A U.S. special operations team boarded a ship in the Indian Ocean last month and seized cargo headed to Iran from China, a U.S. official said, a rare operation at sea aimed at blocking Tehran from rebuilding its military arsenal.
一名美国官员表示,一支美国特种作战小组上月在印度洋登上一艘船,扣押了从中国运往伊朗的货物。这是一次罕见的海上行动,目的是阻止德黑兰重建其武器库。
The seizure, which was first reported by The Wall Street Journal, occurred amid a strategic stalemate between Iran and the United States over its nuclear weapons program.
《华尔街日报》最先报道了这起扣押事件,当时伊朗和美国正就其核武器计划陷入战略僵局。
Iran faced off against Israel and the United States in a short war this summer that killed more than 1,000 people over 12 days of intense long-range missile and air strikes. A fleet of U.S. stealth bombers struck Iranian nuclear facilities during that war, an attack that U.S. officials said had “significantly degraded” Iran’s nuclear weapons program, but regional officials and analysts fear that a renewed conflict is inevitable.
今年夏天,伊朗与以色列和美国进行了一场短暂的战争,在12天的激烈远程导弹和空袭中,有1000多人丧生。在那场战争中,一支美国隐形轰炸机编队袭击了伊朗的核设施,美国官员称此举“大大削弱了”伊朗的核武器计划,但地区官员和分析人士担心,冲突重燃是不可避免的。
The United States had been tracking the shipment as it made its way from China to Iran, the U.S. official said on condition of anonymity because they weren’t authorized to speak publicly, and the ship was sailing several hundred miles off the coast of Sri Lanka when U.S. special operations forces launched the operation. The commandos boarded the ship and confiscated its cargo before letting the vessel proceed.
这名美国官员说,美国一直在跟踪这批货物从中国运往伊朗的过程,因为没有被授权公开发言,这名官员要求匿名。当美国特种作战部队发起行动时,这艘船正在离斯里兰卡海岸约几百公里的地方航行。突击队员登上这艘船,没收了船上的货物,然后让船只继续航行。
It was unclear what exactly the ship was carrying, but the cargo, the official said, consisted of dual-use components that could be used either for civilian applications or to make conventional weapons. The boarding occurred several weeks before the recent seizure of an oil tanker off the coast of Venezuela.
目前尚不清楚这艘船究竟装载了什么,但该官员称,货物包含可用于民用或制造常规武器的两用部件。此次登船检查发生在近期委内瑞拉近海扣押油轮事件数周之前。
A spokesman for the United States Indo-Pacific Command, which oversees military operations in the regions, declined to comment.
负责该地区军事行动的美国印太司令部发言人拒绝置评。
Iranian factories are working around the clock to replenish stockpiles of long-range missiles and drones that can be used to strike Israel. In the war this summer, Iran had sought to overwhelm Israel’s air defense network through sheer numbers, and will likely seek to import components to build as many new weapons as possible ahead of a renewed conflict.
伊朗的工厂正在夜以继日地补充可用于袭击以色列的远程导弹和无人机的库存。在今年夏天的战争中,伊朗曾试图以数量优势压倒以色列的防空网络,而且很可能会寻求进口零部件,在新的冲突爆发之前制造尽可能多的新武器。
The United States has increasingly sought to control the delivery of dual-use goods, especially the microelectronics and software needed to manufacture guided weapons systems and remote drones. Many of these components are much harder to explicitly ban or embargo because of their plausible use in nonmilitary applications.
美国正不断加强对两用商品的管控,特别是制造制导武器系统和远程无人机所需的微电子和软件。由于这些部件在非军事领域具有合理用途,许多此类产品很难被明确禁止或禁运。
Over the course of the war in Ukraine, U.S. officials have sought to interrupt the supply of these goods being shipped from firms in China to Russia. But that effort had never escalated to launching military operations against commercial shipping traffic.
在乌克兰战争期间,美国官员曾试图阻断中国企业向俄罗斯运输此类商品。但这种努力从未升级为针对商业航运的军事行动。
A Hong Kong court handed down a guilty verdict on Monday in the landmark national security trial of Jimmy Lai, a media tycoon and pro-democracy activist whose case highlights shrinking tolerance for dissent in the city.
周一,在对媒体大亨、民主活动人士黎智英进行的里程碑式国家安全案审判中,香港一家法院作出了有罪判决。此案凸显出香港对异见的容忍度正在下降。
Officials in Hong Kong and mainland China had cast Mr. Lai, 78, as the mastermind of antigovernment demonstrations that engulfed the former British colony in 2019, posing a serious challenge to Beijing’s authority. Prosecutors said he colluded with foreign governments, including the United States, to target China and Hong Kong with sanctions.
香港和中国大陆的官员指控78岁的黎智英是2019年席卷香港这一前英国殖民地的反政府示威活动的主脑,对北京的权威构成了严重挑战。检察官表示,他与包括美国在内的外国政府勾结,对中国和香港实施制裁。
Mr. Lai pleaded not guilty to two counts of “conspiracy to collude with foreign forces,” an offense that can be punished by up to life in prison, and not guilty to a count of conspiracy to publish seditious material in Apple Daily, the now-shuttered Chinese-language newspaper he founded in 1995. On Monday, a court found him guilty on all three counts.
黎智英对两项“串谋勾结外国势力”罪名(最高可判终身监禁)及一项通过其创办的《苹果日报》(现已停刊)发布煽动刊物的罪名均作无罪抗辩。本周一,法庭裁定其三项罪名成立。
His legal team argued that his calls for sanctions ended when the 2020 national security law took effect.
他的法律团队主张,随着2020年国家安全法生效,他对制裁的呼吁就终止了。
Hong Kong’s “one country two systems” legal framework is meant to guarantee the territory some autonomy from Beijing and freedom of speech until 2047. But critics say the case shows how the framework has been undercut by two national security laws — one imposed by Beijing in 2020, the other introduced by the Hong Kong government last year — that were responses to the protests.
香港的“一国两制”法律框架本该保证该地区在2047年之前享有一定程度的自治权和言论自由。但批评者指出,此案揭示了该框架如何被两部回应抗议活动的国家安全法削弱——一部由北京于2020年颁布,另一部由香港政府去年推出。
In 2022, a Hong Kong court sentenced Mr. Lai to more than five years in prison for fraud, saying he had violated the terms of a lease agreement related to Apple Daily, a persistent critic of Beijing.
2022年,香港法院以欺诈罪判处黎智英五年多监禁,称其违反了与《苹果日报》相关的租赁协议条款。该报长期批评北京当局。
For the past three decades, as China’s economy has developed into a global powerhouse, investment has grown reliably each year.
过去30年来,随着中国发展成全球经济强国,投资额几乎年年稳定增长。
That is about to change. This year, China’s investments in assets like new factories, public infrastructure and housing are expected to fall for the first time since the late 1980s, ushering in a more conservative era for an economy that has reshaped the global order with years of robust growth.
这种情况即将发生变化。今年,中国对新建工厂、公共基础设施和住房等资产的投资预计将出现自上世纪80年代末以来的首次下降。这标志着以多年强劲增长重塑全球秩序的中国经济将进入一个更为保守的时代。
The shift also signals that investing in China is no longer a surefire bet, even as Beijing continues to project confidence with economic growth estimates of 5 percent. But, as is often the case with the country’s economic data, the investment slump has raised more questions than answers.
这一转变也表明,对中国进行投资已不再是“稳赚不赔”的选择,尽管北京仍在以5%的经济增长预期来展现信心。不过,和中国经济数据常见的情况一样,投资下滑引发的疑问远多于答案。
A real estate crisis in China has dragged on for five years with no end in sight, sapping the strength from one of the economy’s pillars. Local governments, strapped for cash because of the property downturn, are not pouring money into infrastructure projects as they did during previous periods of economic malaise. Beijing’s crackdown on excessive competition among Chinese manufacturers has chilled the climate for capital investment to fuel expansion.
中国的房地产危机已持续五年,仍看不到尽头,这让经济的一大支柱元气大伤。由于房地产市场低迷,地方政府财政吃紧,已不像以往经济放缓时期那样大举投入基础设施建设。与此同时,中国政府打击制造业过度竞争,也让用于扩张的资本投资环境明显降温。
From January to October, a broad measure called fixed-asset investment has fallen 1.7 percent from the same period last year. The slide began in the second half of this year and accelerated with a sharp, double-digit decline in October. Analysts believe that investment dipped again in November, with that data scheduled to be released on Monday.
今年1月至10月,一项被称为“固定资产投资”的综合指标同比下降了1.7%。这一跌势始于今年下半年,并在10月出现两位数的急剧下滑。分析人士认为,11月投资可能继续下跌,相关数据预计将于周一公布。
Investment in property, infrastructure and manufacturing — the three major components that make up the figure — are all declining at the same time. In the past, a downturn in one area was offset by spending in another segment. It is rare for all three pillars of investment to fall at once. The government typically has stepped in to manage downturns by bolstering real estate or spending lavishly on infrastructure. Beijing has been reluctant to act boldly this year to help.
房地产、基础设施和制造业——构成该指标的三大板块——如今同时下行。过去,某一领域的低迷往往会被其他领域的支出所抵消,三大投资支柱同时下滑的情况十分罕见。以往,政府通常会通过托底房地产或大规模增加基础设施支出来应对下行周期,但今年北京方面一直不愿采取大胆的措施出手相助。
“This is a historically significant change,” said Dan Wang, a director on Eurasia Group’s China team. “This is a different style of managing the economy in the short term.”
“这是一次具有历史意义的变化,”欧亚集团中国团队主管王丹表示。“这是一种不同的短期经济管控方式。”
去年,中国武汉的一个建筑工地。中国房地产市场显著放缓是投资下降的一个主要因素。
Ms. Wang said that this more passive approach suggests Chinese leaders are confident in the continued strength of exports, which have fueled a record trade surplus despite rising protectionism and growing global concern about the flood of inexpensive Chinese goods.
王丹认为,这种较为被动的做法表明,中国领导层对出口持续保持强劲抱有信心。尽管保护主义抬头、全球对大量廉价中国商品的担忧加剧,但出口仍推动中国创下了贸易顺差新高。
Instead of pumping money into the economy by building more airports and high-speed railroad stations, highways and bridges, local governments are holding back. And for the property sector, there has been no industrywide bailout or comprehensive plan to spur real estate investment.
地方政府没有再通过修建机场、高铁站、公路和桥梁来向经济注入资金,而是选择按兵不动。对于房地产行业,既没有出台行业范围内的纾困措施,也没有制定刺激房地产投资的全面方案。
The investment drought is playing out urgently in the boardrooms of China Vanke, one of the country’s largest property developers, which is now teetering on the edge of possible financial collapse.
在万科的董事会议室里,投资匮乏的困境正迫切地显现出来。万科是中国最大的房地产开发商之一,如今正徘徊在可能发生财务崩溃的边缘。
Vanke, unable to pay its debts, has leaned on its top shareholder, the state-owned firm Shenzhen Metro, to cover its debt obligations. But last month it asked bondholders to delay repayment of a bond for the first time, signaling that state financial support may have reached its limit. A deadline on some of its debt looms on Monday, and Vanke may need creditors to accept a delay in getting paid.
由于无力偿还债务,万科一直依赖其第一大股东、国有企业深圳地铁来履行偿债义务。但上个月,万科首次请求债券持有人推迟还款,释放出国家金融支持可能已接近极限的信号。部分债务的最后期限将在周一到来,万科或将再次需要债权人同意延期付款。
Chinese officials have started to show some alarm at the plunge in investment, which was listed as a policy priority for 2026 in a plan announced on Thursday by Xi Jinping, China’s top leader.
中国官员已开始对投资大幅下滑显露担忧。中国领导人习近平上周四公布的一项规划中,投资被列为2026年的政策重点之一。
The deep problems in the property sector — too many apartments and long-running drops in their value — have shaken business confidence.
房地产领域的深层问题——住房供应过剩以及房价长期下跌——已经动摇了企业信心。
Chien Ting-tsai, who has run a manufacturing and real estate development company in Zhuhai, a city in southern China, for more than three decades, said customers are not expanding their businesses now because the economy is weak. He said the pipeline of design contracts has thinned dramatically.
在中国南方城市珠海经营制造和房地产开发公司30多年的简廷在表示,由于经济疲软,客户目前不再扩大业务,设计合同的数量已明显减少。
“Some manufacturers have shut down factories and frozen all investment in new facilities,” said Mr. Chien, 69, who is from Taiwan and has worked in China since the 1990s. “Everyone is frantically selling off fixed assets because they’re uncertain about the future.”
“有些制造商已经关闭工厂,冻结了所有新设施的投资,”这位69岁的台商表示,他自上世纪90年代起就在中国工作。“大家都在拼命抛售固定资产,因为对未来没有信心。”
广州的一个招聘会上,纺织厂的代表正在招聘工人。
Pam Jiang, a sales assistant at Fashiontex International Limited, a textile company with roughly 150 employees in Jiangsu Province, one of China’s main fabric manufacturing hubs, said the domestic textile industry is pulling back on investments in facilities.
翀尚时代纺织科技有限公司是江苏省一家有约150名员工的纺织企业,该公司的销售助理帕姆·姜(音)说,中国国内的纺织行业正在收缩,对厂房和设备的投资明显减少。
“The textile industry in China is basically stagnant and downsizing,” she said.
“纺织业在国内基本上是按兵不动和缩减规模,”她说。
She attributed the drop in investment to rising labor costs and uncertainty about tariffs. Instead of expanding domestically, Ms. Jiang said, many Chinese textile manufacturers are investing abroad in countries such as Vietnam and Egypt.
她将投资下降归因于劳动力成本上升以及对关税的不确定性。姜女士表示,许多中国纺织企业没有选择在国内扩张,而是将投资转向越南、埃及等国家。
The slowdown in manufacturing investment has coincided with the government’s campaign against involution, a term for the ruthless competition in which Chinese companies wage profit-eroding price wars to gain market share and outlast rivals. Provincial or city governments have often fueled such races to the bottom by providing incentives and support to foster local champions. This produced an oversupply of well-funded companies, each ready to add more products than customers want to buy.
制造业投资放缓的同时,政府还在推进“反内卷”行动。“内卷”指的是中国企业为抢占市场份额、击败竞争对手展开的残酷价格战,这种价格战会严重损害利润。省级或市级政府过去往往通过提供激励措施和支持来扶持本地龙头企业,从而加剧了这种恶性竞争。这导致资金充裕的企业数量过剩,每家企业都准备推出远超消费者需求的产品。
But some economists say Beijing’s efforts to slow that process down have given local governments permission to hold back on throwing money at manufacturing.
但一些经济学家认为,北京试图缓解“内卷”的努力实际上是在允许地方政府减少对制造业的投资。
Jeremy Smith, a research analyst at Rhodium Group’s China practice, said he believes local governments might be taking Beijing’s cue. He noted that fixed-asset investment has declined in nearly all of China’s provinces and prefectural-level cities since May.
荣鼎集团中国业务研究分析师杰里米·史密斯表示,他认为地方政府可能正在顺应北京的态度。他指出,自5月以来,中国几乎所有省份和地级市的固定资产投资都出现了下降。
许多中国纺织企业正在投资海外,例如越南和埃及等国。
The downturn in investment numbers, he said, more accurately reflects what Rhodium had suspected following the collapse of the property sector.
他说,这一投资数据的下滑更真实地反映了荣鼎在房地产行业崩盘之后所作出的判断。
Rhodium has reported that China’s investment activity likely fell in 2023 and 2024, based on other economic signals, such as credit growth. Due mainly to slower investment, Rhodium estimated that China’s economic growth was between 2.4 percent and 2.8 percent last year, well short of the government’s official figure of 5 percent.
荣鼎报告称,基于信贷增长等其他经济信号,中国的投资活动很可能在2023年和2024年均出现下降。主要由于投资放缓,荣鼎估计中国去年的经济增速在2.4%至2.8%之间,远低于政府公布的5%。
“Declining investment is more the norm than the exception,” Mr. Smith said.
“投资下降才是常态,而不是例外,”史密斯说。
On the one hand, he said, Beijing seeks to project an image of economic resilience. At the same time, it aims to demonstrate that it is curbing the harmful competition plaguing many of its industries.
他表示,北京一方面希望展现经济韧性的形象,另一方面也试图表明自己正在遏制困扰众多行业的有害竞争。
A slump does not bode well for China’s economic growth, as investment accounts for a significant share of gross domestic product. Yet the broader measure of investment China uses to calculate G.D.P. rose in the third quarter despite the sharp decline in fixed-asset investment, leaving economists scrambling for how to explain the discrepancy.
投资下滑对中国经济增长而言并非好兆头,因为投资在国内生产总值中占据相当大的比重。然而,用于计算GDP的更广义投资指标却在第三季度有所增长,与固定资产投资的急剧下降形成反差,这让经济学家一时难以解释其中的矛盾。
中国张家口的一座高铁站。多年来,中国一直通过投资公共基础设施来增加投资总量。
In a November report, Goldman Sachs said it does not expect fixed-asset investment to weigh on economic growth because the decline is “overstated.” The investment bank said that most of the downturn is “a statistical correction of previously overreported data” rather than a genuine slowdown.
高盛在11月的一份报告中表示,预计固定资产投资不会拖累经济增长,因为相关下降“被夸大了”。高盛认为,大部分下滑其实是“对先前高估数据的统计修正”,而非真实的经济放缓。
Last month, Fu Linghui, the spokesman and chief economist of China’s National Bureau of Statistics, attributed the decline to a “complex and severe external environment” and “fierce domestic competition” that has hurt investment returns and dragged down corporate profitability.
国家统计局新闻发言人、首席经济学家付凌晖上个月则将投资下降归因于“复杂严峻的外部环境”和“激烈的国内竞争”,认为这削弱了投资回报,拖累了企业盈利能力。
He noted, however, that investment in high-tech industries such as green energy and aerospace is growing rapidly, a sign that overall investment might be slowing but is also “optimizing.”
但他指出,新能源、航空航天等高技术产业的投资仍在快速增长,显示整体投资增速虽然放缓,但结构正在“优化”。
Economic Daily, a Chinese state-owned newspaper, said in November that the country has entered into a new, high-quality phase of development, echoing official talking points. It accused foreign media of seizing on the investment stall to sensationalize a “crisis theory” about the Chinese economy.
中国官方媒体《经济日报》11月称,中国已进入高质量发展的新阶段,呼应了官方的政策表述,并指责外国媒体借投资停滞之机渲染所谓中国经济“危机论”。
At least 15 people were killed on Sunday and dozens more were injured after two gunmen opened fire at a crowd celebrating the first day of the Hanukkah holiday on Bondi Beach in Sydney, Australia. The gunmen were father and son, the police said, and the older man died during the attack.
周日,在澳大利亚悉尼的邦迪海滩,两名枪手向一群正在庆祝犹太教节日光明节首日的人群开枪,造成至少15人死亡、数十人受伤。警方表示,两名枪手为父子关系,其中年长者在袭击过程中死亡。
On Monday morning in Australia, officials said 40 people were hospitalized from injuries. Two police officers were also hurt in the attack, officials said. The police said the second shooter had also been wounded.
澳大利亚官员周一早间表示,共有40人因伤住院。官员还称,两名警察在袭击中受伤。警方表示,另一名枪手也受了伤。
The police and the country’s leaders called the shootings a targeted attack on Jewish Australians. Law enforcement officials called the shooting a terrorist attack.
警方和该国领导人将这起枪击事件称为针对犹太裔澳大利亚人的袭击。执法部门将此次枪击定性为恐怖袭击。
Police Commissioner Mal Lanyon said the police had found and disabled two improvised explosives devices in a nearby vehicle that is linked to the suspect who was killed. The suspects’ names have not been released yet.
警察总长马尔·兰扬表示,警方在一辆与被击毙嫌疑人有关的车辆中发现并拆除了两个简易爆炸装置。警方目前尚未公布嫌疑人的姓名。
One witness video shows dozens of people running out of the water and away from the beach as gunshots rang out. Another, verified by The New York Times, shows a bystander — who local authorities called a hero — tackling and disarming one of the gunmen.
一段目击者视频显示,随着枪声响起,数十人从海里跑出并逃离海滩。另一段经《纽约时报》核实的视频显示,一名路人制服了枪手并抢下他的武器,当地官员称赞他为英雄。
Jewish people have increasingly been targeted since the Hamas-led attacks in Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. In Britain, a man attacked a synagogue in Manchester on Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the year for Jews. And American Jews have faced a year of violence.
自2023年10月7日以色列发生哈马斯主导的袭击事件以来,犹太人遭受的针对性袭击不断增加。在英国,一名男子在犹太人一年中最神圣的日子赎罪日袭击了曼彻斯特的一座犹太教堂。而在美国,犹太人也经历了一整年的暴力事件。
Here is what we know so far about the Australia shooting:
以下是目前已知的有关澳大利亚枪击事件的信息:
Hundreds had gathered to mark the Jewish holiday.
数百人聚集在一起庆祝犹太节日。
The mass shooting happened around 6:45 p.m. at Bondi Beach, one of Sydney’s most popular tourist destinations that stretches over 3,000 feet long and draws hundreds of thousands of people each year.
这起大规模枪击发生在晚上6点45分左右,事发地是悉尼最受欢迎的旅游胜地之一邦迪海滩,这片海滩全长超过900米,每年吸引数十万名游客。
An event hosted by the Chabad organization was taking place at the beach to celebrate the first day of the Jewish holiday Hanukkah when the gunmen opened fire.
枪手开枪时,海滩上正在举行一个由哈巴德组织主办的庆祝光明节首日的活动。
“An attack on Jewish Australians is an attack on every Australian,” Prime Minister Anthony Albanese of Australia said in a televised address.
“对犹太裔澳大利亚人的攻击就是对每一位澳大利亚人的攻击,”澳大利亚总理安东尼·阿尔巴尼斯在电视讲话中说。
Witnesses said they heard many gunshots.
目击者称,他们听到了多声枪响。
Ebonny Munro was at the beach with her 17-month-old baby when she heard gunshots. She dived under a metal barbecue with another man. She said she heard bullets ricocheting off the barbecue and smelled gunpowder from above.
埃博尼·芒罗当时正带着17个月大的孩子在海滩上,听到枪声后,她与另一名男子一起躲到一个金属烧烤架下面。她说,自己听到子弹击中烧烤架后反弹的声音,并闻到了头顶上方的火药味。
She said the shooting lasted around 10 minutes and she witnessed at least one person being shot. “I was about to leave, and I just heard this pop,” Ms. Munro said.
她表示,枪击持续了约10分钟,她亲眼目睹至少一人中枪。“我正准备离开,突然就听到了‘啪’一声响,”芒罗说。
Finn Foster, 18, a backpacker from Canada, said he and his girlfriend had been headed to McDonald’s to get ice cream when they heard what sounded like fireworks.
18岁的芬恩·福斯特是一名来自加拿大的背包客,他说自己和女友当时正要去麦当劳买冰淇淋,突然听到类似放烟花的声音。
“Pow, pow, pow,” he said. “Like 15 or 20.”
“啪、啪、啪,”他说。“响了15或20声。”
Mass shootings are rare in Australia.
大规模枪击案在澳大利亚十分罕见
Mass shootings are rare in Australia because of the country’s strict gun laws. The nation has one of the lowest gun-related death rates in the developed world.
由于澳大利亚严格的控枪法律,大规模枪击事件在该国十分罕见。澳大利亚是发达国家中枪支相关死亡率最低的国家之一。
The country overhauled its gun laws after a massacre in 1996, when 35 people were killed by a single gunman in the Tasmanian town of Port Arthur. Following the shooting, public anger prompted the government to ban assault rifles and many other semiautomatic rifles and shotguns.
1996年,塔斯马尼亚州亚瑟港发生的一起枪击案中,一名枪手杀害了35人。此后,该国对枪支法律进行了全面改革。枪击案发生后,公众的愤怒促使政府禁止了突击步枪以及许多其他半自动步枪和霰弹枪。
It also imposed new registration requirements and imposed gun buybacks that removed up to a third of privately held guns from circulation and melted down up to a million guns.
澳大利亚还实施了新的枪支登记要求,并进行了枪支回购,收缴了私人持枪的三分之一,并熔化了多达一百万支枪。
Who were some of the victims?
我们了解到哪些遇害者的信息?
As the authorities worked to notify the next of kin of those killed and injured — who ranged in age from 10 to 87, according to the authorities — some of their identities began to emerge.
官方表示,死伤者年龄介于10岁至87岁之间。当局正试图通知死伤者的亲属,部分受害者的身份浮出水面。
Chabad, the Jewish movement that organized the event at Bondi, identified one of the victims as Rabbi Eli Schlanger, saying he was an assistant rabbi of Chabad of Bondi and a “devoted” chaplain who worked tirelessly as a Chabad emissary. Zohran Mamdani, the mayor-elect of New York City, said on social media that Rabbi Schlanger had deep roots to the Crown Heights neighborhood in Brooklyn.
组织邦迪海滩活动的犹太组织哈巴德确认,其中一名遇难者是以利·施兰格拉比。该组织表示,他是邦迪哈巴德的助理拉比,是一名“尽心竭力的”牧师,作为哈巴德的使者不知疲倦地工作。纽约市当选市长佐赫兰·马姆达尼在社交媒体上表示,施兰格拉比与布鲁克林皇冠高地社区有着深厚渊源。
Chabad also named two more people who were killed in the attack: Reuven Morrison, a member of the Chabad community who divided his time between Melbourne and Sydney; and Alex Kleytman, a Holocaust survivor who attended the event with his children and grandchildren.
哈巴德还公布了另外两名袭击事件遇难者的身份:生活在墨尔本和悉尼的哈巴德社群成员鲁文·莫里森;以及大屠杀幸存者亚历克斯·克莱特曼,事发时与子女和孙辈一同出席活动。
Dan Elkayam, a French citizen, was among those killed in the attack, President Emmanuel Macron of France said on social media.
法国总统埃马纽埃尔·马克龙在社交媒体上表示,法国公民丹·埃尔卡亚姆在袭击中遇难。
What we know about the suspects.
关于嫌疑人的已知信息
Investigators did not release the names of the suspects, but described them as a 50-year-old man and his 24-year-old son. The older man died after being shot by police and the younger man sustained “critical injuries,” the police said on Monday morning.
调查人员未公布嫌疑人姓名,但描述他们为一名50岁男子及其24岁的儿子。警方周一上午表示,年长男子被警方开枪击中后死亡,年轻男子“重伤”。
Although officials described the shooting as a terrorist attack, Police Commissioner Mal Lanyon of the New South Wales Police Force declined to comment on the suspects’ ideology, saying that investigators needed time to dig. The police were not searching for any other assailants, he said.
尽管官员将此次枪击事件定性为恐怖袭击,但新南威尔士州警察局局长马尔·兰扬拒绝就嫌疑人的意识形态置评,称调查人员需要时间深入调查。他表示,警方目前无需搜寻其他袭击者。
Although Commissioner Lanyon said that one of the suspects had been known to the police, he said investigators had no indication that either man had been planning the shooting.
兰扬透露,其中一名嫌疑人此前为警方所知晓,但调查人员没有发现两人中有任何一人曾策划此次枪击事件的迹象。
In its rivalry with the United States, China has racked up a series of wins in recent weeks.
在与美国的竞争中,中国在最近几周取得了一系列胜利。
The Trump administration has softened its criticism of China’s Communist Party in a strategy document. It has reopened a channel for high-end chip sales that Washington once treated as untouchable. And President Trump has held his tongue as a key U.S. ally in Asia faces Chinese intimidation for backing Taiwan.
特朗普政府在一份战略文件中软化了对中国共产党的批评。它重新开放了曾被华盛顿视为禁区的高端芯片销售渠道。并且,当美国的一个亚洲关键盟友因支持台湾而面临中国恐吓时,特朗普总统保持了沉默。
For Beijing, the shifts in Washington’s approach suggest that Mr. Trump has less of an appetite for confronting China over ideology, technology and diplomacy. Some commentators in China have hailed these developments as irrefutable signs of American decline and Chinese ascendancy.
对于北京来说,华盛顿的这些立场转变表明,特朗普不再那么热衷于在意识形态、技术和外交方面与中国对抗。中国一些评论员称这些进展无可辩驳地体现了美国的衰落和中国的崛起。
Mr. Trump’s decision on Monday to allow some advanced chips to be sold to China, the prominent Chinese technology executive Zhou Hongyi said on social media, showed how China’s unstoppable technological rise had “pushed the United States against a wall.”
中国知名科技高管周鸿祎在社交媒体上表示,特朗普周一允许向中国出售一些先进芯片的决定表明,中国不可阻挡的技术崛起已将“美国逼到墙角”。
The Global Times, a Communist Party newspaper, pointed to the White House’s new national security strategy, which focuses more on the Western Hemisphere than China, as “evidence of the U.S. acknowledging its relative decline in power.” Washington has realized “it cannot afford the costs of prolonged confrontation” with China, the nationalist blog Jiuwanli similarly concluded.
共产党报纸《环球时报》指出,新的白宫国家安全战略将更多重点放在西半球而非中国,是“美国承认其相对实力下降的证据”。民族主义博客“九万里”也得出类似结论:在对华问题上,华盛顿已经意识到“难以承受长期全面对抗产生的巨大代价”。
And Mr. Trump has remained publicly silent as China has mounted a pressure campaign against Japan, a U.S. ally, over that country’s support for Taiwan. Beijing has summoned Japanese diplomats, canceled flights, curbed tourism and stepped up military flights near Japanese airspace, including with Russia, to highlight its displeasure.
而当中国针对美国的盟友日本、就其支持台湾的言论发起施压行动时,特朗普在公开场合一直保持沉默。北京召见了日本外交官、取消航班、限制旅游,并增加了靠近日本领空的军事飞行,包括与俄罗斯的联合行动,以表达其不满。
上月,中国保安人员在驻华日本大使馆门口执勤。关于中国就日本支持台湾问题对日施加的压力,特朗普始终保持公开沉默。
This is Mr. Trump’s more transactional diplomacy in action, according to Chinese analysts. In this less hawkish, more pragmatic approach, China is seen not as a threat to U.S. supremacy that must be contained, but as a major nation to be negotiated with.
根据中国分析人士的说法,这是特朗普更注重交易的外交在起作用。在这种不那么鹰派、更加务实的思维下,中国不再被视为必须遏制的美国霸权威胁,而是一个必须与之谈判的重要国家。
That shift was laid out plainly in Mr. Trump’s national security strategy, released last week. It recast the U.S.-China rivalry as chiefly an economic contest and not a struggle over security or political systems. The strategy’s stated priority: establishing a “mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing.”
这种转变在上周发布的特朗普国家安全战略中被明确阐述。它将中美竞争重新定义为主要是一场经济竞赛,而非安全或政治制度之争。该战略的既定优先事项是:建立“与北京互利的经济关系”。
And unlike previous presidents, Mr. Trump showed no interest in the longstanding American project of promoting democracy in China. For the first time in more than 30 years, the national security strategy did not criticize China’s authoritarian rule or press Beijing to uphold human rights — sentiments echoed by presidents from George H.W. Bush to Joseph R. Biden Jr. and even to Mr. Trump himself in 2017, during his first term.
而且,与前几任总统不同,特朗普对美国长期以来在中国推行民主的项目不感兴趣。这是30多年来,国家安全战略首次没有批评中国的威权统治或敦促北京维护人权——这一立场曾被从老布什到小拜登的历任总统所坚持,甚至特朗普本人在2017年首个任期时也曾表达过相同观点。
The strategy showed that “China’s push to make the international system friendlier to autocracy is no longer on our list of priorities,” said Caroline Costello, assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, who analyzed previous national security strategies released since 1986, when Congress began requiring U.S. presidents to submit their foreign policy visions.
大西洋理事会全球中国中心助理主任卡罗琳·科斯特洛表示,该战略表明“中国推动国际体系对威权更友好的做法已不再是我们的优先事项”,她分析了1986年国会开始要求美国总统提交外交政策愿景后以来历届总统的国家安全战略。
Xin Qiang, a U.S.-China expert at Fudan University in Shanghai, said that the strategy showed that the Trump administration had finally realized that “trying to change China by playing the ideological card is neither possible nor feasible.”
复旦大学中美问题专家信强表示,该战略表明特朗普政府终于意识到,“试图通过打意识形态牌来改变中国既不可能,也不可行。”
“At least since Trump took office in his second term, he hasn’t shown a strong ideological drive in his China policy. It’s what we call ‘profit-driven,’” he said, adding that this was good for China.
“至少特朗普在他第二个任期上任以来,他的对华政策没有表现出强烈的意识形态驱动。这就是我们所说的‘利益驱动’,”他说,并补充说这对中国是好事。
Mr. Trump’s transactional bent may help explain why his administration reversed export controls on critical artificial intelligence technology that can help China economically and militarily. It granted Nvidia, the American chip maker, permission to begin selling its second-most-powerful semiconductor to China. The U.S. government would receive 25 percent of all the revenues from the sales, Mr. Trump said in a social media post, a trade that critics said prioritizes short-term economic gain over long-term American security interests.
特朗普的交易倾向可能有助于解释为什么他的政府撤销了可能对中国经济和军事发展有帮助的关键人工智能技术的出口管制。它批准美国芯片制造商英伟达开始向中国出售其性能排名第二的半导体。特朗普在社交媒体帖子中表示,美国政府将从所有销售收入中得到25%的提成,批评人士称这种交易将短期经济收益置于美国长期安全利益之上。
英伟达总裁兼首席执行官黄仁勋于10月在华盛顿出席会议。特朗普政府已批准英伟达向中国销售其性能第二强大的半导体产品。
The latest moves by the Trump administration, in some ways, extend the conciliatory posture Mr. Trump struck at his summit with China’s leader, Xi Jinping, in October. That meeting resulted in the United States walking back tariffs after China flexed its leverage by withholding exports of rare earths, critical minerals needed for almost all modern manufacturing, and soybean purchases.
在某些方面,特朗普政府的最新举措延续了他去年10月与中国领导人习近平会晤时所采取的和解姿态。那次会晤的结果是,在中国通过限制出口稀土——几乎所有现代制造业所需的关键矿物——以及大豆采购来发挥影响力之后,美国撤回了关税。
The two leaders spoke again last month, after which Mr. Trump said he had accepted an invitation from Mr. Xi to visit Beijing in April.
两位领导人于上个月再次通话,此后特朗普表示,他已接受了习近平的访华邀请,访问定于明年4月。
David Sacks, a fellow in Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, said Mr. Trump was clearly thinking about that Beijing meeting when the White House released its national security strategy. “I think he likely wants to have maximum negotiating space in that meeting, and perhaps more pointed language on China he might view as constraining that space,” he said.
美国对外关系委员会亚洲研究员戴维·萨克斯表示,白宫发布国家安全战略时,特朗普显然已经把北京会晤纳入考量。他说:“我认为他可能希望在那次会晤中拥有最大的谈判空间,而他可能认为更具针对性的对华措辞会限制这种空间。”
For Beijing, the shift from containment to competition amounts to a strategic victory. It validates China’s argument that countries should not interfere in the matters of other states or impinge on their development, and that there is no such thing as universal human rights that all countries should protect.
对于北京来说,从遏制到竞争的转变相当于一次战略胜利。它证实了中国的论点,即国家不应干涉他国内政或阻碍其发展,并且不存在所有国家都应保护的普世人权。
It also gives Mr. Xi more room to be aggressive in the region. China has repeatedly criticized Japan’s prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, for saying that a hypothetical Chinese attack on Taiwan could incite a military response from Tokyo. China escalated its campaign on Japan on Tuesday, by sending Chinese fighter jets and bombers alongside two nuclear-capable Russian bombers near Japanese islands.
这也给了习近平在该地区采取更激进行动的空间。中国一再批评日本首相高市早苗,因为她表示中国若对台湾发起攻击,可能引发东京的军事反应。周二,中国加大了对日本的行动力度,派遣战斗机和轰炸机,与两架具备核打击能力的俄罗斯轰炸机一同靠近日本岛屿。
When Japan’s defense minister complained that the show of force by China on Tuesday had been a threat to his country’s national security, a spokesman for China’s Defense Ministry shrugged off the criticism, describing the exercises as a “demonstration of the determination and capability” of his country and Russia to deal with regional security challenges. (On Wednesday, Japan and the United States conducted a joint military exercise over the Sea of Japan to demonstrate the strength of their countries’ alliance, Japan said.)
当日本防卫大臣抱怨周二的武力展示对其国家安全构成威胁时,中国国防部发言人对此不屑一顾,称这些演习是“展示”中国和俄罗斯应对地区安全挑战的“决心与能力”。(日本表示,日本和美国周三在日本海举行了联合军事演习,以展示两国联盟的力量。)
日本防卫省公布的照片显示,日美两国周三在日本海上空举行联合飞行演习。日本表示,此次演习旨在展示两国同盟的实力。
Chinese analysts say Mr. Trump’s more pragmatic approach to China should herald a more stable and predictable chapter in the relationship. In response to Mr. Trump’s national security strategy, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said this week that Beijing also wanted “mutually beneficial economic relations” and hoped the United States would continue working with China to “shrink the list of issues” between the two countries.
中国分析人士表示,特朗普对中国采取的更务实方法预示着两国关系将进入一个更稳定和可预测的阶段。本周,中国外交部对特朗普的国家安全战略回应称,北京也希望建立“互利的经济关系”,并希望美国继续与中国合作,“压缩问题清单。”
But others point out that any let up in U.S. pressure on China is only temporary. Meng Weizhan, a social sciences researcher at Fudan University, wrote in an article for the Qianhai Institute for International Affairs in Shenzhen that the Trump administration was still targeting China, just less overtly.
但也有人指出,美国对中国的任何缓解压力的举措都只是暂时的。复旦大学社会科学高等研究院的社会科学研究员孟维瞻博士在为深圳前海国际事务研究院撰写的一篇文章中写道,特朗普政府仍在针对中国,只是不那么公开。
“It’s possible that over the next three years, Trump’s policy toward China will not be excessively aggressive or hard-line,” Dr. Meng wrote. “After he leaves office, you might even think his presidency ‘wasn’t all that bad’ for China.”
“或许未来三年特朗普在对华政策上不会表现得过于激烈强硬,”孟维瞻写道。“甚至等他卸任后回头看,你会觉得他当政时期对中国‘并不算太坏’。”
But, according to Dr. Meng, Mr. Trump might even be taking inspiration from the dictum made famous by the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping: “Hide your strength and bide your time.” By focusing on regrouping and rebuilding America’s economic and technological edge, the United States will be able to better compete with China in the future.
但是,在他看来,特朗普甚至可能在借鉴中国领导人邓小平著名的格言“韬光养晦”。通过专注于重组和重建美国的经济和技术优势,美国将能够在未来更好地与中国竞争。
“The underlying essence of the United States’ strategy toward China has not changed: to maintain its own dominant position, and to prevent and contain China’s rise,” he wrote.
“美国对华战略的底色是不变的,那就是维持自身优势地位、防范和遏制中国崛起,”他写道。
Every few years I am reminded of one of my cardinal rules of journalism: Whenever you see elephants flying, don’t laugh, take notes. Because if you see elephants flying, something very different is going on that you don’t understand but you and your readers need to.
每隔几年,我就会想起自己新闻业的核心准则之一:每当看到大象在天上飞,别急着发笑,先记录下来。因为如果大象真能飞上天,必然有某种你尚未理解、但你与读者都亟需弄清的反常之事正在发生。
I bring that up today in response to the Trump administration’s 33-page National Security Strategy, released last week. It has been widely noted that at a time when our geopolitical rivalry with Russia and China is more heated than at any other time since the Cold War — and Moscow and Beijing are more and more closely aligned against America — the Trump 2025 national security doctrine barely mentions these two geopolitical challengers.
今天提起这个准则,是针对特朗普政府上周发布的33页《国家安全战略》报告。各界普遍注意到:当前美俄、中美地缘政治竞争达到冷战以来最激烈水平,莫斯科与北京正日益紧密地联合对抗美国,但这份“特朗普2025”国家安全纲领却几乎未提及这两大地缘政治挑战者。
While the report surveys U.S. interests across the globe, what intrigues me most about it is how it talks about our European allies and the European Union. It cites activities by our sister European democracies that “undermine political liberty and sovereignty, migration policies that are transforming the continent and creating strife, censorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition, cratering birthrates, and loss of national identities and self-confidence.”
报告概述了美国在全球的利益布局,但最让我关注的是它对欧洲盟友及欧盟的描述。报告称,欧洲民主盟友的部分行为“损害了政治自由与主权,其移民政策正在改变欧洲大陆并引发冲突,存在言论审查与压制政治反对力量现象,出生率暴跌,国家身份认同与自信心丧失”。
“Should present trends continue,” it goes on, “the continent will be unrecognizable in 20 years or less.”
报告进一步警告:“若当前趋势持续,不到20年,欧洲大陆将面目全非。”
Indeed, the strategy paper warns, unless our European allies elect more “patriotic” nationalist parties, committed to stemming immigration, Europe will face “civilizational erasure.” Unstated but implied is that we will judge you not by the quality of your democracy but by the stringency by which you stem the migration flow from Muslim countries to Europe’s south.
事实上,这份战略文件明确指出,除非欧洲盟友选举出更多致力于遏制移民的“爱国”民族主义政党,否则欧洲将面临“文明消亡”。虽未明说,但言外之意是:我们评判你们的标准将不再是民主品质,而是你们阻止穆斯林国家移民涌入欧洲南部的严厉程度。
That is a flying elephant no one should ignore. It is language unlike any previous U.S. national security survey, and to my mind it reveals a deep truth about this second Trump administration: how much it came to Washington to fight America’s third civil war, not to fight the West’s new cold war.
这正是一头不容忽视的飞天大象。这种表述在以往任何一份美国国家安全报告中都未曾出现,在我看来,它揭示了第二届特朗普政府的一个深刻真相:他们入主华盛顿在多大程度上是为了打响美国的第三次内战,而不是为西方面临的新冷战而战。
Yes, in my view, we are in a new civil war over a place called home.
没错,在我看来,我们正处于一场关于何为“家园”的新内战之中。
First, I need to make a quick detour to “home.” These days there is a tendency to reduce every crisis to the dry metrics of economics, to the chessboard machinations of political or military campaigns, or to ideological manifestoes. All, of course, have their relevance, but the longer I have worked as a journalist, the more I have found that the better starting place for unlocking a story is with the disciplines of psychology and anthropology. They are often much better at revealing the primal energies, anxieties and aspirations that animate our national politics — and global geopolitics — because they uncover and illuminate not just what people say they want, but also what they fear and what they privately pray for, and why.
首先,我需要简单阐释“家园”的含义。如今,人们倾向于将所有危机简化为枯燥的经济指标、政治或军事行动的棋盘博弈,或是意识形态宣言。当然,这些都有意义,但从事记者工作多年来,我日益发现,解读一个故事,更好的起点是心理学与人类学的视角。它们往往更能揭示驱动国内政治乃至全球地缘政治的原始能量、焦虑与诉求——因为它们不仅揭露人们口头宣称的诉求,更能揭示他们恐惧什么、私下祈求什么,以及背后的深层原因。
I was not here for the Civil War of the 1860s, and I was still a boy during our second great civil struggle, the 1960s civil rights movement and the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. But I am definitely on duty for America’s third civil war. This one, like the first two, is over the questions “Whose country is this anyway?” and “Who gets to feel at home in our national house?” This civil war has been less violent than the first two — but it is early.
我未曾亲历19世纪60年代的美国内战,在20世纪60年代那场伟大的民权运动与马丁·路德·金遇刺引发的第二次内战般的抗争中,我还只是个孩子。但如今,我无疑正亲历美国的第三次内战。与前两次一样,这场内战围绕两个核心问题展开:“这个国家究竟属于谁?”以及“谁能在我们的国家里找到归属感?”如今这场内战目前比前两次暴力程度低——但一切才刚刚开始。
Humans have an enduring, structural need for home, not only as a physical shelter, but as a psychological anchor and moral compass, too. That is why Dorothy in “The Wizard of Oz” (my favorite movie) got it exactly right: “There’s no place like home.” And when people lose that sense of home — whether by war, rapid economic change, cultural change, demographic change, climate change or technological change — they tend to lose their center of gravity. They may feel as though they are being hurtled around in a tornado, grabbing desperately for anything stable enough to hold onto — and that can include any leader who seems strong enough to reattach them to that place called home, however fraudulent that leader is or unrealistic the prospect.
人类对家园有着持久的、根深蒂固的需求:它不仅是物理意义上的庇护所,更是心理支柱与道德指南针。这就是为什么《绿野仙踪》(我最爱的电影)中的桃乐丝说得千真万确:“世上没有任何地方比得上家。”当人们失去这种家园归属感——无论是因为战争、快速经济变革、文化变迁、人口结构变化、气候变化还是技术变革——他们往往会失去重心,仿佛被卷入龙卷风,拼命抓取任何足够稳固的东西——而这可能包括任何看似强大、能让他们重新锚定“家园”的领导人,无论这位领导人有多么虚伪,他所承诺的前景是多么不切实际。
With that as background, I cannot remember another time in the last 40 years when I have traveled around America, and the world, and found more people asking the same question: “Whose country is this anyway?” Or as Itamar Ben-Gvir, the far-right nationalist Israeli minister, put it, in Hebrew, in his political banner ads during Israel’s 2022 election: “Who is the landlord here?”
在这样的背景下,我回想过去40年间游历美国乃至世界各地的经历,从未见过如此多人反复追问同一个问题:“这究竟是谁的国家?”正如以色列极右翼民族主义部长伊塔马尔·本-格维尔在2022年以色列大选的政治横幅广告中用希伯来语所问的:“这土地的主人是谁?”
And that is not an accident. Today, more people are living outside their country of birth than at any point in recorded history. There are approximately 304 million global migrants — some seeking work, some seeking education, some seeking safety from internal conflicts, some fleeing droughts and floods and deforestation. In our own hemisphere, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection office reports that migrant encounters at our southern border hit historical highs in 2023, while estimates from the Pew Research Center suggest that the total unauthorized population in America grew to 14 million in the same year, breaking a decade-long period of relative stability.
这并非偶然。如今,生活在出生国之外的人口数量已创历史之最——全球约有3.04亿移民,他们当中有人是为谋生,有人是为求学,有人是为了躲避内部冲突,有人是为了逃离干旱、洪水与森林砍伐的威胁。在我们所在的西半球,美国海关与边境保护局报告显示,2023年南部边境移民遭遇数创下历史新高;皮尤研究中心估计,同年美国非法居留人口增至1400万,打破了长达十年的相对稳定期。
But this is not just about immigrants. America’s third civil war is being fought on multiple fronts. On one front it is white, predominantly Christian Americans resisting the emergence of the minority-dominated America that is now baked into our future sometime in the 2040s, driven by lower birthrates among white Americans and growth in Hispanic, Asian and multiracial American populations.
但这不仅仅与移民有关。美国的第三次内战正在多条战线展开:其中一条战线是以白人为主的基督教美国人抵制少数族裔主导美国的趋势——受白人出生率下降以及西班牙裔、亚裔和混血美国人人口增长的推动,这一趋势将在21世纪40年代某个时候成为既定事实。
On another front are Black Americans still struggling against those who would raise new walls to keep them from a place called home. Then there are Americans of every background trying to steady themselves amid cultural currents that seem to shift by the week: new expectations about issues like identity, bathrooms and even a typeface, as well as how we acknowledge one another in the public square.
另一条战线是,非洲裔美国人仍在与那些试图筑起新壁垒、阻止他们获得家园归属感的力量抗争。还有来自各个背景的美国人正试图在瞬息万变的文化洪流中稳住阵脚:关于身份认同、卫生间使用、甚至字体选择的新规范,以及在公共场合如何打招呼的社交礼仪。
On yet another front, the gale-force winds of technological change, propelled now by artificial intelligence, are sweeping through workplaces faster than people can plant their feet. And on a fifth front, young Americans of every race, creed and color are straining to afford even a modest home — the physical and psychological harbor that has long anchored the American dream.
在第四条战线上,由人工智能驱动的技术变革正以飓风之势席卷职场,其速度远超人们适应的步伐。而在第五个战场,各个种族、信仰和肤色的美国年轻人,即便想拥有一套普通的住房都倍感压力——而住房这一实体与心理的港湾长期以来一直是美国梦的核心锚点。
My sense is that we now have millions of Americans waking up each morning unsure of the social script, the economic ladder or the cultural norms that are OK to practice in their home. They are psychologically homeless.
我的感受是,如今,有数以百万计美国人每天醒来,都不确定自己在这个“家园”中应遵循的社会规则、可依赖的经济阶梯,或是可践行的文化规范。他们在心理上处于无家可归的状态。
When Donald Trump made building a wall along the Mexican border the central motif of his first campaign, he instinctively chose a word that did double duty for millions of Americans. “Wall” meant a physical barrier against uncontrolled immigration that was accelerating our transition to a minority-majority-led America. But it also meant a wall against the pace and scope of change: the cultural, digital and generational whirlwinds reshaping daily life.
将特朗普把美墨边境的高墙作为首次竞选的核心主题时,他本能地选择了一个对成百上千万美国人而言具有双重意义的词。“墙”既指阻挡失控移民的物理屏障——这些移民正加速推动美国向少数族裔主导国家的转型;“墙”也象征着壁垒,抵御着那些快速和大规模的变革,就是那些重塑日常生活的文化、数字与代际风暴。
That, to me, is the deep backdrop to Trump’s National Security Strategy. He is not interested in refighting the Cold War to defend and expand the frontiers of democracy. He is, in my view, interested in fighting the civilizational war over what is the American “home” and what is the European “home,” with an emphasis on race and Christian-Judeo faith — and who is an ally in that war and who is not.
在我看来,这正是特朗普国家安全战略的深层背景。他无意重新打响冷战,去捍卫和扩大民主疆域,而是一心想打响一场关于“美国家园”与“欧洲家园”本质的文明之战,其核心是种族与犹太-基督教信仰,并界定谁是盟友、谁是敌人。
The economics writer Noah Smith argued in his Substack this week that this was the key reason the MAGA movement began to turn away from Western Europe and draw closer to Vladimir Putin’s Russia — because Trump’s devotees saw Putin as more of a defender of white Christian nationalism and traditional values than the nations of the European Union.
经济专栏作家诺亚·史密斯本周在Substack撰文指出,这正是“让美国再次伟大”运动开始疏远西欧、与普京领导的俄罗斯走近的关键原因——因为特朗普的追随者认为,相较于欧盟国家,普京更像是白人基督教民族主义与传统价值观的捍卫者。
Historically, “in the American mind,” Smith wrote, “Europe stood across the sea as a place of timeless homogeneity, where the native white population had always been and would always remain.” However, “in the 2010s, it dawned on those Americans that this hallowed image of Europe was no longer accurate. With their working population dwindling, European countries took in millions of Muslim refugees and other immigrants from the Middle East and Central and South Asia — many of whom didn’t assimilate nearly as well as their peers in the U.S. You’d hear people say things like ‘Paris isn’t Paris anymore.’”
史密斯写道,历史上,“在美国人的认知中,隔海相望的欧洲是一个永恒同质的地方,在那里,本土白人人口一直存在,并将永远存在。”然而,“21世纪10年代,这些美国人逐渐意识到,欧洲这一神圣形象已不再准确。随着劳动人口减少,欧洲国家接纳了数以百万计来自中东、中亚和南亚的穆斯林难民及其他移民——其中许多人的同化程度远不及美国同类移民群体。你会听到人们说‘巴黎不再是那个巴黎’这类话。”
Today’s MAGA-led American right, Smith added, does “not care intrinsically about democracy, or about allyship, or about NATO, or about the European project. They care about ‘Western civilization.’ Unless Europe expels Muslim immigrants en masse and starts talking about its Christian heritage, the Republican Party is unlikely to lift a hand to help Europe with any of its problems.”
史密斯还说,如今,由“让美国再次伟大”主导的美国右翼“本质上并不关心民主、盟友关系、北约或欧洲一体化项目。他们关心的是‘西方文明’。除非欧洲大规模驱逐穆斯林移民,并开始强调其基督教遗产,否则共和党不太可能出手帮助欧洲解决任何问题。”
In other words, when protecting “Western civilization” — with a focus on race and faith — become the centerpiece of U.S. national security, the biggest threat becomes uncontrolled immigration into America and Western Europe — not Russia or China. And “protecting American culture, ‘spiritual health’ and ‘traditional families’ are framed as core national security requirements,” as the defense analyst Rick Landgraf pointed out on the defense website “War on the Rocks.”
换言之,当保护以种族和信仰为核心的“西方文明”成为美国国家安全的重中之重时,最大的威胁就变成了涌入美国和西欧的不受控移民,而非俄罗斯或中国。正如国防分析师里克·兰德格拉夫在国防网站War on the Rocks上指出的,“保护美国文化、‘精神健康’和‘传统家庭’被定义为核心国家安全需求。”
And that’s why the Trump National Security Strategy paper is no accident or the work of a few low-level ideologues. It is, in fact, the Rosetta Stone explaining what really animates this administration at home and abroad.
正因如此,特朗普政府的国家安全战略并非偶然,也非少数低级意识形态分子的杰作。事实上,它就像一块罗塞塔石碑,阐释着本届政府国内外政策的真正驱动力。
Mexico’s Congress authorized up to 50 percent tariffs on Chinese imports on Wednesday, a move seen as an effort to align Mexico with the United States amid pressure from Washington.
墨西哥国会周三授权对中国进口商品加征最高50%的关税,此举被视为在华盛顿压力下,墨西哥与美国保持立场一致的重要举措。
On Wednesday morning, Mexico’s lower chamber of Congress approved the tariffs, which apply to China and other countries with which it does not have a trade deal. Mexico’s Senate then passed the bill in an expedited vote on Wednesday night. Seventy-six senators voted in favor versus only five against, while 35 abstained.
周三上午,墨西哥众议院通过了该关税法案,适用对象包括中国及其他与墨西哥无贸易协定的国家。当晚,墨西哥参议院以快速投票方式通过该法案,最终以76票赞成、五票反对、35票弃权的结果获得通过。
President Claudia Sheinbaum, who proposed the tariffs in September, is widely expected to approve the legislation, which would then take effect in January. The tariffs would affect a wide variety of goods, including automotive parts, textiles, furniture, plastics, steel and aluminum.
该关税提案由总统克劳迪娅·辛鲍姆于9月提出,外界普遍预计她将签署批准,法案将于明年1月正式生效。关税覆盖范围广泛,包括汽车零部件、纺织品、家具、塑料、钢铝等多种商品。
President Trump has been pressuring other nations to distance themselves from China, and the new Mexican tariffs would represent one of the biggest moves to do so yet.
特朗普总统一直向其他国家施压,要求它们与中国保持距离,而墨西哥此次加征关税是迄今为止最重大的响应举措之一。
China is the second largest exporter to Mexico after the United States, selling $130 billion in goods to Mexico last year. (The United States sold $334 billion to Mexico last year.)
中国是仅次于美国的墨西哥第二大进口来源国。去年中国对墨出口额达1300亿美元。(美国对墨出口额为3340亿美元)。
Ms. Sheinbaum has denied that the tariffs are to appease Washington. She has said they will help boost Mexico’s domestic manufacturing — a major priority of hers — and close its large trade deficit with China, which buys comparatively little from Mexico.
辛鲍姆否认加征关税是为了迎合华盛顿。她表示,此举将有助于推动墨西哥本土制造业发展——这是她的核心施政重点之一——同时缩小墨方对华巨额贸易逆差,中国目前从墨西哥进口的商品相对较少。
The Chinese government has strongly denounced the levies. It had warned Mexico to “think twice” and criticized moves made “under coercion to constrain China,” an allusion to Mr. Trump’s pressure.
中国政府已强烈谴责该关税措施,此前曾警告墨西哥“三思后行”,并批评这种“在他人胁迫下以各种名目对华设限”的行为,暗指特朗普政府的施压。
China’s Ministry of Commerce said in a statement on Thursday that the tariff increases would “substantially harm” it and Mexico’s other trading partners. It urged Mexico to “correct its erroneous practices of unilateralism and protectionism as soon as possible.” The ministry said a trade barrier investigation it initiated in September regarding Mexico is currently underway.
中国商务部周四在声明中表示,加征关税将“实质性损害”中国及墨西哥其他贸易伙伴的利益,敦促墨西哥“及早纠正这种单边主义、保护主义的错误做法”。商务部还透露,已于9月启动针对墨西哥的贸易壁垒调查,目前调查正在进行中。
The Trump administration has accused Mexico of being a backdoor for Chinese goods to enter the United States. To try to block that, the White House has put new tariffs on Mexican goods made with Chinese parts. As a result, some Mexican companies this year have shifted supply chains away from China, often with the help of the Mexican government.
特朗普政府指控墨西哥是中国商品进入美国的“后门”。为阻止这一情况,白宫已对含中国零部件的墨西哥商品加征新关税。受此影响,今年部分墨西哥企业已将供应链脱离中国,其中不少得到墨西哥政府协助。
美国总统唐纳德·特朗普与墨西哥总统克劳迪娅·辛鲍姆及加拿大总理马克·卡尼进行会谈。美国与墨西哥互为最大贸易伙伴。
In its newly published National Security Strategy, the Trump administration said it was focused on strengthening its grip on the Western Hemisphere, including by keeping powers like China out of the region. “We want other nations to see us as their partner of first choice, and we will (through various means) discourage their collaboration with others,” it said.
特朗普政府在新发布的《国家安全战略》中明确表示,其重点是加强对西半球的掌控,包括阻止中国等国家进入该地区。文件称:“我们希望其他国家将我们视为首选合作伙伴,并将(通过多种方式)阻止它们与其他方合作。”
Washington has enormous leverage over Mexico. The two countries are each other’s largest trading partners, with $840 billion in trade last year, or seven times Mexico’s trade with China. The Trump administration recently kicked off what could be a contentious process to rework the trade deal between the United States, Canada and Mexico — an agreement Mr. Trump signed into law during his first term but has threatened to scrap.
华盛顿对墨西哥拥有巨大影响力。美墨互为最大贸易伙伴,去年双边贸易额达8400亿美元,是墨西哥对华贸易额的七倍。特朗普政府近期启动可能引发争议的程序,旨在重新谈判美加墨贸易协定——该协定由特朗普在第一任期签署生效,但他曾威胁要废除这一协议。
Mr. Trump has also repeatedly warned that he would like to use military force against drug cartels in Mexico, which Ms. Sheinbaum has said would be unacceptable. He has recently softened his stance as Mexico has increased cooperation on security, immigration and trade.
特朗普还多次警告称,考虑对墨西哥贩毒集团采取军事行动,辛鲍姆此前表示这一做法不可接受。随着墨西哥在安全、移民和贸易领域加强与美方合作,特朗普近期已软化相关立场。
The new tariff rates would vary depending on the import. They also apply to other countries that Mexico does not have a trade agreement with, including South Korea, Thailand and India. But China is by far the largest exporter affected.
新关税税率将根据进口商品种类有所不同,同时适用于韩国、泰国、印度等其他与墨西哥无贸易协定的国家,但中国是目前受影响最大的出口国。
Alejandra Barrales, a Mexican senator whose party opposes Ms. Sheinbaum, raised concerns about the tariffs and their potential to increase prices for Mexicans, particularly in the automotive industry.
来自反对党阵营的墨西哥参议员亚历杭德拉·巴雷莱斯对关税措施表示担忧,认为这可能导致墨西哥国内物价上涨,尤其会冲击汽车行业。
She said that Mexico was caught in the middle of a dispute between the world’s two largest economies: the United States and China.
她表示,墨西哥被夹在全球两大经济体美国和中国的争端中间。
“With this tariff proposal, Mexico will be defining who it is going to play with and it will be taking sides in a dispute that doesn’t seem simple at all,” she said before the proposal was approved.
“这份关税提案将决定墨西哥与谁为伍,使墨西哥在一场绝非简单的争端中选边站队,”她在提案通过前表示。
One morning in April 2020, Ranawaka Perera cooked fried eggs and tomatoes for his wife, Li-Meng Yan. When she said she wasn’t hungry, he pressed her to eat anyway. Lately, Dr. Yan had been so anxious that at times she felt she could barely breathe, and Dr. Perera was worried about her health.
2020年4月的一个早晨,拉纳瓦卡·佩雷拉为妻子闫丽梦做了番茄炒蛋。她说自己不饿,佩雷拉劝她多少还是吃一点。最近,闫博士焦虑得有时几乎喘不过气来,佩雷拉博士对她的健康状况感到担心。
Everyone they knew was stressed in early 2020. The couple both worked at a prestigious lab at the University of Hong Kong, where they researched viruses, including an alarming new coronavirus that was spreading around the globe.
2020年初,他们认识的每个人都压力重重。夫妻二人都在香港大学的一个知名实验室工作,研究方向是病毒,其中包括一种当时正在全球蔓延、引发警惕的新型冠状病毒。
But Dr. Yan was convinced that the prevailing theory that Covid-19 had emerged from a live-animal market in the city of Wuhan was false, and that the truth was much darker. She believed the Chinese government had purposefully grown the virus in a lab and released it to set off a deadly pandemic.
但闫丽梦坚信当时的主流观点是错误的,即新冠病毒源于武汉一家贩卖活体动物市场的理论,她认为真相更为骇人。她认为中国政府在实验室故意培育该病毒并将其释放,从而引发了这场致命的大流行病。
Dr. Perera, an experienced virologist, didn’t rule out the possibility of a lab accident. But that would have been far different from a deliberate release, and he told Dr. Yan, who was relatively new to their field, that it was too soon to know where the virus had come from, if they ever would. He resolved to spend less time at the lab so he could care for his wife. After breakfast, he told her, he had planned a journey to a secluded beach. Dr. Yan loved the sea.
佩雷拉是一名经验丰富的病毒学家,他并不排除实验室意外的可能性。但那与蓄意释放病毒完全不是一回事,他告诉在他们领域里相对资浅的闫丽梦,现在断言病毒源头还为时过早,甚至可能永远都无法确定。他决定减少在实验室的时间,以便照顾妻子。吃完早餐后,他告诉她,打算带她去一处僻静的海滩;她一直很喜欢大海。
His attempts to calm her failed. A few days later, Dr. Perera returned from work to find that his wife had fled their home. She left no clues to where she had gone, but there was a cryptic note scribbled on their chalkboard that referenced their pet nicknames for each other.
但他的安抚没有奏效。几天后,佩雷拉下班回家,发现妻子已经离家出走。她没有留下任何去向线索,只在家中的黑板上潦草地写了一句带有他们之间爱称的留言:
“Yoyo love Bingo forever,” it said.
“悠悠永远爱宾果,”上面这样写道。

Soon Dr. Perera would learn that Dr. Yan had for some time been in contact with powerful allies of the Trump administration, people who had their own incentives for blaming the pandemic on China.
佩雷拉很快得知,闫丽梦早已与特朗普政府的重要盟友建立了联系,这些人各自都有将疫情归咎于中国的动机。
Her plane ticket to the United States had been paid for by a foundation tied to Mr. Trump’s former strategist, Steve Bannon, and the exiled Chinese billionaire Guo Wengui. They had placed her in a series of “safe houses” once she arrived and had arranged for her to meet some of the president’s top advisers.
为她购买赴美机票的是一个与特朗普前首席策略师史蒂夫·班农以及流亡的中国富豪郭文贵有关的基金会。在她抵达后,他们将其安置于多处“安全屋”,并安排她与总统的一些高级顾问会面。
Later that summer, he watched in shock as Dr. Yan became a talking head on the MAGA media circuit in the United States, with repeated appearances on Tucker Carlson’s Fox News TV show promoting her origin theories.
那个夏天晚些时候,佩雷拉震惊地看到闫丽梦频频在美国的MAGA媒体上发表评论,还多次出现在塔克·卡尔森的福克斯新闻节目中,宣扬她的病毒起源理论。
“The whole arc of the story and the counternarrative that we put out about Covid, a lot of it was because of Dr. Yan,” Mr. Bannon said in a recent interview. “She became a media star.”
班农在最近的一次采访中说:“我们构建的整个疫情反叙事故事线,很大程度上得益于闫博士。她成了媒体明星。”
In the years since, neither Dr. Perera nor Dr. Yan’s parents, with whom she was close, have been able to find her or communicate with her, though they have tried desperately.
过去几年里,佩雷拉和与闫丽梦关系原本很亲密的父母尽管用尽了各种办法都一直无法找到她,也无法与她取得任何联系。
Dr. Perera got a job at the University of Pennsylvania in 2021 so he could move to the United States and more easily search for his wife. He has traveled the country, begging for help not just from the men who facilitated her move but from police officers, F.B.I. agents, the State Department, powerhouse lawyers, private detectives, even cult deprogrammers. Nothing has worked.
2021年,佩雷拉在宾夕法尼亚大学找到了一份工作,以便能搬到美国,方便寻找妻子。他在全美各处奔走求助,不仅找到协助她来到美国的人,还求助于警察、联邦调查局探员、国务院、顶级律师、私人侦探,甚至是邪教脱离辅导师。但所有努力均告徒劳。
That is because Dr. Yan does not want to be found.
这是因为她不想被人找到。
In a series of video interviews with The New York Times from undisclosed locations, Dr. Yan said she believes her family has been coerced by the Chinese government to lure her back to China, where she said she fears she will be retaliated against.
在一系列未披露的地点接受《纽约时报》视频采访时,闫丽梦表示,她认为家人受到了中国政府的胁迫,目的是诱使她回国,而她担心自己回去后会遭到报复。
Dr. Yan’s relatives strongly deny any such connection — in fact, they concede that it’s reasonable for her to worry about returning to China after publicly criticizing the government for so long. But they also think that she fell under another kind of control, this one exerted by those who they believe exploited her for their own political gain. Because of them, they said, Dr. Yan is now effectively trapped in the United States, her once-promising career and happy marriage destroyed.
她的家人强烈否认与政府存在任何这样的联系——事实上,他们承认,在长期公开批评政府后,闫丽梦对返回中国的担忧是合情合理的。但他们也认为,她落入了另一种控制之下,施加这种控制的人在他们看来是为了自身政治利益而利用她。正是因为这些人,闫丽梦如今实际上被困在了美国,她原本一片光明的事业和幸福婚姻都被毁了。
For the first time, both Dr. Yan and her husband have shared the full details of their family’s story: Dr. Perera’s, the tale of a husband who moved halfway around the world to try to save his wife; Dr. Yan’s, the story of a wife who doesn’t want to be saved.
闫丽梦和她的丈夫首次详尽分享了这个家庭的故事:佩雷拉讲述的是一个丈夫远渡重洋试图拯救妻子的故事;而闫丽梦则讲了一个并不想被拯救的妻子的故事。
“I just want to talk to her directly, and make sure that she’s safe,” Dr. Perera said. “If she’s safe, and doesn’t want to be with me, I can move on. But not until I know exactly what happened. She is the person I love the most.”
“我只想直接和她谈谈,确保她平安无事,”佩雷拉说。“如果她平安无事,并且不想和我在一起,我可以放手。但除非我确切知道发生了什么,否则做不到。她是我最爱的人。”
A Promising Research Career
前途光明的科研生涯
Dr. Yan grew up in Qingdao, a port city in eastern China. As the only child, she was often the center of attention, said her mother, Angel Zhao, who described her daughter, whom she still calls Meng-Meng, as a thoughtful, smart and obedient girl. Ms. Zhao said she and her husband had tried to encourage her passions, whether that meant reading all day in the library or swimming in the sea.
闫丽梦在中国东部的港口城市青岛长大。她的母亲安吉尔·赵说,这个家中唯一的孩子是他们的掌上明珠。她仍然叫女儿梦梦,说她是一个体贴、聪明、听话的孩子。赵女士说,她和丈夫一直鼓励女儿追求自己的兴趣,无论是整天在图书馆看书,还是在海里游泳。
Her grandfather, a renowned doctor, inspired Dr. Yan’s career. At first she decided to be an ophthalmologist because she found it too upsetting to treat people with terminal illnesses. But she later decided to pursue research and moved for a postdoctoral role in stem cell research at the University of Hong Kong.
闫丽梦的祖父是位名医,这激发了她从医的志向。最初她选择成为眼科医生,因为她觉得治疗绝症患者令人过于难受。但后来她决定转向科研领域,并赴香港大学从事干细胞研究的博士后工作。
That’s where she met Dr. Perera, who is from Sri Lanka. He worked as a virologist at a university laboratory affiliated with the World Health Organization, alongside some of the top virologists in the world. After a few years of friendship, Dr. Perera and Dr. Yan married in 2014, and she started working in his department soon after.
正是在那里,她遇到了来自斯里兰卡的佩雷拉。佩雷拉当时是一家世界卫生组织下属大学实验室的病毒学家,该实验室拥有一众世界顶尖病毒学家。经过数年交往,两人于2014年结婚,婚后不久闫丽梦便开始在丈夫的部门工作。
Dr. Perera described their prepandemic marriage as a loving relationship built on mutual trust. When they did argue, he said, it was often because Dr. Perera, who at 51 is nine years older, felt that Dr. Yan was too gullible; Dr. Yan would counter that he was too cynical. But serious fights were rare. Friends and colleagues would remark that even after years of marriage the couple still held hands and were affectionate. Their WhatsApp messages to each other, provided by Dr. Perera, were filled with heart-eyed emojis and kissy faces. Texts show that they discussed trying to have a baby shortly before Dr. Yan left for the United States.
佩雷拉将他们在疫情前的婚姻描述为建立在互信基础上的恩爱关系。他说,两人偶尔发生争执,通常是因为51岁的佩雷拉(比闫丽梦年长九岁)觉得妻子过于轻信他人,而闫丽梦则会反驳丈夫总把事情往坏了想。但严重的争吵很少发生。朋友和同事都感叹,即便结婚多年,这对夫妇还是会经常手拉着手,恩爱如初。佩雷拉提供的WhatsApp聊天记录显示,两人的对话夹杂了很多爱心眼和亲吻表情符号。信息内容表明,在闫丽梦启程前往美国前不久,他们还在讨论尝试生育孩子的事。
闫丽梦的母亲安吉尔·赵仍然叫女儿梦梦,说她是一个体贴、聪明、听话的孩子。
At the end of 2019, Dr. Yan’s supervisor, Leo Poon, called her into his office with a question. He wanted to know if she could ask her friends from medical school in China if they had heard anything about a new coronavirus — one that was circulating in the city of Wuhan, though officials were claiming it was not contagious.
2019年底,闫丽梦的导师潘烈文将她叫到办公室,询问她能否向中国的医学院朋友打听是否听说过一种新型冠状病毒的消息——这种病毒当时已在武汉传播,但官方声称其不具备传染性。
Dr. Yan did what was asked and was shocked by what she heard.
闫丽梦照做了,但听到的消息令她震惊。
One doctor told her that the virus, Covid-19, in fact appeared transmissible between humans. She also heard rumors implicating the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Dr. Yan reported the information back and was dismayed when Dr. Poon didn’t leap into action.
一位医生告诉她,这种新冠病毒实际上似乎能在人际间传播。她还听到了涉及武汉病毒研究所的传闻。闫丽梦将信息反馈后,发现潘烈文并未立即采取行动,这让她深感不安。
Dr. Poon declined to answer specific questions about the encounter but said the meeting had not been unusual and that there had been no secrecy involved.
潘烈文拒绝回答关于那次会面的具体问题,但表示那次见面并无异常,也不存在任何保密内容。
When Dr. Yan complained to her husband that her supervisors hadn’t acted on her concerns, he told her to be patient.
当闫丽梦向丈夫抱怨上级没有对她的担忧采取行动时,他让她耐心一点。
Instead, as the Chinese government downplayed the dangers of the virus and moved to silence medical whistle-blowers, she reached out to Wang Dinggang, a former businessman from China who ran a YouTube channel from the United States on which he regularly criticized the leadership in Beijing. His outlet was one of many geared toward the Chinese diaspora that, as The Times has reported, were often rife with misinformation and supported by the conservative American media.
然而,随着中国政府淡化病毒的危险并开始压制医疗系统内的吹哨人,她联系了王定刚(音)——这位前中国商人在美国运营着一个YouTube频道,经常批评北京领导人。他的平台是众多面向海外华人的媒体之一,而据《纽约时报》报道,这类媒体中常常充斥虚假信息,并得到美国保守派媒体的支持。
Dr. Perera said he had noticed how scared and upset his wife became whenever she had spoken with Mr. Wang. He advised her to cut off contact with the YouTuber, and Dr. Yan didn’t bring him up again. As winter turned into spring, they both continued working hard in the lab.
佩雷拉说,他注意到妻子每次与王定刚交谈后都变得异常恐惧和不安。他建议她与这位YouTube博主断绝联系,闫丽梦之后也没再提起过他。冬去春来,两人继续在实验室埋头工作。
Dr. Perera was so busy that he didn’t realize just how preoccupied his wife still was until early one morning in mid-April, when Dr. Yan received a call while the couple was in bed. It was Mr. Wang, who claimed to have learned that the Chinese government wanted to silence her.
佩雷拉工作很忙,直到4月中旬一个清晨,他才意识到妻子仍深陷困扰。那天早上,夫妻俩还没起床,闫丽梦接到一个电话。打来电话的是王定刚,他声称听说中国政府想封她的口。
After they got off the phone, Dr. Yan started to panic. She confessed to her husband that she had continued speaking with Mr. Wang and begged him to move with her to the United States. She said she was under the impression that his high-powered contacts there could help protect her and arrange jobs for them.
挂断电话后,闫丽梦开始惊慌失措。她向丈夫坦白自己一直与王保持联系,并恳求他一起移居美国。她说她觉得王定刚在美国拥有强大人脉,既能保护她的安全,又能为他们安排工作。
Dr. Perera told his wife he was open to moving but wanted to wait until they had secured stable jobs at good universities. When Dr. Yan insisted they leave immediately, he grew frustrated, arguing that Mr. Wang was trying to manipulate her for his own purposes.
佩雷拉告诉妻子,他愿意搬去美国,但希望等找到好大学的稳定工作再行动。当闫丽梦坚持立即离开时,他感到十分恼火,认为王定刚在操纵她,为自己的目的利用她。
In a written statement, Mr. Wang said that Dr. Yan had come to the United States based on her own assessment of her safety risks.
在一份书面声明中,王定刚表示,闫丽梦是出于自己对安全风险的判断前往美国的。
“There was no ‘urging’ or inducement of any kind,” he wrote. “Any assistance I provided was purely humanitarian and rooted in principle — not in ‘political gain,’ which has no connection to my work.”
“不存在任何‘催促’或诱导,”他写道。“我提供的所有帮助纯属人道主义且基于原则——而非所谓的‘政治利益’,那与我的工作毫无关系。”
In the days after the call, Dr. Yan’s heart wouldn’t stop racing. Dr. Perera convinced her to go to the doctor for her heart palpitations and tried to calm and cheer her as best he could, but nothing seemed to work.
通话后的几天里,闫丽梦一直心悸不已。佩雷拉劝她去看医生,检查心悸问题,还尽量安抚鼓励她,但似乎没什么用。

In general, Dr. Perera said, Dr. Yan could be emotionally volatile. Her nickname was Yoyo because she was “so up and down,” Dr. Perera said. (His was Bingo because he greeted her with the enthusiasm of a dog.) And these were not normal times. On top of the pandemic, there had recently been a monthslong crackdown on Hong Kong’s pro-democracy protesters, some of whom had disappeared, just as Mr. Wang had warned would happen to Dr. Yan.
总体而言,佩雷拉说,闫丽梦的情绪波动很大。她的昵称叫悠悠就是因为她“情绪起伏很大”(此处悠悠是指上下摆动的悠悠球。——译注)。(而他的昵称叫宾果则是因为他每次跟她打招呼都非常热情,跟一只小狗一样。)而当时也绝非正常时期。除了疫情,香港的民主抗争者也刚经历了长达数月的镇压,有些人失踪了,王定刚警告闫丽梦,她也会落得这样的下场。
Soon after their fight, Dr. Perera arrived home to that final chalkboard message.
在他们吵架后不久,佩雷拉回到家,看到了黑板上最后的留言。
His wife was gone.
他的妻子已经离开了。
A Star on Fox News
福克斯新闻的明星
Dr. Yan arrived in April to a shut-down New York, its streets silent but for the sound of sirens. At first, she kept in touch with her husband and her parents, assuring them that she was safe and under the protection of lawyers and government officials. Increasingly convinced that the Chinese military had developed and released the virus, she encouraged Dr. Perera to join her.
闫丽梦于4月抵达纽约,此时纽约已经处于停摆状态,街头一片寂静,只有警笛的鸣响。起初,她还与丈夫和父母保持着联系,让他们放心,说她很安全,而且有律师和政府的保护。她越来越相信是中国军方制造并释放了病毒,于是她开始鼓动佩雷拉来美国找她。
But he and her parents instead begged her to reconsider.
但他和她的父母却恳求她重新考虑。
“We need real experts to help interpret those data,” Dr. Perera explained to her over WhatsApp. “This will ruin your reputation and after that no one will believe you.”
“我们需要真正的专家帮忙解读那些数据,”佩雷拉通过WhatsApp向她解释。“这会毁了你的名誉,以后就不会有人再相信你了。”
One day, Dr. Yan told her parents something “very big” was in the works, Ms. Zhao recalled.
赵女士回忆说,有一天,闫丽梦告诉父母,有一件“非常大的事”正在进行中。
The next time she heard her daughter’s voice was on Fox News, where Dr. Yan introduced herself to the world.
她再次听到女儿的声音时,是在福克斯新闻上,闫丽梦向全世界介绍了自己。
Mr. Perera traveled briefly to New York, but it was too late. Dr. Yan no longer wanted to see him. After that July, she never spoke with her parents or her husband again.
佩雷拉曾短暂赶到纽约,但为时已晚。闫丽梦已经不愿再见他。那年7月之后,她再也没有和父母或丈夫说过话。
They watched in disbelief as Dr. Yan was embraced by conservative media outlets and prominent Republicans like Rudolph Giuliani, who posed for photos with her at his home.
他们难以置信地看着闫丽梦受到了保守派媒体以及像鲁道夫·朱利安尼这样的知名共和党人的认可,后者甚至在家中与她合影。
郭文贵与史蒂夫·班农。
By April 2020, without providing any evidence, Mr. Trump and his allies, many of whom were eager to confront China, had begun pushing the theory that Covid-19 came from a lab.
到2020年4月,特朗普和他的盟友——其中许多人急于对抗中国——开始推动新冠病毒来自实验室的说法,尽管没有提供任何证据。
For them, Dr. Yan was a godsend, a credentialed scientist who had worked at a World Health Organization-affiliated lab with some of the world’s top virologists. (They ignored the fact that she, herself, was not one of them.)
对他们而言,闫丽梦简直是天上掉下来的礼物——她是一名有资历的科学家,曾在世界卫生组织下属的实验室工作,该实验室拥有一批世界顶级的病毒学家。(他们忽略了一个事实:这批顶尖病毒学家并不包括闫丽梦。)
Once Mr. Bannon felt confident that Dr. Yan was ready to go public, he helped plan her Fox News appearance, he said.
班农表示,在确信闫丽梦已经准备好公开露面后,他开始协助策划她在福克斯新闻的亮相。
“She was very plain spoken, with no political agenda,” he said. “She’s kind of a nerd.”
“她说话很直白,没有政治议程,”他说。“她有点书呆子气。”
Documents obtained by The Times show that on July 31, 2020, a foundation linked to Mr. Guo agreed to pay Dr. Yan $10,000 a month to support her in a “shared mission of exposing corruption within the Chinese Communist Party and throughout the world.”
《纽约时报》获取的文件显示,2020年7月31日,与郭文贵有关联的一个基金会同意每月向闫丽梦支付1万美元,以支持她“揭露中共及全球各地腐败行为的共同使命”。
武汉病毒研究所。多年来,外界一直在争论新冠病毒是否从这座位于中国武汉的研究实验室泄漏。
Mr. Bannon said he had also connected her with as many of President Trump’s advisers as possible, in particular Peter Navarro, a longtime Trump confidant and a prominent China hawk who is now the White House’s trade adviser, and Steven Hatfill, then a White House adviser who until recently held another senior role at the Department of Health and Human Services.
班农表示,他还尽可能让特朗普的多位顾问与她会面,特别是彼得·纳瓦罗——特朗普的长期亲信、著名的对华强硬派、现任白宫贸易顾问——以及当时的白宫顾问史蒂文·哈特菲尔,直到最近他还在美国卫生与公众服务部担任高级职位。
“The Fauci crowd dismissed her, but we made sure people in the White House knew exactly what was going on,” Mr. Bannon said.
“福奇那群人对她不屑一顾,但我们确保白宫的人清楚怎么回事,”班农说。
Mr. Navarro said he couldn’t recall if he had ever met Dr. Yan. Dr. Hatfill and Mr. Guo did not respond to requests for comment.
纳瓦罗表示,他不记得自己是否见过闫丽梦。哈特菲尔和郭文贵没有回应置评请求。
From abroad, Dr. Perera and Ms. Zhao frantically tried to appeal to the men who appeared to be surrounding Dr. Yan, but they never heard back.
身在海外的佩雷拉和赵女士曾急切地联系那些似乎围绕在闫丽梦身边的人,但从未得到过回应。
Instead, Mr. Bannon, Mr. Guo and others used their media outlets to amplify claims that Dr. Perera wanted to harm his wife.
相反,班农、郭文贵等人利用他们的媒体渠道放大了一种说法,称佩雷拉想伤害他的妻子。
“From now on, she will forget about the tears of her parents and the threats from her husband,” Mr. Guo told his followers.
“从今以后,她会忘记父母的眼泪和丈夫的威胁,”郭文贵对他的追随者们说。
To support her bioweapon theory, Dr. Yan published a paper online in September, on an open-access repository with no peer review. She then appeared on Tucker Carlson’s Fox News show and confidently wielded the report as proof that Covid-19 was “not from nature.”
为了支持她的生物武器说,闫丽梦于9月在一个没有同行评议的开放网站上发表了一篇论文。随后,她在塔克·卡尔森的福克斯新闻节目中亮相,自信地将该报告作为证据,声称新冠病毒“并非来自自然界”。
闫丽梦在9月接受塔克·卡尔森节目的采访,在线点击量至少达到880万。
The mainstream scientific community quickly and thoroughly attacked the paper, which claimed that puzzling features of the virus could only be explained if it had been designed by the Chinese military.
这篇论文断言,病毒令人费解的特征只能被解释为中国人民解放军的设计使然,相关说法立即遭到主流科学界的全面批驳。
Researchers at Johns Hopkins released a point-by-point rebuttal, stating that Dr. Yan’s key claims were flawed and misinterpreted and that the report provided no proof for its sweeping accusations of a cover-up.
约翰斯·霍普金斯大学的研究人员逐条反驳,指出闫丽梦的关键论点存在缺陷和误读,并且该报告没有提供任何证据来支持其关于掩盖行动的笼统指控。
Dr. Yan’s former employers at the University of Hong Kong also released a statement clarifying that she was a postdoctoral fellow with limited experience.
闫丽梦曾供职的香港大学也发表声明,澄清她只是经验有限的博士后研究员。
It was painful for Dr. Perera to watch as his wife’s professional reputation was dismantled. Years later, he still hasn’t been able to bring himself to read the paper, preferring to preserve the memory of the ambitious and talented scientist he remembers her to be.
看着妻子的专业声誉毁于一旦,佩雷拉感到十分痛苦。过去了数年,他仍无法说服自己去读那篇论文,宁愿保留心中那个雄心勃勃、才华横溢的科学家的记忆。
The debate over whether the virus originated from a lab accident or an animal-to-human transmission has continued into the present. American intelligence agencies remain divided on the issue. But virtually none of the scientists who lean toward the lab leak theory have suggested that the virus was deliberately released. China, meanwhile, has disputed that Covid started in Wuhan at all.
关于病毒是源于实验室泄漏还是动物传人的争论持续至今。美国情报机构在这个问题上仍然存在分歧。但即便是倾向于实验室泄漏说的科学家当中,也几乎没有人认为病毒是被故意释放的。与此同时,中国则对新冠始于武汉的说法予以反驳。
In 2021, Dr. Perera moved to the United States to keep searching for his wife, and continues today. Just a few months ago, he tried once more to reach out to Dr. Yan directly, emailing an address associated with her online.
2021年,佩雷拉搬到美国继续寻妻,至今仍在努力。就在几个月前,他再次尝试直接联系闫丽梦,向一个与她相关的邮箱发去邮件。
“I would like to talk with Dr. Limeng Yan because some people told her lies about me to control her,” he wrote. “I want her to know that I’m not working with ANYONE in China/HK/USA that wishes any form of harm upon her.”
他写道:“我想和闫丽梦博士谈谈,因为有人向她说谎诋毁我,企图控制她。我想让她知道,我没有和中国/香港/美国任何意图伤害她的人合作。”
But as before, there was no response.
但和以前一样,没有回音。
Dr. Perera said he accepted that Dr. Yan might not want to be married to him any longer. But he can’t rest without knowing she is safe.
佩雷拉说,他已经接受闫丽梦可能不想继续维持这段婚姻的事实。但在确认她平安之前,他无法安心。
“I want her to be free, because she did not grow up in a free society that values human freedom,” he said. “I can move on when I know the truth of what happened to her.”
“我希望她能获得自由,因为她不是在一个真正重视自由的社会中长大的,”他说。“只有知道她究竟发生了什么,我才能继续往前走。”
In Hiding
藏匿
The truth is that Dr. Yan is not lost. She’s in hiding.
事实是,闫丽梦并没有失踪。她只是藏匿了起来。
She said she had agreed to be interviewed to raise awareness of her work, but would only confirm she was somewhere in the United States, because she believes that many people are still trying to find her. When she learned that The Times had interviewed her husband and her mother, she was furious.
她说,她之所以同意接受采访,是为了让更多人关注她的工作,但她只愿确认自己在美国的某个地方,因为她认为仍然有许多人在试图找到她。当得知《纽约时报》采访了她的丈夫和母亲后,她极为愤怒。
“For over five years, the C.C.P. has used my parents and Mahen as tools to lure me back, attempting to carry out a ‘perfect crime’ to erase the truth about the virus and avoid accountability,” she said in a statement, referring to the Chinese Communist Party and the name she uses for Dr. Perera.
“五年多来,中共一直利用我的父母和马亨作为诱饵,试图引我回国,实施一场‘完美犯罪’——掩盖病毒真相,逃避责任,”她在声明中写道。这里的马亨是她对佩雷拉的称呼。
In the video interviews, Dr. Yan said she had been affected by the Chinese government’s repressive authoritarianism from an early age. For her, the research job in Hong Kong and her marriage to a non-Chinese man had represented an escape.
在视频采访中,闫丽梦表示,自己从小深受中国政府高压威权体制的影响。对她而言,前往香港从事研究工作以及与一位非华裔男性结婚,都意味着一种逃离。
She told the same story as her husband and mother had about her life up until the pandemic. Yes, her childhood was “very happy.” Yes, she had once thought Dr. Perera was “her soul mate.”
她对自己疫情前人生的描述,与丈夫和母亲的叙述基本一致。是的,童年确实“非常快乐”。是的,她曾认为佩雷拉是“灵魂伴侣”。
She said she had left ophthalmology behind because she wanted to become a top expert in a field where she could help more people. The coveted lab position was a dream come true, but it had shattered when her supervisor dismissed her concerns about the virus.
她说自己之所以放弃眼科,是因为想在一个能够帮助更多人的领域成为顶尖专家。梦寐以求的实验室职位原本像梦想成真,但当自己的导师忽视她对病毒的担忧时,这个梦想破碎了。
王定刚(左)是一位YouTube主播,经常批评中国政府,右边为经常跟他搭档主持的安红。2020年1月,王定刚突然将注意力转向武汉暴发的新冠疫情。
In his first YouTube report that she contributed to while still in Hong Kong, Mr. Wang referred to Dr. Yan as the “world’s absolute top coronavirus expert” and said she had told him that China’s claims that there was no evidence of human-to-human transmission were false. The day after the report aired, the Chinese government admitted that the virus was contagious, and Wuhan went on lockdown shortly after.
在闫丽梦仍居香港时协助制作的首个YouTube节目中,王定刚称她为“世界顶尖的冠状病毒专家”,并透露她曾告知:中国声称“没有证据表明人传人”是假的。节目播出后的第二天,中国政府承认病毒具有传染性,不久武汉封城。
There was no proof that the YouTube segment was responsible for the government’s admission — other Chinese scientists had also warned that the virus could be transmitted between humans — but Dr. Yan interpreted the timing as a calling to do more.
没有任何证据表明这个YouTube节目促使了政府的承认——当时也有其他中国科学家警告病毒可能具有人传人能力——但闫丽梦将这一时机解读为一种召唤,促使她继续行动。
“My only thinking was that if I don’t do it now, I will be regretful for my whole life, and I want to do something to prevent this disaster,” Dr. Yan said.
“我当时唯一的想法就是,如果现在不做,我会后悔一辈子,我想做点什么来阻止这场灾难,”闫丽梦说。
Dr. Perera’s distrust of Mr. Wang, and his refusal to flee to the United States, had shocked her, she said, and she had begun to wonder whether her husband, too, was trying to silence her.
她表示,佩雷拉对王定刚的不信任,以及他拒绝逃往美国,都让她大为震惊,她开始怀疑丈夫是否也想让她闭嘴。
“It’s like he suddenly became a stranger,” she said.
“就好像他突然变成了一个陌生人,”她说。
By the time Dr. Perera cooked her eggs and tomatoes and suggested a trip to the seaside, she had worked herself into a panicked state. Was he trying to poison and kidnap her?
当佩雷拉为她做了番茄炒蛋并提议去海边散心时,她已陷入恐慌状态。他是不是想毒死她、绑架她?
That, she said, was when she told Mr. Wang she was ready to leave. She said he connected her to Mr. Guo, and a foundation connected to him paid for her ticket.
她说,正是在那时,她告诉王定刚自己已经准备好离开。她说,是他帮她联系上郭文贵,而与郭文贵相关的一个基金会支付了她的机票。
Dr. Yan said that she knew little at the time about the politics of Mr. Bannon and the others who assisted her, only that they believed her and promised safety.
闫丽梦表示,当时她对班农及其他帮助她的人的政治背景知之甚少,只知道他们相信她,并承诺会保障她的安全。
Her family’s relentless efforts to find her have only reinforced her certainty that it would be unsafe to reconnect.
家人不懈寻找她的努力反而强化了她的判断——重新联系会使她处于危险之中。
“I miss them,” Dr. Yan said of her parents, “but for me, I don’t know that I can see them in my life until the whole government is eliminated.”
“我想念他们,”闫丽梦在谈到父母时说。“但对我来说,不知道这辈子还能不能再见到他们,除非整个政府被推翻。”
Life in the United States has not lived up to the hopes Dr. Yan held upon arrival.
闫丽梦在美国的生活并没有达到她初到时所抱有的期望。
After Mr. Trump left office in 2021, the invitations to meet with White House officials dwindled. The prime-time TV appearances dried up. Donations from private donors, which had helped with expenses at first, no longer flowed in.
2021年特朗普卸任后,白宫官员的会面邀约逐渐减少。黄金时段的电视露面机会也消失了。最初帮助支付开支的私人捐助也停止了。
By July 2021, Dr. Yan and Mr. Wang distanced themselves from Mr. Guo, and the foundation funding her cut off her payments. Mr. Guo’s legal troubles by then had intensified, and he was convicted in July 2024 in New York for defrauding thousands of his online followers.
到2021年7月,闫丽梦和王定刚疏远了郭文贵,而资助她的基金会也停止付钱给她。那时郭文贵的法律麻烦越来越大,并于2024年7月在纽约因诈骗数千名网络追随者而被定罪。
Once Dr. Yan dreamed of a job at a U.S. university, maybe even of running her own lab. But that is impossible, she said, since she has to remain in hiding. She would like a divorce, but putting her address on legal records could expose her location.
闫丽梦曾梦想在美国大学工作,甚至有一天能拥有自己的实验室。但她说,这已不可能,因为她必须继续躲藏。她希望离婚,但在法律文件上填写住址会暴露她的所在地。
Since she is unable to work, she spends her days assisting Mr. Wang, whom she called her “best friend,” with his broadcasts.
由于无法工作,她每天都在协助王定刚做节目,她称他为自己“最好的朋友”。
“My basic survival has been possible only because Mr. Wang has provided unconditional humanitarian support,” she said.
“我之所以还能基本维持生存,只是因为王先生提供了无条件的人道支持,”她说。
Her fears that the Chinese government is watching her are not far-fetched.
她对中国政府正在监视她的担忧并非毫无根据。
In 2023, she and Mr. Wang said they were among those described as victims in a criminal complaint filed by the U.S. attorney’s office in New York that charged dozens of members of an elite task force of the Chinese National Police with running a transnational repression scheme targeting U.S. residents. None of the defendants have responded to the charges, which are still pending.
2023年,她和王定刚表示,他们在美国纽约东区联邦检察官办公室的刑事起诉书中被列为受害者。那份诉状指控中国公安部一个精英行动小组的数十名成员实施跨国镇压计划,目标针对美国居民。所有被告均未对这些指控作出回应,案件仍在审理中。
The reprisals may have continued into the present. Earlier this year, Google emailed her to tell her she was most likely a victim of a state-sponsored hacking attempt to steal her email password.
报复行动可能至今仍未停止。今年早些时候,谷歌发邮件告诉她,她很可能是一次国家支持的黑客攻击的目标,对方试图窃取她的邮箱密码。
These incidents have hardened Dr. Yan’s certainty that she is in constant danger, and her resolve never to speak to her family or husband again.
这些事件让闫丽梦更加确信自己一直处于危险之中,也更加坚定永不再与家人或丈夫联系的决心。
All of her actions have been “entirely the result of my own independent decisions, personal convictions, and professional judgment,” she wrote in a recent email. “Any effort to mischaracterize these actions as ‘being instructed,’ ‘controlled,’ or ‘manipulated’ by others is not only factually false, but also directly echoes the C.C.P.’s long-running disinformation campaigns against me.”
她的所有行为“完全源自我自己的独立决定、个人信念和专业判断”,她在近期的一封邮件中写道。“任何将这些行为歪曲为‘受指使’、‘被控制’或‘被操纵’的尝试,不仅与事实不符,而且完全呼应了中共长期以来针对我的虚假宣传。”
A spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Washington said that he was not familiar with Dr. Yan but that Chinese officials opposed “anyone politicizing and weaponizing origins-tracing or scapegoating others.”
中国驻华盛顿大使馆的一位发言人表示,他不了解闫丽梦的情况,但中国政府反对“任何人将病毒溯源问题政治化、武器化,或甩锅的做法”。
Dr. Perera is still determined to protect his wife, if only from herself.
佩雷拉依然决心保护妻子,哪怕是让她免受自身伤害。
He and Dr. Yan’s parents struggle to understand why she abandoned a loving marriage, a close family and a prestigious scientific career. Is it possible, they wonder, that she made a rash decision in a state of anxiety and that pride now prevents her from admitting she was wrong? Have the years of isolation since she left, surrounded only by people who support her theories, detached her from reality?
他和闫丽梦的父母都无法理解,为什么她会放弃一段充满爱的婚姻、亲密的家庭和一份备受尊敬的科研事业。他们想知道,她是否可能是在焦虑的状态下做出了草率的决定,而如今又因为自尊,不愿承认自己错了?或者,她离开以来这些年的隔绝生活——身边只有支持她理论的人——是否让她脱离了现实?
But Dr. Yan insisted that the reality she now inhabits is the only one she desires.
但闫丽梦坚持认为,她如今身处的现实正是她唯一想要的。
During one of the video calls, she sat in an office chair in front of a poster that read “JOMO: Joy of Missing Out.” Two furry white puppies played around her legs. When asked if she missed her old life, she said simply, “It’s my previous life.”
在一次视频通话中,她坐在办公椅上,身后贴着写有“接受错失的喜悦”的海报。两只毛茸茸的白色小狗在她腿边嬉戏。当被问及是否怀念旧日生活时,她只是淡淡回应:“那都是前世的事了。”
In July, the Taiwanese engineer Wei-Jen Lo left his job after 21 years at the world’s leading computer chip maker, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. He soon started work at one of TSMC’s rivals: Intel, the struggling Silicon Valley chip maker that the Trump administration has wagered $8.9 billion to transform into the U.S. national champion.
今年7月,台湾工程师罗唯仁在全球领先的计算机芯片制造商台积电工作了21年后离职。不久后,他加入了台积电的竞争对手——陷入困境的硅谷芯片制造商英特尔。特朗普政府已投资89亿美元,希望将其打造成美国的本土冠军企业。
Intel said that Mr. Lo’s decision to hop from one job to another was routine in a competitive industry. But in Taiwan, government prosecutors saw it as a potential threat to national security and started an investigation. Late last month, officials raided Mr. Lo’s homes in Taipei and Hsinchu, the heart of Taiwan’s chip industry, where they took computers and flash drives. A court also approved the seizure of Mr. Lo’s stocks and real estate.
英特尔表示,罗唯仁换工作的决定在竞争激烈的行业是很平常的行为。但在台湾,检方将其视为对国家安全的潜在威胁,并启动了调查。上月末,官员突袭搜查了罗唯仁位于台北和台湾芯片产业核心地带新竹的住所,查扣了电脑和闪存盘。法院还批准扣押其股票和房产。
The case is part of a new push by Taiwanese prosecutors to protect the trade secrets of the island’s world-beating chip makers. Taiwan is the source of most of the world’s advanced computer chips, which are essential to virtually everything from iPhones to cars. But as countries try to boost their domestic chip makers, the authorities in Taiwan are taking a stronger hand in protecting its prized technology.
这起案件是台湾检方为保护岛内全球顶尖芯片制造商的商业机密而采取的新举措之一。台湾生产了全球大多数的先进计算机芯片,它们应用于从iPhone到汽车的几乎所有领域。但随着各国竞相扶持本土芯片制造商,台湾当局正加大力度保护这一宝贵技术。
For the first time, the government is invoking a 2022 law that made chip makers’ trade secrets subject to protection on national security grounds.
这是台湾政府首次援引2022年出台的一项法律,将芯片制造商的商业机密纳入国家安全保护范畴。
On Dec. 2, in a separate case, prosecutors indicted the local unit of one of TSMC’s suppliers, the Japanese equipment maker Tokyo Electron, accusing it of failing to stop a former employee from stealing details about TSMC’s most advanced chips. It was the first time that a company was indicted under Taiwan’s National Security Act over stealing chip trade secrets.
12月2日,在另一起案件中,检方起诉了台积电供应商、日本设备制造商东京电子的台湾子公司,指控其未能阻止前员工窃取台积电最先进芯片的相关细节。这是台湾首次依据《国家安全法》,以窃取芯片商业机密为由起诉企业。
Semiconductor technologies “are the lifeline of our country’s industry,” prosecutors said, adding that their theft threatens the international competitiveness of Taiwan’s chip companies.
检方表示,半导体技术“是我国产业的生命线”,窃取行为威胁台湾芯片企业的国际竞争力。

Many in Taiwan have long viewed the island’s dominance of advanced chip making as a “silicon shield” to deter military action from China, which claims Taiwan as part of its territory.
长期以来,台湾许多人将该岛在先进芯片制造领域的主导地位视为“硅盾”,可以威慑声称对台湾拥有主权的中国采取军事行动。
The trade war between the United States and China during President Trump’s first term and the Covid-19 pandemic underscored how much the world depended on Taiwan for advanced chips. China, the United States, South Korea and Japan have spent billions to boost their own chip makers, many of which use the same suppliers and have repeatedly recruited Taiwanese engineers.
特朗普政府第一任期内的美中贸易战以及新冠疫情凸显了全球对台湾先进芯片的依赖程度。中国、美国、韩国和日本已投入数十亿美元扶持本土芯片制造商,这些企业大多使用相同的供应商,并多次挖角台湾工程师。
All this pushed Taiwan’s lawmakers to expand its national security law to cover semiconductor trade secrets, according to Liu Yi-Chun, a prosecutor at Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice.
台湾法务部检察官刘怡君表示,这一切促使台湾立法者扩大了《国家安全法》的适用范围,将半导体商业机密纳入其中。
“It became apparent that Taiwan supplied a significant portion of the world’s semiconductor production capacity,” Ms. Liu said. “Maintaining that competitiveness is crucial.”
“显然,台湾承担了全球相当大一部分半导体产能供应,”刘怡君说。“维持这种竞争力至关重要。”
After Taiwanese prosecutors opened the national security inquiry into Mr. Lo late last month, TSMC filed a lawsuit against him. TSMC said in a statement that Mr. Lo had told the company in an exit interview that he planned to join an academic institution and had not mentioned Intel.
上月末台湾检方对罗唯仁启动国家安全调查后,台积电对其提起了诉讼。台积电在声明中称,罗唯仁在离职面谈时表示计划加入一家学术机构,并未提及英特尔。
Intel has said it believes the allegations against Mr. Lo have no merit. The company maintains strict policies that prohibit the use or transfer of third-party confidential information, said Cory Pforzheimer, vice president of communications at Intel. “Talent movement across companies is a common and healthy part of our industry, and this situation is no different,” he added.
英特尔表示,它认为针对罗唯仁的指控毫无根据。该公司公关副总裁科里·普福尔茨海默称,英特尔有严格政策禁止使用或转移第三方机密信息。“企业间的人才流动是半导体行业的常态和健康生态,此次情况也不例外,”他还说。
英特尔位于亚利桑那州钱德勒市的奥科蒂洛园区。
In the separate case, Tokyo Electron said that prosecutors had not found that it had directed its former employee to improperly obtain TSMC’s confidential information.
在另一起案件中,东京电子表示,检方并未发现该公司指示前员工不当获取台积电机密信息。
Mr. Lo joined TSMC after 18 years at Intel. In a podcast interview aired in October, he described how he had led an initiative on TSMC’s research and development team to work around the clock under what he called the “Nighthawk Project.” He was also part of several crucial engineering decisions in the development of the company’s most advanced chips. Mr. Lo could not be reached for comment.
罗唯仁在加入台积电之前,已在英特尔工作了18年。在10月播出的一档播客采访中,他描述了自己如何带领台积电研发团队,在其所谓“夜鹰计划”中夜以继日地工作。他还参与了该公司最先进芯片研发过程中的多项关键工程决策。目前无法联系到罗唯仁置评。
TSMC is a giant contract manufacturer. It makes chips that other companies design. Its success depends on keeping secrets.
台积电是全球巨头级晶圆代工厂,制造其他公司设计的芯片。其成功的关键在于严守商业机密。
Among TSMC’s customers are some of the world’s most valuable companies. Apple, which uses the chips in iPhones, and Nvidia, which uses them in artificial intelligence servers. And as the United States and China vie for larger roles for their own chip makers, TSMC is closely guarding the details of its complex production process.
台积电的客户包括全球多家最具价值的企业,例如在iPhone中使用其芯片的苹果公司,以及在人工智能服务器中采用其芯片的英伟达。随着美中两国争相提升本土芯片制造商的地位,台积电正严密守护其复杂生产流程的细节。
Although rivals like Intel, China’s Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, South Korea’s Samsung and the Japanese start-up Rapidus are spending billions to compete with TSMC, it remains several generations ahead.
尽管英特尔、中国的中芯国际、韩国三星以及日本初创企业Rapidus等竞争对手已投入数十亿美元与台积电竞争,但台积电的技术仍领先数代。
The company has strict protocols to protect its trade secrets, including an internal system that tracks which files employees open and print out, and where employees register their engineering breakthroughs. The company follows patent filings by former employees and requires many of its employees to sign noncompete agreements.
台积电拥有严格的商业机密保护协议,包括内部系统追踪员工打开和打印的文件、员工登记工程突破的流程。该公司还会跟踪离职员工的专利申请情况,并要求许多员工签署竞业禁止协议。
台积电位于菲尼克斯的工厂。
For TSMC, the legal case against Mr. Lo compounds an already complicated relationship with Intel, which is not only a competitor but also a major customer. TSMC has been making Intel’s most advanced chips for nearly a decade. Now, Intel and the Trump administration are spending billions on a factory in Arizona where Intel plans to make its own cutting-edge chips in the United States for the first time in years.
对台积电而言,针对罗唯仁的法律诉讼让其与英特尔本就复杂的关系雪上加霜——英特尔既是竞争对手,也是主要客户。近十年来,台积电一直为英特尔生产最先进的芯片。如今,英特尔和特朗普政府正斥资数十亿美元在亚利桑那州建设工厂,计划实现多年来首次在美国本土生产尖端芯片。
But Mr. Trump has also pressured TSMC to do more in the United States. TSMC has already built one chip factory in Arizona and is constructing two more. In March, TSMC said it would invest $100 billion to expand its operations in Arizona, bringing its planned total spending in the United States to $165 billion.
但特朗普也向台积电施压,要求其在美国扩大投资。台积电已在亚利桑那州建成一座芯片工厂,另有两座正在建设中。今年3月,台积电宣布将投资1000亿美元扩大亚利桑那州的业务,使其在美国的计划总投资达到1650亿美元。
Paul Triolo, a partner at DGA-Albright Stonebridge Group, said, “TSMC is in the difficult position of being both essentially the U.S. national champion now, while the Trump administration attempts to remake Intel into a viable company that can compete with TSMC.”
DGA-奥尔布赖特石桥集团合伙人保罗·特里奥洛表示:“台积电如今处于一个尴尬的境地——它实质上已成为美国的本土冠军企业,而特朗普政府却在试图重塑英特尔,使其成为有能力与台积电竞争的公司。”
China should allow its currency to strengthen and rely more on domestic consumer spending instead of ever-rising exports, International Monetary Fund officials said on Wednesday in Beijing at the end of a 10-day visit to China.
国际货币基金组织(IMF)官员周三在北京结束为期十天的访华行程时表示,中国应允许人民币升值,并更多地依赖国内消费者支出,而不是不断增长的出口。
The cautiously worded suggestion that a stronger currency may be needed represents a subtle shift for the fund. The I.M.F. has previously suggested that China should allow more flexibility in the value of the currency, the renminbi, while staying mostly silent on whether it believes the currency should strengthen or weaken against the dollar and other currencies.
基金组织以谨慎措辞提出“可能需要更强势货币”的建议,代表着这一机构立场的微妙转变。此前,IMF建议中国应允许人民币汇率有更大的灵活性,但基本未明确表态是否认为人民币应对美元及其他货币升值或贬值。
The visit to China by the I.M.F., the first of its kind in 18 months, came as the Washington-based multilateral institution finds itself increasingly caught between the Trump administration and the Chinese government.
这是18个月来IMF首次访问中国,而此行正值这一总部设在华盛顿的多边机构日益发现,自己正夹在特朗普政府与中国政府之间。
Kristalina Georgieva, the managing director of the fund, said at a news conference that the I.M.F. was not asking the Chinese government to intervene in markets to make sure the currency strengthens.
该机构总裁克里斯塔利娜·格奥尔基耶娃在新闻发布会上表示,IMF并未要求中国政府干预市场以确保人民币升值。
Ms. Georgieva did not detail how she expected the renminbi to appreciate without government action, and she repeated previous calls for the currency to be flexible. The Chinese government had no immediate response to the I.M.F.’s assessment, although its response will be included when the fund issues a full report in a couple months.
她未详细说明在政府不采取行动的情况下如何实现人民币升值,并重申了此前关于增强汇率灵活性的呼吁。中国政府未立即对IMF的评估作出回应,但其回应将出现在IMF几个月后发布的完整报告中。
American and European officials hold considerable sway over the governance of the I.M.F., which was established at the end of World War II to police stability in currencies and international finance. Today 191 nations are members.
美国和欧洲官员对IMF的治理拥有相当大的影响力。该组织成立于二战结束之际,旨在维持货币和国际金融的稳定,目前拥有191个成员国。
The Trump administration has pressured the I.M.F. to shift from its recent focus on climate change to return to its original mission. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent installed his former chief of staff, Dan Katz, as Ms. Georgieva’s top deputy in October.
特朗普政府已向国际货币基金组织施压,要求其从近年来对气候变化的关注中抽身,回归其最初使命。美国财长斯科特·贝森特10月任命自己的前幕僚长丹·卡茨为格奥尔基耶娃的第一副手。
“In line with its core mandate, the I.M.F. needs to call out countries like China that have pursued globally distortive policies and opaque currency practices for many decades,” Mr. Bessent said in a speech in April.
贝森特在4月的一次演讲中说,“根据其核心使命,IMF需要点名批评像中国这样几十年来推行全球扭曲性政策、实行不透明货币做法的国家。”
Mr. Katz’s new role as first deputy managing director gives him responsibility for the fund’s inspection visits to member countries like the one to China.
卡茨出任第一副总裁后,负责IMF对成员国的例行评估访问,比如此次中国之行。
But China also has considerable leverage at the fund. The I.M.F. needs Beijing’s help in coping with severe debt problems in dozens of developing countries that have borrowed heavily from China and cannot afford repayments.
但中国在该机构中同样拥有相当大的影响力。IMF需要北京的帮助,以应对数十个发展中国家严重的债务问题——这些国家从中国大量借款,却无力偿还。
Ms. Georgieva said that the renminbi could appreciate in “real” terms, which means adjusted for inflation. With producer prices falling 2 percent a year in China and rising several percent a year elsewhere, the value of each renminbi may need to rise 5 percent or more a year against other currencies just to stay even in inflation-adjusted terms.
格奥尔基耶娃表示,人民币可以在“实际”意义上升值,也就是经通胀调整后的升值。由于中国的生产者价格每年下降约2%,而其他地区每年上涨几个百分点,人民币对其他货币每年可能需要升值5%或更多,才能在通胀调整后保持基本持平。
China’s weak currency has helped fuel the flood of its cheap exports globally, drawing criticism and tariffs by the United States, the European Union and other trading partners trying to protect their own industries. China reported on Monday that its trade surplus with the rest of the world had climbed past $1 trillion in the first 11 months of this year.
人民币疲软助推了中国廉价商品席卷全球市场,引发美国、欧盟等试图保护本国产业的贸易伙伴的批评与关税措施。中国本周一公布的数据显示,今年前11个月其全球贸易顺差已突破1万亿美元。
A stronger Chinese currency would make the country’s exports costlier and less competitive in foreign markets, while making imports more affordable for domestic consumers. But more expensive Chinese exports could push up prices for consumers in the United States and elsewhere.
人民币走强将推高中国出口产品的价格,削弱其在海外市场的竞争力,同时会让国内消费者更容易负担进口商品。但中国出口商品涨价也可能推高美国及其他国家的消费者物价。
Ms. Georgieva also called for the Chinese government, heavily indebted and facing shrinking tax revenues, to spend more money to help China’s consumers and to stabilize the country’s real estate sector.
格奥尔基耶娃还呼吁背负沉重债务、税收收入下降的中国政府增加支出,以扶持国内消费并稳定房地产行业。
“It’s an unexpected role reversal that the I.M.F. — patron saint of fiscal restraint — is nudging China toward a debt-fueled stimulus,” said Han Lin, the China country director for the Asia Group, a Washington consulting firm.
“IMF作为财政紧缩政策的守护者,却在推动中国通过举债刺激经济,这种角色反转出人意料,”华盛顿咨询公司亚洲集团中国区负责人林汉昇说。
A research paper last month by Brad Setser and Mark Sobel, two former U.S. Treasury officials, has drawn more attention to China’s currency from business leaders and economists outside the country. The pair pointed out that the I.M.F.’s own formula for currency valuation suggested that the renminbi was undervalued by at least 18 percent.
上月由前美国财政部官员布拉德·塞瑟和马克·索贝尔联合撰写的研究报告进一步引发了国际商界领袖和经济学家对中国汇率问题的关注。两人指出,按照国际货币基金组织自己的汇率估值公式,人民币至少被低估了18%。
Mr. Setser wrote in an email Wednesday that official Chinese data indicated that the country’s central bank and state-controlled commercial banks are on track to buy another $250 billion worth of foreign assets this year, effectively limiting the appreciation of the renminbi.
塞瑟周三在邮件中写道,中国官方数据显示,中国央行和国有商业银行今年预计将再购入2500亿美元外国资产,从而实质上限制了人民币的升值幅度。
When a Chinese company bought the Dutch chipmaker Nexperia in 2019, its head quickly began plotting to move research and technology to China, according to the chipmaker’s former chief executive.
据荷兰芯片制造商安世半导体前首席执行官透露,2019年中国企业收购该公司后,其负责人就迅速开始筹划将研发和技术转移到中国。
The effort came as China was trying to build up its capacity in crucial semiconductor chips — and went largely unchecked.
当时中国正全力提升关键半导体芯片的生产能力,而这一技术转移行为基本未受到制约。
Now, those early moves are at the heart of a geopolitical showdown, with the Netherlands caught in a struggle between Washington and Beijing over who controls critical technology. And Nexperia, which makes basic chips essential for cars and appliances, has become a vivid example of how Chinese acquisitions of foreign tech companies can become national security problems, even years later.
如今,这些早期举动已成为地缘政治对峙的核心,在华盛顿与北京争夺关键技术控制权的角力中,荷兰陷入两难境地。安世半导体生产的基础芯片对汽车和家电行业至关重要,该公司的案例生动展现了中国企业收购外国科技公司可能引发国家安全问题,哪怕是在数年之后。
Dutch officials took the extraordinary step of seizing Nexperia in September, setting off a chain of events that jolted the global auto industry. They cited concerns that the Chinese owner of Nexperia — Wingtech, a tech company that is partially backed by Chinese government funds — would move key technology out of Europe.
今年9月,荷兰官员采取非同寻常的举措,接管了安世半导体的控制权,这一系列事件震动了全球汽车产业。荷兰方面称,担忧该公司的中国所有者——部分获得中国政府资金支持的闻泰科技——会将核心技术转移出欧洲。
In fact, it was clear as early as 2019, from the moment that he took control of Nexperia, that Zhang Xuezheng, Wingtech’s controlling shareholder, sought to transfer research and intellectual property to China, Nexperia’s former chief executive, Frans Scheper, told The New York Times last week.
安世半导体前首席执行官弗朗斯·斯赫珀上周向《纽约时报》透露,事实上,早在2019年掌控安世半导体之初,闻泰科技控股股东张学政就已明确显露将研发成果和知识产权转移到中国的意图。
Mr. Scheper’s account, which has not been previously reported, offers a rare look at what officials understood about the risks posed by the acquisition to the Dutch economy and the global supply chain, and when they understood them.
斯赫珀的陈述此前未曾公开,它们为了解官员们何时意识到这笔收购对荷兰经济和全球供应链构成的风险提供了珍贵视角。
The company employs thousands of people across Europe, the United States and Asia, and its products are foundational to industries far beyond automotive manufacturing. Mr. Scheper said he had alerted Dutch officials to Mr. Zhang’s plans early on.
安世半导体在欧洲、美国和亚洲有数以千计的员工,其产品不仅支撑着汽车制造业,也是众多行业的基础。斯赫珀表示,他很早就提醒荷兰官员注意张学政的计划。
“I told them how critical the knowledge in Nijmegen, Hamburg and Manchester is,” said Mr. Scheper, referring to the Dutch, German and British cities where Nexperia has operations.
“我告诉他们,奈梅亨、汉堡和曼彻斯特三地的技术知识有多关键,”斯赫珀说,他指的是安世半导体在荷兰、德国和英国设有运营机构的三座城市。
Mr. Scheper said Mr. Zhang also pressured him into early retirement in 2020. Mr. Zhang took over as Nexperia’s chief executive, underscoring his push for control. Dutch officials knew as early as 2020 that Mr. Zhang had a criminal record for stealing trade secrets in China, Mr. Scheper said.
斯赫珀还透露,2020年,张学政逼迫他提前退休,随后亲自出任安世半导体首席执行官,凸显出其掌控公司的决心。他表示,荷兰官员早在2020年就已知晓张学政曾因在中国窃取商业机密有犯罪记录。
The Netherlands only adopted a formal review process for foreign takeovers in 2023, but the Nexperia acquisition was reviewed by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, a committee led by the Treasury secretary. Dutch officials also evaluated the deal at the time, Mr. Scheper said.
荷兰直到2023年才正式出台外国收购审查程序,但斯赫珀称,安世半导体的收购案当时已接受美国外国投资委员会(由美国财政部长领导)的审查,荷兰官员也对该交易进行了评估。
The basic chips made by Nexperia were not then seen as a security issue. The Dutch government became concerned about Mr. Zhang, 50, only recently, after Washington adopted a tougher line on Chinese technology, putting new pressure on European companies.
当时,安世半导体生产的基础芯片并未被视为安全问题。直到近期,华盛顿对中国技术采取更强硬立场、向欧洲企业施加新的压力后,荷兰政府才开始对50岁的张学政产生担忧。
Earlier this year, U.S. officials signaled that they would adopt controls making it difficult to do business with majority-owned subsidiaries of companies that are on Washington’s “entity list.” Being on this list limits a company’s ability to purchase American software and equipment.
今年早些时候,美国官员暗示将出台管制措施,使企业难以与华盛顿“实体清单”上公司的控股子公司开展业务。被列入该清单的企业购买美国软件和设备的能力将受到限制。
That mattered to the Netherlands because Wingtech, Nexperia’s parent company, was listed, accused of helping Beijing acquire and move critical chip-making technology away from U.S. allies and into China. The new controls raised the risk that Nexperia itself could soon face similar limits.
这对荷兰来说至关重要,因为安世半导体的母公司闻泰科技已被列入该清单,被美方指控协助北京从美国盟友处获取关键芯片制造技术并转移至中国。新的管制措施意味着,安世半导体本身可能很快面临类似限制。
安世半导体公司位于荷兰奈梅亨市的总部。在荷兰官员接管该公司后不久,法院便罢免了张学政的首席执行官职务。
To protect a critical domestic industry, Dutch officials sought to exempt Nexperia from those controls by setting up a more independent structure, Dutch court documents say. Mr. Zhang initially cooperated with those efforts but later changed course, according to the documents.
荷兰法院文件显示,为保护本土关键产业,荷兰官员曾试图通过建立更独立的公司架构使安世半导体豁免这些管制。文件称,张学政最初配合了这些努力,但后来改变了立场。
His leadership of the company came up in June at a meeting of Dutch officials and representatives of the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security. According to minutes quoted in the court documents, the Americans thought “the fact that the company’s C.E.O. is still the same Chinese owner is problematic.”
今年6月,荷兰官员与美国商务部工业与安全局代表会面时,张学政在安世半导体的领导地位被提及。法院文件援引的会议纪要显示,美方认为“该公司首席执行官仍由这位中国所有者担任,这一情况存在问题”。
In October, after Dutch officials seized Nexperia, a Dutch court removed Mr. Zhang as chief executive.
10月,在荷兰官员掌握安世半导体控制权后,荷兰一家法院罢免了张学政的首席执行官职务。
For a period after the Dutch seizure, China froze exports of Nexperia chips, which are finished in China. That forced European carmakers to slow or suspend production lines.
荷兰夺取公司控制权后,中国曾一度暂停了在华完成封装测试的安世半导体芯片出口,这迫使欧洲汽车制造商放缓或暂停了生产线。
A spokesman for the Dutch ministry of economic affairs, Milan Captein, did not directly comment on Mr. Scheper’s depiction of events. Mr. Captein said in a statement that the ministry became aware in September of “advanced plans to close or significantly scale down the European production and research sites” at Nexperia.
荷兰经济事务部发言人米兰·卡普泰因未直接置评斯赫珀对事件的描述。他在一份声明中表示,该部于9月得知安世半导体“计划关闭或大幅缩减欧洲生产和研发基地”的相关事态。
European countries have been slower than the United States to adopt controls of Chinese technology. The Dutch semiconductor industry wants to maintain access to the Chinese market. But it has been squeezed by Washington’s increasingly tough approach toward China.
欧洲国家在对华技术管制方面比美国行动迟缓。荷兰半导体行业希望保持中国市场准入,但同时又受到华盛顿对华强硬政策的挤压。
Chip controls are one of “the very core elements of the U.S.’s China strategy,” said Frans-Paul van der Putten, an expert on China at the Clingendael Institute, a research group partly funded by the Dutch government. “But they are very harmful for the Netherlands. It creates a lot of tension between two allies.”
“芯片管制是美国对华战略的核心要素之一,”受荷兰政府部分资助的克林根戴尔研究所中国问题专家弗朗斯-保罗·范德普滕表示。“但这对荷兰伤害极大,在两个盟友之间制造了诸多紧张。”
An Earlier Conviction in Trade Secrets
早年的商业机密盗窃案
As a young entrepreneur two decades ago, Mr. Zhang spent more than a year in a Chinese detention center for stealing trade secrets. It was an early sign of his willingness to play loose with intellectual property.
20年前,作为年轻企业家的张学政曾因窃取商业机密在中国看守所被关押一年多。这一早期事件就已显现出他对知识产权问题的漠视态度。
In 2005, he and his associates were found guilty of taking software code from his former employer, the Chinese tech giant ZTE, and earning over 1.1 billion renminbi (about $160 million) by developing cellphones using the stolen code.
2005年,他和同伙被认定从其前雇主中国科技巨头中兴通讯窃取软件代码,并利用被盗代码研发手机,获利超过11亿元人民币。
The theft led ZTE to shut down a product line, according to Chinese court documents, the details of which have not been previously reported.
中国法院文件显示,这起盗窃案导致中兴通讯关闭了一条产品线,相关细节此前未曾公开。
Mr. Zhang was again accused of corporate violations last year, when China’s securities regulator fined Mr. Zhang, another company he controls and a former Wingtech shareholder 18 million renminbi (about $2.5 million) for hiding share purchases from the authorities.
去年,张学政再次被指控存在公司违规行为。中国证券监管机构对张学政、其控制的另一家公司以及闻泰科技前股东处以1800万元人民币罚款,原因是他们向监管机构隐瞒了股票收购事宜。
Mr. Zhang did not respond to a request for an interview. Wingtech declined to comment. Its Dutch entity did not respond to a request for comment.
张学政未回应采访请求,闻泰科技拒绝置评,其荷兰分支机构也未回应置评请求。
中国东莞的安世半导体工厂。该公司的荷兰与中国实体仍处于异常对峙状态。
Mr. Zhang also took a risk by acquiring Nexperia, exposing Wingtech to significant debt. The Dutch outfit was more valuable than the Chinese parent, and Chinese experts likened the deal to a snake swallowing an elephant.
张学政收购安世半导体的举动本身也充满风险,使闻泰科技背负了巨额债务。这家荷兰企业的价值超过其中国母公司,中国专家将这笔交易比作蛇吞象。
But Mr. Zhang was persistent. Ming-Jer Chen, a business professor who taught him in an executive M.B.A. program, said that the Chinese entrepreneur had a scroll hanging in his office that read, “Heaven rewards the diligent.”
但张学政很顽强。曾在高管工商管理硕士项目中教过他的商科教授陈明哲说,这位中国企业家的办公室里挂着一幅字:“天道酬勤。”
For example, while preparing for the Nexperia takeover, Mr. Chen said, Mr. Zhang joined him on a trip to Hong Kong to meet the founder of WH Group, another Chinese company that had engaged in a large takeover — that of the American pork producer Smithfield Foods in 2013.
陈明哲举例说,在筹备收购安世半导体期间,张学政曾与他一同前往香港,会见万洲国际的创始人——这家中国企业曾在2013年完成对美国猪肉生产商史密斯菲尔德食品公司的大型收购。
To ease concerns in the Netherlands about losing a key Dutch technology, Mr. Zhang promised Nexperia executives that the company could maintain its independence. But Mr. Scheper said it was clear early on that Mr. Zhang had other plans.
为缓解荷兰方面对关键技术流失的担忧,张学政曾向安世半导体高管承诺,公司将保持独立性。但斯赫珀表示,很早就可以看出张学政另有打算。
“He’s a figure that really wants to be involved day to day, and that annoyed people,” said Rob de Wijk, founder of The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies in the Netherlands.
“他是一个希望参与日常运营的人,这让很多人感到不满,”荷兰海牙战略研究中心创始人罗布·德维克说。
A Corporate and Diplomatic Standoff
企业与外交对峙
Washington, Beijing, and The Hague have all taken steps to reduce tensions, including revoking the seizure order. But the Dutch court ruling that removed Mr. Zhang as chief executive of Nexperia remains in effect. Wingtech has said it will appeal the decision.
华盛顿、北京和海牙均已采取措施缓和紧张局势,包括撤销扣押令。但荷兰法院罢免张学政安世半导体首席执行官职务的裁决仍然有效,闻泰科技表示将对此提起上诉。
And Nexperia’s Dutch and Chinese entities are in a remarkable standoff, with the Dutch entity accusing the Chinese one of misappropriating the company seal and “establishing unauthorized bank accounts.” Nexperia’s Chinese arm countered on Chinese social media on Nov. 28 that the Dutch one “disregards the facts” and had tried to cut China out of its supply chain.
安世半导体的荷兰分支与中国分支陷入了异常的对峙状态:荷兰指控中国分支挪用公司印章、“擅自开立银行账户”;中国分支则于11月28日在中国社交媒体上回应称,荷兰分支“枉顾事实”,试图将中国排除在其供应链之外。
On Dec. 2, the Dutch economic affairs minister abruptly pulled out of a trade mission to China. Beijing has asserted that the Netherlands is responsible for supply disruptions resulting from the Nexperia dispute. China’s commerce minister said in a meeting on Monday with a German official that the Dutch government should stop interfering inappropriately with business decisions, according to a summary of the meeting posted on the ministry’s website.
12月2日,荷兰经济事务大臣突然退出了原定前往中国的贸易代表团。中国称,安世半导体争端引发的供应链中断责任在荷兰。中国商务部官网发布的会议纪要显示,商务部部长周一在与德国官员会面时表示,荷兰政府应停止不当干预企业决策。
Mr. Zhang, for his part, has kept a low profile. In October, according to the Dutch newspaper NRC, Mr. Zhang claimed on WeChat to be a victim of discrimination.
张学政本人则保持低调。据荷兰报纸《新鹿特丹商业报》报道,他10月在微信上声称自己是歧视行为的受害者。
In the first few months after President Trump returned to the White House, he held firm to an American technology policy that stretches back to the depths of the Cold War.
在重返白宫后的前几个月里,特朗普总统坚持推行一项可追溯至冷战时期的美国技术政策。
Don’t sell your adversaries America’s most advanced technology, the thinking went in those early months — starting with the computing power that has given the United States its edge in space and cyberspace, and in designing nuclear weapons and next-generation fighters.
那段时间的共识是:不要向对手出售美国最先进的技术——首先是那些让美国在太空与网络空间、核武器及下一代战机设计方面保持优势的计算能力。
But all that began to change a few months ago. A handful of the nation’s richest technology executives and Mr. Trump’s own artificial intelligence chief, David Sacks, arrived in Washington with a counterargument: that America’s best bet is to suck China and other nations into the “American tech stack,” the layer cake of American hardware and software that would making China’s users dependent on the most advanced chips in the American arsenal.
但几个月前,这一切开始发生变化。几位美国最富有的科技企业高管与特朗普的人工智能事务主管戴维·萨克斯来到华盛顿,提出了一个相反的论点:美国最好的选择是把中国和其他国家吸纳进“美国技术栈”,也就是由美国硬件和软件层层叠加而成的体系,从而让中国的用户依赖美国技术库中最先进的芯片。
Quickly that argument focused on the chips designed by Nvidia, now the world’s largest company, at least when measured by its $4.48 trillion market capitalization. The company won a huge victory late Monday afternoon, when Mr. Trump declared on his social media account that he was freeing Nvidia to sell its second most powerful chip, known as the H200, to China.
这一论点很快聚焦到英伟达设计的芯片上。按4.48万亿美元的市值计算,英伟达如今已是全球市值最高的公司。周一傍晚,该公司取得重大胜利,特朗普在自己的社交媒体账号上宣布,将允许英伟达向中国销售其性能排名第二的H200芯片。
The chip gives the Chinese a chance to speed ahead in the neck-and-neck artificial intelligence race. China’s own top executives, even the leaders of its most successful A.I. venture, DeepSeek, complain that their progress is limited by a shortage of computing power. Mr. Trump offered little rationale behind the decision, and said nothing about the intense lobbying by Jensen Huang, Nvidia’s chief executive and a frequent visitor to the White House.
这款芯片让中国有机会在白热化的人工智能竞赛中加速前进。就连中国最成功的人工智能企业DeepSeek的负责人在内的多位高管都抱怨,他们的进展受到算力短缺的限制。特朗普对此决定未多作解释,也未提及白宫常客、英伟达首席执行官黄仁勋为此展开的密集游说。
But he did say that in return, 25 percent of all the revenues from the sales would go to the United States.
但他明确表示:作为回报,相关销售收入的25%将归美国政府。
With that announcement, Mr. Trump made clear that decisions once made purely on the basis of national security were now up for sale — a move of dubious legality, since export licenses cannot be sold under existing federal law.
随着这项声明的发布,特朗普明确表明,原本纯粹基于国家安全考量的决定现在可以拿出来交易——这一举动在法律上是存有疑问的,因为现行联邦法律禁止出售出口许可证。
But it also raised the question: If the chips that power the most advanced technology can be sold to the United States’ chief technological, military and financial competitor, where is the new line drawn? By the same logic that it is better to have China using American technology, should Washington sell it F-35s? Advanced missiles?
但这也引发了一个问题:如果为最先进技术提供动力的芯片都可以卖给美国在技术、军事和金融领域的头号竞争对手,那么红线又该如何划定?按照同样的逻辑,既然让中国使用美国技术被认为更有利,华盛顿是否也该向它出售F-35战机?先进导弹呢?
And what happens when the Chinese break through the high barrier of producing the chips themselves? At that moment, do they stick with Nvidia’s astounding chips, essentially a supercomputer in a tiny box? Or, having received a huge boost from Mr. Trump’s decision, do they break out of the tech stack, and turn back to state champions like Huawei, the telecommunications giant that hopes to take on Nvidia, and rely on their own technology, as President Xi Jinping has seemed to suggest?
而当中国最终突破高门槛、能够自己生产这些芯片时,又会发生什么?届时他们会继续使用英伟达那些堪称微型超级计算机的惊人芯片吗?还是说,在特朗普决策的巨大助推下,他们将挣脱美国技术栈的束缚,正如中国国家主席习近平似乎所暗示的那样,转而依靠希望挑战英伟达的电信巨头华为这样的国家队企业、依靠本国技术呢?
Not surprisingly, on Capitol Hill and beyond, the administration’s decision is under new examination and, from many quarters, outright attack. Much as Mr. Trump has upended alliances and the post-World War II order, he is now loosening the stricture of export controls that kept Western technology from its rivals — first from the Soviets, then from China and an array of other competitors.
不出所料,在国会山以及更广泛的政治圈内,政府的这一决定正受到新的审视,并遭到多方激烈抨击。正如特朗普颠覆了盟友关系和二战后的国际秩序一样,他如今又在松动出口管制这道限制措施——这种限制曾阻挡西方技术流向对手,先是苏联,后来是中国以及一众其他竞争者。
In an era in which China is producing far more electric cars and solar panels than the United States, dominating in batteries and surging ahead in biotechnology, the design of the most advanced semiconductors is one of America’s few sparkling gems, an arena where China has struggled to keep up. To many veterans of the chip wars, Mr. Trump is prioritizing short-term economic gain over long-term U.S. security interests.
如今中国在电动车、太阳能电池板的产量上远超美国,在电池领域占据主导,并在生物技术方面突飞猛进;而最先进半导体的设计是美国少数仍然闪耀的“皇冠明珠”之一,是中国一直追赶不上的领域。在许多芯片战的资深人士看来,特朗普正在用美国的长期安全利益换取短期经济利益。
“This decision is nuts,” said Jake Sullivan, who served as national security adviser under President Joseph R. Biden Jr. and designed many of the Biden-era restrictions on chip sales to China.
“这个决定简直疯了,”曾在拜登总统任内担任国家安全顾问、主导制定多项对华芯片销售限制措施的杰克·沙利文表示。
“America and China are competing for leadership on A.I.,” Mr. Sullivan said. “China’s main problem is they don’t have enough advanced computing capability. It makes no sense that President Trump is solving their problem for them by selling them powerful American chips. We are literally handing away our advantage. China’s leaders can’t believe their luck.”
“美中正在争夺人工智能领域的领导地位,”沙利文说。“中国的主要问题在于他们没有足够的先进算力。特朗普总统通过向他们出售强大的美国芯片为他们解决这个问题,完全说不通。我们简直是拱手让出我们的优势。中国的领导人都不敢相信这样的好运气。”
Mr. Sacks sees it differently. One of Silicon Valley’s most successful tech entrepreneurs, he began arguing in the late spring for what he called a “more nuanced” view. When Mr. Trump agreed to allow Beijing to buy a custom, somewhat dumbed-down Nvidia chip, called the H20, he argued that it was the best way to keep Huawei, China’s telecommunications giant and an aspirant to take on Nvidia, from dominating its home market. Mr. Sacks said it was a logical choice.
萨克斯则持不同看法。作为硅谷最成功的科技企业家之一,他自今年春末便开始主张所谓“更精细”的角度看问题。当特朗普同意允许北京采购特制版、性能有所简化的英伟达H20芯片时,萨克斯辩称这是阻止中国电信巨头、英伟达的潜在挑战者华为主导其国内市场的最佳策略。他说,这是一个合乎逻辑的选择。
“You just don’t want to hand Huawei the entire Chinese market,” Mr. Sacks said on Bloomberg television, “when Nvidia is capable of competing for a big slice of it.” The idea, he said, was to deprive Huawei of huge revenues from its older, slower chips that it could pour into research and development. “It’s a huge subsidy for their R&D,” he continued.
“你显然不希望把整个中国市场都拱手让给华为,”萨克斯在彭博电视上说。“而英伟达是有能力争夺其中很大一部分市场的,”他解释说,这是要让华为无法通过其较老、较慢的芯片中获得的巨额收入,因为这些收入可用于研发。“那相当于对他们研发的巨大补贴,”他接着说。
But the Chinese didn’t bite. They refused to buy the H20, saying privately that they were insulted to be offered a chip whose powers were crippled. It may have been a negotiating tactic to get a more advanced chip, called the H200, which Nvidia brought out about a year and a half ago. If so, it worked. Mr. Trump agreed, saying vaguely on social media that it could be shipped “to approved customers in China, and other Countries, under conditions that allow for continued strong National Security.”
但中国方面并不买账。他们拒绝购买H20,私下表示提供性能遭削弱的芯片是一种侮辱。这也许是一种谈判策略,目的是换取一款更先进的芯片——即英伟达在一年半前推出的H200。如果是这样,那它确实奏效了。特朗普同意了,并在社交媒体上含糊地表示,该芯片可以“在符合继续保持强大国家安全的条件下,向中国及其他国家的获批客户”发货。
Mr. Trump said nothing about what those conditions would be. But a White House official, who declined to speak on the record about policy decisions, cast the decision as a compromise, splitting the difference between a national security establishment that would ship the Chinese nothing, and Mr. Huang, who they said wanted permission to ship all his products to China.
特朗普并未说明这些条件具体是什么。但一名不愿就政策决定公开发言的白宫官员表示,该决定是一种妥协,即在主张对中国全面禁运的国家安全体系与据称希望获准对华销售所有产品的黄仁勋之间的折中方案。
(The company’s fastest chip, the one sought by companies seeking to vastly improve their large-scale A.I. offerings and build data centers for high-performance computing, is called the Blackwell. It is still barred for export to China.)
(该公司性能最先进的芯片目前仍被禁止对华出口,那些希望大幅提升大规模人工智能服务、建设高性能计算数据中心的企业争相购买这款名为Blackwell的芯片。)
Of course, there is the matter of the 25 percent cut for the U.S. government, part of Mr. Trump’s argument that he is bringing in cash not only for Nvidia’s shareholders but also relieving the burden on American taxpayers. Appealing as that sounds, it creates a situation that appalls most national security traditionalists, who think export controls should be decided according to standards of potential harm to America’s advantage, particularly its military edge. Selling that off for short term profit, they argue, is a prescription for trouble.
当然,这其中还涉及向美国政府支付25%销售分成的安排,这一点也被特朗普用来证明措施的合理性,声称这不仅为英伟达股东带来收益,同时也减轻了美国纳税人的负担。这种说辞听起来诱人,却造成令多数国家安全传统派深感震惊的局面,在他们看来,出口管制应根据其可能对美国优势(特别是军事优势)构成的潜在损害标准来决定。他们认为,为短期利益出卖这种优势无异于埋下祸根。
Mr. Sullivan, who is now the Kissinger professor of the practice of statecraft and world order at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, says it is clear what may happen next. China’s leaders “intend to get off of American semiconductors as soon as they can,” he said. “So the argument that we can keep them ‘addicted’ holds no water. They want American chips right now for one simple reason: They are behind in the A.I. race and this will help them catch up while they build their own chip capabilities.”
现任哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院治国理政实践与世界秩序基辛格讲席教授的沙利文指出,接下来可能发生的事情是显而易见的。中国领导人“打算尽快摆脱对美国半导体的依赖”,他表示。“所以所谓让他们‘上瘾’的说法根本站不住脚。他们现在需要美国芯片只有一个简单原因:他们在人工智能竞赛中落后了,而这些芯片能在他们建设自主芯片能力的同时,帮助他们追赶上来。”
It may also create a problem with American allies. One company in the Netherlands, ASML, makes the wildly expensive, precision machinery needed to cut the tiniest of circuits on advanced chips. After lengthy negotiations, the company agreed in the Biden years to cut off China from the most advanced chip-making equipment.
此举也可能引发美国与盟友之间的问题。荷兰公司阿斯麦生产能切割最微小电路的昂贵精密设备,是先进芯片的制造不可或缺的。经过漫长谈判,该公司在拜登执政期间同意切断中国获取最先进芯片制造设备的渠道。
But now that it sees the United States profiting from advanced chip sales, it may well question why it should listen to Washington’s entreaties about the dangers of giving too much technology to Chinese makers.
但如今,当它看到美国正从先进芯片的销售中获利时,完全有可能质疑自己为何还要听从华盛顿关于向中国制造商提供过多技术存在风险的劝告。
“It's not reasonable to tell our allies we are going to sell the chips but you can’t sell the machines that make those chips,” said Rush Doshi, a China expert at Georgetown University and the Council on Foreign Relations. “As a result, it is possible that the allied coordination that supports our most important export controls might be seriously damaged by this decision.”
“告诉盟友我们可以销售芯片,但他们不能销售制造这些芯片的机器,这是不合理的,”乔治城大学兼美国外交关系协会中国问题专家杜如松(Rush Doshi)表示。“因此,这一决定有可能严重损害支撑我们最重要出口管制的盟友协调机制。”
The world reacted with alarm this year when Beijing introduced waves of export controls on rare earths, the minerals vital to the manufacturing of everything from cars to advanced electronics. For Japan, the experience felt like déjà vu.
今年,中国多次出台稀土出口管制措施,引发全球担忧。稀土这种矿物对从汽车到高端电子产品的各类制造业都至关重要。而对日本来说,这一幕似曾相识。
China maintains a near monopoly on the supply of the metals. Japan learned that the hard way in 2010 when China effectively cut it off during a territorial dispute between the countries. Tokyo has since quietly stitched together a supply chain that is considerably less dependent on China. For Japan, that is an important hedge to political risk, as a recent flare-up in tensions between the nations underscores.
中国几乎垄断了稀土金属的供应。2010年中日领土争端期间,中国曾实质性切断对日本的稀土出口,让日本深受其苦。此后,日本悄然构建起一条大幅降低对中国依赖程度的供应链。正如近期两国紧张局势升级所凸显的,这一举措成为日本应对政治风险的重要保障。
As the United States and other nations scramble to secure rare earths outside China and build up their domestic supplies, Japan’s experience provides lessons in how it can be done, according to interviews with current and former government officials, business executives and industry experts in Japan.
根据对日本现任及前任政府官员、企业高管和行业专家的采访,在美国等国家急于寻找中国以外的稀土来源并扩大本土供应之际,日本的经验提供了可借鉴的路径。
“The urgency of the rare-earths situation is just now dawning on the United States and Europe,” said Naoki Kobayashi, an official working in the minerals division of Japan’s trade ministry. “For Japan, this painful lesson came 15 years ago,” he said.
“欧美国家现在才逐渐意识到稀土问题的紧迫性,”日本经济产业省矿物部门官员小林直贵表示。“而对日本来说,早在15年前就有了这个惨痛的教训。”
President Trump has said he believes it will take the United States about a year to secure ample rare-earth supplies. But Japan is a case study in how hard it is to pull out of China’s grip — especially its extremely cost competitive rare-earth processing facilities. Experts say such an effort requires both sustained government support and international collaboration.
特朗普总统称,美国大约需要一年时间就能确保充足的稀土供应。但日本的情况表明,摆脱中国的掌控——尤其是其极具成本竞争力的稀土加工设施——难度极大。专家表示,这需要政府持续支持与国际合作双管齐下。
当时担任日本经济产业省高官的寺泽达也回忆称,2010年曾有人警告他,稀土供应中断可能导致整个汽车供应链停摆。
Supply Shock
供应冲击
In September 2010, a collision near disputed islands between a Chinese fishing trawler and two Japanese Coast Guard vessels escalated into a diplomatic and economic crisis. Japan detained the captain of the Chinese ship, and Beijing, in retaliation, implemented an unannounced, two-month embargo on rare-earth exports.
2010年9月,一艘中国渔船与两艘日本海上保安厅船只在争议岛屿附近发生碰撞,事件升级为外交和经济危机。日本扣押了中国渔船船长,作为报复,中国未事先通知便实施了为期两个月的稀土出口禁令。
At first, the significance of China’s move was lost on some Japanese officials.
起初,部分日本官员并未意识到中国这一举措的严重性。
Tatsuya Terazawa was in charge of economic policy at Japan’s trade ministry in 2010. He recalled that the ministry’s lead auto industry official rushed to his desk, warning that the entire automotive supply chain could be suspended because of the sudden cutoff.
2010年担任日本经济产业省经济政策负责人的寺泽达也回忆,当时产业省负责汽车行业的主管匆忙跑到他的办公桌前,警告称稀土突然断供可能导致整个汽车供应链停摆。
“I had to confess, I had zero knowledge about rare earths,” Mr. Terazawa said. He said his colleague explained that these materials were essential ingredients for the magnets used in motors across Japan’s auto sector. And Japan, like most industrialized nations, had ceded control of this vital supply almost entirely to China.
“我得承认,当时我对稀土一无所知,”寺泽达也说。他的同事解释说,这些材料是日本汽车行业电机所用磁体的关键成分。而与大多数工业化国家一样,日本已将这一关键供应的控制权几乎完全交给了中国。
Mr. Terazawa was responsible for developing the trade ministry’s next suite of economic policies. He compiled a package, worth a little over $1 billion at the time, aimed at reducing Japan’s supply chain vulnerability to rare earths. It included substantial support for Japanese groups to diversify rare-earth sources.
寺泽达也负责制定经济产业省的新经济政策。他拟定了一套当时价值略超10亿美元的扶持计划,旨在降低日本稀土供应链的脆弱性,其中包括大力支持日本企业拓宽稀土来源渠道。
“At the time, I was criticized that I was demanding much more money than necessary,” Mr. Terazawa said. “But I was determined that Japan never repeat this incident.”
“当时有人批评我要求的资金远超实际需要,”寺泽达也说。“但我决心让日本永远不再重蹈覆辙。”
2011年2月,马来西亚关丹正在建设的莱纳斯稀土加工厂。
Finding Lynas
找到莱纳斯
The timing was, in some ways, opportune. Sojitz, a Japanese conglomerate, and Jogmec, the government body overseeing mineral resource security, were seeking non-Chinese rare-earth options. And Lynas, an Australian mining company, was dealing with financial difficulties.
从某种程度上说,当时的时机恰到好处。日本综合商社双日株式会社与负责矿产资源安全的政府机构金属和能源安全组织(Jogmec)正在寻找非中国来源的稀土;而澳大利亚矿业公司莱纳斯当时正面临财务困境。
Lynas was trying to create the world’s first integrated rare-earths supply chain without using China, instead mining the ores in Australia and refining them in Malaysia. But it was struggling to amass the capital it needed to increase production at its Malaysian refining site.
莱纳斯当时正试图打造全球第一条不依赖中国的一体化稀土供应链——在澳大利亚开采矿石,在马来西亚进行精炼。但该公司难以筹到足够资金以扩大马来西亚精炼厂产能。
Sojitz had to find sources of rare earths outside China. Without stable supplies, “factories in many places would have to stop operating,” said Kosuke Uemura, the chief executive of Sojitz. At the time, “Lynas was the only option,” he said.
双日株式会社必须找到中国以外的稀土来源。“如果没有稳定供应,许多地方的工厂将被迫停产,”双日株式会社社长植村幸佑表示。他说,当时“莱纳斯是唯一的选择”。
In 2011, Jogmec and Sojitz did a deal that provided $250 million in loans and equity to Lynas. The transaction secured for Japan a long-term supply of rare earths sourced outside China.
2011年,Jogmec与双日株式会社达成协议,向莱纳斯提供2.5亿美元的贷款和股权融资。这笔交易为日本确保了长期稳定的非中国来源稀土供应。
Today, in Western Australia, workers on the remote Mount Weld volcanic plug are flown out from Perth on rotations to extract rare-earth ore from an open-pit mine owned by Lynas
如今,在澳大利亚西部,工人轮班从珀斯乘机前往偏远的韦尔德火山岩丘,在莱纳斯旗下的露天矿开采稀土矿石。
The partially purified concentrate is then shipped 5,000 miles to the company’s facility in Kuantan, Malaysia — until this year, the only large-scale rare-earth separation plant operating outside China. There, the materials are refined through a chemical process into individual rare-earth oxides pure enough to use in manufacturing.
经过部分提纯的稀土精矿随后被运往约8000公里外的马来西亚关丹工厂——该厂直至今年仍是唯一在中国境外运营的大型稀土分离设施。在那里,原材料通过化学工艺被精炼成纯度足以用于生产的单一稀土氧化物。
From Malaysia, the metals are transported another 3,000 miles to Japan, where Sojitz manages distribution to domestic magnet makers. In Japan, the magnets are used in a number of products, including vehicles produced by automakers like Toyota.
这些稀土金属再从马来西亚运往约5000公里外的日本,由双日株式会社负责分销给日本国内的磁体制造商。这些磁体被用于丰田等汽车制造商生产的各类产品中。
莱纳斯技术人员于2018年在马来西亚进行稀土精矿混合作业。
Early Challenges
早期挑战
Japan has significantly bolstered its supply chain resilience. While industry estimates placed Japanese rare-earth imports from China at 90 percent or more during the 2010 trade dispute, that figure now stands closer to 60 percent to 70 percent.
日本已显著增强了其供应链的韧性。2010年贸易争端期间,行业估计日本90%以上的稀土进口来自中国,而目前这一比例已降至60%至70%左右。
Sojitz received its first large shipments of rare earths from the Malaysia facility in 2012 and has continued to expand the breadth of metals it imports. In October, it added a type of specialized, heat-resistant magnet ingredients to its portfolio.
双日株式会社2012年首次从马来西亚工厂收到大规模稀土货物,并持续扩大进口稀土的种类。今年10月,其产品线新增了一种特殊的耐高温磁体原料。
According to Mr. Uemura, the Sojitz chief executive, the toughest bottleneck was the refining process in Malaysia. The chemical separation of rare earths produces large volumes of acidic waste and thousands of tons of low-level radioactive residue. Proper management and disposal of the waste is expensive and time consuming.
植村幸佑表示,最大的瓶颈是马来西亚的精炼过程。稀土的化学分离会产生大量酸性废料和数以千计吨低放射性残渣,妥善管理和处置这些废弃物既昂贵又耗时。
Between 2011 and 2012, the Lynas facility in Malaysia faced months of delays because of fierce local opposition and legal challenges. The facility began operating only after it revised its residue management plan multiple times.
2011年至2012年间,由于当地民众的强烈反对和法律诉讼,莱纳斯在马来西亚的工厂遭遇了数月的延误。直到多次修改残渣管理计划后,该工厂才得以投产。
In contrast, Chinese processing factories are often lightly regulated, and some illegally operated, creating toxic waste sites.
相比之下,中国的加工工厂往往监管宽松,部分甚至非法运营,形成了有毒废弃物污染堆积地。
As a result, Mr. Uemura said, Sojitz and Lynas have higher costs than Chinese rivals and require public backing. “If we were to compete normally with China, we’d be playing on a different field altogether,” he said. “This gap is absolutely unbridgeable.”
植村幸佑表示,正因如此,双日株式会社和莱纳斯的成本高于中国竞争对手,需要政府支持。“如果我们与中国进行正常竞争,那完全是在不同的赛道上,”他说。“这种差距是绝对无法弥合的。”
2012年马来西亚格本,莱纳斯工厂建设期间的反莱纳斯活动人士。
Export Controls
出口管制
This year, China introduced expansive rare-earth export controls, first in April and again in October, restricting the materials themselves and the processing technology. Beijing’s measures targeted all exports, not just those bound for Japan.
今年,中国先后在4月和10月出台了大范围的稀土出口管制措施,不仅限制稀土本身的出口,还包括加工技术。中国的这些措施针对所有出口目的地,不仅限于日本。
Although the broader October restrictions were temporarily suspended through a truce with the United States in November, countries are scrambling to lessen their dependency on China.
尽管11月美国与中国达成休战协议,10月出台的更广泛管制措施得到暂停,但各国仍在急于降低对中国的依赖。
The Trump administration has begun investing federal money to construct a domestic supply chain. The effort entails support for the sole U.S. rare-earth mining operation at Mountain Pass, Calif., as well as for processing and magnet manufacturing facilities in North Carolina and Texas.
特朗普政府已开始投入联邦资金构建本土供应链,包括支持加利福尼亚州帕斯山的美国唯一稀土矿开采项目,以及北卡罗来纳州和得克萨斯州的加工及磁体制造设施。
The United States has also signed international agreements meant to diversify supply chains away from China. Pacts were reached with Australia, the European Union and Japan, the latter of which was signed during Mr. Trump’s visit to Tokyo in October.
美国还签署了多项国际协议,旨在实现供应链多元化、减少对中国的依赖,合作伙伴包括澳大利亚、欧盟和日本,其中与日本的协议是在特朗普10月访日期间签署的。
‘Moment of Truth’
“关键时刻”
For officials in Japan, the current situation presents an opportunity to band together with other countries to solve the issue of cost — one that, over the past 15 years, Japan has struggled to tackle on its own.
对日本官员来说,当前局势为各国联合解决成本问题提供了契机——过去15年来,日本一直在独自艰难地应对这一挑战。
双日公司首席执行官植村幸佑在公司的东京总部。
If nations agree to buy more non-Chinese rare-earth materials, they can build scale and eventually bring down costs, according to Mr. Kobayashi, the trade ministry official. More coordination can also mean creating deeper ties between Japan, which has experience building mine-to-magnet supply chains, and countries willing to host and fund processing facilities.
经产省官员小林直贵表示,如果各国同意购买更多非中国来源的稀土材料,就能形成规模效应,最终降低成本。加强协调还意味着,拥有从矿山到磁体完整供应链建设经验的日本,能与愿意接纳和资助加工设施的国家建立更深厚的联系。
But Mr. Terazawa, the former trade ministry official, who now heads an energy think tank in Tokyo, believes that any push for international cooperation will be a test of genuine commitment. “The question we need to be asking is why this didn’t happen over the past 15 years,” he said.
但现任东京某能源智库负责人、前经济产业省官员寺泽达也认为,任何推动国际合作的努力都将是对真正承诺的考验。“我们要追问的是,为什么过去15年没有实现这一点?”他说。
When he was in government, Mr. Terazawa attempted to stress rare earths as a critical area for bilateral collaboration, including during the first Trump administration. “We are still vulnerable, especially the U.S. is still so vulnerable,” he said.
寺泽达也在政府任职期间,曾试图强调稀土作为双边合作的关键领域,包括在第一届特朗普政府时期。“我们仍然很脆弱,美国尤其脆弱,”他说。
“The U.S. is a great country, for sure, but I don’t think it can deal with China effectively on its own,” Mr. Terazawa said. The recent agreements to coordinate are the groundwork. Now, he said, comes the moment of truth: “Is the U.S. really committed to work with its allies?”
“美国无疑是一个伟大的国家,但我认为它无法独自有效应对中国,”寺泽达也表示。近期达成的协调协议是基础工作,他指出,现在到了关键时刻:“美国是否真正致力于与盟友的合作?”
President Trump’s announcement that the American chip maker Nvidia would be able to sell semiconductors to China appeared to roll back years of policies aimed at blocking the country’s access to advanced technologies.
特朗普总统宣布,美国芯片制造商英伟达获准向中国出售半导体。这一决定似乎逆转了数年来旨在阻止中国获取先进技术的相关政策。
At stake, officials in Washington have argued, is China’s ability to use American technology to gain military and economic advantages, particularly through artificial intelligence. By cutting China off, lawmakers wanted to preserve the lead the United States has achieved in A.I. and slow China’s efforts to catch up.
华盛顿官员称,此举关乎中国能否利用美国技术获取军事和经济优势,尤其是在人工智能领域。议员们希望通过切断中国获取技术的渠道,保住美国在人工智能领域的领先地位,并延缓中国的追赶步伐。
On the other side, Nvidia’s chief executive, Jensen Huang, spent months trying to persuade Mr. Trump to reverse course. He argued that limiting China’s access to American technology has only spurred Chinese companies to improve faster.
另一方面,英伟达首席执行官黄仁勋历时数月游说特朗普改变立场。他声称,限制中国获取美国技术只会促使中国企业加速自主创新。
Mr. Trump’s decision on Monday to allow Nvidia to sell its second-most-powerful chip, known as the H200, to Chinese commercial customers vetted by the U.S. Commerce Department strikes “a thoughtful balance that is great for America,” an Nvidia spokesman said.
特朗普周一决定允许英伟达向经美国商务部审核的中国商业客户出售其第二先进的H200芯片。英伟达发言人表示,这一决定实现了“兼顾各方的平衡,对美国大有裨益”。
The impact of Mr. Trump’s decision is unclear. But the Chinese government has already spent billions in effort to become an A.I. superpower. The country’s chip makers are racing to make advanced chips on their own, and Chinese A.I. companies have become more efficient at using the chips they have access to.
这一决定的影响尚不明朗。但中国政府已投入数十亿美元,力求成为人工智能超级大国。中国芯片制造商正全力自主研发先进芯片,而中国人工智能企业也在更高效地利用现有可获取的芯片资源。
“The push for domestic production will continue,” said Jiang Tianjiao, an associate professor at Fudan University. “Beijing’s strategy is clear.”
“国产芯片研发的推进不会停止,”复旦大学副教授江天骄表示。“中国的战略方向十分明确。”
Investor bets that a Chinese company could soon compete with Nvidia have driven huge gains in the country’s tech stocks this year. Shares of the partly state-backed chip designer Cambricon have risen more than 120 percent, compared with a year ago. Last week, Moore Threads, a start-up chip maker founded by a former Nvidia executive, went public in one of the Shanghai Star Market’s largest offerings of the year.
投资者押注中国企业很快就有能力与英伟达竞争,这推动中国科技股今年大幅上涨。国有控股芯片设计公司寒武纪的股价较去年上涨逾120%。上周,由前英伟达高管创办的初创芯片企业摩尔线程在上海科创板上市,成为该板块今年规模最大的IPO之一。
But even Huawei, the telecommunications giant leading China’s race to compete with Nvidia, remains at least two years behind the Silicon Valley company, experts said.
但专家表示,即便是引领中国与英伟达竞争的科技巨头华为,仍落后这家硅谷公司至少两年时间。
Chinese chips still lag behind Nvidia’s in performance, and the companies face major constraints on their output. Chinese chips can produce, at most, 2 percent as much computing power as foreign rivals, said Tim Fist, a senior adjunct fellow at the Center for a New American Security, a think tank.
中国芯片的性能仍不及英伟达,且企业面临巨大的产能制约。智库新美国安全中心高级客座研究员蒂姆·菲斯特称,中国芯片的算力最多仅为国外同类产品的2%。
Computing power is crucial in A.I. development. Advanced A.I. systems are powered by hundreds of thousands of chips known as GPUs, which companies pack into buildings known as data centers to create giant supercomputers that gobble electricity. OpenAI, the A.I. start-up that created ChatGPT, is planning to build five such facilities in the United States that would together consume more electricity than the three million households in Massachusetts.
算力是人工智能发展的关键。先进的人工智能系统由数十万块图形处理器提供动力,企业将这些芯片集中部署在数据中心,构建成耗电量巨大的超级计算机。ChatGPT的开发方、人工智能初创企业OpenAI计划在美国建造五座这样的设施,其总耗电量将超过马萨诸塞州300万户家庭的用电量总和。
Chinese demand for cutting edge chips is also high. The biggest tech companies, including Alibaba, Tencent and ByteDance, TikTok’s parent company, have poured money into A.I. efforts and infrastructure like data centers.
中国对尖端芯片的需求同样十分旺盛。阿里巴巴、腾讯以及TikTok母公司字节跳动等头部科技企业已向人工智能相关项目及数据中心等基础设施投入巨额资金。
For Chinese companies, “gaining access to higher-end chips like the H200 does indeed come at a critical moment,” said Frank Kung, an analyst at TrendForce, a market research firm in Taipei, Taiwan.
“对于中国企业而言,能获得H200这类高端芯片无疑恰逢关键节点,”台湾市场研究机构集邦科技分析师龚明德表示。
Some officials who worked for former President Joseph R. Biden Jr. have warned that access to the Nvidia chips could help China’s A.I. companies buy time while the country’s chip makers improve the supply and performance of their own offerings.
曾在前总统拜登政府任职的一些官员警告称,让中国企业获得英伟达芯片可能会为中国AI公司争取时间,与此同时,中国本土芯片制造商有机会提升产品供应量与性能。
Mr. Trump’s decision to allow Nvidia to sell advanced chips in China has also renewed a debate about how much future advancements in A.I. technology will depend on vast stockpiles of powerful chips.
特朗普允许英伟达对华出口先进芯片的决定也重新引发了关于未来人工智能技术发展在多大程度上依赖于高性能芯片储备的讨论。
Washington’s constraints have pushed Chinese companies to be more efficient. This year, the Chinese start-up DeepSeek rocked the tech industry with its claim that it had created powerful A.I. systems that required fewer chips and were significantly cheaper to build than those of better-funded American rivals.
华盛顿的限制措施迫使中国企业提高效率。今年,中国初创企业深度求索宣称其研发的强大人工智能系统所需芯片更少、建造成本远低于资金更雄厚的美国竞争对手,这一消息震撼了科技行业。
The less powerful China-made chips require more electricity. But industrial electricity costs in China are far lower than in the United States, said Lian Jye Su, a chief analyst at Omdia, a tech research firm. The abundant cheap power has helped companies create sophisticated A.I. systems despite less powerful chips, Mr. Su said.
中国国产芯片性能较弱,能耗更高。但科技研究机构Omdia首席分析师苏连杰(音)表示,中国的工业电价远低于美国。他指出,充足的廉价电力资源帮助中国企业在芯片性能不足的情况下,仍能构建复杂的人工智能系统。
The Chinese government has pushed companies there to buy domestic chips and warned Nvidia’s chips may carry risks. In July, China’s internet regulator said that it had summoned Nvidia to explain security risks associated with one of its chips developed for sale in China, saying the chips could be shut down remotely or used to track a user’s location.
中国政府一直推动国内企业采购国产芯片,并警告英伟达芯片可能存在安全风险。今年7月,中国互联网监管机构表示已约谈英伟达,要求其就一款专为中国市场研发的芯片相关安全风险作出说明,指出该芯片可能存在远程关停或定位用户位置的风险。
Many Chinese tech companies are already using a mix of domestic and foreign chips, said Paul Triolo, a partner at DGA-Albright Stonebridge Group. “Just because some Chinese companies will choose to purchase some number of H200 does not mean domestic development of advanced A.I. hardware will stop,” he added.
DGA-奥尔布赖特石桥集团合伙人保罗·特里奥洛表示,许多中国科技企业已在混合使用国产和外国芯片。“部分中国企业选择采购一定数量的H200芯片,并不意味着先进人工智能硬件的国产研发会停止,”他还说。
Mr. Trump’s willingness to widen China’s access to advanced American chips has drawn condemnation from members of Congress and former Biden administration officials.
特朗普愿意扩大中国获取美国先进芯片的渠道,这遭到了美国国会议员和前拜登政府官员的谴责。
This summer, Mr. Trump proposed the idea of the government taking a cut of A.I. chip sales to China. On Monday, he reiterated that, writing that 25 percent “will be paid to the United States of America.”
今年夏天,特朗普提出政府要从人工智能芯片对华销售收入中抽成的想法。周一,他重申了这一主张,写道,25%的销售收入“将付给美国政府”。
Mr. Trump’s transactional approach to export controls on chips has led to some paradoxical outcomes. Hours before he said the Commerce Department was finalizing the details to allow sales of the H200 in China, the Department of Justice announced it had detained two people for selling those chips to the country.
特朗普对芯片出口管制采取的交易型策略引发了一些矛盾结果。就在他宣布美国商务部正在敲定H200芯片对华销售细节的数小时前,美国司法部宣布逮捕了两名向中国出售该型号芯片的人员。
The last time President Trump issued a national security strategy, eight years ago, it heralded a return to superpower competition, describing China and Russia as “revisionist” powers seeking to upend American dominance around the world.
八年前,特朗普总统上一次发布国家安全战略时,宣告了超级大国竞争的回归,将中国和俄罗斯定义为试图颠覆美国全球主导地位的“修正主义”强权。
“China and Russia challenge American power, influence and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity,” he wrote in a document that reflected the influence of his advisers in his first term. “They are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence.”
“中俄挑战着美国的权力、影响力与利益,企图削弱美国的安全与繁荣,”他在那份受其第一届政府顾问团队影响的文件中写道。“它们执意要让经济变得更不自由、更不公平,它们扩张本国军力,控制信息与数据以压制本国社会并扩大影响力。”
Eight years later, that diagnosis seems truer than ever. The two U.S. rivals have deepened, and occasionally exaggerated, their “partnership without limits.” China’s nuclear force has more than doubled since the 2017 strategy was published; its military runs exercises encircling Taiwan; and its cyber attackers have drilled into American telecommunications, corporate and government infrastructure.
八年过去了,这一判断似乎比以往任何时候都更加贴切。美国的这两大竞争对手深化了“无上限伙伴关系”,有时甚至夸大这种关系。自2017年前述战略发布以来,中国的核力量已增长了一倍多;它的军队环绕台湾展开军事演习;它的网络攻击者已渗透进美国的电信、企业和政府基础设施。
Russia has engaged in a nearly four-year-long war in Ukraine and a shadow war against U.S. allies across Europe.
俄罗斯则在乌克兰打了一场持续近四年的战争,并在整个欧洲对美国盟友发动了一场影子战争。
本月,乌克兰第148炮兵旅向乌克兰东部的俄军目标开火。
Yet a reader of Mr. Trump’s 2025 strategy would barely know any of that. While the headlines have focused on how European allies must end mass migration and elect “patriotic” parties or face “civilizational erasure,” what is most striking about the 33-page document is what it ignores.
然而,阅读特朗普2025年战略的读者几乎察觉不到这些。尽管媒体焦点集中在欧洲盟友必须终止大规模移民、选举“爱国”政党,否则将面临“文明湮灭”的论述上,这份33页文件最引人注目之处在于其刻意忽略的内容。
Russia is mentioned in only four paragraphs, and never in tones of condemnation for its invasion of a neighboring state, leading to a war that has produced more than 1.5 million casualties. Instead, it portrays the United States as something of a neutral negotiator that can diminish tensions between Russia and Europe and “reestablish strategic stability” with Moscow.
全文仅在四个段落中提到俄罗斯,而且始终未谴责它入侵邻国、发动导致超过150万人伤亡的战争。相反,文件将美国描绘成能够缓和俄欧紧张关系、与莫斯科“重建战略稳定”的中立调停者。
And there is virtually no discussion of the daily battle in cyberspace against China’s state-sponsored hackers, after the administration warned last week of another deep penetration of American corporate and government computer networks.
而关于网络空间每日对抗中国国家支持的黑客活动,这份战略几乎未作讨论——尽管特朗普政府上周刚就美国企业与政府计算机网络再次遭深度渗透发出警告。
But those are hardly the only direct threats to the United States that seem odd by their omission.
但被这份战略反常地忽略的威胁不仅仅是这些。
In 2017, Mr. Trump was threatening “fire and fury” against North Korea, which at the time had one to two dozen nuclear weapons. The 2017 strategy notes that the country “seeks the capability to kill millions of Americans with nuclear weapons,” and delves into its chemical, biological and cyber capability. Today, after years of failed diplomacy, North Korea has 60 or more nuclear weapons.
2017年,特朗普曾对当时拥有一二十枚核武器的朝鲜发出“火与怒”的威胁。2017年的战略文件指出,该国“寻求具备用核武器杀死数百万美国人的能力”,并详细论述了其化学、生物及网络能力。如今,在多年外交失败之后,朝鲜已拥有60枚或更多核武器。
Yet the country is never mentioned in the new strategy. Iran is barely mentioned, and then in contradictory terms. Mr. Trump’s introduction boasts that in June, “we obliterated Iran’s nuclear enrichment capacity.” Then, on the report’s penultimate page, a more careful assessment says that the United States “significantly degraded Iran’s nuclear program.”
但在这份新战略中,却完全没有提到朝鲜。伊朗也仅略微提及,而且表述还自相矛盾。特朗普在序言部分夸口称,在6月,“我们摧毁了伊朗的核浓缩能力”。然而,在文件倒数第二页,一段更为谨慎的评估却表示,美国“严重削弱了伊朗的核计划”。
“The document is silent on how the administration is going to prevent Iran from reconstituting its degraded program,” Scott D. Sagan, a Stanford University professor who writes extensively on nuclear strategy, noted on Saturday.
长期研究核战略的斯坦福大学教授斯科特·萨根在上周六指出,“文件未说明美国政府将如何阻止伊朗重建遭到削弱的核计划。”
No strategy can deal with every threat posed to the United States, of course, and those that try to often read more like a laundry list of challenges. The new report says in its opening paragraphs that it is focused on just a few major national security threats, and that the goal is “to ensure that America remains the world’s strongest, richest, most powerful and most successful country for decades to come.”
当然,没有任何一份战略文件能够涵盖美国面临的所有威胁,那些试图面面俱到的文本,往往读起来更像是一份挑战清单。这份新文件在开篇几段中表示,它只聚焦少数几项主要国家安全威胁,其目标是“确保美国在未来几十年里仍然是世界上最强大、最富有、最具影响力、最成功的国家”。
“Not every country, region, issue or cause — however worthy — can be the focus of American strategy,” the document says. It then goes on to put the first priority on the Western Hemisphere. Most of that involves updating the Monroe Doctrine — which declared the Americas and their surrounding waters as Washington’s sphere of dominance — with a “Trump corollary.” Not surprisingly, it focuses on limiting migration and drugs.
“并非每个国家、地区、议题或事业——无论多么有价值——都能成为美国战略的焦点,”文件写道。随后,它将西半球列为第一优先事项。其中很大一部分内容是在以一种“特朗普推论”的方式对《门罗宣言》加以更新——该宣言曾将美洲大陆及其周边水域界定为华盛顿的势力范围。不出所料,其重点放在了限制移民和毒品问题上。
Still, the move away from discussion of the immediate and long-lasting competition among the world’s two largest economies and three largest nuclear powers is jarring.
然而,这份文件避而不谈全球两大经济体和三大核强国之间迫在眉睫且影响深远的竞争,这一转变令人震惊。
There is no discussion of superpower struggle or strategies of containment. The document argues for a quick end to the Ukraine war, on terms that would preserve a Ukrainian state, as a way of achieving that ill-defined “strategic stability” with the United States. And even though more pages of the document are focused on China than on any other nation, it dwells far more on the commercial relations than the strategic competition.
文件没有讨论超级大国斗争或遏制战略。它主张按照保留乌克兰国家地位的条件迅速结束乌克兰战争,从而与美国实现一种没有清晰定义的“战略稳定”。尽管文件中涉及中国的篇幅超过任何其他国家,但其着墨点更多放在商业关系上,而非战略竞争。
9月,在北京天安门广场举行的阅兵式上,新型东风-5C战略核导弹首次亮相。
China’s nuclear expansion, which has fixated the Pentagon and strategic planners for years, gets only glancing mention, and there is barely a mention of the remarkably sophisticated, extensive cyber attacks that have burrowed deeply into American telecommunications and utility systems and stayed there, despite years of efforts to oust them.
多年来一直令五角大楼和战略规划者高度关注的中国核能力扩张在文件中仅被一笔带过;对于那些已深度渗透美国电信和公用事业系统、虽经多年努力仍无法根除的高度复杂且规模庞大的网络攻击,文件更是几乎未置一词。
“The section on Asia is striking,” said Peter D. Feaver, a professor at Duke University who runs its American Grand Strategy program. “When discussing economic competition, China is mentioned explicitly and in granular detail. But when discussing military threats in the Indo-Pacific, the language becomes very vague.”
杜克大学美国大战略项目主任彼得·费弗教授指出:“关于亚洲的部分引人注目。讨论经济竞争时,中国被明确提及且细节详尽;但论及印太地区军事威胁时,措辞却变得非常模糊。”
He added: “Unlike Trump’s first security strategy, China is not identified by name as a country that poses a military threat, which may be the loudest omission in the entire document.”
他补充道:"与特朗普首份安全战略不同,这一次中国并未被直接点名为构成军事威胁的国家,这可能是整份文件最引人深思的缺略。”
Yet it is not the only arena in which the competition with China is soft-pedaled, at least in comparison to Mr. Trump’s first strategy and the one that followed from the Biden administration.
然而,这并非唯一一个美中竞争问题上被刻意淡化的领域,至少与特朗普首份战略以及随后拜登政府的战略相比是如此。
“Think about the list of challenges where China presents the greatest threat to the U.S. in the next few decades,” said R. Nicholas Burns, who served as ambassador to China until January and, as a career foreign service officer, ambassador to NATO. “It’s who will emerge most powerful in technology — A.I., quantum computing, biotechnology, cyber. They are linked to the intense military competition we have with China every day throughout the Indo-Pacific.”
“想一想未来几十年里中国对美国构成最大威胁的挑战清单,”今年1月卸任美国驻华大使、曾任驻北约大使的资深外交官尼古拉斯·伯恩斯表示。“其实就是谁将在人工智能、量子计算、生物技术、网络安全等技术领域占据主导地位。这些领域与我们在印太地区每日同中国进行的激烈军事竞争密切相关。”
They are mentioned only in passing, Mr. Burns noted. “Nor is there mention of the fact that the E.U. and NATO countries have been critical partners with us in sanctioning Beijing for its support for Russia in Ukraine, on Taiwan and on human rights — on our side of the strategic competition,” he added. “In fact, strangely and falsely, there is more condemnation in the report of our European allies than our adversaries China and Russia.”
伯恩斯指出,这些问题在文件中只是一笔带过。“文件中也没有提到一个事实,即欧盟和北约国家一直是我们在多个议题上的关键伙伴——包括因北京在乌克兰问题上支持俄罗斯、在台湾问题以及在人权问题上的立场而对其实施制裁,在战略竞争中它们是站在我们这一边的,”他补充道。“事实上,令人费解且荒谬的是,文件中对我们欧洲盟友的谴责反而多于对我们的对手中国和俄罗斯的谴责。”
In fact, Russia is not condemned for its invasion of Ukraine, or the evidence that Mr. Putin was considering the use of tactical nuclear weapons inside the country, most dramatically during a crisis in October 2022.
事实上,文件也没有谴责俄罗斯对乌克兰的入侵,也没有提及有关普京考虑在乌克兰境内使用战术核武器的证据——最引人注目的一次发生在2022年10月的一场危机期间。
While the last major nuclear arms control treaty with Russia, New START, expires in two months, there is no discussion of avoiding a renewed, expensive and destabilizing arms race. Instead, the strategy extols missile defenses, “including a Golden Dome for the American homeland,” a project Mr. Trump announced within months of taking office.
虽然与俄罗斯的最后一项重要核军控条约《新削减战略武器条约》将于两个月后到期,但文件并未讨论如何避免一场代价高昂、破坏稳定的新军备竞赛。相反,战略文件大谈导弹防御体系,包括为美国本土打造“金钟罩”的计划——这是特朗普上任数月后宣布的项目。
But while billions of dollars are being spent on the project already, there is no mention in the strategy of the fact that one of its key elements — placing missile interceptors in space — could prompt a race among the superpowers to place nuclear weapons into orbit as well.
然而,尽管该项目已经投入了数十亿美元,战略文件中却没有提及这样一个事实:其关键组成部分之一——在太空部署导弹拦截系统——可能会促使超级大国之间展开一场将核武器送入轨道的竞赛。
It is unclear why the administration turned sharply away from the discussion of superpower competition that it began in 2017. Partly it may be personalities. The national security adviser who oversaw the drafting of the 2017 document, Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, believed the American defense establishment was moving far too slowly in confronting new realities after nearly two decades of focus on counterterrorism.
目前尚不清楚本届政府为何会突然背离其在2017年启动的关于超级大国竞争的讨论。这在一定程度上可能与人事变动有关。曾主导2017年文件起草工作的国家安全顾问、陆军中将H·R·麦克马斯特认为,在专注反恐近20年后,美国的防务体系在应对新的现实方面行动过于迟缓。
He succeeded, and one of the few areas of bipartisan agreement in Congress has been the need to counter China’s rising military and technological power, and Russia’s renewed threats to Europe. But the worldview of the key authors of the 2025 document is significantly different. The approach to the Western Hemisphere echoes the public comments of Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who is also the acting national security adviser.
他曾成功地推动了转变,国会两党为数不多的共识之一就是需要遏制中国日益增长的军事和科技实力,以及俄罗斯对欧洲重新构成威胁。但2025年文件主要起草者的世界观已大不相同:对西半球的态度呼应了国务卿、代国家安全顾问马可·鲁比奥的公开说法。
The discussion of Europe and “civilizational extinction” seems drawn from the speech Vice President JD Vance delivered at the Munich Security Conference in February.
关于欧洲与“文明湮灭”的论述似乎源自副总统JD·万斯今年2月在慕尼黑安全会议上的演讲。
But the caution about China appears to have come from the Treasury, and from Mr. Trump himself, who has said he is looking forward to visiting Beijing in April to strike even larger trade deals.
而对中国的审慎态度似乎源自财政部以及特朗普本人,他曾表示,期待4月访华以达成更大规模的贸易协议。
President Trump said Monday that his administration had granted Nvidia permission to begin selling its second-most-powerful chip to China, a big step up from what the artificial intelligence chip maker had been allowed to offer to Beijing.
周一,特朗普总统表示,他的政府已批准英伟达向中国出售该公司第二先进的芯片,令这家芯片巨头获准对华出口的产品实现了大幅性能提升。
The administration had spent months wrestling with whether it was comfortable relaxing its policy on sales of a critical A.I. technology that has the potential to help China militarily and economically.
美国政府数月来一直在权衡是否要放宽对这项关键人工智能技术的对华销售政策,该技术有可能在军事和经济层面为中国提供助力。
In a social media post, Mr. Trump said the Commerce Department was finishing the details and would make similar opportunities available to other chip makers like Advanced Micro Devices and Intel. The president said a portion of the chip revenue would go to the U.S. government, a proposition that experts say could violate U.S. law.
特朗普在社交媒体上发文称,商务部正在敲定相关细节,并将为AMD、英特尔等其他芯片制造商提供类似出口机会。他还表示,芯片销售收入的一部分将归美国政府所有,专家指出,这一提议可能违反美国法律。
The decision is a major win for Jensen Huang. Nvidia’s chief executive, who spent months lobbying the White House to ease its export restrictions.
这一决定对英伟达首席执行官黄仁勋而言是重大胜利。他数月来一直游说白宫放宽出口限制。
The move is also a departure for Mr. Trump, whose administration initially promised to restrict sales of A.I. chips to China. The early position had support across much of Washington, and a looser policy that has become clear in recent months has drawn bipartisan complaints from Congress.
此举也与特朗普政府最初的立场相悖。其政府曾承诺限制人工智能芯片对华出口,这一早期立场在华盛顿获得广泛支持。近几个月来逐渐显现的宽松政策已引发国会两党的不满。
Last week, six senators, including Pete Ricketts, a Republican from Nebraska, and Chris Coons, a Democrat from Delaware, introduced a bill that would limit the sale of A.I. chips to China.
上周,包括内布拉斯加州共和党参议员皮特·里基茨、特拉华州民主党参议员克里斯·库恩斯在内,六名参议员提出了一项限制人工智能芯片对华销售的法案。
The administration’s shift followed a campaign by Mr. Huang and David Sacks, its A.I. and crypto czar, who have pushed back on national security concerns regarding A.I. chips. They have argued that increasing Nvidia’s sales to China would make Chinese companies dependent on its technology and give it more money to develop future generations of chips.
这一政策转变源于黄仁勋与特朗普政府人工智能及加密货币事务负责人戴维·萨克斯的游说。两人反驳了关于人工智能芯片的国家安全担忧,主张扩大英伟达对华销售将使中国企业依赖其技术,同时为英伟达带来更多资金用于研发下一代芯片。
Mr. Huang met with Mr. Trump at the White House last week, and Mr. Trump praised the executive afterward, saying, “He’s done an amazing job.”
黄仁勋上周在白宫与特朗普会面,特朗普随后称赞这位高管“做得非常出色”。
John Rizzo, an Nvidia spokesman, said offering H200 chips to approved commercial customers that had been vetted by the Commerce Department would strike “a thoughtful balance that is great for America.”
英伟达发言人约翰·里佐表示,向经商务部审核通过的商业客户提供H200芯片,将实现“对美国极具价值的审慎平衡”。
“We applaud President Trump’s decision to allow America’s chip industry to compete to support high-paying jobs and manufacturing in America,” he added.
“我们赞赏特朗普总统的决定,这让美国芯片产业得以参与竞争,支持美国的高薪就业岗位和制造业发展,”他还说。
英伟达首席执行官黄仁勋游说特朗普政府放宽对华芯片销售限制。
The approval of the chip sales was reported earlier by Semafor.
芯片销售获批的消息此前由Semafor率先披露。
Now the question is: Will China buy Nvidia’s latest offering? The administration wants to encourage Chinese companies to use Nvidia’s H200 chip, which it released last year, while limiting sales of the company’s latest generation of chips, known as Blackwell.
如今的问题是:中国会购买吗?美国政府希望鼓励中国企业使用英伟达去年推出的H200芯片,同时限制其最新一代Blackwell芯片的销售。
In July, the Trump administration dropped its restrictions on sales of a chip called the H20, which Nvidia developed specifically for China. But Beijing discouraged companies from buying the chip, with administrators warning that it could have “backdoor security risks.”
今年7月,特朗普政府取消了对H20芯片的对华销售限制,该芯片是英伟达专为中国市场研发的产品。但中国政府不鼓励企业购买这款芯片,有关部门警告称其可能存在“后门安全风险”。
Nvidia could run into similar challenges when it begins selling the more powerful H200. After the first Trump administration and the Biden administration began limiting U.S. technology sales to China, Beijing increased its spending to become technologically self-reliant. Huawei, the country’s tech giant, has been improving its own A.I. chips.
当英伟达开始销售性能更强的H200芯片时,可能会面临类似挑战。在第一届特朗普政府和拜登政府相继限制美国技术对华出口后,中国加大投入以实现技术自主。中国科技巨头华为一直在改进其自主研发的人工智能芯片。
This summer, Mr. Trump proposed the idea of the government’s taking a cut of A.I. chip sales to China. On Monday, he reiterated that, writing that “$25% will be paid to the United States of America” — a 10-percentage-point increase from what the company previously agreed to pay the U.S. government.
今年夏天,特朗普提出政府要从人工智能芯片对华销售收入中分成的想法。周一,他重申了这一主张,称“25%的收入交给美利坚合众国”——这比该公司此前同意向美国政府缴纳的比例提高了10个百分点。
Government lawyers have been researching how to enact such a policy, given that U.S. law prohibits the charging of fees for export licenses. Mr. Huang said in a news conference in Washington in October that government officials were working on a new policy to collect the fees.
鉴于美国法律禁止对出口许可证收取费用,政府律师一直在研究如何实施这一政策。黄仁勋10月在华盛顿的一场新闻发布会上表示,政府官员正在制定一项新政策以收取这笔费用。
Neither U.S. nor Chinese officials have publicly acknowledged that the H200 chips were under discussion. But U.S. rules around the sale of technology to China have been a central issue in the countries’ relationship.
美中两国官员均未公开承认正在讨论H200芯片的对华销售事宜,但美国对华技术销售相关规定一直是两国关系中的核心议题。
After Mr. Trump imposed double-digit tariffs on Chinese exports in April, Beijing restricted exports of rare-earth minerals essential to a variety of industries. The countries tentatively agreed to walk back those restrictions this spring, but the truce fell apart after the United States announced new restrictions on Chinese technology companies. Chinese officials argued that those measures violated the spirit of their agreement.
今年4月,特朗普对中国出口商品加征两位数关税后,中国限制了对多个行业至关重要的稀土矿物出口。两国于今年春季暂时同意撤销这些限制,但在美国宣布对中国科技企业实施新限制后,这一休战协议破裂。中国官员称,这些措施违背了双方协议的精神。
At a meeting in South Korea in October, Mr. Trump and Xi Jinping, the leader of China, restored that truce, with the United States promising to keep tariffs low and Beijing to provide steady exports of rare earths and resume its purchases of American soybeans. The agreement was also widely believed to include a de facto U.S. freeze on any new technology restrictions.
10月在韩国举行的会面中,特朗普与中国国家领导人习近平恢复了休战状态。美国承诺维持低关税,中国则保证稳定出口稀土并恢复购买美国大豆。外界普遍认为,该协议还包括美国事实上冻结新的技术限制措施。
Since then, the countries have been working to keep the peace, and in a call with Mr. Xi in late November, Mr. Trump accepted an invitation to visit China in April. On Friday, Scott Bessent, the treasury secretary, and Jamieson Greer, the U.S. trade representative, spoke with China’s vice premier about the steps the sides were taking to maintain the agreement.
自那以后,两国一直致力于维护和平。11月底,特朗普在与习近平的通话中接受了4月访华的邀请。上周五,美国财政部长斯科特·贝森特、美国贸易代表贾米森·格里尔与中国副总理通话,讨论了双方为维护协议所采取的步骤。
But others in Washington have been critical of the administration’s warmer stance toward China. In a letter last week, Senator Elizabeth Warren, Democrat of Massachusetts, expressed concern over the potential sale of the H200 chip.
但华盛顿的其他人士对政府温和的对华立场提出了批评。马萨诸塞州民主党参议员伊丽莎白·沃伦上周在一封信中,就H200芯片可能对华出售表达了担忧。
“I urge you to stop ignoring the input of bipartisan members of Congress and your own experts in order to cut deals that trade away America’s national security,” she wrote.
“我敦促你停止忽视国会两党议员和你自己的专家的意见,不要再为了达成交易而牺牲美国的国家安全,”她写道。
A night at the Waldorf Astoria hotel in the heart of Manhattan starts at about $2,000. A night at the Waldorf Astoria in the heart of Beijing costs about $340.
位于曼哈顿核心地段的华尔道夫酒店一晚房价约2000美元起;而位于北京核心地段的华尔道夫酒店,一晚房价约合340美元。
Hotel rooms are not all that is cheap right now in China. A Big Mac from McDonald’s costs half as much in China as it does in the United States. Made-in-China goods are cheaper, too: A OnePlus 15 smartphone is $999 in the United States and $692 in China. A BYD Seal plug-in hybrid car sells for $15,500 inside China, including computer-assisted driving, and about $50,000 elsewhere.
目前在中国,价格低廉的远不止酒店客房。麦当劳巨无霸在中国的售价仅为美国的一半。中国制造的商品同样更便宜:一加15智能手机在美国售价999美元,在中国仅需692美元;比亚迪海豹插电式混合动力车(含自动驾驶辅助功能)在中国售价约合1.55万美元,在海外市场则高达5万美元左右。
Large discrepancies between prices inside and outside China point to the biggest distortion in the global economy today: the low value of China’s currency. A combination of low interest rates, slowing economic growth and government policies has kept the country’s currency so weak — undervalued by as much as a third, even some Chinese economists estimate — that prices in China look cheap by international standards.
中国境内外物价的巨大差异折射出当前全球经济最显著的扭曲现象:人民币汇率偏低。低利率、经济增长放缓及政府相关政策等多重因素叠加,导致人民币持续走弱——部分中国经济学家估计,其低估幅度可能高达三分之一,这使得按国际标准衡量,中国物价显得格外低廉。
The weakness of China’s currency, the renminbi or yuan, is not the only reason prices are low in China. A persistent decline in housing has erased much of the savings of Chinese households, leaving them reluctant to spend. Chronic overcapacity at Chinese factories after years of debt-fueled investment has left companies frantically cutting prices for the fewer customers they have left inside the country.
人民币走弱并非中国物价低廉的唯一原因。房地产市场持续低迷侵蚀了大量中国家庭的储蓄,导致居民消费意愿低迷;多年债务驱动型投资造成工业产能长期过剩,迫使企业为争夺有限的国内客户疯狂降价。
The currency remains one of the biggest — and most sensitive — issues in China’s economy. It takes about 7.1 renminbi to buy a single dollar these days. That weakness has powered China’s exports to remarkable heights. Official data released on Monday showed that China’s world surplus in exports over imports this year has already exceeded $1 trillion.
汇率仍是中国经济中最关键、也最敏感的问题之一。目前一美元可兑换约7.1元人民币,这种弱势汇率推动中国出口规模攀升至惊人水平。周一发布的官方数据显示,今年中国进出口贸易顺差已突破1万亿美元。
Chinese officials scrupulously avoid discussing the low value of the currency, which has helped create millions of jobs at Chinese export factories. But some well-connected Chinese economists are starting to say the weakness of the renminbi is way out of line with economic fundamentals.
中国官方谨慎回避人民币汇率低估问题——毕竟这一状况为中国出口工厂创造了成百上千万就业岗位。但部分背景深厚的中国经济学家开始直言,人民币当前的弱势已严重偏离经济基本面。
Before his recent retirement from China’s central bank, Sheng Songcheng was the director general of its financial surveys and statistics department. He was one of the few officials with almost unlimited access to economic data in a country that releases fairly little to the outside world.
盛松成退休前曾任中国央行调查统计司司长,在这个对外公开数据有限的国家,他是少数能接触几乎所有核心经济数据的官员之一。
Now teaching at the China Europe International Business School in Shanghai, Mr. Sheng gave a little-noticed talk in late November about purchasing power parity. That is the economics concept of what currency exchange rates would need to be for similar goods and services to cost the same in different countries.
盛松成如今在上海的中欧国际工商学院任教,他于11月底在一个金融会议上发表了关于购买力平价的演讲,这是一个经济学概念,指为使不同国家的同类商品和服务价格一致,货币汇率应达到的水平。这番讲话当时并未引发广泛关注。
“From the perspective of purchasing power parity, the exchange rate wouldn’t be 1 to 7 — it might be 1 to 5 or even 1 to 4,” Mr. Sheng said at a finance conference, according to a video recording of the event. “Some have calculated that if the exchange rate truly reflected purchasing power parity, one dollar would exchange for only about 3.5 yuan.”
“如果按照购买力平价的话,那就不是1比7了,很可能是1比5、1比4,”盛松成在会上表示。“有人算过说,如果真的按照购买力平价,那就是一个美元换3.5个人民币了。”
If the renminbi were to strengthen significantly past 5 to the dollar, China would pass the United States as having the world’s largest economy when measured in dollars.
若人民币大幅升值至一美元兑五元人民币以下,按美元计价,中国将超越美国成为全球第一大经济体。
China’s currency is so weak that the number of Chinese tourists flocking to Europe has halved since 2019 as they choose far less expensive trips at home instead. The average traveler spent just $125 for a trip during the country’s weeklong national holiday at the start of October, according to government data.
人民币持续走弱导致中国赴欧游客数量较2019年减半,更多人选择成本更低的国内游。政府数据显示,10月初国庆黄金周期间,中国游客人均消费仅911元。
10月中国国庆黄金周期间,北京故宫附近的游客。中国游客纷纷选择境内游,因为这比出境游便宜。
The currency’s recent weakness began with the two-month Covid-19 lockdown in Shanghai in the spring of 2022. The lockdown caused a precipitous, nationwide plunge in consumer confidence, which has never recovered. Many Chinese households and companies have responded by selling their renminbi to buy dollars and other foreign assets, from houses to mines and companies. The investment exodus from the renminbi has also contributed to soaring prices for gold.
人民币近期的弱势始于2022年春季上海持续两个月的新冠疫情封锁。封城导致全国消费者信心急剧下滑,且此后从未恢复。许多中国家庭和企业因此抛售人民币,购买美元及海外房产、矿山、企业等资产。人民币资产的投资外流也推动了黄金价格飙升。
China’s central bank responded by allowing the country’s currency to fall steeply from the first days of the lockdown through the end of 2022. It has then kept the currency at roughly the same level for the past three years.
中国央行的应对举措是:自封锁初期至2022年底,允许人民币大幅贬值,此后三年基本维持在同一水平。
The renminbi had begun to recover slightly in the last several weeks. But the central bank stepped in Thursday to slow the gains, acting to prevent speculators from putting bets on a big appreciation of the renminbi.
过去几周,人民币曾出现小幅回升,但央行于周四出手干预,放缓其升值步伐,以遏制投机者对人民币大幅升值的押注。
Changes in price levels inside and outside China have accentuated the effect from China’s weak currency. While prices in China have been flat or falling for the past several years, prices have been rising elsewhere. Producer prices charged by factories and other businesses climbed 35 percent in Europe in the past five years and 26 percent in the United States.
中国境内外物价水平的变化进一步放大了人民币疲软的影响。过去几年中国物价一直持平或下跌,而全球其他地区物价却持续上涨:过去五年间,欧洲工厂及其他企业收取的生产者价格上涨35%,美国涨幅达26%。
With China’s currency not strengthening to offset these changes in prices, it has become even more appealing for companies to move production to China.
由于人民币未通过升值抵消这些物价变化,企业将生产转移至中国的吸引力愈发强劲。
The weakness of the renminbi has helped fuel a sixteenfold increase in Chinese car exports to the European Union over the past five years.
过去五年,人民币弱势推动中国对欧盟汽车出口增长了16倍。
Another former Chinese central banker, Miao Yanliang, told Bloomberg last week that “the present moment may indeed be a window of opportunity to allow for yuan appreciation.”
另一位前中国央行官员缪延亮上周告诉彭博新闻社:“当前或许确实是允许人民币升值的窗口期。”
China got the world’s attention last January when it announced that its trade surplus for goods and services had hit almost $1 trillion, an excess of exports to imports that no country had ever reached.
今年1月,中国宣布其货物和服务贸易顺差接近1万亿美元,这一消息引发了全球关注——从未有国家的出口与进口差达到如此规模。
Now China has surged through that milestone in just 11 months this year. China’s customs agency announced on Monday that the country’s accumulated trade surplus reached $1.08 trillion through November.
现在,今年刚刚过去了11个月,中国就突破了这一里程碑。中国海关总署周一宣布,截至11月底,中国累计贸易顺差达到1.08万亿美元。
Tariffs imposed by President Trump on China have caused Chinese exports to the United States to drop by nearly a fifth. But China has throttled back its purchases of American soybeans and other products by almost the same rate, continuing to sell three times as much to the United States as it buys.
特朗普总统对中国施加的关税导致中国对美出口下降近五分之一。但中国也以几乎同等幅度大量减少了对美国大豆和其他产品的采购,对美出口量仍然是进口量的三倍。
China’s $111.68 billion trade surplus in November was its third-largest ever in a single month. The overall surplus through the first 11 months of the year is up 21.7 percent from the same period last year.
中国11月贸易顺差达1116.8亿美元,创历史单月第三高。今年前11个月的总体顺差较去年同期增长21.7%。
China has ramped up considerably its sales to other countries. From cars to solar panels to consumer electronics, a tsunami of Chinese exports is flooding Southeast Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America. Carmakers and other exporters in traditional manufacturing powerhouses like Germany, Japan and South Korea are losing customers to Chinese rivals. Factories in developing countries like Indonesia and South Africa have had to curtail production or even close as they struggle to match China’s low prices.
中国对其他国家的出口显著增加。从汽车到太阳能板,再到消费电子产品,中国出口的巨浪正席卷东南亚、非洲、欧洲和拉丁美洲。德国、日本和韩国等传统制造业大国的汽车制造商和其他出口商正在被中国竞争对手抢走市场。印尼和南非等发展中国家的工厂因为难以与中国的低价竞争,不得不削减产量甚至关闭。
Chinese companies have shifted final assembly of their goods to Southeast Asia, Mexico and Africa, which then ship finished products to the United States. This has allowed them to partly bypass Mr. Trump’s tariffs on goods coming straight from China.
中国企业已将产品的最终组装环节转移到东南亚、墨西哥和非洲,再由这些地区向美国运输成品。这让它们得以部分绕过特朗普对直接从中国进口商品加征的关税。
China now sells more than twice as much to the European Union as it buys. China’s trade surplus with the region has widened considerably this year.
中国现在对欧盟的出口额已超过进口额的两倍。中国对该地区的贸易顺差今年大幅扩大。
One major reason is that China’s currency has been weak over the last several years against many other currencies, particularly the euro. Another is that prices have been falling in China, while they have been rising in the United States and Europe.
一个主要原因是,过去几年中国的货币对许多其他货币(尤其是欧元)汇率一直走弱。另一个原因是,中国物价持续下跌,而美国和欧洲的物价却在上涨。
The weakness of the Chinese currency, the renminbi, has helped propel its exports. More than a tenth of the Chinese economy now consists of its trade surplus in manufactured goods. Europe has felt the sting sharply.
人民币的疲软推动了出口的增长。目前中国制造业贸易顺差已占经济总量逾十分之一。欧洲对此感受尤其明显。
“With the renminbi undervalued by 30 percent against the euro, possibly more, it will be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to compete against Chinese manufacturers even if Europe does all the right things it needs to do in terms of deregulation, bringing down energy prices and establishing a true unified market,” said Jens Eskelund, the president of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China.
“人民币相对于欧元贬值了30%,甚至可能更多。即使欧洲在放松监管、降低能源价格、建立真正统一市场等方面做了所有正确的事情,要与中国制造商竞争也将极其困难,甚至是不可能的,”中国欧盟商会主席彦辞(Jens Eskelund)表示。
China’s trade surplus in factory goods is even bigger as a share of its economy than the United States ran in the years immediately after World War II, when most other manufacturing nations were in ruins; or during the early years of World War I, when the United States was at peace and churning out civilian goods while Europe was embroiled in war.
中国在制造业贸易顺差占经济总量的比例甚至超过了美国在二战刚结束后的几年(当时大多数其他制造国百废待兴)或一战早期(当时美国远离战火、大量生产民用商品,而欧洲陷于战争)水平。
Top leaders of the International Monetary Fund, which monitors economies with the aim of preventing crises, are making their annual visit to China this week to review its currency and financial policies and are expected to announce a preliminary summary of their findings on Wednesday.
国际货币基金组织的高层领导人本周正在对中国进行年度访问,审查其货币和金融政策,并预计将在周三发布一份初步总结。该组织以预防危机为目标对各经济体实施监测。
A growing number of economists and business leaders, including former senior officials at China’s own central bank, are calling on Beijing to let the renminbi increase in value against the dollar and other currencies.
包括中国央行前高级官员在内的越来越多经济学家和商业领袖正呼吁北京允许人民币对美元和其他货币升值。
For China, a stronger renminbi would make goods like gasoline, French wines or Japanese cosmetics cheaper to import. Savings on such purchases would leave China’s households with more money to spend on Chinese goods and services, like restaurant meals, concert tickets and electric cars.
对中国来说,更强的人民币会让汽油、法国红酒或日本化妆品等商品的进口变得更便宜。节省下来的开支将使中国家庭有更多资金用于购买中国本土商品和服务,例如外出就餐、音乐会门票和电动汽车。
Reviving consumer spending in China is one of the top goals of Beijing leaders. But doing so by allowing the renminbi to strengthen would also carry costs for China.
提振国内消费是中国领导层的首要目标之一。但通过让人民币升值来实现这一点也会给中国带来代价。
A stronger renminbi would hurt China’s exporters. The dollars they earn by selling goods in foreign markets would yield fewer renminbi for them to pay workers and other expenses. Factories create millions of jobs in China, and a stronger renminbi could slow the rate at which other countries transfer manufacturing to China.
人民币升值将损害中国的出口企业。他们在海外市场销售商品赚取的美元兑换成人民币后将缩水,从而影响支付工人工资及其他开支的能力。制造业在中国创造了数以百万计的就业岗位,人民币升值可能会减缓其他国家将制造业转移到中国的速度。
China’s export success has also financed a boom in technological innovation and has given Beijing the resources to help other authoritarian countries when they encounter difficulties, notably Russia, North Korea and Iran.
中国在出口上取得的成功也为其科技创新热潮提供了资金,并让北京有能力在其他威权国家遇到困难时给予援助,尤其是俄罗斯、朝鲜和伊朗。
China is trying to preserve its trade surplus by pressing other countries not to erect trade barriers. “Protectionism cannot solve the problems caused by global industrial restructuring, but will only worsen the international environment for trade,” Xi Jinping, China’s top leader, said on Thursday, according to a Chinese government summary of his meeting with President Emmanuel Macron of France.
中国正试图通过敦促其他国家不要设置贸易壁垒来维持其贸易顺差。根据中方发布的会晤摘要,中国最高领导人习近平在上周四与法国总统马克龙会面时表示,“保护主义不能解决世界产业结构调整的问题,反而将恶化国际贸易环境。”
Some Chinese economists nonetheless say that China must someday accept a narrower trade surplus to help its long-suffering consumers.
不过,一些中国经济学家表示,中国终有一天必须接受缩减贸易顺差,以帮助其长期承受压力的消费者。
“For China to expand domestic demand, it is necessary to minimize the trade surplus, and in the future it may even need to consider maintaining a trade deficit,” Zhang Jun, dean of the School of Economics at Fudan University in Shanghai, said in a speech last month.
“若要进一步扩大内需,就必须将贸易顺差最小化,甚至可能未来要维持贸易逆差,”复旦大学经济学院院长张军上个月在一次演讲中表示。
The Hong Kong government was doubling down on a campaign to increase voter turnout in tightly controlled legislative elections on Sunday that are largely devoid of opposition parties, even as the city continued mourning a deadly fire that has prompted calls for official accountability.
香港政府加大力度推动提升周日立法会选举的投票率,这场选举在严格管控下进行,几乎没有反对派参与,与此同时香港仍在哀悼一场致命的火灾,这场火灾引发了向官员追责的呼声。
At least 159 people were killed last month when a blaze engulfed Wang Fuk Court, a high-rise apartment complex, in the city’s deadliest fire in decades. Officials have said that substandard construction materials likely contributed to the spread of the fire, raising questions about the city’s oversight of its building industry and whether warnings had been ignored.
上个月,高层住宅小区宏福苑发生大火,造成至少159人死亡,这是香港几十年来最严重的火灾。官员们表示,不合格的建筑材料可能是火灾蔓延的原因之一,这令人们质疑对该市对建筑行业的监管以及政府是否忽视了警告。
Residents are being urged to cast ballots on Sunday in an election in which pro-establishment candidates approved by Beijing are all but certain to dominate.
政府敦促居民在周日的选举中投票,得到北京批准的建制派候选人几乎肯定会占主导地位。
“I’m not voting,” said Mary Chan, 55, a Hong Konger who was at a memorial near the site of the fire earlier this week, where she folded paper cranes as a way to offer peace to the dead. “What’s the point? To help them perform?”
“我不会投票,”55岁的香港人玛丽·陈(音)说。本周早些时候,她参加了火灾现场附近的一个纪念活动,在那里她折起纸鹤,悼念逝者。“去又怎么样?帮他们做台戏?”
周日,火灾现场附近的一个投票站。
In a sign of how sensitive the fire has become, the authorities have invoked national security laws to warn of consequences for “anti-China elements” who they say are looking to use the fire to cause trouble. At least three people have been arrested by national security police since the disaster.
当局援引国家安全法警告,其所称的试图利用这场火灾滋事的“反中乱港分子”会面临后果,表明这场火灾已经变得多么敏感。自灾难发生以来,至少有三人被国安警察逮捕。
On Saturday, Beijing’s national security arm in Hong Kong summoned representatives and journalists from some foreign media organizations, including The New York Times, to warn them about coverage of the disaster.
上周六,北京在香港的国家安全部门召集了包括《纽约时报》在内的一些外国媒体的代表和记者,就灾难报道发出警告。
Questions abounded after the fire about whether to postpone the elections, which analysts said were being treated as a test of legitimacy for the government. Campaign activities were suspended for several days after the blaze, but Hong Kong’s chief executive, John Lee, ultimately decided to go ahead with the poll, explaining that the new legislature was needed to help speed up fire recovery and to introduce regulatory reforms.
火灾发生后,出现了许多关于是否推迟选举的疑问。分析人士表示,此次选举被视为对政府合法性的考验。火灾发生后,竞选活动暂停了几天,但香港特首李家超最终决定继续进行选举,他解释说,需要新的立法机构来帮助加快火灾的恢复,并引入监管改革。
“At this critical moment of post-disaster reconstruction, we must look to the long term, steadily move ahead and gradually promote the normal functioning of society,” Mr. Lee said on Tuesday.
李家超周二表示:“在灾后支援和重建的关键时刻,必须放眼长远,坚定前行,稳步推进社会的正常运作。”
Mr. Lee has led the government campaign urging residents to participate in the elections. For weeks, Hong Kong has been saturated with posters, banners and social media posts promoting the polls as a civic duty. Even public restrooms outfitted with speakers played a jingle calling on people to vote.
李家超领导了敦促居民参加选举的政府宣传活动。数周以来,香港到处都是宣传投票是公民义务的海报、横幅和社交媒体帖子。甚至连配备了扬声器的公共厕所也在播放号召人们投票的广告歌。
香港行政长官李家超上周二在记者会上表示,尽管发生宏福苑火灾事故,他仍决定按原计划举行周日的选举。他解释称,需要新一届立法会协助加快火灾善后工作,并推进监管改革。
The government mobilized civil servants to show up at the polls and asked chambers of commerce to get businesses to incentivize employees to cast ballots. On Saturday, the government hosted a citywide “Election Fun Day,” that included a gala, carnivals and open houses at government offices.
政府动员公务员到投票站投票,并要求商会让企业鼓励员工投票。周六,政府在全市范围内举办了“选举缤纷日”,包括晚会、嘉年华会和政府办公室的开放日。
Even the thousands of displaced residents of Wang Fuk Court, where seven towers were consumed by the fire on Nov. 26, have been the focus of a get-out-the-vote drive. The government said on Tuesday that social workers, who were each assigned a household to help through the aftermath of the fire, would also help residents find their new polling stations and direct them to free transportation.
在11月26日的大火中,宏福苑的七座塔楼被烧毁,就连数千名流离失所的居民也成为投票动员运动的目标。政府周二表示,负责协助各户家庭应对火灾善后的社会工作者,还将协助居民寻找新的投票站,并引导他们乘坐免费交通工具前往。
The outreach effort may also be a way for the authorities to monitor residents in case they begin organizing opposition to the government and its handling of the fire, said Victoria Hui, an associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame who studies Hong Kong. “It seems that they are trying to kill two birds with one stone,” Ms. Hui said.
圣母大学研究香港问题的政治学副教授许嘉莹说,这种外展工作也可能是当局监控居民的一种方式,以防他们开始组织起来反对政府及其对火灾的处理。“他们似乎是想一举两得,”许嘉莹说。
Yam Kai-bong, a former local official in Tai Po, the district where the fire took place, said that a high voter turnout in his former district would be seen as a stamp of approval. “They can announce to the world that the people still believe in the system, believe in the government and believe in the pro-establishment party,” said Mr. Yam, who now lives in Britain.
大火发生地大埔的前地方官员任启邦说,在他以前的选区,高投票率将被视为一种认可的标志。“他就可以向全世界宣布,人们仍相信体制,相信政府,相信建制派,”现居英国的任启邦说。
“The government desperately wants to tell the public that everything is normal,” he said.
“政府好想告诉市民,‘一切如常’,”他说。
Eric Chan, Hong Kong’s No. 2 official, told reporters on Sunday morning that the social workers would not be instructing Wang Fuk residents to vote.
香港二号官员陈国基周日上午告诉记者,社工不会指导宏福苑居民投票。
为上月火灾中失去家园的居民设立的避难所。他们已成为动员投票活动的重点对象。
During the last election in 2021, only 30 percent of registered voters cast a ballot. That was the lowest rate in decades and nearly half the record-high turnout in 2016, long before a national security law imposed in 2020 effectively wiped out the pro-democracy opposition.
在2021年的上次选举中,只有30%的登记选民投了票。这是几十年来的最低投票率,几乎是2016年创纪录投票率的一半,而2020年实施的国家安全法在该选举前已基本消灭了亲民主派反对力量。
In 2021, Beijing imposed an electoral overhaul that required all candidates to be vetted as sufficiently patriotic to China. Before those changes, opposition lawmakers were a major force in the legislature who often frustrated the city’s pro-Beijing leaders. After quitting en masse in 2020 in protest, many ended up in jail or living in exile.
2021年,北京实施了一项选举改革,要求所有候选人都必须通过爱国主义审查。在这些变化之前,反对派议员是立法会的主要力量,他们经常挫败香港亲北京的领导人。在2020年集体辞职抗议后,许多人最终入狱或流亡。
Only 20 of the 90 seats up for grabs on Sunday in the city of more than seven million people are directly elected. That is down from 35 seats before the 2021 reforms. The remaining 70 seats are decided by a select group of voters comprising Beijing loyalists and representing different industries and professions.
在这座有700多万人口的城市,90个立法会席位中只有20个是在周日直接选举产生的。这比2021年改革前的35个席位有所减少。剩下的70个席位由一组精选出来的选民决定,这些选民包括忠于北京的人,代表着不同的行业和专业。
“Some Hong Kong people may feel they do not have a genuine choice of candidates,” said Emily Lau, a veteran pro-democracy politician and former lawmaker who now hosts an interview show on YouTube.
“一些香港人可能觉得他们没有真正的候选人可选,”资深民主派政治家、前立法会议员刘慧卿说。她现在在YouTube上主持一个采访节目。
China is trying to deepen its influence in the legislature after a wave of older and established pro-Beijing politicians abruptly announced in October that they would not seek re-election. In their place are many younger candidates with political and financial ties to the mainland, said John Burns, emeritus professor of politics at Hong Kong University.
去年10月,一批年长的亲北京政治人士突然宣布,他们将不再寻求连任。此后,中国正试图加深自己在立法会的影响力。香港大学政治学名誉教授卜约翰(John Burns)表示,取代这些人的是许多与内地有着政治和资金联系的年轻候选人。
China’s representative office in Hong Kong “carefully curates these contests so that the people that they want to win will win,” said Mr. Burns.
中国驻香港代表处“精心策划这些竞选,让他们想赢的人赢”,卜约翰说。
2021年香港某投票站。香港和北京官员希望今年的投票率能超过上次选举的水平——当时只有30%的登记选民参与投票。
The limited choice on the ballot has sullied enthusiasm for an electorate that traditionally used to skew about 60 percent in favor of the opposition parties. Voter registration this year is down eight percent from 2021 at 4.1 million.
选票上有限的选择削弱了选民的热情,传统上,选民中有60%的人倾向于支持反对党。今年的选民登记比2021年减少了8%,为410万。
In Tai Po, near the site of the fire, voting was the furthest thing from the minds of at least two residents who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were afraid of attracting the attention of the police.
在靠近火灾地点的大埔,至少有两位居民表示他们不关心投票。他们要求匿名接受采访,因为害怕引起警方注意。
One resident said she appreciated the temporary housing the government had provided, but said she needed to dedicate her energy to finding a permanent home and filling out paperwork for financial aid.
一位居民说,她感谢政府提供的临时住房,但她说,她需要把精力投入到寻找永久居所,并填写申请经济援助的文件。
Another resident said he would spend Election Day moving into a new apartment. He said he had lost interest in elections ever since opposition parties were no longer allowed.
另一位居民说他将在选举日搬入新公寓。他说,自从反对党不再被允许参选以来,他对选举失去了兴趣。
A social worker who was assigned to help Wang Fuk Court families said her supervisors had instructed her to provide information about the election, in addition to helping with financial aid applications and accompanying them on visits to a psychiatrist.
一名被指派帮助宏福苑家属的社工说,除协助申请经济援助及陪同就诊精神科医生外,她的上级还要求她提供选举相关信息。
The social worker, who declined to be named because of potential government repercussions, said she felt uncomfortable with the orders related to the election, particularly because some of her charges were still mourning the death of their loved ones from the fire.
由于担心政府报复,这位社会工作者拒绝透露姓名。她说,她对与选举有关的指令感到不适,特别是因为她的一些服务对象仍在哀悼火灾中死去的亲人。
Li Cheuk-man, a 42-year-old consultant who was displaced by the Wang Fuk fire, said he would vote for certain candidates he thought would address the problems that led to the blaze. He hoped the government would address his financial losses from the fire, help his family find a new home and bring those responsible for the disaster to justice.
42岁的顾问李卓文(音)因宏福苑大火而流离失所,他说他会投票给他认为能够解决火灾根源的某些候选人。他希望政府能补偿他在火灾中遭受的经济损失,帮助他的家人找到一个新家,并将灾难责任人绳之以法。
“The government is like our guiding north star,” he said. “Our family is drifting at sea now, not knowing where to go.”
“政府就像指引我们的北极星,”他说。“我们家现在在海上漂流,不知道该去哪里。”
He has spent the past week and a half since the disaster trying to secure relief funds and care for his family, he said.
他说,灾难发生后的一周半时间里,他一直在努力争取救灾资金,照顾家人。
“After my wife and kids have fallen asleep, I’ve cried in a room alone, not knowing what to do,” Mr. Li said.
李卓文说:“妻子和孩子睡着后,我独自在房间里哭,不知道该怎么办。”
Billy Ho, a 46-year-old clerk and resident of Tai Po, said outside a polling station that he had cast his vote for candidates he thought could improve Hong Kong’s economy.
46岁的比利·何(音)是大埔的一名职员,他在一个投票站外说,他把票投给了他认为可以改善香港经济的候选人。
Asked if he felt his vote would make a difference given the relative absence of opposition parties, Mr. Ho said he could only hope it would.
当被问及在反对党相对缺席的情况下是否相信投票能改变现状时,比利·何说,他只能寄希望如此。
“If you don’t even hope for it, it’s a waste of the rights you still have,” he said.
他说:“如果你连希望都不抱,那就是在浪费你仍然拥有的权利。”
More than a week after a fire tore through a Hong Kong housing complex, killing 159 people, the city is confronting a major challenge. It must find homes for the thousands of residents who survived with little more than the clothes on their backs.
在香港一处屋苑发生大火造成159人遇难一周多后,这座城市正面临着一项重大挑战。它必须妥善安置数以千计的受灾民众,他们除了身上的衣服一无所有。
The government is already facing questions over its role in the worst tragedy to befall the city in seven decades. Now, survivors of the deadly fire are looking to the government to help them start over in one of the world’s most expensive and unequal places to live, where the average living space is smaller than a one-car garage.
这起自上世纪70年代以来香港最为严重的悲剧,让政府饱受质疑。香港是世界上生活成本最高、贫富差距最为悬殊的地方之一,人均居住面积还没有单车位车库大,现在,这场致命大火的幸存者正指望政府能帮助他们重新开始生活。
The residential towers in Wang Fuk Court were home to more than 4,900 residents, many of them from working-class families who bought their subsidized homes through a government program and had lived there for decades before the raging fire took the lives of their loved ones and reduced their belongings to ash.
宏福苑住着4900多名居民,许多是工薪家庭,他们通过政府的资助房屋计划购得住房,在这里居住了几十年,直到这场凶猛的大火夺走了亲人的生命,也将他们的全部家当化为灰烬。
“It was horrible — all of our belongings are gone,” said Diana Yu, 71, who lived with her 43-year-old son in a two-bedroom apartment. She watched in tears as flames engulfed the sixth-floor unit where she had lived for four decades, her two cats trapped inside. Ms. Yu will stay in a small room in a former Covid-19 quarantine facility, but she said she did not know for how long.
71岁的戴安娜·余和43岁的儿子住在一个位于六楼的两居室。她流着泪看着大火吞噬了她住了40年的公寓,她的两只猫被困在里面。“太可怕了——我们所有的东西都没了,”她说。余女士将暂时住进一处原新冠隔离设施内的一间小房间,但她表示不知道要住多久。
More than 3,800 Wang Fuk residents have been placed in makeshift apartments in onetime quarantine facilities, youth hostels and housing projects scattered across the city. Others have turned to friends and family for temporary stays because they need to be closer to schools, doctors and workplaces.
目前,已有超过3800名宏福苑居民被安置在分散于全市各处的临时住所,包括昔日的隔离设施、青年旅舍和公屋。还有一些民众为了靠近读书地点或者为了就医和工作方便,选择暂住在亲戚朋友家。
大埔区的一处灾民安置点,摄于上月。
John Lee, Hong Kong’s chief executive, has called on citizens to “transform their grief and care into a force for reconstruction” and allocated about $38 million for the families affected by the fire. The government has held daily news briefings to announce the rising death toll. It has regularly updated the public about an investigation into the malfeasance that led to the fire.
香港行政长官李家超呼吁市民“把悲痛与关爱转化为重建家园的力量”,并为受火灾影响的家庭拨款3亿港元。政府每天举行新闻发布会,通报不断上升的死亡人数,并持续向公众更新对导致火灾的渎职行为的调查。
For the survivors, however, the most pressing concern is how to start their lives again.
然而,对于受灾民众来说,眼下最迫切的问题是生活要如何重新开始。
“We are all waiting. The relief funds are good for short-term, but long-term arrangements have to be solved,” said Leung Ho, 42, a truck driver who lived in the complex with his wife, two children and 70-year-old father, who bought their apartment in 1983. Mr. Leung and his family are staying with friends near Wang Fuk Court so they can be close to his children’s school.
“我们都在等。救济金只能解决短期问题,但长期安置必须解决,”42岁的货车司机梁浩(音)说。他与妻子、两个孩子以及70岁的父亲一起住在宏福苑,房子是父亲在1983年买下的。梁先生一家目前暂住在宏福苑附近朋友的家中,以便孩子能就近上学。
Over the past week, there has been a steady outpouring of support from the community. Volunteers have shown up to distribute food and clothing. More than $390 million in donations have poured in from the city’s 7.5 million residents. Posters taped to buildings that surround the site of the fire contain the names and contact numbers for dozens of nonprofit organizations that are also offering donations.
在过去一周里,社会各界纷纷伸出援手。许多志愿者前来分发食物和衣物。这座有750万人口的城市已收到超过3.9亿元的捐款。张贴在火灾现场周边建筑物上的海报列出了数十家同样提供捐赠的非营利组织的名称和联系方式。
But there is a scarcity of housing. Officials have said that residents can stay in temporary housing at no cost for as long as they need, but some residents want clarity on their future.
但住房依然紧缺。官员们表示,居民可以免费住在临时住所,需要住多久就住多久,但一些居民希望对自己的未来有更明确的安排。
The Hong Kong government is “committed to providing appropriate assistance to meet the housing needs of residents in the longer term,” said Michael Wong, the deputy finance secretary, in an emailed statement. The city would take into account factors like the condition of the buildings, the requirement for repairs and the preferences of the residents affected by the fire, he wrote, adding that the government would “not rule out any long-term possibilities at this stage.”
香港财政司副司长黄伟纶在一份通过电子邮件发送的声明中表示,香港政府“致力于提供妥善援助,以满足居民长期的住房需求”。他写道,政府将综合考虑楼宇状况、维修需要以及受灾居民的意愿,并补充说,政府目前“不会排除任何长期方案”。
But as thousands of survivors of the fire have begun to settle in temporary apartments, hostel rooms and transitional housing, their needs are already clashing with the harsh realities of Hong Kong’s deeply unequal housing market.
然而,随着数千名受灾民众开始在临时公寓、旅舍和过渡性住房中安顿下来,他们的需求已经与香港这个高度不平等的住房市场的严酷现实产生了冲突。
Hong Kong is a city plagued with some of the highest inequality in the world. Available space is limited, and wages have not risen at the same rate as housing prices. More than 215,000 people live in illegally subdivided apartments that are sometimes so small they are called coffin homes.
香港是世界上贫富差距最为严重的城市之一。可用空间有限,而工资上涨的速度远远赶不上房价。超过21.5万人居住在非法分隔的公寓里,这些住宅单位有时小到被称为“棺材房”。
去年,一名男子在香港一间被称为“棺材房”的分割单位里休息。
“In Hong Kong, we have a very large gap between the haves and the have-nots,” said Albert Lai, a civil engineer and founding chairman of the Professional Commons, an independent think tank focused on public policy.
土木工程师、专注于公共政策的独立智库——公共专业联盟的创会主席黎广德表示:“在香港,贫富差距非常大。”
The only immediate option available to help the residents of Wang Fuk Court is to tap public housing, Mr. Lai said. But nearly 200,000 people were already waiting for public housing before the fire, a backlog that currently takes about five years to address. Many displaced Wang Fuk residents are staying in some of the same facilities as citizens who are on the public housing wait list.
黎广德表示,目前能为宏福苑居民提供的唯一即时援助方案是动用公屋资源。但在火灾发生前,已有近20万人在排队等候公屋分配,目前的积压数量需时约五年时间才能消化。许多流离失所的宏福苑居民,现正与一些已在公屋轮候名单上的市民暂居于相同的设施。
If the government decided to move residents from Wang Fuk into public housing, this could take up as much as 10 percent of its average yearly supply, Mr. Lai estimated.
据黎广德估计,如果政府决定将宏福苑居民安置进公屋,可能会占用其年平均供应量的10%。
Even as residents try to settle into a new transitory state, many had more questions than the growing army of government volunteers and social workers could answer.
即便居民们努力适应新的过渡生活状态,他们心中的疑问即便有再多的政府志愿者与社会工作者也难以解答。
One of those questions focused on the recent maintenance fees that residents had been forced to pay to help cover a $40 million renovation that had been underway at the housing complex before the fire.
其中一个问题集中在火灾发生前居民被要求缴纳的最新一笔维修费上——这些费用原本是用来分担该屋苑高达3.3亿港元、火灾前正在进行的大维修工程支出。
It was this renovation, and a contractor’s decision to cut corners and save money, using substandard materials like flammable scaffolding netting and polystyrene foam, that caused the fire to spread so rapidly last week.
上周的大火之所以迅速蔓延,正是由于这次大维修工程,以及承包商为了省钱而偷工减料,使用了诸如可燃的脚手架防护网和发泡胶等不合格材料。
在对宏福苑大火展开调查之际,香港有关部门上周四指示工人拆除沙田穗禾苑一栋楼宇的脚手架防护网。
Mr. Ho, the truck driver, and Keith Cheung, 44, said their families had paid around $20,600 in renovation fees. “We’ve wasted so many years and so much money,” said Mr. Cheung, who lived with his wife and son on the 11th floor of the tower that was most badly burned.
货车司机梁先生和44岁的基思·张说,他们两家都支付了大约16万港元的大维修费用。“我们浪费了这么多年,也花了这么多钱,”张先生说。他与妻儿住在损毁最严重的那栋楼的11层。
Some residents said they wondered if those fees would be compensated, and whether their mortgages and other payments would count toward their next homes. Their questions have so far gone unanswered.
一些居民表示,他们想知道这些费用是否会得到赔偿,以及此前偿还的房贷和其他款项是否可以计入他们下一套住房。这些问题至今仍未得到答复。
Some hope for one-off monetary relief to repurchase a private flat in the same neighborhood, other subsidized housing options or a long-term housing accommodation while their old homes are rebuilt. Many expressed hope that they could continue to live in the Wang Fuk Court area. Some housing experts have suggested that the government could enlist one of Hong Kong’s deep-pocketed property tycoons to repurpose a private real estate development for the displaced residents. Mr. Lai, who previously advised the Hong Kong government on housing and infrastructure as a member of the Commission on Strategic Development, suggested that a special government urban renewal scheme could be repurposed to build a new complex on the same site.
一些人希望能获得一次性现金补助,用于在同一社区重新购置一套私人住宅,或获得其他资助性住房选择,或在旧居重建期间得到长期住房安置。许多人表达了继续居住在宏福苑一带的愿望。有住房专家建议,政府可找一个财力雄厚的本港房地产巨头,将一处私人地产项目改为用于安置受灾居民。曾任香港策略发展委员会成员、为政府提供住房与基础设施方面建议的黎广德提出,可调整现有城市更新规划,在原址重建一个新屋苑。
Residents described Wang Fuk Court as a tight-knit community where young children lived with their parents and grandparents. Some neighbors knew one another from church. Older residents, like Vinnie Chung, 68, had moved in when the housing complex was first built, in 1983. Ms. Chung said another couple in her building had lost their son in the fire. She recalled watching him grow up.
居民们形容宏福苑是一个邻里关系紧密的社区,许多孩童与父母、祖父母同住。部分邻里在教会相识。68岁的雯妮·钟这样的老住户自1983年屋苑落成便居住于此。她提到同栋楼有对夫妇在火灾中失去了儿子,她还记得看着他长大的点点滴滴。
一些宏福苑大火的灾民仍不确定接下来将住在哪里,而他们向市政府提出的许多问题至今没有得到答复。
“Now that life turned out like this, who wouldn’t be heartbroken?” Ms. Chung said.
“生活变成这样,谁不心碎呢?”钟女士说。
Some residents, like Mr. Ho, even wanted to go back to live in their old homes, though he knew it was too burned.
还有一些居民,比如梁先生,甚至希望能回到原来的家中居住,尽管他明知那里已被烧毁。
“The fire was too huge,” he acknowledged. “I know that there is no going back.”
“这场火实在太大了,”他承认。“我知道再也回不去了。”