to suicide. Mr. Xi uses some of those methods of political indoctrination, including mandating study sessions of his personalized doctrine, Xi Jinping Thought, and encouraging the reporting of one’s peers or superiors for violating Mr. Xi’s edicts, according to Wen-Hsuan Tsai, a scholar of elite Chinese politics at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica in Taiwan.

当习近平谈及延安精神时，他刻意回避了延安运动中以残酷的自我批评对数千名党员进行整肃的细节，那些带有强烈心理压迫的整肃甚至导致一些人自杀。台湾中央研究院政治所研究中国高层政治的学者蔡文轩指出，习近平沿用了部分政治灌输手段，包括强制学习他个人的理论“习近平思想”，并鼓励举报违反习近平指令的同僚或上级。

“It turns the whole party into a trial of mutual reporting, so no one can be trusted — not your parents, not your superiors, no one,” Dr. Tsai said.

蔡文轩说：“把整个党内变成一种相互举报的试炼，所以就没有人可以相信，就是你的父母、你的长官、你的谁，你都不能相信。”

“His type of regime needs constant enemies and purges to maintain fear,” he said.

“他还是要不断地找敌人来做清洗，因为（只有这样）这个政权才可以让大家恐惧，”他说。

自毛泽东以来，确保对军队的控制权始终是中华人民共和国历任领导人的关键挑战。

Mr. Xi’s rectification campaign, while not as bloody or extreme as Mao’s, extends across the party apparatus, targeting graft as well as perceived disloyalty. Last year, 983,000 officials were punished for violating party rules, the highest number on record, according to data released by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the party’s internal anti-corruption body.

习近平的整风运动虽然不像毛泽东时期那样血腥或极端，却遍及整个党政体系，既打击贪腐，也针对被认为不忠诚的人。根据党内反腐机构中央纪委公布的数据，去年有98.3万名官员因违反党纪受到惩处，创下历史最高纪录。

The sudden removal of senior officials with no explanation has become a hallmark of Mr. Xi’s rule, inspiring uncertainty and fear among Chinese officials in what analysts say is either a sign of his increasing paranoia or a tactic to keep the leader’s enemies, as well as his allies, guessing.

在没有任何解释的情况下突然撤换高级官员，这已成为习近平执政的一个标志，在中国官场引发了不确定性和恐惧。分析人士称，这可能是习近平越来越偏执的表现，也可能是一种让敌人和盟友都猜不透的策略。

Rather than quietly retire General Zhang at the next leadership transition, in 2027, Mr. Xi chose to publicly and loudly disown him.

习近平没有让张又侠在2027年下一次领导层交接时悄然退休，而是选择公开、高调地与他断绝关系。

“This purge manifests a position of strength,” said Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Stimson Center in Washington. “Xi can move his finger and remove the most powerful leader of the Chinese military.”

“这次清洗体现了一种强势姿态，”华盛顿史汀生中心中国项目主任孙韵说。“习近平动动手指，就能撤换中国军方最有权势的领导人”。

For many spouses, smartphone use is a point of tension. But for David Duda and Hong Liang, a couple in New Haven, Conn., the technology is so essential that they own eight external battery packs. If their phones die, so does their ability to communicate.

对于很多夫妻而言，使用智能手机是引发矛盾的导火索。但对于康涅狄格州纽黑文市的戴维·杜达与梁红（音）夫妇来说，这项技术却至关重要——他们足足备了八个外接移动电源。一旦手机没电，他们就彻底无法交流。

Mr. Duda, 62, speaks English, and Ms. Liang, 57, speaks Mandarin. They rely on a free smartphone app from Microsoft, called Translator, to render a text translation of what they say — like movie subtitles but for daily life.

62岁的杜达只说英语，57岁的梁红只讲普通话。他们依靠微软公司一款名为“翻译”的免费手机应用将彼此的话语转换成文字翻译，就像电影字幕，却是应用于实时的生活中。

Though they have been married for three years, they walked down the street on a recent December afternoon with their arms linked like newlyweds. This was out of necessity as much as affection: One of them chatted and navigated while the other’s eyes were locked on the phone, reading translated remarks.

去年12月的一个下午，尽管已经结婚三年，两人仍挽着胳膊走在街上，宛如新婚夫妇。这既是出于爱意，也是出于必要：一人说话、引路，另一人则紧盯手机阅读译文。

When Mr. Duda told a joke, he held his chortle for a few seconds until Ms. Liang was able to read it.

杜达讲笑话时，总会忍住笑等上几秒，直到梁红看完翻译。

Communicating this way requires close attention. Mr. Duda and Ms. Liang can’t half-listen to each other or walk away while talking. There are no shouted conversations from the shower. When they want to really connect, they spend hours on the couch or lying in bed, going back and forth until they feel sure they understand what the other has said.

这种交流方式需要全神贯注。杜达和梁红不能心不在焉地听对方说话，也不能边说话边走开；没法淋浴时大声交谈。想要真正交流时，他们会在沙发上或床上，一聊就是几个小时，反复确认彼此完全理解对方的意思。

“The translator makes you have to be more in the moment because you’ve got to be reading it and listening,” Mr. Duda said. “You have to pay attention more, which obviously is a good thing when you’re relating to your spouse.”

“翻译工具会让你更关注当下，因为你既要阅读又要倾听，”杜达说。“你必须更专注，这对夫妻相处来说显然是好事。”

“He pays attention to all the details and takes good care of me. He really knows and sees what I need,” Ms. Liang said in Mandarin, as translated by a human interpreter. (Machine translation: He is very attentive. He thought about anything for me, so I was impressed by a lot of his details.)

“没有人这么细心地观察过我，或者是为我考虑过任何事情，所以他的很多细节方面打动了我，”梁红用中文说道，人类口译员这样翻译。（机器翻译版本则是：他替我想得很周全，许多细节都令我感动。）

Automated translation has advanced enough in recent years that it is being used by people whose attraction transcends fluency, like Mr. Duda and Ms. Liang, as well as travelers to foreign lands and companies hoping to appeal to new markets and audiences.

近年来，自动翻译技术已足够先进，开始被杜达、梁红这样这样超越语言障碍的恋人使用，也服务于海外旅行者，以及希望开拓新市场、吸引新受众的企业。

I used Apple AirPods, which have real-time language translation, as well as Microsoft Translator to interview Ms. Liang. I was able to follow much of what she said, though the delay made the conversation challenging. And there were key misunderstandings, which I learned about only when I later asked a professional interpreter to review our conversation.

采访梁红时，我使用了支持实时语言翻译的苹果AirPods和微软翻译软件。尽管延迟让对话变得困难，但我仍能大致听懂她的话。不过对话中出现了几处关键误解，直到后来我请专业译员回看对话内容才发现。

“It’s wonderful that people are able to communicate with a much wider range of people than they could before,” said Lera Boroditsky, a professor of cognitive science at University of California, San Diego. “Those translations are going to be imperfect,” she said, “but having access is better than not having access.”

“人们现在能和比以往更广泛的人群交流，这是件了不起的事情，”加州大学圣迭戈分校认知科学教授莱拉·博罗迪茨基说。“这些翻译并不完美，但是有接触总比完全无法交流要好。”

The idea of a universal translator has long existed in science fiction — how else could the crew of the Enterprise on “Star Trek” talk to alien species? The real-world versions on offer from Microsoft and other companies can assist with 100 or so of the 7,000 languages spoken globally, seemingly realizing the dream of a world where billions of people can understand each other. Or at least muddle through.

万能翻译工具的构想早已存在于科幻作品中——不然《星际迷航》里企业号的船员要怎么和外星物种交流？微软等公司推出的现实版翻译工具能覆盖全球7000种语言中的约100种，似乎实现了令数十亿人相互理解的梦想，至少能令人们彼此勉强沟通。

A more intimate relationship sustained with apps seems less fathomable. “A happy marriage is a long conversation that always seems too short,” wrote the French author André Maurois. Mr. Duda and Ms. Liang’s conversation started at an opportune time, when technological tools existed to facilitate it, and they had developed the patience to use them.

靠手机应用维系一段亲密关系，听起来更加令人难以置信。法国作家安德烈·莫鲁瓦曾写道：“幸福的婚姻是场总嫌太短的漫长对话。”杜达和梁红的交谈，恰逢技术工具足以支撑交流的时代，而他们也拥有使用这些工具的耐心。

“It’s kind of fun for us,” Mr. Duda said. “If people weren’t in love, it would be much more frustrating.”

“对我们来说这还挺有趣的，”杜达说。“如果不是在恋人之间，那就会让人沮丧得多。”

Love in Translation

 翻译里的爱情

Mr. Duda and Ms. Liang met in Xian, China, in the fall of 2019.

杜达和梁红于2019年秋天在中国西安相识。

Mr. Duda’s brother was going there on a work trip, and he tagged along to see the region’s famous Terracotta soldiers and Buddhist temples. His brother’s business partner suggested that her friend, Ms. Liang, drive Mr. Duda around. By the end of the week, Mr. Duda was smitten.

当时杜达的兄弟要去西安出差，他便一同前往，想去看看当地著名的兵马俑和佛教寺庙。他兄弟的生意伙伴提议，让她的朋友梁红开车带杜达四处逛逛。一周行程结束时，杜达已对梁红倾心。

“She is the most joyous, happy person you’ll ever meet,” he said. Mr. Duda thought that there was chemistry between them, and tried to kiss Ms. Liang goodbye before his departure. Surprised, she turned her cheek.

“她是世上最开朗快乐的人，”杜达说。他觉得两人之间有化学反应。临别前，他试图吻别梁红。她猝不及防，侧过脸去。

But she was interested, and so, after Mr. Duda returned to New Haven, where he owns a bookstore, they stayed in touch via WeChat, a Chinese messaging app. They communicated by text in English, with Ms. Liang copying and pasting the messages to an English-Chinese translator.

但她其实对杜达颇有好感。因此，当杜达回到纽黑文经营他在当地的书店后，两人通过中国即时通讯应用微信保持联系。他们用英文打字聊天，梁红则把消息复制粘贴到英汉翻译工具里翻译。

A couple of months after they met, the world shut down because of Covid. Mr. Duda and Ms. Liang, both divorced with adult children, found themselves isolated. They started messaging each other daily, talking about their personal histories, their failed marriages, their families. With pandemic restrictions forcing retailers to close, Mr. Duda’s work turned to preparing books for online shipment, and he started working at night, which meant he was awake at the same time as Ms. Liang.

相识数月后，新冠疫情让世界停摆。当时杜达和梁红都是离异人士，子女均已成年，两人都陷入了隔离状态。他们开始每天发消息，聊各自的人生经历、失败的婚姻，还有他们的家人。疫情管控迫使零售商关门，杜达的工作转为整理书籍用于线上发货，他开始在夜间工作，这让他的作息和梁红刚好同步。

“We spent the next two years on our phones getting to know each other better,” Mr. Duda said.

“接下来的两年，我们天天靠手机互相了解，”杜达说。

杜达与梁红对翻译技术的依赖程度极高，为此他们备着八个外接移动电源。

In September 2022, when China relaxed pandemic travel restrictions, Ms. Liang booked a one-way flight to the United States. She was nervous: Was everything Mr. Duda had said what she understood it to be?

2022年9月，中国放宽疫情旅行限制，梁红订了一张单程机票飞往美国。她心中很忐忑：杜达说的一切，真的和她理解的一样吗？

Mr. Duda met Ms. Liang at the airport holding a sign that said, in Chinese characters, “Love of my life.”

杜达在机场接她，手里举着一块牌子，上面用汉字写着：“我生命中的挚爱”。

“I was deeply touched, because at the airport in front of so many people, he did something that touched my heart,” Ms. Liang recalled. (Machine translation: “I think this is a very, very romantic thing, and in front of so many people at the airport.”)

“我觉得这是一个非常非常浪漫的事情，而且是在机场当着那么多人的面，”梁红回忆。（机器翻译：我觉得这是非常非常浪漫的事，在机场那么多人面前。）

‘You were going to die?’

 “你快要死了？”

Automated language translation has been a goal of computer scientists since at least the 1950s, when Georgetown University researchers designed a system that could translate a couple of hundred Russian words into English. A meaningful translation, however, requires more than a word-for-word swap. Grammar and structure vary between languages, and words can have different meanings depending on context, not to mention the problem of idioms like “it’s a piece of cake” that cannot be translated literally.

至少从20世纪50年代起，自动语言翻译就已是计算机科学家的目标——当时乔治城大学的研究人员设计出一套系统，能将几百个俄语单词翻译成英语。但是有意义的翻译远不止逐字替换。不同语言的语法和结构千差万别，单词含义随语境变化，更不用说“it’s a piece of cake”（小菜一碟）这类无法直译的习语。

These gnarly challenges appealed to machine learning researchers: Could computers ingest language and learn to decipher it?

这些棘手的难题吸引了机器学习研究者：计算机能否吸收语言，并学会解读它？

In the early 2000s, Google and Microsoft developed web-based translation services using statistical approach, but the major breakthrough came a decade later. In a paper, Google researchers described a new technique for processing enormous data sets, which ushered in a new era of artificial intelligence, including chatbots like ChatGPT. This technique is fundamentally about language processing, and the paper was about how well it worked at translating English into French and German.

21世纪初，谷歌和微软利用预测性软件开发了网页翻译服务，但重大突破出现在十年后。谷歌研究人员在一篇论文中介绍了一种处理海量数据集的新技术，开启了人工智能的新时代，催生出ChatGPT等聊天机器人。这项技术的核心是语言处理，论文还展示了它在英译法、英译德方面的出色表现。

Since then, automated systems have improved and can translate text with impressive accuracy. But using A.I. to translate words people speak aloud works less well.

从那以后，自动翻译系统不断进步，文本翻译的准确率已相当可观。但用AI翻译人们的口语，效果仍然略逊一筹。

Communicating on WeChat, Mr. Duda and Ms. Liang had sometimes managed to forget they spoke different languages. In person, communication proved more challenging.

在微信上聊天时，杜达和梁红有时甚至会忘记两人说不同的语言。可面对面交流时，难度却大了不少。

First they tried a hand-held translator that cost $600. They also tried earbuds that would speak translations into their ears. But these devices had to be connected to Wi-Fi, and any background noise made them useless. In the end, they settled on speaking into the Microsoft Translator app that made text translations of what they said. They haven’t tried asking a generative A.I. chatbot to translate for them, though the makers of ChatGPT and Claude have cited translation as a popular use for their products.

起初，他们试过一台600美元的手持翻译机，又试过可将译文传入耳中的耳机。但这些设备必须连接Wi-Fi，背景里稍有噪音就彻底失灵。最终，他们选择用微软翻译，对着手机说话就能生成文字翻译。他们还没试过用生成式AI聊天机器人翻译，尽管ChatGPT和Claude的开发者都将翻译列为产品的热门应用场景。

The transcript of their married life is now held by a giant corporation, but Mr. Duda said it didn’t trouble him. He even granted Microsoft permission to review his audio clips to improve the technology.

杜达和梁红婚姻生活的对话记录如今由一家巨头公司持有，但杜达表示自己并不介意。他甚至授权微软调阅他的语音片段，以改进技术。

Translator could use improvement. I asked Wallace Chen, a professor of Chinese-English translation and interpretation at Middlebury College, to review my conversation with the couple. For simple exchanges, the A.I. did OK, he said. But it faltered on longer ones.

但“翻译”这款应用程序确实有待改进。我请明德学院的中英翻译与口译教授陈瑞清审阅了我与这对夫妇的交谈。他说，面对简短交流，人工智能表现尚可，但在处理较长的句子时，它就开始力不从心了。

For example, while describing how Mr. Duda greeted her at the airport, Ms. Liang said that she got Covid shortly after her arrival and felt so awful she thought she was dying.

比如梁红描述杜达去机场接机的情景时提到，自己抵美后不久便感染新冠，病得厉害，甚至以为自己快要死了。

But those were not the words I saw on the screen. The app’s translation had her saying that she got a “new crown” and thought she was going to die. Confused, I asked if she meant that his gesture of carrying the loving sign was so romantic she could die.

但我当时在屏幕上看到的并不是这些。应用程序的翻译是她得到了一个“新皇冠”，并认为自己快要死了。我当时一头雾水，还问她是不是想说他举着爱心牌迎接她的举动浪漫得要死。

“No, no, no,” she said. And she repeated herself, but we still didn’t get it.

“不是不是不是，”她连声否认。她又重复了一遍，但我们仍如坠五里雾中。

A month later, watching video of the exchange, Dr. Chen explained: The app had translated the Chinese term for Covid-19 — novel corona — as “new crown.” Mr. Duda had stayed next to her throughout her illness, she said, and his attentiveness had deepened her feelings for him, which is why she had brought it up.

一个月后，陈瑞清在回看这段对话视频时道出原委：这款应用将中文的“新冠”直译成英文的“new crown”（新皇冠）。梁红说，患病期间杜达始终相伴在侧，那份体贴令她情意愈笃——这正是她提及此事的缘由。

There were other communication failures. When Ms. Liang’s answers ran long, the speech-to-text transcription would fail to keep up with her, missing words or entire sentences. It was like a phone call where the sound cuts out and results in gibberish.

沟通失败的情况还不止于此。梁红作答稍长时，语音转文字功能就跟不上了，会漏遗漏字词乃至整句话。这就像通话信号中断，最后出来的全是莫名其妙的话。

Chris Wendt, a former group program manager at Microsoft who worked on Translator for two decades, said, “The person speaking needs to verify what they said.”

曾在微软参与“翻译”开发二十余载的前项目经理克里斯·温特表示：“讲话者必须确认自己的发言已被准确识别。”

This means looking at the app while you’re talking, not at the person you’re talking to, to make sure it accurately captures your words.

这意味着你在说话时得盯着这款应用程序，以确保它准确记录了你的话，而不是盯着你的交流对象。

This was news to the couple. “Why didn’t they tell us that two years ago?” Mr. Duda said.

这对夫妇闻之愕然。“两年前他们怎么不告诉我们？”杜达叹道。

Rendering speech into text is challenging even without translating to another language: Microphone quality, ambient noise or people talking over each other can all interfere with accurate speech recognition, said Philipp Koehn, a pioneer in machine translation who teaches at Johns Hopkins University.

即便不涉及语言翻译，将语音转化为文字也极具挑战性。约翰斯·霍普金斯大学机器翻译领域的先驱菲利普·科恩指出，麦克风的音质、环境噪音或多人同时说话都会干扰语音识别的准确性。

And spoken language is more varied than written text. There are accents and dialects, meaningful hesitations that can’t be conveyed, emotion and tone that is lost. People talk fast, or ramble, or trail off on a half-formed thought.

口语比书面语更为庞杂多样。它包含口音、方言、还有意味深长、无法传达的停顿，以及易于流失的情感和语调。人们说话时可能语速飞快，或者东拉西扯，或思绪未竟便渐无声息。

家中墙上贴着一张英语字母发音表，用来帮助梁红练习英文字母的发音。

Dr. Chen, the professor and interpreter from Middlebury, said automated translators should be used with caution “in situations where every word matters.”

明德学院教授、译员陈瑞清提醒，在“每个字都很重要”的场合，使用自动翻译务须审慎。

Mr. Duda and Ms. Liang know the translator often gets their meaning wrong. They have an expression for when it happens: bù bù hǎo, pronounced “boo boo how,” a play on a Chinese phrase that means “not good.” When it happens, they try again, or use body language, or pull up a photo on the internet for illustration. Words sometimes fail them, as they do us all.

杜达和梁红深知翻译工具经常误解他们的意思。每当这种情况发生时，他们会就会说“bù bù hǎo”，这是在玩中文“不好”的谐音梗。遇到这种翻译翻车的时候，他们会再次尝试，或者使用肢体语言，又或者在网上找张图片来示意。文字有时会让他们感到词不达意，正如我们所有人都会遇到的那样。

Big Ambitions

宏愿

Microsoft declined to answer questions, but I asked Mr. Wendt, the former program manager, what his team had in mind when they created Translator. Did they imagine it could sustain a marriage?

微软婉拒采访，但我询问了前项目经理温特，他的团队在开发“翻译”时初衷是什么。他们是否想过，有朝一日它能支撑一段婚姻？

“That was the intent,” he said. “We thought it was possible.”

“那正是我们的本意，”他说。“我们相信这是可能的。”

He and his co-workers had big ambitions; they thought they could connect the world by breaking down language barriers. In 2014, Microsoft demonstrated its ability to do simultaneous translation with a Skype call between two schoolgirls, one in Seattle and one in Mexico City. The faces of the girls — and their classmates — lit up with amazement as a computer-generated voice spoke their words in Spanish or English.

他与同事们怀抱宏愿：他们认为可以通过打破语言障碍来连接世界。2014年，微软通过两名女学生（分别在西雅图和墨西哥城）之间的Skype通话展示了同步翻译能力。当电脑生成的声音将她们的话语转化为西班牙语或英语时，女孩们和她们同学的脸上都绽放出惊奇的笑容。

Since then, translation has become a $31 billion industry, according to the market intelligence firm Slator. In the last year, social media platforms including YouTube and Instagram have released tools for creators to automatically translate and dub their videos into other languages. Amazon is testing “A.I.-aided dubbing” of foreign-language movies into English and Spanish and allowing authors to translate their self-published books on Kindle using A.I. Reddit has translated all the content on its site into 30 different languages. Many video call services offer real-time translation to paying users.

据市场情报公司Slator称，自那时起，翻译已发展成为一个价值310亿美元的产业。去年，包括YouTube和Instagram在内的社交媒体平台都发布了工具，供创作者自动翻译其视频并进行配音。亚马逊正在测试用“AI辅助配音”将外语电影转为英语和西班牙语对白，并允许作者在Kindle上利用AI翻译自出版书籍。Reddit已将其网站上的所有内容翻译成了30种不同的语言。许多视频通话服务也向付费用户提供实时翻译功能。

Mr. Wendt compared A.I. translation to GPS, which powers mobile navigation apps.

温特将AI翻译比作驱动手机导航应用程序的GPS。

“When you have GPS, you’re not afraid of getting lost,” said Mr. Wendt, who uses the Translator app when he travels. “It enables you to go into situations you would not normally go into.”

“有了GPS，你就不再害怕迷路，”温特说道。他在旅行时也会使用“翻译”应用，“它能让你勇敢地进入那些通常不敢涉足的境地。”

Within two months of Ms. Liang’s arrival, Mr. Duda knew he wanted her to stay. During Thanksgiving dinner with his extended family, he got down on one knee and attempted to propose in Chinese.

梁红抵美不到两个月，杜达就认定自己想让她留下来。感恩节家宴上，他单膝跪地，尝试用中文向她求婚。

Ms. Liang did not understand his words, but the meaning of the kneeling was clear. They married a month later.

梁红没听懂他的话，但跪下的意思再明白不过。一个月后，他们结为夫妻。

Their lives are not so different from those of other couples: They eat out, go biking, take beach walks and watch shows with Chinese subtitles. (They liked “Ted Lasso.”) But in one way, they might be unusual: In three years of marriage, they have not had a fight. A heated marital spat is often fueled by a rapid exchange of barbs that would be difficult through Translator.

他们的生活与寻常夫妻并无二致：外出用餐、骑车兜风、海边漫步、看带中文字幕的剧集（《足球教练》是他们的心头好）。但有一点或许与众不同：结婚三载，他们从未吵过架。夫妻间的激烈争执往往在双方的唇枪舌剑中火上浇油，而通过“翻译”应用程序，这太难了。

“Maybe the best way to have a lasting marriage is to speak different languages,” Mr. Duda joked.

“或许，长久婚姻的秘诀就是说不同的语言，”杜达打趣道。

That both Mr. Duda and Ms. Liang were older and divorced when they met has helped their communication, they said. They have experienced how a marriage can go wrong and better understand the workings of a happy one. And they are attentive to body language. Ms. Liang said that Mr. Duda’s facial expressions and gestures tell her more about his emotions than Translator does.

他们表示，两人相遇时都已较为年长且有过离异经历，这反而有助于沟通。他们都经历过婚姻如何触礁，因此更懂得幸福婚姻的经营之道。同时，他们对肢体语言格外留意。梁红说，比起“翻译”应用程序，杜达的面部表情和动作更能让她读懂他的情绪。

“These translation apps struggle with a lot of things like metaphors, sense of humor, tone register, cultural references,” said Per Urlaub, a professor and the director of global languages at M.I.T. But, he added, the apps “are meaningful and functional” for Mr. Duda and Ms. Liang.

“这些翻译应用程序在隐喻、幽默感、语气分寸、文化典故等诸多方面都表现得不尽如人意，”麻省理工学院全球语言项目主任、教授珀·乌尔劳布指出。但他也表示，对杜达和梁红而言，这类应用“是有意义且实用的”。

“Technology is making intimacy possible under conditions where it otherwise would not exist,” he said. “In this case, I feel that the proof is in the pudding.”

“技术让原本不可能的亲密关系成为可能，”他说。“从这个案例看，我觉得事实胜于雄辩。”

‘Love Actually’ … but Actually

《真爱至上》……但现实中……

Anyone who has seen “Love Actually” has an expectation of how this story should have gone: When a couple in that rom-com have chemistry and a language barrier, they both hit the books to become fluent.

但凡看过《真爱至上》的人，大约都会为这类故事预设一个走向：那部浪漫喜剧里的男女主角产生了化学反应但存在语言障碍，于是双双埋头苦学，终至精通对方语言。

Mr. Duda is trying to learn basic Mandarin from children’s books and apps like Duolingo. Ms. Liang, who works as a masseuse and acupuncturist, took an English class when she first arrived in New Haven, and also uses language learning apps. But they estimate that they know only 200 words in the other’s language. Mr. Duda said he felt too old to become fluent in a new language.

杜达也在尝试靠儿童绘本和多邻国之类的应用学习基础的汉语普通话。梁红从事按摩针灸工作，初到纽黑文时上过英语课，也用语言学习应用程序。但据他们估算，两人掌握对方语言的词汇量仅约200个。杜达说，自己这把年纪，怕是没法流利掌握一门新语言了。

Mr. Duda and Ms. Liang say their infatuation for each other makes it work. When the passion fades, the struggle of using translation apps might drive them crazy, Mr. Duda conceded.

杜达与梁红说，对彼此的热恋让这段关系得以维系。杜达也承认，待激情褪去，使用翻译软件的种种不便恐怕会令人抓狂。

Ms. Liang’s eyes were locked on her phone, closely reading the translation of what Mr. Duda was saying. Then she looked up and chimed in.

梁红的双眼紧盯着手机，仔细读着杜达那句被译成中文的话。随即她抬起头，接过话头。

“In fact, this is basically the same as what the Chinese say,” she said, according to my AirPods. “We say that two people are together because they don’t know each other. We want to explore each other’s secrets.”

“其实这跟中国人说的差不多，”我的AirPods里传来了翻译后的声音。“我们说两个人在一起是因为彼此不了解。我们想要探索对方的秘密。”

Once she really gets to know him, she said, she might not be as interested. She watched him following along on the phone, waiting until he finished reading that part to laugh.

她说，一旦真正读懂了他，或许便没那么多好奇了。她看着杜达低头凑近手机，等他读完那句译文才笑出声。

President Trump’s seizure of Venezuela’s oil and his on-again, off-again vows to acquire Greenland, by force if necessary, have underscored the new threat that Washington poses to nations’ sovereignty.

特朗普总统夺取委内瑞拉石油资源，还时断时续地宣称要吞并格陵兰岛，必要时不惜动用武力，他的种种言行凸显了华盛顿对各国主权构成的新威胁。

The land and resource grabs have alarmed even once-close allies, compelling them to consider other, less obvious risks. The most pointed stems from American dominance over the global financial networks and technology systems that undergird nearly every purchase or exchange of information made by citizens, businesses and governments.

这种对土地和资源的掠夺甚至让昔日关系密切的盟友也警觉起来，迫使他们开始考虑其他尚不醒目的风险。其中最尖锐的担忧源自美国对全球金融网络和技术系统的主导地位——而这些系统支撑着公民、企业和各国政府几乎所有购买行为或信息交换。

Allies are concerned for their financial independence and the security of confidential national data.

盟友们担心自身的金融独立以及国家机密数据的安全。

The risks may be harder to visualize than crashing through a nation’s border and carting off its valuable crude. But they have revived efforts, particularly in Europe, to strengthen control over these critical, though unseen, sources of autonomy and power.

这些风险或许不像冲破国界、掠走其宝贵的原油那样直观可见，却促使相关国家（尤其是欧洲）重新加强管控这些虽然无形却关乎自主与权力的关键要素。

European leaders have stepped up their push to reduce reliance on big American tech firms like Amazon, Google and Microsoft for cloud computing, and on financial services titans like Mastercard and Visa for payment systems.

欧洲领导人已加紧行动，力求在云计算领域减少对亚马逊、谷歌、微软等美国科技巨头的依赖，在支付系统层面降低对万事达卡、维萨等金融服务巨擘的依附。

The move to secure what are being labeled monetary sovereignty and digital sovereignty is part of a broader effort to reduce Europe’s dependence on American weapons, trade, technology and more.

这场围绕所谓“货币主权”和“数字主权”的保障行动是欧洲力图摆脱对美国武器、贸易、技术等领域依赖这一更宏大努力的一部分。

At a summit in Belgium this week, President Emmanuel Macron of France warned that the reliance makes the continent more vulnerable to economic and political coercion from the White House, and he urged other European leaders to seize “the Greenland moment” to do something about it.

本周在比利时举行的峰会上，法国总统马克龙警告说，这种依赖使欧洲大陆更容易受到白宫的经济和政治胁迫。他敦促其他欧洲领导人抓住“格陵兰时刻”，以此为契机采取行动。

Economists and bankers have also been urging lawmakers to approve the creation of a digital euro — the online version of cash — to lessen dependence on American financial service companies and networks.

经济学家和银行家也一直在敦促立法者批准创建“数字欧元”——即现金的线上版本——以减少对美国金融服务公司和支付网络的依赖。

法国总统马克龙在比利时的一场峰会上就欧洲的技术依赖发出警告。

“Trump was elected and everyone started getting very, very scared,” said Dan Davies, formerly an economist at the Bank of England. Europeans woke up to Mr. Trump’s willingness to use their needs to squeeze Europe and realized “now this is obviously a national security issue.”

“特朗普当选后，所有人都变得非常、非常担忧，”曾担任英格兰银行经济学家的丹·戴维斯表示。欧洲人猛然意识到，特朗普不惜利用欧洲的需求来压榨欧洲，并惊觉“这显然已是个国家安全议题”。

Nearly two-thirds of the transactions in countries that use the euro, the second-most commonly used currency in global trade, were handled by Mastercard or Visa in 2025, according to the European Central Bank. And at least 13 European nations, including Austria, Spain and Ireland, have no nationally controlled option for in-store or online digital payments.

据欧洲中央银行数据，2025年，在欧元区（欧元为全球贸易第二大货币）的交易中，近三分之二经由万事达或维萨处理。而包括奥地利、西班牙、爱尔兰在内的至少13个欧洲国家在实体店或线上支付领域均无可独立掌控的本国方案。

The issue gained urgency as leaders began to consider that powerful tools that Washington once reserved for adversaries like Russia and Iran could be turned on them.

随着各国领导人开始意识到华盛顿曾用来对付俄罗斯和伊朗等对手的强大工具也可能被用在他们身上，这一议题的紧迫性骤增。

The risk is rising that Europe could “lose control over the most fundamental element in our economy: our money,” 70 prominent economists and other experts wrote in a letter to the European Parliament last month.

上个月，70位知名经济学家和来自其他领域的专家在致欧洲议会的一封信中写道，欧洲面临的风险正在上升，它可能会“失去对我们经济中最根本要素——我们的货币——的控制”。

Christine Lagarde, president of the European Central Bank, has pointed to Mr. Trump’s decision to impose sanctions on judges and prosecutors at the International Criminal Court for investigating whether Israel committed war crimes in Gaza. Mr. Trump’s action effectively cut off their access to digital and financial services, including credit cards.

欧洲央行行长克里斯蒂娜·拉加德指出，特朗普曾因国际刑事法院调查以色列是否在加沙犯下战争罪而对相关法官和检察官实施制裁。特朗普的举措实际上切断了他们的数字及金融服务渠道，包括信用卡的使用。

And because the executive order barred U.S. companies from providing services to those listed, the chief prosecutor’s email account provided by Microsoft was turned off.

而且，由于该行政命令禁止美国公司向被列入名单的人提供服务，国际刑事法院首席检察官由微软提供的电子邮箱账户亦遭停用。

欧洲央行行长拉加德警告，美国的制裁正威胁欧洲的金融主权。

The move set off shudders among government and security officials throughout Europe as an illustration of Mr. Trump’s quickness to leverage America’s financial and tech dominance to punish opponents even in allied countries.

这一举动在整个欧洲的政府和安全官员中引发震动，因为它清楚地展示了特朗普多么迅速地利用美国在金融和科技领域的主导地位去惩罚对手——即便这些对手来自盟友国家。

“That gives you one very specific example of how we are not effectively sovereign in our own garden,” Ms. Lagarde said in an interview with The Financial Times.

“这正是一个非常具体的例子，说明我们在自家院子里都谈不上真正的主权，”拉加德在接受《金融时报》采访时表示。

The Trump administration’s embrace of stablecoins and cryptocurrencies has only ratcheted up concerns in the European Union about control of the euro.

特朗普政府对稳定币和加密货币的支持也进一步加剧了欧盟对欧元控制权的担忧。

Worries about the integrity of sensitive and private information, too, are rising.

与此同时，对敏感与私人信息安全性的忧虑也在上升。

Legislation passed by Congress in recent years, including changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and a law known as the CLOUD Act, gives the U.S. government additional powers to spy on foreigners’ communications without a warrant and to force American companies to hand over data from anywhere around the globe.

近年美国国会通过的多项立法——包括《外国情报监视法》修订案及《澄清境外合法使用数据法》（简称云法案）——赋予美国政府更大的权力，可以在没有搜查令的情况下监控外国人的通信，并强制美国公司交出全球任何地方的数据。

Mr. Trump has also threatened the 27-member European Union with tariffs if it tries to regulate or tax American tech firms.

特朗普还威胁称，若欧盟试图对美国科技公司施以监管或征税，将对这一拥有27个成员国的集团加征关税。

The risk of “exposing our scientific exchanges, sensitive data and strategic innovations to non-European actors” prompted the French government to order all state workers to stop using the American-owned video platform Zoom and switch to a homegrown alternative, Visio.

“将我们的科学交流、敏感数据及战略创新暴露于非欧盟行为体”的风险促使法国政府下令所有公职人员停止使用美国拥有的视频平台Zoom，改用本土替代方案Visio。

Municipalities in Germany, Denmark and France have also been shifting from American-owned systems to European or other alternatives.

德国、丹麦及法国等国的市政当局亦陆续弃用美国拥有的系统，转向欧洲或其他地区的替代方案。

今年1月，丹麦哥本哈根民众走上街头，抗议特朗普总统对格陵兰岛的威胁。

But there can be glitches. The Netherlands had hired Solvinity, a Dutch cloud company, to operate its national digital identity system. But in November, the firm announced an agreement to be acquired by the American multinational Kyndryl.

但这种转型过程中也会出现问题。荷兰曾聘请一家荷兰云计算公司Solvinity运营其国家数字身份系统。但在去年11月，这家公司宣布已达成协议，将被美国的跨国企业Kyndryl收购。

European leaders have vowed to spend billions to build cloud computing infrastructure and develop artificial intelligence and quantum computing.

欧洲领导人已承诺投入数十亿欧元，用于建设云计算基础设施，并发展人工智能和量子计算。

Reducing dependence on American tech or financial services firms is easier said than done.

然而，减少对美国科技或金融服务公司的依赖说起来容易，做起来却很难。

The banking industry in Europe, which is developing private payment alternatives, has opposed a digital euro, and so have far-right political parties, citing concerns about privacy and economic centralization.

欧洲银行业正在开发私营支付替代方案，却始终反对推出数字欧元；一些极右翼政党也持反对态度，理由是担心隐私问题和经济权力过度集中。

As for digital technologies, at least 80 percent of Europe’s are imported, according to a recent report by European Digital SME Alliance, a trade group. In 2013, Europe controlled about 22 percent of the global market for information and communications technology. By 2022, it was only about 11 percent.

至于数字技术，根据行业组织欧洲数字中小企业联盟最近发布的报告，欧洲至少80%的数字技术依赖进口。2013年，欧洲曾占全球信息与通信技术市场约22%的份额；到2022年，这一比例已降至11%左右。

Journalists and researchers will spend the next months ferreting through the Epstein files in search of further criminal conduct or a new conspiratorial wrinkle. But one truth has already emerged.

记者与研究人员将在未来数月里深挖爱泼斯坦相关文件，寻找更多犯罪行为或新的阴谋论线索。但有一个真相已经浮出水面。

In unsparing detail, the documents lay bare the once-furtive activities of an unaccountable elite, largely made up of rich and powerful men from business, politics, academia and show business. The pages tell a story of a heinous criminal given a free ride by the ruling class in which he dwelled, all because he had things to offer them: money, connections, sumptuous dinner parties, a private plane, a secluded island and, in some cases, sex.

这些文件以毫不留情的细节揭露了一群不受问责的精英阶层曾经隐秘的活动，他们有钱有势，大多来自商界、政界、学术界和娱乐圈。文件讲述了一个令人发指的罪犯如何被他所属的统治阶层庇护纵容，只因为他能为这些人提供金钱、人脉、奢华晚宴、私人飞机、隐秘岛屿，在某些情况下，还有性服务。

That story of impunity is all the more outrageous now in the midst of rising populist anger and ever-growing inequality. The Caligula-like antics of Jeffrey Epstein and friends occurred over two decades that saw the decline of America’s manufacturing sector and the subprime mortgage crisis, in which millions of Americans lost their homes.

如今，在民粹主义情绪高涨、不平等日益加剧的背景下，这种逍遥法外的故事显得愈发令人愤慨。杰弗里·爱泼斯坦及其圈子的卡里古拉式荒诞放纵的行径持续了20多年。而这期间，美国制造业衰落，次贷危机爆发，数以百万计的美国人失去了家园。

If Mr. Epstein’s goal was to build a wall of protection around his abuse by surrounding himself with the well connected, he failed in the end. But both before and after he was first prosecuted for abusing girls, his correspondence described a network of people whose high-flying lives belied the struggles of ordinary Americans. And at the center of that network was a sexual predator seemingly on top of the world.

如果爱泼斯坦的目的是靠结交权贵为自己的性侵行为筑起保护墙，他最终还是失败了。但无论在他首次因性侵少女被起诉之前还是之后，他的往来通信都描绘出一个权贵网络，这群人纸醉金迷的生活与普通美国人的挣扎形成鲜明反差。而在这个网络中心的，是一个看似站在世界之巅的性掠夺者。

“We’ve heard so much about the Epstein scandal over the past several years,” said Nicole Hemmer, a history professor at Vanderbilt University who writes frequently about political culture. “And yet people do seem shocked by the scope of elite complicity in his world. It’s a level of corruption that the public is now getting a full view of.”

“过去几年我们已经听过太多关于爱泼斯坦丑闻的消息，”经常撰写政治文化相关文章的范德堡大学历史学教授妮可·亨默说。“但人们似乎依然对精英阶层在他的世界里共谋的程度感到震惊。公众现在终于完整看到了这种腐败的程度。”

In 2002, Mr. Epstein hosted former President Bill Clinton and the actor Kevin Spacey on a tour of African countries aboard his private jet.

2002年，爱泼斯坦曾邀请前总统克林顿和演员凯文·史派西搭乘他的私人飞机前往非洲多国访问。

His talent for entertaining attracted interest from one of the world’s richest men, Elon Musk, who emailed Mr. Epstein in 2012 to ask, “What day/night will be the wildest party on your island?” (Mr. Musk has said on social media that he “had very little correspondence with Epstein and declined repeated invitations to go to his island.”)

他擅长款待客人的能力吸引了世界顶级首富埃隆·马斯克的注意。马斯克在2012年给爱泼斯坦发邮件问道：“你岛上最疯狂的派对是哪天/哪夜？”（马斯克曾在社交媒体表示，他“与爱泼斯坦往来极少，并多次拒绝了其登岛邀请”。）

He dispensed favors to, and rubbed elbows with, Woody Allen; Noam Chomsky, the linguist and intellectual; Kenneth W. Starr, the independent counsel in the Clinton investigation; Kathryn Ruemmler, a former Obama White House counsel and currently the general counsel of Goldman Sachs; Stephen K. Bannon, one of President Trump’s top political allies; Deepak Chopra, the New Age guru; the film producer Barry Josephson; Lawrence H. Summers, a former president of Harvard and former Treasury secretary; Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor, the former Prince Andrew; Sarah Ferguson, the former Duchess of York; Crown Princess Mette-Marit of Norway; and a cavalcade of financial titans.

他向以下人士提供便利并密切往来：伍迪·艾伦；语言学家与学者诺姆·乔姆斯基；负责调查克林顿案的独立检察官肯尼斯·斯塔尔；前奥巴马白宫法律顾问、现高盛总法律顾问凯瑟琳·鲁姆勒；特朗普总统最重要的政治盟友之一史蒂芬·班农；新时代灵性导师迪帕克·乔布拉；电影制片人巴里·约瑟夫森；前哈佛大学校长、前财政部长劳伦斯·萨默斯；前英国安德鲁王子；前约克公爵夫人莎拉·弗格森；挪威王储妃梅特-玛丽特，以及一众金融巨头。

史蒂芬·班农是与爱泼斯坦有往来的权势人物之一，这些人皆拥有广泛的人脉关系。

James E. Staley, who recently stepped down as the chief executive of Barclay’s in the wake of allegations involving his ties to Mr. Epstein, emailed Mr. Epstein in 2014 to suggest that upper-caste Americans like themselves were unlikely to ever face a populist uprising like the protests taking place in Brazil at the time.

近期因与爱泼斯坦关联的指控辞去巴克莱银行首席执行官一职的詹姆斯·斯塔利在2014年给爱泼斯坦发邮件称，像他们这样的美国上层精英，几乎不可能遭遇当时巴西那样的民粹主义抗议浪潮。

Pointing to Super Bowl ads that year, Mr. Staley wrote: “Its all about hip blacks in hip cars with white women. The group that should be in the streets, has been bought off. By Jay-Z.”

斯塔利在提到当年的超级碗广告时写道：“全都是时髦黑人开着豪车载着白人女性。本该上街抗议的那群人已经被收买了。收买者正是Jay-Z。”

詹姆斯·斯塔利在卷入与爱泼斯坦有关的指控后，辞去了巴克莱银行首席执行官的职务。

The shocking nature of some of the revelations, combined with the prominence and status of those in Mr. Epstein’s orbit, has done nothing to quiet the conspiracy theories that his behavior spawned and that both the right and the left have sought to weaponize for political advantage. If anything, the raft of new details has spiraled into feverish new speculation with little or no factual basis.

部分爆料的骇人性质，加上爱泼斯坦圈子里人物的显赫地位非但没有平息由此滋生的阴谋论，反而让左右两派都试图将其用作武器，以谋取政治利益。新披露的大量细节反而催生出更多近乎狂热、几乎毫无事实依据的猜测。

In 2014, Mr. Epstein received an email from an associate whose name has been redacted that said in full, “Thank you for a fun night … your littlest girl was a little naughty.” In another email, Mr. Epstein instructed a recipient whose name is also redacted to buy several sex toys, adding: “I want you to talk as nasty, vulgar, imaginative as you can … It will free your mind. Its like a mental sneeze.”

2014年，爱泼斯坦收到一封联系人（姓名被涂黑）的邮件，全文只有一句：“谢谢你带来的愉快夜晚……你最小的那个女孩有点调皮。”在另一封邮件中，爱泼斯坦指示另一位同样被涂黑的收件人购买多件性玩具，并补充道：“我要你说最下流、最粗俗、最放浪形骸的话……这会解放你的思想。就像一次精神上的喷嚏。”

Mr. Epstein wrote to another undisclosed recipient in 2009, who was identified on Wednesday in a House hearing as Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, a powerful Emirati businessman: “where are you? are you ok, I loved the torture video.”

2009年，爱泼斯坦写信给另一位未公开身份的收件人——此人在周三的一场国会听证会上被确认为阿联酋权势商人苏丹·艾哈迈德·本·苏莱姆：“你在哪？还好吗，我喜欢那段酷刑视频。”

Lacking context, such messages are subject to speculation about their meaning and provide fresh opportunities for those intent on drawing attention to themselves and their views.

由于缺乏上下文，这类信息很容易被随意解读，亦为那些渴望博取眼球之人提供了新素材。

An assistant to Mr. Epstein wrote to him in 2011: “I ordered sweet young coconuts from Thailand for you and they just arrived … just so you don’t have to drink juices from old hairy things.”

爱泼斯坦的一名助手在2011年写信给他：“我为你从泰国订了清甜的嫩椰子，刚到货……这样你就不用喝那些老毛玩意儿榨的汁了。”

Underscoring how even the apparently mundane can be stretched into the potentially conspiratorial, frequent references to pizza have given fresh life to the discredited 2016 “Pizzagate” conspiracy theory, in which prominent Democrats were said to be torturing and raping children in the basement of a Washington restaurant. That the places and characters in Pizzagate are almost entirely different from the ones appearing in the Epstein files has not stopped some from insisting that there is a connection.

就连看似平淡的内容也能被歪曲成潜在阴谋，例如文件中频繁出现的“披萨”一词，让2016年已被证伪的“披萨门”阴谋论死灰复燃——该论调称，知名民主党人在华盛顿一家餐厅的地下室虐待、强奸儿童。尽管披萨门涉及的地点和人物与爱泼斯坦文件几乎完全不同，仍有人坚称两者存在关联。

Ms. Hemmer, the Vanderbilt professor, said that the shadowy nature of Mr. Epstein’s life, coupled with the Trump administration’s haphazard production of the documents, was “bound to beef up a ton of conspiracy theories.”

范德堡大学的亨默教授表示，爱泼斯坦的生平本就扑朔迷离，再加上特朗普政府杂乱无章地公布文件，“注定会催生大量阴谋论”。

Newly released video logs of the prison wing where Mr. Epstein was found dead, for example, suggest that a human figure not previously accounted for in the records was moving in the general direction of Mr. Epstein’s cell late that evening.

例如，爱泼斯坦被发现死亡的监狱区域最新公布的监控记录显示，当晚深夜，有一个此前未被记录的人影朝爱泼斯坦牢房的方向移动。

This has led some internet sleuths to conclude that Mr. Epstein, whose death in federal custody in 2019 was ruled a suicide, might have been killed. Others have speculated that he might not be dead at all, given that Mr. Epstein testified in a deposition in 2017 that he had a barbed-wire tattoo on his left biceps, but no such tattoo is visible in the recently released photo of his body.

这让一些网络侦探得出结论：2019年在联邦羁押期间死亡并被裁定为自杀的爱泼斯坦可能是他杀。还有人猜测他根本没死，理由是爱泼斯坦在2017年的一份证词中称自己左臂二头肌有一道铁丝网纹身，但在最新公布的遗体照片中却看不到这处纹身。

Representative Ro Khanna, the California Democrat who worked with Marjorie Taylor Greene, the former Republican congresswoman, and Representative Thomas Massie, Republican of Kentucky, to pass legislation compelling the release of the documents, dismissed the conspiracy theories.

加州民主党众议员罗·卡纳曾与前共和党众议员玛乔丽·泰勒·格林、肯塔基州共和党众议员托马斯·马西共同推动法案，强制公开相关文件。他对这些阴谋论嗤之以鼻。

But, he said in an interview, “we must ask ourselves how we have produced an elite that is so immature, reckless and arrogant.”

但他在采访中说：“我们必须扪心自问，我们为何会造就出如此幼稚、鲁莽且傲慢的精英阶层。”

While Mr. Epstein’s remarkable web of connections suggests to some that he was a puppet master calling the shots for a cabal of elites, that same web offers at least some proof to the contrary. Mr. Epstein counted presidents and cabinet members as his friends, but his influence on American policymaking was negligible.

尽管爱泼斯坦惊人的人脉网络让一些人认为他是操控精英小团体的幕后黑手，但这个网络本身至少也提供了部分反证。爱泼斯坦把总统和内阁成员当作朋友，但他对美国政策制定的影响微乎其微。

His chums in the media were not newspaper publishers and TV network chief executives but those farther down the food chain, including the author Michael Wolff and a New York Times financial reporter, Landon Thomas Jr., who left the paper after admitting that he had solicited money from Mr. Epstein for a personal charity.

他在媒体界的朋友并非报业大亨或电视网高管，而是食物链更底层的人物，包括作家迈克尔·沃尔夫，以及前《纽约时报》财经记者小兰登·托马斯——后者承认曾为一个个人慈善机构向爱泼斯坦募款后离开了报社。

Notably absent from his coterie were any federal prosecutors, judges or law enforcement figures who could have allowed him to escape justice.

值得注意的是，爱泼斯坦的圈子里没有任何能让他逃脱法律制裁的联邦检察官、法官或执法人员。

In the end, Mr. Epstein was arrested, charged with serious sex crimes and died in prison while awaiting trial. His associate Ghislaine Maxwell also remains incarcerated.

最终，爱泼斯坦被捕，被控严重性侵犯罪，并在候审期间死于狱中。他的同伙吉斯莱恩·马克斯韦尔目前仍在服刑。