When Xi Jinping met President Trump last year, the Chinese leader wielded his country’s control over critical minerals, a strong posture that helped nudge Mr. Trump to agree to a yearlong trade truce. This week, when Mr. Xi hosts the American president in Beijing, he will have another powerful card to play: the war in Iran.

去年习近平会见特朗普总统时，这位中国领导人利用本国对关键矿产的控制权作为筹码，这一强硬姿态促使特朗普同意了为期一年的贸易休战。本周，当习近平在北京接待美国总统时，他将拥有另一张有力的王牌：伊朗战争。

While the United States has been at war, Mr. Xi has been calling for peace and receiving foreign dignitaries from the Gulf and Europe seeking his help to end the crisis. Just before the U.S. president’s visit, Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, traveled to Beijing in a not-so-subtle reminder of China’s sway over its partner in the Middle East.

在美国深陷战争之际，习近平一直在呼吁和平，并接见来自海湾地区和欧洲、寻求他协助结束这场危机的外国政要。就在美国总统访问前夕，伊朗外长阿巴斯·阿拉格齐访问了北京，不那么含蓄地彰显了中国对其中东伙伴的影响力。

“The Iran issue actually helps China,” said Li Daokui, a prominent economist at Tsinghua University in Beijing.

北京清华大学著名经济学家李稻葵表示：“伊朗问题实际上对中国有帮助。”

China, he said, has important economic leverage over Tehran that it could be willing to use in pursuit of goals it cares more about — chief among them, prying the United States away from Taiwan, the self-governing island Beijing claims is its own.

他说，中国对德黑兰拥有重要的经济杠杆，并可能愿意利用这一杠杆来追求自身更关心的目标——其中最核心的是让美国远离台湾这个北京声称拥有主权的自治岛屿。

That should give Mr. Xi extra confidence going into the summit that starts Thursday, the leaders’ first in-person meeting since October. The White House has been trying to pressure China, a key buyer of sanctioned Iranian oil, to cut back on its support of Tehran.

这应该会给习近平在周四开始的峰会中带来额外信心，这是两位领导人自去年10月以来的首次面对面会晤。白宫一直试图向中国施压，要求其减少对德黑兰的支持，因为中国是受制裁伊朗石油的主要买家。

China’s Useful Influence Over Iran

中国对伊朗的有益影响

China has its own reasons to help end the conflict. Its economy is affected by higher energy prices. A global recession would hurt China’s exports, which are a major engine of growth. Its strategic oil reserves, while helpful, are not limitless.

中国自身也有理由协助结束这场冲突。其经济正受到能源价格上涨的影响。全球经济衰退将损害中国的出口，而出口是中国经济增长的主要引擎。中国的战略石油储备虽然有所帮助，但并非无穷无尽。

China has prodded Iranian officials to negotiate with the United States, but is wary of becoming entangled in a war it sees as largely Washington’s to resolve. Even if it won’t get involved militarily, though, China may be willing to work with the United States on the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, a key sea route through which as much as 40 percent of China’s oil imports are shipped.

中国已督促伊朗官员与美国进行谈判，但也对卷入一场它认为主要应由华盛顿解决的战争持谨慎态度。不过，即便中国不进行军事干预，它也可能愿意与美国就重新开放霍尔木兹海峡展开合作，中国多达40%的进口石油需经由这条关键海运通道运输。

中国南京的一家原油炼油厂和石化厂，摄于本月。

“The Chinese side may reach some agreement with the U.S. saying, ‘Let’s work together to persuade Iran to keep the strait open,’” Dr. Li said, adding that Beijing would also likely want assurances that the United States would not blockade the waterway.

“中方可能会与美国达成某种协议，表示‘让我们共同劝说伊朗保持海峡开放’，”李稻葵说。他还说，北京可能也会希望获得美国不会封锁该水道的保证。

China could still offer various incentives to Tehran to work with Washington, such as loans, investments and offers to help with postwar reconstruction, analysts say. (Beijing is unlikely to press Tehran to give up its nuclear program, though.)

分析人士称，中国仍可向德黑兰提供各种激励措施，促其与华盛顿合作，例如贷款、投资以及战后重建援助。（不过，北京不太可能施压德黑兰放弃其核计划。）

Discussing Taiwan Arms Sales: No Longer Taboo?

讨论对台军售：不再是禁忌？

What Mr. Xi wants most from Mr. Trump lies elsewhere — in Taiwan. Mr. Xi is seeking a softening of America’s support for the island, whether through a delay or reduction in arms sales, or a statement that Washington opposes its independence. The Trump administration has already delayed announcing a $13 billion package of arms sales to Taiwan to avoid angering Mr. Xi.

习近平最想从特朗普那里得到的东西在别处——在台湾。习近平希望美国弱化对该岛的支持，无论是通过推迟或减少军售，还是发表华盛顿反对台湾独立的声明。特朗普政府此前已经推迟宣布一项价值130亿美元的对台军售计划，以避免激怒习近平。

Mr. Trump this week said again that he planned to discuss with China the question of arms sales to Taiwan. If he were to do so, Mr. Trump could be violating a longstanding commitment known as the Six Assurances, a pillar of U.S.-Taiwan and U.S.-China policies. The Reagan-era assurances were sent to Taiwan’s president in 1982, and one is generally understood to say that the U.S. government would not consult with Beijing before an arms sale to Taiwan.

特朗普本周再次表示，他计划与中国讨论对台军售问题。如果这样，特朗普可能违反一项被称为“六项保证”的长期承诺——这是美台和美中政策的支柱。这些保证始于里根时期，于1982年送达台湾总统，其中一项保证通常被理解为美国政府在对台军售前不会与北京商讨。

2023年，台湾军队演练如何击退入侵部队。

For Mr. Trump to put this on the table could be a departure from decades of American foreign policy, depending on how the topic was broached, and a win for Mr. Xi.

特朗普若将此作为谈判筹码，视具体讨论方式，可能成为对美国数十年来外交政策的背离，并且成为习近平的胜利。

Among more hawkish Chinese scholars, the war in Iran has also exposed U.S. military weakness, giving Beijing yet more confidence to push on the issue of Taiwan. During the conflict, the United States was forced to divert military assets away from Asia and deplete its munitions stockpiles.

在立场更强硬的中国学者看来，伊朗战争还暴露了美国军力的薄弱，这让北京在推进台湾问题方面更有信心。冲突期间，美国被迫将军事力量移出亚洲，并耗尽了弹药库存。

“The conflict with Iran indicates that the U.S. simply cannot sustain a major war with China over Taiwan. That’s very clear,” said Wu Xinbo, a leading American studies scholar at Fudan University in Shanghai.

“与伊朗的冲突表明，美国根本无法承受因台湾问题与中国发生一场大战。这非常明确，”上海复旦大学著名美国问题研究学者吴心伯说。

Redefining the Relationship

重新定义关系

For Beijing, the summit is perhaps less about extracting any specific concessions and more about redefining the terms of how the two superpowers should engage.

对于北京而言，此次峰会或许与其说是争取具体让步，不如说是重新定义两大超级大国应如何接触。

Mr. Xi will be seeking validation that his country, the world’s second-largest economy, is now an equal to the United States. And that he, as its leader, is a peer of Mr. Trump’s. It is something Mr. Xi has sought since he first took office in 2012 and an understanding that Chinese officials and analysts say would herald a more stable relationship of managed, however uneasy, coexistence.

习近平将寻求一种确认：中国作为世界第二大经济体，如今与美国起鼓相当；而作为国家领导人的他与特朗普平起平坐。这是习近平自2012年首次就任以来一直追求的目标。中国官员和分析人士表示，这样的共识将预示着一种更稳定的关系，是一种尽管仍然充满不安，但属于可控的共存状态。

“If the U.S. president is the leader of the free world and Xi Jinping is his peer, then what does that say about Xi Jinping’s — his leadership? That means that he must be a world leader as well,” said Yun Sun, director of the China program at the Stimson Center in Washington.

“如果美国总统是自由世界的领袖，而习近平和他平起平坐，那么这说明了习近平的什么——他的领导力？这意味着习近平必定也是一位世界领袖，”华盛顿史汀生中心中国项目主任孙韵说。

特朗普总统于周三抵达北京。

China has argued, most recently in an editorial by the official Xinhua News Agency on Wednesday headlined “Finding the Right Way for China and the U.S. to Get Along as Major Powers,” that the United States should not expect to have it both ways with China. It criticized Washington for asking Beijing to help on issues it cares about — such as helping to curb the flow of fentanyl to America — while simultaneously hurting Chinese interests, for instance by imposing sanctions on Chinese companies.

中国一直认为，美国不应该指望在中国问题上两头获利，最近的例子是官方通讯社新华社周三发表的题为《走出一条中美大国正确相处之道》的社论，文中批评华盛顿一方面要求北京在美方关切的问题上提供协助，例如协助遏制芬太尼流入美国；另一方面却损害中国利益，例如对中企实施制裁。

But that dynamic has defined the relationship for the past eight years, leading them to spar over everything from the origins of the Covid-19 pandemic to the appearance of a Chinese spy balloon floating over the United States. Today, the two sides remain at odds over China’s support of Iran and Russia, as well as U.S. export controls that cut Chinese companies off from advanced computer chips and other technology.

但这种动态在过去八年里定义了中美双边关系，导致两国在从新冠疫情源头到中国间谍气球飘过美国上空等所有问题上发生争执。如今，在中国支持伊朗和俄罗斯的问题上，以及在美国切断中国企业获取先进计算机芯片和其他技术的出口管制问题上，双方依然存在分歧。

China Wants to Buy Time to Get Stronger

中国希望争取时间，让自己更强大

Ultimately, China wants more stability and a continuation of the trade truce. That means no more tariffs, no export controls, no sanctions imposed on its companies.

归根结底，中国希望保持稳定，并延续贸易停火状态。这意味着不再加征关税、不再实施出口管制、不再有针对其企业的制裁。

“They just want time and space to fortify themselves for future competition,” said Amanda Hsiao, a director in Eurasia Group’s China Practice, who was recently in Beijing meeting scholars and officials.

“他们只是想要时间和空间来巩固自身实力，应对未来的竞争，”欧亚集团中国业务总监萧嫣然说，她最近在北京会见了学者和官员。

Beijing has already been doing that, by building up what Mr. Xi calls “national self-reliance” in technology but also trade and science. Since the two leaders last met six months ago, China has sharpened its tools to inflict economic pain on rivals. After years of U.S. export controls, Chinese companies are building their own chips, while firms like DeepSeek are designing A.I. systems that get around the constraints.

北京已经在这样做，通过构建习近平所称的技术、贸易和科学领域的“国家自力更生”来实现这一点。自两位领导人六个月前上次会面以来，中国已经磨砺了给对手造成经济痛苦的手段。经过美国几年来的出口管制，中国企业正在自主研发芯片，而像DeepSeek这样的公司正在设计能够规避这些限制的人工智能系统。

Beijing has also demonstrated that it will push back if provoked: When Washington placed sanctions on a Chinese refinery in April for buying Iranian oil, China ordered its companies not to comply.

北京也已经表明，如果受到挑衅，它将予以回击：当华盛顿在4月份因购买伊朗石油对一家中国炼油厂实施制裁时，中国命令其企业不予配合。

To help set a positive tone, though, China may commit to purchases of Boeing aircraft, American soybeans and U.S. beef.

不过，为了协助营造积极的基调，中国可能会承诺采购波音飞机、美国大豆和美国牛肉。

“For the Chinese, that’s an OK price to pay for stability,” Ms. Hsiao said.

“对中国人来说，为了换取稳定，这是一个可以接受的代价，”萧嫣然说。

Just weeks ago, after the U.S. military seized a ship in the Strait of Hormuz, President Trump said he suspected that the Chinese government was attempting to sneak a “gift” past America’s blockade and into the hands of Iran.

就在几周前，在美国军方于霍尔木兹海峡扣押一艘船只后，特朗普总统表示，他怀疑中国政府试图绕过美国的封锁，向伊朗偷偷送去一份“礼物”。

“I thought I had an understanding with President Xi,” Mr. Trump said in an interview with CNBC, calling himself “surprised.” He added: “But that’s all right. That’s the way war goes, right?”

“我以为我和习主席达成了某种默契，”特朗普在接受CNBC采访时说。他自称“感到意外”，补充道：“但没关系。战争就是这样，对吧？”

China has rejected Mr. Trump’s accusation. But the incident underscores the uneasy nature of the relationship between Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi as the American president arrives in Beijing for a summit between two of the world’s most powerful men.

中国已驳斥了特朗普的指控。但就在这位美国总统抵达北京，参加两位全球最有权势人物的峰会之际，这一事件凸显了特朗普与习近平之间关系的微妙之处。

Mr. Trump, who has long wanted to court relationships with the world’s strongmen, has cultivated what he describes as a friendship with Mr. Xi, referring to China’s leader as “a brilliant leader.”

长期以来一直希望与世界强人建立关系的特朗普培养了他所描述的与习近平的友谊，称中国领导人为“一位杰出的领导人”。

“He’s a wonderful guy,” Mr. Trump said this week before departing for Beijing. “He’s a friend of mine.”

“他是个很棒的人，”特朗普本周在启程前往北京前说。“他是我的朋友。”

Mr. Xi, in turn, has flattered Mr. Trump with ceremony on a scale rarely afforded foreign leaders, turning a state visit during his first term into a theatrical display of pomp and symbolism. On Wednesday, Mr. Trump was greeted by a military honor guard as well as men and women dressed in blue and white waving Chinese and American flags.

而习近平曾以罕见规格的礼仪款待特朗普，将其第一任期内的国事访问变成了一场盛大排场和象征意义的戏剧性展示。周三，特朗普受到了仪仗队以及身着蓝白服装、挥舞中美两国国旗的男女的欢迎。

But beneath the public displays of warmth, the two men are at the center of the most consequential geopolitical rivalry of the 21st century. Their relationship is marked just as much by mistrust and confrontation as it is niceties.

但在公开的热情表象之下，两人正处于21世纪最重大的地缘政治竞争中心。他们的关系既充满客套，也同样充斥着不信任与对抗。

For each public compliment, there is another maneuver in a trade war between the two countries. For each assertion of deep friendship, there is an uneasiness about the other’s military ambitions. For each attempt at flattery, there is an accompanying suspicion.

每一次公开的赞美背后，都伴随着两国贸易战中的另一场博弈。每一次深厚友谊的宣示背后，都隐藏着对对方军事野心的不安。每一次奉承的尝试背后，都伴随着怀疑。

“Xi Jinping is not somebody who’s very sentimental about personal relationships, even inside his inner circle, never mind with what he sees as the leader of his main geopolitical foe,” said Jonathan A. Czin, the chairman of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution. “He purged the most senior leader of the military this winter. If he’s willing to get rid of a guy like that, that he’s known for decades and has a deep relationship with, I think it’s very instructive about how he approaches a guy like Trump.”

“习近平不是那种会被个人关系左右的人，即使在他自己的核心圈子里也是如此，更不用说与他视为主要地缘政治对手的领导人了，”布鲁金斯学会外交政策研究主席秦江南(Jonathan A. Czin)说。“他在这个冬天清洗了军方最高领导人。如果一个他认识几十年、关系深厚的人都能除掉，我想这很能说明他会如何对待特朗普这样的人。”

2017年，特朗普与习近平在前者的佛罗里达州马阿拉歌庄园首次会面。

The relationship between Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi has had its ups and downs since the American president’s first term. There is rarely an interaction without some surprises.

自特朗普的第一个任期以来，他与习近平的关系起起伏伏。两人之间的互动很少波澜不惊。

The two men first met at Mr. Trump’s Mar-a-Lago resort in 2017. Mr. Trump greeted Mr. Xi with a military honor guard and a lavish dinner.

两人于2017年在特朗普的马阿拉歌庄园首次会面。特朗普以仪仗队和盛大晚宴迎接习近平。

While they were enjoying what Mr. Trump called “the most beautiful piece of chocolate cake that you’ve ever seen,” the American president informed Mr. Xi that the United States had launched missile strikes against Syria in response to President Bashar al-Assad’s chemical weapons attack in the Syrian civil war.

就在他们享用特朗普所说的“你见过的最漂亮的一块巧克力蛋糕”时，这位美国总统告知习近平，美国已对叙利亚发动导弹袭击，以回应巴沙尔·阿萨德总统在叙利亚内战中使用化学武器。

If the announcement was meant to catch the Chinese president off guard, Mr. Xi appeared unfazed.

如果这一宣布意在让中国领导人措手不及，习近平似乎并未感到不安。

“We are so used to thinking of Trump as being very idiosyncratic, very different from his predecessors,” Mr. Czin said. “But from a Chinese perspective, this looks very similar to President Obama’s intervention in Libya and President Bush’s intervention in Iraq. This is just the United States doing in a more intense way what it’s done for most of the century.”

“我们已经习惯于认为特朗普非常特立独行，与他的前任大不相同，”秦江南说。“但从中国视角来看，这与奥巴马总统干预利比亚、布什总统干预伊拉克非常相似。这只是美国以更激烈的方式做了一个世纪以来一直在做的事。”

Mr. Trump emerged from that meeting claiming they had developed “great chemistry.”

特朗普在那次会晤后声称，他们建立了“极好的默契”。

Months later, Mr. Xi returned the favor with an extravagant state visit to Beijing unlike any reception afforded to Mr. Trump’s recent predecessors.

几个月后，习近平以同样盛大的仪礼招待访问北京的特朗普，其规格是以往几届美国总统未曾享有的。

During what Chinese officials called a “state visit-plus,” Mr. Trump toured the Forbidden City in a highly symbolic gesture emphasizing imperial grandeur and historic continuity. The two men strolled through ancient palace courtyards as television cameras followed closely behind.

在中国官员称为“国事访问+”的行程中，特朗普参观了故宫，这一极具象征意义的举动强调了帝王气概与历史延续性。两人漫步在古老的宫廷庭院中，电视摄像机紧随其后。

Chinese officials arranged a private opera performance and seated Mr. Trump beside Mr. Xi in a setting meant to project intimacy and prestige.

中国官员安排了一场私人戏曲表演，并让特朗普与习近平并肩而坐，营造出亲密与尊贵的氛围。

During that trip, Mr. Trump said he gave China “great credit” for taking advantage of the United States on trade.

在那次访问中，特朗普表示，他对中国在贸易上利用美国的做法“很欣赏”。

“I don’t blame China,” he said. “After all, who can blame a country for being able to take advantage of another country for the benefit of its citizens?”

“我不怪中国，”他说。“毕竟，谁能怪一个国家为了本国公民的利益而占另一个国家的便宜呢？”

Rush Doshi, a researcher at Georgetown University and at the Council on Foreign Relations, said it was important for both leaders to exit any negotiations in a manner that saved face for themselves and their countries. That is why Mr. Trump has often praised China’s actions, even if they are hostile to America’s interests.

乔治城大学和外交关系委员会研究员杜如松(Rush Doshi)表示，双方领导人都希望以能为自身和国家保全面子的方式结束任何谈判。这就是为什么特朗普经常赞扬中国的行动，即使这些行动有损美国利益。

“His general impulse is to say, in effect: ‘I am a worldly pragmatist who understands that what they’ve done isn’t personal against me. It’s just business,’” Mr. Doshi said. “That’s the way in which he downplays these significantly escalatory acts.”

“他的心态总的来说就是，‘我是个老练的实用主义者，我明白他们所做的事并非针对我个人。这只是生意，’”杜如松说。“这就是他淡化这些重大升级行为的方式。”

2017年访华期间，特朗普与第一夫人梅拉尼娅及习近平与夫人彭丽媛一同在北京观看戏曲演出。习近平为特朗普安排了极为奢华的招待仪式，其规格是以往几届美国总统未曾享有的。

Mr. Trump arrived in China on Wednesday, and he departs Friday. Anna Kelly, a White House spokeswoman, said that there would again be moments of great symbolism on the trip but that Mr. Trump would also return with economic deals beneficial to Americans.

特朗普于周三抵达中国，将于周五离开。白宫发言人安娜·凯利表示，此行将再次出现重要的象征性时刻，但特朗普也将带回有利于美国人的经济协议。

“This will be a visit of tremendous symbolic significance,” Ms. Kelly said. “But of course, President Trump never travels for symbolism alone. The American people can expect the president to deliver more good deals on behalf of our country. These agreements will further rebalance trade with China while putting American workers, farmers and families first and safeguarding U.S. economic strength in national security.”

“这将是一次具有巨大象征意义的重要访问，”凯利说。“但当然，特朗普总统从来不会只为象征意义而出行。美国人民可以期待总统为我们的国家带来更多好协议。这些协议将进一步重塑与中国的贸易，同时把美国工人、农民和家庭放在首位，并维护美国在国家安全方面的经济实力。”

The relationship between the two men has grown more tense. Mr. Trump’s trip was initially delayed because of his war against Iran, a major supplier of oil to China.

两人之间的关系已变得更加紧张。特朗普的此次访问最初因其对伊朗的战争而被推迟——伊朗是中国主要的石油供应国。

Since his first meeting with Mr. Trump, Mr. Xi has expressed more warmth for President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, calling him my “best and bosom friend,” and recently the Chinese president criticized Mr. Trump, though not by name, for flouting international law and returning “to the law of the jungle.”

自从与特朗普的首次会面后，习近平与俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·V·普京走得更近了，称其为我“最好的知心朋友”，而就在最近，这位中国领导人还曾间接批评特朗普无视国际法并回归“丛林法则”。

And Mr. Trump’s return to office brought an intensely confrontational economic agenda toward China, reviving tensions between the world’s two largest economies.

特朗普重返白宫后则对中国采取了强烈对抗的经济议程，重燃了全球两大经济体之间的紧张关系。

Within months of taking office, Mr. Trump imposed sweeping new tariffs on imports from a wide range of countries, with China receiving some of the harshest. Despite the aggressive talk, both governments eventually moved toward negotiations.

在上任后几个月内，特朗普就对来自广泛国家的进口商品征收了大规模新关税，中国受到的冲击最为严重。尽管言辞强硬，但两国政府最终还是转向了谈判。

Tariffs are expected to be a major topic on the agenda this week.

关税预计将成为本周议程上的主要议题。

Perhaps at no point were the personal tensions on greater display than last year when Mr. Xi signaled that he was shoring up his own alliances against American interests when he hosted the leaders of Russia and North Korea for a military parade.

去年，当习近平通过接待俄罗斯和朝鲜领导人参加阅兵来强化对抗美国利益的联盟时，这种个人关系的紧张或许达到了最公开的展示。

Mr. Trump addressed Mr. Xi in a comment about it on social media, which read in part, “Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un, as you conspire against The United States of America.”

特朗普在社交媒体上就此事发表评论，部分内容为：“请向与你一起密谋对抗美利坚合众国的弗拉基米尔·普京和金正恩转达我最诚挚的问候。”

In remarks in the Oval Office, Mr. Trump took pains to brush off the striking show of solidarity among America’s adversaries. He praised the parade as “beautiful,” and “very, very impressive.”

在椭圆形办公室的讲话中，特朗普努力淡化美国对手间这一引人注目的团结展示。他称赞阅兵“美丽”且“非常、非常令人印象深刻”。

“I understood the reason they were doing it, and they were hoping I was watching, and I was watching,” Mr. Trump told reporters. “My relationship with all of them is very good.”

“我理解他们这么做的原因，他们希望我看，我也看了，”特朗普告诉记者。“我和他们的关系都很好。”

Melanie Hart, the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, called Mr. Trump’s reaction to the gathering “the most public expression of FOMO” — fear of missing out — “we’ve ever seen from a U.S. president.”

大西洋理事会全球中国中心高级主任韩美妮(Melanie Hart)称，特朗普对此次聚会的反应是“我们见过的美国总统最公开的‘FOMO’表现”。（FOMO意为“害怕错过”。）

“Trump seems to think he can charm Xi Jinping,” she said. “But Xi is not a relationship guy. Xi really looks at the United States as China’s main rival at a systemic level. Trump really wants Xi Jinping to like him, and Xi couldn’t care less.”

“特朗普似乎认为他可以吸引习近平，”她说。“但习不是一个注重关系的人。习近平真正将美国视为中国在系统层面上的主要竞争对手。特朗普非常希望习近平喜欢他，而习根本不在乎。”

Even so, Mr. Trump expects to be greeted in Beijing with great fanfare, and hopes to return the favor for Mr. Xi when the Chinese leader visits Washington later this year.

即便如此，特朗普仍期待在北京受到盛大欢迎，并希望在中国领导人今年晚些时候访问华盛顿时予以回礼。

The American president said he hopes to show off a renovated Lincoln Memorial Reflecting Pool to Mr. Xi. But he expressed disappointment that his signature project, a ballroom attached to the White House, will not be built in time for a lavish welcome.

这位美国总统表示，他希望向习近平展示翻新后的林肯纪念堂倒影池。但他对自己的标志性项目——白宫的宴会厅——无法及时完工以迎接盛大欢迎感到失望。

“I only wish we had the ballroom finished,” Mr. Trump said before departing for China.

“我只希望我们能把宴会厅建好，”特朗普在启程前往中国前说。

During his 2005 presidential visit to China, George W. Bush, an enthusiastic mountain biker, cycled with members of the country’s national team.

2005年小布什访华期间，这位热衷山地自行车运动的美国总统与中国国家队成员一起骑行。

When China’s current leader, Xi Jinping, toured the United States in 2015, he received a football jersey from high schoolers in Tacoma, Wash., and promised to encourage more tourism between the countries.

中国现任领导人习近平2015年访美时，在华盛顿州塔科马市收到了当地高中生赠送的橄榄球球衣，并承诺推动两国之间更多的旅游往来。

There seem to be few such displays of bilateral bonhomie in store for this week’s summit between Mr. Xi and President Trump in Beijing.

而在本周习近平主席与特朗普总统于北京举行的峰会上，似乎不会再出现这种双边友好气氛的展示。

That reflects a grim reality of U.S.-China relations: As geopolitical and economic tensions have grown, softer ties — which previously had persisted despite other disputes — have weakened, too. Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi are expected to discuss contentious issues such as trade, Taiwan and the war in Iran.

这反映出当前美中关系的一个严峻现实：随着地缘政治和经济紧张局势加剧，两国的软性纽带如今也已削弱。以往尽管存在其他争端，这种纽带仍得以维持。特朗普与习近平预计将就贸易、台湾及伊朗战争等棘手议题展开磋商。

For decades, displays of fellowship between the countries’ leaders and ordinary people were staples of high-level, bilateral meetings. Though highly choreographed, they reflected genuine ties. Hundreds of thousands of students traveled between the United States and China each year. American athletes and musicians toured China to rapturous crowds. Chinese and American scientists worked closely together to fuel breakthroughs in clean energy, particle physics and cancer research.

几十年来，两国领导人与普通民众之间展现友好关系的场景一直是高层双边会晤的重要组成部分。这些场景固然经过精心编排，但也确实反映了双方真实存在的联系。每年都有数十万学生往返于美中两国间。美国运动员和音乐家赴中国演出时经常受到民众的热烈欢迎。中美科学家也曾密切合作，在清洁能源、粒子物理和癌症研究领域推动重大突破。

But now, student exchanges between the two countries are declining. Foreign performers have had gigs abruptly canceled by the Chinese authorities. And scientific collaboration has been chilled by concerns from both governments about sharing sensitive research.

但如今，两国间的学生交流规模正在萎缩。外国演艺人员的演出会被中国当局突然取消。由于两国政府对分享敏感研究的担忧，科学合作也已日趋冷淡。

Today, there are fewer than 2,000 American students in China — compared with 11,000 in 2019, according to the U.S.-China Education Trust, a nonprofit group in Washington. Near Peking University in Beijing — which sits on the site of a former university built by American missionaries — bars that used to be hot spots for American students now cater to a largely Chinese clientele.

如今，在中国的美国学生不到2000人，根据华盛顿的非营利组织中美教育基金的数据，2019年这一数字曾达到1.1万人。在北京大学附近——这所高校坐落于昔日美国传教士创办的大学旧址之上——那些曾是美国学生聚集地的酒吧如今的顾客已几乎清一色是中国人。

“There is no place where the Americans hang out at Peking,” said Domenic Caturello, a 26-year-old master’s student of international relations from Massachusetts. “Because there are so few of us.”

“北大没有美国人扎堆的地方了，”来自马萨诸塞州、就读国际关系硕士专业的26岁学生多梅尼克·卡图雷洛说，“因为我们人数实在太少了。”

Chinese enrollment in American universities is falling, too. For years, China was the biggest source of international students to the United States. But now, many prospective Chinese students have been driven away by fears of visa denials and anti-Chinese hostility. In the 2023-24 school year, India overtook China as the top country of origin.

中国学生赴美就读的人数同样在下滑。多年来，中国一直是美国国际学生的最大来源国。但如今，签证被拒和反华情绪的阴影令许多有意赴美的中国学生望而却步。2023至2024学年，印度已超越中国，跃升为国际学生的第一大来源国。

Mr. Caturello said that he also faced skepticism at home about studying in China. An acquaintance asked him why he was going to the country of “the enemy.”

卡图雷洛说，他在美国国内也遭遇质疑。一位熟人问他，为何要去“敌国”求学。

But Mr. Caturello said he had never been treated poorly in China because of his nationality. And getting to hear Chinese perspectives on international relations was invaluable, especially given the American strategic rivalry with the country, he added.

但卡图雷洛表示，他在中国从未因为国籍而受到恶劣对待。他补充说，能听到中国人对国际关系的看法是非常宝贵的，尤其是在美中战略竞争的背景下。

“It would be really shooting ourselves in the foot as a nation, if we were to willingly blind ourselves to the reality of things in the other country,” he said.

“如果我们主动对另一个国家的现实视而不见，那作为一个国家无异于自己害自己，”他说。

Other forms of cultural exchange have also suffered. The Philadelphia Orchestra first traveled to Beijing in 1973, becoming the first American ensemble to perform in Communist-led China. It has visited 15 more times, including a trip by a small delegation last year. But if the group did not have such a long history in the country, organizing visits today would be “extraordinarily difficult,” said Ryan Fleur, the orchestra’s president.

其他形式的文化交流同样受到冲击。费城交响乐团1973年首次赴京演出，成为共产党掌权后的中国登台亮相的第一个美国乐团，此后又先后15次访华，包括去年派出了一个小型代表团。但乐团总裁瑞恩·弗勒坦言，若非有如此深厚的历史渊源，在今天组织这样的访问演出将“极其困难”。

“In the particular climate of the times, if you don’t already have an open door, it’s hard to open one,” he said.

“在当下的特殊氛围下，如果你原本没有一扇已经打开的门，那就很难打开一扇新的门，”他说。

1973年，时任费城交响乐团指挥的尤金·奥曼迪（中）在长城游览。

American government support for cultural exchange has waned, too. Even as relations with China reached perhaps their lowest point in decades under President Joseph R. Biden, the administration emphasized cultural diplomacy, including backing a trip to China by the Philadelphia Orchestra. But the Trump administration has threatened to revoke the visas of Chinese students and slashed funding for international exchange programs.

美国政府对文化交流的支持也有所减弱。即使在拜登总统任内美中关系跌至可能数十年来的最低点时，拜登政府仍强调文化外交，包括支持费城交响乐团访华。但特朗普政府威胁撤销中国学生的签证，并大幅削减了对国际交流项目的资助。

There are recent signs that cultural ties could begin to strengthen once again. Polls show that attitudes toward China in the United States are improving, though still largely negative. Younger Americans in particular see China more favorably, partly influenced by social media trends that highlight the country’s economic advances.

不过，近期也出现了一些文化交流回暖的迹象。民调显示，美国公众对中国的看法有所改善，尽管整体上仍偏负面。年轻美国人对中国的看法更加积极，部分原因在于社交媒体上大量突出中国经济发展成果的内容。

China, for its part, has loosened visa requirements for many foreign tourists. Last month, the government invited American athletes to Beijing for an event celebrating the 55th anniversary of “ping pong diplomacy” — the visit of American ping pong players to China before diplomatic ties were restored under Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong.

中国方面也向众多外国游客放宽了签证要求。上个月，中国政府邀请美国运动员赴北京出席纪念“乒乓外交”55周年的活动。“乒乓外交”指的是美国乒乓球队在尼克松与毛泽东恢复两国外交关系之前访问中国的历史事件。

Lines of Chinese applicants seeking visas to study in and travel to the United States still form outside of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing.

在北京的美国大使馆外，申请赴美留学和旅游签证的中国人依然排着长队。

But even those applicants may cast a warier eye on the United States. Xue Jun, a visa consultant in the city of Nanjing, said that many of his customers these days were driven by a desire to escape China’s economic downturn, rather than fondness for the United States.

但即便是这些申请者，对美国的看法也可能多了几分警惕。南京的签证顾问薛军（音）表示，如今他的许多客户申请赴美，更多是出于逃离中国经济下行压力的考虑，而不是因为对美国抱有好感。

“People don’t look at the United States with the same sense of mystique or infatuation as in the ’90s, or even just a few years ago,” Mr. Xue said. “I don’t think we’ll see an upward trend ahead.”

“大家对于美国没有像90年代或者是前几年那段时间那么神话或者是迷恋，”薛军说，“我不觉得它会是一个上升的趋势。”

President Trump arrived Wednesday night in Beijing, where he was welcomed by a military band, an honor guard, hundreds of Chinese youth waving flags and China’s vice president, Han Zheng.

特朗普总统周三晚抵达北京，迎接他的是军乐队、仪仗队、数百名挥舞两国国旗的中国年轻人，以及中国国家副主席韩正。

Such carefully designed receptions for foreign leaders telegraph Beijing’s attitude toward these visits. Sometimes Beijing sends a lower-level official to convey displeasure or distance. Sometimes they send someone senior and influential to signal a high degree of respect.

北京为外国领导人精心安排的迎接仪式历来是其对待此类访问态度的晴雨表。有时，北京会派级别较低的官员出面，以示不满或保持距离；有时则会安排位高权重的人物，以示高度重视。

This time, they sent someone who is high-level but whose position is mostly that of a figurehead — which could be a way to send a layered message.

而这一次，他们派出的是一位级别很高，但职位更多带有礼仪性质的人物——这或许是传递多层信息的一种方式。

“Beijing sent Han Zheng to Trump’s inauguration and knows that his title of vice president, even though it is a ceremonial role, will impress the status-conscious American president,” said Julian Gewirtz, a China historian at Columbia University who served in senior China policy roles in the National Security Council under President Biden.

“北京曾派韩正出席了特朗普的就职典礼，并且知道国家副主席这个头衔尽管是礼仪性职务，但会让这位重视身份地位的美国总统感到受用，”哥伦比亚大学的中国历史学者朱利安·格维茨表示。他曾在拜登总统任内的国家安全委员会担任负责中国政策的高级职务。

“It’s an example of how, throughout this summit, China is hoping to trade symbolism for substance — using protocol and Trump’s preference for pageantry to hold off a return to economic escalation and buy time for China,” he said.

他说：“这体现了中国在整个峰会期间的一种策略：希望用象征意义换取实质内容——利用礼宾安排以及特朗普对盛大场面的偏好来避免中美关系重新升级为经济对抗，并为中国争取时间。”

In his role as vice president, Mr. Han is often sent to formal diplomatic events, such as the coronation ceremony in Britain of King Charles III or Mr. Trump’s second inauguration as president. But Mr. Han, who stepped down from the elite Politburo Standing Committee, the apex of power in China’s ruling Communist Party, now has little influence over policymaking.

作为国家副主席，韩正经常被派往出席正式的外交活动，例如英国国王查尔斯三世的加冕典礼，或特朗普的第二次总统就职仪式。但韩正已从中共权力最高层的政治局常委位置上退下，如今对政策制定几乎没有什么影响力。

The choice of Mr. Han could also signal how Beijing is approaching a visit by the leader of the most powerful country in the world, but who now faces a more defiant and assertive Beijing. It would suggest that Mr. Trump could be feted with the honors of a formal state visit but not given special treatment beyond that of any other power in the world.

选择韩正或许也折射出北京对待这位来访者的态度——他固然是世界上最强大国家的领导人，但他所面对的，已是一个更加不服输、更自信的北京。这意味着，特朗普将享有正式国事访问的礼遇，但不会获得有别于世界其他大国领导人的特殊款待。

“In Chinese diplomacy, protocol is substance, especially during a state visit,” said Evan Medeiros, a professor of Asian studies at Georgetown University who served as an Asia adviser to President Barack Obama. “The arrival ceremony is the first threshold in the protocol game; it is how China signals respect.”

“在中国外交中，礼宾程序本身就是实质内容，在国事访问期间尤为如此，”曾任奥巴马总统亚洲事务顾问、乔治城大学亚洲研究教授麦艾文(Evan Medeiros)说，“抵达仪式是礼宾博弈的第一道门槛，是中国传递尊重信号的方式。”

Mr. Han’s presence is a slight downgrade from the welcome Mr. Trump received in 2017, some analysts say. During that state visit, Mr. Trump was greeted by Yang Jiechi, China’s top diplomat and a member of the Politburo, the party’s second-most powerful body. At the time, Xinhua, China’s official news agency, described the presence of such a “heavyweight” as a sign of “the importance China attaches to the meeting” between the two leaders.

一些分析人士表示，与特朗普2017年访华时相比，这次韩正出面迎接，其规格实际上是略有下降的。在2017年的国事访问期间，迎接特朗普的是中国最高外交官杨洁篪，他同时还是中共中央政治局委员，这是中共第二高权力机构。中国官方通讯社新华社在当时称，这一“重量级”安排“凸显的是中方对中美元首北京会晤的重视”。

“If they sent someone who is a Politburo member, it means they really think this is so important and you are our most important guest,” said Wei-Feng Tzeng, an associate research fellow at National Chengchi University in Taipei who has researched Chinese diplomatic protocol.

“如果派来的是政治局委员，意味着中方真的认为这次访问极为重要，你是我们最尊贵的客人，”研究中国外交礼规的台北国立政治大学副研究员曾伟峰说。

Still, U.S. presidents have recently enjoyed higher-level airport greeters than have leaders of other countries considered closer to Beijing. During a state visit in 2024, President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia was received by the state councilor Shen Yiqin, whose position is lower than Mr. Han’s.

不过，近年来美国总统的接机规格实际上仍高于一些被认为与北京关系更密切国家的领导人。例如，2024年俄罗斯总统普京对中国进行国事访问时，迎接他的是国务委员谌贻琴，级别低于韩正。

China has made these subtle changes in reception before. In 2014, President Obama visited Beijing amid his “pivot” to Asia, which involved shoring up alliances in the region to constrain a more-assertive China. He was treated to a more standard protocol of a ministry-level official: the head of China’s foreign ministry, Wang Yi.

中国此前也曾在接待规格上做出过这种微妙调整。2014年，奥巴马总统在推行“重返亚洲”战略背景下访问北京——该战略旨在 巩固美国在亚洲的盟友，以制衡日趋强硬的中国。那次，中方给予奥巴马的是更标准化的礼宾安排——由部长级官员、中国外长王毅接机。

Compare that to 2009, when Mr. Obama became the first U.S. president to visit China during his first year in office. He was greeted by Xi Jinping himself, who was also vice president but a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. At the time, he was already seen as the likely successor to Hu Jintao as China’s leader.

相比之下，2009年奥巴马成为首位在上任第一年就访华的美国总统。当时迎接他的是习近平本人——习近平时任国家副主席，同时也是政治局常委。那时他已被外界普遍视为胡锦涛的接班人。

When President Trump campaigned in 2024, he promised a trade agenda that would hit China harder than any other economic partner, expanding on actions he had taken in his first term.

2024年特朗普竞选时，他承诺对华推行一套打击力度将超过针对任何其他经济伙伴的贸易议程，并且要在其首个任期内采取的行动基础上进一步加码。

Mr. Trump talked about imposing a tariff of 60 percent or more on the country, and proposed stripping China of the preferential trade relations given to it when it joined the World Trade Organization. The rest of the world would be subject to tariffs too, but they would be much lower, at 10 or 20 percent.

特朗普当时扬言，要对中国征收60%甚至更高的关税，并提议取消中国加入世贸组织后所获得的优惠贸易待遇。其他国家同样会被征收关税，但税率将低得多，在10%至20%之间。

More than a year into Mr. Trump’s first term, the picture looks dramatically different. Though U.S. tariffs on China are higher overall when the tariffs from Mr. Trump’s first term are added in, other countries have faced punitive levies that were nearly as high, and higher for some products.

然而，特朗普第二任期开局已一年有余，现实与当初的放话却大相径庭。尽管叠加第一任期的关税后，美国对华关税整体水平提高了，但其他许多国家也承受了几乎同样惩罚性的税率，部分商品的关税甚至更高。

The Trump administration has saved its most caustic criticism for allies in Europe and Canada, while approaching China more cautiously. And as Mr. Trump heads to Beijing this week for a summit with the Chinese leader Xi Jinping, expectations for its outcomes are limited.

特朗普政府将最狠的话留给了欧洲和加拿大等盟友，对中国反而态度更为审慎。而随着特朗普本周前往北京与中国领导人习近平举行峰会，外界对此次会谈的预期相当有限。

Rather than pushing China for broader structural changes to its economy, as Mr. Trump’s aides did in his first term, the focus now is largely on maintaining stable relations between the countries, while restoring or increasing U.S. sales of products like airplanes, ethanol, soybeans, beef and sorghum.

与特朗普第一任期时其助手试图推动中国进行更广泛经济结构改革不同，如今的重点主要变成了维持两国关系稳定，同时恢复或增加美国飞机、乙醇、大豆、牛肉和高粱等商品的对华出口。

The remarkable shrinking of Mr. Trump’s Chinese ambitions is the result of the events of the last year, when China responded to Mr. Trump’s tariffs by cutting off the supply of rare earth minerals and magnets needed by American companies making everything from cars and weaponry to power tools.

特朗普对华雄心的大幅缩水是过去一年局势发展的结果。当时，中国以切断稀土矿物和磁材的供应来回击特朗普的关税，而这些是美国从汽车、武器到电动工具等各类制造企业所必需的原材料。

Facing the prospect of shuttered U.S. factories and widespread economic damage, the Trump administration appears to have given up the idea of a more ambitious deal with China — widely acknowledged as America’s most problematic trading partner — even as it presses less troublesome partners more aggressively than ever before.

面对美国工厂停产以及经济遭受大面积冲击的前景，特朗普政府似乎已经放弃了与中国达成更宏大协议的想法——尽管中国被普遍认为是美国最棘手的贸易伙伴——与此同时，美国却以前所未有的强硬向其他那些不是那么棘手的伙伴施压。

Myron Brilliant, a senior counselor at DGA-Albright Stonebridge Group, a consulting firm, said this week’s summit in Beijing would be “high on strategic distrust and high on symbolism but low on ambition.” Last year was a tumultuous period for U.S.-China relations, he said, and both sides “are in risk management now.”

咨询公司奥尔布赖特石桥集团的高级顾问薄迈伦(Myron Brilliant)本周表示，此次北京峰会将是“战略互疑高、象征意义高、雄心却很低”的一次会面。他说，过去一年美中关系充满动荡，双方如今都进入了“风险管理模式”。

“Each side seeks stability, and deliverables will be largely short-term in nature,” he said. Mr. Brilliant said the outcomes could include agricultural and airplane purchases, and agreements to curb fentanyl exports.

“双方都在寻求稳定，取得的成果基本将是短期的，”薄迈伦说。他表示，峰会成果可能包括农产品和飞机的采购协议，以及遏制芬太尼出口的相关安排。

U.S. officials have talked about the creation of a new “board of trade” that would oversee the agreed purchases, which could run to tens of billions of dollars. Others have suggested the meeting could result in lower tariffs on more general products, to spur their sales.

美国官员谈到要成立一个新的“贸易委员会”，负责监督双方达成的采购协议，这些采购规模可能高达数百亿美元。还有一些人则建议，此次会晤可能会降低更多普通产品的关税，以刺激销售。

While Mr. Trump’s global tariffs have been repeatedly struck down by the courts, the administration is preparing two new trade investigations that are likely to result in more levies on dozens of countries this summer, including China. Chinese officials are expected to press U.S. officials to keep those tariffs low.

尽管特朗普的全球关税政策屡遭法院叫停，政府仍在筹备两项新的贸易调查，可能在今夏对包括中国在内的数十个国家加征新一轮关税。预计中国官员将向美方施压，要求维持较低税率。

Analysts said Chinese officials also appeared likely to push for the relaxation of U.S. technology controls or a change in U.S. posture on Taiwan, a self-governing island that China claims as its own.

分析人士表示，中国官员也很可能推动美国放松技术管制，或调整美国对台湾的立场。台湾是一个实行自治的岛屿，中国宣称对其拥有主权。

Kurt Campbell, a former U.S. deputy Secretary of State, said the Chinese side would be looking, wherever possible, to get the United States to relent on economic actions like tariffs. But the most important priority for China is to get Mr. Trump to depart from traditional approaches when it comes to Taiwan.

前美国副国务卿库尔特·坎贝尔表示，中方会尽可能寻求让美国在关税等经济行动上让步。但对中国而言，最重要的优先议题是让特朗普在台湾问题上脱离传统做法。

“If there are deals to be made on Chinese substantial purchases of agricultural or beef products, pork or Boeing, they will expect things in return for that,” he said.

“如果要在中方大量购买农产品、牛肉、猪肉或波音飞机上达成协议，中方会期待有所回报，”他说。

U.S. officials have said they don’t expect to see any changes with regard to policy on Taiwan. In a briefing with reporters Sunday, Anna Kelly, a spokeswoman for the White House, said that Mr. Trump had refocused U.S.-China relations “on what matters most, rebuilding the safety, security and prosperity of Americans.”

美国官员表示，他们预计在台湾政策方面不会看到任何变化。白宫发言人安娜·凯利在周日的媒体吹风会上表示，特朗普已经将美中关系重新聚焦于“最重要的事情，即重建美国人的安全、保障和繁荣”。

“During this visit, President Trump will continue doing what he has done over the past year, rebalancing the relationship with China and prioritizing reciprocity and fairness to restore American economic independence,” she said.

“在此次访问期间，特朗普总统将一如既往地推进过去一年所做的工作——重新平衡对华关系，优先追求互惠与公平，以恢复美国的经济独立，”她说。

Despite Mr. Trump’s aggressive talk during the campaign, his advisers say his goal was never a decisive decoupling with China. Instead, he envisioned his trade threats as a way to push Beijing into a bigger trade deal that would tilt the balance in the relationship to benefit the U.S. economy and help ensure global peace.

尽管特朗普在竞选期间措辞激烈，但顾问们表示，他的目标从来都不是与中国彻底脱钩。相反，他设想的是利用贸易威胁迫使北京达成更大的贸易协议，从而让双边关系更加有利于美国经济，并有助于确保全球和平。

The problem was the execution. When Mr. Trump tried to force China into making concessions last year by threatening extreme tariffs, the tactic backfired, forcing the U.S. to pare back its goals.

问题出在执行上。去年，当特朗普试图以极端关税威胁迫使中国做出让步时，这一策略适得其反，迫使美国调低了自己的目标。

“They did move to be more aggressive on China,” Mary Lovely, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, said of U.S. officials. “What happened was China decided to invoke its significant choke-points of its own and countered the U.S. in ways that it hadn’t done before.”

“他们确实采取了对华更为强硬的行动，”彼得森国际经济研究所高级研究员玛丽·洛弗利在谈到美国官员时表示。“实际情况是，中国决定动用自身掌握的重要卡脖子手段，以此前从未有过的方式反制美国。”

“I have no idea why they didn’t anticipate that,” she added.

“我不知道他们为什么没有预料到这一点，”她补充道。

As the situation escalated again last fall, top officials including Scott Bessent, the Treasury secretary, and Jamieson Greer, the trade representative, assembled a list of actions they could take to strike back, including restrictions on things like software, semiconductor manufacturing equipment and visas, that might force Beijing to back down.

去年秋天局势再次升级时，财政部长斯科特·贝森特和贸易代表贾米森·格里尔等高层官员制定了一份可采取的反制措施清单，包括对软件、半导体制造设备和签证等方面的限制，希望借此迫使北京退让。

But ahead of a meeting with Mr. Xi in South Korea in October, the president told his advisers instead to try to push for a truce. The United States ended up shelving a variety of actions on China, including a delay in the imposition of a sweeping technology restriction that would affect Chinese companies, and new fees on Chinese ships aimed at building up the U.S. shipbuilding industry.

然而，在10月赴韩国与习近平会面前夕，特朗普却告诉顾问们争取达成停战协议。美国最终搁置了一系列对华行动，包括推迟实施一项将影响中国企业的大范围技术限制，以及旨在扶持美国造船业而对中国船只征收的新收费措施。

In recent months, the United States and China have maintained a tentative truce. Many exports of Chinese rare earths have resumed to companies not linked to the military, though U.S. companies remain intensely concerned about their longer-term access to minerals. The administration has taken steps to try to increase the domestic supply of rare earths, including creating a critical minerals stockpile, but U.S. industry remains heavily reliant on China for the materials that will be critical to the U.S. economy going forward.

近几个月来，美国和中国维持着脆弱的休战状态。中国对许多非军工相关企业的稀土出口已恢复，尽管美国企业仍对其长期获取矿产的能力深感担忧。政府已采取措施努力扩大国内稀土供应，包括建立关键矿产储备，但美国产业界在这些对未来经济至关重要的原材料上仍高度依赖中国。

After Mr. Trump met Mr. Xi in South Korea, both sides talked enthusiastically of meetings to come between the leaders in the following year. A meeting was planned for April, but then rescheduled for May because of the Iran conflict.

特朗普在韩国与习近平会晤后，双方都热情谈论未来一年继续举行领导人会晤的计划。原定4月举行的峰会因伊朗冲突改期至5月。

Christopher Padilla, a former trade official in the George W. Bush administration, agreed that there would likely not be “a lot of big outcomes.” He added, “They’re going to agree we buy some of this, they buy some of that, and then they’ll have a party and call it a day.”

前小布什政府贸易官员克里斯托弗·帕迪利亚同样认为，此次峰会不大可能产生“多少重大成果”。他说：“双方会商定我买一些这个、他们买一些那个，然后开个派对，算是交差了事。”

U.S. officials say their talks will result in a fairer trade relationship with China, and argue that they still have an edge. But the Chinese government seems more determined than ever to match any offensive U.S. measures step for step, in ways that could be deeply harmful for the U.S. economy.

美国官员表示，此次谈判将带来更公平的对华贸易关系，并认为美方仍占据优势。然而，中国政府似乎比以往任何时候都更坚定地准备对美国的每一步施压进行对等回应，而这种回应可能会对美国经济造成严重伤害。

China has issued regulations in recent months to investigate and punish foreign companies that stop using Chinese suppliers in response to foreign pressure. And after the United States penalized several Chinese refineries for purchasing Iranian oil, the Chinese government took the unorthodox step of ordering its companies not to comply with the sanctions.

近几个月来，中国已出台法规，调查并惩罚那些因外国压力而停止使用中国供应商的外国公司。在美国对几家购买伊朗石油的中国炼油厂实施制裁后，中国政府采取了非同寻常的做法，下令中国企业不要遵守这些制裁。

Ms. Lovely of the Peterson Institute said China had been building out the legal foundation for measures to counter foreign sanctions for a decade. “Now they feel confident enough to use them,” she said.

彼得森研究所的洛弗利表示，中国已用十年时间构建起一套反制外国制裁的法律基础。“现在，他们对动用这套工具已有足够的自信，”她说。

A representative from a Chinese think tank approached officials from Anthropic at a meeting in Singapore last month to insist that the company change its stance and give Beijing access to its powerful new artificial intelligence model, according to people briefed on the discussions.

据知情人士透露，上个月在新加坡举行的一次会议上，一家中国智库的代表接触了Anthropic公司官员，坚持要求该公司改变立场，允许北京方面使用其强大的新人工智能模型。

Anthropic refused.

Anthropic拒绝了。

The request was not an official demand from the Chinese government. But the talks in Singapore were a form of exchange that is often meant to pave the way for formal, direct diplomacy.

这一请求并非中国政府的正式要求。但新加坡的这次会谈是一种常见的交流形式，通常旨在为正式、直接的外交铺平道路。

When officials from the National Security Council at the White House learned about the exchange at the meeting, which was convened by the Washington-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, they reacted with alarm. Some Trump administration officials saw it as another sign that Beijing would try every possible avenue to swiftly acquire the most powerful artificial intelligence model a U.S. company has produced so far, according to people briefed on the discussions.

获悉这次会议的交流内容后，白宫国家安全委员会官员表示警觉。据知情人士透露，一些特朗普政府官员将此视为另一个信号，表明北京会尝试一切可能的途径，迅速获取美国公司迄今为止开发的最强大人工智能模型。此次会议由总部位于华盛顿的卡内基国际和平基金会召集。

However subtle, the outreach is a sign of the intensifying competition between China and the United States over artificial intelligence, which a growing number of national security officials and analysts have begun to liken to the Cold War’s nuclear arms race. Chinese analysts see the release of the latest models from Anthropic and ChatGPT as a significant advance in American technology, one that could pose a threat to China.

尽管方式微妙，但此次接触显示中美在人工智能领域的竞争正在加剧。越来越多的国家安全官员和分析人士开始将这场竞争比作冷战时期的核军备竞赛。中国分析人士认为，Anthropic和ChatGPT最新模型的发布是美国技术的重大进步，可能对中国构成威胁。

The escalating rivalry is an important backdrop to the summit this week between the United States and China. President Trump is scheduled to arrive in Beijing on Wednesday, for meetings with the Chinese leader Xi Jinping. While the race to develop the most effective model is unlikely to be discussed, the two sides could talk about access to the chips that power artificial intelligence or guardrails around its use.

这一不断升级的竞争是本周中美峰会的重要背景。特朗普总统计划于周三抵达北京，与中国领导人习近平举行会晤。虽然开发最有效模型的竞赛不太可能被讨论，但双方可能会谈到驱动人工智能的芯片获取问题或围绕其使用的防护措施。

Previewing the summit Sunday during a call with reporters, a senior U.S. official said A.I. and cybersecurity were high on the agenda with Beijing, noting concerns with “the latest models of A.I.” The official said the United States and China were exploring how to establish better communication over artificial intelligence, creating a “deconfliction” channel in which experts from each country could address the risks of artificial intelligence.

一名美国高级官员周日在与记者的电话会议上预览峰会时表示，人工智能和网络安全是与北京的重点议题，并提到了对“最新人工智能模型”的担忧。该官员称，美国和中国正在探索如何建立更好的人工智能沟通机制，创建一个“冲突化解”渠道，让两国专家能够共同应对人工智能风险。

In April, Anthropic announced a new A.I. model called Mythos. The company said it was withholding it from a public release because it was skilled at finding software vulnerabilities and could cause a cybersecurity reckoning. It made the model available to the U.S. government and more than 40 organizations and companies, so that they could identify and guard against future attacks.

今年4月，Anthropic宣布推出名为Mythos的新人工智能模型。该公司表示，由于该模型擅长发现软件漏洞，可能引发网络安全危机，因此暂不公开发布。它已将该模型提供给美国政府以及40多家组织和公司，以便它们识别并防范未来的攻击。

The technology has set off alarm bells across the world. For rivals like China and Russia, it showed the risks of falling behind in the race to develop powerful artificial intelligence. The systems have the potential to give a nation-state the upper hand in defending against — and spearheading — cyberattacks at a vast scope and scale.

这项技术已在全球范围内敲响警钟。对于中国和俄罗斯等竞争对手来说，这凸显了在开发强大人工智能竞赛中落后的风险。这些系统有可能让某一个民族国家在防御和发动大规模网络攻击方面占据上风。

For years, U.S. officials have estimated that artificial intelligence models developed by the most advanced American firms are around six months ahead of China’s best models.

多年来，美国官员一直估计，美国最先进公司开发的人工智能模型领先中国最佳模型约六个月。

But according to some U.S. government and industry officials, the latest models — OpenAI’s ChatGPT 5.5 as well as Anthropic’s Mythos — have drastically extended the lead, potentially by nine months to a year. Other American officials have been more cautious, noting that China has a track record of catching up quickly.

但根据一些美国政府和行业官员的看法，最新模型——OpenAI的ChatGPT 5.5以及Anthropic的Mythos——已大幅扩大领先优势，可能达到九个月至一年。也有美国官员较为谨慎，指出中国有快速追赶的记录。

Last year, innovations by the Chinese firm DeepSeek showcased the country’s ability to close the A.I. gap. And DeepSeek has said that its new model was adapted to run on chips made by the Chinese tech giant Huawei, further underscoring Beijing’s push to keep pace.

去年，中国公司深度求索(DeepSeek)的创新展示了该国缩小人工智能差距的能力。DeepSeek表示，其新模型已适配中国科技巨头华为制造的芯片，进一步凸显北京追赶的努力。

Still, Chinese analysts have expressed concern over the potential of the new Anthropic model. One organization, IDC China, said that Mythos posed a significant risk to Chinese companies, and that Anthropic’s limits on its reach created a technology gap. Another analyst, highlighting the cybersecurity threat, wrote that China was sharpening swords while the other side rolled out a Gatling gun.

尽管如此，中国分析人士仍对Anthropic新模型的潜力表示担忧。IDC中国表示，Mythos对中国公司构成重大风险，而Anthropic对其使用范围的限制制造了技术差距。另一位分析师在强调网络安全威胁时写道，中国正在磨刀，而对方已经推出了加特林机枪。

Chinese analysts have been particularly worried because they view Anthropic as hostile to China. The start-up is currently embroiled in suits with the Pentagon, which announced it would be removed from American government networks after a dispute over how the technology would be used.

令中国分析人士格外担忧的是，他们认为Anthropic对中国持敌对态度。这家初创公司目前正与五角大楼陷入诉讼，在双方就技术使用方式发生争执后，后者宣布将其从美国政府网络中移除。

But since its founding, Anthropic has geared its business toward U.S. national security customers. It was the first to put its A.I. models on classified American networks, for example, and has long taken pains to keep its technology out of the hands of the Chinese. In September, Anthropic expanded restrictions on its technology to include companies whose ownership structures made them vulnerable to control “from jurisdictions where our products are not permitted, like China, regardless of where they operate.”

但自成立以来，Anthropic一直将业务导向美国国家安全客户。例如，它是首批将人工智能模型部署到美国机密网络的公司之一，并长期努力防止其技术落入中国手中。今年9月，Anthropic扩大了对技术的限制范围，包括那些所有权结构使其容易受到“来自我们产品不被允许的司法管辖区（如中国）控制”的公司，无论它们在哪里运营。

Increasingly, both the Chinese and U.S. governments view their artificial intelligence companies — including those that produce the models and the cloud companies that host the computer networks they run on — as national assets. China blocked a $2 billion acquisition by Meta of the Chinese A.I. company Manus. China has also told some of its A.I. start-ups that they cannot accept American investment without government approval.

中美两国政府越来越多地将本国人工智能公司——包括生产模型的公司和托管其运行计算机网络的云服务公司——视为国家资产。中国阻止了Meta对中资人工智能公司Manus的20亿美元收购。中国还告知部分人工智能初创企业，未经政府批准不得接受美国投资。

Anthropic and OpenAI have restricted access to their latest models to a few companies and U.S. government agencies. Both models have the ability to discover previously unknown vulnerabilities in computer networks.

Anthropic和OpenAI已将其最新模型的访问权限限制在少数公司和美国政府机构。这些模型都具备发现计算机网络中未知漏洞的能力。

Chinese officials have argued that Anthropic and OpenAI have been wrong to keep a close hold on the models, contending that China needs access to them to find vulnerabilities in software, especially to defend its own critical infrastructure.

中国官员辩称，Anthropic和OpenAI严格控制模型的做法是错误的，认为中国需要获取这些模型来发现软件漏洞，尤其是保护自身关键基础设施。

Officials from Anthropic declined to discuss the Chinese request.

Anthropic官员拒绝讨论中方的这一请求。

Liu Pengyu, a spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, said he was not familiar with the exchange at the Carnegie meeting. But he said China was committed to balancing A.I. development with security.

中国驻华盛顿大使馆发言人刘鹏宇表示，他不了解卡内基会议上的那次交流。但他称，中国致力于平衡人工智能发展与安全。

“China stands ready to strengthen exchanges and cooperation on A.I. with all parties, to foster shared benefits through joint consultation and to work together to create an open, inclusive and mutually beneficial development environment,” he said in a statement.

“中方愿与各方加强人工智能交流与合作，通过共同协商实现互利共赢，共同营造开放、包容、互惠的发展环境，”他在声明中表示。

U.S. officials noted that while a member of a Chinese think tank made the overture, it was all but certain that the Chinese government had approved and directed the message. Beijing typically exercises a strong degree of control over its think tanks, especially when they are engaged in unofficial diplomacy, like that type of exchange, known as a Track 2 dialogue.

美国官员指出，虽然提出请求的是中国智库成员，但几乎可以肯定中国政府批准并指示了这一信息。北京通常对其智库实施高度控制，尤其是在进行像此次交流这样的非官方外交时，这样的外交被称为“二轨”对话。

President Trump welcomed Jensen Huang, the chief executive of the chip giant Nvidia, late Tuesday onto Air Force One as he headed to Beijing for a summit with China’s leader.

周二晚些时候，特朗普在“空军一号”上迎来了芯片巨头英伟达首席执行官黄仁勋。他即将前往北京，与中国领导人举行峰会。

Mr. Huang, who leads the world’s most valuable company, had been omitted from a list of business leaders slated to travel to China. But after seeing reports that Mr. Huang wasn’t coming, Mr. Trump called him on Tuesday morning and extended an invitation, said a person familiar with the call.

黄仁勋执掌着全球市值最高的公司，但他并未出现在原定随行赴华的商界领袖名单上。一位知情人士透露，特朗普在看到黄仁勋未获邀请的相关报道后，于周二上午亲自致电，向其发出邀请。

Mr. Huang flew to Alaska late Tuesday and boarded Air Force One during a layover. For nearly a year, he has been lobbying officials in Washington and Beijing to allow Nvidia to sell its artificial intelligence chips to China.

黄仁勋于周二晚些时候飞抵阿拉斯加，在“空军一号”经停期间登机。近一年来，他一直在游说华盛顿和北京的官员，希望允许英伟达向中国出售人工智能芯片。

“Jensen is currently on Air Force One,” Mr. Trump said in a social media post. He said it was an honor to have the Nvidia chief executive, who he called “the Great Jensen Huang,” and other business leaders “journeying to the Great Country of China where I will be asking President Xi, a Leader of extraordinary distinction, to ‘open up’ China so that these brilliant people can work their magic.”

“黄仁勋现在正在‘空军一号’上，”特朗普在社交媒体上发帖称。他表示，很荣幸能邀请到这位英伟达的首席执行官（他称之为“伟大的黄仁勋”）以及其他商界领袖“前往中国这个伟大的国家，在那里我将请求习近平主席——一位具有卓越非凡领导力的领导人——‘开放’中国，以便这些才华横溢的人施展他们的魔法”。

On Monday, the White House released a list of 16 chief executives, including Tim Cook of Apple, Larry Fink of BlackRock and leaders of other companies pushing for deals with China. It did not include Mr. Huang.

周一，白宫公布了一份由16位首席执行官组成的随行人员名单，包括苹果公司的蒂姆·库克、贝莱德的拉里·芬克，以及其他寻求与中国达成协议的企业领袖，黄仁勋不在其中。

That omission was noted across Silicon Valley and Washington. Mr. Huang has forged a strong relationship with Mr. Trump and has acted as a go-between for the administration between Washington and Beijing. His company’s chips have been critical to the A.I. boom that is reshaping the global economy, and are coveted by governments and companies across the world.

这一缺席在硅谷和华盛顿都引发了广泛关注。黄仁勋与特朗普建立了密切关系，并在政府与北京之间扮演着中间人的角色。英伟达的芯片对于重塑全球经济格局的人工智能热潮至关重要，受到世界各国政府和企业的竞相追捧。

Selling A.I. chips to China has been contentious in Washington.

在华盛顿，对华出售人工智能芯片一直是一个充满争议的议题。

Last summer, Mr. Trump approved the sale of an older generation of Nvidia chips to China and planned to take a cut of those sales. But the Chinese government hasn’t approved any purchases.

去年夏天，特朗普批准向中国出售上一代英伟达芯片，并计划从这些销售中抽成。但中国政府尚未批准任何采购。

Some Republicans have supported legislation that would limit the scope of those sales, and last year, members of Mr. Trump’s own administration intervened to discourage him from permitting the sale of even more advanced A.I. chips for national security reasons.

一些共和党人支持立法限制这些芯片的销售范围，而去年，特朗普自己政府内的成员出于国家安全考虑，曾出面劝说他不要批准出售更先进的人工智能芯片。

When the Chinese start-up DeepSeek released its latest artificial intelligence model last month, it edged Beijing closer to a future that it has spent years trying to build.

上个月，中国初创公司DeepSeek发布其最新人工智能模型时，它让北京距离一个多年来一直努力构建的未来又近了一步。

In a small but meaningful break from American technology, DeepSeek said for the first time that its new model had been optimized to run on chips made by the Chinese tech giant Huawei. This was a milestone in China’s long-running effort to develop advanced technologies at home and reduce its reliance on Western innovation.

在与美国技术的一次虽小但意义深远的切割中，DeepSeek首次宣布，其新模型已针对中国科技巨头华为生产的芯片进行了优化。这是中国长期推动先进技术国产化、减少对西方创新依赖的重要里程碑。

While most of the world’s leading A.I. systems still rely on semiconductors from the U.S. chip-making giant Nvidia, Chinese A.I. firms are increasingly turning to homegrown alternatives.

尽管全球大多数领先的人工智能系统仍然依赖美国芯片巨头英伟达的半导体，但中国的人工智能企业正越来越多地转向国产替代方案。

The timing of DeepSeek’s announcement — before this week’s scheduled summit between President Trump and Xi Jinping, China’s leader — gives Beijing fresh confidence entering trade talks that U.S. export controls on Nvidia chips have not derailed China’s A.I. development.

DeepSeek宣布这一消息的时间点——恰好在本周特朗普总统与中国领导人习近平计划举行峰会之前——也让北京在贸易谈判前增添了新的信心，美国对英伟达芯片的出口管制并未阻断中国人工智能的发展进程。

Any meaningful shift by China away from American A.I. technology could limit the impact of U.S. export controls and deprive Washington of a critical source of leverage over Beijing. That prospect gained urgency since DeepSeek’s A.I. technology rattled the U.S. tech industry and turned the company into a potent symbol of China’s drive for technological self-sufficiency.

中国若能在实质意义上减少对美国人工智能技术的依赖，不仅可能削弱美国出口管制的效力，还将令华盛顿失去一张制衡北京的关键筹码。自DeepSeek的人工智能技术令美国科技业为之震动、并成为中国追求科技自给自足象征之后，这种前景变得更加紧迫。

Before last year’s meeting between the two leaders, Mr. Trump said he planned to discuss Nvidia’s most powerful A.I. chips with Mr. Xi, fueling speculation that the United States might ease restrictions on the technology.

在去年两国领导人会晤之前，特朗普曾表示，他计划与习近平讨论英伟达最强大的人工智能芯片，这引发了外界猜测：美国可能会放松对相关技术的限制。

But after years of Washington’s preventing Chinese companies from buying certain advanced technology products, firms like DeepSeek and Moonshot AI are starting to design their A.I. systems around the constraints rather than waiting for them to disappear. That includes exploring how their models can run on a broader range of processors beyond Nvidia’s.

但在华盛顿多年来阻止中国企业购买某些先进技术产品之后，DeepSeek、月之暗面等公司已开始围绕这些限制来重新设计人工智能系统，而非坐等限制解除。这包括探索如何让模型在英伟达之外更多种类的处理器上运行。

“U.S. export controls are not freezing China’s A.I. development,” said Wei Sun, a principal A.I. analyst at Counterpoint Research in Beijing. “They are forcing China to build an alternative stack.”

“美国的出口管制并没有冻结中国的人工智能发展，”北京Counterpoint Research的人工智能首席分析师孙薇表示。“它们正在迫使中国建立一套替代性的技术栈。”

在DeepSeek发布最新模型时，华为表示，双方实现了“芯模技术紧密协同”。

DeepSeek has said its latest model can use Huawei chips for inference, the process that allows an A.I. system to respond more quickly and accurately to users. Inference generally requires less computing power than training, the demanding process of teaching a model how to function. DeepSeek still relied on Nvidia chips to train its system, according to two people in the semiconductor industry who were not authorized to comment publicly on the matter.

DeepSeek表示，其最新模型可以使用华为芯片进行推理，即让人工智能系统能够更快速、更准确地回应用户的过程。相比训练——即教会模型如何运作这一高强度计算过程——推理通常需要更少的算力。据两位不便公开发表意见的半导体业内人士透露，DeepSeek在训练系统时仍然依赖英伟达芯片。

It was not immediately clear how DeepSeek gained access to those chips, though Chinese companies can still remotely use Nvidia chips housed in data centers outside China. DeepSeek did not respond to a request for comment.

目前尚不清楚DeepSeek是如何获得这些芯片的，不过中国企业仍然可以远程使用部署在中国境外数据中心里的英伟达芯片。DeepSeek未回应置评请求。

Huawei has said it plans to release a chip for training this year. But it also said it would take another year after that before its products could match the performance of Nvidia’s current offerings.

华为表示，计划在今年推出一款用于训练的芯片。但它同时也表示，其产品要达到英伟达现有产品的性能水平，还需再等一年。

The growing split between Chinese and American A.I. infrastructure is a consequence that Jensen Huang, Nvidia’s chief executive, has long warned would result from rigid export controls.

中美人工智能基础设施之间日益分裂的局面正是英伟达首席执行官黄仁勋长期以来警告出口管制可能导致的后果。

He has said the restrictions have only pushed Chinese companies to accelerate efforts to build domestic alternatives, which could lead to a bifurcated market: Chinese A.I. systems running on Chinese chips while the West sticks with American hardware.

他曾表示，这些限制只会促使中国企业加快研发国内替代方案，最终可能导致市场一分为二：中国人工智能系统运行在中国芯片之上，西方则继续使用美国硬件。

As the world’s dominant maker of A.I. chips, Nvidia stands to gain from unfettered access to China. But Mr. Huang has argued that the strict restrictions will ultimately hurt the United States by diminishing its influence over China’s A.I. industry.

作为全球人工智能芯片的主导制造商，英伟达本可以从不受限制地进入中国市场中获得好处。但黄仁勋认为，严格的限制最终将削弱美国对中国人工智能产业的影响力，从而损害美国自身利益。

Two months after his last meeting with Mr. Xi, Mr. Trump granted Nvidia permission to sell the H200, one of its most powerful chips, to China.

与习近平上次会面两个月后，特朗普批准英伟达向中国出售H200——其最强大的芯片之一。

But since then, those chips have been squeezed between lawmakers in Washington, who are seeking closer oversight of their use in China, and Beijing, which has directed Chinese tech companies to buy domestic chips.

但自那以后，这些芯片一直受困于两方面的压力：一方面是华盛顿的立法者，他们要求更严格地监督这些芯片在中国的使用；另一方面是北京，它已指示中国科技公司采购国产芯片。

英伟达首席执行官黄仁勋表示，严格的出口管制已促使中国企业加速打造本土替代方案。

Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick told a Senate Appropriations Committee last month that no H200s had actually gone to China, and Nvidia said in regulatory filings this year that it had yet to generate any revenue from H200 sales there. Ahead of this week’s summit in Beijing, the fate of Nvidia’s chips in China is no clearer than it was at the last meeting between Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi.

商务部长霍华德·卢特尼克上月在参议院拨款委员会作证时表示，实际上并无H200芯片运抵中国；英伟达在今年提交的监管文件中也表示，尚未从对华销售H200中产生任何收入。在本周北京峰会前夕，英伟达芯片在中国的命运并不比特朗普与习近平上次会面时更加明朗。

Analysts expect that China’s frustration with U.S. export controls will be part of the discussion when the two leaders meet.

分析人士预计，中国对美国出口管制的不满情绪将成为两国领导人会谈议题的一部分。

“Chip export controls have consistently been an issue China opposes,” said Jiang Tianjiao, an associate professor at Fudan University in Shanghai. But as China’s chip-making abilities improve, officials may not want to interfere with efforts to reduce its dependence on American technologies, he said.

“芯片出口管制一直是中国反对的问题，”上海复旦大学副教授江天骄说。但他表示，随着中国芯片制造能力的不断提升，官员们或许并不想干预中国减少对美国技术依赖的努力。

While Chinese technology companies have continued to release high-performing A.I. systems despite export controls, China’s push for technological self-sufficiency in chip manufacturing still faces significant hurdles. Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, or SMIC, the Chinese company making some Huawei chips, has struggled to produce them at scale. The chips it manufactures are more prone to defects and consume more power than those made by foreign rivals.

尽管在出口管制下，中国科技公司仍在持续发布高性能的人工智能系统，但中国在芯片制造领域追求技术自给自足的努力仍面临重大障碍。生产部分华为芯片的中芯国际在大规模量产方面一直面临困难，其生产的芯片良品率较低、能耗也高于外国竞争对手。

Huawei’s workaround has been to strap together large numbers of these weaker chips to achieve the computing power of more advanced processors — a strategy that depends on SMIC’s being able to manufacture in large volumes. Yet Chinese chipmakers are still expected to produce only a small fraction of the advanced semiconductors made by foreign companies like Nvidia this year.

华为的应对办法是将大量性能较弱的芯片捆绑在一起，以达到更先进处理器的算力——这一策略有赖于中芯国际实现大规模量产。然而，中国芯片制造商今年预计生产的先进半导体仍只是英伟达等外国企业产量的极小一部分。

Before Washington tightened controls, many of Huawei’s chips were made by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, which produces most of the world’s advanced chips, including Nvidia’s.

在华盛顿收紧管制之前，华为的许多芯片由台积电制造。台积电生产全球大部分先进芯片，包括英伟达的芯片。

Export controls have constrained China’s ability to make the large volumes of advanced chips needed for A.I., said Dan Kim, chief strategy officer at TechInsights, a Canadian research firm, and a Commerce Department official during the Biden administration. But he added that those same restrictions had also pushed Chinese tech companies to innovate in new ways.

加拿大研究机构TechInsights首席战略官、拜登政府时期商务部官员丹·金表示，出口管制限制了中国制造大规模先进人工智能芯片的能力。但他同时也指出，这些限制也推动中国科技公司以新的方式进行创新。

Chinese companies are trying to redefine what determines success in the race to build cutting-edge A.I. For years, the industry’s most advanced systems have come from companies that can afford to spend billions of dollars assembling vast numbers of powerful chips.

中国企业正试图重新定义人工智能竞赛的成功标准。多年来，行业内最先进的系统，都出自那些能够投入数十亿美元、组建庞大高性能芯片集群的公司。

Now, companies like Huawei are betting that success could someday depend less on amassing the most computing power and more on building an integrated ecosystem of chips, A.I. models and applications that is good enough for most real-world uses. By working closely with A.I. model developers like DeepSeek, Huawei can customize its hardware to better support the software running on it.

如今，华为等公司押注于另一种可能：未来的成功或许不再主要取决于谁拥有最多的计算能力，而是取决于谁能建立一个足够好、能够满足大多数现实应用需求的芯片、人工智能模型与应用程序的一体化生态系统。通过与DeepSeek这样的人工智能模型开发商紧密合作，华为可以对硬件进行定制化调整，以更好地支持在其上运行的软件。

When DeepSeek announced its latest model, Huawei said there had been “close collaboration of chip and model technologies from both parties.”

在DeepSeek发布最新模型时，华为表示，双方实现了“芯模技术紧密协同”。

In technical papers describing its models, DeepSeek outlined specific ways chip makers could modify their products to improve performance with its systems.

在描述其模型的技术论文中，DeepSeek详细阐述了芯片制造商可以如何改进产品，以提升与其系统的适配性能。

“DeepSeek is calling out into the void to Huawei and other companies, ‘Please make these changes so we can get better performance out of your chips,’” said Jacob Feldgoise, an analyst at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology at Georgetown University.

乔治城大学安全与新兴技术中心分析师雅各布·费尔德戈斯说，“DeepSeek是在向华为和其他公司喊话：‘请做出这些修改，这样我们就能从你们的芯片中获得更好的性能。”

This is not how President Trump wanted to arrive in China.

特朗普总统本不想在这样的局势下前往中国。

When he delayed his long-awaited trip to Beijing by six weeks, Mr. Trump was betting he would arrive in Beijing this week having forced the Iranians to capitulate to his demands. He anticipated that by now the shattered Iranian leadership would have agreed to turn over its nuclear stockpile, forgo its atomic ambitions and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. The message to President Xi Jinping would have been clear: Chinese declarations of a superpower in decline were premature.

当他将期待已久的北京之行推迟六周时，特朗普原本赌的是，本周他抵达北京时，自己已经成功迫使伊朗人屈服于他的要求。他料想到这个时候，遭受重创的伊朗领导层会同意交出核材料储备、放弃核野心，并重新开放霍尔木兹海峡。向习近平主席传递的信息将是明确无误的：中国所谓美国这个超级大国正在衰落的论断，为时过早。

Instead, Mr. Trump will arrive on Wednesday with many in China wondering how he got bogged down by a far lesser power in a war he started. Iran’s nuclear stockpile is exactly where it was, still under the rubble of an American bombing raid last June. The Strait of Hormuz, through which China gets more than 30 percent of its oil and a bit less of its natural gas, remains closed, with no obvious plan to pry it open again.

然而，当特朗普周三抵达北京时，许多中国人都在疑惑：他怎么会在一场自己发起的战争中被一个远不如美国强大的对手搞得进退两难。伊朗的核材料储备分毫未动，依然深埋在去年6月美军轰炸留下的废墟之下。霍尔木兹海峡依然封锁，而且没有明确的重开计划，而中国超过30%的石油和相当比例的天然气都要经过这里。

But the war is also tricky for Mr. Xi. For all of China’s global ambitions, he has been unable and unwilling to come to the aid of Iran, a political partner and key supplier, and has offered no plan of his own to resume the vital flow of China-bound oil and gas.

然而，这场战争对习近平来说同样棘手。尽管中国野心勃勃、志在全球，他却既没有能力、也无意出手援助伊朗——中国的政治伙伴与重要能源供应国。而且对于如何恢复这条向中国输送石油和天然气的重要通道，他也没有拿出自己的任何方案。

The result is that this is a summit like few others. The world’s two major superpowers, eager to demonstrate their dominance, are both bogged down and uncertain about how the Iran conflict will play out in the context of their struggle for military, economic and technological dominance.

结果就是，这成为了一场前所未有的峰会。世界两大超级大国都急于展示自身主导地位，却同时陷入困境，对伊朗冲突将如何在双方争夺军事、经济与技术主导地位的大背景下收场，都没有把握。

The result is that the ambitions for this summit have been greatly scaled back. The honor guards and celebrations will remain intact, and Mr. Trump is bringing a dozen or so of America’s most powerful business executives with him, from Elon Musk of Tesla and SpaceX to Tim Cook, the soon-to-retire chief executive of Apple, to the top executives of Citi, BlackRock, Blackstone, Boeing and Goldman Sachs.

因此，对此次峰会的期望已大幅降低。仪仗队和迎宾仪式将照常进行，特朗普还带来了十几位美国最具影响力的商界领袖，从特斯拉和SpaceX的埃隆·马斯克，到即将退休的苹果公司首席执行官蒂姆·库克，以及花旗集团、贝莱德、黑石、波音和高盛的高管。

But the early hopes that Mr. Trump will finally begin to address the larger issues that threaten to drive the two nations into a new Cold War competition are quickly fading. The Iran war has been so all-consuming at the White House that, beyond trade and other economic issues, very little has been prepared in advance.

早先人们还期待特朗普能着手解决那些可能将两国推向新冷战竞争的重大问题，但这种希望正在迅速消散。伊朗战争让白宫几乎无暇他顾，以至于除了贸易和其他经济议题外，其他方面几乎没做多少事先准备。

The chief negotiator with China leading up to the trip here has been Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, evidence of how central Mr. Trump regards the bilateral trade and economic relationship. But turning to the Treasury secretary to take the lead would have been unthinkable in most previous administrations, where the secretary of state and the national security adviser — both jobs currently held by Marco Rubio — would insist on purview over the entirety of the complex relationship.

在此次访华前，主导对华谈判的是财政部长斯科特·贝森特，这足以证明特朗普多么重视双边贸易与经济关系。然而，让财政部长来牵头在以往的大多数政府中都是不可想象的，国务卿和国家安全顾问通常会坚持对这一复杂关系的全盘主导权，而这两个职位目前均由马可·鲁比奥一人兼任。

在峰会前的谈判中，国务卿鲁比奥退居次要位置，而财政部长贝森特则处于主导地位——这种做法在美国过去的大多数政府中几乎是不可想象的。

“For the first time since Kissinger,” R. Nicholas Burns, a longtime American diplomat who was ambassador to China under President Joseph R. Biden Jr., “the secretary of state and national security adviser are not driving the relationship with China.” (Kissinger also held both jobs.)

“自基辛格以来，这是国务卿和国家安全顾问首次不再主导对华关系，”曾在拜登政府担任驻华大使的资深外交官尼古拉斯·伯恩斯说。（基辛格当年也曾同时兼任这两个职务。）

That may reflect Mr. Trump’s own shifts on China after he came to office for a second term. He ran as a China hawk, denouncing its trade practices and accusing it of stealing American jobs and intellectual property. His first national security strategy, published in 2017, described China and Russia together as challenging “American power, influence and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.” His second, in 2025, described them as potential partners.

这或许反映了特朗普进入第二任期后自身对华立场的转变。他以对华强硬姿态参选，抨击中国的贸易行为，指责其窃取美国就业岗位和知识产权。他在2017年发布的首份国家安全战略中，将中国和俄罗斯并列为挑战“美国实力、影响力和利益”，试图“削弱美国的安全与繁荣”的威胁。而到了2025年的第二份国家安全战略中，他将两国称为潜在伙伴。

That shift will likely be on display this week. Administration officials concede that their Chinese counterparts have refused to talk about their remarkably rapid nuclear weapons expansion, much less the new arms control debates swirling around artificial intelligence. Early hopes for a broad trade framework that gets at the critical issues tearing at their relationship — who controls supply chains, and what kind of investments each nation is willing to tolerate in the other — may get short shrift.

这一转变很可能在本周有所体现。政府官员承认，中方已拒绝就其核武器的惊人扩张速度展开讨论，更遑论围绕人工智能展开的新一轮军备控制辩论。早先那种希望达成一个广泛贸易框架、以触及那些正在撕裂两国关系的核心问题——谁控制供应链，以及各自允许对方何种类型的投资——的期待，如今可能也会被轻描淡写地带过。

Mr. Rubio will be along. And so will Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, an unusual, apparently last-minute participant.

鲁比奥将随行，还有国防部长皮特·海格塞斯，他的加入颇为出人意料，似乎是最后关头才定下来的。

Of course, there will be announcements on sales of billions of dollars in American soybeans, which the Chinese need to buy anyway, and doubtless billions in Boeing airplanes and parts. Mr. Xi learned early that the key to dealing productively with Mr. Trump is to start with a full order book for American goods, all the more important because the American trade deficit with China has continued to surge, propelled by China’s overproduction of manufactured goods, which has prompted deflation in Beijing.

当然，届时自然少不了大笔美国大豆销售合同的宣布——中国本就需要购买，再加上数十亿美元的波音飞机及零部件订单。习近平早已摸清了与特朗普打交道的窍门：开局先拿出一份满满当当的美国商品采购清单，这一点尤为重要，因为美国对华贸易逆差仍在持续扩大，而推动这一趋势的是中国制造业的产能过剩，这也导致北京面临通货紧缩压力

As in Mr. Trump’s first term, the rest of the conversation is still something of a mystery, with much left to the private meetings between Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi. Robert Hormats, who helped prepare for some of Kissinger’s first meetings with the Chinese, noted this week that “most of a summit’s outcome should be embedded in the draft communiqué, meticulously crafted by senior advisers and pre-agreed by the two leaders.” The purpose was to “leave no room for misunderstandings or differing characterizations between the two sides in the aftermath.”

如同特朗普第一个任期一样，会谈的其余内容仍然是个谜，很大程度上将留待特朗普与习近平之间的私下会谈决定。曾协助筹备基辛格与中方早期部分会晤的罗伯特·霍马茨本周指出，“峰会的大部分成果应嵌入公报草案中，由高级顾问精心起草并经两国领导人预先确认。”这样做的目的是为了“不给事后双方之间出现误解或各执一词留有任何余地”。

At the end of this week, White House officials say, there may be no communiqué at all. Aside from trade and tariffs, which are likely to dominate the summit, here is a look at some of the most contentious issues:

而白宫官员表示，到本周结束时，甚至可能根本不会有任何联合公报。除了几乎肯定将主导峰会的贸易和关税问题之外，以下是一些最具争议的议题：

A Growing Nuclear Arsenal

持续扩张的核武库

When the last remaining major nuclear arms control agreement, New START, expired between the United States and Russia in February, Mr. Trump said it made sense to negotiate a new treaty only if China — which now has the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal, and the fastest-growing — was a party to a new accord. In January, in an interview with The New York Times, he said that he planned to bring that up with Mr. Xi, and that the Chinese were open to the idea.

今年2月，美俄之间最后一项主要核军控条约《新削减战略武器条约》到期。特朗普表示，除非拥有全球第三大核武库、且核力量增速最快的中国也加入新协议，否则没必要谈判缔结新条约。今年1月，特朗普在接受《纽约时报》采访时称，计划就此与习近平进行讨论，还表示中方对此持开放态度。

They are not. White House officials say that in the lead-up to the summit, China’s private position was the same as its public one: There is no reason to enter negotiations with Washington and Moscow until Beijing has an arsenal comparable to those of the two other powers. The United States and Russia each have about 1,550 weapons deployed, the limit under New START, but with the treaty’s expiration, they are both free to expand those numbers. According to the Pentagon’s public estimates, China has around 600 weapons, a number expected to rise to 1,000 by 2030 and ultimately to 1,500.

但事实并非如此。白宫官员透露，峰会前夕，中方私下立场与公开表态一致：在中国核武库规模达到与与另外两个核大国比肩之前，没有理由与华盛顿和莫斯科展开谈判。美俄各自部署核弹头约1550枚，这是《新削减战略武器条约》规定的上限；条约失效后，两国均可无限制扩大这一数字。据五角大楼公开估算，中国现有核弹头约600枚，预计2030年增至1000枚，最终将达到1500枚。

Mr. Trump is likely to raise the topic, one of his senior aides told reporters on Sunday. But don’t expect Mr. Xi to say much.

特朗普一名高级助手周日向记者透露，特朗普很可能在会晤中提及这一话题，但不要指望习近平会多说什么。

Cybersecurity and Artificial Intelligence

网络安全与人工智能

Eleven years ago, President Barack Obama and Mr. Xi stood in the Rose Garden of the White House and described what amounted to a first accord between the two countries on limiting state-sponsored cyberattacks. “Confrontation will lead to losses on both sides,” Mr. Xi said.

11年前，奥巴马总统与习近平在白宫玫瑰园阐述了中美首次就限制国家主导网络攻击达成的共识。习近平当时表示：“对抗只会两败俱伤。”

2015年，奥巴马总统与习近平在白宫共同宣布了一项关于限制国家支持的网络攻击的协议，但该协议最终未能奏效。

The impetus had been the theft of more than 20 million sensitive personnel records from the Office of Personnel Management. Yet the accord was already unraveling within two years, as China turned to outside contractors to conduct the attacks, and reserved the most sensitive operations for its Ministry of State Security.

促成这一共识的起因是美国人事管理办公室超2000万份敏感人事档案遭网络窃取。然而短短两年内，这份共识便开始瓦解：中方转而委托外部机构实施网络攻击，同时将最高敏感度的网络行动交由国家安全部负责。

In recent times, China has embedded itself into American networks with two very different kinds of cyberintrusions. One is apparently aimed at shutting down American power grids and water supplies in case of a conflict over Taiwan, another at sophisticated espionage that bored deep into the Justice Department’s secret systems, among others.

近年来，中国通过两种截然不同的网络入侵方式渗透美国网络体系。第一种的目的是在台海爆发冲突时，用于关停美国电网与供水系统；第二种方式是针对司法部等机构机密系统的精密间谍活动。

Now the artificial intelligence competition between China and the United States is making the cybersecurity problem even harder. If there is any technological development that should prompt both leaders to tackle this issue, it is the sudden shock of Mythos, the Anthropic model that has not been released to the public because it is expert at finding vulnerabilities in the computer code in a matter of milliseconds, speeding up hacking. That is a deeper threat to the systems that control everything from electric grids to missile targeting systems.

如今，中美人工智能领域的竞争使网络安全问题变得更加棘手。如果说有什么技术进展能促使两国领导人着手解决这一问题，那就是Mythos带来的突如其来的冲击——这款由Anthropic公司研发的模型尚未对外公开，它能在毫秒级时间内找出计算机代码漏洞、大幅加速黑客攻击，对电网、导弹制导系统等一切设施的控制系统构成深层威胁。

Mr. Trump is considering an executive order that would require all such new models to undergo a government review before they are released, a reversal of the administration’s approach so far. But American experts believe a Chinese equivalent may only be months away, and the only arms control that might work in this arena is one in which the two countries work together.

特朗普正考虑签署行政令，要求所有此类新型人工智能模型发布前必须接受政府审查，这与本届政府迄今为止的做法截然相反。但美国专家认为，中国同类模型可能数月内就会问世；在这一领域，唯一可行的军控方式唯有两国携手合作。

So far the only agreement in recent times on artificial intelligence came between Mr. Biden and Mr. Xi, who agreed in 2024 not to allow A.I. products to control nuclear weapons. And that basic, common-sense accord took months.

迄今为止，双方近期唯一一份人工智能相关协议是拜登与习近平达成的：双方同意在2024年前不允许人工智能产品控制核武器。就连这样一份基础的常识性共识也耗时数月才敲定。

Taiwan

台湾问题

The White House says to expect no significant changes on Washington’s policy toward Taiwan, dismissing talk that Mr. Trump might be persuaded by Mr. Xi to be more explicit in opposing Taiwanese independence.

白宫表示，华盛顿对台政策不会有重大变化，并驳斥了有关特朗普可能被习近平说服、在反对台湾独立问题上更明确表态的说法。

Chinese officials have been urging Mr. Trump to change the wording American officials use, from saying that the United States “does not support” Taiwan independence to actively “opposing” it.

中方官员一直敦促美方修改官方措辞，从目前的“不支持”台湾独立，转变为明确“反对”台湾独立。

It is unlikely that change will happen, at least in any formal way. But Mr. Xi may be counting on Mr. Trump using informal language to speak about a subject in which every word is parsed and measured. Looming over the discussions: what would happen to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, which makes most of the chips that go into building A.I. models and that power the iPhone and countless American weapons systems.

这种表述的改变不太可能发生，至少在正式场合不会。但习近平或许寄希望于特朗普以非正式口吻来谈及这一每个字都会被仔细解读和衡量的话题。笼罩在此次会谈之上的一大问题是台积电将会面临什么，这家公司生产用于构建人工智能模型的大部分芯片，并为iPhone和无数美国武器系统提供动力。

Supply Chains

供应链

Past generations of diplomats who dealt with China struggled with questions like how a non-market economy could integrate with a market one. Now the question is how to deal with two countries that believe they are overdependent on each other.

过去几代与中国打交道的外交官纠结的是市场经济与非市场经济如何融合这类问题。如今的难题则是如何应对彼此都认为过度依赖对方的两个国家。

Mr. Trump’s administration is intensifying a drive to hunt down and replace every source of Chinese supply for critical American systems, particularly weapons. That means building new sources of everything from rare earth processing to the manufacturing of many kinds of semiconductors.

特朗普政府正加紧行动，排查并替换美国关键系统的所有中国供应链来源，尤其是军工领域。这意味着从稀土加工到各类半导体制造，所有领域都需要建立新的供应来源。

China is doing the same, seeking to wean itself from relying on U.S. technology. And while the two sides insist they are seeking to “de-risk” rather than “decouple” their economies, these projects are clearly intended to prepare for a day when the two nations are in a deep Cold War, or a hot one. Washington’s limits on sending the fastest semiconductors to China, and Beijing’s on rare earths mined chiefly in China, could be just a start.

中国也在采取同样的举措，力求摆脱对美国技术的依赖。尽管双方都坚称目标旨在“去风险”而非“脱钩”，但这些布局显然是在为未来两国可能爆发的深度冷战乃至热战做准备。华盛顿限制向中国出口最先进的半导体，北京对主要产自中国的稀土实施限制，这或许只是开端。

But presidents do not usually talk supply chains. And that is unlikely to change.

不过，各国领导人通常不会深入探讨供应链问题，此次峰会大概率也不会例外。

“Gone is any pretense of solving the major structural issues at the heart of the world’s most important bilateral relationship: China’s mercantilist economic model, its designs on absorbing Taiwan and its active support of U.S. adversaries such as Iran and Russia,” Michael Froman, the U.S. trade representative during Mr. Obama’s second term, wrote last week. “As such, the summit is unlikely to alter the character and course of the U.S.-China relationship long-term. It is about managing for stability, not solving outstanding concerns.”

“已经没有人假装要去解决这个世界最重要双边关系的核心重大结构性问题：中国重商主义的经济模式、它谋求吞并台湾的意图，以及对伊朗和俄罗斯等美国对手的积极支持，”奥巴马第二任期的美国贸易代表迈克尔·弗罗曼上周撰文表示。“因此，本次峰会不太可能从根本上改变中美关系的性质与走向，其意义只在于维护稳定，而非解决悬而未决的关切。”

When President Trump visited China in late 2017, Xi Jinping welcomed him with a grand display of Chinese history and culture: a four-hour private tour of the Forbidden City culminating in a performance by the Peking Opera.

2017年末特朗普总统访华时，习近平以一场盛大的中国历史与文化展示欢迎他：四小时的故宫私人参观，最后以一场京剧表演收尾。

Eight years, a pandemic and two trade wars later, Mr. Trump is returning to Beijing, where the theme of future dominance, not ancient majesty, has filled domestic and international headlines with articles about dancing robots, drone swarms and the quiet hum of electric vehicles.

八年之后，经过一场疫情和两场贸易战，特朗普再次回到北京。此时，主导新闻头条的已不再是古代的辉煌，而是关于未来主导权的主题——跳舞的机器人、无人机蜂群，以及电动汽车安静的嗡鸣声。

China increasingly casts itself not as a fading civilization trying to catch up to the West but as a superpower poised to surpass it. Chinese nationalists and state-linked commentators say they have Mr. Trump to thank. America under his rule, they say, validates Mr. Xi’s worldview centered on “the rise of the East and decline of the West.”

中国越来越不把自己描绘成一个试图追赶西方的衰落文明，而是定位为一个即将超越西方的超级大国。中国民族主义者和有官方背景的评论人士表示，他们要感谢特朗普。他们认为，在特朗普治下的美国印证了习近平以“东升西降”为核心的世界观。

For decades, many Chinese viewed the United States with a mix of admiration, envy and resentment. America represented wealth, technological sophistication and institutional confidence. Even critics of Washington who reviled the American system often assumed that it worked.

几十年来，许多中国人以一种钦佩、羡慕和怨恨交织的心情看待美国。美国代表着富有、技术先进和制度自信。即使是批评华盛顿的人，在痛斥美国体制的同时，也往往认为它行之有效。

Mr. Trump’s ascent and his volatile second term shattered that image.

特朗普的崛起及其动荡的第二任期打破了这一形象。

In January, a nationalistic Beijing think tank affiliated with Renmin University published a triumphant report about Mr. Trump’s first year back in office. The report argued that his tariffs, attacks on allies, anti-immigration policies and assaults on the American political establishment had inadvertently strengthened China while weakening the United States. Its title: “Thank Trump.”

今年1月，一家隶属于中国人民大学的民族主义智库就特朗普再度执政的第一年发表了一份得意洋洋的报告。报告认为，他的关税、对盟友的攻击、反移民政策以及对美国政治建制的冲击在无意中增强了中国，同时削弱了美国。报告标题是：《“感谢”特朗普》。

The report called Mr. Trump an “accelerator of American political decay,” with the United States sliding toward polarization, institutional dysfunction and even “Latin American-style instability.” His hostility toward China, the authors argued, was a “reverse booster” that unified the country and helped bring about its strategic self-reliance.

报告称特朗普是“美国政治衰朽的加速器”，美国正滑向两极化、制度失能，甚至“‘拉美化’动荡”。作者认为，他对中国的敌意反而成了“反向助推器”，让中国团结起来，并推动了战略自立。

“At this turning point in history,” the authors wrote, “what we hear is the heavy and haunting toll of an empire’s evening bell.”

“在历史的转弯处，”作者写道，“我们看到的是帝国晚钟沉闷而凄厉的回响。”

Such language, once confined largely to nationalist corners of the Chinese internet, has increasingly entered mainstream political discourse.

这种语言曾经主要局限于中国互联网的民族主义角落，如今已越来越多地进入主流政治话语。

Evidence of this shift is measurable: The use of terms related to “American decline” in official Chinese sources nearly doubled in 2025, according to a study by two Brookings Institution researchers.

这一转变有可衡量的证据：根据布鲁金斯学会两位研究人员的报告，2025年中国官方来源中与“美国衰落”相关的表述使用频率几乎翻了一倍。

The narrative of American decline did not begin with Mr. Trump. For years, Chinese state media and nationalist pundits have highlighted mass shootings, homelessness, political polarization and economic inequality in the United States as evidence of the failures of Western democracy. More recently, official outlets embraced the viral phrase “kill line,” borrowed from video game culture, to describe what they portrayed as the irreversible downward spiral facing America’s working poor. It’s a familiar tactic of the Communist Party to distract the Chinese public from the country’s own issues.

美国衰落的叙事并非始于特朗普。多年来，中国官方媒体和民族主义评论人士一直突出美国的大规模枪击事件、无家可归、政治极化以及经济不平等，以此作为西方民主失败的证据。最近，官方媒体又采纳了从电子游戏文化中借来的流行词“斩杀线”，来描述他们所称的美国底层民众不可逆转的向下坠落。这是中共惯用的转移视线战术，旨在转移公众对中国自身问题的注意力。

But Mr. Trump’s return to office and his administration’s erratic decision-making in both domestic and foreign policy have supplied the propaganda machine with plentiful fresh material. Images of immigration raids, the Minneapolis shootings and bitter political infighting circulate widely on Chinese social media alongside triumphant commentary about American dysfunction. What once sounded to many educated Chinese like exaggerated propaganda increasingly feels, to some, observational.

但特朗普重返白宫及其政府在国内和外交政策上反复无常的决策为宣传机器提供了大量新鲜素材。移民突击搜查、明尼阿波利斯枪击事件以及激烈的政治内斗的画面在中国社交媒体上广泛传播，伴之以对美国机能失调兴高采烈的评论。对许多受过教育的中国人来说，曾经听起来像夸张宣传的内容，现在越来越像是观察到的现实。

A 31-year-old education consultant in northern China who advises families on overseas study told me that parents who had once aspired to Ivy League degrees for their children now saw America as “too chaotic.” A decade ago, more than 80 percent of his students considered the United States for study abroad, said the consultant, who asked me to use only his family name, Wang, for fear of government retribution. Now, he estimated, the figure has fallen to 45 percent.

中国北方一位31岁的教育咨询顾问（他为家庭提供留学建议）告诉我，那些曾经渴望孩子就读常春藤盟校的父母现在认为美国“太乱了”。由于担心遭到政府报复，这位顾问要求仅使用他的姓氏“王”。他说，十年前他的学生中超过80%考虑去美国留学，现在他估计这一比例已降至45%。

Mr. Wang described watching footage of the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol and finding himself thinking of the Red Guards that Mao Zedong dispatched to tear apart China’s institutions during the Cultural Revolution. That feeling returned more insistently with the immigration raids and the targeting of perceived enemies during Mr. Trump’s second term.

王先生说，在观看2021年1月6日美国国会大厦遇袭的画面时，他想到了“文革”期间毛泽东派去摧毁中国体制的红卫兵。这种感觉在特朗普第二任期的移民突击搜查和针对“敌人”的打击中变得愈发强烈。

“The America that represented wealth, freedom and institutional confidence feels like it belonged to a different era,” Mr. Wang said.

“那个代表着财富、自由和制度自信的美国似乎属于另一个时代，”王先生说。

北达科他州一农场正在装运大豆。上海外国语大学一位教授表示，随着中期选举临近，特朗普需要一个可见的胜利，比如中国采购美国大豆。

Among China’s foreign policy analysts, the conversation has turned to what Beijing can gain from the bilateral relationship, which has become more transactional under Mr. Trump than under President Joseph R. Biden Jr.

在中国的外交政策分析人士中，讨论的焦点已转向北京能从双边关系中获得什么。在特朗普治下，这种关系比在拜登总统时期更具交易性。

“Only China can save Trump,” said Huang Jing, a professor at Shanghai International Studies University, during a media event that was livestreamed in late 2025. With the U.S. midterm elections approaching, he argued, Mr. Trump needed visible wins such as Chinese purchases of American soybeans, corn and natural gas that could play well in swing states.

“只有中国才能救特朗普，”上海外国语大学教授黄靖在2025年末一场直播的媒体活动上说。他认为，随着美国中期选举临近，特朗普需要看得见的胜利，比如中国购买美国大豆、玉米和天然气，这些能在摇摆州产生良好效果。

“Since Trump,” Mr. Huang said at the event, “the United States has become increasingly prone to compromise.”

黄靖在活动中表示：“从特朗普开始，美国越来越易妥协，。”

Wu Xinbo, a leading American studies scholar at Fudan University, offered a similar assessment. If Republicans lose control of the House this fall, he said at the same event, Mr. Trump is likely to pivot toward his foreign policy legacy, creating space for a larger accommodation with Beijing.

复旦大学美国研究资深学者吴心伯也给出了类似评估。他说，如果共和党今年秋天失去众议院控制权，特朗普很可能转向打造自己的外交政策遗产，从而为与北京达成更大和解创造空间。

China, he said, “should make good use of this opportunity.”

他说，中国“应该好好利用这个机会”。

The war in Iran has reinforced the view that China has the upper hand with Mr. Trump. At a conference in late April, Mr. Wu argued that the war reduced Washington’s leverage against China while increasing Beijing’s by consuming American military and diplomatic attention in the Middle East.

伊朗战争进一步强化了中国在特朗普面前占据上风的观点。在4月底的一场会议上，吴心伯认为，这场战争消耗了美国在中东的军事和外交注意力，从而削弱了华盛顿对中国的杠杆，同时增加了北京的杠杆。

The logic helps explain why China’s official language regarding Mr. Trump has often been less hostile than it was regarding Mr. Biden. According to a project by the Tracking People’s Daily newsletter, which used artificial intelligence to analyze nearly 7,000 Chinese official statements since 2021, Mr. Biden was presented as a more systemic threat — so serious that Mr. Xi accused Washington of “encirclement and suppression,” unusually confrontational language for a Chinese leader.

这种逻辑有助于解释为什么中国官方对特朗普的措辞往往比对拜登温和。根据“Tracking People’s Daily”通讯项目使用人工智能对2021年以来近7000份中国官方声明的分析，拜登被呈现为更具系统性的威胁——严重到习近平指责华盛顿“遏制、围堵”，这是中国领导人极不寻常的对抗性语言。

By contrast, the study noted, “Trump’s transactionalism is something Beijing understands and can work with.”

相比之下，该研究指出，“特朗普的交易主义是北京能够理解并与之打交道的”。

Yet belief in U.S. decline has not translated into aggressive Chinese foreign policy, at least not the kind of overt geopolitical gamble that Russia made before invading Ukraine.

然而，对美国衰落的信念并未转化为激进的中国外交政策，至少不是俄罗斯入侵乌克兰前那种公开的地缘政治冒险。

China has become more assertive, pressuring U.S. allies, expanding military activity around Taiwan and restricting rare-earth exports in response to Mr. Trump’s tariffs. But even as Beijing advances the idea of the decline of American power, it appears wary of directly confronting what many Chinese analysts describe as a still dangerous superpower.

中国变得更加强势，对美国盟友施压、扩大在台湾周边的军事活动，并在回应特朗普关税时限制稀土出口。但即便北京推进美国实力衰落的叙事，它似乎仍谨慎避免直接对抗许多中国分析人士眼中仍然危险的超级大国。

Two factors play into this circumspection. First, many Chinese strategists believe Beijing can do better by sitting back while the Trump administration fumbles. Second, an unstable and distracted United States may also be a more unpredictable one.

有两个因素导致了这种谨慎。第一，许多中国战略家认为，让特朗普政府自己犯错，而北京坐收渔利，会更好。第二，一个不稳定且分心的美国，也可能是一个更难以预测的美国。

Beijing’s export-dependent economy needs a stable international order to function. An erratic United States threatens that stability in ways a confident, predictable America never did, Zongyuan Zoe Liu, an economist at the Council for Foreign Relations, told me.

外交关系委员会经济学家刘宗媛告诉我，北京以出口为主的经济需要一个稳定的国际秩序才能运转。一个反复无常的美国以一种自信、可预测的美国从未有过的方式威胁着这种稳定。

Mr. Xi “is getting the United States he always wanted,” she said, “and the America he most feared at the same time.”

习近平“正在得到他一直想要的美国”，她说，“同时也是他最害怕的那个美国。”

When a man identifying himself as Chris Chen reached out this winter to an aide on a House committee focused on threats from China, he came armed with a lucrative offer.

去年冬天，一个自称克里斯·陈的男子联系上了一位供职于专门关注中国威胁的众议院委员会的助理，他带来了一个诱人的提议。

The staff member, Mr. Chen proposed, could earn $10,000 or more by barely lifting a finger. All he would need to do is agree to phone calls every other week to share information about the committee’s work and U.S. foreign policy about China.

克里斯·陈对这名工作人员提出，几乎不费吹灰之力就可以赚到1万美元甚至更多。他所需要做的只是每隔一周接听一次电话，分享该委员会的工作动态和美国对华外交政策的相关信息。

Insights into U.S. trade or national-security issues, including the Trump administration’s plans for Venezuela in the aftermath of the January military operation there, would be especially valuable, Mr. Chen said. To sweeten the pot, Mr. Chen repeatedly promised to send the aide $2,000 up front.

这位陈先生表示，涉及美国贸易或国家安全问题的内幕信息尤其有价值，包括1月份美国在委内瑞拉展开军事行动后特朗普政府对那里的计划。为了进一步提高吸引力，他一再承诺会先支付2000美元作为预付款。

The offer seemed too good to be true. Instead of quietly accepting the deal, the aide, whose identity The New York Times agreed to withhold because he works on sensitive policy issues related to China, reported it to his bosses on the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. The panel quickly concluded Mr. Chen was not the Singapore-based business consultant he claimed to be, but instead likely a Chinese intelligence officer or contractor seeking a new recruit.

这个提议好得令人难以置信。这名助理没有悄悄接受这笔交易，而是向他在众议院中国问题特设委员会的上司报告了此事。（由于工作涉及涉华敏感政策，《纽约时报》应其要求隐去其身份）该委员会很快断定，克里斯·陈并不是他自称的新加坡商业顾问，而很可能是一名正在寻找新线人的中国情报官员或线人承包商。

An offer of $10,000 for information

以1万美元换取情报

By framing the initial offer as a “trial period,” Mr. Chen dangled the expectation of a longer relationship with more payments to come, a common recruitment hook for spies.

克里斯·陈将最初的提议包装成“试用期”，以此暗示双方将建立更长期的合作关系、未来还有更多报酬，这是间谍招募中惯用的诱饵手法。

“I would like to propose … three-month trial period lasting until the end of March. … And I will provide a total compensation of $10,000 for the three-month trial period.”

“我想提议……为期三个月的试用期，持续到3月底……在三个月的试用期内，我将提供总计1万美元的报酬。”

Rather than cut off contact, the committee’s Republican majority staff agreed to keep talking to Mr. Chen. They recorded a series of calls this winter to learn more about Mr. Chen’s tactics and interests.

该委员会的多数党共和党工作人员没有切断联系，而是同意继续与陈先生联络。他们在去年冬天录下了一系列通话，以深入了解他的手段和意图。

Transcripts of those calls, which the committee shared with The Times alongside some of the recorded audio, depict a determined, at times impatient, individual eager to earn the trust of his mark and get down to business. Mr. Chen mixes holiday greetings with elaborate questions about manufacturing in Vietnam and Mexico and the future of Venezuela’s oil industry.

该委员会与《纽约时报》分享了这些通话的文字记录以及部分录音。记录显示，克里斯·陈是个意志坚定、有时会不耐烦的人，急于赢得目标对象的信任并尽快进入实质合作。他在节日问候的寒暄之间，夹杂着对越南、墨西哥制造业现状以及委内瑞拉石油工业前景的详细询问。

特朗普总统与中国领导人习近平之间的关系日趋紧张。图为两人去年秋天会晤时的场景。

Beijing and Washington have been aggressively spying on one another for decades, an inevitable byproduct of the world’s two largest economies competing across the globe. But by their nature, those shadow games rarely surface such a detailed look at how either side plies its trade.

多年来，北京与华盛顿一直在相互进行激烈的间谍活动，这是世界两大经济体在全球竞争所不可避免的副产品。但由于其隐秘性质，这类影子游戏很少会让其中一方的手法暴露得如此详细。

The outreach by Mr. Chen to an aide on the very committee responsible for investigating Chinese national-security threats appears to provide an unusually vivid portrait of how Beijing’s spy services seek to gain access to sensitive information from within the corridors of power in Washington.

克里斯·陈主动接触专门负责调查中国国家安全威胁的委员会的助理，此举似乎异常生动地展示了北京的情报机构是如何试图渗透华盛顿的权力走廊、获取敏感信息的。

By some measures, the spying on both sides has intensified in recent months, as the bilateral relationship — which will be tested next week during a summit in Beijing between President Trump and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping — has grown more strained.

按照某些衡量标准，美中双方近来的间谍活动都有所升级，因为两国关系已愈发紧张，而本周特朗普总统与中国领导人习近平在北京举行的峰会将是对这一关系的重大考验。

Chinese hackers are believed by U.S. investigators to have at least twice compromised internal networks at the F.B.I. related to its sensitive surveillance activities. The C.I.A. has published videos on social media in Mandarin openly seeking to recruit spies from China’s military that have led to new assets being developed in the country, according to U.S. intelligence officials.

美国调查人员认为，中国黑客至少两次侵入了联邦调查局内部与其敏感监视活动相关的网络。中央情报局在社交媒体上发布普通话视频，公开招募来自中国军方的情报人员，据美国情报官员透露，美方已借此在中国境内发展出新的情报来源。

After about two months of conversations with Mr. Chen, the House committee referred the matter to the F.B.I., which declined to comment when asked if it had opened an investigation, but it has been tracking increasingly brazen intelligence-gathering operations by China. It said only that “China and other foreign governments are using professional networking social media sites to target people with U.S. government security clearances.”

在与克里斯·陈保持联络约两个月后，该众议院委员会将此事移交给了联邦调查局。联邦调查局拒绝就是否已立案展开调查置评，但该局一直在追踪中国日益猖獗的情报收集行动。它仅表示，“中国及其他外国政府正在利用专业社交网络平台，对持有美国政府安全许可的人员实施定向渗透。”

Seeking to cultivate a source in the heart of a congressional committee dedicated to addressing the threat from China would be an especially audacious move.

试图在一个专门应对中国威胁的国会委员会内部培植线人无疑是极为大胆的举动。

Mr. Chen first contacted the staff member in December from a Gmail account with a display name of Kris Chen, though he signed his emails with the spelling Chris. He described himself as an employee of NimbusHub Strategic Consulting, a Hong Kong-based firm with a spartan website that promises “to provide clients with the tools and knowledge necessary to navigate an increasingly complex global landscape.” The website contains filler text in Latin, which often auto-populates within unfinished sections of websites.

陈先生首次联系该工作人员是在去年12月，使用的是Gmail账户，邮件账户显示他的姓名为“Kris Chen”，但他在邮件中的署名拼写为“Chris”。他自称供职于香港一家名为NimbusHub Strategic Consulting的咨询公司，该公司官网十分简陋，声称“为客户提供应对日益复杂的全球环境所需的工具和知识”。网站还出现了作为占位符的拉丁文，它们通常自动出现在网站未完成的部分。

Other clues point to NimbusHub as a front for China’s spy services. In a February report on malicious uses of its artificial-intelligence tools, OpenAI identified ChatGPT users who had used the model to generate email drafts purporting to be from employees of NimbusHub. The emails addressed to state officials in the United States and policy analysts working in business and finance came from personas who, like Mr. Chen, sought to offer paid consulting gigs for information.

还有一些线索表明，NimbusHub可能是中国情报部门的幌子。OpenAI在今年2月的一份关于其人工智能工具遭滥用的报告中指出，有ChatGPT用户曾借助该模型起草电子邮件，发件人自称是NimbusHub的员工。这些邮件被发送给美国各州官员及商界、金融领域的政策分析人士，发件人以虚拟身份试图以“付费咨询工作”为名换取信息，其手法与克里斯·陈如出一辙。

NimbusHub did not respond to emailed requests for comment, nor did Mr. Chen on the Gmail account or phone number he used to contact the congressional aide. The profile picture for Mr. Chen’s WhatsApp number depicts a Winnie-the-Pooh doll wearing large headphones, an apparent mocking reference to Mr. Xi. Winnie-the-Pooh imagery has for years been a target of censorship in China and a symbol of resistance, which would fit with a persona of a Hong Kong businessman at a remove from mainland China.

NimbusHub没有回复通过电子邮件提出的置评请求，陈先生用来联系国会助理的Gmail邮箱和电话号码也没有回应。他的WhatsApp头像是一只戴着大耳机的小熊维尼玩偶——这显然是在讽刺习近平。多年来，小熊维尼的形象在中国一直是审查的对象，也是抵抗的象征，这与克里斯·陈“远离中国大陆的香港商人”人设相吻合。

香港大有大厦。

There was no sign of NimbusHub at the Hong Kong address listed on the firm’s website when a Times reporter visited Tuesday. An office directory displayed near the elevator banks of the 24-story tower, Tai Yau Building, in the heart of the city’s crowded Wan Chai district, listed 94 other tenants. Two women stationed at a concierge booth in the beige-tiled lobby said they had never heard of NimbusHub.

《纽约时报》记者于周二前往该公司网站所列的香港地址时，并未发现NimbusHub的任何踪迹。这栋24层高的大厦位于湾仔繁华地段，名为大有大厦，电梯厅的租户目录列有94家公司的名称，没有NimbusHub。在米色瓷砖铺就的大堂服务台，两名女接待员表示，她们从未听说过NimbusHub这家公司。

Liu Pengyu, a spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, said in a statement that “the so-called false narrative regarding China engaging in espionage activities is entirely devoid of factual basis or evidence.”

中国驻华盛顿大使馆发言人刘鹏宇在声明中表示，“所谓中国从事间谍活动的虚假叙事完全缺乏事实依据或证据支持”。

Interest in U.S. plans for Venezuela

对美国在委内瑞拉的计划感兴趣

Days after the U.S. military in January captured the Venezuelan president, Nicolás Maduro, in a nighttime raid in Caracas, Mr. Chen asked for insights into U.S. plans for Venezuela.

今年1月，美国军方在加拉加斯发动夜间突袭，逮捕了委内瑞拉总统尼古拉斯·马杜罗。数日后，克里斯·陈便询问美国对委内瑞拉的下一步计划。

”Maybe next time we can discuss Venezuela, like how it ties into the U.S. reshaping supply chains, such as the oil supply chain, and the key minerals and the manufacturing supply chain.”

“也许下次我们可以聊聊委内瑞拉，比如它如何与美国重塑供应链联系在一起，例如石油供应链、关键矿产以及制造业供应链。”

The introductory email from Mr. Chen on Dec. 17 was full of business jargon, and presented the chance to share information as a way to offer “expert consultation and viewpoint exchange, including real-time policy and news interpretation and forward-looking strategic insights.”

克里斯·陈在12月17日发出的第一封邮件里充斥着商业术语，并将情报的分享描述为一种“提供专家咨询和观点交流的机会，包括实时政策与新闻解读，以及前瞻性战略洞察”。

After notifying his colleagues on the committee, the congressional aide responded and conveyed an interest in expanding his “advisory work outside my primary duties.” From then on, Mr. Chen appeared hooked. In follow-up emails and on phone calls, he expressed a willingness to be flexible with the work arrangement while making clear he was eager to start paying.

在向委员会同事报告此事后，这名国会助理回复了邮件，表示有兴趣“在主要职责之外拓展咨询业务”。在那以后，克里斯·陈似乎上钩了。在后续邮件和电话中，他一再表示愿意在合作安排上保持灵活，但明确表示希望尽快开始支付酬劳。

该委员会的共和党主席、众议员约翰·穆伦纳尔去年曾成为一起疑似中国情报行动的目标。

“I can pay you $2,000 — $2,000 advance payment,” Mr. Chen said during a call in January. “As soon as possible in the next few days, just to make sure our operation is getting started.”

“我可以付你2000美元——2000美元预付款，”他在1月的一次通话中说，“在接下来的几天内尽快，就为了确保我们的合作能够启动。”

Mr. Chen at times seemed most curious to learn what those close to power in the United States thought about China’s stated intentions, such as a commitment to purchase U.S. soybeans or whether China would relax control over rare-earth minerals. “So if China turns the controls back next year, do you guys have a plan B?” he asked.

陈先生有时似乎最想了解那些接近美国权力核心的人如何看待中国公开表明的意图，例如中国购买美国大豆的承诺，或者中国是否会放松对稀土矿产的管控。“那么，如果中国明年重新实施管制，你们有备用方案吗？”他问道。

The committee has been targeted by Chinese intelligence operations before. Last year, the panel disclosed that an apparent impostor was posing as its Republican chairman, Representative John Moolenaar of Michigan, and sending emails to government agencies and other institutions seeking information about potential sanctions against Beijing. Cybersecurity investigators linked the emails to a hacking group with ties to the Ministry of State Security, a central spy agency for China.

这并非该委员会第一次成为中国情报行动的目标。去年，该委员会披露，一名冒充者假借委员会共和党主席、密歇根州众议员约翰·穆勒纳尔的名义，向政府机构和其他单位发送邮件，索取有关对华潜在制裁的信息。网络安全调查人员将这些邮件追踪至一个与中国国家安全部有关联的黑客组织。

“The Chinese government actively targets Congress and congressional staff as part of a broader influence and intelligence collection effort, frequently using benign-appearing inquiries to get sensitive information,” Mr. Moolenaar said in a statement.

穆伦纳尔在声明中表示：“中国政府将国会和国会工作人员列为目标，这是其更广泛的影响力渗透和情报收集行动的组成部分，经常利用看似无害的询问获取敏感信息。”

Access to the boss

接触老板的机会

Mr. Chen does little to hide his interest in mapping the House aide’s proximity to powerful figures in Washington.

克里斯·陈几乎毫不掩饰自己想弄清这名众议院助手与华盛顿权势人物之间距离有多近。

Mr. Chen: So the congressman is the person in the committee, right?

陈：那么这位议员就是委员会里的人，对吧？

Aide: Yes, he’s the boss. He’s the top boss.

助手：是的，他是老板，是最大的老板。

Mr. Chen: If he’s the boss, you work for the chairman, right?

陈：如果他是老板，那你就是为委员会主席工作，对吧？

Aide: Correct.

助手：对的。

Mr. Chen: Wow. Wow.

陈：哇！哇！

China has a long record of targeting U.S. politicians and federal workers for espionage, including the theft of government personnel files on more than 20 million people a decade ago. Last year, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington-based think tank, and Reuters found evidence that a network of fake consulting firms controlled by a Chinese technology firm was targeting former government employees who had lost their jobs at the start of the second Trump administration.

中国长期以来一直针对美国政治人物和联邦工作人员进行间谍活动，包括10年前曾窃取超过2000万人的政府人事档案。去年，总部位于华盛顿的智库“保卫民主基金会”和路透社发现证据表明，一家中国科技公司控制着一个由虚假咨询公司组成的网络，正在对特朗普第二个任期上台之初遭裁员的前政府雇员实施定向渗透。

Recruiting an aide on the House China Committee is not likely to be as valuable as turning an intelligence official with access to classified material about U.S. nuclear weapons programs, bespoke hacking tools or espionage assets in China, experts said. But the panel is still a high-value target. The congressional aide cut off contact with Mr. Chen in late February before being paid, citing an internal ethics determination. Mr. Chen lamented the development, but emailed again days later to say he believed they could get around the conflict.

专家表示，策反众议院中国委员会的一名助理，其情报价值或许不及收买一名能接触美国核武器计划、定制黑客工具或在华情报资产等涉密材料的情报官员。但该委员会仍是一个极具价值的目标。这名国会助理以内部道德审查为由，于2月下旬中断了与克里斯·陈的联系，此时他尚未收到任何付款。克里斯·陈对此深表遗憾，但数日后再度发来邮件，称相信双方可以绕过这一障碍。

“If you are still interested in exploring a collaboration, I would welcome the chance to walk you through this alternative path during a brief call,” Mr. Chen said. “Please let me know if this is of interest to you.”

“如果您仍有意探讨合作可能，我希望能有机会在简短的通话中，向您介绍这一替代路径，”他写道。“请告知您是否有兴趣。”

The aide never responded.

该工作人员此后再未回复。

Peace and stability will be the public message when President Trump and China’s leader, Xi Jinping, meet in Beijing this week. But behind the diplomatic platitudes, both governments are quietly preparing for something harsher — a prolonged economic war, mapping vulnerabilities and sharpening tools to inflict pain on the other.

特朗普总统与中国领导人习近平本周在北京举行会面时，公开传递的信息将是和平与稳定。但在外交辞令背后，两国都悄然在为更严峻的局面做准备——一场可能持续很久的经济战，双方都在摸排对方的软肋，并不断打磨可以施加压力的工具。

In recent weeks, China has made clear that it no longer fears another escalation. It reached for a new legal mechanism to counter U.S. sanctions. It blocked Meta’s acquisition of a promising A.I. start-up founded in China. And it codified rules aimed at punishing foreign businesses that comply with Western efforts to pull back from China.

近几周来，中国已明确表示，不再惧怕进一步升级冲突。它祭出一项新的法律机制，以反制美国制裁；阻止了Meta收购一家在华成立的颇具前途的人工智能初创公司；并制定了针对配合西方撤离中国行动的外国企业进行惩罚的法规。

The moves are part of Beijing’s broader campaign to push back against what it sees as Washington’s intensifying efforts to constrain its economy and technological rise. Over the past year, the two countries have ratcheted up their economic offensives, whacking each other with steep tariffs, restricting the flow of rare earths and critical technologies and imposing sanctions on major industrial companies.

这些举措是中国更广泛反击行动的一部分，北京认为华盛顿正在加大对中国经济与科技崛起的遏制力度。过去一年来，两国不断升级经济攻势，相互加征高额关税，限制稀土和关键技术的流通，并对大型工业企业实施制裁。

Whether Mr. Xi and Mr. Trump can agree to place even modest guardrails on their expanding economic weapons will be a critical litmus test of whether their meeting succeeds.

习近平与特朗普能否同意为他们不断扩大的经济武器库设置哪怕是最低限度的护栏，将是衡量他们此次会晤成功与否的关键试金石。

“China is signaling more strongly that they are locked and loaded,” said Andrew Gilholm, a China expert at Control Risks, a consulting firm. “We are on the brink of a much more frequent or widespread use of Chinese countermeasures against U.S. sanctions.”

“中国正在释放更为强烈的他们已严阵以待的信号，”咨询公司化险集团的中国问题专家安德鲁·吉尔霍姆说。“我们正处于中国更频繁或更广泛地采取反制措施来应对美国制裁的边缘。”

It is a high-stakes moment a decade in the making. In his first term, Mr. Trump warned that confrontation with China over technology and trade was unavoidable. He placed tariffs on certain Chinese sectors and singled out companies for sanctions. China responded with restrained, largely symbolic countermeasures, as regulators drafted laws mirroring U.S. actions, creating blacklists and export control lists.

这是一个酝酿了十年之久的高风险时刻。在特朗普的第一任期内，他曾警告说，与中国在技术和贸易上的对抗是不可避免的。他对部分中国行业加征关税，并针对特定企业实施了制裁。彼时，中国的反应较为克制，大多停留于象征性层面，同时监管部门也在起草与美国做法相对应的法律，建立黑名单和出口管制清单。

But what started as a game of tit-for-tat has escalated, reaching across global supply chains and leaving countries and companies scrambling to manage the fallout. After years of mostly reacting, China is going after entities that comply with Washington’s sanctions.

然而，最初的针锋相对已经升级，波及全球供应链，令各国和众多企业疲于应对。在多年以被动应对为主后，现在中国开始将矛头指向那些配合华盛顿制裁行动的实体。

The growing concern is that both countries will wield their expanding regulatory regimes as economic cudgels, dragging other nations and businesses into the fight. Business leaders and experts warn that the two superpowers are increasingly forcing the world to choose a side: China or the United States.

外界日益忧虑的是，两国将把各自不断扩张的监管体系当作经济大棒挥舞，把其他国家和企业拖入这场争斗。商界领袖和专家警告，这两个超级大国正日益迫使世界在中美之间选边站队。

In April, Beijing announced sweeping rules giving regulators the power to investigate corporate records, interrogate employees and bar companies or executives from leaving China if they are found to be helping shift supply chains out of the country.

今年4月，北京宣布了一套影响深远的规定，赋予监管部门调查企业档案、盘问员工的权力，如果发现企业帮助将供应链转移出中国，可以禁止公司或高管离境。

That puts companies manufacturing goods for Americans in a difficult position. Many have already moved factories to countries like Vietnam or Mexico to avoid sky-high tariffs on Chinese-made products, while others have drawn up contingency plans to do so.

这让为美国市场生产商品的企业陷入两难。许多企业已将工厂迁往越南、墨西哥等国，以规避对中国制造征收的高额关税，另一些企业也制定了相应的应急预案。

The rules also open a new corporate battlefront that Beijing previewed in 2024 after PVH, the owner of Calvin Klein and Tommy Hilfiger, stopped sourcing cotton from Xinjiang, the western Chinese region. The United States has imposed an import ban on cotton from Xinjiang because of its association with forced labor.

这些规则也开启了企业冲突的新前线。北京在2024年曾针对PVH集团（Calvin Klein和Tommy Hilfiger的母公司）停止采购新疆棉而采取行动。美国以存在强迫劳动为由，对新疆棉实施了进口禁令。

China accused PVH of discrimination, initiated an investigation and eventually placed the company on its “unreliable entity list,” a designation that can carry legal consequences, including restrictions on executives from leaving the country.

中国指控PVH存在歧视性措施，启动了调查，最终将其列入“不可靠实体清单”——这一认定可带来法律后果，包括限制高管离境。

It no longer appears to be an isolated case of retaliation. “It is posing both a risk and a dilemma: ‘Will you break our law or American law?’” said Sean Stein, president of the U.S.-China Business Council.

这似乎已不再是一个孤立的报复案例。美中贸易全国委员会会长谭森(Sean Stein)表示：“这既带来了风险，也导致了两难困境：‘你是要违反我们的法律，还是要违反美国的法律？’”

The shift in China’s regulatory posture accelerated last year after a series of aggressive actions from Washington, including raising tariffs to 145 percent, imposing fees on Chinese ships at U.S. ports and restricting critical technologies such as semiconductors, chemicals and machinery.

在华盛顿采取一系列激进举措之后，包括将关税提高至145%、对中国船舶在美国港口停靠征收费用，以及限制半导体、化学品和机械设备等关键技术出口，中国监管态度的转变自去年起开始加速。

“Now it has become a hot stove approach: ‘We need to show that when the U.S. takes an action, they will touch a hot stove and get burned,’” Mr. Stein said, summarizing the Chinese perspective.

“现在变成了一种热炉策略：‘我们要让对方知道，美国每采取一个行动，就会碰到一个滚烫的炉子，就会被烫伤，’”谭森以此来总结中方的态度。

This approach means putting new regulatory weapons into action, as Beijing did this month after Washington placed sanctions on five Chinese refineries over their ties to Iran. China ordered the companies to defy the sanctions, invoking a blocking measure it enacted in 2021 to shield companies from foreign laws it opposes.

这一策略意味着将新的监管工具付诸实践。例如在本月，在华盛顿以与伊朗存在关联为由对五家中国炼油厂实施制裁后，中国随即下令要求这些公司无视制裁，动用了在2021年制定的一项反制措施，旨在保护企业免受其反对的外国法律的影响。

China’s state-controlled media trumpeted the move as “a pivotal step in China’s transition from building a legal reserve to the practical application of its foreign-related legal weapon,” casting it as a stand against American hegemony on behalf of the world.

中国的官方媒体高调宣传此举是“我国涉外法治武器从制度储备走向实战落地的关键一步”，并将其定性为呼应国际社会反对霸权的普遍诉求。

The United States is “swinging the sanctions stick at law-abiding Chinese enterprises, severely infringing on the rights of Chinese business,” read the commentary in People’s Daily, China’s largest daily newspaper and the mouthpiece for the ruling Communist Party.

美国“将制裁大棒挥向中国守法经营企业，严重侵害我国经营主体合法权益”，中国发行量最大的日报、共产党党报《人民日报》的评论文章写道。

The five refineries, including Hengli Petrochemical Refinery, one of China’s largest private refineries, are among the biggest buyers of restricted Iranian oil and central to China’s industrial policy.

这五家炼油企业（包括中国最大的民营炼油企业之一恒力石化）是受限伊朗石油的重要买家，也是中国产业政策的重要组成部分。

The Chinese government has come to see Washington’s economic nationalism and trade protectionism as part of a longer trend that threatens China’s economy and national security.

中国政府将华盛顿的经济民族主义和贸易保护主义视为一种长期趋势的组成部分，而这股趋势正对中国的经济与国家安全构成威胁。

To stave off a deep economic downturn set off by a real estate crisis, Beijing has propped up manufacturing through subsidies and tax benefits, leaving China with a huge and growing trade surplus with much of the world.

为应对房地产危机带来的经济严重滑坡，北京通过补贴和税收优惠扶持制造业，使中国对全球多数国家的贸易顺差不断扩大。

Sanctions and restrictions “will pose a serious danger to the safety of China’s supply chain, so China needs to deal with this challenge in a more systemic way, not only to identify and provide early warning to the possible threat, but also to cope with this threat when it has already occurred,” said Wu Xinbo, director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai.

复旦大学美国研究中心主任吴心伯表示，制裁和限制“将对中国供应链安全构成严重威胁，因此中国需要系统性应对，不仅要识别可能的威胁并提供预警，还要在威胁已经发生时予以应对”。

“China,” he added, “needs to establish a legal framework for dealing with these kinds of challenges in the long term.”

“从长远来看，中国需要建立一个法律框架来应对这类挑战，”他补充说。

In the foothills of the Argentine Andes, the enormous Chinese radio telescope sits in one of the world’s premier stargazing locations, surrounded by vast, undulating mountain ranges and beneath skies untouched by light pollution. It is also on the opposite side of the planet from Beijing, offering China a window on the half of the heavens it would not otherwise see.

在阿根廷安第斯山脉的山麓地带，这座巨大的中国射电望远镜坐落于世界顶级观星地之一，四周环绕着辽阔起伏的山脉，头顶是未受光污染影响的纯净夜空。该望远镜也位于北京在地球对侧的位置，为中国开启了一扇窗口，得以观测另一半它原本无法观测的天空。

But the Chinese telescope at the site, the Cesco observatory in San Juan Province, picks up no signals. After the U.S. government repeatedly pressed them on the issue, the Argentine authorities stopped the project’s completion. Lacking key parts, the telescope now sits dismembered, its gigantic antenna pointing blindly at the sky.

然而，这座位于圣胡安省塞斯科天文台的中国望远镜，如今无法接收任何信号。在美国政府就此事反复施压后，阿根廷当局叫停了该项目建设。由于关键部件缺失，望远镜如今处于解体状态，巨大的天线茫然地指向天空。

As the United States increasingly views Beijing as a rival in space, the stars above South America have become flash points in a geopolitical struggle, with top American officials trying to halt astronomy projects in the Andean deserts out of fear China could use them for military purposes.

随着美国日益将中国视为太空领域的竞争对手，南美洲上空的星空已成为地缘政治博弈的焦点。美国高层官员试图阻止安第斯沙漠中的天文项目，担心中国可能将其用于军事目的。

The Trump administration says it is enforcing an updated Monroe Doctrine, in part to counter China’s growing footprint in the Western Hemisphere. China is a key trading partner for many countries in Latin America, and it is trying to build scientific and security ties. Its relations in the region could come up in official talks this week in Beijing between President Trump and Xi Jinping, China’s leader.

特朗普政府表示，正在推行更新版的门罗主义，部分目的是遏制中国在西半球日益增长的影响力。中国是拉美多国的重要贸易伙伴，并致力于构建科技与安全合作关系。本周，特朗普总统将与中国国家主席习近平在北京举行正式会谈，双方或提及中国在该地区的关系问题。

Last year, Argentina’s neighbor Chile stopped a Chinese astronomical observatory project in the Atacama Desert after strong urging from a U.S. ambassador. And in the case of the Cesco observatory’s Chinese radio telescope project — which would be the largest of its kind in South America — authorities have held some key, final parts for it at customs for about nine months.

去年，在美方大使的强烈敦促下，阿根廷的邻国智利叫停了中国在阿塔卡马沙漠建设天文观测站的项目。塞斯科天文台的中国射电望远镜项目建成后将成为南美同类设施中规模最大的，其部分关键收尾部件已被阿根廷海关扣留约九个月。

According to a document from the Argentine government’s cabinet chief, procedural violations in renewing the deal with China prevented the project from going forward. The government declined to comment on whether the U.S. diplomacy played a role in the decision.

阿根廷政府内阁首席部长的一份文件显示，与中国续签协议过程中存在程序违规，导致项目无法推进。对于美国外交施压是否影响了该决定，阿根廷政府拒绝置评。

几位天文学家正在一架位于中国未完工射电望远镜附近的望远镜旁工作。

But current and former American officials, some of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive diplomacy, said the U.S. government had repeatedly expressed concerns with the Argentine authorities about the Chinese telescope, worried it could be used to track U.S. satellites and communicate with Chinese ones.

但多位现任及前任美国官员（因涉及敏感外交事务，部分人要求匿名）表示，美国政府已就中国射电望远镜项目多次向阿根廷当局表达关切，担心其可用于追踪美国卫星并与中国卫星通信。

The campaign began during the Biden administration and continued under President Trump.

这一施压行动始于拜登政府时期，并在特朗普总统任期内持续进行。

Argentine astronomers, who have spent most of their lives observing stars light years away, have received a crash course in earthly politics.

阿根廷的天文学家们毕生都在观测数光年外的恒星，如今却不得不仓促学习现实政治。

Scientists had looked forward to sharing the telescope with China and other nations. Then they learned that the U.S. effort to check China had reached the deserts of South America, threatening their search into the vastness of space.

科学家们曾期待与中国及其他国家共享这座望远镜，如今却发现，美国遏制中国的举措已延伸至南美沙漠，威胁着他们探索浩瀚宇宙的计划。

“We are stuck in a political black hole,” said Ana Maria Pacheco, 61, an astronomer.

61岁的天文学家安娜·玛丽亚·帕切科说：“我们陷进了一个政治黑洞里。”

The State Department did not reply to requests for comment.

美国国务院未回应置评请求。

In 2015, as China was expanding its presence across South America, the Chinese military built another facility, a $50 million satellite and space mission control station in Neuquén Province, in Argentina’s Patagonian desert. Argentina gave China the use of the land where the station was built, rent free, for 50 years.

2015年，中国在南美影响力持续扩大之际，中国军方在阿根廷巴塔哥尼亚沙漠的内乌肯省建造了另一处设施——一座耗资5000万美元的卫星及航天任务控制站。阿根廷将该中心所在地块无偿租借给中国，租期50年。

For China hawks in Washington, that Patagonian base became a symbol of how Argentina was being pulled into China’s orbit, and the site’s antenna there stands as a 450-ton cautionary tale.

对于华盛顿的对华鹰派而言，这座巴塔哥尼亚基地成为阿根廷被拉入中国势力范围的象征，基地内450吨重的天线俨然是一则警示寓言。

The Trump administration has forged a tight bond with Javier Milei, Argentina’s right-wing president, and aided him with a $20 billion lifeline ahead of key midterm elections last year.

特朗普政府与阿根廷右翼总统哈维尔·米莱建立了紧密关系，并在去年关键中期选举前向其提供200亿美元的救命钱。

While running for president, Mr. Milei expressed hostility toward China. But after being elected in 2023, he softened his tone, perhaps facing the reality that China’s economy is entwined with that of Argentina through trade, infrastructure, mining projects and financial assistance, just as it is in other Latin American countries.

米莱竞选总统期间曾对中国持敌对态度，但2023年当选后态度软化。这或许是因为他意识到，阿根廷的经济已通过贸易、基建、矿业项目及金融援助与中国深度绑定，拉美多国亦是如此。

U.S. officials say they are aware that dislodging China from Latin America will be hard. Still, they see the frozen gears of the San Juan radio telescope — which was built in partnership between the National University of San Juan and the National Astronomical Observatory of China — as a sign that U.S. diplomacy can help thwart aspects of China’s space ambitions, and perhaps its military ones too.

美国官员表示，将中国逐出拉美并非易事。尽管如此，他们仍将圣胡安射电望远镜的停滞——该项目由圣胡安国立大学与中国国家天文台合作建设——视为美国外交能够牵制中国的太空野心、或许也包括军事野心的例证。

The Chinese Embassy in Buenos Aires said in a statement that the U.S. was “looking for an excuse to contain and suppress China.” They said the project was aimed at promoting scientific progress in both Argentina and China, with benefits for all of humanity. They called the American position “ridiculous and regrettable.”

中国驻布宜诺斯艾利斯大使馆发表声明称，美方是在“找借口遏制打压中国”，强调该项目旨在推动阿中两国科技进步，造福全人类，指责美方立场“荒谬且令人遗憾”。

When the Chilean observatory project was halted last year, the Chinese Embassy in Santiago said in a statement that the United States also uses telescopes in Chile and accused it of a “pure and simple manifestation of hegemonism.”

去年智利天文台项目被叫停时，中国驻圣地亚哥大使馆发表声明，指出美国也在智利使用射电望远镜，指责其行径是“赤裸裸的霸权主义”。

The United States does have a significant astronomical presence in South America, with NASA using several space stations to track satellites.

美国在南美确实拥有相当规模的天文设施，NASA使用多个空间站开展卫星追踪工作。

Stargazing With China

与中国共探星空

圣胡安国立大学天文学家埃里克·冈萨雷斯（左），他站在这座尚未完工的中国望远镜的地下室里。埃尔莱翁西托的塞斯科天文台内，几位天文学家站在一座射电台旁。这里的天空被认为是世界上最适合研究太空的地方之一。

The Argentine observatory in San Juan where the disputed Chinese telescope stands was inaugurated in the 1960s in partnership with Yale and Columbia University. Argentina has some of the world’s clearest, cloudless skies, and German, Russian and Brazilian institutions built telescopes that now dot the observatory’s grounds. Construction has started on a new telescope in collaboration with the University of Texas.

圣胡安省这座存有争议的中国望远镜所在的阿根廷天文台是在20世纪60年代与耶鲁大学、哥伦比亚大学合作建成的。阿根廷拥有全球最澄澈的少云天空，德国、俄罗斯、巴西等国机构在此建设的望远镜如今点缀在这座天文台的场地中。目前，与得克萨斯大学合作的新望远镜已开始建设。

But the venture with China tested the limits of this astronomical cosmopolitanism.

但与中国的合作项目却考验着这种天文国际主义的极限。

The China Argentina Radio Telescope was a $32 million investment that started about 15 years ago. It has a 130-foot-wide antenna: a gigantic satellite dish that allows scientists to capture invisible radio waves from space to map the birth of stars and distant galaxies. It is thanks to these types of telescopes that astronomers captured the first-ever image of a black hole in 2019.

中阿射电望远镜项目总投资3200万美元，约15年前启动。望远镜配备了直径约40米的巨大卫星碟形天线，可捕捉宇宙中的不可见射电波，助力科学家绘制恒星与遥远星系的诞生图景。正是借助这类望远镜，天文学家于2019年首次拍到黑洞照片。

In 2023, 100 trucks carrying the telescope’s enormous iron components wound their way up narrow mountain roads to the observatory. Along with the machinery came a team of Chinese technicians who took up residence in Barreal, the nearest town, where horses and cows wander past low-slung houses.

2023年，100辆卡车装载着望远镜的巨型铁制构件，沿着狭窄山路蜿蜒而上运抵天文台。随行的还有中国技术团队，他们驻扎在附近的巴雷亚尔小镇，在那里低矮的房屋旁边，牛马悠闲地漫步。

From early in the Biden administration, top White House national security officials and State Department diplomats were aware of the project. In August 2021, Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser, and Juan Gonzalez, the top White House adviser on Latin America, raised the issue during a visit to Buenos Aires, Mr. Gonzalez said.

拜登政府上任初期，白宫国家安全官员与国务院外交官便已知晓该项目。白宫拉丁美洲事务高级顾问胡安·冈萨雷斯称，2021年8月，国家安全顾问杰克·沙利文与他本人在访问布宜诺斯艾利斯期间，就曾提出该问题。

The American officials told Alberto Fernández, then the president of Argentina, that they were concerned about several Chinese projects, including the radio telescope, a port in Ushuaia in the far south, and the base in Neuquén, he said.

冈萨雷斯表示，美方官员向时任阿根廷总统阿尔韦托·费尔南德斯表达了对阿根廷多个中国项目的担忧，包括这座射电望远镜、阿根廷最南端乌斯怀亚的港口，以及位于内乌肯省的那座基地。

The Argentine president said he would ensure the projects were not used for military purposes, Mr. Gonzalez said, but a 50-year lease on the land in Neuquén meant China had a strong legal case to continue using that site.

冈萨雷斯说，阿根廷总统承诺确保这些项目不用于军事目的，但内乌肯土地50年的租约，意味着中国拥有继续使用该设施的坚实法律依据。

American officials, in diplomatic conversations, pushed harder on the radio telescope project in San Juan.

在外交磋商中，美国官员对圣胡安射电望远镜项目的态度更加强硬。

The Trump administration kept up the pressure. In February 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio discussed “space collaboration” with Gerardo Werthein, Argentina’s foreign minister at the time, according to a State Department summary of the call.

特朗普政府延续了施压态势。国务院通话纪要显示，2025年2月，国务卿鲁比奥与时任阿根廷外长赫拉多·韦尔海恩就“太空合作”问题进行了讨论。

That spring, experts from the Sandia lab in Albuquerque, run by the Department of Energy, traveled to Buenos Aires to brief Argentine officials about the possible risks posed by the Chinese telescope, American officials said.

美国官员称，同年春季，美国能源部管理下的阿尔伯克基桑迪亚国家实验室的专家前往布宜诺斯艾利斯，向阿根廷官员说明该中国望远镜可能带来的风险。

At the State Department’s urging, the office of the U.S. trade representative included language in a new bilateral trade agreement that tried to limit Argentina’s ability to work with China on space projects.

在国务院敦促下，美国贸易代表办公室在新的双边贸易协定中加入相关条款，试图限制阿根廷与中国在航天项目上的合作。

The document says Argentina must cooperate with “U.S. government technical experts to implement sufficient control measures at space installations operated by other countries to ensure their exclusively civilian use.”

该文件规定，阿根廷须与“美国政府技术专家合作，在他国运营的太空设施中实施充分管控措施，确保其仅用于民用目的”。

Argentina’s agreement with China to build the telescope expired last summer. Shortly after, customs authorities froze some key parts of the antenna in the port of Buenos Aires.

阿中望远镜合作协议于去年夏天到期。此后不久，阿根廷海关在布宜诺斯艾利斯港扣留了其天线的部分关键部件。

Every evening as our children eat dinner, my phone notifies me that our 3-year-old’s teacher has uploaded photos taken during the day at school. An artificial intelligence facial recognition feature puts a red square around his face, letting me know which photos to look at. It’s kind of creepy, but kind of helpful, too.

每天晚上，当我们的孩子吃晚饭时，我的手机就会通知我，我们三岁孩子的老师上传了当天在学校拍摄的照片。人工智能人脸识别功能会在他的脸周围画一个红框，提醒我该看哪些照片。这有点令人毛骨悚然，但也挺有帮助的。

In China, surveillance technology and A.I. surround our everyday life. It’s built into the way we order food delivered to us from online apps; almost nobody I know here in Shanghai buys groceries at a grocery store, so we rely on A.I.-powered technologies to keep us fed. It’s visible in the infrastructure we use to go to work and school, from trains using facial recognition in lieu of physical tickets to self-driving taxis. China’s technological system offers an unparalleled convenience, and A.I. is such a huge part of it.

在中国，监控技术和人工智能已经渗透到日常生活的方方面面。我们通过在线应用订外卖时就用到了它；我在上海认识的人几乎没人去实体超市买菜，我们依赖人工智能驱动的技术来解决吃饭问题。在我们上下班和上学的基础设施中也能看到它的身影——从用刷脸代替实体车票的列车，到自动驾驶出租车。中国的技术体系提供了无与伦比的便利，而人工智能是其中极其重要的一部分。

Many American leaders believe the United States cannot overcome its adversary China unless it beats the country in the A.I. race. Every new chip that President Trump approves for sale to China, every visit by Nvidia chief’s executive, Jensen Huang, to Shanghai and every Chinese A.I. breakthrough strikes terror into the hearts of America’s China hawks. Hardware, rare-earth metals, revamped power grids and human talent could all dictate which side ends up creating the first superintelligence. The upcoming summit between Mr. Trump and China’s leader, Xi Jinping, may lead to a few policy changes, but this belief is more fixed.

许多美国领导人认为，美国要想战胜自己的对手中国，必须在人工智能竞赛中击败它。每一次特朗普总统批准向中国出售的新芯片，每一次英伟达首席执行官黄仁勋访问上海，以及每一次中国人工智能的突破，都让美国的“对华鹰派”感到恐惧。硬件、稀土金属、升级后的电网以及人才，都可能决定哪一方率先创造出第一个超级智能。特朗普与中国领导人习近平即将举行的峰会可能会带来一些政策调整，但这种信念已经根深蒂固。

The reality is that China and the United States are racing in different directions, because the two countries conceptualize A.I. very differently. Americans want to create the most powerful technology humans have ever known. In the quest for superintelligence, the U.S. government is encouraging private firms to move full speed ahead, regulation be damned. Under the very tightest regulation, by contrast, the Chinese want to make A.I. more practical and embedded in society, more carefully selecting how it is deployed and used by the population. If the Chinese achieve their A.I. goals, they may take a lead in the larger geopolitical contest between the two nations.

现实情况是，中国和美国正朝着不同的方向竞赛，因为两国对人工智能的理解截然不同。美国人想要创造人类有史以来最强大的技术。在追求超级智能的过程中，美国政府鼓励私营企业全速前进，让监管见鬼去吧。相比之下，在极为严格的监管下，中国希望让人工智能变得更加实用、更加深入社会，更谨慎地选择如何部署和让民众使用它。如果中国实现其人工智能目标，他们可能会地缘政治的大国竞争中占据上风。

Most Chinese policymakers don’t believe A.I. superintelligence is arriving any time soon. Instead, the Chinese strategy is about advancing a government-directed strategy referred to as “A.I.+” that treats A.I. as if it were infrastructure. This includes government-coordinated plans, local subsidies and national computing-power programs to diffuse cheap, capable A.I. tools into every public service. Chinese people encounter A.I. as a natural part of their day-to-day lives. Sometimes it’s visible and palpable, like the “smile to pay” terminals used in many shops. Sometimes it’s invisible, like Hangzhou’s City Brain, which uses A.I. to analyze massive amounts of data for urban management needs like regulating traffic and environmental protection.

大多数中国决策者并不认为人工超级智能很快就会到来。相反，中国的战略是推进一项政府主导的策略，称为“人工智能+”，将人工智能视为基础设施。这包括政府协调的规划、地方补贴以及国家算力项目，目的是将廉价、高性能的人工智能工具普及到每一项公共服务中。中国人把人工智能当作日常生活自然而然的一部分。有时它显而易见，比如许多商店里使用的“微笑支付”终端；有时它隐形无踪，比如杭州的“城市大脑”，它利用人工智能分析海量数据，用于交通管理和环境保护等城市治理需求。

Unlike in the United States, where most people remain wary, A.I. seems to have had less of a backlash in China. The Chinese A.I.+ strategy is practical and comprehensible to the local population in a way that the U.S. strategy simply is not, which may explain why the Chinese appear so much more optimistic about A.I. than Americans.

与美国不同（大多数人仍对人工智能保持警惕），人工智能在中国似乎没有引发太多反弹。中国的“人工智能+”战略对当地民众来说实用且易于理解，而美国的战略则远非如此，这或许解释了为什么中国人对人工智能显得比美国人乐观得多。

Chinese leaders are trying to maximize the country’s resources. The country’s chief resource is not oil, soybeans or pork bellies, but Chinese people. As of the 2020 census, nearly 40 percent of Chinese lived in rural areas, including 110 million children. Even more are living without access to quality education and health care. For Chinese leaders, the fact that so many Chinese people are structurally denied access to their best lives is a crisis even bigger than the low birthrate. How many potential geniuses are there among those 110 million rural children? What if the gross domestic product per capita of all of them could be quadrupled?

中国领导人正在努力最大化国家的资源。中国最重要的资源不是石油、大豆或五花肉，而是中国人民。根据2020年人口普查，近40%的中国人生活在农村地区，其中包括1.1亿儿童。还有更多人无法获得优质教育和医疗。对中国领导人来说，如此多的中国人被结构性剥夺了过上最好生活的机会，这是一场比低生育率更大的危机。在那1.1亿农村儿童中，有多少潜在的天才？如果他们所有人的国内生产总值人均值都能翻两番呢？

A.I. may be the answer. Are the teachers in rural schools overworked and undertrained? A.I. agents can help teach students with personalized instruction. Are the hospitals lacking in high-quality doctors? A.I. can diagnose diseases by analyzing patients’ health data. A.I. could make it easier to hire and train the caregivers needed for China’s growing elderly population, with robotic or digital companions supplementing the work of human nurses.

人工智能或许就是答案。农村学校的老师是否负担过重、培训不足？人工智能代理可以提供个性化教学来帮助学生。医院是否缺乏高素质医生？人工智能可以通过分析患者健康数据来诊断疾病。人工智能还能协助招聘和培训中国日益增长的老龄人口所需的护理人员，机器人或数字伴侣可以辅助人类护士的工作。

A.I. could also make it easier to predict and prepare for extreme weather events that could set back local economies. It could further optimize the transition to green energy. China has ports in which machines put containers on ships with barely any human supervision.

人工智能还可以更容易地预测和准备极端天气事件，这些事件可能拖累地方经济。它还能进一步优化向绿色能源的转型。中国的一些港口已经实现机器在几乎无人监督的情况下将集装箱装上船。

But China’s A.I.-as-infrastructure strategy is about more than just improving the country’s domestic quality of life. It’s also about exporting Chinese influence. Chinese A.I. is already integrated into the supply chains that dominate world trade.

但中国“人工智能即基础设施”的战略不仅仅是为了改善国内生活质量。它还关乎输出中国的影响力。中国人工智能已经融入主导世界贸易的供应链之中。

And increasingly, rather than selling individual goods or services, China is selling a whole suite — energy, infrastructure, telecoms, transportation, surveillance — with A.I. systems to manage it all. As emerging markets from Southeast Asia to Latin America to Europe seek solutions to large problems like keeping power grids running, Chinese A.I. solutions may be what they end up buying. These models don’t have to be as powerful as American ones; they just have to be powerful enough. In that way, as China exports those A.I. models, it will be exporting Chinese governance as well, with all of the safety, abundance, surveillance and embedded hierarchies that entails.

而且，中国越来越不是在销售单个商品或服务，而是销售一整套解决方案——能源、基础设施、电信、交通、监控——并用人工智能系统来管理这一切。从东南亚到拉丁美洲再到欧洲，新兴市场都在寻找解决大规模问题（如维持电网运行）的方案，最终可能都会选择中国的人工智能解决方案。这些模型不必像美国的那样强大，只要足够强大就行。这样一来，随着中国出口这些人工智能模型，它也将同时输出中国的治理模式，包括随之而来的安全、富足、监控以及嵌入其中的等级秩序。

That’s why the difference between these two countries in the A.I. race matters so much. America’s spaceship might still be the first to take off. But back on planet Earth, the Chinese will be using A.I. to run their hospitals, schools, roads and more. Brazilians, Russians, Africans and even the Europeans may be doing so soon, too.

这就是为什么两国在人工智能竞赛中的差异如此重要。美国的“宇宙飞船”可能仍是第一个起飞的。但在地球上，中国人正在用人工智能管理他们的医院、学校、道路等等。巴西人、俄罗斯人、非洲人，甚至欧洲人，可能很快也会这么做。

Poland will soon host production lines for South Korean tanks. Australia is buying warships from Japan. Canada will send uranium to India, while India offers cruise missiles to Vietnam, and Brazil builds military transport planes for the United Arab Emirates.

波兰即将启用韩国坦克生产线；澳大利亚正从日本采购军舰；加拿大将向印度出口铀，印度则向越南提供巡航导弹；巴西为阿联酋制造军用运输机。

All of these deals were sealed in the past few weeks. Each one represents an attempt by middle powers to protect themselves as the conflict in Iran throttles global energy supplies, and as a high-stakes summit between President Trump and Xi Jinping of China looms.

以上军购协议均在过去数周内敲定。随着伊朗冲突导致全球能源供应受阻，特朗普总统与中国国家主席习近平事关重大的峰会迫在眉睫，这些协议交易无不体现了中等强国为自保所作的努力。

Global polls show the world has little trust in the United States and China. Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi have both used their enormous leverage over trade and security to coerce or punish. And in response, smaller nations are behaving as if they are stuck in “Godzilla” or “Dune” — moving quietly in small groups, trying not to provoke the wrath of petulant giants.

全球民调显示，世界各国对美中两国均缺乏信任。特朗普与习近平都曾利用自身在贸易和安全领域的巨大影响力，对他国进行胁迫或惩罚。作为回应，小国的处境如同电影《哥斯拉》(Godzilla)或《沙丘》(Dune)中的角色——它们低调地抱团行动，避免触怒喜怒无常的大国。

“It’s fifty shades of hedging,” said Richard Heydarian, a Filipino political scientist at Oxford University. Or, as Ja Ian Chong, a security analyst in Singapore put it, “No party wants to cross Beijing and now Washington, too.”

菲律宾政治学家、牛津大学学者理查德·海达里安称：“这是花样百出的避险策略。”新加坡安全分析师庄嘉颖则表示：“没有任何一方愿意得罪北京，现在也不愿得罪华盛顿。”

2025年，波兰布拉涅沃，波兰士兵在一次训练演习中驾驶韩国制造的K2黑豹坦克。

For countries watching from afar, dread and hope hover over the Trump-Xi meeting in Beijing, which is scheduled for this week. In Asia, which has been hit hardest and fastest by oil shortages caused by the war and China’s tight control of oil-product exports, the mood is particularly grim. Interviews with officials, and statements from leaders traveling the globe to secure trade and defense deals, suggest that most middle powers feel overwhelmed by the deteriorating world order.

对于远观局势的国家而言，本周将在北京举行的特朗普与习近平会晤让它们既担忧又心存希望。在亚洲，由于战争引发的石油短缺以及中国对石油产品出口的严格管控，该地区受冲击最为严重且速度最快，当地的氛围尤为严峻。多国官员接受采访时的言论，以及各国领导人奔走全球敲定贸易与防务协议的表态，均表明多数中等国家对持续恶化的国际秩序感到无力。

Many believe the summit carries more potential for harm than help. And Mr. Trump’s gut-driven approach to complex issues is the main source of anxiety.

许多国家认为，此次峰会弊大于利。而特朗普凭直觉处理复杂问题的风格正是引发焦虑的主要根源。

For months, officials in Asia have worried that the president might be too eager to make a deal with Mr. Xi, ending weapons sales to Taiwan or agreeing to softened policy language that could make it easier for China to undermine the democratic island.

数月来，亚洲各国官员一直担心，特朗普可能急于与习近平达成协议，从而停止对台军售，或同意软化政策表述，使中国更容易破坏这个民主岛屿的稳定。

“That would be the biggest nightmare,” said one Taiwanese official who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss internal government matters. He insisted that reduced support from the U.S. was unlikely.

一位因讨论政府内部事务而不愿透露姓名的台湾官员说：“那将是最大的噩梦。”他坚称美国减少对台支持的可能性不大。

But any concession on Taiwan could lead other American partners to fear abandonment. Beijing’s push for compliance on contested territory elsewhere would be bolstered, from the border with India to the South China Sea.

但是，任何涉及台湾问题的让步都可能导致美国的其他合作伙伴担心被抛弃。从中印边境到南海，中国在争议领土问题问题上要求对方服从的立场也将得到助长。

Vietnamese officials said that if President Trump makes a conciliatory gesture or flatters Xi, even without bigger compromises, China will gain leeway to press harder on smaller countries.

越南官员表示，如果特朗普总统做出和解姿态或对习近平大加赞扬，即使没有更大的让步，中国也将获得更多回旋余地，从而对小国施加更大压力。

Another concern being discussed across the region: that Mr. Trump might alter long-term security plans in exchange for better economic terms with China.

该地区正在讨论的另一个担忧是，为了换取与中国更有利的经济条款，特朗普可能会调整长期安全部署。

Mr. Trump’s decision to redirect a carrier strike group from the Pacific and munitions from South Korea for the war in Iran may have created momentum for broader redeployments. When the Pentagon announced it would pull at least 5,000 troops from Germany after Mr. Trump expressed annoyance with the German chancellor, allies in Asia were again reminded how quickly collective deterrence can be weakened.

此前，特朗普为伊朗战争而调遣太平洋航母战斗群、从韩国抽调军火，这些决定可能为更广泛的部队重新部署造势。特朗普对德国总理表达不满后，五角大楼宣布从德国撤出至少5000名士兵，这再次令亚洲盟友意识到，集体威慑体系可能迅速削弱。

5月，美军士兵在波兰参加北约军事演习。美国可能将从德国维尔塞克基地撤出第2骑兵团斯特赖克旅，特朗普总统此前曾作此宣布。

Mr. Trump has threatened in the past to make troop withdrawals from Japan, which hosts around 53,000 American military personnel — more than any other country — and South Korea, where another 24,000 Americans are stationed. If he could get something big from Mr. Xi for a drawdown, would he turn down the deal?

特朗普曾威胁从日本和韩国撤军，日本驻有约5.3万名美军，为全球最多，韩国驻有2.4万名美军。如果能通过缩减驻军从习近平那里换取重大利益，特朗普会拒绝这笔交易吗？

Analysts noted that plans opposed by China, such as AUKUS, a pact between Australia, England and the U.S. designed to counter Beijing’s influence by equipping Australia with nuclear-powered submarines and advanced technology, could also be suddenly canceled.

分析人士指出，中国反对的其他计划也有可能被突然取消，例如由澳大利亚、英国和美国组成的AUKUS联盟，该协议旨在为澳大利亚配备核潜艇及先进技术，制衡北京的影响力。

“The sense that U.S. allies have to look to one another because they can no longer look to America is very real,” said Hugh White, a former Australian intelligence official who teaches strategic studies at the Australia National University.

澳大利亚国立大学战略研究教授、前情报官员休·怀特表示：“盟友们真切地意识到，它们无法再依赖美国，只能彼此依靠。”

That sentiment is much stronger than “the cautious public language” of national leaders might suggest, he added.

他还说，这种情绪远比各国领导人“谨慎的公开言论”要强烈得多。

European and Asian officials often talk privately in frank terms about giving up their faith in America, prompting a no-turning-back effort to diversify away from the United States. In casual discussions with reporters, they can sound a lot like Prime Minister Mark Carney of Canada, who received a standing ovation in Davos this year for a speech that declared, “We are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition.”

欧洲和亚洲官员私下经常坦言，已对美国失去信心，并着手摆脱对美依赖，展开了不可逆转的多元化努力。在与记者的非正式交谈中，他们的语气往往与加拿大总理马克·卡尼如出一辙——今年达沃斯论坛上，卡尼的演讲赢得全场起立鼓掌，他宣称：“我们正身处秩序断裂的时期，而不是过渡时期。”

But in public, they’re more circumspect. Some officials admit their countries are trying to buy time and evade Mr. Trump’s fits of pique, while continuing the performance of imperial fealty.

但在公开场合，他们更为谨慎。部分官员承认，他们的国家正设法拖延时间、避免触怒特朗普，同时继续表演对帝国的效忠。

2026年3月，在韩国举行的韩美自由盾牌联合军演期间，美军官兵正在参加联合演习。

South Korean officials have simply expressed resignation over American military diversions, after making clear they felt betrayed in 2004, when President George W. Bush announced plans to move troops from Asia to the war in Iraq. Australia, Taiwan and Japan publicly and repeatedly stress the value of American leadership without caveats — even as U.S. tariffs and the war Mr. Trump started with Iran kneecap their economies.

韩国官员对美国的军事部署调整仅表示无奈，而在2004年小布什总统宣布将部队从亚洲调往伊拉克参战时，他们曾明确表示感觉遭到背叛。澳大利亚、台湾和日本则反复公开强调美国领导力的价值，而且不附带任何条件——即便美国关税政策与特朗普挑起的伊朗战争正重创它们的经济。

Walking with Caution

谨慎前行

No one wants to be seen stepping out of line.

无人愿被视作越界。

Japan’s new prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, has been bolder than most in trying to foster stronger relationships with other countries. Yet even as she crisscrossed the region promoting military cooperation, officials in Tokyo worried about how Washington would view her efforts.

日本新首相高市早苗在寻求加强与其他国家的关系方面比大多数领导人都更为大胆。但即便她奔走地区各国、促进军事合作，东京官员仍担忧华盛顿会如何看待她的这些努力。

“The Japanese don’t want Takaichi’s security cooperation and tour, especially to Australia, to be seen as a version of Mark Carney,” said Michael J. Green, the author of several books on Japan, and chief executive of the United States Study Centre at the University of Sydney.

“日本人不希望高市早苗的安全合作及出访——尤其是对澳大利亚的访问——被视为马克·卡尼式的举动，”迈克尔·格林表示，他著有多部关于日本的著作，现任悉尼大学美国研究中心主任。

今年3月，加拿大总理马克·卡尼与印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪在新德里海得拉巴府会晤前合影。

Others have apparently reached the same conclusion. Mr. Carney’s recent visits to India and Australia did not yield strong statements from their leaders echoing his criticism of great power rivalry or his warning that if middle powers are “not at the table, we’re on the menu.”

其他国家也得出了同样的结论。卡尼近期访问了印度与澳大利亚，印澳两国领导人并未发表强有力的声明，以呼应卡尼对大国竞争的批评，或他关于“如果中等国家不在谈判桌旁，就会成为盘中餐”的警告。 

At the same time, many countries — including some that are benefiting from the thickening of middle-power bonds — have been careful not to anger the world’s other hegemon, China.

与此同时，许多国家——包括那些受益于中等国家联盟强化的国家——都在小心翼翼，避免激怒另一个霸权——中国。

Nations managing their own disputes with Beijing, such as Indonesia, have done less to rally around Japan than some in Tokyo would have liked, since Ms. Takaichi became embroiled in a diplomatic crisis after telling her Parliament that if China attacked Taiwan, Japan could respond militarily.

像印度尼西亚这样正处理同北京之间争端的国家，在团结支持日本方面所做的努力远不及东京的期望。此前，高市早苗在向议会表示“如果中国攻击台湾，日本可以采取军事行动”后，卷入了一场外交危机。

Vietnamese officials even pressed Ms. Takaichi to avoid directly criticizing China in her speech at a university on May 2 in Hanoi, according to diplomats who spoke on condition of anonymity to describe sensitive discussions. It is not clear if adjustments were made. Chinese officials later condemned her diplomatic efforts as “war preparation.”

据几位因透露敏感讨论而要求匿名的外交官称，越南官员甚至要求高市早苗5月2日在河内一所大学演讲时，避免直接批评中国。目前尚不清楚她是否作出了调整。中方随后谴责她的外交举动是“备战”。

And yet, in a sign of how middle powers are still doing more while saying less, the two countries signed six cooperation agreements, including one on satellite data sharing and another to secure deliveries for Vietnam’s largest oil refinery, potentially easing shortages.

但中等国家多做少说的策略仍在延续：日本和越南签署六项合作协议，其中包括一项关于卫星数据共享的协议，以及另一项旨在保障越南最大炼油厂原油供应的协议，这有望缓解供应短缺问题。

特朗普总统于3月在白宫与日本首相高市早苗共进晚餐时发表讲话。

“The U.S. has become more unreliable, so it makes sense to try to develop alternatives,” said Robert O. Keohane, an international relations professor at Princeton University. Even if what’s been formed so far is insufficient, he added, “having a weak alternative is better than having no alternative at all.”

普林斯顿大学国际关系教授罗伯特·基欧汉表示：“美国可靠性下降，寻求替代方案是合情合理的。”他还说，即便现有合作尚不完善，“有一个薄弱的替代方案也胜于毫无选择。”

A day after a federal court ruled against President Trump’s latest global tariffs, his administration returned to the drawing board on Friday, trying to preserve its powers to wage economic warfare in time for high-stakes trade talks with China.

联邦法院裁定否决了特朗普总统的最新全球关税政策，次日（即上周五），特朗普政府重新谋划方案，力图在与中国举行事关重大的贸易谈判之前，保留发动经济战的权力。

The latest legal blow concerned the 10 percent tariff that Mr. Trump imposed in late February on nearly all U.S. imports. The president unveiled that policy as a sort of temporary fix, after the Supreme Court tossed out his initial duties, but a panel of judges once again found that the White House had run afoul of the law.

此次最新法律打击涉及特朗普于2月底对几乎所有美国进口商品加征的10%关税。最高法院此前已驳回他的首批关税，总统随后推出该政策作为临时补救措施，但一个法官小组再次裁定白宫此举违法。

The result was a familiar set of headaches for Mr. Trump, who has tried repeatedly — and with mixed success — to stretch his authority to tax imports without the express permission of Congress. Yet the president seemed unfazed by his latest defeat, telling reporters he would pursue his tariffs “a different way,” before the administration took the first steps toward appealing the case.

这对特朗普而言是熟悉的窘境——他屡次试图在未获国会明确授权的情况下扩大对进口征税的权限，成效不一。但总统似乎对此次失利不以为意，对记者称将“换种方式”推行关税，随后其政府启动上诉程序。

Technically, the Court of International Trade only declared the president’s across-the-board, 10 percent tariff to be illegal. Otherwise, it did not issue an order forcing the government to stop collecting it from all importers, at least for now. Still, the outcome marked both a political and legal setback for Mr. Trump, who had spent much of the week issuing trade threats against Europe and preparing for talks in China.

严格来说，美国国际贸易法院仅裁定总统的全面10%关税非法，此外，至少在目前，法院尚未下达命令，强制政府停止向所有进口商征收该关税。尽管如此，这一结果对特朗普而言，仍是政治与法律的双重挫折，他上周大部分时间都在对欧洲发出贸易威胁，并为访华谈判做准备。

Tariffs are expected to be a major topic on the agenda when Mr. Trump travels to Beijing to meet next week with his counterpart, Xi Jinping. Trade experts said the court decision could undercut the president’s leverage. Eswar Prasad, a professor of economics at Cornell University, said the ruling “severely handicapped” the administration’s ability to employ tariffs against foreign nations, leaving Mr. Trump with a “much weaker bargaining hand” when it comes to China.

特朗普本周启程前往北京与中国国家主席习近平会晤时，关税预计将成为核心议题。贸易专家表示，法院裁决或将削弱总统的谈判筹码。康奈尔大学经济学教授埃斯瓦尔·普拉萨德称，该裁决“严重削弱”美国政府对他国动用关税的能力，使特朗普在对华谈判中“处于明显劣势”。

“Any threats by Trump to hit China with broader and higher tariffs if Xi doesn’t bend to his will on economic and geopolitical matters now seem like empty bluster rather than credible ultimatums,” he said.

 “特朗普曾威胁，若习近平不在经济与地缘政治问题上屈从于他的意志，就对中国加征更广泛、更高的关税，如今这些威胁看起来像是虚张声势，而非可信的最后通牒，”他说。

One of the president’s top trade advisers, Jamieson Greer, appeared to brush aside some of those concerns on Friday. During an interview on Fox Business, he criticized the court for ruling against the White House, claiming that some of the judges on the panel were “apparently just hellbent on importing more from China.”

总统首席贸易顾问之一詹姆斯·格里尔上周五似乎对此类担忧不屑一顾。他在接受福克斯商业频道采访时批评法院作出不利于白宫的裁决，声称该合议庭部分法官“显然一心只想增加从中国进口”。

Mr. Greer, who defended the president’s use of trade powers, added that the administration is “confident on appeal we’ll be successful.” Shortly after his comments, the Justice Department filed a notice that it would appeal the matter in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

格里尔为总统动用贸易权力的行为辩护，并称政府“有信心上诉成功”。 在他发表上述言论后不久，司法部便提交通知，表示将向美国联邦巡回上诉法院提起上诉。

At the heart of the matter is Mr. Trump’s decision to invoke a trade power that no president had ever used. Known as Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, it permits the president to impose tariffs up to 15 percent for 150 days, but only in response to strict conditions, including a “balance of payments” crisis.

问题核心在于特朗普援引了一项历任总统均未使用过的贸易权力——《1974年贸易法》第122条。该条款允许总统在150天内征收最高15%的关税，但仅限于满足严格条件的情况下，包括发生“国际收支”危机。

The term itself reflects a bygone concern from the time the law was adopted, when the U.S. dollar was pegged to gold, creating unique economic risks. But the Trump administration sought to argue that the law still applied today, pointing in part to the country’s persistent trade deficit, a different measurement, which reflects the gap between U.S. imports and exports.

该术语源自法案出台时的一个久远担忧——当时美元与黄金挂钩，从而产生了特殊经济风险。但特朗普政府主张该条款至今仍适用，部分理由是美国持续存在的贸易逆差，这一不同的衡量标准反映了美国进出口之间的差距。。

In the end, a majority of judges on the Court of International Trade found the argument unpersuasive and sided with small businesses and states that had sued. It was the second time that some of those challengers had prevailed against Mr. Trump, after they persuaded the Supreme Court to invalidate his earlier use of emergency powers to impose withering tariffs.

最终，国际贸易法院多数法官认为该主张缺乏说服力，并支持提起诉讼的小企业与各州。这是部分原告在与特朗普的对抗中第二次胜诉，此前他们曾说服最高法院宣布特朗普此前动用紧急权力实施重税的决定无效。

The new decision raised the odds that the administration could soon have to pay back the billions of dollars collected from its 10 percent tariff, on top of the $166 billion that the government already owes to U.S. importers from its last legal defeat. But the fight appeared far from over, and much remained uncertain by Friday — not just for American businesses, which paid the cost to import goods, but for the Trump administration itself.

新裁决意味着，政府除上次败诉已欠美国进口商1660亿美元外，可能很快还需退还征收10%关税所得的数十亿美元。但这场纷争远未结束，截至上周五，局势仍充满不确定性——不仅对承担进口成本的美国企业如此，对特朗普政府自身亦是如此。

“President Trump has lawfully used the tariff authorities granted to him by Congress to address our balance of payments crisis,” Kush Desai, a White House spokesman, said in a statement. “The Trump administration is reviewing legal options and maintains confidence in ultimately prevailing.”

白宫发言人库什·德赛在声明中表示：“特朗普总统合法行使国会授予的关税权力，以应对我国的国际收支危机。特朗普政府正评估法律方案，坚信最终将胜诉。”

For one thing, the court appeared to bar the collection of the president’s 10 percent tariff for only some of the plaintiffs that sued, many legal experts said. That raised the odds that droves of U.S. businesses could soon mobilize and “file a court case” of their own asking for similar relief, said Ted Murphy, a top trade lawyer at the law firm Sidley Austin. He added that he also expected the trade court to pause its order pending an appeal.

多位法律专家称，法院似乎仅禁止向部分起诉原告征收总统的10%关税。盛德律师事务所顶级贸易律师特德·墨菲表示，这意味着大批美国企业可能很快会动员起来，自行“提起诉讼”，寻求类似救济。他还预计，贸易法院或将在上诉期间暂停执行其裁决。

The timing is important to Mr. Trump, who had always envisioned his across-the-board tariff as a stopgap that would allow the government time to prepare a set of more lasting rates using another set of authorities, known as Section 301. But that process was widely expected to take months, since the law requires the government to conduct investigations into other countries’ trade practices before Mr. Trump can apply new duties.

时机对特朗普而言至关重要。他一直将全面关税视为一种权宜之计，以便政府争取时间，依据另一项名为“301条款”的贸易授权，制定一套更持久的关税税率。但但人们普遍预计该程序预计耗时数月，因为法律要求政府先对他国贸易行为展开调查，总统才能实施新关税。

Those inquiries targeting dozens of countries are well underway, and the president at times has suggested the final rates could be set at new highs. Some experts believe the tariffs imposed using Section 301 could be more legally durable, though the administration could still face lawsuits over his aggressive use of the law.

针对数十个国家的相关调查已在推进，总统有时暗示最终税率可能创下历史新高。部分专家认为，依据301条款加征的关税，法律效力可能更具持久性，尽管政府仍可能因激进使用该条款面临诉讼。

Michael Lowell, the chair of the global regulatory enforcement group at the law firm Reed Smith, said the White House probably would not have to worry about “a broad attack on that authority.” But, he said, the courts had recently drawn something of a line in the sand, suggesting they would be “very skeptical of the administration looking to the past and finding and repurposing” other powers to advance its trade agenda.

礼德师事务所全球监管执法团队主席迈克尔·洛厄尔表示，白宫或许无需担忧“该权限会遭到全面质疑”。但他称，法院近期已划定底线，表示将“高度质疑政府回溯历史、寻找并重新利用”其他权力，以便推进贸易议程的行为。

Unlike the president’s other trade gambits, his use of Section 301 to apply tariffs was successful in the past, including on China. That left some analysts to conclude that Mr. Trump, while blemished, would still retain some leverage ahead of his trip to Beijing next week.

与他的其他贸易策略不同，特朗普过往曾成功动用301条款加征关税，包括针对中国的关税。这让部分分析人士认为，特朗普虽遇挫折，但在本周访华前仍保有一定谈判筹码。

“Unless they have amnesia, China should remember quite vividly how during Trump’s first term, the U.S. imposed multiple rounds of tariffs under Section 301 on China during negotiations,” said Sara Schuman, a former U.S. trade official who is now managing director at Beacon Global Strategies.

前美国贸易官员、现灯塔全球战略董事总经理萨拉·舒曼表示：“除非他们失忆，否则中国应清楚记得，特朗普首届任期内，美国曾在谈判期间依据301条款对中国加征了多轮关税。”

The administration still has multiple options “to increase tariffs on China in pretty short order,” she added.

她还说，政府仍有多种选择，“能在相当短的时间里对中国加征关税”。

Mr. Trump’s trip to China had been scheduled for April, but was delayed because of the war in Iran. U.S. officials have said their goals for the visit include establishing a “board of trade,” which would oversee commerce between the countries in an effort to balance trade and reduce the U.S. trade deficit with China.

特朗普原定于4月访华，后因伊朗战争推迟。美方官员称，此行目标包括设立“贸易委员会”，负责监督两国商业往来，旨在平衡贸易、减少美国对华逆差。

On Friday, Mr. Greer sketched out a long list of concerns that the administration planned to raise with its Chinese counterparts, from its adherence to past purchase agreements to its approach to artificial intelligence.

周五，格里尔罗列了政府计划向中方提出的一系列关切，从中国是否遵守以往的采购协议，到中国对人工智能的处理方式。

“There’s not really a situation where we go, we get China to change the way they govern, the way they manage their economy; that’s all baked into their system,” he said. “But I think there is a world where we find out where we can optimize trade between China and the U.S. to achieve more balance.”

“实际上，我们很难指望去说服中国改变其治理方式或经济管理方式；这些都已深深植根于他们的体制之中，”他说。“但我认为，我们完全可以探索如何优化中美贸易，实现更加平衡的局面。”

One of the most widely shared viral memes on Chinese social media today is “the American kill line.”

如今，中国的社交媒体上传播最广的热门迷因之一是“美国斩杀线”。

Borrowed from video game slang for the threshold at which a weakened character can be easily finished off, it refers to the widely held notion in China that millions of American families are teetering on a precipice — one lost job, illness or unexpected expense away from ruin. It has become the prevailing Chinese metaphor for an America seen as mired in economic decay, violent crime and irreversible decline.

这一说法借用的是电子游戏术语，原指角色血量跌至某一临界值后便可被轻易击杀。在中国语境中，它代指一种广泛流行的观点：数以百万计的美国家庭正站在悬崖边缘，一旦失业、患病或遭遇意外支出，便会轰然坠落。这已成为中国人描绘美国的主流隐喻——一个深陷经济衰败、暴力犯罪和不可逆转的衰落之中的美国。

This is, of course, false. Violent crime rates in the United States are the lowest in decades, the country retains unmatched geopolitical and financial power and its economy remains vibrant and more than 50 percent larger than China’s.

当然，这种看法是错误的。美国的暴力犯罪率处于几十年来的最低水平，它仍然拥有无可匹敌的地缘政治和金融实力，其经济依然充满活力，比中国的经济总量高出50%以上。

Yet as Beijing prepares for President Trump’s visit this week, I see a dangerous new overconfidence taking hold in my native country based on misplaced notions of American decline. I fear it is fueling a sense of intransigence that is making Chinese leaders more willing to weaponize their nation’s power and less likely to back down in future confrontations with the United States.

然而，在北京为特朗普总统本周的到访做准备之际，我在自己的祖国看到一种基于对美国衰落的错误认知而产生的危险的新型自负情绪正在蔓延。我担心，这种情绪正在助长一种不妥协的心态，使中国领导人更愿意将国家力量武器化，并在未来与美国的对抗中更不愿意退让。

Traveling across China this spring, I am hearing this narrative everywhere. After one particularly gruesome variation on the “kill line” meme made the rounds recently, my family members in China said they feared for the safety of our relatives in the United States. I hear about students who once dreamed of studying in America now enrolling elsewhere, worried about U.S. crime and poor job prospects.

今年春天我在中国各地旅行时，到处都听到这种叙事。最近一个尤为骇人的“斩杀线”版本在网上广泛传播后，我在中国的家人甚至表示担心我们在美国的安全。我还听说，一些曾梦想去美国留学的学生如今选择去其他国家，因为担心美国的治安和就业前景。

Views of the United States have soured over the past decade due in large part to the erratic, weakened America that Mr. Trump appears to represent. A survey in December found that nearly half of Chinese respondents believe U.S. global influence is waning.

过去十年间，美国的形象持续恶化，这在很大程度上是因为特朗普似乎代表着一个反复无常、日渐衰弱的美国。去年12月的一项调查显示，近半数中国受访者认为美国的全球影响力正在减弱。

This belief is partly a defense mechanism to help Chinese people cope with their own problems: a slowing economy, a collapsing property market, high unemployment and a widespread sense of uncertainty. A Beijing taxi driver captured this uneasy mix of anxiety and swagger last month. After venting to me about the problems China’s people face, he added, “At least we have a minimum safety net here. Better than falling below the kill line in America.”

这种认知在一定程度上是一种心理防御机制，帮助中国人消化自身面临的重重困境：经济放缓、房地产市场崩盘、高失业率以及弥漫于社会的不确定感。上个月，北京一名出租车司机向我表达了这种焦虑与自信交织的心态。他向我大倒中国老百姓的苦水之后，补了一句：“至少我们这里还有最低保障，比在美国掉到‘斩杀线’以下好多了。”

Insular, nationalist voices are amplified more than ever. Zhang Weiwei, a university professor who served as Deng Xiaoping’s interpreter and has millions of online followers, absurdly claimed in a viral video in January that China is the only country in the world whose people eat well.

狭隘的民族主义声音比以往任何时候都更加响亮。曾担任邓小平翻译、在网上拥有数百万粉丝的大学教授张维为在今年1月一段广泛传播的视频中荒谬地声称，中国是世界上唯一一个人民吃得好的国家。

Communist Party rhetoric reinforces this. One need only watch China’s state-run nightly news: Most of the half-hour broadcast celebrates domestic successes before usually signing off with a few minutes on U.S. dysfunction, dominated lately by the global chaos unleashed by Mr. Trump’s war on Iran.

中共的宣传也在推波助澜。只要看一看中国国家电视台在晚上的新闻即可：在半小时的节目中，大部分时间都在颂扬国内的成就，最后通常会用几分钟时间报道美国的乱象——近来的主角自然是特朗普发动伊朗战争所引发的全球动荡。

The government also has in the past few years pushed to purge academia of “erroneous” Western intellectual frameworks — such as judicial independence and separation of powers — and replace them with concepts that stress patriotism, party ideology and national security.

过去几年，政府还推动清除学术界“错误的”西方思想框架——如司法独立和三权分立——并用强调爱国主义、党的意识形态和国家安全的概念取而代之。

The theme of U.S. decline is repeatedly reaffirmed in policy documents, speeches by political leaders and influential Communist Party journals and is now voiced even by some mainstream scholars. In the past, many ordinary Chinese shrugged off such rhetoric as propaganda. But recent surveys and studies suggest more people, especially younger Chinese, may be increasingly buying into the narrative.

美国衰落这一论调在中国的政策文件、政治领导人讲话以及有影响力的党刊中被反复强调，如今甚至得到一些主流学者的附和。过去，许多普通中国人将对此类言论视为宣传说辞，对其不屑一顾。但近期的调查与研究显示，越来越多的人似乎正逐渐认同这一说法，尤其是中国的年轻人。

I came of age in China in the 1980s when the country was opening up to the world. We were optimistic about someday rejoining the ranks of great powers. But there was also a palpable humility, a desire to fit into the existing global order. Today, I see a far more prosperous and powerful China than we dared to imagine, self-assured and inclined to play by its own rules.

我于20世纪80年代在中国长大，那时国家正开始对外开放。我们乐观地憧憬着中国有朝一日能重返大国行列，但同时也心怀一种切实的谦逊，渴望融入既有国际秩序。如今中国的繁荣与强大远超我们当年敢于想象的，它自信满满，且倾向于按自己的规则行事。

Chinese leaders no longer seem to view U.S. pressure on trade and technology as existential threats demanding compromise, but as something easily parried by wielding China’s own strengths, as President Xi Jinping did last year when his threat to halt exports of rare earths and other critical minerals forced Mr. Trump to back down on tariffs. Such leverage is a major reason China continues to push aggressively for dominance in sectors like critical minerals, as well as clean energy technologies such as electric vehicles and solar panels, and the raw pharmaceutical ingredients that make up much of the world’s drug supply. These are now nuclear options for China in future trade negotiations or a geopolitical confrontation.

中国领导人似乎不再将美国在贸易和科技领域的施压视为需要妥协应对的生存威胁，而是认为只要发挥中国的自身优势，便能轻松化解。习近平主席去年便是如此：他威胁停止出口稀土及其他关键矿产，迫使特朗普在关税问题上让步。这种反制能力正是中国持续大力谋求关键矿产、电动汽车与太阳能电池板等清洁能源技术，以及全球大部分药品原料领域主导地位的主要原因。这些领域如今已成为中国未来贸易谈判或地缘政治对抗中核武器级别的选项。

As the Chinese public’s hubris rises, it raises the political cost for the country’s leaders to show any restraint in potential crises over the South China Sea or Taiwan. Game-theory research last year showed that even modest increases in nationalism measurably raise the probability that both China and the United States will adopt more hawkish stances in a standoff.

随着中国民众自大情绪的高涨，一旦南海或台湾问题引发潜在危机，中国领导人若表现出任何克制，都将面临更高的政治代价。去年的博弈论研究表明，即便是民族主义情绪的小幅上升，也会显著提高中美双方在对峙中采取更强硬立场的概率。

This arc is not irreversible. U.S. policy toward China should be refocused on a combination of deterrence — such as strengthening America’s resilience in critical supply chains and its geopolitical presence in Asia — and restoring the human connections that once helped hold the relationship together and prevented each side retreating into its own information cocoon.

这种趋势并非不可逆转。美国的对华政策应重新聚焦于威慑与修复人文联系的结合：前者需要增强美国关键供应链的韧性，巩固在亚洲的地缘政治存在；后者则需要重建曾经有助于维系两国关系，避免双方各自退缩到信息茧房中的人文纽带。

A simple but potentially effective starting point would be for Washington to ease visa and security barriers for Chinese students and scholars and to expand fading exchanges in tourism, academia and business.

一个简单却可能有效的切入点是：华盛顿应放宽针对中国学生与学者的签证及安全限制，扩大日渐萎缩的旅游、学术与商业交流。

It’s been nearly nine years since an American president visited China (Mr. Trump, in his first term). That sort of gap is untenable. Sustained, cleareyed and firm U.S. engagement may be the best way to reverse Chinese misperceptions and reset the world’s most consequential relationship.

美国总统上一次访华是在特朗普的首任任期，距今已近九年。这样的外交断层是不合理的。持续、清醒且坚定的对华接触或许是扭转中国认知偏差、重塑这一全球最重要双边关系的最佳途径。

The purge China’s leader, Xi Jinping, has inflicted on the military elite was plain to see at a recent legislative meeting. A year earlier, state television footage showed around 40 generals in the room. This time, there were only a handful.

中国领导人习近平对军队高层实施的清洗在最近一次的人大会议上一目了然。在一年前的人大会议上，官方电视台的画面显示，会场里坐着约40名将领。而这一次，仅寥寥数人。

Yet Mr. Xi indicated that an upheaval that rivaled those of the Mao era was not over. Stony-faced, he warned the remaining officers to beware of disloyalty.

然而，习近平表示，这场堪比毛泽东时代的动荡尚未结束。他面色铁青，警告剩下的军官要警惕不忠之心。

“The military,” he said, “must never have anyone who harbors a divided heart toward the party.”

他说，“军中绝不能有对党怀有二心之人。”

It was a rare public reference by Mr. Xi to one of the worst political crises of his 13 years in power: He had lost faith in the military leadership that he had spent a decade remolding.

这是习近平罕见地公开提及掌权13年来最严重的政治危机之一：他已对自己花费十年重塑的军队领导层失去了信任。

“When Xi uses the words ‘divided heart,’ they are heavy with meaning,” said Chien-wen Kou, a professor at National Chengchi University in Taiwan. The phrase is found in ancient Chinese treatises that counsel rulers against treacherous generals, including a volume Mr. Xi has kept on his bookshelf.

“习近平使用‘二心’这个词，其分量不言而喻，”台湾国立政治大学教授寇健文说。它典出中国古代劝诫帝王防范奸将之道的论著，其中一本据说放在习近平的书架上。

“Even his most trusted and important confidants have fallen,” Professor Kou said. “Who else can gain his trust?”

“即便是他最信任、最倚重的心腹也相继落马，”寇健文说。“还能信任谁呢？”

The crisis threatens one of Mr. Xi’s great feats: the transformation of the Chinese military into a formidable force with new aircraft carriers, hypersonic missiles and an expanding nuclear arsenal. And it comes as China’s rivalry with the United States has intensified, and as the Trump administration has put American firepower, and its limits, on vivid display in Venezuela and Iran.

这场危机威胁到习近平的一大历史性成就：将中国军队打造成一支装备新型航母、高超音速导弹和不断扩充核武库的强大力量。与此同时，中美战略竞争持续加剧，特朗普政府已通过委内瑞拉和伊朗两场军事行动将美国的军事实力——及其局限——展露无遗。

China’s war readiness may be disrupted for years by the very cleanup that Mr. Xi has said is necessary to purify and strengthen the ranks. What once looked like a limited crackdown on corruption became a sweeping dismissal of dozens of top officers, and culminated in the downfall early this year of Zhang Youxia, China’s top uniformed commander, who had appeared to be a confidant of Mr. Xi’s.

习近平所称的这场为了净化和强军的必要清洗可能在未来数年损害中国的战备能力。最初看似针对腐败的有限整治最终演变为对数十名高级军官的大规模撤换，并在今年初以张又侠的落马达到高潮——这位中国最高军职将领曾被视为习近平的心腹。

The final break between them came, by some accounts, when Mr. Xi sought to promote the general leading the cleanup to a position rivaling General Zhang’s. General Zhang objected. Months later, he was out.

据传，二人彻底决裂的导火索是习近平想把主导清洗行动的将领提拔至跟张又侠平起平坐的位置，遭到张的反对。数月后，张又侠出局。

2023年在北京举行的全国人民代表大会上，中央军委成员宣誓就职，习近平在主席台上居中就座。如今这些将军多数已被调查或免职。

The gravity of the campaign was on stark display again this past week, when a military court sentenced two former defense ministers to death, suspended for two years, for bribery. They will probably spend the rest of their lives in prison.

这场反腐运动的严肃性在过去一周再次得到充分体现：一家军事法院以受贿罪判处两名前国防部长死刑，缓期两年执行。他们极有可能在狱中度过余生。

“This is Xi Jinping’s military,” said Daniel Mattingly, an associate professor at Yale University who studies China’s politics and military. “Why does he break the thing that he built?

“这是习近平的军队，”耶鲁大学政治学者丹尼尔·马丁利说，“他为什么要打破自己亲手建立的东西？”

“It’s not what people would have expected of Xi, even five years ago. Something profound changed,” he said.

“即便五年前，人们也不会料到习近平会走到这一步。某些深层的东西已经发生了变化，”他说。

The corruption Mr. Xi has been hunting is real. But earlier internal speeches by Mr. Xi, not previously reported in detail, reveal another factor: a leader who saw in any sign of disobedience the seed of a political threat to his rule. He became convinced, analysts say, that the commanders he had chosen to modernize the military could no longer be trusted, their loyalty and effectiveness eroded by graft and cronyism.

习近平所追查的腐败问题确实存在。然而，此前未详细披露的习近平内部讲话显示，还有另一层因素：这位领导人将任何不服从的苗头都视为对其统治的政治威胁。分析人士认为，他逐渐相信，他亲自挑选来推进军队现代化的指挥官已不再可靠，他们的忠诚与战斗力被贪腐和裙带关系所侵蚀。

Analysts say the upheaval has also exposed the tensions between Mr. Xi’s two imperatives — preparing for combat and enforcing loyalty. Ultimately, Mr. Xi ousted a battle-experienced general who helped remake his military and replaced him with an inquisitor, who is now, alongside Mr. Xi, the sole other remaining member of China’s top military council.

分析人士称，这场动荡也暴露了习近平两个目标——备战能力与政治忠诚之间的紧张关系。最终，习近平罢免了一位具有实战经验、帮助重塑军队的将领，并用一名负责整肃的人取而代之，而此人现在跟习近平一道，是中央军委仅存的两名成员之一。

“Xi Jinping’s rule is slowly entering its late stage,” Professor Kou said. “His political calculations change in this stage, his anxieties become increasingly about members of his own inner circle.”

“习近平的统治时期已经慢慢走入后半段了，”寇健文说。“他的政治算计就有变化了，他会更加担忧他自己圈子的亲信。”

Seizing Control of the Gun

抓住枪杆子

Early on, Mr. Xi appeared determined to avoid the fate of his predecessor, Hu Jintao, who was widely seen to have failed to establish his authority over China’s military commanders.

早期，习近平似乎下定决心避免重蹈前任胡锦涛的覆辙——后者被普遍认为未能真正确立对军队的权威。

Mr. Hu’s weakness was exposed in 2011 during a visit to Beijing by Robert Gates, then the U.S. secretary of defense. Mr. Gates asked Mr. Hu about the test flight of a Chinese stealth fighter jet, news of which had emerged that morning on Chinese websites.

2011年，时任美国国防部长罗伯特·盖茨访问北京时，胡锦涛的弱势暴露无遗。盖茨问及当天早些时候中国网络上流出的中国隐形战机试飞的消息，

Mr. Hu seemed to have no knowledge of it. “The civilian leadership seemed surprised by the test,” Mr. Gates told reporters later.

胡锦涛对此似乎毫不知情。盖茨后来对记者说：“文职领导层似乎对这次试飞感到意外。”

Mr. Hu’s directives to army commanders were “more like suggestions they would consider,” said John Culver, a former C.I.A. analyst now at the Brookings Institution. “Basically you had a system that was no longer responsive to the party.”

胡锦涛对军队指挥官发出的指令“更像是供他们参考的建议，”前中情局分析员、现供职于布鲁金斯学会的约翰·卡尔弗说。“军队基本上已不再听命于党。”

2011年，当时的美国国防部长罗伯特·盖茨与时任中国国家主席胡锦涛在北京人民大会堂会面。

After coming to power in 2012, Mr. Xi launched investigations against commanders who had grown wealthy, and overweening, under Mr. Hu, including some previously deemed untouchable because of their status.

2012年执掌大权后，习近平随即对在胡锦涛时代揽聚财富和权力的将领展开调查，其中不乏因地位显赫而曾被视为动不得的人物。

In 2014, Mr. Xi summoned hundreds of senior officers to Gutian, a town in eastern China where, according to party histories, Mao Zedong in 1929 established the fundamental principle that defines the Chinese state today: The party commands the gun.

2014年，习近平召集数百名高级军官赴福建省东部的古田开会。根据党史记载，1929年毛泽东正是在古田确立了一条定义了今日中国国家形态的根本原则：党指挥枪。

Mr. Xi used that historical backdrop to warn that the Communist Party’s control of the armed forces had eroded to a dangerous degree.

借助这段历史，习近平警告说，共产党对军队的控制已弱化到危险的程度。

At Gutian, Mr. Xi laid out the problems he had inherited. Faith in the party’s values had decayed. Corruption, cronyism and insubordination was brazen. He cited training exercises so fake that soldiers used shovels and sticks instead of guns.

在古田，习近平历数他所接手的种种积弊：对党的价值观的信仰日益式微，腐败、裙带关系和公然抗令横行。他举例说，有的训练演习弄虚作假，士兵拿铁锹和木棍代替枪械。

The Rot

腐化糜烂

To Mr. Xi, the rot was exemplified by Gen. Xu Caihou, who was a retired vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, a position that had put him near the top of the People’s Liberation Army. General Xu had been placed under investigation, accused of taking huge bribes, including for arranging promotions for officers.

在习近平看来，这种腐化糜烂的典型代表是徐才厚上将。徐退休前曾任中央军委副主席，这一职位使他一度位居解放军权力顶端。徐才厚后来受到调查，被指控收受巨额贿赂，包括通过为军官安排晋升换取好处。

“Xu Caihou always solemnly professed undying loyalty and love toward the party,” Mr. Xi said, according to a previously unreported version of a speech he made in Gutian that circulated inside the military. “But really, deep in his soul he had long ago fallen away from the party and into corruption and depravity.”

根据一份此前未被报道、曾在军内流传的古田讲话版本，习近平说：“徐才厚口头上总是信誓旦旦表白‘永远忠于党热爱党’，但实际上灵魂深处早已同党离心离德、腐化糜烂了，”

2004年，徐才厚在长春。他被指控收受巨额贿赂，以换取为他人安排晋升。

Mr. Xi was also alarmed by events abroad. He cited cautionary stories of leaders in the Middle East and the Soviet Union who were toppled after their militaries abandoned them in the face of insurrections.

习近平也对国外发生的事情感到警惕。他指出中东和苏联领导人的前车之鉴——当民众揭竿而起时，军队倒戈，领导人随之被推翻。

Mr. Xi came to the job with a reverence for the People’s Liberation Army. His father was a revolutionary leader who had fought under Mao. In his early career, Mr. Xi worked as a secretary to the minister of defense. Mr. Xi believed that to instill loyalty in the military to the Communist Party and to him, he had to revive “political work” — the indoctrination, vetting and monitoring that made officers and troops trustworthy.

习近平掌权之初，对人民解放军怀有崇敬之情。他的父亲是一位曾在毛泽东麾下战斗过的革命领导人。他早年曾担任国防部长秘书。习近平相信，要让军队忠于共产党以及他本人，就必须重新重视“政治工作”——即通过思想灌输、资格审查和监控，确保军官和士兵的可靠性。

To drive home the new spirit of discipline that he demanded in Gutian, Mr. Xi was shown eating coarse rice and pumpkin soup, the humble, storied meal of the early Red Army.

为了强调他在古田所要求的纪律新风，习近平在镜头前吃粗粮、南瓜汤——这是早期红军朴素而富有象征意义的食物。

“Absolute loyalty to the party rests on the word ‘absolute’,” Mr. Xi said. “It is a loyalty that is singular, total, unconditional and free from any impurities or fakery.”

“对党绝对忠诚要害在‘绝对’两个字，”习近平说。“就是唯一的、彻底的、无条件的、不掺任何杂质的、没有任何水分的忠诚。”

The Chairman Is in Charge

主席说了算

From his first years in power, Mr. Xi also began entrenching a “chairman responsibility system,” an overhaul that tightened his control over the military by giving him intelligence and control deep into its ranks. He declared his confidence in his own ability to spot the right commanders for promotion.

从执政最初几年开始，习近平还着手巩固“军委主席负责制”——这一改革通过让他深入掌握军队内部的情报与控制权，加强了他对军队的掌控。他宣称有信心亲自甄别提拔合适的指挥官。

“The key to building a strong military lies in picking the right people,” he said in an internal speech in 2016, describing how he vetted and spoke to prospects for promotion. “Senior and mid-ranking officers are the backbone for building and running the military, and as chairman of the Central Military Commission, I should personally handle this.”

“强军之道，要在得人，”他在2016年的一次内部讲话中描述自己亲自审核晋升候选人的过程时说。“高中级干部是建军治军骨干，我作为军委主席，应该亲力亲为抓。”

He also replaced decades-old military regions with new theater commands and he dissolved central People’s Liberation Army departments that he saw as barriers to effective control. His goal was to give China the ability to combine land, air and sea forces to project power abroad, while ensuring that this modernized force stayed unflinchingly loyal.

他还以新的战区指挥系统取代了沿用数十年的军区体制，并撤销了他认为阻碍有效指挥的解放军若干中央部门。他的目标是在实现中国陆海空联合作战、对外投送力量的能力同时，确保军队绝对忠诚。

Gen. Zhang Youxia was among the commanders entrusted with executing Mr. Xi’s vision. General Zhang was a gruff, charismatic officer who had distinguished himself on the frontline of China’s yearslong border war with Vietnam from 1979. He was the son of a revolutionary general who had fought alongside Mr. Xi’s father.

张又侠上将是被委以执行习近平愿景重任的指挥官之一。他是一名性格粗犷、富有魅力的军官，在1979年起中国和越南持续数年的边境战争前线表现突出，因而声名显赫。他是革命将领之子，其父曾与习近平的父亲并肩作战。

Mr. Xi had earlier promoted him to the Central Military Commission and made him head of the military’s general armaments department. The department was in charge of acquiring new weapons, which are vital to Mr. Xi’s modernization plans, but had also become a mire of corruption, fed by its control over funds and contracts.

习近平此前已将他提拔至中央军委，并任命他为军队总装备部负责人。该部门负责新武器采购，这些武器对习近平的军队现代化计划至关重要，但同时也因掌控大量资金和合同而成为腐败的温床。

中国官方媒体提供的一张照片显示去年北京阅兵式上的无人机及其他武器装备。习近平曾赋予张又侠上将执行其军队现代化构想的重任。

“He came from a privileged Communist Party background, and it showed,” said Drew Thompson, who was working at the Pentagon and met General Zhang in 2012 when he took part in a Chinese military delegation on a visit to the United States. “I think that combination of his background, his combat experience, his self-confidence, his comfort with weapon systems and his openness to change made him attractive to Xi.”

“他出身中共特权家庭，这一点显而易见，”曾在五角大楼任职、2012年中国军事代表团访美时见过张又侠的唐安竹(Drew Thompson)说。“我认为，他的出身背景、实战经验、自信气质、对武器系统的熟稔以及对变革的开放态度，让他受到习近平的青睐。”

By 2018, Mr. Xi appeared satisfied that his overhaul was paying off. While he acknowledged to the Central Military Commission that problems remained, he said the changes were a “historic transformation” that had “saved the military.”

一直到2018年，习近平对他的改革成效似乎都是满意的。尽管他在中央军委承认问题仍然存在，但他表示这是一场“历史性变革”，并且“挽救了军队”。

When Mr. Xi won a third term as leader in 2022, he unexpectedly retained General Zhang in the military commission. At 72, the commander had been expected to step down. Mr. Xi instead made him China’s top general, tasked with pursuing Mr. Xi’s goal of a breakthrough in military capabilities by 2027.

2022年习近平获得第三个任期时，他出人意料地把张又侠留在了军委。这位72岁的将领原本预计会卸任，但习近平反而让他成为了中国的最高军事指挥官，负责推进习近平提出的2027年前实现军事能力重大突破的目标。

China faced an increasingly perilous world, Mr. Xi said two weeks later during a visit to the Joint Operations Command Center. “Direct all our energies to combat readiness,” he said.

两周后，习近平在视察军委联合作战指挥中心时表示，中国面临日益严峻的世界形势。他说：“全部精力向打仗聚焦。”

Last Man Standing

最后的幸存者

But just over half a year later, in 2023, the veneer of stability cracked. Mr. Xi abruptly replaced the Rocket Force’s top commander and his deputy — an extraordinary move in the arm of the military that controls nuclear and conventional missiles. The purge was never publicly explained. Then China’s defense minister was dismissed without explanation.

但仅仅过了半年多，在2023年，表面的稳定就被打破。习近平突然撤换了火箭军司令及其副手——对于这个掌管核武器与常规导弹的军种，这样的行动极为罕见，始终未获官方解释。随后，国防部长亦在没有任何说明的情况下遭到免职。

Suddenly, Mr. Xi’s transformation of the People’s Liberation Army looked plagued by the same problems of corruption and disobedience that he claimed to have excised.

突然之间，习近平对中国人民解放军的改造似乎也饱受腐败和不服从问题的困扰——而这些问题他本声称已经根除。

This time, Mr. Xi brought his commanders to Yan’an, the hallowed base of Mao’s revolution, where Mr. Xi called for a deepening campaign of “political rectification.” In the two years that followed, dozens of high-ranking officers were removed or disappeared from public view.

这一次，习近平把他的军官们带到了延安——毛泽东革命的圣地，并在此呼吁持续深化“政治整训”。在接下来的两年里，数十名高级军官被撤职或从公众视野中消失。

As the campaign widened, so did the power of Gen. Zhang Shengmin, the commander steering the investigations. He had risen through the ranks despite having little experience in military operations. In the Rocket Force, he was a political commissar, enforcing party loyalty. He was known for his love of Chinese brush calligraphy.

随着这场运动不断推进，主导调查的张升民将军的权力也日益扩大。他虽然缺乏实际军事作战经验，却一路晋升。他曾在火箭军担任政治委员，负责贯彻对党的忠诚。他以喜爱中国书法著称。

He was later promoted to a newly created agency that investigates graft and disloyalty in the military. His ascent reflected the importance Mr. Xi gave to ideological control and political loyalty, even as he also called for battlefield readiness.

他后来被提拔到一个新设立的机构，专门调查军队中的贪腐与不忠行为。他的升迁反映出习近平对意识形态控制与政治忠诚的重视，即便他同时也强调战场战备能力。

“In Xi’s analysis, failures of readiness stemming from corruption are merely an outgrowth of ideological impurity,” said Joel Wuthnow, a senior fellow at the National Defense University in Washington who studies China’s military. “The rot was perhaps deeper than Xi imagined in 2023, and so he needed to take more drastic steps.”

“在习近平看来，因腐败导致的战备松懈，不过是意识形态不纯的一个外在表现，”华盛顿国防大学研究中国军事的高级研究员吴志远(Joel Wuthnow)说。“腐烂的程度或许比习近平2023年所预想的还要深重，因此他不得不采取更为激烈的措施。”

Gen. Zhang Shengmin’s powers were most likely enhanced by pervasive surveillance technologies that gave investigators more tools to spy into the lives, and financial flows, of officers and their families, said Mr. Culver, the researcher at Brookings.

布鲁金斯学会研究员卡尔弗表示，张升民权力的扩大很可能得益于无处不在的监控技术，使调查人员拥有了更多手段，深入地监视军官及其家属的日常生活和资金往来。

By late 2025, the purges were reshaping not just the ranks but the balance of power among remaining commanders. Analysts suggested that as the investigations deepened, there was growing turbulence inside the military elite, including between commanders focused on warfighting goals and officers tasked with enforcing political loyalty.

到2025年底，清洗不仅重塑了军队的等级结构，也改变了现存将领之间的权力格局。分析人士认为，随着调查深入，军队高层内部出现了越来越激烈的震荡，包括专注作战能力的将领与负责政治忠诚的官员之间的冲突。

“Xi is trapped in a red versus expert contradiction,” said Mr. Thompson, the former Pentagon official, referring to “red” as loyalty to the party.

“习近平陷入了‘红’与‘专’之间的矛盾，”前五角大楼官员唐安竹说，这里的“红”指的是对党的忠诚。

2025年3月在北京人民大会堂，张升民上将向习近平敬礼。

With China’s next leadership transition due at a Communist Party congress late next year, in this reading, Mr. Xi appeared more sensitive to perceived threats to his authority. His top commander, Gen. Zhang Youxia, seemed more dominant, with many potential rivals toppled. But he was not untouched: The investigations had also brought down other generals linked to him, potentially implicating him.

随着中共下次领导层换届的党代会将于明年底举行，按照这种解读，习近平对所有被视为威胁其权威的动向越来越敏感。他的最高将领张又侠的地位看似更加稳固了，众多潜在竞争者相继倒台。然而他未能全身而退：调查同样拉下了一批与他有关联的将领，可能使他受到牵连。

And the chief investigator, Gen. Zhang Shengmin, was rising.

而负责调查的上将张升民则在步步高升。

The final straw came when Mr. Xi moved to promote Gen. Zhang Shengmin to vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, said Christopher K. Johnson, a former U.S. government intelligence officer who is now president of China Strategies Group, a consultancy firm.

据咨询公司中国战略集团总裁、前美国政府情报官员张克斯(Christopher K. Johnson)称，最后的导火索是习近平欲提拔张升民出任中央军委副主席。

Gen. Zhang Youxia, backed by his second-in-command, Gen. Liu Zhenli, objected to that proposal because placing an investigator in such a powerful position risked painting the People’s Liberation Army as an unserious combat force, Mr. Johnson said.

张又侠在其副手刘振立上将的支持下，对这一提议表示反对。张克斯表示，张又侠认为，将一名纪委负责人置于如此要职，有损解放军作为一支严肃的作战力量的形象。

Modern Chinese history offers examples of commanders who overestimated how far they could push their leaders. General Zhang appears to have done the same. “Zhang Youxia thought, ‘I’ve got the credentials to say this,’ and it turns out he didn’t,” Mr. Johnson said.

中国现代史上不乏将领高估自己与领导人博弈空间的案例，张又侠似乎有了同样的误判。“张又侠以为凭自己的资历可以说这话，结果证明并非如此，”张克斯说。

When he and his deputy were removed early this year, the official military newspaper accused them of having “gravely trampled on” the chairman responsibility system, which Mr. Xi had built up to cement his control over the military.

今年初，张又侠与其副手遭到撤职，军报随即指控他们“严重破坏践踏”了习近平为巩固对军队控制权而建立的主席负责制。

Mr. Xi is not stopping there. In April, he launched a program of “ideological rectification” and “revolutionary forging” within the military — an indoctrination drive, in other words. Mr. Xi addressed the assembled senior officers, described as the first batch of attendees in Beijing, suggesting that the campaign to instill loyalty would roll on.

习近平并未止步于此。今年4月，他在军内举办培训班，发起“思想整风”，加强“革命性锻造”。习近平亲自出席并向被称为“首批学员”的全军高级干部发表讲话，暗示这场灌输忠诚的运动将持续推进。

Television footage of the meeting showed rows of officers diligently taking notes as Mr. Xi spoke. Sitting next to him was Gen. Zhang Shengmin, the enforcer.

电视画面显示，在习近平讲话时，一排排军官认真地做着笔记。坐在他身旁的，正是那位执行者——张升民上将。

For months, Taiwanese lawmakers have been fighting over a proposal by President Lai Ching-te to spend $40 billion on arms, exposing divisions in the island between a Washington-aligned president and an opposition leader leaning to Beijing. Taiwan had been under pressure from the Trump administration to increase military spending.

几个月来，台湾立法委员们一直围绕总统赖清德提出的400亿美元军购案展开激烈争斗，暴露了岛内亲华盛顿的总统与倾向北京的反对党领袖之间的分歧。特朗普政府一直在向台湾施压，要求其增加军事开支。

On Friday, Taiwan’s legislature finally approved $25 billion in special funds to buy missiles and other weapons from the United States, ending the deadlock ahead of a summit between President Trump and his Chinese counterpart.

周五，台湾立法院终于批准了250亿美元的特别预算，用于向美国采购导弹和其他武器，在特朗普总统与中国领导人的峰会前结束了这一僵局。

China asserts sovereignty over Taiwan and has threatened to claim it by force. The United States provides military and political backing to Taiwan, which many in Washington see as a democratic partner against Beijing.

中国主张对台湾拥有主权，并威胁要以武力收复。美国则向台湾提供军事和政治支持，华盛顿许多人将台湾视为对抗北京的民主伙伴。

China’s leader, Xi Jinping, appears likely to press Mr. Trump on Taiwan during their meeting next week. He has already warned that Mr. Trump should handle U.S. arms sales to the island with “extreme caution.”

中国领导人习近平似乎很可能在本周的会晤中就台湾问题向特朗普施压。他已警告特朗普，在对台军售问题上应“极为谨慎”。

The summit, and growing pressure to lock in orders of American weapons amid high demand, may have prompted Taiwan’s rival political parties to move toward compromise on Friday.

此次峰会，以及需求紧迫的情况下锁定美国武器订单的压力增大，可能促使台湾对立的政党走向妥协。

“The clock was ticking, as there were indications that unless the legislature passed the special defense budget Taiwan would have missed an opportunity to acquire these capabilities,” said David Sacks, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who had previously worked in the United States government dealing with Taiwan, including on arms sales.

“时间很紧，有迹象表明，除非立法院通过这项特别防务预算，否则台湾将错失获得这些能力的机会，”美国外交关系委员会研究员戴维·萨克斯表示。他曾在美国政府负责台湾事务，包括军售问题。

Ahead of the summit in Beijing, Taiwan might also be trying to “buy good will with Trump,” signaling that the island is “stepping up and taking its defense seriously,” Mr. Sacks added.

萨克斯补充说，在北京峰会前，台湾可能也试图“向特朗普买好感”，表明该岛“正在挺身而出，认真对待自身防务”。

The $25 billion approved by Taiwan’s legislature included money to cover an order of U.S.-made weapons that Washington approved late last year, and around $15 billion for proposed arms purchases that are awaiting approval from the Trump administration. The administration has held off on approving a latest package of arms sales to Taiwan to avoid upsetting Mr. Xi before the summit, U.S. officials said earlier this year.

台湾立法院批准的250亿美元中，包括用于支付去年年底华盛顿已批准的美国武器订单的资金，以及约150亿美元用于等待特朗普政府批准的拟议军购。美国官员今年早些时候表示，为避免在峰会前激怒习近平，政府暂缓了最新的对台军售方案的批准。

Taiwan’s arms fund will go toward the purchase of mobile, surface-to-air missiles called Patriots; Hellfire air-to-ground precision missiles; systems to knock out airborne drones; and missiles for striking armored vehicles.

台湾的军购资金将用于采购机动型“爱国者”地对空导弹、“地狱火”空对地精确制导导弹、反无人机系统以及打击装甲车辆的导弹。

“The general direction of these projects is sound,” said Chieh Chung, an adjunct associate research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, a government-funded body in Taipei.

台北政府资助的国防安全研究院兼任副研究员揭仲表示：“这些项目的总体方向是正确的。”

But the approved budget left out the government’s plans for spending on domestic weapons production. That makes it less clear how quickly Taiwan can build up its homegrown drones and munitions, Mr. Chieh said.

但批准的预算并未包含政府用于本土武器生产的计划资金。这让人担心台湾何时才能建起本土的无人机和弹药能力，揭仲说。

The months of sometimes bitter squabbling in the legislature had highlighted rifts in Taiwan over how to navigate Mr. Trump’s unpredictability and the risks posed by China. Both sides made concessions to reach the budget agreement.

立法院数月来有时激烈的争吵，凸显了台湾在如何应对特朗普的不可预测性以及中国带来的风险上存在的裂痕。双方都做出了让步以达成预算协议。

Mr. Lai and his Democratic Progressive Party are deeply wary of China, regard Taiwan as a separate country and support sharper rises in military spending, while the Nationalist Party, Taiwan’s main opposition, has historically tried to keep close ties with both Washington and Beijing. Its chairwoman, Cheng Li-wun, has embraced China and held a friendly meeting with Mr. Xi in Beijing last month.

赖清德及其民进党对中国高度警惕，认为台湾是一个独立国家，并支持大幅增加军事开支；而主要反对党国民党历史上则试图与华盛顿和北京都保持密切关系。其主席郑丽文上个月在北京与习近平举行了友好会晤。

大屏幕显示中国国家主席习近平与台湾最大反对党国民党主席郑丽文4月在北京人民大会堂的会晤。

Mr. Lai had proposed spending $40 billion over eight years for weapons and military technology, in addition to Taiwan’s main annual military budget.

赖清德此前提出在台湾年度主要军事预算之外，再在八年时间里投入400亿美元用于武器和军事技术。

Taiwan’s two main opposition parties, which control a majority of seats in the legislature, had blocked the plan. They accused Mr. Lai of not sharing enough information, complained about a backlog of undelivered weapons from the United States and argued that the large spending on homegrown weapons production could become a fertile ground for corruption.

控制立法院多数席位的两大主要反对党此前阻挠了该计划。他们指责赖清德未提供足够信息，抱怨美国武器迟迟未交付，并认为本土武器生产的大笔支出可能成为腐败的温床。

Ms. Cheng, the chairwoman of the Nationalist Party, eventually agreed to $11 billion in funding for arms sales that had already been approved by the Trump administration last year. But she insisted that additional funds could only be considered after Washington made firm offers of more weapons, which critics said would seriously slow Taiwan’s arms buildup.

国民党主席郑丽文最终同意为特朗普政府去年已批准的军售提供110亿美元资金。但她坚持认为，只有在华盛顿提出更多武器的明确报价后，才能考虑额外资金。批评者称，这将严重拖慢台湾的军力建设。

Centrist Nationalist politicians appear to have pressed the party to come around to a more generous proposal. They warned that the party’s resistance to expanded military spending might hurt their hopes in local elections late this year, said Dennis Lu-Chung Weng, an associate professor at Sam Houston State University in Texas who is advising a potential Nationalist presidential candidate in 2028.

国民党内的中间派政治人物似乎向党内施压，要求提出更慷慨的方案。得州萨姆休斯顿州立大学副教授翁履中(Dennis Lu-Chung Weng)表示，这些人警告称，抵制扩大军事开支可能会影响本党今年年底地方选举的前景。翁履中正在为一位潜在的2028年国民党总统候选人提供咨询。

“That created real political pressure on the party,” he said.

“这给党内造成了巨大的政治压力，”他说。

Still, the governing Democratic Progressive Party was dissatisfied with the outcome of negotiations, because it left out spending for domestically made drones and other weapons. All 51 Democratic Progressive lawmakers abstained from the vote.

尽管如此，执政的民进党对谈判结果并不满意，因为它没有包含本土制造无人机和其他武器的支出。所有51名民进党立委在投票中均投了弃权票。

After the vote, Mr. Lai, the president, called the outcome a “significant step forward” in enhancing Taiwan’s defense. But he lamented the lack of funding for domestic weapons development.

投票结束后，总统赖清德称该结果是为提升台湾防务能力迈出的“不容易的一步”。但他对缺乏本土武器开发资金表示遗憾。

“Any gap will compromise the integrity of the overall defensive system,” Mr. Lai wrote in a statement about the military funding.

赖清德在一份关于军事经费的声明中写道：“任何一个缺口，都会影响整体防卫体系的完整性。”

President Trump and China’s leader, Xi Jinping, are scheduled to meet in Beijing next week for a high-stakes summit that could shape the next stage of rivalry between the world’s two major powers.

特朗普总统与中国国家主席习近平定于本周在北京举行一场事关重大的峰会，此次会晤或将决定全球两大强国下一阶段的竞争格局。

Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi are expected to discuss the war in Iran, trade, Taiwan and other points of contention during a two-day summit beginning on Thursday. Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi last met in October in South Korea, where they agreed to pause a bruising trade war in which the U.S. imposed triple-digit tariffs on Chinese goods and Beijing threatened to throttle the global supply of rare earths.

为期两天的峰会将于周四启幕，预计特朗普与习近平将讨论伊朗战争、贸易、台湾及其他争议议题。两人上一次会面是去年10月在韩国，当时双方同意暂停一场激烈的贸易战——当时美国对中国商品加征三位数关税，北京则威胁限制全球稀土供应。

The visit next week could determine whether an uneasy détente that has emerged since that meeting will hold.

此次访问或将决定自上次会晤后形成的脆弱缓和局面能否延续。

A lot has changed since the two leaders last met. Mr. Trump is now embroiled in a war with Iran, China’s closest partner in the Middle East, that has led to a global energy crisis and diverted U.S. military assets from Asia. The war has also depleted U.S. munitions, raising doubts among some Chinese analysts about the United States’ ability to defend Taiwan, a close partner of Washington.

两国领导人上次会面以来，局势已发生诸多变化。特朗普如今深陷与伊朗的战争，而伊朗是中国在中东最亲密的伙伴，这场冲突已引发全球能源危机，并迫使美国将军事力量从亚洲调离。战争还消耗了美国大量军火储备，令部分中国分析人士怀疑美国是否有能力保卫其亲密盟友台湾。

Mr. Xi faces his own challenges as he grapples with slower economic growth, higher energy prices and the possibility of a global recession that would hurt China’s export-reliant economy.

习近平则面临自身挑战：他正努力应对经济增速放缓、能源价格高企，以及可能爆发的全球衰退——这将重创依赖出口的中国经济。

What is on the table?

谈判议题有哪些？

Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi are likely to discuss trade, including possible investment in each other’s countries. Washington has been emphasizing what analysts call the “Five B’s.” These include Chinese purchases of Boeing airplanes, U.S. beef and soybeans, as well as the creation of a board of investment and a board of trade. Those two entities would carve out areas of economic exchange between the United States and China that do not raise national security concerns.

特朗普与习近平或将讨论贸易问题，包括两国间潜在的相互投资。美方一直强调所谓的“五B”：中国采购波音飞机(Boeing)、美国牛肉(beef)与大豆(soybeans)，以及设立投资委员会(board of investment)和贸易委员会(board of trade)。这两个机构将划定中美经济交流中不涉及国家安全风险的领域。

The Chinese have been emphasizing the “Three T’s”: tariffs, technology and Taiwan, which Beijing claims is part of China’s territory. Beijing is likely to push for an extension of last year’s trade truce and the loosening of export controls on advanced semiconductors that China needs to upgrade its industrial sector. Mr. Xi, who told Mr. Trump by phone in February that his country would “never allow Taiwan to be separated from China,” is likely to push Mr. Trump to dial back U.S. support for the self-governed island.

中方则强调“三T”：关税(tariffs)、科技(technology)与台湾(Taiwan)——中国宣称台湾为其领土一部分。北京或将推动延续去年的贸易休战协议，并放宽对中国升级工业部门所需先进半导体产品的出口管制。习近平于今年2月与特朗普通电话时表示，中国“永远不可能让台湾分裂出去”，他很可能将敦促特朗普减少美国对这个自治岛屿的支持。

Mr. Trump is expected to call on Beijing to persuade Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. The two sides are also expected to discuss cooperation on managing risk related to artificial intelligence.

特朗普预计将要求中国劝说伊朗重新开放霍尔木兹海峡。双方还可能讨论人工智能风险管理领域的合作。

Mr. Trump has said that he will raise the case of the Hong Kong democracy activist Jimmy Lai, who was sentenced in February to 20 years in prison for collusion and sedition. Other issues include the buildup of China’s nuclear weapons, security in the South China Sea and reducing flows of fentanyl into the United States.

特朗普已表示，将提及香港民主活动人士黎智英的案件，黎智英于今年2月因串谋及煽动罪被判处20年监禁。其他议题还包括中国核武器扩张、南海安全，以及减少芬太尼流入美国等。

What are the possible outcomes?

可能出现哪些结果？

Mr. Trump has been boastful about his relationship with Mr. Xi, whom he calls “a friend,” and is keen to announce an increase in Chinese investment in the United States.

特朗普一向吹嘘自己和习近平的关系，称其为“朋友”，并急于宣布中国增加对美投资的消息。

But expectations are not high that the two sides will reach a major economic deal or resolve their deep differences. A more likely outcome is a set of modest agreements on investment and an extension of last year’s temporary trade truce.

但外界对双方达成重大经济协议或化解深层分歧的预期并不高。更可能的结果是，双方就投资达成若干温和的共识，并延续去年达成的临时贸易休战协议。

“We probably shouldn’t expect this meeting to have particularly substantial, major breakthroughs,” said Zhao Minghao, an international relations expert at Shanghai’s Fudan University, who said the meeting would serve as a starting point for more engagement. American officials have said that the two leaders could meet four times this year.

复旦大学国际关系专家赵明昊表示：“我们不应期待此次会晤取得特别重大的突破性进展。”他认为，此次会面将成为两国进一步互动的起点。美方官员透露，两国领导人今年或举行四次会晤。

Analysts say the summit is also a way for both sides to buy themselves time to reduce reliance on the other country as competition continues. “Within China there is also still a deep sense of suspicion about the United States,” said Bonny Lin, director of the China Power Project and senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

分析人士称，随着竞争持续，此次峰会也是双方为自己争取时间、降低对彼此依赖的一种方式。战略与国际研究中心中国实力项目主任、高级顾问林洋表示：“中国国内对美国仍存有根深蒂固的疑虑。”

What could go wrong?

可能出现什么问题？

Contention over the war in Iran could undermine the talks. Without naming Mr. Trump, Mr. Xi last month criticized the American president’s flouting of international law as a “return to the law of the jungle.”

与伊朗战争相关的争议有可能破坏会谈进程。上月，习近平虽未点名特朗普，但批评其无视国际法是“倒退回丛林法则”。

While China is prodding Iranian officials to negotiate with the United States, it has held back from doing more to help resolve a war that Beijing sees as Washington’s problem. The Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, met his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, this week in Beijing. Mr. Wang called for greater efforts to open the strait but also said China supported Iran’s “legitimate right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.”

中国虽敦促伊朗官员与美国谈判，但并未采取更多行动推动解决这场冲突——北京视其为华盛顿的问题。中国外长王毅上周在北京会见伊朗外长阿巴斯·阿拉格奇，呼吁各方加大努力开放海峡，同时表示中国支持伊朗“和平利用核能的正当权利”。

But Mr. Trump said Thursday that he believes China has not provided more support for the Iranian position out of respect for his relationship with Mr. Xi.

但特朗普周四称，他认为中国之所以没有进一步支持伊朗立场，是因为尊重他与习近平之间的关系。

Both China and the United States have been strengthening their weapons of economic warfare. When the U.S. Treasury imposed sanctions on a Chinese refinery in April for buying Iranian oil, China ordered its companies not to comply and issued regulations giving authorities powers to investigate foreign companies and governments.

中美两国均在强化自身经济战武器。今年4月，美国财政部以购买伊朗石油为由制裁一家中国炼油厂，中国随即下令本国企业不予配合，并出台法规，授权相关部门调查外国企业及政府。