Perhaps no business needs certainty more than the auto industry. It usually takes at least four years to design a new model and bring it to market, requiring carmakers to divine what buyers will find appealing by the time the vehicles reach showrooms.

或许没有哪个行业比汽车业更需要确定性。一款新车型从设计到上市通常至少需要四年时间，这要求车企必须预判出当车辆最终进入展厅时，消费者会青睐哪些特性。

Yet industry veterans say they can’t remember a time when the biggest carmakers faced as much uncertainty as they do now. They have been whipsawed by tariffs. Chinese carmakers are breathing down their necks around the world. Self-driving taxi companies like Waymo are changing the very nature of transportation. Software has replaced horsepower as a key selling point. Sales are flat almost everywhere, and profits are declining.

但行业资深人士表示，他们记忆中从未有过像现在这样的时候，大型车企面临如此巨大的不确定性。关税政策反复冲击；中国车企在全球范围内步步紧逼；Waymo等自动驾驶出租车公司正在改变交通的本质；软件已取代马力成为核心卖点；全球几乎所有地区销量都陷入停滞，利润不断下滑。

How U.S. carmakers cope with this pivotal moment will determine whether they survive as global players or slide into irrelevance, becoming niche manufacturers of pickups and sport utility vehicles that only Americans buy.

美国车企如何应对这一关键节点将决定它们是继续作为全球玩家生存下去，还是沦为无足轻重的小众厂商，生产只供美国人购买的皮卡和运动型多用途汽车。

The early indications are not promising. Many established U.S. and European carmakers have been stumped by electric vehicles at seemingly every turn. First, Tesla’s meteoric rise caught them unawares. They responded by investing in new factories but are now pulling back after the U.S. government repealed tax credits and other subsidies for those cars.

初步迹象并不乐观。许多老牌美国和欧洲车企在电动汽车领域似乎处处碰壁。先是特斯拉的迅速崛起令他们措手不及。它们随即投资建设新工厂，但在美国政府取消电动汽车税收抵免等补贴后，如今又开始收缩战线。

“The term ‘unprecedented’ is always overused. But it is really everything coming together at once,” said Stuart Taylor, a former Ford Motor executive who is chief product officer at Envorso, which advises carmakers on software.

“‘史无前例’这个词总是被滥用，但现在的情况确实是所有问题一起到来了，”曾任职于福特汽车、现任软件咨询公司Envorso首席产品官的斯图尔特·泰勒说。

U.S. carmakers, in particular, face some difficult choices.

美国汽车制造商尤其面临艰难抉择。

President Trump has given them a short-term gain by dismantling clean air regulations and fuel economy standards, making it easier to sell pickups and sport utility vehicles that are very profitable.

通过废除清洁空气法规和燃油经济性标准，特朗普总统为它们带来了短期利好，让利润丰厚的皮卡和运动型多功能车更容易销售。

Should they use that relief to please Wall Street and make as much money as possible? Or should they keep investing in new technologies?

它们应该利用这种宽松政策取悦华尔街、尽可能赚取利润，还是应该继续投资新技术？

Auto experts say old-line companies risk becoming obsolete if they don’t learn how to make appealing, profitable electric vehicles, which most executives expect to eventually replace cars that run on gasoline despite the Trump’s administration efforts to promote fossil fuels. Improvements in electric vehicle technology mean that, within a few years, they will be cheaper to buy and will charge in 15 minutes or less.

汽车行业专家表示，如果老牌车企不能学会打造有吸引力、能盈利的电动汽车，就有可能被淘汰。尽管特朗普政府大力推广化石燃料，但大多数高管预计，电动汽车最终将取代燃油车。电动汽车技术的进步意味着几年内购车成本将会更低，充电时间可缩短至15分钟以内。

One of the biggest problems established manufacturers have is that many of the electric models they sell have fared poorly against cars from Tesla and other newer companies.

老牌车企面临的最大问题之一是，它们推出的许多电动车型在市场竞争中屡屡败给特斯拉等新兴企业。

Tesla and Chinese carmakers like BYD have a substantial lead in battery technology and software. Established Western carmakers tend to lose money on electric vehicles and for the most part are also behind on self-driving cars. The Chinese have a head start there, too, as do Tesla and Waymo, a division of Google’s parent company that operates autonomous taxis in 10 U.S. cities and is expanding rapidly.

特斯拉以及比亚迪等中国车企在电池技术和软件方面拥有显著领先优势。传统西方车企在电动汽车领域大多处于亏损状态，并且在自动驾驶领域整体落后。中国企业在这个领域同样起步更早，特斯拉以及谷歌母公司旗下的Waymo也是如此——Waymo已在美国10座城市运营自动驾驶出租车，并正在快速扩张。

“It’s not impossible that in 10 years we wake up and see that we actually don’t have a domestic industry in the sense of something that does significant research and development,” said Susan Helper, a professor at Case Western Reserve University who was chief economist at the Commerce Department under President Barack Obama.

“10年后我们醒来时，可能会发现，国内已不存在一个能进行大规模研发的汽车产业，”凯斯西储大学教授、奥巴马政府时期商务部首席经济学家苏珊·赫尔珀说。

“Maybe Ford and G.M. exist as nameplates but the powertrains and their cars are all Chinese,” said Ms. Helper, who also advised President Joseph R. Biden Jr. on electric vehicles.

“也许福特和通用还作为品牌存在，但动力总成和整车都来自中国，”曾在拜登政府担任电动汽车政策顾问的赫尔珀表示。

得克萨斯州奥斯汀的一辆Waymo自动驾驶汽车，摄于去年。老牌美国汽车制造商在自动驾驶汽车领域远远落后。

The challenges facing automakers in the United States and Europe come after a tough year.

经历了去年一年的艰难后，美国和欧洲车企如今更是面临重重挑战。

Ford, General Motors and Stellantis, the European-American company that owns Chrysler, Fiat, Jeep and Peugeot, reported multibillion-dollar losses at the end of 2025 as they delayed and canceled electric vehicle investments.

福特、通用汽车，以及拥有克莱斯勒、菲亚特、Jeep和标致品牌的欧美合资公司Stellantis推迟并取消了电动汽车投资，在2025年底均报告数十亿美元亏损。

Even automakers that made money last year, like the German luxury brand Mercedes-Benz, made a lot less of it. Among major automakers, only Toyota of Japan managed a significant increase in sales during 2025. Analysts expect industrywide sales to be flat again in 2026. (Ford did report a 1 percent increase in sales for the year.)

即使是德国豪华品牌梅赛德斯-奔驰等去年实现盈利的车企，利润也大幅缩水。在主要车企中，只有日本丰田在2025年实现销量显著增长。分析师预计，2026年全行业销量将再次持平。（福特报告全年销量增长为1%。）

Automakers say things are not as bad as they look. Many have cash reserves they built up during the pandemic, when shortages allowed them to raise car prices.

车企表示，实际情况并没有看上去那么糟糕。许多企业仍持有新冠疫情期间积累的现金储备，当时供应短缺使它们得以抬高车价。

G.M. felt confident enough in its finances to spend $6 billion last year to buy back its own shares, a way of returning money to investors. The company has earmarked a similar amount for 2026.

通用汽车对自身财务状况充满信心，去年斥资60亿美元回购股票，以此向投资者返还资金。该公司还为2026年划拨了同等规模的资金。

“The balance sheet of G.M. has probably never been stronger,” Paul Jacobson, the company’s chief financial officer, said last month at a conference on the automobile industry organized by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.

“通用汽车的资产负债表可能从未如此强劲，”公司首席财务官保罗·雅各布森上月在芝加哥联邦储备银行举办的一场汽车行业会议上表示。

Ford also returned money to shareholders through dividends.

福特也通过分红向股东返还资金。

Such payouts generate good will on Wall Street and may help companies raise capital later, said John Paul MacDuffie, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School. But he noted that the money could be better spent on new products and technology.

宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院教授约翰·保罗·麦克达菲表示，此类回报能在华尔街赢得好感，或许有助于企业后续融资。但他指出，这些资金如果用于新产品和技术研发将更具价值。

“I don’t know if I fully understand the strategic logic behind the stock buybacks,” Mr. MacDuffie said. He added that U.S. carmakers had advantages, including the ability to exploit innovations from Silicon Valley in ways that Chinese carmakers cannot.

“我不太确定我完全理解股票回购背后的战略逻辑，”麦克达菲说。他还称，美国车企仍具备优势，包括能够利用硅谷的创新成果，这是中国车企难以做到的。

Carmakers say they continue to invest in electric vehicles, batteries and self-driving cars, even if the pace has slowed. G.M. has a dozen electric models, including battery-powered versions of the Chevrolet Equinox, the Chevrolet Blazer and the Cadillac Escalade IQ.

车企称，尽管步伐放缓，但它们仍在继续投资电动汽车、电池和自动驾驶技术。通用汽车已推出十余款电动车型，包括雪佛兰探界者、雪佛兰开拓者以及凯迪拉克凯雷德IQ的纯电版本。

“We continue to believe in E.V.s,” Mary T. Barra, G.M.’s chief executive, said during a conference call in January. The company is investing in battery technology and ways to manufacture electric vehicles profitably, executives say. Last year, Ford discontinued the electric F-150 Lightning pickup, but is planning to begin selling a midsize electric pickup next year for around $30,000. The truck will be able to travel 300 miles between charges. Ford sequestered the design and engineering team in California to insulate it from corporate meddling.

 “我们仍然看好电动车，”通用汽车首席执行官玛丽·博拉今年1月在一次电话会议上表示。公司高管称，通用汽车正在投资电池技术，并探索如何实现电动汽车的盈利。去年，福特停止生产电动皮卡F-150 Lightning，但计划明年开始推出一款中型电动皮卡，售价在3万美元左右。这款车充一次电可行驶近500公里。福特还将该车型的设计和工程团队集中在加州，与公司其他部门隔离，以避免受到公司内部的干扰。

The pickup will address “the core of the market in our home market where there’s not a lot of competition,” Jim Farley, Ford’s chief executive, told investors and analysts last month. He added, “The real question that I ask myself is how will the Chinese change the game.”

福特首席执行官吉姆·法利上个月对投资者和分析师表示，这款皮卡将瞄准“我们本土市场的核心需求，而这个领域目前竞争并不激烈”。他还补充说：“我真正思考的问题是，中国企业将如何改变游戏规则。”

Ford executives say they have not dialed back investment in electric vehicles, just redirected the money to products that are more likely to make a profit. In the future, the company plans to offer a new version of the Lightning that will run on battery power but also have a gasoline motor that can charge the battery when needed.

福特高管表示，公司并没有减少对电动车的投资，只是把资金转向更有可能实现盈利的产品。未来，福特计划推出一款新的Lightning版本，它仍将使用电池驱动，但会配备一台汽油发动机，在需要时为电池充电。

In Europe, Ford plans to cut costs by producing electric vehicles using technology developed by the French carmaker Renault.

在欧洲，福特计划通过采用法国汽车制造商雷诺开发的技术来生产电动车，以降低成本。

Chinese companies like BYD, Geely and SAIC are effectively banned from the United States by tariffs. But they are taking market share from Ford in places like Asia, Australia and Europe. The Chinese probably can’t be kept out of U.S. showrooms forever. Mr. Trump has mused about letting them build factories in the United States.

由于关税的原因，比亚迪、吉利、上汽等中国车企实际上被挡在了美国市场之外。但它们正在亚洲、澳大利亚和欧洲等地抢占福特的市场份额。中国汽车或许不能永远被挡在美国市场之外。特朗普已在考虑让它们在美国建厂。

Carmakers from China are often accused of unfair competition because they receive government subsidies. But there’s more to it than that, analysts say.

中国汽车制造商经常被指责进行不公平竞争，因为它们获得了政府补贴。但分析人士表示，问题不止于此。

BYD sells vehicles in China for a lot less than Tesla, which also makes cars in that country, largely by doing things like making its own batteries and other components rather than buying them, according to the Rhodium Group, a research firm. Subsidies account for only a small portion of the difference in prices of BYD and Tesla cars.

研究公司荣鼎集团表示，由于自己做电池和其他零部件而非向外采购，比亚迪在中国国内的售价比同样在中国生产的特斯拉低得多。补贴在比亚迪和特斯拉价格差异中只占很小一部分。

The Chinese also move at astonishing speed — some companies from that country can develop new models in as little as 14 months, said Mark Wakefield, a managing director at the consulting firm AlixPartners who specializes in the auto industry.

中国企业的行动速度也令人惊讶。咨询公司艾睿铂负责汽车行业的董事总经理马克·韦克菲尔德表示，一些中国公司开发一款新车型最短只需14个月。

The Chinese companies make decisions more quickly, use virtual simulations for testing and are willing to take risks that Western automakers might not, Mr. Wakefield said.

韦克菲尔德说，中国企业做决策更快，利用虚拟仿真进行测试，并且愿意承担一些西方汽车制造商可能不愿意承担的风险。

U.S. automakers realize that they need to become faster and more innovative, he said. But it’s not clear whether they can overhaul their organizations quickly enough.

他说，美国汽车制造商已经意识到自己需要变得更快、更具创新性。但目前还不清楚他们能否以足够快的速度对组织结构进行彻底改革。

“Some of the senior executives have a significant sense of urgency,” Mr. Wakefield said. “It’s just tough to translate that into revolutionary change.”

韦克菲尔德表示：“一些高管确实有很强的紧迫感，但要把这种紧迫感转化为革命性的改变，却非常困难。”

Since World War II, presidents of both parties have found ways to hollow out the Constitution’s constraints on their power to order military attacks. President Trump’s unilateral decision to launch a war against Iran threatens to gut nearly all of what little remains.

自第二次世界大战以来，两党的美国总统都各显神通，架空了宪法对其发动军事攻击的权力的约束。特朗普总统单方面决定对伊朗开战可能将抹去最后仅存的那一点约束。

It is supposed to be a foundational principle of American democracy that unless the United States is under attack, the power to declare war is vested in Congress. But especially since the start of the Cold War, presidents of both parties have chipped away at that by claiming a right to order the military into various limited hostile situations.

美国民主的一项基本原则是：除非美国遭受攻击，否则宣战权属于国会。但两党总统——尤其是自冷战开始以来——都通过宣称有权下令军队进入各种有限的敌对状态逐步削弱了这一原则。

Some lawmakers complained. But as an institution, Congress acquiesced. Consistently paralyzed by competing impulses — party loyalty, support for the policy goals of various deployments or fear of being accused of undercutting troops already in harm’s way — lawmakers let presidents get away with serial power grabs.

一些议员表达了不满。但作为一个整体机构，国会选择了默许。出于党派忠诚、支持各项军事部署的政策目标，或是害怕被指责损害本已身处险境的部队，议员们任由总统一次次攫取权力。

Successive administrations built on their predecessors’ innovations, a one-way ratchet expanding the circumstances in which presidents had claimed and demonstrated that they could by themselves deploy troops into combat. As precedents accumulated, the split between how the founders clearly intended decisions about initiating war to be made and how the country was governed in practice kept widening.

历届政府在前任的创新基础上继续推进，出现了一种单向棘轮的效应，总统们在越来越多的情形下声称并用实际行动证明，他们可以单方面决定动用军队投入战斗。随着先例不断累积，治国先贤们在发动战争方面做出的意图清晰的决定，与现实中国家治理方式的裂痕持续扩大。

Even so, the prospect of attacking Iran, absent a literally imminent threat of attack by the country, had stood apart as a textbook example of what would seemingly still require congressional authorization. The potential for rapid spiraling — of retaliatory strikes on U.S. citizens, troops and allies in neighboring countries, of escalation into a bloody regional conflagration with global economic consequences — seemed too extreme a risk for any one person to decide to take on.

即便如此，在没有直接、迫在眉睫的攻击威胁的情况下进攻伊朗一直被视为一个仍需国会授权的典型例子。局势迅速升级的可能性——对邻国美国公民、军队和盟友的报复性打击，升级为造成全球经济后果的血腥地区大战——对任何人来说都是过于极端的风险。

Asked to detail its legal analysis, the White House provided a brief statement that described decades of misdeeds by Iran, claiming that Mr. Trump “exercised his authority as commander in chief to defend U.S. personnel and bases in the region.”

在被要求详细说明法律分析时，白宫发表了一份简短声明，列举了伊朗数十年的不当行为，声称特朗普“为保护该地区美方人员及基地而行使了最高统帅权”。

Process is no guarantee. Some presidentially ordered operations have gone smoothly, while the congressionally authorized wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are widely considered fiascoes. But given such risks, the question is who the founders thought should decide, and whether that still means anything.

程序并不能保证结果。一些总统下令的军事行动进展顺利，而国会授权的阿富汗战争和伊拉克战争却被普遍认为是一场灾难。但考虑到此类风险，问题在于治国先贤们认为应当由谁来做决定，以及如今这样做是否仍有意义。

The House on Thursday rejected a resolution directing Mr. Trump to cease the war without congressional authorization, and the Senate defeated the same measure a day earlier in a nearly party-line vote. Even if it had passed both chambers, the president could have vetoed it.

众议院周四否决了一项要求特朗普在未经国会授权的情况下停止战争的决议；参议院在前一天以几乎完全符合党派分野的投票结果击败了同样的措施。即便该决议在两院获得通过，总统仍可将其否决。

Regardless, Mr. Trump has already established a new precedent. His Iran war expands the scope of the kinds of “major combat operations” that presidents in the modern era have demonstrated they can start on their own authority. Executive branch lawyers will be able to cite this moment as support for blessing future unilateral presidential war-making.

无论如何，特朗普已经确立了一个新的先例。他的伊朗战争扩大了现代总统已证明可自行授权开展的“重大作战行动”的范围。行政部门的律师将能够援引这一时刻为未来总统单方面发动战争的合法性背书。

A remnant of a line remains uncrossed for now: While Mr. Trump briefly sent ground forces into Venezuela in January, accepting the risk of U.S. casualties, he has yet to put boots on the ground in Iran. It appears his plan is to avoid doing so.

目前仍有一条底线尚未被跨越：尽管特朗普今年1月曾短暂派遣地面部队进入委内瑞拉，接受了美军出现伤亡的风险，但他尚未在伊朗投送地面部队。看起来他的计划是避免这样做。

Still, in a letter notifying lawmakers two days after he started the war, Mr. Trump warned that while he “desires a quick and enduring peace, it is not possible at this time to know the full scope and duration of military operations that may be necessary.”

尽管如此，在他发动战争两天后通知议员的信中，特朗普警告称，虽然他“渴望迅速而持久的和平，但目前尚无法预知可能需要的军事行动的范围和持续时间”。

Jack Goldsmith, a Harvard Law professor and former senior Justice Department official in the George W. Bush administration, said Mr. Trump’s unilateral launch of the Iran war may be remembered as the death of any pretense that law and executive branch lawyers can be counted on to meaningfully constrain a president who wants to use military force on his own.

哈佛大学法学教授、乔治·W·布什政府时期司法部高级官员杰克·戈德史密斯表示，后人可能会将特朗普单方面发动伊朗战争作为这样一种观念的终结：即可以倚仗法律和行政部门律师去对想要自行使用武力的总统施加有意义的约束。

“By using the military on such a large and dangerous scale with foreseeable U.S. casualties, this operation kills the idea of any effective legal constraint on the president’s use of force,” he said. “It’s been very close to dead for years, I think.”

“通过以如此庞大而危险的规模动用军队，并预见会造成美军伤亡，这次行动扼杀了总统在使用武力方面受到任何有效法律约束的观念，”他说。“而我认为，这种观念多年前就已经非常接近死亡。”

Iran and Escalation

伊朗与局势升级

Arash Khamooshi for The New York Times

In 2007, Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. argued in a presidential candidate survey that presidents have no legitimate power to bomb another country without congressional authorization, unless the United States is about to be attacked. Senator Barack Obama said the same thing. But executive power can look different from the vantage point of the Oval Office.

2007年，小约瑟夫·R·拜登参议员在一次总统候选人调查问答中表示，除非美国即将遭到攻击，否则总统无权在未经国会授权的情况下轰炸另一个国家。While Mr. Trump’s open indifference to law and norms of self-restraint has pushed presidential war-making powers to a new extreme, he is also extending a path that the country was already on. For generations, presidents in the modern era have steadily eroded constraints on their power to initiate military actions.

虽然特朗普对法律和自我约束规范的公开漠视将总统发动战争的权力推向了新的极端，但他也是在延长一条美国早已踏上的道路。几个世代的现代总统都在稳步削弱对发动军事行动权力的限制。

In 1950, President Harry S. Truman took the country into the Korean War without going to Congress. He pointed to authorization by the new United Nations Security Council, but that did not matter for the domestic law question of who had the rightful power to decide whether the United States would participate.

1950年，哈里·S·杜鲁门总统在未征求国会意见的情况下将国家拖入朝鲜战争。他援引了新成立的联合国安理会的授权，但这对于“谁拥有合法权力决定是否让美国参与”这一国内法问题并无影响。

No president had ever launched such a war effort without seeking congressional permission, but Congress did not impeach him.

此前从未有总统在不寻求国会许可的情况下发动过这样的战争，但国会并未弹劾他。

In 1973, after bipartisan recognition that the Vietnam War had been a disaster, lawmakers sought to regain their constitutional role in deciding whether to go to war. They enacted, over President Richard M. Nixon’s veto, the War Powers Resolution.

1973年，在两党一致认识到越南战争是一场灾难之后，议员们试图重新夺回他们在决定是否开战方面的宪法角色。他们不顾理查德·M·尼克松总统的否决，通过了《战争权力决议》。

The act established mechanisms by which Congress could, in theory, end unauthorized deployments. And it laid out a limited vision of when presidents could deploy troops into hostile situations on their own — essentially, only if the country was under attack.

该法案建立了一些机制，理论上可让国会结束未经授权的军事部署。它还规定了总统可自行将部队投入敌对局势的有限情形——基本上，仅限于在美国遭受攻击时。

For the three largest wars since then — the Persian Gulf War and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq — presidents went to Congress for authorization. They also serially stretched the Afghanistan war law, which targeted Al Qaeda, by interpreting it as approval to battle other militant groups with Qaeda links in countries like Syria and Somalia. Congress acquiesced.

自那以后，对于之后的三场最大规模的战争——海湾战争以及阿富汗和伊拉克战争——总统们都去国会寻求了授权。他们还相继将针对“基地”组织的阿富汗战争法进行延伸，称该法允许在叙利亚和索马里等国家与其他有“基地”组织联系的激进组织作战。国会默许了。

The new Iran war appears likely to be the most aggressive and significant military operation undertaken since 1973 without any claim of congressional approval.

新的伊朗战争可能是1973年以来在没有任何国会授权主张的情况下采取的最具侵略性和最重大的军事行动。

It is not clear whether the administration’s internal legal analysis relies on any claim that Iran posed an imminent threat of attack. Neither the White House statement nor a letter Mr. Trump sent to Congress said it did.

目前尚不清楚政府内部的法律分析是否依赖任何关于伊朗构成迫在眉睫的攻击威胁的说法。无论是白宫声明还是特朗普发给国会的信中，都没有这样说。

But in public statements, Mr. Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who also serves as the national security adviser, have invoked that phrase. Mr. Trump went on to say it would be intolerable to allow Iran time to develop a nuclear weapon and long-range missiles — apparently relying on a very elongated view of what counts as imminent.

但在公开声明中，特朗普和同时担任国家安全顾问的国务卿马可·鲁比奥都使用了这一表述。特朗普接着说，允许伊朗有时间发展核武器和远程导弹将是不可容忍的——这显然依赖于对“迫在眉睫”的含义进行大幅延伸。

Chipping Away

逐步蚕食

Republican and Democratic administrations have interpreted the War Powers Resolution narrowly. Since it was enacted, every president has deployed troops into limited hostile situations that went beyond the act’s narrow parameters, like trying to rescue Americans in places like Cambodia and Iran; peacekeeping missions in places like Lebanon, Somalia and Bosnia; and NATO air wars in Kosovo and Libya.

共和党和民主党政府都对《战争权力决议》作了狭义解释。自该法案颁布以来，每位总统都将部队部署到超出该法案狭窄界定的有限敌对局势中，例如在柬埔寨和伊朗等地试图营救美国人；在黎巴嫩、索马里和波斯尼亚等地的维和任务；以及在科索沃和利比亚的北约空袭。

Blessing such operations as lawful, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel has argued that the president has constitutional power to deploy troops into hostile situations in the national interest, so long as the anticipated intensity, scope and duration fall short of “war” in the constitutional sense.

司法部法律顾问办公室宣称这些行动合法，辩称总统拥有宪法赋予的权力，可将部队部署到符合美国国家利益的敌对局势中，只要预期的强度、范围和持续时间未达到宪法意义上的“战争”程度。

Executive branch lawyers have produced a series of memos blessing unilateral deployments by pointing to various factors that they said meant what the president wanted to do met that standard. But the pattern over time has been that when subsequent proposed deployments lack such factors, the Office of Legal Counsel has found ways to approve them, too.

行政部门律师搬出了一系列备忘录，通过指出他们认为总统意图采取的行动符合该标准的各种因素，来认可单方面的军事部署。但随着时间的推移，这种模式已演变为：当后续的拟议部署缺乏这些因素时，法律顾问办公室也会找到批准它们的方法。

Professor Goldsmith said that while law has been revealed as toothless as an internal executive branch check on unilateral presidential war-making, there was still politics.

戈德史密斯表示，虽然法律已被证明作为一种行政部门内部的制衡手段，对总统单方面发动战争毫无约束力，但还有政治这条路可走。

“Courts can’t do anything, there is clearly zero internal check and that literally means that all that is left is Congress and the people,” he said. “That might amount to nothing, but it’s literally all that is conceivably left.”

“法院无能为力，而内部制衡显然不存在，这实际上意味着剩下的只有国会和人民，”他说。“也许最终都是徒劳，但这确实是理论上仅存的东西了。”

Despite long being treated as a pariah by the West and isolated by U.S. sanctions, Iran’s revolutionary Islamic government maintained diplomatic, commercial and military ties with a range of countries.

尽管伊朗伊斯兰革命政府长期被西方视为弃儿，并在美国制裁下陷入孤立，它仍与多个国家保持着外交、经贸和军事联系。

Turkey and India engaged with it on trade and security. China looked to it for cheap oil. North Korea, Venezuela and Russia considered it an ally in their struggle against the West and conspired with it to develop military technology and subvert sanctions.

土耳其与印度在贸易和安全领域同伊朗往来；中国从伊朗获取廉价石油；朝鲜、委内瑞拉和俄罗斯将伊朗视为对抗西方的盟友，并与其合谋开发军事技术，规避制裁。

Now that Iran finds itself under attack by the United States and Israel, those friends, neighbors and partners have little more than words to offer the Islamic Republic. They, in turn, could become targets. Turkey on Wednesday said NATO shot down a ballistic missile fired from Iran that was headed for Turkish airspace. On Thursday, Iran denied it had targeted Turkey.

如今，伊朗遭到美国和以色列袭击，这些友邦、邻国与伙伴能带给伊朗伊斯兰共和国的，却只有口头上的支持。而它们自身反而可能成为袭击目标。土耳其周三称，北约击落了一枚从伊朗发射、飞向土耳其领空的弹道导弹。周四，伊朗否认曾以土耳其为目标。

Without true allies, it is a lonely war for Iran.

没有真正的盟友，伊朗正陷入孤军奋战。

That is a product, experts say, of Iran’s foreign policy, which has shied away from commitments to other countries while investing in militias that share its religiously-fueled hatred of the United States and Israel.

专家表示，这是伊朗外交政策的必然结果：它不愿向他国作出承诺，同时大力扶持那些出于宗教狂热仇视美国和以色列的民兵组织。

Those militias can’t help Iran now. The most formidable of them, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, have been ground down by wars with Israel. The Houthi militia in Yemen and Iraqi armed groups backed by Iran can target ships in the Red Sea or American forces in Iraq. But such attacks are unlikely to change the course of a war inside Iran.

这些民兵如今已无力帮助伊朗。其中实力最强的黎巴嫩真主党与加沙哈马斯已在与以色列的战争中元气大伤。也门胡塞武装与伊朗支持的伊拉克武装可以袭击红海船只或驻伊拉克美军，但此类行动难以改变伊朗本土战事的走向。

抗议者挥舞真主党与伊朗国旗，抗议美以部队刺杀伊朗最高领袖哈梅内伊。

Nor have Iran’s relationships with other states resulted in concrete support, even from those united by their animosity toward what they consider Western imperialism.

伊朗与其他国家的关系也没有转化为实质性支持，即便那些因共同敌视所谓西方帝国主义而团结的国家亦是如此。

“It is a rude wake-up call for those who believed that there was an emergent anti-West axis,” said Sinan Ulgen, a former Turkish diplomat and the director of Edam, an Istanbul-based think tank.

“对那些相信一个新兴反西方轴心正在形成的人来说，这是刺耳的警钟，”土耳其前外交官、伊斯坦布尔智库Edam主管锡南·乌尔根表示。

Referring to Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, he said, “Now you see that it means nothing for one of those four countries when they are under siege by the West.”

谈及俄罗斯、中国、伊朗和朝鲜，他说：“现在你会发现，当这四个国家中的一个遭到西方围攻时，这毫无意义。”

Most countries that maintain ties with Iran do so out of strategic, geographic or economic necessity, giving them little reason to sacrifice when Iran comes under fire, experts said.

专家称，大多数与伊朗保持关系的国家都是出于战略、地理或经济上的需要，几乎没有理由在伊朗遭受打击时为其牺牲。

Now, those relationships may not protect them.

而现在，这些关系甚至未必能保护它们自身。

Turkey’s defense ministry did not specify the target of the ballistic missile from Iran that NATO defenses shot down on Wednesday. But a senior U.S. military official and a Western official said it was aimed at Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey, which houses a U.S. Air Force contingent and other NATO forces. Debris from the munitions that brought the missile down fell about 30 miles from the base. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak to journalists.

土耳其国防部并未说明周三被北约防空系统击落的伊朗弹道导弹的攻击目标。但一名美军高级官员和一名西方官员表示，导弹瞄准的是土耳其南部的因吉尔利克空军基地，这里驻扎着美国空军分遣队及其他北约部队。拦截导弹产生的残骸落在距基地约48公里处。这些官员因未获授权向媒体发言而要求匿名。

The Iranian military denied in a statement on Thursday that it had fired a missile at Turkey, saying it respected Turkey’s sovereignty.

伊朗军方周四发表声明否认向土耳其发射导弹，称尊重土耳其主权。

Turkey shares a 300-mile border with Iran, has longstanding standing diplomatic and trade ties and also tried to fend off the war.

土耳其与伊朗拥有约480公里的共同边境，两国有着长期的外交与贸易联系，土耳其也曾努力避免卷入战争。

Mr. Ulgen, the former diplomat, characterized Turkey’s approach to Iran as rooted in history and driven by proximity and “grudging respect.”

前外交官乌尔根称，土耳其对伊朗的态度植根于历史，由地缘邻近性驱动，并带着“勉强的尊重”。

“We are not friends with Iran, we don’t agree on much, but we have to coexist in this geographical space,” he said.

“我们和伊朗不是朋友，在很多问题上立场不一，但我们必须在这片地理空间中共存，”他说。

Despite his warm ties with President Trump, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey called the U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran a “clear violation of international law.” On Monday, he said on social media that he was “saddened” by the killing of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

尽管土耳其总统埃尔多安与特朗普总统关系融洽，他仍称美以对伊朗的袭击“明显违反国际法”。周一，他在社交媒体上表示，对伊朗最高领袖哈梅内伊身亡“深感悲痛”。

2024年，土耳其东部凡省，土耳其士兵沿着土耳其与伊朗边境墙巡逻。

Turkish officials are working to stop the war, not because they love Iran’s leaders but because they fear that instability in Iran could spill into Turkey, as happened during past conflicts in Iraq and Syria, which also border Turkey.

土耳其官员正努力阻止战争，并非因为他们喜爱伊朗领导层，而是担心伊朗的不稳定会外溢至土耳其——就像与土耳其接壤的伊拉克和叙利亚发生冲突时那样。

The fall of the government in Tehran could be even worse, Mr. Ulgen said.

乌尔根说，德黑兰政权倒台的后果可能更糟。

“The type of instability that regime change could create could be an order of magnitude bigger than what we saw in Syria and Iraq,” he said.

“政权更迭可能引发的动荡规模可能比我们在叙利亚和伊拉克看到的还要高出一个量级，”他说。

India, too, engaged with Iran as an important player in its region and to seek economic advantages, according to Kabir Taneja, the executive director of the Dubai-based Observer Research Foundation Middle East.

总部位于迪拜的中东观察者研究基金会执行主管卡比尔·塔内贾表示，印度同样将伊朗视为地区重要力量，并谋求经济利益。

“There was definitely no overlap as far as worldview is concerned,” he said. “It was always a very transactional relationship, but a functional and a useful one as far as New Delhi was concerned.”

“两国在世界观上绝对没有共同点，”他说。“这始终是一种非常功利的关系，但在新德里看来，它实用且有利。”

India exports rice, produce and pharmaceuticals to Iran and invested heavily in the Chabahar Port on Iran’s southern coast to give itself an export pathway to Central Asia that circumvented Pakistan, its top rival.

印度向伊朗出口大米、农产品和药品，并在伊朗南部海岸的恰巴哈尔港投入巨资，为自己开辟一条绕过主要对手巴基斯坦的中亚出口通道。

特朗普于2025年在白宫会见土耳其总统埃尔多安。

Ties with Iran did not stop India from becoming Israel’s largest arms customer, with Indian purchases making up 34 percent of Israel’s total sales between 2020 and 2024, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

与伊朗的关系并未阻止印度成为以色列最大的军火买家。斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所的数据显示，2020至2024年，印度采购量占以色列军火总出口的34%。

Visiting Israel just days before the war, Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India addressed the Israeli Knesset, received a parliamentary honor and signed trade deals with his Israeli counterpart, Benjamin Netanyahu.

战争爆发前几天，印度总理莫迪还在访问以色列，在以色列议会发表演讲、接受议会荣誉，并与以色列总理内塔尼亚胡签署贸易协议。

India’s balancing act between Israel, Iran and other countries meant it would steer clear of the war in Iran, Mr. Taneja said.

塔内贾表示，印度在以色列、伊朗及其他国家间的平衡策略意味着它会置身于伊朗战争之外。

“Indian foreign policy is clear in that matter, that it does not enter into other people’s business,” he said.

“印度在这一问题上的外交政策很明确：不干涉他国内政，”他说。

Other countries that have relationships with Iran and also host the U.S. military have found themselves targets as Iran strikes back.

其他与伊朗保持关系、同时又驻扎美军的国家也因伊朗的报复而成为目标。

Iran has fired drones and missiles at Qatar, with which it shares an offshore gas field; the United Arab Emirates, a major trade partner; and Oman, a key mediator in talks with the United States that sought to prevent the war.

伊朗已向卡塔尔、阿联酋和阿曼发射无人机和导弹。卡塔尔与伊朗共享海上天然气田，阿联酋是伊朗的主要贸易伙伴，阿曼则是在防止战争的美伊谈判中担任关键调解人的国家。

Iran has received little support from partner countries that share its hostility to the West.

伊朗几乎没有从那些同样敌视西方的伙伴国家获得实质支持。

North Korea condemned the war but has done little else, and Venezuela’s posture has changed since the United States ousted President Nicolás Maduro in January.

朝鲜谴责了战争，但未采取其他行动；而委内瑞拉自今年1月美国推翻该国总统马杜罗后，立场已发生转变。

以色列总理内塔尼亚胡与印度总理莫迪在耶路撒冷会晤，此时距离伊朗战争爆发仅有数日。

China remains Iran’s largest trading partner, mostly because it buys more than three-quarters of Iran’s oil, which it gets at a significant discount because of U.S. sanctions.

中国仍是伊朗最大的贸易伙伴，主要原因是中国购买了伊朗逾四分之三的石油——由于美国制裁影响，中国能以大幅折扣获得这些石油。

China has called for restraint, criticized the killing of Ayatollah Khamenei as “unacceptable” and appointed an envoy to mediate. It is unlikely to directly challenge the United States, analysts said, so as not to upset a fragile détente before Mr. Trump’s expected visit to China in April.

中方呼吁保持克制，批评哈梅内伊遇袭身亡“不可接受”，并任命特使斡旋。分析人士称，中国不太可能直接挑战美国，以免破坏4月特朗普访华前本就脆弱的缓和局面。

Russia has been Iran’s closest state ally in pushing back against the West for more than a decade.

十多年来，俄罗斯一直是伊朗对抗西方最亲密的国家盟友。

“You have this growing alignment and grievance over the global order and the U.S. alliance system,” said Hanna Notte, the Eurasia program director at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

“在全球秩序和美国同盟体系问题上，它们的立场日益趋同，不满情绪也日益一致，”詹姆斯·马丁不扩散研究中心欧亚项目主任汉娜·诺特表示。

Military cooperation between Russia and Iran grew during the conflict in Syria, where both countries propped up President Bashar al-Assad before he was ousted in December 2024.

俄伊军事合作在叙利亚冲突期间不断加深，两国曾共同扶持阿萨德总统，直至他在2024年12月被推翻。

美国和以色列空袭后，烟雾升腾于德黑兰上空。

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine further solidified the relationship because Russia needed Iranian drone technology, which it deployed against Ukraine.

俄罗斯全面入侵乌克兰进一步巩固了两国关系，因为俄方需要伊朗的无人机技术，并将其用于对乌作战。

In January 2025, Russia and Iran signed a major cooperation treaty that deepened their defense ties but did not include a requirement to come to each other’s defense in case of a military attack.

2025年1月，俄伊签署重大合作条约，深化防务关系，但并未约定在遭受军事攻击时必须相互保卫。

Russia has given Iran some military equipment but its support has been limited, Ms. Notte said, in part because Russia did not want to complicate its relationship with Israel.

诺特表示，俄罗斯向伊朗提供了部分军事装备，但支持力度有限，部分原因是俄罗斯不想令本国同以色列的关系复杂化。

Now that Iran is at war, Russia will likely stick to its policy of avoiding direct military conflict with Israel and the United States in the Middle East, Ms. Notte said.

诺特称，如今伊朗陷入战争，俄罗斯很可能继续奉行避免在中东与以色列和美国发生直接军事冲突的政策。

That will likely confine Russia’s contribution to standing up for Iran at the United Nations and in other international forums.

这意味着俄罗斯的贡献很可能仅限于在联合国及其他国际论坛上为伊朗发声。

“The Russians have defended the Iranians quite aggressively,” Ms. Notte said of Russia’s diplomacy. “But that does not do much for Iran in this situation.”

“俄罗斯人在外交上相当积极地为伊朗辩护，”诺特在谈及俄外交时说。“但在当前局势下，这对伊朗帮助不大。”

Stocks across most of Asia rallied on Thursday, a day after tumbling over fears around the region’s heavy reliance on imported oil and gas.

亚洲大多数地区的股市周四出现反弹。此前一天，由于投资者担心该地区对进口石油和天然气的高度依赖，市场曾大幅下跌。

The turnaround illustrates the hair-trigger reactions of investors around the world who are trying to assess the immediate and possible long-term effects of the strikes on Iran by the United States and Israel and the repercussions around the Persian Gulf, where much of the world’s oil and gas is produced.

这种反转凸显了全球投资者的高度敏感反应，他们正试图评估美国和以色列对伊朗发动打击所带来的即时影响以及可能产生的长期后果，以及这些行动在波斯湾地区引发的连锁反应——该地区是全球主要的石油和天然气产地。

The swing was particularly stark for South Korea’s Kospi index, which had dropped 12 percent in its worst single-day crash, then turned around to close nearly 10 percent higher on Thursday. At one point on Wednesday the plunge was so rapid that trading was temporarily halted to stem the losses.

韩国综合股价指数的波动尤其明显，该指数曾暴跌12%，创下最大单日跌幅，随后在周四反弹，收盘时上涨近10%。周三盘中，该指数一度下跌过快触发临时停牌，以阻止继续下跌。

Stocks in Taiwan also swung, falling more than 4 percent on Wednesday before jumping nearly 3 percent 24 hours later.

台湾股市也出现波动，周三下跌逾4%，24小时后又反弹了近3%。

The recovery in Asia took the lead from trading on Wednesday in the United States, where stocks opened higher for the first time all week after President Trump suggested that the U.S. Navy may escort ships through the Strait of Hormuz, and President Emmanuel Macron of France called for an international coalition to help secure commercial shipping routes.

亚洲市场的回升受到周三美国股市交易走势的带动。在特朗普总统建议美国海军可能在霍尔木兹海峡为船只护航，以及法国总统马克龙呼吁建立一个国际联盟来帮助确保商业航道安全后，美国股市本周首次开盘走高。

Over the past year, intense optimism about artificial intelligence has led investors to pour money into tech stocks in Taiwan and South Korea. The two places make most of the equipment like computer chips and servers that power the world’s A.I. systems. They also depend on imports for virtually all of their energy.

过去一年里，由于对人工智能的极度乐观情绪，投资者大举投资台湾和韩国的科技股。这两个地区生产着全球人工智能系统所需的大部分设备，例如计算机芯片和服务器。但与此同时，它们几乎所有能源都依赖进口。

The stock market seesaw served as a reminder not only of the central role that these two East Asian democracies play in the global economy, but how bullish investors remain about A.I.

股市的起伏不仅让人看到这两个东亚民主政体在全球经济中扮演的核心角色，也让人看到投资者对人工智能依然保持着强烈的看涨情绪。

Jim Fontanelli, a senior analyst at Arete Research, an equity research firm, said the movement in the stocks was “not a reflection of a change in the fundamentals of A.I.”

股票研究公司Arete Research的高级分析师吉姆·丰塔内利表示，股价的波动“并不反映人工智能基本面发生了变化”。

“Questions around A.I. optimism have been a consistent theme for all these stocks over the past few years,” he said. “The conflict has little direct impact on that question.”

“对人工智能乐观情绪的质疑过去几年一直是所有这些股票的一个不变主题，”他说。“这场冲突对这个问题没什么直接影响。”

In February, the share prices of many of East Asia’s biggest companies climbed to record highs, including Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, which makes chips for Apple and Nvidia, as well as Samsung and SK Hynix, which manufacture memory chips for Nvidia’s sought-after A.I. servers. All three closed lower on Wednesday and then recovered.

今年2月，东亚许多大型公司的股价曾创下历史新高，包括为苹果和英伟达生产芯片的台积电，以及为英伟达热门人工智能服务器生产存储芯片的三星电子和SK海力士。周三，这三家公司股价都收跌，之后又出现反弹。

“The conflict in the Middle East probably does not directly impact the fundamental demand for companies like TSMC and Samsung,” said Vey-Sern Ling, an equities adviser based in Singapore at the bank Union Bancaire Privé. “Heavy investment in A.I. infrastructure could continue for years even with the war.”

“中东冲突可能不会直接影响台积电和三星等公司的基本面需求，”瑞士瑞联银行驻新加坡的股票顾问凌炜森表示。“即便战争爆发，对人工智能基础设施的大规模投资仍可能持续多年。”

Yet, a prolonged and ever-wider conflict in the Middle East that interrupts the supply of energy to Asia could damage the electricity-intensive production of chips.

但如果中东冲突旷日持久，不断扩大，亚洲能源供应受阻，就可能损害芯片生产这种高度依赖电力的产业。

Since they are so dependent on imported oil and gas, Asia’s semiconductor manufacturing hubs would bear the brunt of the shock from any energy disruptions, said Randy Yang, an analyst at TrendForce, a market research firm in Taipei. The build-out of A.I. infrastructure in the United States faces a lower risk from the Persian Gulf conflict, since America can rely on its own sources of energy, Mr. Yang said.

台北市场研究公司集邦科技分析师兰迪·杨（音）表示，由于严重依赖进口石油和天然气，一旦能源供应出现中断，亚洲的半导体制造中心将首当其冲受到冲击。兰迪·杨表示，美国的人工智能基础设施建设面临的波斯湾冲突风险较低，因为美国可以依赖自己的能源。

Every day, around 80 oil and gas tankers typically pass through the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway off Iran’s southern coast that carries a fifth of the world’s oil and a significant amount of natural gas.

通常，每天有约80艘油气运输船只通过霍尔木兹海峡。这条位于伊朗南海岸的狭窄水道承载了全球五分之一的石油和相当一部分天然气的运输。

On Monday, just two oil and gas tankers appear to have crossed the strait, according to a New York Times analysis of shipping activity from Kpler, an industry data firm. On Tuesday, one tanker passed through.

通过分析行业数据公司Kpler的航运活动数据，《纽约时报》发现，周一似乎仅有两艘油气运输船只穿过该海峡，周二仅有一艘油轮通过。

“It’s a de facto closure,” said Dan Pickering, chief investment officer of Pickering Energy Partners, a Houston financial services firm. “You’ve got a significant number of vessels on either side of the strait but no one is willing to go through.”

休斯顿金融服务公司Pickering Energy Partners的首席投资官丹·皮克林表示：“这实际上等同于封锁。海峡两侧都有大量船只滞留，但没人愿意冒险通过。”

Tankers have been staying away from Hormuz since the U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran that began on Saturday. A prolonged conflict could ripple broadly across the global economy, threatening the energy supplies of countries halfway around the world and stoking inflation.

自上周六美以对伊朗发动袭击以来，油轮一直远离霍尔木兹海峡。长期冲突可能引发全球经济广泛的连锁反应，威胁到半个地球之外国家的能源供应，并推高通胀。

International oil prices have climbed 12 percent since the fighting began, trading Tuesday around $81 a barrel, and natural gas prices have surged in Europe and in Asia.

自战斗开始以来，国际油价已上涨12%，周二交易价格在每桶81美元左右；同时，欧洲和亚洲的天然气价格也大幅飙升。

A senior Iranian military official threatened this week to “set on fire” any ships traveling through the Strait of Hormuz. Vessels in the region have already come under attack. Several oil and gas facilities have also been struck or affected by nearby shelling, though the damage did not initially appear to be catastrophic.

一名伊朗将领本周威胁要将所有经过霍尔木兹海峡的船只“付之一炬”。该地区已经有船只遭到袭击。数个石油和天然气设施也遭到炮击或受到影响，尽管损失初步看来不算太严重。

受损船只和能源设施所在位置。注：截至北京时间周三凌晨3点的损失情况。来源：Kpler、科威特国家石油公司、沙特能源部、Planet Labs、卡塔尔能源公司、英国海上贸易行动办公室及Vanguard Tech。

A fire broke out Tuesday at a major energy hub in Fujairah, United Arab Emirates, from the falling debris of a downed drone, the authorities said. On Monday, Qatar halted production of liquefied natural gas, or fuel that has been cooled so that it can be transported on ships, after attacks on its facilities.

阿联酋当局表示，由于一架被击落无人机的碎片坠落，阿联酋富查伊拉的一个主要能源枢纽周二发生火灾。周一，卡塔尔在设施遭到袭击后停止了液化天然气的生产。液化天然气是一种经过冷却处理、便于船舶运输的燃料。

据沙特能源部称，周一两架伊朗无人机被拦截后碎片坠落，导致沙特拉斯坦努拉炼油厂的设施起火。

The sharp reduction in tanker traffic is reducing the supply of oil and gas to world markets, pushing up prices for both commodities. And the longer that ships stay away from the Strait of Hormuz, the less oil and gas get out to the world, which could raise prices even more.

运输流量锐减正在减少世界市场的油气供应，推高了这两种大宗商品的价格。船只远离霍尔木兹海峡的时间越长，运往全球的油气就越少，这可能会进一步推高价格。

Shipping companies have paused their tankers to protect their crew and cargo, and because insurance companies are charging significantly more to cover vessels in the conflict area.

航运公司已暂停运输船只的航行，以保护船员和货物，部分原因也是保险公司对冲突地区的船舶承保费用显著增加。

On Tuesday, President Trump said that “if necessary,” the U.S. Navy would begin escorting tankers through the strait. He also said a U.S. government agency would begin offering “political risk insurance” to shipping lines in the area.

周二，特朗普总统表示，“如果有必要，”美国海军将开始为通过海峡的运输船只护航。他还表示，一家美国政府机构将开始向该地区的航运公司提供“政治风险保险”。

In addition to tankers, other large vessels regularly go through the strait, including car carriers and container ships. In normal conditions, nearly 160 make the trip each day.

除油气外，汽车运输船和集装箱船等其他大型船只也会频繁通过该海峡。在正常情况下，每天约有160艘此类船只往返。

Some ships in the region turn off the devices that broadcast their positions, while others transmit false locations — making it hard to give a full picture of the traffic in the strait.

该地区的一些船只会关闭广播其位置的设备，有一些会发送虚假位置，这使得人们很难全面掌握海峡内的交通状况。

The Shiva is a small oil tanker that has repeatedly faked its location, according to TankerTrackers.com, which tracks global oil shipments. It is suspected of carrying sanctioned Iranian oil, according to Kpler. The Shiva was one of the two tankers that crossed the strait on Monday.

根据追踪全球石油运输的TankerTrackers.com，湿婆号是一艘反复伪造位置的小型油轮。Kpler公司怀疑该船运载的是受制裁的伊朗石油。它是周一穿过海峡的两艘油轮之一。

The oil and gas that typically move through the strait come from big producing countries like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran and United Arab Emirates, and are exported around the world.

通常流经该海峡的石油和天然气来自沙特阿拉伯、伊拉克、伊朗和阿联酋等主要产油国，并出口到世界各地。

穿越海峡的油气运输船只的航线。注：包括自1月1日起所有油轮和天然气运输船。来源：Kpler。

In 2024, more than 80 percent of the oil and gas transported through the Strait of Hormuz went to Asia. China, India, Japan and South Korea were the top importers, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

根据美国能源信息署的数据，2024年通过霍尔木兹海峡运输的石油和天然气中，有80%以上运往了亚洲，其中中国、印度、日本和韩国是最大的进口国。

Countries have energy stockpiles that could last them into the coming months, but a continued shutdown of the strait could damage their economies.

各国虽拥有可维持数月的能源储备，但海峡持续关闭可能会损害其经济。

Several big disruptions have roiled supply chains in recent years, but the tanker standstill in the Strait of Hormuz could have an outsize impact.

近年来，数次重大动荡扰乱了供应链，但霍尔木兹海峡的油气运输停摆可能会产生格外巨大的影响。

From its strikes on Iran to its global tariffs, the United States has wielded military force and economic threats to impose its will. China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, is preparing for this era of perilous rivalry by pouring resources into artificial intelligence, quantum computing and other strategic technologies, while also expanding the country’s armed forces.

从对伊朗的袭击到全球关税政策，美国正动用军事力量和经济威胁来强加其意志。中国最高领导人习近平正通过向人工智能、量子计算及其他战略技术领域倾注资源，同时扩张武装力量，为这个充满险恶竞争的时代做准备。

Mr. Xi’s ambitious goals for the next five years of China’s technological ascent were expected to be endorsed at a weeklong meeting of the national legislature in Beijing that started on Thursday. The approach reflects Mr. Xi’s view that competition with the United States will ultimately be decided by technological innovation that drives economic, military and cultural strength.

周四在北京开幕的为期一周的全国立法会议预计将批准习近平关于未来五年中国技术崛起的宏大目标。这一方略反映了习近平的观点：推动经济、军事和文化实力的技术创新将决定与美国的这场竞争的胜负。

The plan, according to an outline of it announced in October, will call for fostering new engines of economic growth in emerging industries like quantum computing, bio-manufacturing, hydrogen and fusion energy, brain-computer interfaces, embodied intelligence and 6G.

根据去年10月公布的计划大纲，该计划将要求在量子计算、生物制造、氢能与核聚变能源、脑机接口、具身智能以及6G等新兴产业中培育新的经济增长引擎。

As China’s relationship with the United States has deteriorated, threatening Beijing’s access to U.S. technology, leaders in Beijing see this race as ever more urgent. In a speech in October about the outlines of the five-year plan, Mr. Xi called on the country to “seize this window of opportunity to consolidate and expand our advantages, break through bottlenecks and constraints, and address weaknesses and shortcomings.”

随着中美关系恶化并威胁到北京获取美国技术的渠道，北京高层认为这场竞赛愈发紧迫。在10月关于五年规划大纲的讲话中，习近平号召全国“抓住这个时间窗口，巩固拓展优势、破除瓶颈制约、补强短板弱项”。

华盛顿的出口管制促使北京愈发积极推动半导体完全国产化。

Even as Mr. Xi is preparing to host President Trump in early April to try to extend a trade truce, he is doubling down on a strategy of ensuring that China’s economy and military are not vulnerable to being cut off by the West from advanced semiconductors and other critical technologies.

尽管准备在4月初接待特朗普总统来访，试图延长贸易休战协议，习近平同时也在加倍强化其战略，以确保在面临西方切断先进半导体和其他关键技术供应时中国经济和军事不会陷入不利。

“Chinese leaders have a view that Washington will continue trying to constrain China’s technological development,” said Gerard DiPippo, an associate director of the China Research Center at RAND, a research organization. “That belief underpins the urgency behind self-reliance efforts. Even if there is temporary stabilization, the underlying dynamic remains structurally competitive.”

“中国领导人认为华盛顿将继续试图遏制中国的技术发展，”研究机构兰德公司中国研究中心副主任杰拉德·迪皮波表示。“这一判断支撑着自力更生努力背后的紧迫感。即使出现了暂时的稳定，也仍然保持着结构性的竞争态势。”

The ongoing U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran and America’s attack on Venezuela in January — which led to the capture of President Nicolás Maduro and takeover of that country’s oil industry — may have deepened Chinese leaders’ wariness of Mr. Trump, said Daniel R. Russel, a former assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs.

曾任东亚和太平洋事务助理国务卿的丹尼尔·拉塞尔指出，美以目前对伊朗的持续袭击以及1月美国对委内瑞拉的攻击可能加深了中国领导人对特朗普的警惕。对委内瑞拉的攻击导致该国总统尼古拉斯·马杜罗被捕，其石油工业被接管。

“Donald Trump may think he is demonstrating military strength that will intimidate Beijing,” said Mr. Russel, a distinguished fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute. “But his actions in Venezuela and Iran are more likely to drive Beijing’s determination to harden its capacity to resist the U.S. and to tighten its alignment with Russia.”

“唐纳德·特朗普可能认为他正在展示能威慑北京的军事实力，”现为亚洲协会政策研究所卓越研究员的拉塞尔表示。“但他对委内瑞拉和伊朗的行动更可能促使北京下定决心，强化其抵抗美国的能力，并加强与俄罗斯的协作。”

To fortify China against perceived threats, Mr. Xi is also committed to a continued buildup of the People’s Liberation Army forces, even after eviscerating its high command with purges that have removed his top generals and left key leadership posts vacant.

为了强化中国防御潜在威胁的能力，习近平还致力于持续建设中国人民解放军，尽管他刚刚对军队高层进行了大清洗，撤换多名高级将领，导致关键领导职位出现空缺。

周四参加开幕会的军队代表。

At the legislative meeting, the government said it would increase its military spending by 7 percent this year relative to last year. That rise would bring China’s annual spending on its armed forces to about $277 billion, which is about one third of the Trump administration’s proposed military spending for the 2026 fiscal year.

在立法会议上，政府表示今年的军费开支将比去年增长7%。这一增长将使中国每年的军费开支达到约1.91万亿元，约为特朗普政府提议的2026财年军事预算的三分之一。

But Mr. Xi has indicated that long-term victory depends less on raw spending and more on the country’s ability to dominate industries of the future.

但习近平已表明，长期的胜利更多要取决于国家主导未来产业的能力，而不是单纯的资金投入量。

In areas like A.I., robotics, quantum computing and 6G, “I think there’s a strong sense among China’s policymakers that they can take the lead over the U.S.,” said Kyle Chan, a fellow at the Brookings Institution focusing on China’s industrial policies.

布鲁金斯学会专注于中国产业政策的研究员陈凯欣(Kyle Chan)表示，在人工智能、机器人、量子计算和6G等领域，“我认为中国决策者深信他们可以领先于美国。”

Although China’s economy, and especially its tech sector, is now heavily commercial, the goals laid down in the plan are like “huge flashing lights that orient central bureaucrats, local officials, domestic companies, and multinationals on the country’s priorities for the next five years,” said Scott Kennedy, a researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington and the author of a new study of China’s drive for technological breakthroughs.

华盛顿战略与国际研究中心研究员、一份关于中国技术突破的新研究报告的作者甘思德(Scott Kennedy)表示，尽管中国经济（尤其是科技部门）目前高度商业化，但计划中设定的目标就像“巨大的闪光信号灯，为中央官僚、地方官员、国内公司和跨国公司指明了未来五年的国家优先事项”。

“Policymakers will need to develop more specific policies to achieve these goals, and businesses will need to align their strategies, at least in name, toward these aims,” Mr. Kennedy wrote in emailed comments.

甘思德在电子邮件评论中写道：“决策者将需要制定更具体的政策来实现这些目标，企业则需要调整其战略，至少在名义上要向这些目标靠拢。”

The plan calls for investment to also flow into enhancing China’s advanced industries, such as industrial robots and pharmaceuticals. And while Mr. Xi sets the national vision, the execution often falls to local officials across the country, creating a surge in production that is likely to spill over China’s borders, further straining relations with trading partners.

该计划还要求资金流向提升中国的先进工业，如工业机器人和制药业。虽然习近平设定了国家愿景，但执行往往由全国各地的官员落实，由此引发的生产激增，极有可能溢出中国边境，进一步加剧与贸易伙伴的关系紧张。

“To the extent that industrial policies are implemented with little coordination across local levels, overcapacity will continue to be a feature,” said Zongyuan Zoe Liu, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who studies Chinese economic strategy. “This means Chinese producers will continue to find buyers around the world. The tactics are a combination of export and shifting production capacity overseas.”

“由于产业政策在实施过程中缺乏跨区域的协调，产能过剩将继续作为一种有意而为的特性存在，”外交关系协会研究中国经济战略的高级研究员刘宗媛(Zongyuan Zoe Liu)表示。“这意味着中国生产商将继续在世界范围内寻找买家。其策略是出口与向海外转移产能相结合。”

There is chaos in the Middle East and global markets have been oscillating wildly. But rather than panic about what the Iran war may be doing to your investments, try to forget about all of it.

中东局势陷入混乱，全球市场也在剧烈波动。但是，与其因伊朗战争可能对你的投资产生的影响而惶惶不安，不如试着把这一切抛诸脑后。

That, in a nutshell, is the standard long-term investing playbook for times of crisis.

简而言之，这正是危机时期长期投资的标准策略。

It’s not the most exciting approach. You may be able to profit if you behave opportunistically. Buy and sell energy and military stocks — or gold, or U.S. Treasuries, or anything else that may be the flavor of the moment — and do so at just the right time. But speculating in the markets and consistently coming out ahead is hard to do.

这并不是最刺激的做法。如果你采取机会主义的操作，也许能够获利。低买高卖能源股、军工股，或者黄金、美国国债，以及任何当下炙手可热的资产，时机要拿捏得恰到好处。但在市场上投机并且始终保持盈利是一件很难做到的事情。

Academic wisdom suggests simply aiming for an average market return over the long haul is a sensible approach — and, probably, the best strategy for most people. So if you already have set up your portfolio appropriately, using cheap, diversified index funds to hold the entire stock and bond markets in a reasonable proportion, there is no reason to make abrupt changes — and plenty of reasons to avoid acting hastily.

学术界的普遍观点认为，做长线投资、追求市场平均回报率是一种明智的做法——而且对多数人来说，这可能也是最好的策略。因此，如果你已经对自己的投资进行了合理配置，通过费用低廉、多样化的指数基金，以合理的比例持有了整个股票和债券市场，那么就没有理由做出突然的调整——反而有很多理由避免仓促行动。

History shows that doing nothing has generally been a fine strategy when the markets act up, whether the immediate cause of the trouble has been military conflicts, natural disasters, nuclear power plant accidents, political shocks, or nearly any other abrupt, unexpected event.

历史表明，当市场出现动荡时，什么都不做往往是一种不错的策略，无论眼前的动荡是由军事冲突、自然灾害、核电站事故、政治冲击，还是几乎任何其他突发事件所引发。

Long-term stock market returns have been fabulous, and high-quality bonds have usually — but not always — buffered portfolios in times of trouble. Avoiding adjustments in midcourse is frequently the best policy.

股市的长期回报一直非常可观，高质量的债券在市场困难时期也经常（尽管并不总是）起到缓冲作用。避免中途调整往往是最佳策略。

And Yet

然而

The logic here is sound, but I readily admit that it’s not foolproof. Economic recessions are bad for nearly everyone, and certainly for the markets, and if the crisis in the Persian Gulf sets off a recession, it could conceivably take a long time for a full recovery.

上述逻辑是合理的，但我也得承认，它并非万无一失。经济衰退对几乎所有人都不是好事，对市场更是如此，如果波斯湾的危机引发衰退，可以想见，经济要完全复苏可能需要很长时间。

Even more potentially troubling, the buy-and-hold, do-nothing approach is based on the assumption that the future will resemble the past, and that what is happening in the gulf will not result in an irrecoverable disaster for the entire region and the world.

更深的隐患在于，“买入并持有、以不变应万变”的策略，是基于这样一种假设：未来将与过去相似，海湾正在发生的事情不会给整个地区和世界带来不可挽回的灾难。

As I’ve pointed out repeatedly, the Trump administration is ignoring previous norms and is trying to change the world. In this case, the bombing of Iran and the killing of many of its top leaders have been followed by declarations from U.S. and Israeli leaders that they will continue the assault until they demolish the country’s capacity to fight back. Iranian reprisals in the gulf have already begun. They may not end there. President Trump’s decisions could have unintended consequences for the United States.

正如我反复指出的，特朗普政府正在无视以往的规范，并且正试图改变世界。此番，对伊朗的轰炸及其多名最高层领导人身亡后，美国和以色列领导人相继宣称，他们将持续发动攻击，直到彻底摧毁伊朗的还击能力为止。伊朗在海湾地区的报复行动已经开始，而且未必会止步于此。特朗普的决策可能给美国带来意想不到的后果。

At the same time, the U.S. stock market may be particularly vulnerable to setbacks because it has become highly concentrated and highly priced, largely because of investor enthusiasm about artificial intelligence.

与此同时，由于在相当程度上源于投资者对人工智能的热情，美国股市变得高度集中，价位也很高，因此可能特别容易受到回调冲击。

It’s possible that some prior assumptions about investing may not necessarily hold in this case. While I think it makes sense to follow the same basic playbook, the risks we are facing may be greater than many people understand or that market prices reflect. Try to make sure that you have put aside enough safe money to take account of these potential dangers.

在这种情况下，以往关于投资的一些假设未必还能完全成立。尽管我认为遵循同一套基本的应对策略仍然有其道理，但我们所面对的风险可能比很多人理解的或市场价格所反映出来的要更大。尽量确保你已经预留了足够的安全资金，以应对这些潜在的危险。

The Case for Doing Nothing

以不变应万变

If you have been following markets and world politics for a while, you will know that the U.S. stock market has trended upward, despite periodic setbacks, for the last century. That trend has sometimes been interrupted by military conflicts, but it has never been entirely broken. Riding the stock market upward — and diversifying in other markets, as well — has proved to be successful. Running scared has been a mistake.

如果你长期关注市场和世界政治，就会知道，尽管期间经历过多次波折，美国股市在过去一个世纪里总体上一直呈上升趋势。这一趋势有时会因军事冲突而中断，但从未被彻底打破。顺着股市的长期上升趋势进行投资——同时在其他市场进行适度分散——事实证明是成功的做法；因恐慌而仓促撤离，反而往往是错误。

Jeffrey Yale Rubin, the president of Birinyi Associates, an independent stock market research and investing firm in Westport, Conn., pointed out that truth in a succinct report for clients, which he expanded at my request.

康涅狄格州韦斯特波特的独立股市研究和投资公司Birinyi Associates总裁杰弗里·耶鲁·鲁宾在一份给客户的简明报告中阐述了这一事实，并在我的请求下作了进一步说明。

Mr. Rubin examined the stock and oil market response to all of the “past U.S. attacks lasting more than one day,” starting with “Operation Desert Storm,” the U.S.-led war to drive the Iraqi forces of Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. That war began in mid-January 1991. It was short and, by most contemporary accounts, resoundingly successful (though the U.S. decision to leave Mr. Hussein in power was later sharply critiqued).

鲁宾研究了所有“持续时间超过一天的美国军事打击”开始后的股市和油市反应，从“沙漠风暴行动”开始——那场由美国领导、将萨达姆·侯赛因的伊拉克军队逐出科威特的战争。它始于1991年1月中旬。战争持续时间不长，而且根据当时多数人的说法，取得了巨大成功（尽管美国让萨达姆继续掌权的决定后来受到尖锐批评）。

There were seven more U.S. military campaigns of more than one day’s duration from then until the current Iran war. And they ranged geographically and in intensity and duration, including conflicts in Bosnia, Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya and Syria.

从那以后直到当前的伊朗战争，美国又发动了七场持续超过一天的军事行动。这些行动在地理范围、强度和持续时间上各不相同，涉及波斯尼亚、伊拉克、科索沃、阿富汗、利比亚和叙利亚等地的冲突。

What Mr. Rubin found was striking. One year after the start of these conflicts, the S&P 500, on average, rose 12.5 percent. That compares with an average annualized price return (without dividends) of the S&P 500 of only 9 percent. In an email, Mr. Rubin said, “The bottom line is geopolitical events, similar to the current period, have historically delivered above average” returns one year later.

鲁宾的发现颇为引人注目：在这些冲突开始一年后，标普500指数平均上涨了12.5%。相比之下，标普500指数的平均年化价格回报（不含股息）只有9%。鲁宾在电子邮件中写道：“归根结底，从历史上看，与当前时期类似的地缘政治事件发生一年后，市场回报率高于平均水平。”

In other words, while the stock market has often, though not always, fallen in the weeks after the start of a U.S. conflict or of other geopolitical shocks, shares have usually recovered and rebounded fairly quickly. Keeping your costs low and sticking with the stock market has paid off over the long haul.

换句话说，尽管在美国卷入冲突或出现其他地缘政治冲击后的最初几周里，股市常常——但并非总是——出现下跌，但股价通常会很快复苏和反弹。从长期来看，保持低成本投资并坚持持有股市资产，一直是能够带来回报的策略。

Watch Out for Wild Cards

警惕意外变数

The oil market is another matter. Oil prices have jumped in the current conflict, as they have in many past conflicts. What’s more, one year after the start of military action, Mr. Rubin found, the price of Brent crude, the benchmark for oil outside the United States, has risen, too. The average price gain has been substantial, 27 percent. That’s frequently set off higher inflation. And soaring oil prices led to recessions, especially in earlier periods, like the 1970s and early 1980s

石油市场则是另一回事。与以往的多次冲突一样，本轮冲突中油价已大幅上涨。此外，鲁宾发现，军事行动启动一年后，作为美国以外地区石油基准的布伦特原油价格同样上涨，平均涨幅高达27%。这往往会引发通胀走高。而油价飙升曾多次导致经济衰退，尤其是在20世纪70年代和80年代初等较早时期。

Perhaps anticipating the current troubles in the Middle East, the energy sector of the S&P 500 rose sharply in the weeks leading up to the war. It was up more than 26 percent from the start of the year through March 2, compared with a small loss for the overall S&P 500. Exxon Mobil, the oil giant, was up more than 25 percent through Tuesday. The United States Oil Fund E.T.F., which holds futures contracts in oil, had risen about the same amount. For those holding oil stocks, the war has been a boon.

或许是提前预见到中东当前的乱局，标普500指数中的能源板块在战争爆发前几周大幅上涨。从年初至3月2日，该板块涨幅已超过26%，而同期标普500整体小幅下跌。石油巨头埃克森美孚截至周二涨幅超过25%，持有石油期货合约的美国石油基金ETF涨幅也大致相当。对持有石油股的人来说，这场战争是利好。

If the conflict ends soon without much damage to energy infrastructure or the natural environment, and shipping resumes through the Strait of Hormuz, then the shock of higher energy prices may abate, too. A protracted closure of the strait — through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas transit — could have dire consequences.

如果冲突很快结束，能源设施与自然环境未遭受严重破坏，霍尔木兹海峡航运得以恢复，那么能源价格上涨带来的冲击可能会随之缓解。但这条承担全球约五分之一石油与天然气运输的海峡若长期关闭，可能造成严重后果。

Even though the global economy, and the U.S. economy, in particular, are not nearly as dependent on oil as they were 50 years ago, a big and extended oil shock could be painful. Because the United States is now a net exporter of oil and natural gas, the U.S. energy sector could have windfall profits. But rising prices would hurt U.S. consumers and the rest of the economy. It’s not clear how the U.S. stock market would react under those circumstances. European markets are more vulnerable to energy shocks, and have underperformed U.S. markets in the early days of the crisis.

尽管全球经济——尤其是美国经济——对石油的依赖程度已远不及50年前，但一轮大幅且持续的石油冲击仍可能带来痛苦。由于美国如今已成为石油和天然气净出口国，其能源行业可能获得暴利。但物价上涨会损害美国消费者和其他经济领域。在这种情况下，美国股市将作何反应尚不明朗。欧洲市场对能源冲击更为敏感，在危机初期表现已弱于美国市场。

The bond market and the dollar are in play right now. Treasury yields, and the yields of sovereign bonds of many other countries, have fluctuated during the crisis. The prospect of potential energy price increases and of an upward surge in inflation raises questions about the potential for interest rate increases by major central banks this year, especially for the Federal Reserve. The dollar has risen in value, partly because of the expectation that the Iran war will keep U.S. rates higher than might otherwise be the case.

债券市场与美元正受到直接影响。危机期间，美国国债及其他许多国家主权债券的收益率出现波动。能源价格可能上涨以及通胀可能飙升的前景，引发了外界对主要央行今年是否会加息的质疑，尤其是美联储。美元汇率走高，部分原因是市场预期伊朗战争将使美国利率维持在高于原本水平的位置。

With “affordability” a major concern in the United States, higher short- and-long-term interest rates could have far-reaching political effects. President Trump has been sensitive to rising bond yields in the past, and could alter his military plans if the markets and the economy were to come unglued.

由于“可负担能力”是美国的一大核心议题，短期和长期利率的攀升可能产生深远的政治影响。特朗普总统过去对债券收益率上升一直很敏感，如果市场和经济出现动荡，他可能会调整军事计划。

Even if these wild cards were to play out in unfortunate ways, long-term investors with deep pockets might still flourish by ignoring the war and its aftermath. As long as the economy stays strong — or rebounds, if the war leads to economic weakening — corporations are likely to find ways of generating profits, which, ultimately, flow back to investors.

即便这些意外变量朝着不利方向发展，资金雄厚的长期投资者仍有可能无视战争及其后果而获得收益。只要经济保持强劲——或在战争导致经济疲软后出现反弹——企业就有可能找到盈利途径，而利润终将回流至投资者手中。

Ideally, you have already put aside enough money in safe places — like federally insured bank accounts, Treasury bills and high-quality money-market funds — to ride out a storm. Within weeks or months, the markets usually rebound, and people who stay the course end up prospering.

理想情况下，你早已在安全资产中储备了足够资金——例如联邦保险银行账户、美国国库券和优质货币市场基金——从而安然度过风暴。市场通常会在数周或数月内反弹，坚持到底的人最终会获得丰厚回报。

But the world is moving into strange new places and it would be wise to prepare for further departure from past norms. Hold more bonds and cash then usual, if you are worried. Hope for peace and prosperity but prepare for the horrors of war.

但世界正在步入诡谲的新境地，为进一步偏离过往常态做好准备是明智之举。若你心存忧虑，可比平时增持债券和现金。祈盼和平与繁荣，但也要为战争的残酷做好准备。

The husband of a British lawmaker was one of three men arrested on Wednesday by the British police on suspicion of spying for China, deepening concerns about the possible extent of Chinese espionage in Western nations.

三名涉嫌为中国从事间谍活动的男子于周三被英国警方逮捕，其中包括一名英国议员的丈夫，这加剧了外界对中国在西方国家间谍活动可能范围的担忧。

A statement from the Metropolitan Police in London said that three men had been taken into custody on suspicion of “assisting a foreign intelligence service, contrary to Section 3 of the National Security Act.” The release confirmed that the country in question was China.

伦敦警察厅发表声明称，三男子因涉嫌“协助外国情报机构，违反《国家安全法》第三条”而被拘留。声明证实所涉国家为中国。

The statement did not name the men, in keeping with British police practice. But later on Wednesday, Joani Reid, a Labour Party lawmaker, issued a statement referencing a police investigation into her husband, David Taylor, which said that she had “never seen anything to make me suspect my husband has broken any law.”

按照英国警方惯例，声明未透露三名男子的姓名。但周三晚些时候，工党议员乔安妮·里德发表声明提及针对其丈夫戴维·泰勒的警方调查，称自己“从未发现任何迹象让我怀疑丈夫触犯了任何法律”。

Chinese spying has been a sensitive topic in Britain recently, following various accusations that Beijing has engaged in extensive information gathering. At the same time, the Labour government has been trying to improve its economic ties with China after years of frosty relations, and in January approved a contentious Chinese “mega-embassy” in the heart of London.

近期，中国间谍活动在英国成为敏感话题，此前有多起指控称北京进行了大规模情报搜集。与此同时，经历两国关系数年冷淡后，工党正努力改善与中国的经济联系，并于1月批准了颇具争议的中国“超级大使馆”在伦敦市中心落地。

Ms. Reid, who represents East Kilbride and Strathaven in Scotland, said that she had never visited China, had not spoken on matters related to it in Parliament or “as far as I am aware,” met Chinese businesses, diplomats or government employees.

代表苏格兰东基尔布赖德和斯特拉思文选区的里德表示，她从未访问过中国，未在议会就相关议题发言，且“据我所知”，也未曾与中国企业、外交官或政府雇员会面。

“I am not part of my husband’s business activities and neither I nor my children are part of this investigation,” she said in her statement to Britain’s P.A. news agency.

“我不参与丈夫的商业活动，我和我的孩子们都不在此次调查范围内，”她在向英国PA通讯社发送的声明中说。

China’s embassy in London did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

中国驻伦敦大使馆未立即回应置评请求。

周三因涉嫌为中国从事间谍活动而被捕的三人之一是执政党工党议员乔安妮·里德的丈夫。

Mr. Taylor has been registered as a lobbyist since August 2024, according to Ms. Reid’s parliamentary declaration of interests, for his role as director of Earthcott, a public relations, communications and consultancy firm in London.

根据里德的议会利益申报，泰勒自2024年8月起以伦敦公关、传播与咨询公司Earthcott董事身份，注册为游说人士。

Mr. Taylor is also the head of programs at Asia House, a research institute in London that focuses on dialogue among Asia, the Middle East and Europe. He was appointed to the role in September 2024. His profile on the institute’s website states that he is “passionate about advancing Asia House’s mission of providing insights and facilitating engagement between Asia and the rest of the world.”

泰勒还担任伦敦研究机构亚洲之家的项目主管，该机构专注于亚洲、中东与欧洲之间的对话。他于2024年9月获任此职。该机构网站上的个人简介称，他“致力于推动亚洲之家的使命，即提供深入观点并促进亚洲与世界其他地区的交流”。

Mr. Taylor, who has not been charged, did not immediately respond to a request for comment. In a statement, Asia House said it could not comment on an active police investigation and had no further information beyond what had been made public.

泰勒尚未被起诉，也未立即回应置评请求。亚洲之家发表声明称，无法就正在进行的警方调查置评，除已公开信息外无法提供更多细节。

The arrests on Wednesday intensified the political debate over China’s activities, with some opposition lawmakers accusing the government of failing to stand up to Beijing.

周三的逮捕事件加剧了关于中国活动的政治辩论，部分反对党议员指责政府未能对北京采取强硬立场。

Last year, prosecutors in England were preparing a case against two men accused of funneling sensitive information to officials in Beijing. But the case fell apart after prosecutors concluded that, at the time of the alleged spying, the government had not deemed China an enemy or a threat to national security. The men, who denied the charges, were acquitted.

去年，英格兰检察官曾准备对两名涉嫌向北京官员泄露敏感信息的男子提起诉讼。但检方认定，在所称的间谍行为发生时，政府尚未将中国列为敌对国家或国家安全威胁，该案随之被撤销。两名否认指控的男子最终被无罪释放。

The collapse of that case became a political headache for Prime Minister Keir Starmer, who was repeatedly pressed by opposition leaders in Parliament on why the prosecution did not proceed.

该案被撤成为斯塔默首相的政治难题，反对党领袖在议会中多次质问他检方为何终止起诉。

Earlier this year, Mr. Starmer became the first British prime minister since 2018 to visit Beijing, where he met with the Chinese president, Xi Jinping. The British delegation included a group of business leaders, and the government claimed it had secured billions of pounds worth of export and investment deals.

今年早些时候，斯塔默成为自2018年以来首位访问北京的英国首相，期间与中国国家主席习近平会晤。英国代表团包括一批商界领袖，政府称已达成价值数十亿英镑的出口与投资协议。

The visit followed the hotly contested decision by the British government to give the go-ahead for a new Chinese embassy on a 5.5-acre site in the heart of London. In doing so, the government rejected the objections of critics who said the location and scale of the building would make it easier for China to spy in Britain.

此次访问前，英国政府做出备受争议的决定，批准在伦敦市中心一块占地约2.23公顷的土地上新建中国大使馆。政府此举驳回了批评者的反对意见，后者称该建筑的位置与规模将使中国更易在英国从事间谍活动。

今年早些时候，斯塔默成为2018年以来首位访问北京的英国首相，访华期间他与中国国家主席习近平会面。

Speaking in Parliament on Wednesday, Dan Jarvis, a security minister, said the arrests related to an investigation into “foreign interference targeting U.K. democracy” and added that the government was “deeply concerned by an increasing pattern of covert activity from Chinese state-linked actors.”

安全大臣丹·贾维斯周三在议会发言时表示，此次逮捕与调查“针对英国民主的外国干涉”有关，并称，政府“对与中国国家相关行为体日益增多的秘密活动模式深感担忧”。

He said, “This involves attempts to obtain information on U.K. policymaking and interfere with our sovereign affairs.”

他说：“这包括试图获取英国政策制定信息，以及干涉我国主权事务的企图。”

In reply, Alex Burghart, a senior lawmaker for the opposition Conservative Party, asked for clarification of news reports “that one of those arrested is the spouse of a sitting Labour MP and that another is the spouse of a former Labour MP,” using an abbreviation for a member of Parliament. The identities of the other two men arrested have not been confirmed, nor has the report that one of them was married to a former Labour lawmaker.

反对党保守党资深议员亚历克斯·伯格哈特回应时，要求澄清新闻报道中“被捕者之一是现任工党议员配偶，另一人是前任工党议员配偶”的说法。另外两名被捕男子的身份尚未确认，关于其中一人为前工党议员配偶的报道也未得到证实。

The police statement described the three men as a 39-year-old arrested in London, a 68-year-old arrested in Powys, Wales, and a 43-year-old arrested in Pontyclun, Wales.

警方声明称，三名被捕男子分别为：在伦敦被捕的39岁男子、在威尔士波伊斯郡被捕的68岁男子，以及在威尔士庞蒂克伦被捕的43岁男子。

The police did not offer any details on what led to the arrests or the possible impact of any national security information that had been revealed. But the authorities described the arrests as serious.

警方未透露逮捕行动的具体缘由，也未说明已泄露的国家安全信息可能造成的危害，但当局称此次逮捕事件性质严重。

“Today’s arrests are part of a proactive investigation, and while these are serious matters, we do not believe there to be any imminent or direct threat to the public relating to this,” said Helen Flanagan, the London head of operations for Counter Terrorism Policing, which is leading the investigation.

“今日的逮捕是一项主动调查的一部分，尽管事态严重，但我们认为此事不会对公众造成紧迫或直接的威胁，”主导此次调查的反恐警务部门伦敦行动负责人海伦·弗拉纳根表示。

Every March, China’s leaders gather in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People to announce how much the world’s second-largest economy is expected to grow that year.

每年3月，中国领导人都会齐聚北京的人民大会堂，宣布全球第二大经济体当年的预期增长目标。

It doesn’t change much from year to year.

这一目标每年变化不大。

On Thursday, the target for 2026 was set at between 4.5 percent and 5 percent. It was the first time in more than three decades that the benchmark was placed below the 5 percent mark, an acknowledgment that China is on a slower growth path.

周四，2026年的增长目标被设定在4.5%至5%之间。这是30多年来该基准首次低于5%的门槛，表明中国已进入增速放缓轨道。

The announcement came at the start of the National People’s Congress, the meeting of China’s Communist Party controlled legislature, when leaders unveil the government’s main economic and policy priorities for the year.

该目标在全国人民代表大会开幕时宣布——在这一由中国共产党领导的立法机构会议上，领导人将公布政府全年主要经济与政策重点。

Speculation over whether the target would be below 5 percent, where it has been for the past three years, was a parlor game among China watchers.

过去三年，增长目标一直维持在5%，对于今年该目标是否会跌破5%的猜测，已成为中国问题观察人士的热门话题。

The unveiling of the growth target is followed closely by financial markets because it lays out the expectations of the country’s officials, including the China’s leader, Xi Jinping. In a political system heavily directed from top levels, the number can offer clues about plans for economic policymaking.

该增长目标的公布备受金融市场关注，因为它体现了包括国家主席习近平在内的中国官方预期。在高度自上而下的中国政治体制中，这一数字能为经济政策计划提供线索。

In recent years, China has endured downward pressures in its domestic economy, such as chronic price deflation, high youth unemployment and lagging consumer confidence. A trade war with President Trump, currently in an uneasy truce, has caused China to redirect its considerable exports, pressuring businesses and causing factories to scramble for new markets.

近年来，中国国内经济持续承受下行压力，面临长期通缩、青年失业率高企、消费信心疲软等问题。与特朗普政府的贸易战虽目前处于不稳定的休战状态，仍迫使中国调整庞大出口结构，给企业带来压力，迫使工厂纷纷寻找新市场。

But those exports, which produced a record trade surplus of $1.19 trillion in 2025, remain a powerful economic driver. The government reported in January that growth last year was 5 percent, exactly the same as the previous year.

不过，出口仍是强劲的经济引擎——2025年，中国实现1.19万亿美元的创纪录贸易顺差。今年1月，政府公布去年经济增长为5%，与前年完全持平。

中国经济实力的很大一部分源于制造业，建造了庞大的电动汽车工厂、工业园区和数据中心。

Not everyone accepts the official numbers at face value. Some experts say that the economy’s actual growth may be half of what official statistics indicate. Rhodium Group, a New York-based research firm specializing in China, estimated that the Chinese economy grew less than 3 percent last year.

并非所有人都会采信官方数据。部分专家认为，中国经济实际增速可能仅为官方数据的一半。纽约专注中国研究的荣鼎集团估算，去年中国经济增速不足3%。

In recent months, many of China’s provinces and major cities released their own 2026 growth targets that were lower than those for last year. That fueled speculation from economists that the national target might fall below 5 percent this year for the first time since 1991, according to an analysis by Macquarie Group, an investment bank. (Officials did not release a growth target in 2020 because of the Covid-19 pandemic.)

近几个月，中国多个省份及主要城市公布的2026年增长目标均低于去年。投行麦格理集团分析指出，这引发经济学家猜测，中国的全国目标今年可能自1991年以来首次跌破5%（2020年因新冠疫情，官方未公布增长目标）。

For years after the country opened up to foreign investors and businesses, China grew rapidly. As it has expanded, becoming now the world’s second largest economy, the growth has slowed as it became harder to be more productive.

自对外开放吸引外资以来，中国经济多年保持高速增长。随着经济体量扩大、成为全球第二大经济体，提升生产率的难度增加，增长速度逐步放缓。

“The more you have caught up in terms of productivity, the less straightforward it is to keep powering ahead,” said Louis Kuijs, chief economist for Asia-Pacific at S&P Global Ratings.

标普全球评级亚太区首席经济学家路易斯·奎伊斯表示：“生产率提升得越充分，高增速实现起来就越复杂。”

Much of China’s economic strength comes from manufacturing. The country has built vast industrial parks, electric-vehicle plants and data centers, often financed by cheap loans from its state-owned banks. China’s factories produce much of the world’s electric vehicles, solar panels and lithium batteries. Last year, the Chinese carmaker BYD overtook Tesla as the world’s largest electric vehicle producer.

中国经济的强劲很大程度上源于制造业。国家建设了庞大的工业园区、电动汽车工厂与数据中心，资金多来自国有银行的低成本贷款。中国工厂生产了全球大部分电动汽车、太阳能板与锂电池。去年，中国车企比亚迪超越特斯拉，成为全球最大电动汽车生产商。

But relying too much on manufacturing has created problems for Beijing. Excess factory capacity and fierce competition have driven down prices in a cycle known as “involution,” crushing profit margins across industries. Companies produce more, but earn less.

但过度依赖制造业也给北京带来问题。产能过剩、激烈竞争导致价格持续下跌，形成“内卷”循环，全行业利润率被挤压——企业生产更多，却赚得更少。

Improving the economic outlook requires stronger domestic spending along with a shift toward what the government calls “high-quality growth” in advanced sectors like artificial intelligence.

改善经济前景需要提振国内消费，并向人工智能等高端领域转型，实现政府所称的“高质量发展”。

Economists and outside organizations like the International Monetary Fund have long argued that China should adopt policies to encourage more consumer spending.

经济学家及国际货币基金组织等外部机构长期以来一直主张，中国应出台政策鼓励更多消费。

Those calls grew louder in the past few years after a severe slump in the housing market ate into household wealth, and stagnant wage growth left consumers even more wary of spending. The lack of a robust social safety net also feeds into the heavy savings rate in China as households worry about how they will cover future medical bills and expenses in retirement.

过去几年，房地产市场严重下滑侵蚀家庭财富，工资增长停滞让消费者更加不愿花钱，呼吁提振消费的声音愈发强烈。中国社会保障体系不够完善，也推高了居民储蓄率——家庭担心未来医疗与养老支出。

Boosting consumption, according to Mr. Kuijs, requires structural changes, including expanding access to public services such as education and health care, particularly for migrant workers in cities.

奎伊斯认为，提振消费需要结构性改革，包括扩大教育、医疗等公共服务覆盖面，尤其是面向城市农民工群体。

To jump-start that spending, the government has tried offering subsidies for consumer goods, including rebates on appliances and electric vehicles. Officials have also raised pensions and introduced child care subsidies to ease the financial burden on families.

为刺激消费，政府已尝试推出消费品补贴，包括家电与电动汽车的折扣。官员还提高了养老金，并推出育儿补贴以减轻家庭经济负担。

Those measures, however, have not been enough to make a significant difference and don’t solve the underlying issues. Wage growth has lagged across much of the economy, limiting how much households can spend, said Alicia García-Herrero, chief economist for Asia-Pacific at Natixis. Without stronger income growth, policies to boost spending are unlikely to have much effect.

但法国外贸银行亚太区首席经济学家艾丽西亚·加西亚-埃雷罗表示，这些措施效果有限，未能解决根本问题。大部分经济领域工资增长乏力，限制了家庭消费能力。没有更强的收入增长，刺激消费的政策难有实效。

“How can you consume if you don’t earn any money?” she said.

“不赚钱，怎么消费？”她问道。

In public, Iran’s surviving leaders have defiantly refused to negotiate with President Trump to end the American and Israeli assault on their country. But a day after the attacks began, operatives from Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence reached out indirectly to the C.I.A. with an offer to discuss terms for ending the conflict, according to officials briefed on the outreach.

在公开场合，伊朗幸存的领导人仍强硬拒绝与特朗普总统谈判，以结束美国和以色列对其国家的攻击。但据知情官员透露，袭击开始一天后，伊朗情报部的特工通过间接渠道联系了美国中央情报局，表示愿意商讨结束冲突的条件。

U.S. officials are skeptical — at least in the short term — that either the Trump administration or Iran is really ready for an offramp, the officials briefed on the outreach said.

知情官员称，美国官员怀疑，至少短期内，无论是特朗普政府还是伊朗，都尚未真正准备好找到一个结束冲突的出口。

Still, the offer, which was made through another country’s spy agency, raises critical questions about whether any Iranian officials could put into place a cease-fire agreement with the Tehran government in chaos as its leaders are methodically picked off by Israeli strikes.

尽管如此，这项通过他国情报机构传递的提议还是引发了关键疑问：在以色列定点清除行动令德黑兰政府陷入混乱之际，伊朗是否还有官员能真正落实停火协议。

The offer was described on the condition of anonymity to The New York Times by Middle Eastern officials and officials from a Western country.

中东国家官员及某西方国家官员在不具名条件下向《纽约时报》描述了这一提议。

White House and Iranian officials did not respond to requests for comment. The C.I.A. declined to comment.

白宫与伊朗官员未回应置评请求。中央情报局拒绝就本文发表评论。

Israeli officials, who want a weekslong campaign to inflict maximum damage on Iran’s military capabilities, and perhaps cause Iran’s government to collapse, have urged the United States to ignore the approach. For now, the offer is not considered serious in Washington.

以色列官员希望开展一场持续数周的行动，对伊朗的军事能力造成最大程度的破坏，甚至促使伊朗政府垮台，他们敦促美国无视这一接触。就目前而言，华盛顿方面并不认为该提议具有严肃性。

And after saying for days that he was open to discussing a deal with Iran, Mr. Trump posted on social media on Tuesday morning that it was now “too late” for talks.

在连续数日表示对与伊朗达成协议持开放态度后，特朗普总统周二早上在社交媒体上发帖称，现在进行谈判已经“太晚了”。

Speaking with reporters later in the day, Mr. Trump lamented that the Iranian officials the United States knew and had considered as potential leaders were being killed.

当天晚些时候，特朗普在与记者交谈时感叹，那些美国熟知并曾视为潜在领导人的伊朗官员正在被逐一清除。

“Most of the people we had in mind are dead,” Mr. Trump said. “Pretty soon we are not going to know anybody.”

“我们原本考虑的人，大多数已经死了，”特朗普说。“很快我们就一个都不认识了。”

The Iranian outreach, and the chaos in Iran’s leadership ranks as the assault continues, highlights the key issue Mr. Trump faces as he decides what sort of Iranian government he might hope to shape, or at least settle for. He already seems to have stopped promoting his initial scenario of a popular uprising against the government yielding a new set of leaders and instead seems to view the best outcome as more pragmatic figures emerging atop the existing political structure.

随着袭击持续，伊朗方面的接触意图及其领导层内部的混乱，凸显出特朗普在决定希望塑造（或至少接受）何种伊朗政府时所面临的关键问题。他似乎已不再鼓吹最初的设想——通过民众起义推翻政府以产生一批新的领导人，而是将务实派人物在现有政治架构中掌权视为最佳结果。

At a minimum, Trump officials will expect any agreement to stop the bombing to include a pledge from Tehran to abandon or drastically curtail its ballistic missile and nuclear programs, and its support for foreign proxy groups like Hezbollah. In return, Mr. Trump has suggested that he would allow Iran’s surviving leaders to maintain their economic and political power.

至少，特朗普政府预计，任何停止轰炸的协议都必须包括德黑兰方面的承诺：放弃或大幅削减弹道导弹和核项目，以及停止对真主党这样的海外代理组织的支持。作为交换，特朗普暗示，他可能会允许伊朗现存的领导人维持经济和政治权力。

Mr. Trump suggested again on Tuesday that his model would be Venezuela after the U.S. capture in January of the country’s leader, Nicolás Maduro. Under threat of additional force, Mr. Trump has compelled Mr. Maduro’s successor to grant the United States control over Venezuela’s oil exports while making few demands for political reform.

特朗普周二再次表示，他的一个参考模式是委内瑞拉——今年1月，美国在一次行动中抓获了该国领导人尼古拉斯·马杜罗。此后，在进一步武力威胁下，特朗普迫使马杜罗的继任者同意让美国控制委内瑞拉的石油出口，而几乎没有提出政治改革的要求。

“What we did in Venezuela, I think, is the perfect scenario,” Mr. Trump said in a Sunday interview with The New York Times. “Leaders can be picked.”

“我们在委内瑞拉的做法，我认为是完美的范本，”特朗普在周日接受《纽约时报》采访时表示。“领导人是可以挑选的。”

But that vision could be a mirage.

但这种愿景或许只是海市蜃楼。

First, it is not clear that Iran is actually open to a deal, despite the recent outreach from its intelligence arm. Some Iranian leaders may believe they can inflict enough physical, economic and political pain on the United States and Israel to force an end to their assault. Mr. Trump already faces growing political pressure from Republican allies unhappy about the operation.

首先，尽管伊朗情报机构最近进行了接触，但并不清楚伊朗是否真的愿意达成协议。一些伊朗领导人可能认为，他们能够给美国和以色列造成足够拳拳到肉的、经济和政治上的痛苦，从而迫使两国停止对伊朗的攻击。特朗普已经面临来自共和党盟友越来越大的政治压力，他们对此次行动感到不满。

Mr. Trump’s shifting statements on Iranian leadership might reflect tension with Israel about the war’s goals, said Steven A. Cook, a Middle East expert with the Council on Foreign Relations.

美国外交关系委员会的中东问题专家史蒂文·库克表示，特朗普关于伊朗领导层的不断变化的表态，可能反映出他与以色列在战争目标上的分歧。

特朗普总统周二早上在社交媒体上发帖称，现在与伊朗进行谈判已经“太晚了”。

Israel, Mr. Cook said in a briefing on Monday for reporters, does not want to see Mr. Trump engineer a “Venezuela-like solution to change in Iran,” possibly with a member of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The elite military force controls much of Iran’s economy. Some analysts and U.S. officials believe its ranks might include pragmatists less invested in their regime’s fundamentalist principles than in preserving their power and wealth.

库克在周一给记者们的情况介绍会上表示，以色列不希望看到特朗普策划一场“委内瑞拉式的伊朗政权更迭方案”，例如由伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队中的某个成员来接管权力。这支精锐军事力量控制着伊朗经济的大部分。一些分析师和美国官员认为，在革命卫队内部，可能存在一些更务实的人物，他们对维持政权的意识形态原则兴趣不大，而更关心保住自己的权力和财富。

On Tuesday, Israel struck a compound where senior Iranian clerics were meeting to choose a successor to their supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed in an airstrike on Saturday.

周二，以色列袭击了一处设施，当时伊朗高级神职人员正在该处开会，挑选上周六在空袭中丧生的最高领袖哈梅内伊的继任者。

Ahead of the strikes on Iran, the C.I.A. produced an intelligence assessment examining various scenarios of what sort of Iranian leadership might emerge after a U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran. People briefed on the various scenarios produced by the agency note that none had a high degree of confidence — there were simply too many unknown variables to predict how it would play out.

在对伊朗发动袭击之前，中情局曾做出一份情报评估，分析美以打击后伊朗可能出现什么样的领导层。据知情人士透露，在这份评估设想的各种情况中，没有一种情况具有很高的确定性——因为存在太多未知变量，无法预测局势将如何发展。

But policymakers who have reviewed the intelligence have made their own conclusions about the most likely scenarios. Some have been dismissive of the idea that the Iranian opposition would find a way to seize power. They have been more focused on the prospect that a group of Islamic Revolutionary Guard members might emerge as the most influential voice in the government.

不过，审阅过这些情报的政策制定者也得出了他们自己的判断。一些人并不认同伊朗反对派能找到机会夺权的看法。他们更关注另一种可能性：一批伊斯兰革命卫队成员可能成为政府中最有影响力的力量。

The question for the Trump administration now is whether any of those officials will emerge alive from the repeated attacks on the government.

对特朗普政府来说，现在的问题是，在针对政府的连续打击中，这些官员是否还能有人活下来。

Mr. Trump has made several contradictory statements about his war aims, so it is possible that he will change his mind after ruling out negotiations.

特朗普对这场战争的目标发表了若干相互矛盾的表态，因此，在排除谈判选项之后，他仍然有可能改变主意。

But even if he renews his search for an Iranian leader, as the government weakens, it could be harder to find a person with enough influence to compel the country to abide by a deal with the United States.

但即使他重新开始寻找可以接手的伊朗领导人，随着政府力量不断削弱，要找到一个具有足够影响力、能够迫使该国遵守与美国达成协议的人，可能会变得更加困难。

Many analysts warn that Iran’s government could soon lose control over remote regions dominated by ethnic minorities like the Kurds or collapse entirely, leading to chaos and violence reminiscent of the civil wars in Syria and Libya.

许多分析人士警告说，伊朗政府可能很快就会失去对库尔德人等少数民族聚居的偏远地区的控制，或者彻底垮台，从而引发让人想起叙利亚和利比亚内战的混乱和暴力。

Iranians could overthrow their weakened government. Experts say that the regime is deeply unpopular and has retained power only through the brutal repression of popular uprisings. Mr. Trump’s talk of regime change came after a vicious crackdown in January.

伊朗民众也可能推翻这个已被削弱的政府。专家表示，该政权极不受欢迎，它依靠对民众起义进行残酷镇压才得以维持统治。今年1月伊朗发生严厉镇压后，特朗普开始谈论政权更迭。

But there is no guarantee that Mr. Trump would welcome the outcome of a popular revolution, analysts warn.

但分析人士警告，即便发生民众革命，也不能保证其结果会受到特朗普的欢迎。

“There’s a low likelihood that a successor state would be a liberal democracy friendly to the United States — given that it was forged in a war with the United States,” said Rosemary Kelanic, the director of the Middle East program at Defense Priorities, a group generally opposed to U.S. foreign interventions.

“继任政权不太可能成为一个对美国友好的自由民主国家——毕竟它是在与美国的战争中诞生的，”智库Defense Priorities的中东项目主任罗斯玛丽·凯拉尼克说。该智库总体上是反对美国对外干预的。

Mr. Trump and his top advisers say it is impossible to do business with Iran’s current leaders given their religiously based radicalism and avowed hatred of the West. They argue that Iran’s refusal to accept Mr. Trump’s demands during last month’s nuclear negotiations, at what amounted to gunpoint, demonstrated its leaders’ fanaticism.

特朗普及其高级顾问表示，鉴于伊朗现任领导人基于宗教的激进主义和对西方的公开仇恨，与他们打交道是不可能的。他们认为，在上个月的核谈判中，伊朗几乎是在枪口之下拒绝了特朗普的要求，这证明了其领导人具有狂热的意识形态。

On Monday, Mr. Trump called Iran’s leaders “radical lunatics,” adding: “They’re sick people. They’re mentally ill. Sick people. They are angry. They are crazy. They are sick.”

周一，特朗普称伊朗领导人是“激进的疯子”，还说：“他们是病人。他们有精神问题。他们是病人。他们很愤怒。他们是疯子。他们有病。”

If Iran’s government survives, the question may be whether Mr. Trump can find a “more moderate” interlocutor, as he put it on Tuesday. That would mean someone senior enough in the current government to command authority, but not too invested in its revolutionary ideology.

如果伊朗政府幸存下来，问题可能是特朗普是否能够找到一位“更温和”的对话对象——正如他周二所说的那样。那意味着要在现任政府中找一个级别足够高、足以发号施令，但又不能太过深陷于革命意识形态之中的人。

When the A.I. video generation tool Seedance 2.0 debuted recently, with the ability to create impressively realistic clips of just about anything a user could imagine, it prompted two drastically different reactions on opposite sides of the world.

最近发布的人工智能视频生成工具Seedance 2.0能够根据用户的想象创造出令人惊艳的逼真视频片段，它在地球两端引发了两种截然不同的反应。

In the United States, many in the movie industry responded with fear. After a Seedance-generated video purporting to show a fight scene between Brad Pitt and Tom Cruise spread widely online, Hollywood filmmakers and writers said their jobs were fast becoming obsolete.

在美国，电影行业的许多人对此感到恐惧。一段据称是布拉德·皮特和汤姆·克鲁斯打斗场面的Seedance生成视频在网上广泛传播后，好莱坞的电影制作人和编剧们表示，他们的工作正迅速变得过时。

But in China, many reacted with pride and excitement. Stocks in short-video companies surged. One of China’s most famous directors, Jia Zhangke, shared a short film that he made using Seedance, in which his real self and an A.I. version discussed moviemaking.

但在中国，许多人的反应是自豪和兴奋。短视频公司的股票大涨。中国最著名的导演之一贾樟柯分享了他使用Seedance制作的短片，片中真实的自己与一个人工智能版本的自己讨论电影创作。

“I’m not worried about technology replacing movies. From the very beginning, movies have coexisted with new technology,” Mr. Jia wrote on social media. “What really matters is how people use technology.”

“我并不担心技术会不会‘取代’电影。电影从诞生之初，就一直在和新技术共处，”贾樟柯在社交媒体上写道。“真正重要的，还是人如何使用技术。”

The contrasting reactions point to a broader split between China and much of the West on A.I.: Chinese people appear to be much more optimistic about it.

这种截然不同的反应揭示了中国与西方大部分国家在人工智能问题上更广泛的分歧：中国人似乎对人工智能更加乐观。

People in China are among the most excited in the world about A.I., according to a KPMG survey of 47 countries last year. While 69 percent of people in China said the technology’s benefits outweighed its risks, only 35 percent of Americans agreed. Other polls have shown similar disparities.

毕马威咨询去年对47个国家进行的一项调查显示，中国人是对人工智能最兴奋的人群之一。在中国，69%的受访者认为该技术的好处大于风险，而持同样看法的美国人只有35%。其他民调也显示出类似的差距。

The question is, why?

问题是，为什么会这样？

The answer may be related to how the technology has been deployed in each country, as well as how the government and industry leaders have talked about it.

答案可能与这项技术在各国的应用方式有关，也与政府和行业领袖如何谈论它有关。

In China, A.I. Is Seemingly Everywhere

在中国，人工智能似乎无处不在

Driverless taxis roam more than a dozen Chinese cities, and service robots putter through hotels and restaurants. Chinese tech companies have rolled out medical chatbots to help users avoid long lines at hospitals. They’ve embedded A.I. assistants throughout popular apps, so users can ask A.I. in their mapping apps to help them decide where to eat, or in their shopping apps to help them choose between pairs of shoes.

无人驾驶出租车在中国十多个城市穿行，服务机器人在酒店和餐馆里缓缓穿行。中国科技公司推出了医疗聊天机器人，帮助用户避免在医院排长队。他们还把人工智能助手嵌入各种热门应用中：用户可以在地图应用里询问人工智能该去哪里吃饭，也可以在购物应用中让人工智能帮忙在两双鞋之间做出选择。

在中国中部城市芜湖，警方使用机器人协助交通监测。在中国，人工智能似乎无处不在。

That’s because Chinese tech companies have focused intensely on real-world applications for A.I. By contrast, many leading American tech companies have been focused on more abstract goals, like developing the most cutting-edge model, or achieving artificial general intelligence.

这是因为中国科技公司高度专注于人工智能的实际应用。相比之下，许多领先的美国科技公司一直专注于更抽象的目标，比如开发最前沿的模型，或实现通用人工智能。

In addition, most of China’s leading A.I. models are free to use, unlike in the United States, where users have to pay for chatbots like ChatGPT to access all their features. (In fact, Chinese companies have been giving away money and luxury cars to entice people to download their apps.)

此外，中国大多数领先的人工智能模型都是免费的，不像在美国，用户必须为ChatGPT等聊天机器人付费才能使用全部功能。（事实上，一些中国公司甚至通过赠送现金和豪车来吸引用户下载他们的应用程序。）

As a result, Chinese consumers are feeling the benefits of A.I., said Bai Guo, a professor who studies the digital economy at China Europe International Business School in Shanghai.

因此，中国消费者已经开始感受到人工智能带来的好处，上海的中欧国际工商学院研究数字经济的白果教授说。

“A lot of things can already be helped by A.I., and people find that interesting, that’s useful, and so there are quite a lot of positive and active feelings toward it,” Professor Bai said. Potential dangers, such as unemployment or increased inequality, still feel remote.

“很多事情已经可以由人工智能来帮助完成，人们觉得这很有意思，也很有用，所以对它抱有相当多积极、主动的情绪，”白教授说。至于潜在的风险，比如失业或不平等加剧，目前仍然让人感觉比较遥远。

Beijing Has Been a Big Champion

中国政府一直是人工智能的积极推动者

The focus on A.I. applications is a product of China’s hypercompetitive internet economy. Leading companies like Alibaba, ByteDance and the food delivery giant Meituan are locked in a perpetual battle for users, and A.I. is the latest tool.

对人工智能应用的关注是中国高度竞争的互联网经济的产物。阿里巴巴、字节跳动和外卖巨头美团等领先企业陷入了一场争夺用户的持久战，而人工智能是最新的竞争工具。

The Chinese government has also encouraged this approach. Xi Jinping has said that China’s A.I. industry should “prioritize practical application.” Officials say that A.I. could help solve China’s thorniest problems, such as inequalities in health care, or an aging work force.

中国政府也鼓励这种做法。习近平曾表示，中国的人工智能产业应“全面推进赋能应用”。官员们表示，人工智能可以帮助解决中国一些最棘手的问题，如医疗资源不均衡，或劳动力老龄化。

阿里巴巴集团在杭州的总部。阿里巴巴开发了广泛使用的开源人工智能系统。

In August, the government laid out a plan, called A.I.+, for A.I. to penetrate more than 70 percent of Chinese society by 2027, and 90 percent by 2030. The plan said A.I. will “promote a revolutionary leap in productive ability” and “create higher-quality, beautiful lives.”

去年8月，政府提出了一项名为“人工智能+”的计划，目标是到2027年让人工智能应用普及率达到70%以上，到2030年达到90%。该计划称，人工智能将“推动生产力整体跃升”，并“打造更有品质的美好生活”。

Because Chinese officials are promoting A.I. as an economic engine, they may also be silencing those who are more pessimistic about it. Crashes involving autonomous driving have attracted widespread attention online, only for posts to be censored. State media outlets have compared concerns about job loss for taxi drivers to the Luddite movement.

由于中国官员将人工智能作为经济引擎来推广，他们可能也在压制那些对此更为悲观的声音。与自动驾驶有关的事故在网上曾引发广泛关注，但相关帖子随后遭删除。官方媒体还把出租车司机对失业的担忧与历史上的卢德运动相提并论。

China also does not permit independent labor unions, which have been some of the most vocal critics of A.I. in the West.

中国也不允许独立的工会存在，而在西方，工会一直是人工智能最直言不讳的批评者之一。

The signaling by the state that A.I. is strictly managed has, for some Chinese, bolstered their confidence in the technology. In interviews, some parents have said that they are comfortable letting their children use A.I. toys or educational tools because they believe the government would not permit the models to produce anything harmful.

国家不断释放出人工智能受到严格管理的信号，这也在一定程度上增强了一些中国人对这项技术的信心。在采访中，一些家长表示，他们愿意让孩子使用人工智能玩具或教育工具，因为他们相信政府不会允许这些模型产生任何有害内容。

National Pride and Faith in Technology

民族自豪感与对技术的信念

Many Chinese scholars, investors and entrepreneurs cited a more abstract reason for the optimism: Simply put, China has modernized so quickly in recent decades that many Chinese are used to groundbreaking change. And technology has been key to that change.

许多中国学者、投资者和企业家提出了一个更为抽象的原因来解释这种乐观情绪：简单来说，中国在过去几十年里现代化速度极快，许多中国人已经习惯了颠覆性的变革。而技术一直是这种变革的关键。

去年在武汉的一次演示中，对一辆无人驾驶电动小巴进行监控。

Afra Wang, a technology writer from China, wrote in a recent newsletter about her grandmother, who once walked five hours to buy a clock so that her children could get to school on time. “Today her Xiaomi phone has given her an online shopping addiction, and delivery drones fly above her apartment,” Ms. Wang wrote. “A.I. simply looks like the next turn of a wheel that has only ever spun forward.”

中国科技作者阿芙拉·王（音）最近在一篇通讯中写到了她的祖母。当年祖母曾经为了买闹钟走了五个小时路，就为了让孩子们能够按时上学。“而今天，她的小米手机让她沉迷于网购，送货无人机在她的公寓上空飞行，”王女士写道。“人工智能看起来不过是那只一直向前滚动的车轮的下一次转动。”

For many Chinese, their country’s ability to compete with the United States on A.I. is a source of great pride, further proof of how far China has come. After Seedance 2.0 was released, the hashtag “Seedance 2.0 has been praised to the skies overseas” was a top trend on Chinese social media.

对许多中国人来说，中国能够在人工智能领域与美国竞争是一种巨大的自豪感，也是中国取得巨大进步的又一证明。Seedance 2.0发布后，“Seedance 2.0在海外出圈”的话题在中国社交媒体上迅速登上热搜。

“Technology still firmly occupies a particular place in the Chinese imagination: It is still seen as a channel for upward mobility,” Ms. Wang wrote.

“在当代中国人的想象中，技术仍然牢固地占据着一个特殊的位置：它仍被视为向上流动的渠道，”王女士写道。

Concerns About A.I. Are Growing

对人工智能的担忧正在增加

Still, there are signs of increased caution, by both the government and the general public.

然而，无论是政府还是普通公众，都已表现出更为谨慎的迹象。

Some Chinese content creators have expressed unease about Seedance 2.0’s prowess.

一些中国内容创作者对Seedance 2.0的强大能力表示不安。

Feng Ji, the founder of a leading Chinese video game developer, wrote online that intellectual property laws would face “unprecedented challenges.” Disney and the Motion Picture Association, which represents major Hollywood studios, have already accused ByteDance, the Chinese company that made Seedance, of copyright infringement. (Not long after the release, ByteDance announced that it would temporarily restrict the creation of videos featuring real people.)

一家中国知名游戏开发公司的创始人冯骥在网上写道，知识产权法将面临“空前冲击”。迪士尼以及代表好莱坞主要电影公司的美国电影协会已经指控开发Seedance的中国公司字节跳动侵犯版权。（该工具发布不久后，字节跳动宣布将暂时限制生成包含真人形象的视频。）

在上海一个人工智能大会上的面部识别展示。

Users have also raised concerns about how easily the government’s restrictions can be bypassed. A Chinese feminist group recently highlighted tutorials for making sexually explicit deepfakes that circulate openly on Chinese social media. Attempts to report the images were unsuccessful, the group said.

用户还提出担忧，认为政府的监管很容易规避。一个中国女权团体最近指出，在中国社交媒体上公开流传着制作色情深度伪造的教程。该团体表示，他们尝试举报这些图片，但没有成功。

The Chinese government has also begun more directly addressing the technology’s potential for disrupting jobs, mental health or the Communist Party’s grip on power.

中国政府也开始更加直接地讨论这项技术可能对就业、心理健康以及共产党执政稳定带来的潜在影响。

The state news agency reported in January that the government would soon release an action plan to address A.I.’s effect on employment, as automation threatens to displace workers in some industries.

官方通讯社今年1月报道称，政府很快将发布一项行动计划，以应对人工智能对就业的影响，因为自动化可能取代某些行业的工人。

The government has also ordered A.I. companies to impose a wide range of guardrails, from blocking politically sensitive content to preventing users from becoming dependent on their A.I. companions.

政府还要求人工智能公司设置广泛的安全防护措施，包括屏蔽政治敏感内容，以及防止用户对人工智能伴侣产生依赖。

For all of its potential, China must not let A.I. “spiral out of control,” Mr. Xi warned during a recent meeting of the leaders of the Communist Party.

中国领导人近日在共产党领导人会议上警告称，尽管人工智能潜力巨大，但中国绝不能让其“失控”。

Across China, where education is famously cutthroat, parents are turning to artificial intelligence to gain a competitive edge. Some are making interactive learning games or using chatbots to grade their children’s homework. Others are using A.I.-powered gadgets to get past a language barrier.

在中国各地，教育竞争之激烈众所周知，家长们正纷纷转向人工智能，希望获取竞争优势。一些家长制作互动学习游戏，或用聊天机器人批改孩子的作业。还有一些家长借助由人工智能驱动的小工具来跨越语言障碍。

Their eagerness to experiment is one example of how Chinese users are embracing A.I. for learning, even as many in the United States worry that it feeds students misinformation or erodes critical thinking. This cultural rift is backed by data: A 2025 global survey led by the services firm KPMG found that more than 90 percent of Chinese said they felt optimistic about the technology, compared to just over 50 percent in the United States.

他们热衷于尝试新技术，这体现了中国用户在学习领域对人工智能的积极接纳；尽管许多美国人担心它会给学生灌输错误信息，或削弱审辩性思维。这种文化差异也有数据为证：2025年毕马威咨询主导的一项全球调查发现，超过90%的中国受访者表示对这项技术感到乐观，而在美国，这一比例仅略高于50%。

The enthusiasm in China has fueled a sprawling, often unchecked, marketplace for educational technology that is worth more than $43 billion by some estimates, and where gimmicks and exaggerated marketing are common. Yet for some families, the tools are providing genuine relief. Three parents shared videos of their routines, showing how A.I., while imperfect, has made parenting and teaching their children a little easier.

中国的这股热情催生了一个庞大且往往缺乏监管的教育科技市场，据一些估计，该市场规模已超过430亿美元，在这里，噱头和夸大宣传亦随处可见。然而对一些家庭来说，这些工具确实带来了实实在在的帮助。三位家长分享了他们的日常视频，展示了人工智能虽然不完美，但让育儿和教学变得稍微轻松了一些。

A.I. Translation Mask

智能翻译口罩

As a mother of two with a full-time public relations job, Zheng Wenqi, 42, had little time to practice English herself, let alone teach her children. She knew her 9-year-old son needed more conversational experience but didn’t know where to turn.

42岁的郑文琪（音）有一份全职的公关工作，还是两个孩子的母亲，她几乎没有时间练习自己的英语，更不用说教孩子了。她知道九岁的儿子需要更多的会话经验，但不知从何入手。

“There just wasn’t an opportunity for him to start talking,” said Ms. Zheng, who lives in northern China’s Heilongjiang Province.

“就没有这个契机让他开口，”住在中国北部黑龙江省的郑女士说。

Then she saw a livestream promoting a gadget she could wear to make her conversant in English.

后来，她在网上的直播中看到一种可穿戴设备，这种设备能让她流利地说英语。

It has two parts: a mask that covers her mouth, and a speaker that hangs around her neck. Ms. Zheng speaks Chinese into the mask, which also muffles her voice. Then, a translation comes out of the speaker. She began wearing it around the house, for 30 to 60 minutes a day.

该设备由两部分组成：一个遮住嘴巴的口罩，以及一个挂在脖子上的扬声器。郑女士对着能消音的口罩说中文，然后扬声器里就会传出翻译的英文。她开始在家里戴它，每天30到60分钟。

The roughly $375 device, called Native Language Star, draws on speech and language models developed by several Chinese technology firms, according to the company, based in Shenzhen, that makes the device.

这款名为母语星球的设备售价约人民币2500元。制造商是一家位于深圳的企业，据其宣称，该产品利用了中国几家科技公司开发的语音和语言模型。

Ms. Zheng said the translations were sometimes stiff. But she said that after about a month, her son was speaking more confidently and initiating conversations.

郑女士表示，翻译有时会比较生硬。但她说，大约一个月后，儿子说英语变得自信了，并会主动发起对话。

Ms. Zheng also uses the device with her 5-year-old daughter, who had never learned English before. The child can now describe daily tasks, like getting dressed and putting her shoes on.

郑女士还会与五岁的女儿一起使用该设备，女儿之前从未学过英语。现在，她已经能描述穿衣、穿鞋等日常活动。

“We say, ‘Now is English time, let’s all speak in English,’ and I’ll put that thing on,” Ms. Zheng said. “And then they just say whatever they know.”

“我们会说：‘我们说，现在是英语时间啊，我们大家都说英语，然后我带我挂着那个东西说，”郑女士说，“然后他俩就是自己会啥说啥。”

A Chatbot With ‘Eyes’

长了“眼睛”的聊天机器人

Li Linyun, a stay-at-home mother, used to fight with her 10-year-old daughter, Weixiao, over her studies.

全职母亲李琳云（音）以前常常因为学习问题和10岁的女儿微笑（音）发生争执。

Now Ms. Li has delegated supervision of Weixiao’s schoolwork to an A.I. chatbot.

现在，李女士已经把监督微笑做功课的任务交给了一款人工智能聊天机器人。

“It’s a 24-hour online teacher, and it’s knowledgeable and extremely patient,” said Ms. Li, who lives in Hunan Province, in central China.

“它就是一个24小时在线的一个老师， 而且知识渊博，还非常具有耐心，”住在华中省份湖南的李女士说。

Ms. Li uses Doubao, China’s most popular A.I. chatbot, which was created by ByteDance, the parent company of TikTok. It has a camera function, which parents refer to as Doubao’s “eyes.” People can use it to learn more about their surroundings, for instance by asking Doubao to identify plants or give more details about museum artifacts. (ChatGPT has a similar function for paying users; Doubao’s is free.)

李女士使用的是中国最受欢迎的人工智能聊天机器人豆包，由TikTok的母公司字节跳动开发。它具有摄像头功能，家长们称之为豆包的“眼睛”。人们可以用它来了解周围的环境，例如让豆包识别植物，或介绍博物馆文物的更多信息。（ChatGPT为付费用户提供类似功能；豆包则是免费的。）

After more experimentation, Ms. Li learned that Doubao could explain grammar rules better than she ever could.

经过多番尝试，李女士发现豆包对语法规则的解释比她自己清楚得多。

Weixiao said she liked that she could ask Doubao to repeat explanations as many times as she needed, while her teachers moved on quickly. “It explains in more detail, so I can understand,” she said.

微笑说，她喜欢可以随时让豆包反复解释，而她的老师通常很快就继续讲新的内容了。“我觉得它讲的更详细，让我能听懂，”她说。

Ms. Li also began asking Doubao to grade completed homework assignments by uploading a photo to the app.

李女士还开始让豆包给已经做完的作业评分，只需给作业拍照然后上传到应用中。

The chatbot identifies wrong answers and corrects them, Ms. Li said, though it sometimes makes mistakes.

李女士说，这个聊天机器人可以找出错误答案并进行纠正，尽管有时也会出错。

The camera can also monitor Weixiao’s posture. But Ms. Li said she rarely used that feature, because her daughter didn’t like the feeling of being watched.

摄像头还可以监测微笑的坐姿。但李女士说，她很少使用这个功能，因为女儿不喜欢被监视的感觉。

Ms. Li said she wasn’t worried about feeding so much footage of Weixiao to the chatbot. In the social media age, “we don’t have a lot of privacy anyway,” she said.

李女士表示，她并不担心向聊天机器人提供这么多关于女儿的影像。在社交媒体时代，“我觉得我们也没有很多隐私，”她说。

And the benefits were more than worthwhile. She no longer had to spend hundreds of dollars a month on English tutoring, and Weixiao’s grades had improved. “It makes educational resources more equitable for ordinary people,” Ms. Li said.

而且由此带来的好处是值得的。她无需每月再花费几千块请英语家教，微笑的成绩也提高了。“可以让我们普通人的这个教育资源能够更加公平一些，”李女士说。

Her relationship with Weixiao had improved, too, she said. “To ease tensions in a parent-child relationship, you can’t spend too much time on homework,” she said. “Just encouraging her is enough.”

她还表示，自己和女儿的关系也改善了。“然后也就是亲子关系，其实如果想要缓解的话，真的是不能在作业上花太多时间，”她说，“给她鼓励就行了。”

Creating Learning Games

制作学习游戏

Yin Xingyu, 37, uses A.I. chatbots like DeepSeek in her job as a marketer in Shenzhen. She started to wonder whether the tool could also help her 6-year-old daughter.

37岁的殷星昱在深圳从事市场营销工作，在工作中会使用DeepSeek这样的人工智能聊天机器人。她开始思考这个工具是否也能帮到她六岁的女儿。

Ms. Yin didn’t know how to code, so she turned to what’s known as “vibecoding” instead: using A.I. models to build software by describing what you want in plain language. She worked with DeepSeek to build an interactive English word game for her daughter. The chatbot wrote the code for her.

殷星昱不会编程，于是转而使用一种被称为“氛围编程”的方法：用自然语言描述需求，让人工智能模型帮助构建软件。她与DeepSeek一起为女儿开发了一个互动式英语单词游戏。代码是由聊天机器人为她写的。

She is now sharing the prompts on social media so other parents can input them into their own chatbots and replicate her games.

她在社交媒体上分享了这些提示词，以便其他家长可以将其输入自己的聊天机器人，复制她的游戏。

Ms. Yin has also experimented with other models. She used Google’s A.I. image generator, Nano Banana Pro, to create comic strips that used her daughter’s Chinese vocabulary words, starring her favorite characters from movies like “Zootopia” and “Frozen.”

殷星昱还尝试了其他模型。她使用谷歌的人工智能图像生成工具Nano Banana Pro，用女儿能理解的中文词创作连环画，主角是她女儿最喜欢的《疯狂动物城》和《冰雪奇缘》等电影中的角色。

Ms. Yin said she didn’t think that her daughter would become dependent on A.I., because she designed the games to prioritize active thinking over passive stimulation. She plans to encourage her daughter to use the tools even more as she gets older; for example, by using chatbots to brainstorm ideas for essays.

殷星昱说，她并不担心女儿会对人工智能产生依赖，因为她设计这些游戏时更强调主动思考，而不是被动的刺激。随着女儿长大，她甚至计划鼓励她更多地使用这些工具，比如利用聊天机器人为作文构思点子。

“Most likely that’s how the future will be, and I want her to get used to it from a young age,” she said.

“我觉得大概率这个未来是这样子的，你要去习惯，”她说。

‘A.I. Self-Study Rooms’

“AI自习室”

Not every effort to use A.I. for education has been successful. Some companies have rolled out products that critics say are more hype than substance.

并不是所有利用人工智能进行教育的尝试都取得了成功。一些公司推出的产品，被批评者认为噱头大于实质。

So-called “A.I. self-study rooms,” for example, are advertised as physical spaces where students can learn from A.I.-powered tablets that tailor learning plans to individual needs. Fees range from a few dollars an hour to hundreds of dollars a month.

例如所谓的“AI自习室”，被宣传为一种实体学习空间，学生可以在那里使用由人工智能驱动的平板电脑学习，这些设备会根据个人需求制定学习计划。收费从每小时几十元到每月上千元不等。

A state media report from 2024 about the trend showed a classroom in Zhejiang Province lined with cubicles, where students sat quietly in front of tablets that assessed their completion of assignments for accuracy and speed.

2024年，有官媒报道了浙江的一个AI自习室，里面排列着隔间，学生们安静地坐在平板电脑前，平板电脑会根据学生完成作业的准确率和速度进行评估。

But some parents and former employees have complained that the “A.I.” is merely a marketing facade for prerecorded lessons or other less advanced technology, and that the tablets are just basic, off-the-shelf devices.

但一些家长和前员工抱怨说，所谓的“人工智能”其实只是营销外衣，背后不过是预先录制的课程或其他较为落后的技术，而那些平板电脑也只是普通的现成设备。

State media outlets have also accused the operators of some of the centers of trying to circumvent a 2021 ban on for-profit tutoring that was meant to shield children from having too much homework and families from spending too heavily. Many tutoring services have continued to operate underground. (The study centers have said that A.I. is doing the teaching, not tutors, so the ban does not apply.)

官方媒体还指责，一些自习室的经营者试图绕过中国2021年出台的营利性教辅禁令。该禁令旨在减少孩子的作业负担，并避免家庭在补课上花费过多。但许多教辅服务仍在地下运营。（这些自习室则表示，教学由人工智能完成，而不是由辅导老师，因此禁令不适用。）

Many of the study rooms have already shut down, according to media reports. The New York Times twice tried to visit one in Beijing, only to find it locked and empty, with posters purporting to show reviews from satisfied parents still on the walls.

据媒体报道，许多这样的自习室已经关闭。《纽约时报》曾两次尝试探访北京的一家AI自习室，却发现大门紧锁、空无一人，墙上的海报展示着家长的好评。

May Zeng, 24, worked at a study room in Jiangxi Province for two months last year, where she was in charge of making sure that students didn’t slack off. She thought that parents didn’t care as much about A.I. as they did about having somewhere to put their children.

24岁的曾梅（音）去年在江西一家自习室工作了两个月，她的职责是确保学生不会偷懒。她认为，家长其实并不那么在意人工智能，而更在意是否有一个地方可以把孩子送过去。

Still, A.I. was getting used — by Ms. Zeng herself. As part of her duties, she had to write feedback on each student’s progress.

不过，人工智能还是被用上了——只是使用的人是曾梅自己。作为工作的一部分，她需要为每个学生写学习进展反馈。

“When I found I really had nothing to say, I’d just throw it to the A.I.,” she said. “In this A.I. self-study room, I was the one using the most A.I.”

“我发现自己有时候词穷之后我就会给扔给它，”她说，“所以觉得在这个AI自习室，其实我用AI是用的最多的”。

For years, the Persian Gulf countries had worried about the prospect of an out-of-control war with Iran, which would bring missiles and drones to their gleaming cities, trapping tourists and sending foreign executives fleeing.

多年来，波斯湾国家一直担忧与伊朗爆发一场失控的战争，届时导弹和无人机将袭击他们光鲜靓丽的城市，困住游客，逼走外国高管。

The fear of conflict is one reason they have cultivated such close ties with the United States. They have built American military bases and spent tens of billions of dollars on American weapons.

对冲突的恐惧是它们与美国建立紧密关系的原因之一。它们允许美国建立军事基地，并斥资数百亿美元购买美国武器。

They had hoped to buy protection from Iran and its regional proxies.

它们本希望以此买到保护，免受伊朗及其地区代理人的威胁。

But the United States and Israel have launched a massive assault that has rapidly spiraled into a nightmare scenario for Gulf leaders. In retaliation, Iran has fired more than a thousand missiles and drones at Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman. The strikes have killed at least seven people in those countries, according to official reports tallied by The New York Times.

但美国和以色列发动的大规模袭击迅速演变为海湾国家领导人的噩梦场景。作为报复，伊朗已向沙特、阿联酋、卡塔尔、巴林、科威特和阿曼发射逾千导弹与无人机。《纽约时报》统计的官方报告显示，袭击已造成这些国家至少七人死亡。

Their governments are now facing uncomfortable questions about whether their stockpile of missile interceptors and strategic food reserves can last through the war.

这些国家的政府如今面临棘手问题：库存的导弹拦截弹和战略粮食储备能否撑过这场战争。

周二，阿拉伯联合酋长国迪拜滨海区。多年来，波斯湾国家一直担忧与伊朗爆发战争的可能性，这场战争将使导弹和无人机飞抵他们光鲜靓丽的城市。

More dangerous questions loom: Will they join the fight against Iran and risk a major escalation against them? Or will they double down on diplomacy even though their lobbying to prevent the war seems to have made little impact?

更危险的问题迫在眉睫：它们是否要加入对伊朗作战，令自己冒着冲突大幅升级的风险；抑或继续加倍投入外交努力——尽管此前阻止战争的游说似乎收效甚微。

“The Gulf states are caught in a strategic squeeze between the United States and Iran in a conflict they did not choose and are trying to manage this with a mix of diplomacy, restraint and defensive readiness,” said Abdullah Baabood, an Omani academic at Waseda University in Japan.

“海湾国家在一场并非自己选择的冲突中被夹在美国与伊朗之间，正试图以外交、克制和防御准备相结合的方式应对，”日本早稻田大学的阿曼学者阿卜杜拉·巴阿布德表示。

As they try to balance these interests, Gulf governments are hoping to keep the region stable “even as external powers clash around them,” he said.

他还说，在努力平衡这些利益的同时，海湾国家政府仍希望维持地区稳定，“即便外部势力在其周边激烈对抗。”

The list of targets hit by Iran in the Gulf has included not only American military bases and embassies in the Gulf, but also energy installations, airports and resorts. In the Middle East business capital of Dubai — a city that was effectively immune to regional conflicts for decades — explosions shattered apartment windows and five-star hotels caught fire.

伊朗在海湾地区打击的目标不仅包括美军基地和使馆，还涵盖能源设施、机场和度假胜地。在数十年几乎不受地区冲突影响的中东商业之都迪拜，爆炸震碎了公寓窗户，数家五星级酒店起火。

“The inability of key Gulf states to dissuade President Trump from maximalist Israeli notions of chaotic regime change in Iran shows the traditional limits of their influence in Washington when it comes to regional security,” said Yasmine Farouk, the director of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula project for the International Crisis Group.

“海湾核心国家未能阻止特朗普总统接受以色列的极端主张，即令伊朗在混乱中发生政权更迭，这显示出它们在地区安全问题上对华盛顿影响力的传统局限，”国际危机组织海湾与阿拉伯半岛项目主任亚斯明·法鲁克说。

周二在科威特城，参加两名士兵的葬礼的人群。

The stakes rose on Monday, when the U.S. State Department issued a warning to American citizens across a dozen Arab countries to “depart now via commercial means.” It did not mention that airspace had already been closed in many of those nations, leaving few viable escape routes.

周一，局势进一步升级，美国国务院向十多个阿拉伯国家的美国公民发出警告，要求“立即通过商业渠道离境”。声明未提及这些国家的许多空域已关闭，几乎没有可行的撤离航线。

“If the Iranian threat and Israeli war machine persist, then the future is not promising,” Ms. Farouk said.

“如果伊朗的威胁和以色列的战争机器持续存在，未来将不容乐观，”法鲁克表示。

For Gulf governments, both Iran and Israel pose risks to the regional stability that their economic prosperity depends on. Oman and Qatar have cultivated friendly relations with Iran, and over the past few years, the Emirates and Saudi Arabia have also built deeper ties with Iran to lower its potential threat.

对海湾国家政府而言，伊朗和以色列都对其经济繁荣所依赖的地区稳定构成威胁。阿曼和卡塔尔与伊朗保持友好关系，过去几年，阿联酋和沙特也与伊朗深化关系，以降低潜在威胁。

Mohammed Baharoon, the head of B’huth, a research center in Dubai, predicted that the Gulf nations will try to de-escalate tensions even after these attacks.

迪拜研究中心B’huth负责人穆罕默德·巴哈伦预测，即便遭遇袭击，海湾国家仍会努力缓和紧张局势。

And even though Iran and its proxies have stirred tensions and violence in the Middle East in recent years, Mr. Baharoon said, “Israel and the U.S. continue to be the main cause of instability in the region.”

巴哈伦表示，尽管伊朗及其代理人近年在中东制造紧张与暴力，但“以色列和美国仍是该地区不稳定的主要根源”。

Arab countries share that view. For a generation, people have watched successive U.S. wars and conflicts started by its allies wielding American weapons that leave entire countries in tatters. While Gulf leaders have built warm relationships with Mr. Trump and his family, they are also wary of his unpredictability, analysts say.

阿拉伯国家普遍持这一观点。整整一代人目睹美国接连发动战争，其盟友使用美国武器挑起冲突，让一些国家支离破碎。分析人士称，尽管海湾国家领导人与特朗普及其家族建立了良好关系，但也对他的不可预测性保持警惕。

周日卡塔尔多哈的伊朗导弹袭击。

While Israeli and American officials might believe that the benefits of potential regime change in Iran could override the potential consequences of the war, Mr. Baharoon said he was “not sure this is an outcome that we will see in the remaining part of a Trump presidency.”

法鲁克表示，美以官员或许认为，伊朗政权更迭的潜在收益可能超过战争后果，但他“不确定在特朗普剩余任期内能看到这个结果的实现”。

If the war ends up toppling or weakening the Iranian regime, Gulf leaders would be forced to face another uncomfortable issue. Iran is a regional rival and a persistent security threat to some Gulf countries, especially to Saudi Arabia. But Gulf officials and analysts said they saw Iran’s power as a check on Israel’s regional ambitions.

如果战争最终推翻或削弱伊朗政权，海湾国家领导人将被迫面对另一个棘手问题。伊朗是地区对手，对部分海湾国家尤其是沙特构成持续安全威胁。但海湾地区官员与分析人士表示，他们认为伊朗的力量可以制衡以色列的地区野心。

And even though several Gulf rulers have cultivated closer ties with Israel in recent years, none of them want a Middle East dominated by the nation.

尽管近年多名海湾统治者积极发展与以色列的关系，但无人希望出现一个由以色列主导的中东。

Some Gulf officials have come to view Israel as a threat to regional security, too, according to analysts. Israel has become increasingly belligerent since the Iran-backed Hamas led an attack on the country on Oct. 7, 2023, that killed about 1,200 people.

分析人士称，部分海湾官员已开始将以色列也视为地区安全威胁。自2023年10月7日伊朗支持的哈马斯袭击以色列，造成约1200人死亡后，以色列变得愈发好战。

Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al-Thani, a former Qatari prime minister, warned in a series of social media posts this week that once this war ends, “new dynamics will emerge in the region,” and “Israel is likely to wield considerable influence.”

卡塔尔前首相哈马德·本·贾西姆·阿勒萨尼本周在一系列社交媒体帖文中警告，一旦战争结束，“地区将出现新态势，”并且“以色列可能掌握巨大的影响力”。

Sheikh Hamad urged the Gulf states not to be drawn “into a direct confrontation with Iran” and called for greater self-reliance. What had happened this week “compels the Gulf to reassess its strategic outlook to ensure that we are not drawn into conflicts that do not serve our interests,” he added.

哈马德敦促海湾国家不要被“拖入与伊朗的直接对抗”，并呼吁加强自主能力。他补充说，本周发生的一切“迫使海湾重新评估战略前景，确保不被卷入不符合自身利益的冲突”。

周一，迪拜国际机场的到达大厅空无一人。

“This reassessment requires building a credible deterrent capability that relies less on external allies and more on our own collective capacities,” Sheikh Hamad added.

“这一重新评估需要建立可靠的威慑能力，更少依赖外部盟友，更多依靠我们自身的集体力量，”哈马德表示。

Gulf officials have so far at least publicly indicated that they are seeking to de-escalate the war, not join it.

截至目前，海湾官员至少在公开层面表示，他们寻求缓和战争，而非加入战争。

“We are in contact with our allies in the region and with all those concerned to discuss de-escalation,” Majed al-Ansari, a Qatari foreign ministry spokesman, said in a news media briefing on Tuesday. “Our focus is on defending our homeland.”

“我们正与地区盟友及有关各方接触，讨论缓和局势，”卡塔尔外交部发言人马吉德·安萨里周二在新闻发布会上表示。“我们的重点是保卫祖国。”

The United Arab Emirates, which has faced the brunt of the Iranian attacks this week, also believes that diplomacy remains the only viable path to ending the regional crisis, Reem Al-Hashimy, an Emirati minister of state, told a news media briefing on Tuesday.

在本周伊朗发起的袭击中，阿联酋首当其冲，该国国务部长雷姆·阿尔哈希米周二在新闻发布会上表示，外交仍是结束地区危机的唯一可行途径。

“The military solution will only lead to more crises,” she said.

“军事解决方案只会带来更多危机，”她说。

The Islamic Republic of Iran’s first priority is to survive. To do that, its leaders will want to drive up the cost of the war for President Trump — in terms of American casualties, energy costs and inflation — to try to persuade him to declare victory and go home.

伊朗伊斯兰共和国的首要任务是生存。为此，其领导人将设法提高这场战争带给特朗普总统的代价——无论是美军伤亡、能源价格或是通胀——试图说服他宣告胜利、收兵回国。

Faced with the overwhelming firepower of the United States and Israel, diplomats and analysts say, Iran is working to enlarge the battlefield from its own territory to the broader region. The goals are to damage oil and gas infrastructure in neighboring countries, shut the Strait of Hormuz to shipping and curtail air traffic — all to disrupt the economies of the Persian Gulf and drive up global energy prices and inflation. Iran will also be trying to exhaust the number of expensive missile interceptors held by its enemies.

外交官和分析人士表示，面对美国和以色列的压倒性火力，伊朗正努力将战场从本国领土扩大至整个地区。其目标包括破坏邻国油气基础设施、封锁霍尔木兹海峡航运、削减空中交通。所有这些都是为了扰乱波斯湾国家的经济，推高全球能源价格与通胀。伊朗还将试图耗尽对手昂贵的导弹拦截系统储备。

“The war has become a test of wills and stamina,” said Vali Nasr of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington. “Iran is facing qualitatively superior militaries, so the strategy is to test their will by expanding the battlefield, complicating the war and increasing the danger to the world economy.”

“这场战争已成为意志与耐力的较量，”华盛顿约翰·霍普金斯大学高级国际研究学院的瓦利·纳赛尔说。“伊朗面对的是质量上占优的军队，因此其战略是通过扩大战场、将战争复杂化、增加对世界经济的威胁，来考验对方的意志。”

The strategy is not complicated.

这一战略并不复杂。

Ali Vaez, the Iran director of the Brussels-based think tank International Crisis Group, said, “The Iranians want to spread the pain as much as they can, regardless of the cost to themselves and burned relations with their neighbors, hoping to create enough opposition to the war to compel President Trump to back off.”

总部位于布鲁塞尔的智库国际危机组织伊朗项目负责人阿里·瓦埃兹表示：“伊朗人企图不惜代价将痛苦扩散至最大范围，即便这意味着与邻国关系破裂，希望制造足够多的反战压力，迫使特朗普总统收手。”

“For the Islamic Republic,” he added, “survival is a victory, even if it is a Pyrrhic one.”

“对伊斯兰共和国而言，”他补充道，“生存就是胜利，哪怕是一场惨胜。”

周二，美以空袭后德黑兰正在清理瓦砾。一位分析人士表示：“这场战争已演变成意志与耐力的较量。”

The plan is so-called asymmetric endurance, accepting initial damage to preserve the ability to escalate when Israeli, American and Persian Gulf air defenses are stretched thin. The thinking behind that strategy is that Mr. Trump, facing midterm elections and a skeptical MAGA movement, will choose to curtail the war before American casualties, and inflation, go much higher.

该计划就是所谓的非对称持久战：承受初期损失，以保留升级战事的实力，待以色列、美国及波斯湾地区防空力量捉襟见肘时再行反击。这一战略背后的判断是：面临中期选举与“让美国再次伟大”运动内部质疑的特朗普，会选择在美国伤亡和通胀进一步攀升前结束战争。

Already, U.S. and even some European bases and embassies have been attacked, six American troops have been killed and three planes shot down. Hezbollah has entered the war, and the Persian Gulf countries are anxious and running out of expensive interceptors used against cheap Iranian drones. Saudi and Qatari energy installations have been struck. Oil and gas prices have shot up and shipping has practically stopped through the Strait of Hormuz, through which at least a fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas normally travels.

目前，美国甚至部分欧洲国家的基地与使馆已遭袭击，六名美军士兵死亡，三架飞机被击落。真主党已参战，波斯湾国家焦虑不安，用于拦截廉价伊朗无人机的昂贵拦截弹即将耗尽。沙特与卡塔尔能源设施遭袭。油气价格暴涨，霍尔木兹海峡航运几乎停滞——全球至少五分之一的石油与天然气通常经由这里运输。

Ali Larijani, secretary of the Iranian National Security Council, claimed on social media on Monday that Iran, “unlike the United States, has prepared itself for a long war,” including plans for gradual escalation and expansion of the battlefield.

伊朗国家安全委员会秘书阿里·拉里贾尼周一在社交媒体上宣称，伊朗“与美国不同，已为长期战争做好准备”，包括逐步升级与扩大战场的计划。

Franz-Stefan Gady, a military analyst, called the conflict “a race for and against time.” Israel, the United States and their allies are trying to destroy missiles, launchers and communication nodes as quickly as possible, he said, so that more advanced Iranian missiles cannot easily be launched when interceptors are in short supply.

军事分析师弗朗茨-斯特凡·加迪称这场冲突是“一场争取时间又在对抗时间的较量”。他表示，以色列、美国及其盟友正试图尽快摧毁导弹、发射装置与通信节点，以便在拦截弹短缺时，伊朗更先进的导弹无法轻易发射。

Even the heavily armed Israel, toward the end of the 12-day war against Iran in June, had to limit its use of interceptors, allowing some Iranian missiles to land if they were not deemed to be close to key sites or cities.

即便是军备雄厚的以色列，在去年6月为期12天的对伊朗战争接近尾声时也不得不限制拦截弹的使用，允许部分未靠近关键地点或城市的伊朗导弹落地。

耶路撒冷防空系统周日开火拦截伊朗发射的导弹。

If Iran’s strategy is clear, so are the risks. And those are already coming into view.

如果说伊朗的战略清晰，那么其风险也同样明显。而这些风险已初现端倪。

On Monday, Mr. Trump vowed to continue the war for at least another month and did not rule out the use of American ground troops. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said, “The hardest hits are yet to come,” and the Pentagon said it would send more soldiers and fighter jets to the war.

周一，特朗普誓言将战争至少再持续一个月，且不排除动用美国地面部队。国务卿鲁比奥表示：“最猛烈的打击还在后头。”五角大楼称将向战场增派士兵与战斗机。

And there are suggestions, analysts say, that the United States is encouraging Iranian minorities, like the Kurds and the Baluchis, to rise up against the government, bombing police and army positions in those territories, hoping to create at least the start of a popular uprising.

分析人士称，有迹象显示，美国正在鼓动库尔德人、俾路支人等伊朗少数族群反抗政府，轰炸这些地区的警察与军队据点，希望至少为民意起事的开端创造条件。

Although Iran has attacked Persian Gulf countries, including hotels and airports, Tehran has so far failed to drive a wedge between them and Washington.

尽管伊朗已袭击多个波斯海湾国家，包括酒店与机场，但德黑兰迄今未能在这些国家与华盛顿之间制造裂痕。

The nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council, including Saudi Arabia, issued a statement on Sunday underlining “their unified stance in confronting these attacks, stressing that the security of G.C.C. member states is indivisible” and reserving the right to respond in self-defense.

包括沙特在内的海湾合作委员会国家周日发表声明，强调“在应对这些袭击上立场统一，强调海合会成员国安全不可分割”，并保留自卫反击权利。

While calling for a cessation of hostilities, the members have not criticized the U.S.-Israel war against Iran and are likely to allow American forces to have overflight rights, which they denied at the start of the war.

这些成员国虽呼吁停止敌对行动，但并未批评美以对伊战争，且可能允许美军飞越其领空——这一权利在战争初期曾被它们拒绝。

In the past, the Persian Gulf nations have acted as mediators, urging Washington to pursue negotiations with Tehran instead of war. But, under attack from Iran, those countries are now more likely to allow American forces greater operational access to their airspace and territory that would help the United States conduct operations more efficiently, said Hasan T. Alhasan, a Middle East expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London research organization.

伦敦研究机构国际战略研究所的中东专家哈桑·阿尔哈桑表示，以往，波斯湾国家曾扮演调解者，敦促华盛顿与德黑兰谈判而非开战。但如今在遭到伊朗袭击后，这些国家更可能向美军提供更大的空域与领土行动便利，帮助美军更高效地开展行动。

Britain, France and Germany, which have criticized Iran but did not initially support this war, have also now indicated that they could act to protect their own troops and interests in the Persian Gulf, Mr. Alhasan told the BBC, “because everyone realizes that the collective global interest here is at stake.”

英国、法国和德国虽然批评伊朗，但最初并未支持这场战争。这些国家现在也表示可能采取行动保护自己在波斯湾的部队和利益，阿尔哈桑告诉BBC，“因为所有人都意识到，这里涉及的是全球共同利益”。

But having tried to wean itself off Russian gas, Europe is more dependent than ever on energy from the Persian Gulf, while half of India’s oil travels through the Strait of Hormuz. So pressures on Mr. Trump to shorten the war will grow, even if Israel is anxious to force a conclusion to end the threat of the Islamic Republic.

但欧洲在努力摆脱对俄罗斯天然气依赖后，比以往任何时候都更依赖波斯湾能源；印度一半的石油也需经霍尔木兹海峡运输。因此，即便以色列急于一劳永逸消除伊朗伊斯兰共和国的威胁，要求特朗普缩短战争的压力也会不断加大。

黎巴嫩贝鲁特的一所学校被用作被迫逃离家园者的避难所。

Mr. Trump often talks about wanting to do a deal with Iran and has recently brought up the example of Venezuela, where he was content to capture President Nicolás Maduro but leave his government largely in place. “What we did in Venezuela, I think, is the perfect, the perfect scenario,” Mr. Trump told The New York Times on Sunday.

特朗普经常谈及希望与伊朗达成协议，最近还以委内瑞拉为例：他满足于抓捕总统马杜罗而基本保留其政府架构。“我们在委内瑞拉的做法，我认为是完美、完美的范例，”特朗普周日对《纽约时报》表示。

It may be that Iran, too, will replace the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, killed on the first day of the war, with a less ideological government that could be willing to negotiate a deal on its nuclear program to preserve the system.

伊朗也有可能替换战争首日身亡的最高领袖哈梅内伊，组建一个意识形态色彩更淡的政府，该政府愿意就核计划谈判以保全现有体制。

As ever, it is hard to know Mr. Trump’s mind, said Ellie Geranmayeh, an Iran expert with the European Council on Foreign Relations, a research group. “Trump already took out Khamenei, which no other president dared to do,” she said. “He has an offramp if he wants, even if Israel sees a momentous window to take out this regime.”

欧洲对外关系委员会的伊朗专家埃莉·盖尔马耶赫表示，特朗普的真实想法向来难以捉摸。“特朗普已经除掉了哈梅内伊，这是历任总统都不敢做的，”她说。“即便以色列认为这是推翻该政权的重大窗口期，特朗普仍可随时抽身。”

Matthew Kroenig, a former U.S. defense official under Republican presidents who studies Mr. Trump’s foreign policy, agreed. Mr. Trump “is skeptical of long, drawn-out military campaigns” and could be satisfied with a number of outcomes, including the Venezuela model, he said.

曾在共和党总统任内担任美国国防官员、研究特朗普外交政策的马修·克罗尼格对此表示赞同。他说，特朗普“对旷日持久的军事行动持怀疑态度”，多种结果都可能让他满意，包括委内瑞拉模式。

“They’ve already achieved several of their objectives,” added Mr. Kroenig, who is vice president of the Atlantic Council in Washington. Ayatollah Khamenei and much of the leadership of a major American adversary are dead, and Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and other military capabilities are badly degraded, Mr. Kroenig noted.

“他们已经实现了多个目标，”兼任华盛顿大西洋理事会副主席的克罗尼格补充说。他指出，最高领袖哈梅内伊以及这个美国主要对手的大部分领导层已经死亡，伊朗核计划、导弹计划及其他军事能力遭到严重削弱。

“So I think they could go home almost at any time and declare this a success,” he said. Right now, he added, “I think the strategy is more about what they want to avoid than about exactly what they want to achieve.”

“所以我认为他们几乎随时可以宣告胜利并收兵，”他说。他还表示，目前来看，“战略更侧重于规避风险而非追求具体目标。”

The détente between China and the United States was already fragile. Now it faces a new strain: the killing of Iran’s supreme leader, an American-backed strike that Beijing denounced as a blatant attempt at regime change.

中美之间本就脆弱的缓和关系如今又面临新的压力：美国支持的刺杀伊朗最高领袖行动被北京谴责为公然企图改变政权。

China has moved quickly to condemn the U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, with its top diplomat, Wang Yi, accusing both governments of assassinating another country’s leader and pledging to support Tehran’s sovereignty and security.

中国迅速谴责了美国和以色列对伊朗的袭击，中国最高外交官王毅指责两国政府暗杀他国领导人，并承诺支持伊朗的主权与安全。

The killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei came less than two months after American forces captured President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela, another close partner of China. Together, the moves amount to a forceful display of American power against governments China has cultivated as part of its broader global strategy.

伊朗最高领袖哈梅内伊遇袭身亡距美军抓捕中国另一亲密伙伴委内瑞拉总统马杜罗还不到两个月。这两起行动共同构成美国力量的强力展示，直指中国全球战略中重点培育的政府。

Yet for Beijing, the question is how far to defend Iran, its closest diplomatic partner in the Middle East, without hurting its own economic interests or worsening tensions with the United States.

但对北京而言，核心问题是：在不损害自身经济利益、不加剧与美国紧张关系的前提下，应该在多大程度上捍卫其中东最密切的外交伙伴伊朗。

Already, the fighting has touched China directly. China’s foreign ministry said a Chinese national had been killed in Tehran and that Beijing was scrambling to evacuate thousands of its citizens.

战事已直接波及中国。中国外交部称，一名中国公民在德黑兰遇难，北京正紧急撤离数以千计的在伊公民。

一名工人周一在伊朗德黑兰空袭后拆除受损建筑的钢结构。

Beijing is likely troubled by the potential ripple effects of the American and Israeli strikes. China is the world’s largest importer of energy and Iran has already threatened to “set on fire” any ships traveling through the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway off Iran’s southern coast through which a fifth of the world’s oil travels. That could drive up prices and hit China’s economy.

美以发动的袭击带来的潜在连锁反应很可能让北京忧心忡忡。中国是全球最大能源进口国，而伊朗已威胁要“点燃”所有穿越霍尔木兹海峡的船只——这条伊朗南部沿海的航道承载着全球五分之一的石油运输。这可能推高能源价格，冲击中国经济。

There is also a quieter, domestic sensitivity to foreign-backed regime change. Xi Jinping, China’s leader, who has been in power since 2012 and is widely expected to begin a fourth term next year, presides over a political system that brooks no dissent. Under a Chinese state media article about Mr. Khamenei’s death, internet users congratulated Iranian residents and wondered aloud which leader might be next. Other comments suggesting that Iranians might have been celebrating have been censored.

此外，中国国内对于外国势力推动的政权更迭还有一层更隐秘的敏感情绪。自2012年执政、并被广泛预计将于明年开启第四个任期的中国领导人习近平领导着一个不容异见的政治体制。在中国官媒一篇关于哈梅内伊身亡的报道下，有网民向伊朗民众道贺，并大胆猜测下一个遇刺的领导人可能是谁。其他暗示伊朗民众可能在庆祝的评论已被审查删除。

Even as it navigates the various dimensions of the fallout from Iran, Beijing is likely most focused on its relationship with the United States.

即便要应对伊朗局势引发的多方面连锁反应，北京最关注的大概率仍是与美国的关系。

President Trump and China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, are weeks away from a summit in Beijing where they are expected to extend a trade truce between the world’s two-largest economies.

特朗普总统与中国最高领导人习近平几周后将在北京举行峰会，预计双方会延长这两大经济体之间的贸易休战协议。

The White House has said the meeting would take place from March 31 to April 2. China has yet to confirm details of the meeting and a foreign ministry spokeswoman said on Monday only that the two countries were in talks.

白宫已宣布会晤将于3月31日至4月2日举行。中国尚未确认会晤细节，外交部发言人周一仅表示，两国正就此沟通。

China could still consider canceling or postponing the meeting with Mr. Trump to show its displeasure with Washington’s use of military power against Iran.

中国仍可能考虑取消或推迟与特朗普的会晤，以此表达对华盛顿对伊朗动武的不满。

1989年，时任伊朗总统哈梅内伊访问中国，在北京会见了中国领导人邓小平。

Despite its sharp rhetoric over Iran, Beijing has strong incentives to keep its relationship with the United States on an even keel, analysts said. China wants Washington to agree to extend the trade truce, reduce its support for Taiwan and ease its restrictions on technology exports.

分析人士称，尽管在伊朗问题上言辞激烈，北京仍有强烈动机维持与美国关系的平稳。中国希望华盛顿同意延长贸易休战、减少对台支持，并放宽对华技术出口限制。

“Beijing cares much more about managing the United States than events in the Middle East,” said Julian Gewirtz, a former senior director for China and Taiwan Affairs at the National Security Council under President Joseph R. Biden Jr.

“比起中东局势，北京更在意如何处理对美关系，”拜登政府时期国家安全委员会中国与台湾事务前高级主任朱利安·格维茨表示。

The trip to China, which would be the first by an American president since Mr. Trump went in 2017, is seen as vital for maintaining the truce Mr. Xi and Mr. Trump reached last October in Busan, South Korea. Before that, China and the United States had engaged in a blistering trade war that sunk relations to their lowest point in more than 50 years.

此次访华将是特朗普2017年访华后美国总统首次访华，被视为维系习近平与特朗普去年10月在韩国釜山达成的休战协议的关键。此前，中美曾爆发激烈贸易战，双边关系跌至50多年来的最低点。

For China, postponing or canceling the summit would carry costs of its own. Mr. Trump has signaled a willingness to avoid confrontation with Beijing. His administration recently delayed announcing a package of arms sales to Taiwan, the self-governed island claimed by Beijing. It has eased restrictions on sales of advanced American chips to China. Mr. Trump refrained from mentioning China in last week’s State of the Union address, an unusual omission.

对中国而言，推迟或取消峰会自身也将付出代价。特朗普已释放出避免与北京对抗的意愿：其政府近期推迟公布对台军售计划（台湾是北京宣称拥有主权的自治岛屿），放宽了对华先进芯片的销售限制；上周国情咨文演讲中，特朗普未提及中国，这是一个不寻常的遗漏。

The legal landscape has also shifted in favor of Beijing, with the recent Supreme Court ruling that struck down many of President Trump’s tariffs. His new 10 percent tariff on global imports is beneficial to China.

法律层面也出现对北京有利的变化：美国最高法院近期的裁决推翻了特朗普多项关税政策；他新推出的全球进口商品10%关税政策对中国有利。

Walking away from the meeting could mean forfeiting that momentum.

放弃此次会晤可能意味着错失这一有利势头。

2017年，特朗普总统与中国国家主席习近平举行会晤。当时特朗普对中国进行了国事访问，虽然仪式隆重，但未取得实质性成果。

Beyond the summit, the conflict could reshape the strategic landscape in ways that benefit Beijing. Already, the United States has amassed the largest military force in the Middle East since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, deploying aircraft carrier strike groups and jets to the region. If that effort proves sustained, it could draw American attention and resources away from Asia.

除峰会外，这场冲突还可能重塑战略格局，给北京带来利好。美国已在中东集结了自2003年伊拉克战争以来规模最大的军事力量，向该地区部署了航母打击群与战机。若这一部署持续，可能会将美国的注意力与资源从亚洲转移。

Beijing may not be bothered if “the United States becomes bogged down in another unpopular war in the Middle East” that distracts it from China, Mr. Gewirtz said.

格维茨表示，如果“美国再次陷入一场不得人心的中东战争”，从而分散对中国的关注，北京或许并不会介意。

Beijing must also thread a diplomatic needle with Tehran. China has forged deep economic ties with many of the countries in the Gulf that Iran has launched attacks against in recent days, such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Mr. Wang tried to strike a balance in his call with Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, calling on Iran to “pay attention to reasonable concerns of its neighboring countries.”

北京还必须在对伊朗外交方面拿捏分寸。中国与伊朗近期袭击的多个海湾国家（如阿联酋、沙特）有着深厚经济联系。王毅在与伊朗外长阿拉格齐通话时试图平衡立场，呼吁伊朗“重视邻国合理关切”。

Unlike the United States, which has formal defense commitments with dozens of allies, China has only one, with North Korea. Its partnerships with Iran and Venezuela are strategic, not military alliances.

美国与数十个盟友有正式防务承诺，而中国仅与朝鲜有此类承诺。中伊、中委关系是战略伙伴关系，而非军事同盟。

“Xi Jinping is unsentimental toward all of Beijing’s external relationships. He got to where he is based on his hardheadedness,” said Joe Webster, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, a Washington research group. “There’s not a large dividend for having a soft heart in the Chinese Communist Party.”

“习近平对北京所有对外关系都不感情用事，他能走到今天的位置，靠的是务实强硬，”华盛顿研究机构大西洋理事会高级研究员乔·韦伯斯特表示。“在中共内部，心软没什么好处。”

Beijing will instead likely continue to offer rhetorical support for Tehran while arguing that the United States is the greatest source of global instability. An editorial in the Global Times, a Chinese Communist Party tabloid, on Monday called on the international community to reject what it said was Washington’s bid to return the world to the “law of the jungle.”

因此，北京大概率会继续在口头上支持伊朗，同时指责美国是全球不稳定的最大根源。中共所有的小报《环球时报》周一发表社论，呼吁国际社会抵制华盛顿试图让世界重回“丛林法则”的行径。

Chinese analysts speaking to state media say the United States and Israel are sowing chaos in the Middle East and have set a dangerous precedent by assassinating Mr. Khamenei.

中国官媒援引的分析人士称，美以两国正在中东播撒混乱，且暗杀哈梅内伊开创了危险先例。

Still, the strikes on Iran have laid bare the gulf between the two superpowers’ military capabilities. Despite its rapid investment in recent decades, China does not possess an army like the United States that can project power in any part of the world.

但对伊朗的袭击也暴露了两个超级大国军事实力的差距。尽管中国近几十年快速投入军力建设，却尚未拥有像美国那样、能在全球任何地方投射力量的军队。

That rankles Beijing, said Dylan Loh, an expert on Chinese foreign policy at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, because it means no country — not even China — can stop the United States from taking whatever action it wants.

新加坡南洋理工大学中国外交政策专家骆明辉表示，这让北京感到刺痛——因为这意味着没有任何国家能阻止美国为所欲为，哪怕中国也不例外。

“The demonstration of raw, hard power is something that will worry Beijing,” Mr. Loh said.

“这种赤裸裸的硬实力展示，会让北京感到担忧，”骆明辉说。

People on social media in China and the West can’t stop comparing Alysa Liu and Eileen Gu, two of the biggest stars at the Winter Olympics. It’s hard not to. Both were born and raised in the Bay Area. Both have a parent from China. Both are sports prodigies.

中美社交媒体上的网民热衷于将冬奥会最闪耀的两颗明星——刘美贤和谷爱凌进行对比。这确实很难避免：两人都在湾区出生长大，都是体育神童，父母中都有一方来自中国。

In Milan, Ms. Liu, 20, became the first American in 24 years to win gold in women’s figure skating, and she added a second gold in the team event. Ms. Gu, 22, won one gold and two silvers in freestyle skiing.

在米兰冬奥赛场，20岁的刘美贤成为24年来首位夺得女子花样滑冰金牌的美国人，她还在团体赛中随队获得了一枚金牌。22岁的谷爱凌则在自由式滑雪项目中摘得一金两银。

The difference: Ms. Liu, whose father was a Tiananmen-era dissident who fled China for the United States in 1989, was on Team U.S.A. Ms. Gu, who obtained a Chinese passport in 2019, chose to represent China.

不同之处在于：刘美贤的父亲是天安门事件时期的异见人士，于1989年逃往美国，她代表美国队参赛；谷爱凌于2019年获得中国护照，选择代表中国出战。

In the United States, many people celebrated Ms. Liu’s performance as a win for liberty, while some, like the former National Basketball Association player Enes Kanter Freedom and various conservative media figures, have called Ms. Gu a traitor. Several politicians have accused her of supporting America’s adversary.

在美国，许多人将刘美贤的表现赞誉为自由的胜利；前NBA球员埃内斯·坎特·自由和各类保守派媒体人士则斥责谷爱凌为叛徒。几位政治人士甚至指责她支持美国的对手。

On the Chinese internet, the treatment of the two women was largely reversed. On the Chinese social media platform Weibo, for instance, a user based in Guangdong commented, “Eileen Gu is a hero of China while Alysa Liu is a descendant of an anti-China figure.”

在中国互联网上，对两人的评价完全反转。例如，在社交平台微博上，一名广东用户评论道：“谷爱凌是中国的英雄，刘美贤是反华分子的后代。”

The reaction is both unfortunate and predictable. As the United States and China intensify a geopolitical rivalry that could determine global leadership deep into the 21st century, nationalism on both sides has intensified.

这种反应既令人遗憾，又在预料之中。随着中美两国可能决定21世纪全球领导权的地缘政治竞争愈演愈烈，双方的民族主义情绪也随之升温。

The uncomfortable comparison so many are making between Ms. Liu and Ms. Gu speaks to more than sport. It exposes questions of heritage, loyalty and identity, thrusting the two athletes into the politics of both countries. Much of the commentary is a proxy for rival nationalism: on the American side, increasingly vocal demands that immigrants prove their allegiance; on the Chinese side, an insistence that Chinese ethnicity demands loyalty and that dissent is betrayal.

许多人对刘美贤和谷爱凌进行这种令人不适的对比，其意义已超出了体育本身。它揭示了关于血统、忠诚和身份认同的问题，将两名运动员推向了两国的政治风口浪尖。许多评论已成为对抗性民族主义的代名词：在美国，要求移民证明忠诚的呼声日益高涨；中国则坚持认为华裔血统就必须效忠，异见即是背叛。

The Chinese Communist Party has long advanced an ethnonationalist idea of belonging: that people of Chinese descent, wherever they reside and whatever passport they hold, remain part of the Chinese nation. Under Xi Jinping, who took full power in 2013, this principle has strengthened: Ethnicity has become a bond that carries expectations of loyalty.

中国共产党长期推行一种血缘民族主义的归属观：无论华裔身处何方、持有何种护照，始终是中华民族的一部分。在2013年全面掌权的习近平领导下，这一原则得到了强化：族裔身份已成为一种承载忠诚期待的纽带。

刘美贤在米兰滑冰场参加训练。

Many Chinese people, in and outside the country, who criticize or question official Beijing positions, not only political activists but journalists, too, are invariably labeled sellouts or worse.

无论身处国内还是海外，许多批评或质疑北京官方立场的华人——不仅是政治活动人士，连记者也不例外——无不被贴上卖国贼或更难听的标签。

This is worth keeping in mind when Americans call Ms. Gu a traitor. They’re borrowing the Chinese Communist Party’s vocabulary and adopting its framework of birthplace loyalty.

当美国人称谷爱凌为叛徒时，这一点值得警惕：他们借用了中国共产党的词汇，并采纳了那种“出生地效忠”的框架。

The ethnonationalist philosophy also explains the scale of China’s investment in athletes of Chinese heritage. Of the 48 players on China’s men’s and women’s Olympic hockey teams in 2022, 22 were naturalized athletes with Chinese lineage.

这种血缘民族主义理念也解释了中国在华裔运动员上的巨大投入。在2022年冬奥中国男女冰球队的48名球员中，有22名是华裔归化运动员。

Ms. Gu was the most visible example of this recruitment effort. When she switched to represent China in 2019, she became a geopolitical asset for Beijing.

谷爱凌是这一招募行动中最显眼的例子。当她在2019年转而代表中国参赛时，她便成为了北京的地缘政治资产。

A Beijing city government document published last year showed that the municipal sports bureau planned to pay Ms. Gu and one other American-born athlete competing for China a combined $14 million over three years. Their names were later scrubbed from the record after it drew public criticism. The episode offered a rare glimpse into how the state invests in athletic success as a form of soft power.

去年发布的一份北京市政府文件显示，市体育局曾计划在三年内向谷爱凌和另一位代表中国参赛的美籍华裔运动员支付近亿元人民币。在引起公众批评后，两人的名字随后从记录中被删除。这一插曲让人罕见地窥见中国如何将体育成功作为一种软实力进行投资。

If Ms. Gu’s case illustrates how the state embraces certain members of the Chinese diaspora, Ms. Liu’s family story illustrated how it treats others.

如果说谷爱凌的案例说明了中国如何接纳某一些海外华人，刘美贤的家族故事则说明了它如何对待另一些群体。

谷爱凌在奥运会前进行训练。

Her father, Arthur Liu, was a student activist who ended up on the government’s most wanted list after the Tiananmen crackdown. He fled to the United States, became a lawyer and raised five children as a single father. Alysa is the oldest. She started skating at 5 and became national champion at 13. Mr. Liu said in media interviews that he had been approached about having Alysa represent China but declined out of concerns about the country’s human rights record.

她的父亲刘俊曾是一名学生领袖，在天安门镇压后被列入政府头号通缉名单。他逃往美国成为一名律师，并作为单身父亲抚养了五个孩子，刘美贤是长女。她五岁开始滑冰，13岁便成为全美冠军。刘俊在媒体采访中表示，曾有人接洽希望刘美贤代表中国参赛，但他因担忧该国的人权记录而拒绝了。

Before the 2022 Beijing Olympics, it was reported at the time, U.S. authorities informed Mr. Liu that he and Alysa were targets of a Chinese government-linked surveillance and harassment effort. The U.S. government provided protection for Alysa during the games. She was 16. It was her first trip to China.

据当时的报道，在2022年北京冬奥会前，美国当局告知刘俊，他和刘美贤成为与中国政府有关联的监视和骚扰行动的目标。美国政府在比赛期间为刘美贤提供了保护。那时她16岁，是第一次来到中国。

Mr. Liu also said he had learned that Beijing was aware that his daughter had once posted an Instagram message about the government’s crackdown on the ethnic minority Uyghurs in China.

刘俊还表示，他获悉北京方面知道他的女儿曾在Instagram上发布过一条关于政府镇压中国少数民族维吾尔人的消息。

When Ms. Liu won gold medals in Milan, she became a problem that China’s censorship apparatus could not quite solve. Praise for her skating on the internet in China was often followed by vague warnings, usually from commenters, to “look up her family background and political orientation.” They couldn’t be more specific and had to resort to euphemisms and coded language because references to June 4, 1989, the date of the Tiananmen massacre, are heavily censored. She is sometimes called a “second-generation anti-China figure.”

当刘美贤在米兰赢得金牌时，她成了中国审查机构无法彻底解决的一个麻烦。中国互联网上，对她滑冰技术的赞美往往伴随着模糊的警告，评论者通常提醒人们去“查查她的家庭背景和政治取向”。他们无法说得更具体，只能借助于委婉语和暗号，因为对1989年6月4日天安门事件这一日期的提及是被严厉审查的。她有时被称为“反华二代”。

If parts of China struggle with how to absorb Ms. Liu’s story, parts of the United States struggle to understand Ms. Gu’s. Their underlying logic — that identity carries duty — sounds familiar to the ears of many Chinese.

如果说中国部分群体难以接纳刘美贤的故事，美国部分群体也难以理解谷爱凌的故事。但他们的底层逻辑——身份承载着义务——对许多中国人来说听起来非常耳熟。

At the same time, some on the American political left risk flattening all criticism of Ms. Gu as racism, sidestepping questions about how authoritarian governments deploy athletes and soft power.

与此同时，美国政治左翼中的一些人将所有针对谷爱凌的批评都简化为种族主义，这带来一种风险——有可能回避了关于威权政府如何利用运动员和软实力的问题。

Ms. Gu grew up with feet in both worlds, but the rivalry between Washington and Beijing has narrowed the space for dual belonging.

谷爱凌在两个世界中长大，但华盛顿与北京之间的对抗挤压了这种双重归属的空间。

She spent most summers in Beijing, her mother’s hometown. She speaks fluent Mandarin Chinese and in 2019, at 15, became a naturalized Chinese citizen, joining Beijing’s effort to project national strength on the global stage. It proved to be a lucrative arrangement for both sides. Ms. Gu has won six Olympic medals for China and became one of the highest-earning female athletes in the world, with most of her sponsors being Chinese brands and global brands targeting the Chinese market.

她大部分夏天都在母亲的家乡北京度过。她能讲流利的普通话，并在2019年15岁时入籍成为中国公民，加入了北京向全球展示国家实力的行动。事实证明，这对双方都是一笔划算的买卖。谷爱凌为中国赢得了六枚奥运奖牌，成为世界上收入最高的女运动员之一，她的赞助商大多是中国品牌以及针对中国市场的全球品牌。

Ms. Gu has declined to comment on her citizenship status — Chinese law forbids dual citizenship — and on China’s human rights record. Time magazine asked her recently about the treatment of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang. She replied that she did not think it was her business to comment. She was not an expert, she said, and reaching a conclusion would require extensive research and a visit to the region in China.

谷爱凌一直拒绝评论她的国籍状态（中国法律禁止双重国籍）以及中国的人权记录。《时代》杂志最近询问她关于新疆维吾尔人的待遇问题。她回答说，她认为评价这些并非她的职责。她说自己不是专家，要得出结论需要进行广泛的研究并实地考察中国该地区。

Her response set off criticism from human rights activists. “Choosing who you represent is a personal decision. No one is a traitor for that,” wrote the Digital Citizens for Human Rights, an X account that focuses on China. “You don’t need to speak for power. But you cannot claim innocence while benefiting from it.”

她的回应引发了人权活动人士的批评。关注中国的X账号“数字公民”写道：“选择代表谁是个人的决定，没人因此就是叛徒。你不需要为权力发声，但不能在受益于权力时声称自己清白无辜。”

Even on Chinese social media, Ms. Gu is a divisive figure. While many Chinese people hail her as a hero and address her adoringly as the “snow princess,” some criticize her for having the privilege of being “a part-time Chinese” — being Chinese when it is profitable and American when it is convenient.

即使在中国社交媒体上，谷爱凌也是一个充满争议的人物。虽然许多中国人尊称她为英雄，亲切地称她为“冰雪公主”，但也有人批评她拥有“兼职中国人”的特权——在有利可图时做中国人，在方便时做美国人。

“She gets to have it both ways. Must be nice,” one commenter wrote on Weibo, the Chinese internet platform.

“她两家通吃。一定很棒吧，”有人在微博上写道。

Authoritarian politics and military aggression are a dangerous mix. As President Trump announced his war on Iran wearing a baseball cap in a video released in the early hours Saturday morning while he was at Mar-a-Lago, that lesson hung heavily over the proceedings. This was a decision made by one man with no legal basis, little public support and no coherent explanation of an endgame.

威权政治与军事侵略是一种危险的组合。周六凌晨，戴着棒球帽的特朗普总统在佛罗里达州马阿拉歌庄园发布视频，宣布对伊朗开战，这一教训沉重地笼罩着整个过程。这是由一人作出的决定，没有法律依据，缺乏公众支持，也没有对最终目标作出前后一致的解释。

Within a few months, Mr. Trump has ordered the military to blow up boats in the Caribbean, abduct the leader of Venezuela and decapitate the government of Iran. The absence of any congressional authorization or campaign to prepare the American people feels intentional. We are not meant to think too much about the basis for action, how much it costs or what happens after the spectacle of bombs falling. Before we digest the last operation, there is the threat of a new one. The dizzying nature of these actions makes them seem routine.

在短短几个月里，特朗普下令军方在加勒比海炸毁船只，绑架委内瑞拉领导人，斩首伊朗政府。他的行动没有任何国会授权，也没有开展让美国人民有所准备的宣传活动，这种缺失让人感觉是刻意为之。他们刻意让我们不要去深究行动的依据、代价，或者炸弹落下的震撼场面之后会发生什么。我们还没消化完上一次行动，新的威胁就已经出现。这种令人目眩的节奏使这些行动显得仿佛稀松平常。

But something has shifted. Mr. Trump now regularly uses the military as an extension of his personal instincts. He may try to keep the operation short. That won’t stave off the consequences. Whatever happens in the coming weeks, the United States has extended its post-9/11 forever war into Iran, an act that will reverberate across the Middle East for years to come.

但情况已经发生变化。特朗普现在经常将军队用作他个人本能的延伸。他可能会试图让行动保持短促。但这无法避免后果。无论未来几周发生什么，美国已将后“9·11”时代无休无止的战争延伸到了伊朗，这一举动将在未来数年里在整个中东地区产生严重影响。

The immediate questions concern the course of the war. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was a brutal and repressive force in the lives of Iranians for decades. His demise hardly resolves the matter of who will control a country of more than 90 million people, particularly as the most heavily armed factions tend to be the most hard-line and are faced with a direct threat to their power and wealth.

眼前的问题关乎战争的走向。几十年来，伊朗最高领袖哈梅内伊一直是压迫伊朗人的一股残暴压制力量。他的死并不能解决谁来控制这个拥有9000多万人口国家的问题，尤其是那些武装最精良的派系往往最为强硬，他们正面临对其权力和财富的直接威胁。

The Iranian regime is weakened but still capable of inflicting damage. Strikes at U.S. military facilities and civilian targets from the Persian Gulf states to Israel suggest an initial strategy of trying to redistribute the violence and disruption wrought upon Iran to its neighbors. Attacks on energy infrastructure and shipping could bring those costs to the global economy. (Energy prices have already jumped.) Retaliatory cyberoperations, terrorism and proxy strikes could also come in waves.

伊朗政权虽然遭到削弱，但仍然具备造成破坏的能力。从波斯湾国家到以色列，对美国军事设施和民用目标的打击表明，伊朗的初步战略是把施加在它身上的暴力与破坏引向邻国。对能源基础设施和航运的攻击可能会把这些代价转嫁给全球经济。（能源价格已经上涨。）报复性的网络行动、恐怖主义以及代理人袭击也可能一波波袭来。

Mr. Trump’s only stated plan for regime change was a call for the Iranian people to rise up. Then what? Those who do may be massacred. Some version of the regime could still cling to power. Iran could devolve into civil conflict, as Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya did after the initially triumphant toppling of their leaders. Separatist movements among ethnic minorities could fracture the country and draw in neighboring states. Protracted violence or extreme poverty could lead to a surge of refugees into Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey and ultimately Europe.

特朗普关于政权更迭唯一公开宣称的方案是呼吁伊朗人民起来反抗。然后呢？那些起义者可能会遭到屠杀。伊朗政权的某种形式仍可能顽强维持权力。伊朗也可能像阿富汗、伊拉克和利比亚那样，在其领导人最初被成功推翻后陷入内战。少数民族中的分离主义运动可能会导致国家分裂，并把邻国卷入其中。长期的暴力或极端贫困可能会导致难民涌入阿富汗、巴基斯坦、土耳其，最终流向欧洲。

There are, of course, better scenarios. A chastened regime could pursue some form of accommodation with America and evolution at home. Or perhaps Iran could buck the trend of nearly every other country from North Africa to South Asia that has undergone regime change this century and transition peacefully to a democratic form of government.

当然，也存在更好的可能。一个受挫的政权可能会寻求某种形式的对美妥协，并在国内推动渐进变革。或者，伊朗可能逆转本世纪从北非到南亚几乎所有经历政权更迭国家的趋势，实现向民主政体的和平过渡。

Mr. Trump will surely declare victory in Iran, just as he did last summer. But wars play out in the lives of people and nations, not news cycles. The 1953 U.S. and British-backed coup that enabled the shah to consolidate power in Iran appeared to be a victory, but it became part of the DNA of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Islamic republic that has bedeviled the United States ever since.

特朗普肯定会像去年夏天那样宣布在伊朗取得胜利。但战争的展开关乎人民和国家的生命，而不是新闻周期的更迭。1953年美英支持的政变使伊朗国王得以在伊朗巩固权力，当时这看似一场胜利，但它却成了1979年伊朗革命以及其后一直困扰美国的伊斯兰共和国的基因组成部分。

Even those who welcome the decapitation of the Iranian regime may feel deep unease about America’s behavior. The United States, like Israel, now seems to follow no rules, consult few allies and pay little regard to the destruction it leaves behind, including in the prosperous Arab gulf states. Like an empire of old, it demands tribute — be it Venezuelan oil or payments to the amorphous “Board of Peace.” Mr. Trump’s tariff policies, maximum pressure sanctions, episodic threats on Greenland and military action are experienced as a strategy of calculated chaos.

即使那些欢迎伊朗政权被斩首的人也可能对美国的行为深感不安。美国如今似乎和以色列一样，不遵循任何规则，很少咨询盟友意见，也很少顾及自己所留下的破坏，包括在富裕的阿拉伯海湾国家造成的影响。它像一个老牌帝国一样要求进贡——无论是委内瑞拉的石油，还是向说不清道不明的和平委员会付款。特朗普的关税政策、极限施压制裁、对格陵兰的间歇性威胁以及军事行动都被视为一种蓄意制造混乱的策略。

What lessons will nations draw from this new reality? For would-be nuclear powers, it is that North Korea’s arsenal brought security that Iran’s negotiations could not. For Russia and China, it is that might makes right. For our European allies, it is that the United States is an unpredictable force that could again threaten Greenland or meddle in their internal politics at any moment. The old U.S.-led order is dead. The new one feels unstable and ominous, as if a storm could descend at any moment.

各国会从这一新现实中汲取什么教训？对于潜在的核国家来说，教训是朝鲜的核武库带来了伊朗靠谈判无法实现的安全。对于俄罗斯和中国来说，教训是强权即公理。对于我们的欧洲盟友来说，教训是美国是一个不可预测的力量，可能随时再次威胁格陵兰，或干涉它们的内政。由美国主导的旧秩序已经终结。新的秩序则显得不稳定且让人不安，仿佛风暴随时可能降临。

Mr. Trump probably would not have become president without his stated opposition to forever wars; it is a feature, not a bug, of MAGA. Yet in his return to the presidency, he has proved to be far more interested in power itself. Setting aside the risks outlined above, this dynamic alone should compel stronger and sustained Democratic opposition to this war.

特朗普之所以能当选总统，很大程度上正是因为他公开反对永无休止的战争；这是“让美国再次伟大”运动的特征，而非缺陷。然而在重返总统职位后，他展现出对权力本身更强烈的渴求。即便撇开上文概述的风险不谈，这种趋势本身也足以促使民主党对这场战争进行更强烈且持续的反对。

Rather than representing a break from America’s imperial instincts, Mr. Trump has personalized them. There is no reason to believe he won’t lash out militarily again. (How many Americans even know we bombed Nigeria on Christmas Day?) Cuba is currently being starved by a blockade, despite posing no danger to U.S. national security.

特朗普并未摒弃美国的帝国主义倾向，而是将其个人化了。没有理由相信他不会再次动用军事手段。（有多少美国人知道我们在圣诞节轰炸了尼日利亚？）古巴目前正因封锁而挨饿，尽管它并未对美国国家安全构成威胁。

After 25 years of constant war, there is little appetite for this kind of adventurism among the American people. The operations around Venezuela and in Iran are both estimated to cost at least several billion dollars, with more to come. That is not how American taxpayers want their money spent amid a cost-of-living crisis, deep cuts to the social safety net and exploding deficits.

在经历了25年的持续战争之后，美国人民对这种冒险主义已提不起什么兴致。据估计，围绕委内瑞拉的行动以及在伊朗的行动都将至少耗资数十亿美元，后续还会有更多支出。在生活成本危机、社会保障体系大幅削减以及赤字激增的情况下，美国纳税人可不希望他们的钱被这样花掉。

More profoundly, the way Mr. Trump has deployed the newly minted Department of War abroad should raise concerns about what he might do with the military at home. Already he has tried to send troops into American cities but faced judicial pushback. He has mused about invoking the Insurrection Act, which would grant him emergency powers to deploy the military to enforce laws within the United States. Whether in response to peaceful protests or an election loss, this would put American democracy into dangerous territory.

更深层次来看，特朗普在海外动用新成立的战争部的方式应该引发人们对他可能在国内如何动用军队的担忧。他已尝试派遣军队进入美国城市，但遇到了司法阻碍。他考虑过援引《反叛乱法》，这将授予他动用军队在美国境内执法的紧急权力。无论是为了应对和平抗议还是选举失利，这都将把美国民主推入危险境地。

If these scenarios seem fanciful, consider what has already happened. Mr. Trump addressed general officers and suggested that U.S. cities become military training grounds. He called for the imprisonment of a handful of Democratic members of Congress for suggesting that service members should not follow illegal orders. And last week he ordered the government to stop using the services of the artificial intelligence company Anthropic because it refused to allow the Pentagon to have unfettered access to its technology for the mass surveillance of Americans.

如果这些情景听起来像是天方夜谭，不妨想想已经发生的事。特朗普曾对将官们发表讲话，表示美国城市可以成为军事训练场。他呼吁将几名民主党国会议员投入监狱，只因他们主张军人不应服从非法命令。上周，他还命令政府停止使用人工智能公司Anthropic的服务，因为该公司拒绝让五角大楼对其技术拥有不受限制的访问权，以便对美国人进行大规模监控。

We must not be numbed to the repeated, illegal use of the United States military. Nor should we discount what Mr. Trump’s extension of the forever war is doing to us.

我们不能对反复非法使用美国军队的行为麻木不仁。我们也不应低估特朗普将永久战争扩大化对我们造成的影响。

Foundational questions are at stake for Americans. Do we want to continue forever wars financed with borrowed money and fought by service members whose sacrifices stand in stark contrast to the cowardice of our billionaire class? Do we want to regularly bomb other countries while endangering the lives of millions of human beings by dismantling the U.S. Agency for International Development? Do we want to remain in a permanent state of war that migrates from one place to another while rampant inequality and revolutionary technologies remake our communities with little resistance?

一些关乎根本的问题正摆在美国人面前。我们是否要继续打这种用借来的钱资助、由军人承担牺牲的永久战争？而这些牺牲与我们亿万富豪阶层的怯懦形成鲜明对比。我们是否要一边频繁轰炸其他国家，一边通过削弱美国国际开发署而危及数百万人的生命？肆虐的不平等和革命性的技术正在重塑我们的社区，却几乎未遇任何阻力，我们是否希望维持在一种永久战争状态，任凭战火从一个地方蔓延到另一个地方？

Mr. Trump’s authoritarianism is not abstract. There is nothing stopping him from wielding the awesome power of the United States to serve his own interests, not the public’s. War should never be normal. We don’t know where this one will lead, but we do know that it has already killed untold civilians — including dozens of girls who did nothing but go to school. The desensitization of Americans to this kind of violence is part of what is broken in our society.

特朗普的威权主义并非抽象概念。没有什么能阻止他运用美国的强大国家力量来服务于他的个人利益，而非公共利益。战争绝不应成为常态。我们不知道这场战争将走向何方，但我们知道它已经造成了无数平民死亡——其中包括数十名只是去上学的女孩。美国人对这种暴力逐渐麻木本身就是我们社会失序的一部分。

By aligning themselves with public opinion, the Constitution and a sense of shared humanity at home and abroad, Democrats can offer an alternative vision to the forever war. The just and lasting peace that most Americans seek is one in which government responds to their problems, rather than constantly looking for regimes to change or enemies, whether foreign or domestic, to crush.

如果民主党能够顺应民意、坚守宪法原则，并秉持对国内外共同人性的尊重，他们就可以为永久战争提供一种替代愿景。大多数美国人所追求的公正而持久的和平是一种政府能够回应他们问题的和平，而不是不断寻找要更迭的政权或要粉碎的内外敌人的和平。

The quiet luxury of Dubai’s high-priced hotels and resorts was punctured this weekend as Iran aimed hundreds of missiles and drones at targets across the United Arab Emirates in retaliation for the Israeli-U.S. attack.

这个周末，迪拜昂贵的酒店和度假村的宁静奢华被打破，伊朗针对阿联酋各目标发射了大量导弹和无人机，以报复以色列和美国的袭击。

Videos posted online showed fires at five-star hotels like the Jumeirah Burj Al Arab and the Fairmont Dubai, and passengers scrambling to evacuate Dubai International Airport — one of the world’s busiest — after an explosion on a concourse injured four people.

网上发布的视频显示，五星级酒店如朱美拉帆船酒店和迪拜费尔蒙酒店起火，乘客们急匆匆地撤离迪拜国际机场——世界上最繁忙的机场之一，此前这里的一个大厅发生爆炸，造成四人受伤。

In Abu Dhabi, one person died and seven were injured by debris from a drone that targeted Zayed International Airport. In Iran, Israel and elsewhere in the Middle East, hundreds of people have died during the ongoing conflict.

在阿布扎比，一架针对扎耶德国际机场的无人机的碎片导致一人死亡、7人受伤。在伊朗、以色列以及中东其他地区，持续冲突已造成数百人死亡。

The hostilities have come as a shock to tourists, who visit the United Arab Emirates not only for the Michelin-star dining, hospitality, shopping and beaches, but also for the Emirates’ reputation as a safe destination in a volatile region. Dubai, ranked among the top 10 destinations in the world, welcomed 19.59 million tourists last year, a 5 percent increase over its previous record year in 2024, according to data published by the Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism.

这些敌对行动让游客震惊，他们前往阿联酋不仅仅是为了米其林星级餐饮、好客的氛围、购物和海滩，还因为阿联酋在动荡地区被视为安全目的地。根据迪拜经济与旅游局发布的数据，迪拜去年位列全球前10大目的地，接待了1959万游客，比2024年的创纪录年份增长5%。

Airports in the region have become major hubs for passengers traveling to India, Africa and Asia. In 2025, more than 33 million passengers passed through Abu Dhabi’s five airports, a record.

该地区的机场已成为前往印度、非洲和亚洲乘客的主要枢纽。2025年，阿布扎比的五个机场旅客吞吐量超过3300万人次，创下纪录。

The airstrikes forced the closure of airports in Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Doha, Qatar. Now, as the fighting continues, hundreds of thousands of tourists and business travelers are struggling to book flights home. At least 11,000 flights to and from the Middle East have been canceled since Saturday, and one million travelers have been affected by the disruption so far, according to Cirium, an aviation data firm.

空袭迫使迪拜、阿布扎比和卡塔尔多哈的机场关闭。现在，随着战斗继续，数十万旅游和出差的乘客正努力预订回程航班。据航空数据公司Cirium称，自周六以来，中东进出航班至少取消了1.1万架次，已影响100万旅客。

A limited number of flights were scheduled to depart Dubai and Abu Dhabi airports on Monday.

周一，仅有数量有限的航班计划从迪拜和阿布扎比机场起飞。

Emirates, the region’s largest carrier, said on social media that it would prioritize stranded customers with canceled bookings. The announcement was met by hundreds of responses from panicked passengers wondering how they could get on a flight.

该地区最大航空公司阿联酋航空在社交媒体上表示，将优先处理那些预订被取消的滞留客户。这一公告引发数百名惊慌乘客的回复，纷纷询问如何登机。

‘No Certainty Right Now’

“目前什么都不确定”

周一，迪拜国际机场空空如也的到达区。

Dubai International is the world’s busiest airport for international travel, with more than 95 million passengers last year. Abu Dhabi’s airport and Hamad International Airport in Qatar are also among the largest international hubs, said Henry Harteveldt, an aviation industry analyst for Atmosphere Research. He said the conflict would ripple out to airports worldwide and could chill international travel plans.

Atmosphere Research的航空业分析师亨利·哈特维尔德表示，迪拜国际机场是全球最繁忙的国际旅行机场，去年客运量超过9500万人次。阿布扎比机场和卡塔尔哈马德国际机场也是最大的国际枢纽之一。他表示，此次冲突将波及全球机场，并可能令国际旅行计划降温。

“There is no certainty right now about when the fighting will end and when it will be deemed safe for commercial flights to resume,” Mr. Harteveldt said. “Clearly, there’s going to be a lot of concern, legitimate concern, in consumers’ minds about whether they should travel through those airports, at least in the immediate aftermath of the fighting.”

“目前什么都不确定，不知道战斗何时结束，不知道何时才能恢复商业飞行的安全环境，”哈特维尔德说，“显然，消费者心中会产生大量合理的担忧，至少在战斗刚结束的一段时间内，他们会疑虑是否应该经由这些机场旅行。”

Vishwas Gowda, a 23-year-old engineer who lives in Bengaluru, India, had planned for a nine-hour layover in Dubai. On Saturday morning, he was on an Emirates flight from Dubai to San Francisco when news of the airspace closures hit, and the plane turned around. Back in Dubai, it was “complete chaos and confusion,” he said, with long lines throughout the airport and “no clear next steps.”

23岁的维什瓦斯·高达是一名住在印度班加罗尔的工程师，他原计划在迪拜中转停留九小时。周六早上，当空域关闭的消息传来时，他正坐在从迪拜飞往旧金山的阿联酋航空飞机上，随后飞机被迫返航。他说，回到迪拜后，机场“完全陷入了混乱和迷惑”，到处排着长队，“没有明确的后续安排。”

The airline still hasn’t contacted him about when he can fly to San Francisco or back home to India, he said.

他表示，航空公司至今仍未联系他，告知何时能飞往旧金山或返回印度。

“I can’t believe there is no way for us to get out,” said Chresida Elston, a British tourist who is on vacation with her husband and two children at the Mandarin Oriental in Dubai. “It’s so surreal to be going to the beach and pretending we’re having a normal holiday to the children when there are explosions in the sky and you have no idea where the next missile will land,” she said in a phone interview.

“我不敢相信我们竟然没办法离开，”英国游客克雷西达·埃尔斯顿说，她正和丈夫及两个孩子在迪拜文华东方酒店度假。“这太超现实了，当天空中有爆炸声，你根本不知道下一枚导弹会落在哪里时，我们还要在海滩上向孩子们假装在度过一个正常的假期，”她在电话采访中说道。

On Saturday, emergency alerts sent to cellphones warned of potential missile threats. Tourists shared videos of themselves and others in hotel basements; on Sunday, they were advised to stay indoors.

周六，手机发出的紧急警报警告了潜在的导弹威胁。游客们分享了自己和其他人躲在酒店地下室的视频；周日，他们被建议待在室内。

Covered Costs

费用承担

The United Arab Emirates announced on Sunday that it would cover accommodation costs for stranded visitors. The General Civil Aviation Authority said it was picking up the tab for meals and accommodation for more than 20,000 passengers who were unable to leave over the weekend.

阿拉伯联合酋长国周日宣布，将承担滞留游客的住宿费用。民航总局表示，正在为周末无法离境的2万多名乘客支付餐饮和住宿账单。

周日，一枚被拦截的飞行物落入迪拜朱美拉棕榈岛群附近的海域。

The Ministry of Defense of the United Arab Emirates said on Monday that 174 ballistic missiles had been launched toward the country since the start of the attack on Saturday. Additionally, 689 Iranian drones were detected, with 645 intercepted and 44 falling within the country’s territory. Several cruise missiles had been intercepted, and the resulting debris caused damage. The attacks resulted in three deaths and 68 minor injuries.

阿联酋国防部周一表示，自周六袭击开始以来，已有174枚弹道导弹向该国发射。此外还探测到689架伊朗无人机，其中645架被拦截，44架落在该国境内。多枚巡航导弹被拦截，产生的碎片造成了破坏。袭击导致三人死亡，68人轻伤。

Members of the travel industry downplayed the situation, saying that the incidents of falling debris were isolated.

旅游业从业人员试图淡化事态，称碎片坠落只是孤立案例。

“Dubai has long been recognized for its infrastructure resilience, governance and crisis response capabilities,” said Ali Asgar Hussain, the managing director of Turning Point Tourism, a Dubai-based travel company.

迪拜旅游公司Turning Point Tourism董事总经理阿里·阿斯加尔·侯赛因表示：“迪拜长期以来因其基础设施的韧性、治理能力和危机应对能力而受到认可。”

“Things remain calm, and people are getting on with their daily lives as best they can,” said Ahmed Soliman, the managing director of Travel Connections Arabia, a consulting firm.

咨询公司Travel Connections Arabia的董事总经理艾哈迈德·苏莱曼说：“局势始终是稳定的，人们正在尽力继续日常生活。”

On Monday, the atmosphere across Dubai was calm. While some tourists ventured out, many decided to stay in their hotels.

周一，迪拜各地的气氛很平静。虽然有些游客冒险外出，但许多人选择留在酒店内。

Some people are relying on private security firms to help them leave Dubai by land to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and Muscat, Oman, where private and commercial planes are operating.

一些人正依靠私人安保公司帮助，通过陆路离开迪拜前往沙特阿拉伯的利雅得和阿曼的马斯喀特，那里的私人和商业飞机仍在运营。

“Our approach is straightforward: GPS-tracked ground transport running 24/7 from Dubai to open land borders,” said Rafal Hyps, chief executive of the global risk management firm Sicuro Group. He said the company had assisted about 1,000 people, “including employees of major multinational companies, family offices and individual travelers.”

全球风险管理公司Sicuro Group的首席执行官拉法尔·希普斯表示：“我们的方法很简单：提供七天24小时全天候GPS跟踪的地面运输，从迪拜通往开放的陆路口岸。”他说，公司已协助约1000人，“包括大型跨国公司的员工、家族办公室和个人旅行者。”

He declined to specify the cost of getting out overland, but said it was “comparable to the price of an international air ticket.”

他拒绝透露陆路撤离的具体费用，但表示“与国际机票价格相当”。

While a limited number of flights departed from the United Arab Emirates on Monday, there was no information on whether flights would operate on Tuesday. The government urged passengers not to travel to the airport unless their flight was confirmed.

虽然周一有少量航班从阿联酋起飞，但尚无周二是否运营的信息。政府敦促乘客，除非航班已确认，否则不要前往机场。

周一，在周末的袭击过后，一些游客和居民开始冒险外出。上图为迪拜码头附近海滩上的日光浴者。

“Normally, I would not mind being stuck in Dubai. It’s beautiful here, and there is so much to do,” said Lara Riva, an Italian tourist in Dubai whose flight home was canceled on Sunday. “But this is a very different situation.”

“通常情况下，我不介意被困在迪拜。这里很美，有那么多事可以做，”意大利游客劳拉·里瓦说，她回程的航班在周日被取消了。“但现在的情况完全不同。”

Rebecca Clothey, 57, a professor at Drexel University in Philadelphia who was stranded in Abu Dhabi over the weekend, was looking into options to drive to the nearest operating international airport, more than five hours away in Oman, when Etihad Airways rebooked her on a flight to Bengaluru, where she had been scheduled to arrive two days earlier.

57岁的丽贝卡·克洛西是费城德雷塞尔大学的一名教授，周末被困在阿布扎比。就在她考虑开车五小时前往阿曼境内最近的一个仍在运营的国际机场时，阿提哈德航空给她改签了一个飞往班加罗尔的航班——按照原来的计划，她应该在两天前抵达那里。

In an interview from her taxi after landing, she said that she wasn’t sure how she was selected for that flight but that only every other seat was occupied.

降落后，她在出租车里接受采访时说，她不确定自己是如何被选中改签那趟航班的，但飞机上每隔一个座位才坐一个人。

In Abu Dhabi, she said, she had been put up at the Grand Millennium Al Wahda, a five-star hotel, where the Emirati government covered all her expenses. Looking back on the experience, she added, “I was treated really well. But you’re thinking, ‘Am I going to be here a week? Is this situation going to get worse? I mean, how am I going to get out?’”

她说自己被安置在五星级的阿布扎比大禧年阿尔华达酒店，阿联酋政府承担了所有费用。回想起这段经历，她补充道：“我受到了很好的对待。但你心里会想，‘我要在这里待一周吗？情况会恶化吗？我到底该怎么离开？’”

The United States and Israel opened their war on Iran this weekend with a sudden strike on its longtime supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. While the war as a whole has been broadly denounced as illegal by critics who point to its lack of authorization from Congress or the United Nations Security Council, the ayatollah’s killing raises particular legal questions.

周末，美国与以色列对伊朗发动战争，突袭该国多年的最高领袖哈梅内伊。这场战争本身已被批评者普遍谴责为非法，他们指出其未获美国国会或联合国安理会授权，但击毙哈梅内伊一事引发了尤为特殊的法律疑问。

It is extraordinarily rare for a country to deliberately and openly kill the leader of another sovereign nation — even during legally uncontested wars. As a result, the question has rarely come up. A very rare precedent of sorts came in March 2003, when the Bush administration tried to kill Saddam Hussein on the cusp of the Iraq war, a conflict Congress had authorized — but that airstrike missed its target.

一国蓄意、公开地杀死另一个主权国家领导人的情况极为罕见——即便在法律上无争议的战争中也是如此。因此，相关法律问题极少出现。一个勉强算得上的罕见先例发生在2003年3月，布什政府在伊拉克战争爆发前夕试图击毙萨达姆·侯赛因（那场战争获得了国会授权），但空袭并未命中目标。

Asked for a detailed description of its legal views on the issue, the White House said in a statement that President Trump had “exercised his authority as commander in chief to defend U.S. personnel and bases in the region.” It described decades of misdeeds by Iran but did not specifically address the killing of its leader.

当被要求详细说明政府在这一问题上的法律立场时，白宫在一份声明中表示，特朗普总统“为保护该地区美方人员及基地而行使了最高统帅权”。声明列举了伊朗数十年来的恶行，但并未专门就击毙伊朗领导人一事作出法律解释。

Here is a closer look.

以下是详细分析。

What happened?

发生了什么？

The United States under Mr. Trump and Israel under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu jointly launched a war against Iran on Feb. 28 with a surprise strike on Iranian leadership, killing Ayatollah Khamenei, a hard-line Shiite cleric and Iran’s ruler for nearly four decades.

特朗普领导下的美国与内塔尼亚胡领导下的以色列于2月28日联合发动对伊朗的战争，突袭伊朗领导层，击毙担任伊朗最高领袖近四十年的强硬什叶派神职人员哈梅内伊。

The C.I.A. had been tracking his movements and passed his whereabouts to Israel, which carried out the strike that killed him, according to officials. The two countries are said to have moved up their plans for the war to take advantage of the window of opportunity.

据官员透露，美国中央情报局一直在追踪哈梅内伊的行踪，并将其位置通报以色列，由以色列实施了致命打击。据称，美以两国为抓住这个短时间内出现的机会，提前了战争计划。

What was Khamenei’s status?

哈梅内伊的身份是什么？

The ayatollah was a civilian — not a uniformed member of the Iranian military — but he was also the supreme leader of Iran’s armed forces, just as Mr. Trump is a civilian who is also the commander in chief of the American military. This hybrid status creates a complication.

哈梅内伊是文职人员，并非伊朗军队现役军人，但他同时是伊朗武装部队最高领袖，正如特朗普身为文职却也是美军总司令一样。这种双重身份造成了法律上的复杂性。

It is generally agreed that in wartime, a country’s military commanders are lawful targets. It is also generally agreed that civilian officials with no military functions — like a health minister — are not lawful targets unless they are directly participating in hostilities.

普遍共识是，战争期间一国军事指挥官属于合法打击目标。同样普遍的共识是，不承担军事职能的文职官员——如卫生部长——不属于合法目标，除非他们直接参与敌对行动。

2024年，哈梅内伊在德黑兰发表演讲。

A civilian leader who commands a military force is a messier situation. Still, under the laws of armed conflict, a civilian leader who controls the military is likely to be a legitimate military target in an active war whether he is interpreted as being part of his country’s armed forces or as a civilian directly participating in hostilities, legal experts said.

指挥军队的文职领导人则处于更模糊的地带。但法律专家表示，根据武装冲突法，控制军队的文职领导人在实际战争中很可能属于合法军事目标，无论将其界定为该国武装力量一部分，还是直接参与敌对行动的文职人员。

What about targeting former leaders?

针对前领导人的打击如何界定？

Reports from Iran say an airstrike has also killed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who served as Iran’s president from 2005 until 2013. Based on the presently available facts, he would seem unambiguously to have been a civilian who was not directly participating in hostilities. It is not clear what legal theory would support any deliberate targeting of him as lawful.

 来自伊朗的报道称，2005年至2013年担任伊朗总统的马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪-内贾德也在空袭中身亡。根据目前已知事实，他显然属于未直接参与敌对行动的文职人员。目前尚不清楚有何种法律理论可以支持将其蓄意列为打击目标的合法性。

When did the armed conflict begin?

武装冲突何时开始？

It began with the very strike that killed Ayatollah Khamenei, which complicates the question of whether he was a lawful military target at the time of the strike. In peacetime, it would be murder to kill a member of a foreign military or any government official who is not engaged in an imminent armed attack.

冲突始于击毙哈梅内伊的那次空袭本身，这使得判断他在遇袭时是否为合法军事目标的问题变得复杂。在和平时期，杀死未参与迫在眉睫的武装攻击的外国军人或政府官员均构成谋杀。

The United Nations Charter, a treaty the United States has ratified, provides that a nation may not use force on the sovereign territory of another country without its consent, a self-defense rationale or the authorization of the U.N. Security Council.

得到了美国批准的《联合国宪章》规定，除非经当事国同意、出于自卫理由或获得联合国安理会授权，任何国家不得在另一国主权领土使用武力。

周六德黑兰的爆炸。

“Whether or not an individual would be a lawful military target as a matter of the law of armed conflict, if the strike itself violates the U.N. Charter, that strike is illegal,” said Rebecca Ingber, a professor at the Cardozo School of Law and a former senior State Department lawyer. “A state can’t backfill a justification for killing a head of state by unlawfully starting an armed conflict.”

“无论根据武装冲突法，某个人是否属于合法军事目标，如果袭击本身违反《联合国宪章》，那么这次袭击就是非法的，”卡多佐法学院教授、前国务院高级律师丽贝卡·英格伯说。“一个国家不能先非法发动武装冲突，事后再为杀死他国国家元首寻找正当理由。”

Was there an ‘imminent’ threat?

是否存在“迫在眉睫”的威胁？

To invoke self-defense, the U.N. Charter requires there to be an armed attack. Customary international law broadly accepts that this includes a right to use force against an imminent threat of an armed attack, which in turn raises the question of what counts as imminent.

《联合国宪章》规定，援引自卫权需存在武装攻击行为。国际法惯例上大致承认，这包括对迫在眉睫的武装攻击威胁使用武力的权利，而这又引出何为“迫在眉睫”的问题。

Since the attack, the Trump administration has gestured toward two versions of this argument. One appears to rely on a very elastic definition, and one arguably appeared to rely on circular reasoning.

袭击发生后，特朗普政府提出了两种版本的相关理由。一种似乎依赖非常弹性的定义，另一种则被认为属于循环论证。

In a video on Saturday, Mr. Trump declared that the objective was “to defend the American people by eliminating imminent threats from the Iranian regime.” But he did not suggest that Iran was on the cusp of launching an armed attack before the strikes, instead saying it would be intolerable to allow it to build a nuclear weapon and long-range missiles.

特朗普在周六的一段视频中宣称，行动目标是“通过消除伊朗政权带来的迫在眉睫的威胁，来保卫美国人民”。但他并未表明伊朗在袭击前即将发动武装攻击，而是声称绝不能容忍伊朗发展核武器与远程导弹。

On Monday, Marco Rubio, the secretary of state and national security adviser, told reporters that “there absolutely was an imminent threat.” He said the United States believed Israel was going to attack Iran, and if it did so, Iran would attack American bases, so the country joined Israel’s attack “proactively, in a defensive way, to prevent them from inflicting higher damage.”

周一，国务卿兼国家安全顾问鲁比奥对记者表示，“绝对存在迫在眉睫的威胁。”他称，美国认为以色列将攻击伊朗，而一旦以色列动手，伊朗就会袭击美军基地，因此美国“以预防性、防御性的方式”加入以色列的袭击，“以防止伊朗造成更大破坏。”

美国国务卿鲁比奥周一在国会大厦向国会领导人通报伊朗袭击事件前。

Does the administration care about international law?

本届政府是否在意国际法？

There is reason to believe it does not care about this part of it.

有理由认为，政府在这方面并不在意。

The American military’s invasion of Venezuela in January to arrest President Nicolás Maduro also appears to have violated the U.N. Charter. But a memo by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel said the charter did not matter for the purposes of that operation. It cited past opinions by executive branch lawyers who claimed that as a matter of domestic law, the president has constitutional power to act in ways that conflict with the Charter.

今年1月，美军入侵委内瑞拉逮捕总统马杜罗，此举同样似乎违反《联合国宪章》。但司法部法律顾问办公室的一份备忘录称，该行动无需考虑宪章条款。备忘录援引了行政部门律师过往的观点，称根据美国国内法，总统拥有采取与《宪章》相抵触的行动的宪法权力。

Does it matter which country killed Khamenei?

由哪国击毙哈梅内伊是否重要？

Not under the doctrine of state responsibility, if reporting about the behind-the-scenes decision-making is accurate. According to the doctrine, if a country knowingly helps another nation commit a violation of international law, both are considered culpable for the wrongful act. By that logic, if killing the ayatollah was unlawful, and if the United States knew or intended for Israel to target him when it passed along his location, the United States shares legal responsibility.

如果有关幕后决策的报道属实，则不属于国家责任原则范畴。根据这一原则，如果一国故意协助另一国实施违反国际法的行为，两国均应对该不法行为承担责任。按照这一逻辑，如果击毙哈梅内伊属于非法行为，且美国在向以色列通报其位置时知晓或意图让以色列将哈梅内伊列为目标，那么美国需承担共同法律责任。

Was starting the war legal, domestically?

在国内层面，发动战争是否合法？

The Constitution vests the power to declare war with Congress. But especially since World War II, presidents of both parties have unilaterally committed U.S. troops into limited combat situations on their own. Executive branch lawyers claim that this is lawful if the anticipated nature, scope and duration of an operation fall short of a “war” in the constitutional sense.

美国宪法将宣战权授予国会。但自二战以来，两党总统均曾单方面将美军投入有限作战行动。行政部门律师主张，如果一项行动的预期性质、规模和持续时间未达到宪法意义上的“战争”标准，则属合法。

Despite those accumulating precedents, since the War Powers Resolution of 1973, presidents have sought prior authorization for major wars: the Persian Gulf war, Iraq and the war against Al Qaeda that began in Afghanistan. Mr. Trump’s war with Iran appears likely to be the most significant unilateral presidential military action since the law’s enactment.

尽管先例不断累积，但自1973年《战争权力决议》通过以来，总统发动重大战争均事先寻求国会授权：海湾战争、伊拉克战争以及始于阿富汗的针对基地组织的战争。特朗普对伊朗发动的战争很可能成为该法案颁布以来总统采取的最重大单边军事行动。

What about the assassination ban?

刺杀禁令如何适用？

After an inquiry in the 1970s that brought to light C.I.A. links to Cold War plots to kill foreign leaders, known as the Church Committee investigation, President Gerald Ford issued an executive order that banned “assassinations.” The ban is now part of Executive Order 12333, which states: “No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.” The order does not define what types of killings count.

20世纪70年代，一场调查——名为“丘奇委员会调查”——揭露了中情局参与冷战时期暗杀外国领导人的阴谋。此后福特总统发布行政命令，禁止“刺杀”。该禁令如今已纳入第12333号行政命令，其中规定：“任何受雇于或代表美国政府行事的人员，不得从事或密谋从事刺杀。”该命令未界定何种杀戮行为属于刺杀。

Both before and after Congress authorized the war against Al Qaeda in 2001, the executive branch took the position that this ban would not bar the targeted killings of high-level terrorist leaders as self-defense or part of the armed conflict. Still, Qaeda operatives are not leaders of sovereign states.

在2001年国会授权对基地组织开战之前和之后，行政部门均坚持立场，认为该禁令不禁止出于自卫或作为武装冲突一部分而定点清除高级恐怖主义领导人。但基地组织成员并非主权国家领导人。

In 2020, Mr. Trump ordered an airstrike in Iraq that killed Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, a top Iranian military commander. The visible portions of a heavily redacted Justice Department memo that blessed that strike do not address the assassination ban, but the memo accused him of orchestrating years of operations that killed American troops deployed in Iraq.

2020年，特朗普下令在伊拉克发动空袭，击毙伊朗高级军事指挥官卡西姆·苏莱曼尼少将。司法部为该袭击背书的备忘录经过大量涂黑，可见部分并未提及刺杀禁令，但备忘录指控苏莱曼尼策划了多年来导致驻伊美军伤亡的行动。

When Nicolás Maduro and his wife walked into their apartment deep in a Caracas military base on an early January morning, they had no way of knowing that their every movement was being tracked by American intelligence. Or that the apartment, including the safe room, had been replicated in Kentucky by a Delta team that did dozens of practice runs figuring out how to immobilize the guards and breach the doors.

1月初的一个清晨，当尼古拉斯·马杜罗与妻子走进加拉加斯一处军事基地深处的公寓时，他们全然不知，自己的一举一动都在美国情报部门的监控之下。他们也无从知晓，这套公寓——包括安全屋——已被美国三角洲部队在肯塔基州复刻，该部队进行了数十次演练，只为摸清如何制服守卫、破门而入。

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei apparently ignored the evidence that the C.I.A. was tracking him and his top leaders, too, an operation that President Trump exposed in a social media post eight months ago. When the United States and Israel discovered that he and his national security team would be gathering Saturday morning, they advanced the timeline for their attack.

哈梅内伊显然也无视了中情局正在监控他与高层官员的证据，特朗普总统早在8个月前就通过社交媒体曝光了这一行动。当美国和以色列的情报部门获悉哈梅内伊与国家安全团队将于周六上午会面时，便提前了袭击计划。

Mr. Maduro is now in the federal detention center in Brooklyn. Ayatollah Khamenei’s state funeral is being planned for the coming days. And the rest of the world’s leaders are left to mull the combination of exquisite American surveillance capabilities and a president who seems to take delight in using that information to capture or kill his perceived enemies.

如今，马杜罗被关押在布鲁克林联邦拘留中心；哈梅内伊的国葬正在筹备中。世界各国领导人不得不重新审视：美国精密的情报监控能力，以及一位乐于利用这些信息来抓捕或杀死其眼中之敌的总统，二者结合会带来什么样的影响。

American intelligence agencies have long wiretapped, geolocated and monitored senior leaders, back to the earliest days of the Cold War. Fifteen years ago, WikiLeaks revelations included documents that gave glimpses of how the United States attempted to track China’s leaders and its nuclear weapons. Germany’s former chancellor, Angela Merkel, was outraged to discover that her personal cellphone was tapped by the country’s closest ally, and complained to President Barack Obama that it reminded her of growing up in East Germany.

自从冷战初期，美国情报机构就长期对外国高层进行窃听、定位与监控。15年前，维基解密披露的文件曾让外界窥见美国如何追踪中国领导人与核武器。德国前总理默克尔得知自己的私人手机被最亲密的盟友窃听时勃然大怒，并向奥巴马总统抱怨，称这让她想起了在东德长大的经历。

Today, merely tapping into a foreign leader’s conversations seems like a quaint remnant of post-Cold War spycraft.

如今，单纯窃听外国领导人的通话似乎已是后冷战时代间谍手段的古旧遗迹。

Today, the real-time ability to locate a leader is the holy grail. And the surge in the number of electronic sensors deployed on street corners and doorbell cameras and toll highways, combined with artificial intelligence techniques to quickly parse truly vital information from billions of data points those sensors generate, has transformed the art form of surveilling V.I.P. whereabouts.

当下，实时锁定领导人位置才是情报界的圣杯。遍布街角、门铃摄像头与收费公路的电子传感器数量激增，再加上人工智能技术能从这些传感器产生的数十亿数据点中快速筛选关键信息，这已彻底重塑了监控政要行踪的手段。

It has allowed intelligence agencies to track motorcades. (In Washington, presidential and vice-presidential movements are usually still announced by blaring motorcycles and familiar helicopter flight patterns, but cabinet members and the C.I.A. director move more discreetly.) Around the world, spy agencies have learned how to monitor the opening and closing of electronic doors at leadership compounds, and to locate the cellphones of bodyguards and family members who may travel with a foreign leader but are usually a lot sloppier about encrypting their messages and using burner phones.

这让情报机构得以追踪车队动向。（在华盛顿，总统与副总统的出行仍然常以轰鸣的摩托车开道和熟悉的直升机飞行来宣告，但内阁成员与中情局局长的行动则隐秘得多。）全球各地的情报部门已掌握如何监控领导人官邸电子门的开关，以及定位保镖与家属的手机——这些人常随外国领导人出行，却往往在信息加密与使用一次性手机方面要马虎得多。

“If we had had this capability with a high degree of certainty to get Saddam Hussein through a precision strike, we wouldn’t have had the Iraq war,” said Glenn Gerstell, the general counsel of the National Security Agency from 2015 through 2020, a period that included part of Mr. Trump’s first term. “The only way to get him was to have boots on the ground. But now, with heightened capabilities, we can target individual leaders.”

“若当年我们拥有如此高确定性的精准打击能力，能定位萨达姆·侯赛因，就不会爆发伊拉克战争了，”2015至2020年（涵盖特朗普首个任期部分时段）担任美国国家安全局总法律顾问的格伦·格斯特尔表示。“当年只能靠地面部队抓捕他。但如今，凭借升级的能力，我们可以精准锁定特定领导人。”

(In fact, American forces tried to take out Mr. Hussein in the opening hours of the war. But he had left the home they targeted a few hours earlier.)

（事实上，美军曾在战争爆发头几个小时试图除掉萨达姆，但他在目标住所遭袭前数小时离开。）

As Mr. Trump has shown, this targeting ability opens new options for presidents seeking to change the attitude of foreign regimes — or change their leadership.

正如特朗普所展现的，这种精准打击能力，为试图改变外国政权态度甚至更迭其领导人的美国总统，提供了全新的选项。

Mr. Trump’s decision to snatch Mr. Maduro from his bed, but keep the rest of the Venezuelan leadership in place, is an experiment in remote-control occupation. After the Delta team landed by helicopter that early January night, killed Mr. Maduro’s Cuban and Venezuelan guards, and seized him seconds before he could lock himself in that safe room, Mr. Trump blessed the installation of Vice President Delcy Rodríguez as acting president.

特朗普决定从床上抓走马杜罗却保留委内瑞拉其他领导层是一场远程遥控占领的试验。1月初的深夜，三角洲部队乘直升机着陆，击毙马杜罗的古巴与委内瑞拉守卫，在他即将闭锁安全屋的瞬间将其抓获。随后，特朗普批准副总统德尔西·罗德里格斯就任代总统。

She will stay there, he has said, as long as she follows Washington’s instructions. And clearly he is enamored of the early results. In a brief conversation with The New York Times on Sunday, on the second day of the American and Israeli attack on Iran, he cited the Venezuela experience as a model for what he was trying to accomplish in Iran.

特朗普称，只要她听从华盛顿指令，就能继续留任。显然，他对初步成果颇为满意。周日，在美以袭击伊朗的第二天，他接受《纽约时报》简短采访时，将委内瑞拉的经验称为伊朗行动的范本。

“What we did in Venezuela, I think, is the perfect, the perfect scenario,” Mr. Trump insisted. “Everybody’s kept their job except for two people.”

“我们在委内瑞拉的做法，我认为是完美、完美的范例，”特朗普坚称。“除了两个人，所有人都保住了工作。”

In the Iran case, Mr. Trump had flagged for Ayatollah Khamenei that the United States was watching his every movement — a revelation that, had it appeared first in the media, might well have triggered a Justice Department leak investigation.

在伊朗问题上，特朗普早已向哈梅内伊明示，美国正监控他的一举一动——这一爆料若先由媒体披露，很可能会引发司法部针对泄密的调查。

“We now have complete and total control of the skies over Iran,” he posted on Truth Social in June 2025, as he cut short his participation in a summit and flew back to Washington to talk about how the United States would participate in the attacks Israel had begun on the country.

2025年6月，特朗普在Truth Social平台发文：“我们已完全掌控伊朗领空。”当时，他缩短了参加一场峰会的行程，飞回华盛顿讨论美国如何参与以色列已发起的对伊袭击。

Then he added: “We know exactly where the so-called ‘Supreme Leader’ is hiding. He is an easy target, but is safe there — We are not going to take him out (kill!), at least not for now.”

他还写道：“我们精确掌握所谓‘最高领袖’的藏身之处。他是个容易打击的目标，但他目前还安全——我们不会清除（杀掉）他，目前暂时不会。”

For good measure, Mr. Trump added an all-caps demand for “UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER!”

为强化威慑，特朗普还用全大写字母要求：“无条件投降！”

It is impossible to know whether Ayatollah Khamenei was following Mr. Trump’s posts, but he certainly did not seem impressed by the warning. On Saturday, even with an American naval force deployed around Iran and fighter jets visible on satellite images massing on American and Israeli bases, Ayatollah Khamenei was in his official residence. So were national security leaders. And while the United States did not launch the missile that killed him, it was the C.I.A.’s warning, backed by indicators from other U.S. intelligence agencies, that killed him in one of the first Israeli strikes.

无人知晓哈梅内伊是否关注特朗普的发文，但他显然对此警告不以为然。周六，即便美国海军舰队部署在伊朗周边、卫星图像显示美以基地战机集结，哈梅内伊仍在官邸，国家安全高层也齐聚于此。尽管击毙他的导弹并非美军发射，但正是中情局的预警（辅以美国其他情报机构的佐证），让他在以色列的首轮袭击中身亡。

It is not clear how far the United States can push this new power — or whether it would risk using this targeting capability in the case of the leader of a country that had nuclear weapons available to retaliate.

目前尚不清楚美国能将这一新能力运用到何种程度，也不清楚当目标国拥有核武器可实施报复时，美国是否会冒险动用这种定点清除能力。

Notably, Mr. Trump is not messing with China’s Xi Jinping, or Russia’s Vladimir V. Putin or even North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, who has an arsenal of 60 or more nuclear weapons. “I’m not sure you can extrapolate this capability into a universal ability to track every leader everywhere,” said Paul Kolbe, who served as the C.I.A.’s station chief in Moscow early in Mr. Putin’s rule. “But this is why Putin is so paranoid about his location,” and moves frequently among his many houses.

值得注意的是，特朗普并没有去招惹中国国家主席习近平、俄罗斯总统普京，甚至拥有60余枚核武器的朝鲜最高领导人金正恩。“我不确定能否将这种能力推广为全球追踪所有领导人的通用手段，”普京执政初期曾任中情局莫斯科站站长的保罗·科尔比表示。“但这正是普京对其行踪如此敏感的原因”——他频繁在多处住所间转移。

“If you are the leader of an adversary nation, you should be pretty worried,” Mr. Kolbe said. “But if you are Putin or Xi, not so much, because of the stakes at play. The lesson that keeps getting taught is that if you don’t have nukes, you are far more vulnerable.”

“如果你是敌对国家领导人，理应高度警惕，”科尔比说。“但普京或习近平则不必过度担忧，因为风险代价极高。反复印证的教训是：没有核武器，你就会脆弱得多。”

The Iranians do not have nuclear weapons, which might make them hesitate before naming a new supreme leader, who would move to the top of the target list. Nonetheless Majid Takht-Ravanchi, the Iranian deputy foreign minister, said on CNN on Monday morning that the government remains in place and Ayatollah Khamenei’s replacement would soon be announced.

伊朗没有核武器，这或许会让它在提名新的最高领袖时有所犹豫——新领袖将立即成为头号打击目标。尽管如此，伊朗副外长马吉德·塔赫特-拉万奇周一上午在CNN表示，伊朗政府运转正常，哈梅内伊的继任者将很快公布。

“We have a president,” he said. “We have head of judiciary. We had the head of parliament. The supreme leader was assassinated — was murdered by Israeli and American aggression.”

“我们有总统，有司法首脑，我们曾有议会领袖，”他说。“最高领袖遭暗杀——是被美以侵略势力谋杀的。”

Now, he said, “the new leader is going to be elected. So everybody — everything is in order.”

如今，“新领袖将通过选举产生，”他还说。“所以一切——一切都井然有序。”