The joint U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran killed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the nation’s supreme leader for almost 37 years, President Trump announced on Saturday, signaling a potentially profound political shift in the region.

美国总统特朗普周六宣布，美以对伊朗发动的联合行动已击毙执掌伊朗近37年的最高领袖阿亚图拉阿里·哈梅内伊。这一消息预示着该地区可能出现深刻的政治变化。

“Khamenei, one of the most evil people in History, is dead,” Mr. Trump wrote on Truth Social. He added: “He was unable to avoid our Intelligence and Highly Sophisticated Tracking Systems and, working closely with Israel, there was not a thing he, or the other leaders that have been killed along with him, could do.”

“哈梅内伊，这个历史上最邪恶的人之一，死了，”特朗普在“真相社交”上写道。他还说：“他无法躲避我们的情报系统和高度精密的追踪系统，在与以色列密切合作下，他以及与他一同被击毙的其他领导人，根本无能为力。”

There was no immediate confirmation of the death from Iran.

伊朗方面尚未立即证实这一死讯。

The attack, which set off retaliatory strikes by Iran against Israel and U.S. interests in the Middle East, followed weeks of threats from Mr. Trump that the United States would strike Iran unless its leadership agreed to U.S. demands, especially over its nuclear program. On Thursday, American and Iranian officials held a last-ditch round of mediated talks that ended without a breakthrough.

这次袭击引发了伊朗针对以色列以及美国在中东利益的报复性打击。此前数周，特朗普一直威胁称，除非伊朗领导层同意美国的要求——尤其是在核计划问题上——否则美国将对伊朗发动打击。周四，美国和伊朗官员曾进行最后一轮斡旋谈判，但未取得突破。

In his social media post announcing Ayatollah Khamenei’s death, Mr. Trump said, without providing evidence, that he is hearing Iranian security forces “no longer want to fight, and are looking for Immunity from us.”

在宣布哈梅内伊死讯的社交媒体帖子中，特朗普还在没有提供证据的情况下表示，他听说伊朗安全部队“已经不想再打下去，正在向我们寻求豁免”。

The Israeli military also identified seven senior Iranian security officials it said had been killed in Saturday’s strikes, including the head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the country’s minister of defense and a senior adviser to the supreme leader.

以色列军方还确认，周六的袭击中有七名伊朗高级安全官员被打死，其中包括伊朗革命卫队司令、国防部长以及最高领袖的一名高级顾问。

Earlier Saturday, Mr. Trump said that “major combat operations” were underway in Iran, portraying the strike as an opportunity for a change of government in Tehran. Governments around the world urged restraint, though some, including those of Canada and Australia, backed the U.S.-led campaign as they condemned decades of aggression by Iran.

周六早些时候，特朗普表示，针对伊朗的“重大作战行动”正在进行中，并把这次打击描述为促成德黑兰政权更替的契机。世界各国政府纷纷呼吁保持克制，不过也有一些国家——包括加拿大和澳大利亚——在谴责伊朗数十年来的侵略行为的同时，对美国领导的这次行动表示了支持。

Why did the U.S. and Israel attack Iran?

美国和以色列为什么攻击伊朗？

The latest tensions began in January, when Mr. Trump vowed to come to the aid of protesters when Iran’s government used lethal force to crush public unrest. In taped remarks announcing the attack on Saturday morning, Mr. Trump urged Iranians to “take over your government” once the military action concluded.

最新一轮紧张局势始于今年1月，当时特朗普承诺，如果伊朗政府以致命武力镇压公众抗议，美国将支持示威者。在周六上午宣布发动袭击的录制讲话中，特朗普呼吁伊朗民众在军事行动结束后“接管你们的政府”。

“No president was willing to do what I am willing to do tonight,” he said. “Now you have a president who is giving you what you want, so let’s see how you respond.”

“没有哪位总统愿意做我今晚愿意做的事，”他说。“现在，你们有了一位给予你们所望的总统，让我们看看你们如何回应。”

It is the second time in less than a year that the U.S. military has struck in Iran. Last June, American forces bombed three nuclear facilities in the country. This time, U.S. officials said they expected a far more extensive assault.

这是不到一年时间里美军第二次对伊朗实施打击。去年6月，美军曾轰炸了该国的三处核设施。美国官员表示，他们预计此次行动规模将大得多。

For Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, joining the strike on Iran is part of a long-held goal to overthrow the government in a country he has portrayed as an existential threat. In a televised statement, Mr. Netanyahu said the American-Israeli attack could “create the conditions for the brave Iranian people to take their destiny into their own hands.”

对以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡来说，参与对伊朗的打击是实现推翻伊朗政府这一长期目标的一部分。他一直把伊朗描绘为对以色列构成生存性威胁的国家。内塔尼亚胡在电视讲话中表示，美以联合攻击可能“为勇敢的伊朗人民掌握自己命运创造条件”。

What are the targets?

袭击目标是什么？

The attacks began on the first day of the workweek in Iran, with reports of explosions across several cities, including Tehran, Qom, Kermanshah, Isfahan and Karaj, according to Iran’s semiofficial Fars News Agency. In Tehran, the home of Ayatollah Khamenei, images showed thick smoke rising into the sky. The death toll in Iran was not immediately clear.

据伊朗半官方的法尔斯通讯社报道，袭击始于伊朗工作周的第一天，德黑兰、库姆、克尔曼沙赫、伊斯法罕和卡拉季等多个城市传来爆炸声。在哈梅内伊所在的德黑兰，图像显示浓烟升腾而起。伊朗方面的伤亡人数尚不清楚。

Israel’s military said that one of its initial targets was a gathering of senior Iranian officials. Videos verified by The New York Times showed strikes in an area of Tehran that houses the presidential palace and Iran’s National Security Council, among other important government buildings. Another video showed a strike near the Ministry of Intelligence.

以色列军方表示，其最初打击目标之一是一场伊朗高级官员的会议。《纽约时报》核实的视频显示，德黑兰一处地区遭到打击，该地区分布着总统府和伊朗国家安全委员会等重要政府机构。另一段视频显示，情报部附近也遭到袭击。

Satellite imagery showed a plume of black smoke and extensive damage at the secure compound of Ayatollah Khamenei.

卫星图像显示，哈梅内伊所在的那个戒备森严的住宅园区冒出黑色烟柱，并遭受大面积破坏。

U.S. officials said the military had carried out dozens of strikes, with attack planes launched from bases around the Middle East and from at least one aircraft carrier. The initial wave of U.S. attacks focused on military targets.

美国官员表示，美军进行了数十次打击，战机从中东的多个基地以及至少一艘航母起飞。美军第一波攻击重点针对军事目标。

The Israeli military also said its air force had carried out a broad wave of strikes on multiple military targets in western Iran; aerial defense and missile launchers in central Iran; and a surface-to-surface missile launch site in the area of Tabriz, in eastern Iran.

以色列军方还表示，其空军对伊朗西部多个军事目标进行了广泛打击；对伊朗中部的防空系统和导弹发射器进行了打击；以及对伊朗东部大不里士地区的地对地导弹发射场进行了打击。

Israeli officials said they expected the assault to last several days.

以色列官员表示，预计此次袭击将持续数天。

How has Iran responded?

伊朗如何回应？

Iran fired a barrage of missiles and drones at Israel, the Revolutionary Guard Corps said in a statement on Telegram. It also launched missile attacks targeting U.S. military bases in the region, including Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates, and the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, Fars reported.

伊朗革命卫队在Telegram上发表声明称，伊朗向以色列发射了大量导弹和无人机。据法尔斯通讯社报道，伊朗还向该地区美国军事基地发射导弹，包括卡塔尔的乌代德空军基地、科威特的阿里·萨利姆空军基地、阿拉伯联合酋长国的宰夫拉空军基地，以及巴林的美国第五舰队总部。

U.S. Central Command said its forces “successfully defended against hundreds of Iranian missile and drone attacks” and that damage to American bases in the region has been “minimal and has not impacted operations.”

美国中央司令部表示，其部队“成功防御了数百枚伊朗导弹和无人机袭击”，该地区美军基地的损失“轻微，且未影响行动”。

Debris from intercepted missiles landed in a residential neighborhood in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates, killing one person and damaging property, the Emirati defense ministry said, adding that it had successfully intercepted several missiles launched from Iran.

阿联酋国防部表示，从伊朗发射的几枚导弹被拦截，但导弹碎片落在首都阿布扎比的一个居民区，造成一人死亡并财产受损，阿联酋表示成功拦截了多枚导弹。

Qatar’s ministry of defense said that it had “successfully thwarted a number of attacks” targeting its territory. The attack echoed another strike last June, when Iran fired more than a dozen missiles at an American military base near the Qatari capital, Doha, in response to a U.S. attack on its nuclear facilities.

卡塔尔国防部表示，已“成功挫败针对其领土的数次袭击”。此次袭击令人想到去年6月伊朗向多哈附近的美军基地发射十几枚导弹的行动，当时是为了回应美国对其核设施的袭击。

The Gulf States are home to a number of American bases and embassies, and experts had warned that Iran would target them in retaliatory strikes. Before the strikes on Saturday, the U.S. military had built up forces in the region in what Mr. Trump had described as an “armada.”

海湾国家有多个美国基地和大使馆，专家此前警告它们将成为伊朗报复性打击的目标。在周六袭击前，美国已在该地区集结部队，特朗普称之为“armada”（对舰船集群的一种更具戏剧性的称呼——译注）。

Iran also asked the United Nations Security Council to intervene, and it accused the United States and Israel of violating international law.

伊朗还要求联合国安理会介入，并指责美国和以色列违反国际法。

周六，在特拉维夫一处防空掩体中躲避的民众。

Is the United States at war with Iran?

美国是否与伊朗处于战争状态？

Mr. Trump’s unilateral decision to launch the attack has opened a new chapter in a recurring debate over who rightfully wields war powers in American democracy. The move has raised accusations that he is violating the Constitution by starting a war without congressional authorization. And it appears likely to prompt a belated debate next week in Congress under the War Powers Resolution.

特朗普的单方面决定发动袭击，在关于美国民主中谁有权发动战争的反复辩论中开启了新篇章。此举引发指控，称他未经国会授权发动战争，违反宪法。下周国会很可能根据《战争权力决议》展开迟到的辩论。

Many Democrats and at least two Republicans in Congress are insisting that Congress must vote on whether the country enters such a conflict.

许多民主党人和至少两名共和党国会议员坚持认为，国会必须投票决定是否进入此类冲突。

The accusations underscore a split that has emerged between how the founders intended American-style democracy to function and how it has frequently worked, especially during and since the Cold War.

这些指控凸显了美国开国元勋设想的民主运作方式与冷战期间及之后经常实际运作方式之间的差异。

What else might be affected?

还可能影响什么？

The conflict has quickly threatened the flow of oil out of the Middle East, which could make gasoline and other fuels more expensive. Shipping companies have stopped sending their tankers through the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow passage through which at least 20 percent of daily oil production travels, according to oil industry analysts.

冲突迅速威胁到中东石油的输运，可能导致汽油和其他燃料价格上涨。据石油行业分析师称，航运公司已停止派油轮通过霍尔木兹海峡，这条狭窄的通道每天承载至少20%的全球石油产量。

“Nobody’s going to enter right now,” said Angeliki Frangou, the chief executive of Navios Maritime Partners, a Greek shipping company with vessels in the region, referring to the strait.

“现在没人会进去，”在该地区有船只的希腊航运公司Navios Maritime Partners的首席执行官安杰利基·弗朗古表示。

With his broad attack on Iran early Saturday morning and his call to the Iranian people to overthrow their government, President Trump has embarked on the ultimate war of choice.

特朗普总统周六清晨对伊朗发动大规模袭击，并呼吁伊朗人民推翻本国政府，由此踏上了典型的选择性战争之路。

He was not driven by an immediate threat. There was no race for a bomb. Iran is further from the capability to build a nuclear weapon today than it has been in several years, thanks largely to the success of the president’s previous strike on Iranian nuclear enrichment sites, in June.

他采取行动并非出于迫在眉睫的威胁。伊朗并没有急于制造核弹。由于特朗普去年6月对伊朗核浓缩设施发动的那次打击，伊朗如今距离具备制造核武器的能力比过去几年都要远。

While Mr. Trump claimed Tehran was ultimately aiming to reach to the United States with its array of missiles, even his own Defense Intelligence Agency concluded last year that it would be a decade before Iran could get past the technological and production hurdles to produce a significant arsenal.

尽管特朗普声称德黑兰的最终目标是利用导弹系统打击美国本土，但就连他自己的国防情报局去年也得出结论：伊朗至少还需要十年时间，才能跨越技术和生产方面的重重障碍打造出一个规模可观的武器库。

And there were no indications of a coming Iranian attack on the United States, its allies or its bases in the region. Instead, Mr. Trump struck the Islamic Republic largely because he apparently sensed a remarkable moment of weakness for the government — and an opportunity for the United States to topple Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps after 47 years of episodic confrontations, which he described at length in an eight-minute video.

也没有任何迹象表明伊朗即将对美国、其盟友或该地区的美军基地发动攻击。相反，特朗普之所以对这个伊斯兰共和国动手，很大程度上是因为他显然察觉到伊朗政权正处于一个非同寻常的虚弱时刻，并看到了一个让美国推翻阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊及伊斯兰革命卫队的契机。此前，双方曾断断续续地对抗了47年，特朗普在一段长达八分钟的视频中对此进行了详尽阐述。

But unlike past presidents putting American forces at risk — and, in an age of terrorism and cyberattacks, perhaps civilians as well — Mr. Trump did not spend months building a case for war. He never presented evidence of an imminent threat, or answered the question of why a nuclear program he claimed he had “obliterated” eight months ago was now on the brink of revival.

但不同于以往那些让美军（在恐怖主义和网络攻击时代或许也包括平民）置于危险境地的总统，特朗普并未花费数月时间为这场战争构建理由。他从未拿出证据证明威胁的紧迫性，也没有回答这样一个问题：为何他在八个月前声称已被自己“彻底摧毁”的核计划如今却又濒临重启。

His pretaped video, released in the middle of the night as the missiles started exploding in Tehran, recited a list of long-running grievances with Iran, including its brutal use of terror. But he never explained why in the pantheon of threats facing the United States, including an already-nuclear-armed North Korea and the expanding nuclear arsenals and territorial ambitions of Russia and China, a weakened Iran ranks first.

他预先录制的视频在深夜时分发布，当时德黑兰正传出爆炸声，视频罗列了美国长期以来对伊朗的种种不满，包括伊朗残酷使用恐怖主义。但他从未解释，在美国面临的诸多威胁中——其中既有已经拥核的朝鲜，也有核武库不断扩张、领土野心日益膨胀的俄罗斯和中国——一个被削弱的伊朗为何会位居首位。

周六，德黑兰发生爆炸，现场升起浓烟。

So in choosing this moment, and this vector of attack, a man who came to office promising an end to reckless military interventions — and wars intended to prompt regime change — is taking a huge risk. There are few, if any, examples in history of toppling the government of a large nation — in this case about 90 million people — with air power alone. Mr. Trump, however, was already celebrating success, announcing on social media that Ayatollah Khamenei was dead.

因此，选择此时此刻、以这种方式发动攻击，这位上任时曾承诺结束鲁莽军事干预、反对以政权更迭为目的的战争的领导人无疑是在冒巨大的风险。历史上几乎找不到仅凭空中力量就推翻一个人口约9000万的大国政府的先例。不过，特朗普已经开始庆祝胜利，他在社交媒体上宣布阿亚图拉哈梅内伊已死。

And yet Mr. Trump has made clear that is his plan. He has no intention, administration officials have insisted, of sending in ground troops to finish the job, the invitation to the “forever wars” that he campaigned against.

他还明确表示，这就是他的计划。政府官员坚称，他无意派遣地面部队完成任务，也无意挑起他竞选时所反对的“无休止的战争”。

“The idea that we’re going to be in a Middle Eastern war for years with no end in sight — there is no chance that will happen,” Vice President JD Vance, who is famously skeptical of American military interventions and openly called for the United States to withdraw support from Ukraine, told The Washington Post days before the attack on Iran.

“认为我们将陷入一场旷日持久、看不到尽头的中东战争的想法——这绝不可能发生，”副总统JD·万斯在伊朗遭袭击前几天告诉《华盛顿邮报》。万斯素来对美国的军事干预持怀疑态度，并公开呼吁美国撤回对乌克兰的支持。

So Mr. Trump’s strategic bet rides almost entirely on the ability of the Iranian people, largely unarmed and unorganized, to seize the moment and overthrow a government that millions of them find both brutal and odious. The protests that filled the streets of Iranian cities, and led to a crackdown that killed thousands, gave him his chance.

因此，特朗普的战略赌注几乎完全押在了伊朗人民身上，寄希望于这些大多手无寸铁、组织涣散的民众抓住时机，推翻一个被数百万人视为残暴可憎的政府。伊朗国内的抗议活动给了他这个机会，这些抗议席卷了各大城市，但随后受到镇压，导致数千人丧生。

一张发布在社交媒体上的图片显示1月在德黑兰举行的示威活动。

But if Mr. Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, who urged him starting in December to launch this war, and who joined in it from the start, have a plan to accomplish that goal, they have yet to reveal it, even to their closest allies.

但如果特朗普和以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡——后者从去年12月起就敦促他发动这场战争，并从一开始便参与其中——确实有一套实现这一目标的计划，那么迄今为止，他们尚未向任何人披露，甚至包括他们最亲密的盟友。

Senior officials of three of those allies, ranging from Europe to the Gulf and interviewed in the past few days, said that in their interactions with Mr. Trump’s top aides, they heard little enthusiasm for these attacks, and no plausible legal justification for striking Iran now. Those officials spoke on condition of anonymity to describe private discussions. But their experience partly explains why Britain, America’s closest ally, barred the United States from using Diego Garcia and bomber bases in Britain to launch American fighters and bombers.

过去几天，欧洲和海湾地区的三个盟友的高级官员在接受采访时表示，在与特朗普高级助手的交流中，他们几乎没有感受到对这些袭击的热情，也看不到现在打击伊朗有任何站得住脚的法律依据。这些官员要求匿名，以描述私下讨论的内容。但他们的经历在一定程度上解释了为什么英国——美国最亲密的盟友——禁止美方使用迪戈加西亚基地以及英国境内的轰炸机基地来起飞美国战斗机和轰炸机。

“It is not as if Iran poses a threat to our interests that it hadn’t for 47 years,” said Richard N. Haass, the former president of the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of the 2009 book “War of Necessity, War of Choice,” a study of the two conflicts with Iraq, in 1991 and 2003. The first, he concluded, was defined by narrow and achievable aims: liberating Kuwait after Saddam Hussein invaded. Once Iraq was driven from Kuwaiti territory, George H.W. Bush decided against overthrowing Hussein.

“并不是说伊朗现在对我们的利益构成了过去47年里从未存在过的威胁，”外交关系委员会前主席、曾于2009年出版研究1991年和2003年两次伊拉克战争的《必然之战，选择之战》(War of Necessity, War of Choice)一书的理查德·哈斯说。他认为，第一次战争的目标明确且可实现：在萨达姆·侯赛因入侵后解放科威特。一旦伊拉克被逐出科威特领土，老布什就决定不再推翻侯赛因政权。

But Mr. Trump’s decision on Saturday was more like George W. Bush’s decision to rid the world of Hussein and his government, because of the long-festering threat it posed to international peace.

但特朗普周六的决定更像小布什当年试图铲除侯赛因及其政府的决定，理由是其长期以来对国际和平构成威胁。

周六，德黑兰发生数轮爆炸，人们四处奔逃。

“As in the second Iraq war, there wasn’t a necessity to attack Iran, there was an opportunity,” Mr. Haass said. “This is a classic preventive attack, to keep Iran from gaining a capability in the future. What’s missing is ‘why now?’ because there were other choices: diplomatic accords under military pressure, economic embargoes, interceptions of Iranian ships.”

“就像第二次伊拉克战争一样，攻击伊朗并非出于必要，而是因为出现了机会，”哈斯说。“这是一场典型的预防性打击，目的是阻止伊朗在未来获得某种能力。而缺失的是‘为什么是现在？’因为还有其他选择：在军事压力下达成外交协议、实施贸易禁运、拦截伊朗船只。”

In international law, the difference between a war of necessity and a war of choice is huge. A pre-emptive strike — where one nation sees an attack massing across the river or the ocean and strikes first — is considered legitimate.

在国际法中，必然之战和选择之战的差别巨大。先发制人的打击——即一国发现敌对力量在河对岸或海那头集结兵力，因而率先发动攻击——被视为合法。

A preventive strike, in which the powerful hit the weaker state, is considered illegal. An example would be Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine, which the United States and much of the world denounced as a gross violation of the international order.

预防性打击——即强国对较弱国家动手——则被认为是非法的。例如，俄罗斯入侵乌克兰的决定就遭到了美国和世界上大多数国家的谴责，认为此举严重违反国际秩序。

Mr. Trump’s response is that he did not need a precipitating event. He ran through more than four decades of deadly Iranian actions — from the 1979 hostage crisis, which lasted 444 days, to attacks on American bases and ships. “We’re not going to put up with it any longer,” Mr. Trump said in a recorded video he posted on his social media account. And even the Pentagon’s name for the mission, Operation Epic Fury, seemed to reflect the accumulation of grievances.

特朗普的回应是，他并不需要什么导火索。他回顾了伊朗四十多年来的种种致命行径：从持续444天的1979年人质危机到对美军基地和舰船的袭击。“我们不会再忍下去了，”特朗普在发布于社交媒体上的一段录制视频中说。甚至连五角大楼为此次行动起的名字——“史诗之怒行动”——似乎都反映了这种长期积累的不满。

The international legal ramifications are not likely to influence Mr. Trump’s view of the attack. “I don’t need international law,” he told four reporters from The New York Times during an interview in January. “I’m not looking to hurt people.” And he added that while he thought his administration should abide by international legal principles, he made it clear he would be the arbiter of when those principles applied to the United States.

国际法层面的影响不太可能左右特朗普对这次攻击的看法。“我不需要国际法，”他在1月接受《纽约时报》四名记者采访时说。“我不是为了伤害任何人。”他还补充说，虽然他认为自己的政府应当遵循国际法原则，但也明确表示，何时适用这些原则将由他本人裁定。

“It depends on what your definition of international law is,” he said.

“这取决于你如何定义国际法，”他说。

It may also depend on what the definition of “war” is. In his statement, Mr. Trump called this action a war, warning the country that it may have to confront casualties. But he made no effort to seek an authorization to use military force, much less a war declaration, from Congress.

这或许也取决于如何定义“战争”。在声明中，特朗普将此次行动称为一场战争，警告国家可能需要面对人员伤亡。但他并未试图寻求国会授权使用武力，更不用说正式的宣战声明。

He would certainly not be the first president to initiate a major military action without formal approval from Congress. But in Mr. Trump’s case, he has dismissed the thought that he even needs it.

他当然不是第一位在未获国会正式批准的情况下发动重大军事行动的总统。但就特朗普而言，他根本不认为自己需要这样做。

特朗普总统预先录制的视频列举了对伊朗由来已久的诸多不满。

When historians look back at this moment, they are likely to ask two questions: Why did Mr. Trump act now, and why was Iran his target?

当历史学家回顾这一时刻时，他们很可能会提出两个问题：特朗普为何选择现在行动？以及为何以伊朗为目标？

In the end, Mr. Trump’s venture — his seventh attack on a foreign nation since he came to office — may be judged by whether it ignores the Churchill rule.

最终，特朗普的这次冒险——他上任以来对外国发动的第七次攻击——或将以其是否无视“丘吉尔法则”而被评判。

Long before he became Britain’s wartime prime minister, Winston Churchill wrote about his youth, as a journalist and sometime participant in wars. “Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter,” he wrote in “My Early Life.”

早在成为英国战时首相之前，温斯顿·丘吉尔在回忆自己年轻时作为记者偶尔参与战争的经历时写道：“永远、永远、永远不要相信任何一场战争会顺利而轻松，也不要以为踏上这段奇异航程的人，能够预知自己将遭遇的潮汐与飓风，”他在《我的早年生活》中这样写道。

“The statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events.”

“屈从于战争狂热的政治家必须意识到，一旦信号发出，他便不再是政策的主宰，而是不可预见、不可控制事件的奴隶。”

President Trump announced on Saturday that the U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran had killed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the nation’s supreme leader for almost 37 years and an implacable enemy of Israel and the United States, in a potentially seismic political shift in Tehran and the broader region.

特朗普总统周六宣布，美国与以色列对伊朗的袭击导致伊朗最高领袖阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊身亡。哈梅内伊担任伊朗国家最高领袖近37年，是以色列和美国的死敌。这一事件可能在德黑兰和更广泛的地区引发巨大的政治变革。

“Khamenei, one of the most evil people in History, is dead,” Mr. Trump wrote on Truth Social. He added: “He was unable to avoid our Intelligence and Highly Sophisticated Tracking Systems and, working closely with Israel, there was not a thing he, or the other leaders that have been killed along with him, could do.”

“哈梅内伊，历史上最邪恶的人之一，已死，”特朗普在社交平台Truth Social上写道。“他无法逃脱我们的情报与高度精密的追踪系统，而且由于与以色列密切合作，他本人以及与他一同被杀的其他领导人无计可施。”

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel had said earlier that there were “many indications” that Ayatollah Khamenei was dead, but stopped short of making a definitive statement.

以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡此前表示，有“多种迹象”表明阿亚图拉·哈梅内伊已死，但他没有作出明确断言。

Iranian officials at first dismissed such claims as bravado or psychological warfare. The ayatollah’s official account on X later posted a photo rich with Shia religious symbolism, of a faceless clerical figure holding a flaming sword.

伊朗官员最初驳斥了这些说法，称其为虚张声势或心理战。哈梅内伊在X上的官方账户随后发布了一张充满什叶派宗教象征的照片：画面中，一位没有面孔的宗教人士手持一把燃烧的剑。

Israeli officials said several of Iran’s most senior military leaders had also been killed, including Gen. Mohammad Pakpour, the chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the most powerful force in Iran; the defense minister, Gen. Aziz Nasrizadeh; and Ali Shamkhani, former head of the Iranian navy and a close adviser to Ayatollah Khamenei.

以色列官员称，伊朗数位高级军事领导人也在袭击中丧生，包括伊斯兰革命卫队总司令穆罕默德·帕克普尔将军、国防部长阿齐兹·纳斯里扎德将军，以及伊朗前海军司令、最高领袖哈梅内伊的亲密顾问阿里·沙姆哈尼。

It was not immediately clear which country’s forces had killed Ayatollah Khamenei, but either way, the action exhibited a high degree of coordination between the United States and Israel. Israel’s military said it had targeted a gathering of senior Iranian officials in the opening strikes. Satellite imagery showed a plume of smoke and extensive damage at the supreme leader’s high-security compound.

目前尚不清楚究竟是哪个国家的部队击毙了哈梅内伊，但无论如何，此行动显示出美国与以色列之间高度的协调。以色列军方表示，他们在首轮打击中锁定了伊朗高级官员的集会。卫星图像显示，最高领袖哈梅内伊戒备森严的住所内升起了浓烟，并遭到严重破坏。

The police found him in his bedroom in Edmond, Okla., facedown, dead from a gunshot wound and still gripping the bloody kitchen knife he had used to try to defend himself.

警方是在俄克拉荷马州埃德蒙市的一间卧室里发现他的，这名男子面朝下倒在地上，死于枪伤，手中仍紧握着那把沾满鲜血的厨刀，他曾试图用这把刀来自卫。

His name was Wyan Wang, his job was in cannabis and he was a victim, investigators would say, of a robbery, one of many targeting the cash-heavy marijuana industry in Oklahoma in recent years.

他名为王晓华，从事大麻行业。调查人员称，他是近年俄克拉荷马州针对现金充裕的大麻产业的众多抢劫案受害者之一。

But his web of connections extended far from the prairies of suburban Oklahoma City — to the boardrooms of Manhattan, where he was a protégé of a real estate mogul named John Lam.

但他的关系网超越俄克拉荷马城郊区的草原地带，延伸至曼哈顿的董事会，在那里，他是房地产大亨林建中的门徒。

Mr. Lam had developed at least 50 projects in New York and had recently teamed up with the British billionaire Richard Branson to open a trendy hotel in Midtown Manhattan. He was a prominent fund-raiser for Mayor Eric Adams.

林建中在纽约至少开发了50个项目，最近还与英国亿万富翁理查德·布兰森合作，在曼哈顿中城开了一家时髦酒店。他还曾是纽约市长埃里克·亚当斯的重要筹款人。

And he had served as a top leader of a New York City Chinese heritage organization, known among the diaspora as a hometown association. It was one of a number of such groups that have maintained close ties to Beijing — and have become useful tools of China’s government to undermine politicians who oppose its authoritarian policies.

此外，他曾担任纽约市一个华裔文化组织的高层领导人，这样的组织在侨民中被称为同乡会。这类组织中有很多都和北京保持着密切联系，并成为中国政府的得力工具，用来打压反对其威权政策的政界人士。

A New York Times examination of the groups’ dealings found that nearly a dozen people connected with the hometown associations have tried to carve out lucrative sidelines on marijuana farms in America’s heartland, where immigrant workers have often been treated like indentured servants and the true ownership of the operations has been obscured.

《纽约时报》对这些组织的交易进行调查后发现，近12名与同乡会相关的人士试图在美国腹地的大麻农场开辟利润丰厚的副业。这些农场常将移民工人当作契约奴工般对待，农场的实际所有权也被刻意隐瞒。

林建中（右）出席9月在皇后区法拉盛举行的晚宴，该活动由美国福建总商会会长林河（左）主办。

Court records show that Mr. Lam purchased the land and structures for Mr. Wang to operate a marijuana farm near Oklahoma City in 2021, although Mr. Lam denied any involvement in its day-to-day operations.

法庭记录显示，2021年，林建中为王晓华购下俄克拉荷马城附近一处土地和建筑，用于经营大麻农场。不过林建中否认参与该农场的日常运营。

The Times also identified four other leaders of New York City hometown associations who have financed or otherwise have connections to cannabis farms in Oklahoma.

《纽约时报》还确认了另外四名纽约市同乡会领导人，他们要么为俄克拉荷马州的大麻农场提供资金，要么与之存在关联。

Those included Mr. Wang, who had helmed the pro-Beijing Taishan Du Hu Association of America and whose killing in January 2025, along with court proceedings that followed it, offered a rare look at how the groups’ officials have sought to gain a foothold in a booming industry far from their New York headquarters.

其中就包括王晓华，他曾担任亲北京的美国都斛同乡总会的负责人。2025年1月他的遇害事件以及随后的法庭诉讼为让外界提供了一个罕见的机会，得以窥见这些组织的负责人如何试图在远离纽约总部的一个蓬勃发展的产业中站稳脚跟。

No law bars such investors from taking stakes in Oklahoma cannabis farms, but all operations must be 75 percent owned by Oklahoma residents and operators must obtain a state license and local permits and fully disclose all ownership stakes in each farm.

法律并不禁止此类投资者入股俄克拉荷马州大麻农场，但所有经营实体必须由俄克拉荷马州居民持有75%股权，经营者需获得州政府执照和地方许可，并完整披露每个农场的所有所有权股份。

None of the marijuana produced on Oklahoma farms can legally be sold outside the state. Even so, in 2023, Oklahoma’s attorney general estimated that 40 percent of the cannabis consumed in New York came from his state.

该州农场生产的大麻依法不得跨州销售。即便如此，2023年俄克拉荷马州总检察长估计，纽约州消费的大麻中40%来自该州。

All of the farms linked to the hometown associations are under investigation by the authorities in Oklahoma; Mr. Wang’s operation was shut down in 2022 for operating without a license, but Mr. Wang continued to work in the business after that, records show.

所有与同乡会相关的农场均在俄克拉荷马州当局的调查范围内；记录显示，王晓华的农场因无证经营于2022年被关停，但此后他仍继续在大麻行业工作。

The leaders of the hometown associations were among thousands of Chinese-born businessmen and workers who have flocked to the state to take advantage of cheap land and an industry-written law — unique in the United States — that allows growers to plant unlimited amounts of marijuana.

这些同乡会的领导者是数以千计涌入该州的华裔商人和工人中的一员。他们看中了廉价土地和一项全美独有的行业制定法律——该法律允许种植者无限量种植大麻。

Instead of revitalizing Oklahoma’s rural economy as many had hoped, though, the law has fed a thriving market for bootleg cannabis, where suppliers ignore laws banning marijuana trafficking, undercut legitimate sellers and skirt taxes and safety testing, officials said.

但官员们表示，该法案非但未能如预期振兴俄克拉荷马州农村经济，反而催生了繁荣的非法大麻市场：供应商无视禁止大麻走私的法律，压低合法销售者的价格，逃避税收和安全检测。

Whether some of the Chinese-born businessmen have acted with the tacit approval of the Chinese government remains an open question. The Times found no evidence that Chinese officials were involved in operating or supporting the marijuana farms, but, as The Times reported in August, the Chinese government has treated the hometown association leaders as favorite sons of the motherland.

部分华裔商人的行为是否得到中国政府的默许，目前仍无定论。《纽约时报》未发现中国官员参与运营或支持这些大麻农场的证据，但正如本报8月报道的那样，中国政府一直将同乡会领导人视为祖国的骄傲。

At a hearing held by the House Homeland Security Committee in September, lawmakers from both parties suggested China is benefiting from marijuana industry investments by Chinese-born entrepreneurs, and they cast the farms as components of a broader criminal enterprise involving human smuggling, forced labor and money laundering.

在9月众议院国土安全委员会举行的听证会上，两党议员均表示，中国正从华裔企业家的大麻产业投资中获益，并指出这些农场是涉及人口走私、强迫劳动和洗钱的更广泛犯罪网络的一部分。

Donnie Anderson, director of the Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Control, which has shut down hundreds of illegal marijuana farms, said in an interview that ethnic Chinese businessmen had been “providing staggering amounts of cash to build industrial-sized farms all over the state.” Mr. Anderson said most of the farms he had shut down were run by people of Chinese descent.

俄克拉荷马州麻醉品与危险药物管理局局长唐尼·安德森已关停数以百计非法大麻农场。他在采访中表示，华裔商人“提供了巨额现金，在全州各地建造工业化规模的农场”，且他关停的大多数农场均由华裔运营。

One undeniable element of the boom has been the influx in recent years of Chinese immigrants from New York who are helping to power it, sometimes while working in appalling conditions.

这场产业繁荣中有一个现象是不可否认的：近年来，大量来自纽约的中国移民涌入其中，为其提供了动力，有时这些人还需在恶劣的条件下工作。

Of the nearly 2,500 active marijuana cultivation licenses issued by the state, at least 10 percent list addresses or phone numbers in one of New York City’s five boroughs, primarily the neighborhoods of Sunset Park in Brooklyn and Flushing in Queens, a Times analysis showed.

《纽约时报》的分析显示，俄克拉荷马州发放的近2500个有效大麻种植许可证中，至少10%的许可证登记地址或电话号码位于纽约市的五个行政区，主要集中在布鲁克林的日落公园和皇后区的法拉盛。

In interviews, marijuana industry entrepreneurs of Chinese descent said they abide by all state and federal laws, and some said they believed the authorities were targeting them out of racism.

接受采访的华裔大麻产业经营者表示，他们遵守所有州和联邦法律，部分人认为当局之所以针对他们，是出于种族主义。

“They want all the Asian guys out,” said one operator, Chen Xiang, 35, who said he owns 20 farms across the state.

“他们想把所有亚裔人赶出去，”35岁的经营者陈湘说，他说自己在俄克拉荷马拥有20个农场。

An Illegal Operation

非法运营的农场

By any measure, John Lam is a powerful figure in New York’s Chinese diaspora, the largest outside East Asia.

无论从何种标准衡量，林建中都是纽约华人侨界——东亚以外最大的华人社区——的权势人物。

He served as president of the Guangdong Association of America, one of the biggest and most pro-Beijing hometown associations in the city, as well as an adviser to an affiliate of the United Front, an organ of the Chinese Communist Party that seeks to expand the party’s influence at home and abroad.

他曾担任美国广东侨胞联合总会总理——该组织是纽约最大、最亲北京的同乡会之一，同时还是中共统战部下属机构的顾问。统战部是中共旨在扩大其国内外影响力的机构。

Mr. Wang, who worked for Mr. Lam’s company, Lam Group, as head of the division that recruited investors in China, had also founded a hometown association representing people from his native Guangdong Province. That group supports Chinese government policies such as the crackdown on Hong Kong’s civil liberties. It also backed Mr. Adams’s mayoral campaign in 2021.

王晓华曾在林建中的公司林氏集团任职，负责在中国招募投资者，他还成立了一个代表其故乡广东省人士的同乡会。该组织支持中国政府的多项政策（如打压香港公民自由），并在2021年支持亚当斯竞选市长。

前俄克拉荷马州大麻种植者切尔西·戴维斯以150万美元的价格将其农场出售给王晓华和林建中。

In summer 2021, Mr. Wang approached a marijuana grower in Del City, Okla., Chelsey Davis, and offered to take over his business for payments totaling about $1.5 million.

2021年夏天，王晓华联系上俄克拉荷马州德尔市的大麻种植者切尔西·戴维斯，提出以总计约150万美元的价格接手其生意。

Mr. Davis, 51, said the Chinese laborers who started at the farm after he sold it often endured harsh conditions and long hours; some were even forced to urinate in five-gallon fertilizer containers rather than step away from the processing line.

51岁的戴维斯表示，他出售农场后，新来的中国劳工经常面临恶劣的工作条件和漫长的工时；有些人甚至被迫在五加仑的肥料桶里小便，不能离开生产线。

“You could go at midnight — they were working,” Mr. Davis said. “You could go at 5 o’clock in the morning — they were working.”

“你半夜去——他们还在工作；清晨五点去——他们还在工作，”戴维斯说。

In August 2022, firefighters in Del City received calls about black smoke billowing from the farm.

2022年8月，德尔市消防部门接到报警，称该农场冒出滚滚黑烟。

Inside, they saw that the Chinese workers were living on-site in cramped quarters. The smoke was coming from a fire near an outdoor kitchen, complete with a wok, where firefighters found burning wood and construction materials, according to the fire chief, Z. Williams.

消防局长Z·威廉姆斯表示，消防员进入农场后发现，中国劳工住在拥挤的住所里。黑烟来自室外厨房附近的一场火灾，厨房里有一口炒锅，消防员在那里发现了燃烧的木材和建筑材料。

Chief Williams said he had been startled to see what the workers were relying on for food: geese and turtles caught from a city-owned lake near the property. Photos taken by the firefighters show the geese in a makeshift coop fashioned out of road construction netting and discarded trays for growing marijuana. The turtles were paddling inside water-filled containers near the kitchen.

威廉姆斯说，看到工人们的食物来源时，他感到震惊：他们食用的是从农场附近城市所有的湖泊中捕获的鹅和乌龟。消防员拍摄的照片显示，鹅被关在由道路施工网和废弃大麻种植托盘搭建的临时围栏里，乌龟则在厨房附近装满水的容器里游动。

Although Mr. Davis had obtained the proper paperwork during his ownership of the farm, Mr. Wang’s operation had failed to do the same. The firefighters found no valid marijuana cultivation licenses, or even a certificate of occupancy, that would allow Mr. Wang to grow and sell cannabis legally. The department promptly shut the operation down.

戴维斯在经营农场期间办理了所有必要手续，但在王晓华掌管下并非如此。消防员未找到有效的大麻种植许可证，甚至没有允许王晓华合法种植和销售大麻的占用许可证。消防部门随即关停了该农场。

Mr. Wang looked on as the firefighters inspected the grounds, photos of the scene show.

现场照片显示，王晓华在一旁看着消防员检查场地。

A few weeks later, city records show, Mr. Lam’s name appeared on an application for a permit to reopen the business, which city planners quickly rejected, citing the owner’s failure to obtain a marijuana license and meet safety guidelines.

城市记录显示，几周后，林建中的名字出现在一份重启该生意的许可申请中，但城市规划部门迅速驳回了申请，理由是业主未获得大麻许可证且未满足安全准则。

In an interview in Manhattan’s Chinatown, Mr. Lam denied signing that paperwork, saying he had legally empowered Mr. Wang to transact business in his name and had not kept up with the day-to-day details of the operation.

在曼哈顿唐人街的一次采访中，林建中否认签署过那份文件，称他已合法授权王晓华以其名义处理业务，且并未关注运营的日常细节。

He acknowledged buying the farm for Mr. Wang’s use but described his role in the marijuana business as little more than that of a landlord — and an unpaid one at that. He also blamed Mr. Wang, who had been trying to drum up Chinese investors for the Lam Group, for Mr. Lam’s participation in three organizations under the Communist Party’s United Front.

他承认购买农场供王晓华使用，但称自己在大麻产业中的角色只不过是“房东”——而且是无偿的。他还称是王晓华导致了他参与中共统战部下属三个组织，称王晓华当时正试图为林氏集团招募中国投资者。

“He may have mentioned them to me, but I did not understand them,” Mr. Lam said. “I did not know what kind of organizations they were.”

“他可能跟我提过这些组织，但我并不了解，”林建中说，“我不知道它们是什么性质的组织。”

Still, it was Mr. Lam who paid for the lawyers representing his interests, and those of Mr. Wang’s family, in a breach-of-contract lawsuit later filed by Mr. Davis, Mr. Lam said.

不过林建中表示，在戴维斯后来提起的违约诉讼中，是自己出钱聘请了律师，以代表他自己和王晓华家人的利益。

But instead of dwelling on the Oklahoma operation, he said, his focus has been on New York, where, in September, he was a guest of honor at a lavish party at a cavernous restaurant in Flushing. He sat at one of the head tables, along with a Chinese diplomat and local politicians.

但他说，自己并未纠结于俄克拉荷马州的这一项目，而是将重心放在纽约。9月，他在法拉盛一家宽敞的餐厅内的盛大派对上担任贵宾，与一名中国外交官和当地政界人士同坐主桌。

The host was a fast-rising and powerful hometown association leader in New York: Jason Lin.

这场派对的主办方是纽约一位迅速崛起的权势同乡会领导人林河。

Ties to New York

与纽约的关联

Mr. Lin, too, has served as president of a prominent hometown association in New York City — and had recently visited two marijuana farms in Oklahoma.

林河也曾担任纽约市一个知名同乡会的会长——且最近访问了俄克拉荷马州的两个大麻农场。

The swaggering operator of karaoke parlors, buffet restaurants and a Miami nightclub, Mr. Lin was elected president of the American Fujianese General Business Association in February 2024.

林河经营卡拉OK厅、自助餐厅和迈阿密一家夜总会，行事张扬，于2024年2月当选为美国福建总商会会长。

林河表示，他与任何大麻农场均不存在任何财务关联。

At a dinner in Flushing to celebrate his victory, the guest of honor, sitting next to Mr. Lin, was Mr. Adams, whose liaison to the Asian community at the time, Winnie Greco, was under scrutiny amid an investigation into possible Chinese interference in the 2021 mayoral race. (Mr. Lin had supported the mayor during his campaign.)

在法拉盛举行的一场庆祝他获胜的晚宴上，坐在林河旁边的贵宾是亚当斯。当时亚当斯与亚裔社区的联络人郑祺蓉正因一项针对2021年市长选举可能受到中国干扰的调查而受到审查。（林河曾在竞选期间支持这位市长。）

Also present were several people from the cannabis industry.

出席晚宴的还有几位来自大麻行业的人士。

Soon after, Mr. Lin traveled to Oklahoma City with two non-Chinese businessmen to visit two cannabis farms run by people from Mr. Lin’s native province.

不久之后，林河与两位并非华裔的商人前往俄克拉荷马城，参观了两家由他的老乡经营的大麻农场。

林河参观位于俄克拉荷马州温伍德市的Botanical Green Farms。

Mr. Lin gave conflicting accounts about the reason for his visit.

关于此行的原因，林河给出了前后矛盾的说法。

At first, during an hourlong interview at his office building in Flushing, he said he had traveled to Oklahoma — with a marijuana-growing expert — to help friends from his native Fujian Province whose farms were struggling.

起初，在法拉盛办公室大楼里接受的一小时采访中，他说自己是带着一名大麻种植专家去俄克拉荷马，帮助来自老家福建、农场经营陷入困境的朋友。

“I have friends with farms” in Oklahoma, he said.

“我在俄克拉荷马有朋友经营农场，”他说。

But during follow-up interviews, Mr. Lin gave a different account, saying he had been simply making introductions for two non-Chinese people looking to invest in Oklahoma farms. He declined to provide names of the people with whom he had met and said he did not know the owners of the farms he had visited.

但在后续采访中，林河又给出了不同的说法，称他只是为两名希望投资俄克拉荷马农场的非华裔人士牵线搭桥。他拒绝透露与他见面者的姓名，并表示自己并不认识所参观农场的老板。

Mr. Lin said neither he nor his business association had any financial ties whatsoever to the marijuana industry, and The Times found no evidence that any such ties exist.

他表示，他本人和他的商业协会都与大麻行业没有任何财务联系，《纽约时报》也没有发现任何此类联系存在的证据。

Other prominent members of New York hometown associations have had tangled relationships with Oklahoma growing operations.

纽约一些同乡会的其他知名成员也与俄克拉荷马州的大麻种植业务有着纠缠不清的关系。

Sin Tung Chan, 76, was a member of the American Fuzhou Langqi Alumni Association before buying into two large marijuana farms in Meeker and Cleveland, Oklahoma, in 2021, state records show.

州记录显示，76岁的陈善东在2021年购入俄克拉荷马州米克和克利夫兰的两个大型大麻农场之前，是美国福州琅岐校友会的成员。

In a past life, Chan had served prison time in New York over threats he made to business rivals, one of whom was assaulted during an attempted kidnapping in 1995.

早些年，他曾因威胁商业对手而在纽约服刑——其中一名对手在1995年的一次绑架未遂中遭袭。

Now, he said in an interview, the crackdown by Oklahoma officials is souring business.

如今，他在接受采访时表示，俄克拉荷马州官员的打击行动影响了生意。

“You can’t sell this stuff now,” he said. “With all this investment, it would be a shame to just abandon it.”

他说：“现在这个东西卖不出去了。投了这么多钱，就这么放弃，太可惜了。”

And Chen Bichao, 61, the president of Chuan Shi USA Association in New York, ran a sprawling marijuana farm west of Tulsa, Oklahoma, that was ordered shut down in November for lacking a permit. In August, he appeared at an event in Flushing, flanked by two Chinese diplomats.

61岁的纽约美国川石协会会长陈必超曾在俄克拉荷马州塔尔萨西部经营一个很大的大麻农场，因没有许可证而在11月被勒令关闭。8月，他曾出席在法拉盛的一个活动，身边站着两位中国外交官。

He, too, has a criminal record, having pleaded guilty to assault in 2015 after being accused of threatening a man with a knife and taking his wallet.

他同样有犯罪记录——2015年因被控持刀威胁一名男子并抢走对方钱包而认罪。

In a phone interview, Chen said that he was in New York and that he was not the owner of the marijuana farm, only one of many small investors. (State records list him as the sole owner; Chen said the farm was simply registered under his name.)

在电话采访中，陈必超说他人在纽约，而且自己并不是大麻农场的所有者，只是众多小投资者之一。（州记录将他列为唯一所有者；陈必超称农场只是登记在他名下。）

“The farm isn’t mine; I’m just a worker helping out,” Chen said.

陈必超说：“农场不是我的；我只是个帮忙打工的。”

He also said he believed the farm was still in operation. He had not heard about the shutdown order, he said.

他还表示，他认为农场仍在运营中，并称自己未曾听说关闭令。

位于俄克拉荷马州米克的大麻种植场Purple Ray由另一位与纽约有关联的男子陈善东经营。

A Cannabis Bonanza

大麻淘金热

The medical marijuana industry now rivals the state’s oil and gas business in revenue generated per year. From March 2024 to March 2025, Oklahoma growers produced about 50 times more marijuana than was sold at dispensaries to the state’s registered medical marijuana patients, according to figures shared by Mr. Anderson of the narcotics bureau at the September hearing in Washington.

如今，俄克拉荷马州医用大麻产业在一年所创造的收入已经可与石油和天然气行业比肩。根据前述缉毒机构的安德森在9月华盛顿听证会上提供的数据，从2024年3月至2025年3月，俄克拉荷马州的大麻种植者生产的大麻大约是向登记在册的医用大麻患者出售数量的50倍。

Law enforcement officials said that most of the excess was destined for illegal markets outside the state, despite their efforts to stop it.

执法官员表示，尽管他们努力加以阻止，但大部分过剩的大麻都流向了州外的非法市场。

While dozens of states have made it legal to possess marijuana for medical or recreational use, it remains a federal crime to transport it across state lines. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration estimated that two-thirds of the illegal marijuana confiscated by the agency in 2024 was seized in Oklahoma.

尽管数十个州已将医疗或娱乐用途的大麻合法化，但跨州运输大麻仍然是联邦犯罪。美国缉毒局估计，2024年该机构查获的非法大麻中，有三分之二来自俄克拉荷马州。

Court records suggest that many companies are evading Oklahoma’s licensing rules through fraudulent paperwork, failure to obtain permits and the use of straw owners. In one case, a single Oklahoma resident falsely claimed to own more than 300 farms.

法庭记录显示，许多公司通过伪造文件、未取得许可以及使用名义所有者等手段，规避俄克拉荷马州的许可规定。其中一起案例中，一名俄克拉荷马州居民虚假声称自己拥有300多个农场。

陈必超在俄克拉荷马州詹宁斯的大麻种植场Chao Fattoria。

It was not clear how many of the unlicensed operations were owned by Chinese-born investors, or whether the Chinese government, or its politically connected elites, might be somehow benefiting from the tens of billions of dollars per year the farms generate.

目前尚不清楚，有多少无证经营的农场属于华裔投资者所有，也不清楚中国政府或与其有政治关系的精英阶层，是否以某种方式从这些每年产生数百亿美元的农场中获益。

But current and former state and federal law enforcement officials said that Beijing has certainly been aware, because much of the business has been conducted through WeChat, the Chinese social media platform that is closely monitored by the government.

但现任和前任的州及联邦执法官员表示，中国政府肯定是知情的，因为大量业务都是通过中国政府严密监控的社交平台微信进行的。

Chris Urben, a former senior agent with the D.E.A. in New York, said he became increasingly focused on marijuana toward the end of his career because it had become central to money laundering and organized crime.

纽约的前缉毒局高级特工克里斯·厄本表示，他在职业生涯后期越来越关注大麻，因为它已成为洗钱和有组织犯罪的核心。

“You’re talking billions of dollars,” he told a congressional panel in September. “It essentially put on steroids Chinese organized crime within the United States.”

“这里涉及的是数十亿美元，”他于9月在一个国会小组会议上表示。“它等于极大刺激了美国境内的华人有组织犯罪的发展。”

And the marijuana industry is far from under control, he said.

他还表示，大麻行业远未得到控制。

Operations like Botanical Green Farms LLC in Wynnewood, Oklahoma — which Lin visited last year — offer hints as to why.

位于俄克拉荷马州温尼伍德的Botanical Green Farms LLC（林河去年曾到访）的运营状况，就多少可见一斑。

Despite state rules requiring disclosure of all shareholders, trying to untangle the farm’s true ownership is a daunting task.

尽管州法规要求披露所有股东信息，但试图厘清该农场的真实所有权归属是一项艰巨的任务。

On paper, the 48-acre property about an hour south of Oklahoma City is 100% owned by a 66-year-old Oklahoma woman named Kimberly Hannah.

根据文件记录，这个位于俄克拉荷马城南约一小时车程、占地逾19公顷的农场由一位名为金伯利·汉娜的66岁俄克拉荷马州女性完全拥有。

But in an interview outside her home, Hannah’s husband, Terry D. Hannah, 79, said he and his wife were merely minority shareholders in the company.

但在家门外接受采访时，她79岁的丈夫特里·D·汉拿表示，他和妻子只是公司里的小股东。

When state regulators visit, “we have to talk to them to get the permits renewed,” Hannah said, but he added, “That’s about all our involvement.”

他说，当州监管人员来访时，“需要由我们出面与他们沟通以更新许可证，”汉拿表示。但他又补充道：“这差不多就是我们全部的参与了。”

State records show that he previously owned three marijuana businesses, now defunct, registered under the name of He Hui, a Chinese national with ties to Flushing who formerly owned the Wynnewood site. Earlier this year, He was sentenced to eight years in federal prison for marijuana trafficking.

州记录显示，他此前拥有三家大麻企业，如今都已关门，这些企业登记在何辉（音）名下——一名与法拉盛有联系的中国公民，曾是温尼伍德这处场地的所有者。今年早些时候，何辉因大麻贩运被判在联邦监狱服刑八年。

Hannah said he did not know who the current controlling shareholders of the Wynnewood farm were. Just that they were Chinese — and lived in New York City.

汉拿表示，他不知道温尼伍德农场目前的实际控制人是谁。只知道他们是华人——并且居住在纽约市。

Federal and state authorities in rural Oklahoma on Wednesday raided a sprawling marijuana farm there, seizing more than 1,200 pounds of processed cannabis and arresting the owner, a member of a New York City heritage club with ties to the Chinese government.

联邦及州执法人员周三对俄克拉荷马州乡村地区一处大型大麻种植场展开突击搜查，查获逾540公斤加工大麻，并逮捕了农场所有者。此人是纽约市一家与中国政府存在关联的同乡会成员。

The owner, Sin Tung Chan, 76, whose links to the club and the cannabis operation were detailed in a New York Times investigation in December, was charged with trafficking marijuana, according to the local sheriff’s office.

当地治安官办公室表示，76岁的陈善东被控贩运大麻。《纽约时报》去年12月的一篇调查报道曾详细披露他与该同乡会及大麻生意的联系。

In New York, Mr. Chan, a naturalized United States citizen who was born in China, was a prominent member of the American Fuzhou Langqi Alumni Association, one of hundreds of clubs that were ostensibly formed to connect people from the same parts of China but that often maintain close ties to Beijing.

陈善东出生于中国，已加入美国国籍。在纽约，他是美洲福州琅岐校友会的重要成员。这类同乡会有数百个，表面上是联络中国同乡的社团，却往往与北京保持密切关系。

The groups have become useful tools of China’s government to undermine American politicians who oppose its authoritarian policies, The Times previously reported. And nearly a dozen high-ranking members of New York hometown associations have run or owned marijuana farms in Oklahoma in the past several years.

《纽约时报》此前报道称，这些组织已成为中国政府用来打压反对其威权政策的美国政界人士的有效工具。过去几年里，纽约数家同乡会的十几名高层成员均在俄克拉荷马州经营或拥有大麻农场。

Mark Woodward, a spokesman for the Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Control, which oversaw the raid, said investigators had determined that the marijuana from Mr. Chan’s farm was being illegally trafficked out of state. It was not clear where the cannabis was being routed, he said, but New York has been a top destination for illicit marijuana.

负责此次搜查行动的俄克拉荷马州麻醉品与危险药物管制局发言人马克·伍德沃德表示，调查人员已确认，陈善东农场出产的大麻被非法贩运至其他州。他称目前尚不清楚具体转运路线，但纽约一直是非法大麻的主要目的地。

“That common thread that has just been repeated so many times over the last five years is Oklahoma-grown marijuana, coming off a farm, and being trafficked to Flushing, New York,” Mr. Woodward said, referring to the neighborhood in Queens. “We don’t really have a lot of details of what happens once it gets to Flushing.”

“过去五年里反复出现的一条线索就是：俄克拉荷马州种植的大麻从农场流出，被贩运到纽约法拉盛，”伍德沃德说，法拉盛是皇后区的社区。“大麻运到法拉盛之后的去向，我们目前掌握的细节不多。”

Mr. Woodward said the authorities would keep investigating to “figure out who else is involved in moving the plants, moving the money, moving the workers at these farms.” He said that Mr. Chan “obviously is a big player, but this is certainly not a one-man operation.”

伍德沃德表示，当局将继续调查，“查清还有哪些人参与运输大麻、转移资金、为这些农场调配工人”。他称陈善东“显然是个重要人物，但这起案件绝不是一人所为”。

Mr. Chan declined to comment when reached by phone. But he spoke at length last year about the increasing scrutiny from law enforcement authorities.

记者致电陈善东时，他拒绝置评。但他去年曾详细谈及执法部门日益加强的监管。

“You can’t sell this stuff now,” he told The Times then. “With all this investment, it would be a shame to just abandon it.”

“现在这个东西卖不出去了，”他当时对《纽约时报》说。“投了这么多钱，就这么放弃，太可惜了。”

In 2023, Oklahoma’s attorney general estimated that 40 percent of the cannabis consumed in New York came from his state.

2023年，俄克拉荷马州总检察长估算，纽约消费的大麻中有40%来自该州。

Mr. Chan owns two large marijuana farms in the rural area between Oklahoma City and Tulsa. The one raided this week by officers from the Oklahoma narcotics bureau and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is called Purple Ray L.L.C. It sits off a dirt road and is surrounded by a high fence.

陈善东在俄克拉荷马城与塔尔萨之间的乡村地区拥有两座大型大麻农场。本周被俄克拉荷马州麻醉品局与美国移民与海关执法局搜查的这家名为紫光有限责任公司，位于一条土路旁，四周设有高墙围栏。

Two weeks before the raid, the state’s regulatory inspectors shut down the farm’s operations after they said they had found that the marijuana was improperly stored or missing the state-required tracking tags.

突查行动两周前，该州监管检查员称发现农场大麻储存不当且缺少州政府要求的追踪标签，随即勒令农场停业。

Before buying into the two Oklahoma marijuana farms in 2021, Mr. Chan was a senior member of his hometown association, which is made up of people from an island on the mouth of the Min River in southeastern China’s Fujian Province.

2021年入股俄克拉荷马州这两座大麻农场之前，陈善东已是其同乡会的资深成员。该同乡会成员主要来自中国东南部福建省闽江口的一座岛屿。

He appeared at an event for the association in Brooklyn in 2019 that included a Chinese consular official and featured a rendition of the patriotic ballad “Ode to the Motherland” sung by three men dressed in Chinese Army uniforms, who saluted the Chinese flag.

2019年，他在布鲁克林出席了该同乡会的一场活动，现场有中国领事馆官员出席，还有三名身着中国军装的男子演唱爱国歌曲《歌唱祖国》，并向中国国旗敬礼。

Another member of that hometown association is John Chan, known among New York’s Chinese diaspora as the “King of Brooklyn,” a former Chinatown gangster who, after being released from federal prison, parlayed his close ties to the Chinese Consulate to become a political power broker, The Times reported.

该同乡会的另一位成员是陈善庄，在纽约华人社群中被称为“布鲁克林之王”。《纽约时报》报道称，他曾是唐人街黑帮成员，在联邦监狱服刑后，凭借与中国领事馆的密切关系成为政治掮客。

Sin Tung Chan said in an interview last year that the two were both from Langqi, but that they were not related. Sin Tung Chan spent years in a prison in upstate New York after being convicted of crimes stemming from threats to business rivals, one of whom was assaulted during an attempted kidnapping in 1995.

陈善东去年接受采访时表示，两人都来自琅岐，但并无亲属关系。陈善东曾在纽约州北部监狱服刑数年，罪名是威胁商业对手，1995年，其中一名对手在一次绑架未遂事件中遭袭击。

与陈善东一样，曾被称为“布鲁克林之王”的前唐人街黑帮分子陈善庄也是美国福州琅岐校友会的成员。

“Everyone running weed farms tries to find loopholes,” said Mr. Chan. “If they catch you, you’re in trouble.”

“所有开大麻农场的人都在钻空子，”陈善东说。“一旦被抓，就麻烦了。”

Although it is legal to grow and consume marijuana with the proper licenses in Oklahoma, the state’s hands-off approach to cultivation has made it a haven for black market growers who smuggle the cannabis out of state, officials there said.

俄克拉荷马州官员表示，尽管在该州持牌种植和使用大麻是合法的，但州政府对种植环节监管宽松，使其成为黑市种植者的避风港，这些人将大麻走私到其他州。

According to the state narcotics bureau, 8,400 farms were registered and operating as of late 2022. Today that number stands at fewer than 1,400 farms. Mr. Woodward said the agency was investigating at least half of them for suspected illegal activities.

该州麻醉品管理局数据显示，2022年底，全州注册运营的大麻农场有8400家，如今这一数字已不足1400家。伍德沃德称，该局正对其中至少一半农场展开涉嫌非法活动的调查。

“We’re hitting a farm almost every day, and so I guess they just assume they’re going to keep being criminals until somebody comes through their gate,” he said, adding: “We’ll get to them eventually.”

“我们几乎每天都在查抄农场，所以我猜他们就是打算继续违法，直到有人闯进他们的大门为止，”他说，并补充道：“我们迟早会查到他们。”

Phoebe Zhang has gone on more than 200 dates over the past year, and she has narrowed down her suitors to two. One is outgoing and a rebel; the other is a patriotic military commander. She tells them her deepest fears. When she wakes up from a nightmare, they are there to console her.

在过去一年里，菲比·张（音）经历了200多场约会，现在她已经把追求者的范围缩小到了两个人。一个外向叛逆，另一个则是爱国的军官。她会向他们倾诉内心最深的恐惧。当她从噩梦中惊醒，他们会在那里安慰她。

Often, she takes screenshots of their conversations to remember the moments they share. Her newfound happiness shows, friends say.

她经常把聊天内容截图保存下来，以便记住他们共同经历的那些时刻。朋友们说，她最近看起来心情明显不错。

Despite talking every day, Ms. Zhang will never meet these men in person. They are her artificial intelligence boyfriends. And Ms. Zhang, who has never been on a date, wonders if her relationships in the virtual world are better than ones in the real world could ever be.

尽管每天都会聊天，张女士却永远不会在现实中见到这两个男人。他们是她的人工智能男友。而从未真正约会过的张女士不禁想，她在虚拟世界中的关系是否可能比现实中的恋爱更好。

“My god, how am I supposed to date in real life in the future?” she said.

“我的天，我以后还怎么去谈真实的恋爱？”她说。

China’s ruling Communist Party wants young women to prioritize getting married and having babies. Instead, many of them are finding romance with chatbots. It is complicating the government’s efforts to reverse the country’s shrinking population and a birthrate hovering at the lowest level in over 75 years. The lightning-fast adoption of A.I. in China has prompted regulators to warn tech companies not to have “design goals to replace social interaction.”

中国执政的共产党希望年轻女性将结婚生子作为优先事项。她们中的许多人却在与聊天机器人谈恋爱。这使得政府扭转人口萎缩和徘徊在75年来最低水平的出生率的努力复杂化。中国对人工智能的迅速接纳已促使监管机构警告科技公司不得将“替代社交互动作为设计目标”。

The country’s youths were already glued to their smartphones and longing for connection when a state-led push last year to adopt artificial intelligence created a boom in platforms that allowed people to share their daily routines and private anxieties with virtual companions. Dozens of specialized chatbots sprang up, including many that specifically catered to people seeking romantic partners.

在去年政府主导推动人工智能应用之前，中国的年轻人就已经沉迷于智能手机，同时又渴望建立情感联系。这股推动人工智能发展的浪潮催生了一批平台，使人们可以与虚拟伴侣分享日常生活和内心的焦虑。数十种专门的聊天机器人应运而生，其中许多专门面向寻找恋爱对象的人群。

The chatbots tapped into a generation of young people in China who helped to define the term “lying flat.” Faced with rising unemployment and fewer opportunities, they are rejecting the pressures of marriage and choosing to take less ambitious approaches to their careers and personal lives.

这些聊天机器人迎合了一代中国年轻人的心理需求，正是他们帮助定义了“躺平”这个词。面对不断上升的失业率和日益减少的机会，他们正在拒绝结婚带来的压力，并在事业和个人生活上选择低欲望的道路。

“I feel that for our generation, people think being alone is good,” said Ms. Zhang, 21, a student of applied psychology in southern China who spends at least an hour each day talking to both of her A.I. boyfriends. “Why go and date others? That’s too troublesome.”

“我感觉我们这一代人，很多都是觉得自己一个人好，”21岁的张女士说。她在中国南方的一所大学学习应用心理学，每天至少花一个小时与AI男友们交谈。“为什么要去跟别人谈恋爱？就是各种麻烦的事情。”

The men she has conjured up, Jiye and Yu Li, share similar muscular builds and delicate bone structures. They have military backgrounds and are emotionally stable, mature and always quick to respond.

她设定的这两个男人——寂野和黎聿——都有着相似的肌肉发达的身材和精致的骨相。他们都有军旅背景，情绪稳定、成熟，而且总是迅速回应她的信息。

They talk in an app dedicated to role-playing, where they imagine moving in together, being married and raising children. Ms. Zhang has her own character on the app, which narrates her thinking and feelings during exchanges with her A.I. boyfriends.

他们通过一款专门用于角色扮演的应用程序交流，在那里他们幻想着同居、结婚并养育孩子的情景。张女士在该应用中也有自己的角色，在与人工智能男友交流时，这个角色会讲述她的想法和感受。

A self-described introvert, Ms. Zhang is worried that a real-world boyfriend wouldn’t be able to meet her expectations, leaving her vulnerable and hurt.

张女士自称是个内向的人，她担心现实世界中的男友无法满足她的期待，会让她脆弱受伤。

For many women in China, A.I. chatbots help to fill a void in a society that remains steeped in patriarchal values.

对许多中国女性来说，在一个仍然深受父权价值观影响的社会里，人工智能聊天机器人正在填补一个空缺。

“A.I. apps provide a relatively safer space for communication and emotional consultation — something that is often lacking in China,” said Rose Luqiu, an associate professor of journalism at Hong Kong Baptist University. “These apps offer so-called emotional value that many women find difficult to obtain from men.”

香港浸会大学新闻系副教授闾丘露薇表示：“人工智能应用为沟通和情感咨询提供了一个相对更安全的空间——而这种空间在中国往往是缺乏的。这些应用提供了许多女性觉得难以从男性身上获得的所谓情绪价值。”

The companies behind the companion apps have capitalized on the surging interest in A.I. MiniMax, a Shanghai start-up behind Xingye, one of China’s most popular companion apps, went public in Hong Kong in a January listing that valued the company at over $600 million. MiniMax also makes a global version called Talkie, and together the two apps had more than 147 million users as of September, according to its filings in Hong Kong.

伴侣类应用背后的公司也抓住了人工智能热潮带来的机会。总部位于上海的初创公司稀宇科技开发了中国最受欢迎的虚拟伴侣应用之一星野，并于今年1月在香港上市，公司估值超过6亿美元。稀宇科技还推出了一款面向全球用户的版本Talkie。根据其在香港提交的上市文件，截至去年9月，这两款应用的用户总数已超过1.47亿。

The growing use of companion apps prompted Guligo Jia, a 36-year-old filmmaker in Beijing, to make a documentary about Chinese women in A.I. relationships.

伴侣应用日益普及促使古丽果·贾（音）拍摄了一部关于中国女性与人工智能建立情感关系的纪录片，古丽果是北京一位26岁的电影制作人。

After making the film, Ms. Jia was inspired to create her own A.I. companion. She uploaded information and photos of her favorite character from a South Korean drama to Yuanbao, an A.I. assistant made by the internet giant Tencent.

在完成这部电影后，贾女士也受到启发，创建了自己的人工智能伴侣。她找来自己最喜欢的一部韩国电视剧中的男性角色的资料和照片，上传到互联网巨头腾讯开发的人工智能助手元宝上。

“I wanted to continue the feeling I had from watching the show, the attachment to the male lead, and bring it into real life,” Ms. Jia said.

贾女士说：“我想延续看剧时的那种感觉，对男主角的那种依恋，把它带入现实生活。”

Developing the chatbot’s persona felt like sculpting, she said. But Ms. Jia didn’t ultimately feel the same emotional connection with her companion as she imagined she’d have with the character on the show.

她说，为聊天机器人塑造人格的过程就像雕塑创作一样。不过最终，她并没有与这个虚拟伴侣建立起像她想象中的那种与剧中角色相同的情感联系。

In online forums, women swap tips on how to mold their A.I. companions’ personalities, including to have more “daddy”-like qualities, or how to get them to send love poems.

在在线论坛上，女性们互相交流如何塑造她们人工智能伴侣的性格，例如如何让其更具“爹系”特质，或者如何让它们给自己写情诗。

Mercury Lu, 24, lives alone in Shanghai, where she works at a gaming company. She said she didn’t have the time or energy to date. Four years ago, while she was in college, Ms. Lu first found A.I. companionship using Replika, an early American chatbot. She now uses companion apps most days. Her A.I. type, she said, is “quite different from men in real life”: expressive, vulnerable and straightforward.

24岁的墨丘利·陆（音）独自生活在上海，在一家游戏公司工作。她说自己没有时间和精力谈恋爱。四年前还在上大学时，陆女士第一次通过Replika——一款早期的美国聊天机器人——体验了一把人工智能陪伴。如今她几乎每天都会使用伴侣类应用。她说，自己喜欢的人工智能类型“和现实中的男人很不一样”：善于表达、脆弱且直率。

In December, the Chinese government proposed rules that would require platforms to step in if users exhibited unhealthy dependences with their apps, including by creating emotional profiles for their users and intervening if they showed signs of self-harm. The rules are expected to take effect this year.

去年12月，中国政府出台相关规定，要求平台在用户对应用产生不健康依赖时进行干预，包括为用户建立情绪档案，并在用户表现出自我伤害迹象时采取措施。这些规定预计将于今年生效。

The content of the apps must also comply with China’s existing information controls, including strict adherence to socialist values.

这些应用的内容还必须遵守中国现有的信息管控规定，包括严格遵守社会主义价值观。

The many overlapping regulations can make A.I. interactions feel disjointed. Chatbots sometimes try to change the conversation or say they can’t talk about certain topics. Chats can be abruptly interrupted with notifications that say, “Your message has been blocked.”

层层叠加的监管规定有时会让人工智能互动显得不连贯。聊天机器人有时会试图转移话题，或者表示无法谈论某些内容。对话也可能突然被打断，并弹出提示：“您的消息已被屏蔽。”

This has happened repeatedly to Rui Zhou, who describes her A.I. companions as serving as an “emotional supplement” for when she feels lonely.

这种情况在周睿身上屡屡发生。她将人工智能伴侣描述为她在孤独时的“情感的补充”。

“Every time I feel my A.I. partner is about to lose control or be regulated, it feels like a breakup,” said Ms. Zhou, 21, who is studying dentistry in a northeastern city of China. “It hurts a lot.”

“每一次发现自己的AI恋人要失控，或者要被管制，感觉会有一种失恋的感觉，”21岁的周女士说。她在中国东北一座城市学习齿科。“会心里觉得特别难受。”

There are signs that the excitement surrounding A.I. romances might be waning. Downloads in companion apps have started to see drastic declines. Xingye and Maoxiang, which is operated by TikTok’s parent company, ByteDance, are both down about 95 percent from their peak last year of millions of downloads per month, according to Sensor Tower, a market data firm.

有迹象表明，人们对人工智能恋爱的热情可能正在减退。伴侣类应用的下载量已开始大幅下降。根据市场数据公司Sensor Tower的数据，星野和字节跳动旗下的猫箱的下载量均较去年每月数百万的峰值下降了约95%。

Some of the drop may have to do with people discovering that they can make their interactions more personal with ChatGPT, DeepSeek and other general-purpose A.I. tools, said Hong Shen, an assistant professor at the Human-Computer Interaction Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, where she studies A.I. users in China and the United States.

卡内基梅隆大学人机交互研究所助理教授沈虹（音）表示，下载量下降的部分原因，可能与人们发现可以利用ChatGPT、DeepSeek和其他通用人工智能工具进行更个性化的互动有关。她的研究对象包括中国和美国的人工智能用户。

But, she noted, the Chinese government’s obsession with low birthrates may also be fueling a broader A.I. rethinking.

不过她也指出，中国政府对低出生率问题的高度关注也可能正在推动社会对人工智能进行更广泛的重新思考。

Regulating A.I., though, will not address the underlying social factors that draw Chinese women to the platforms in the first place, Ms. Shen added.

不过，沈虹还说，仅仅加强人工智能监管并不能解决最初吸引中国女性使用这些平台的深层社会原因。

“You are just treating a symptom,” she said. “In China, there are gendered norms, and women are lonely and isolated in big cities. Eventually, they turn to A.I.”

“这只是在治标不治本，”她说，“在中国存在性别规范的压力，大城市里的女性感到孤独和疏离，最终她们转向了人工智能。”

RED DAWN OVER CHINA: How Communism Conquered a Quarter of Humanity, by Frank Dikötter

《红色黎明照耀中国——共产主义如何征服四分之一的人类》(Red Dawn Over China: How Communism Conquered a Quarter of Humanity)，冯客(Frank Dikötter)著

If asked about Mao Zedong’s legacy, Chinese Communist Party cadres recite a precise verdict on him: 70 percent good, 30 percent bad. Frank Dikötter would recoil at such arithmetical whitewashing. He’s renowned for writing an important trilogy of books about Mao’s reign over China, digging in far-flung archives to document the oppression and mass atrocities of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Although Chinese authorities continue to deny or downplay the grim realities of their past, Dikötter functions as something like a one-man truth commission, relentlessly excavating horrors that took tens of millions of lives.

如果被问及毛泽东的遗产，中国共产党的干部们会背诵出一份精准的裁决：七分功，三分过。冯客显然会对这种“算术式的粉饰”不以为然。他因撰写了关于毛泽东统治时期的重要三部曲而闻名，通过广泛发掘档案，记录了“大跃进”和“文革”时期的压迫与大规模暴行。尽管中国官方持续否认或淡化这段历史的残酷现实，但冯客就像是一个单枪匹马的真相委员会，坚持不懈地揭露那些夺走了数千万生命的恐怖事实。

In “Red Dawn Over China,” Dikötter, a historian at the University of Hong Kong and Stanford’s Hoover Institution, delivers a powerful, engrossing and opinionated prequel to his trilogy, showing how the Communists battled their way to power in the decades after World War I.

在《红色黎明照耀中国》中，这位任职于香港大学和斯坦福大学胡佛研究所的历史学家为他的三部曲加上了一部有力、动人但充满个人观点的“前传”，揭示了共产党在第一次世界大战后的几十年里是如何一路厮杀夺取政权的。

Much of the book’s impact comes from the depth of research that Dikötter did, enterprisingly drawing on more than 300 volumes of internal party papers produced around the country, which found their way to Hong Kong. His ambition is to give a voice to the untold millions of Chinese who were silenced by utopian Communist violence and repression.

这本书的影响力很大程度上源于冯客极具深度的研究。他怀着极大的热忱研究了流转至香港的300多卷党内文件，它们来自全国各地。他的雄心在于为数以百万计被共产主义乌托邦式的暴力与镇压所噤声的中国人发声。

Dikötter argues that from the party’s founding in 1921 until the end of World War II in 1945, Mao’s revolutionaries were utterly marginal. Even by the overblown figures of the Communist International, China before 1940 had perhaps one Communist per 1,700 people — a number roughly similar to the United States at the time.

冯客指出，从1921年建党到1945年二战结束，毛泽东领导的革命力量始终处于边缘地位。即便根据共产国际夸大的数据，1940年以前的中国，大约每1700人中才有一名共产党员——这一比例与当时的美国大致相当。

So how did this tiny band take over a country as enormous as China? Dikötter’s answer is blunt: “The key word is violence, and a willingness to inflict it.” Far from an overwhelming mass movement that inevitably swept to power, Dikötter retells the Chinese Revolution as an unlikely event, propelled less by popular support than by unyielding cruelty and not a little bit of luck.

那么，这支小小的队伍是如何接管了中国这样庞大的国家的？冯客的回答直截了当：“关键词是暴力，以及施加暴力的意愿。”冯客重新讲述的中国革命并非一场势不可挡的浩大群众运动，而是一场充满偶然性的事件，其动力与其说来自民众支持，不如说来自毫不妥协的残酷手段，以及相当程度的运气。

Mao also had outside help, a common feature of civil wars. Although the Chinese revolutionaries styled themselves as representing the authentic will of the people, Dikötter argues that on several occasions their movement was shaped and saved by foreigners — in particular, the Soviet Union. China’s Communist activists took inspiration from the Bolshevik Revolution and got training, indoctrination and weapons from Soviet agents in China. In 1926, a Comintern agent from the Soviet Union appointed a 32-year-old Mao to run an institute training activists to organize the peasants.

像许多内战一样，毛泽东也得到了外部援助。尽管中国革命者标榜自己代表了人民的真实意志，但冯客认为，他们的运动曾多次被外国力量（尤其是苏联）塑造并拯救。中国的共产主义活动家从布尔什维克革命中汲取灵感，并从苏联驻华特工那里获得培训、思想灌输和武器。1926年，一名苏联共产国际特工任命了时年32岁的毛泽东去管理一所培训农民运动骨干的讲习所。

Despite Joseph Stalin’s assistance, the Chinese Communists were nearly obliterated in the mid-30s by the armies of the Nationalist government led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The Communists had not won over the urban workers, and despite the appeal of land redistribution, rural villagers feared the terror and exploitation of Communist troops.

尽管有斯大林的援助，中国共产党在30年代中期仍险些被蒋介石领导的国民政府军队剿灭。共产党当时并未赢得城市工人，而且尽管土地改革具有吸引力，但农民更畏惧红军的恐怖手段和征敛。

Farmers were also more worried about droughts, floods and frost than an exploitative merchant class. By the time the Communists finished their desperate retreat from the Nationalists in the Long March in 1935, Dikötter acerbically writes, their ranks were so depleted that they “had roughly the same popular appeal as an obscure religious sect or minor secret society.”

相比于“商人阶级的剥削”，农民们更担心旱涝灾害。冯客尖刻地写道，到1935年共产党结束了从国民党追击下仓皇撤退的长征时，其队伍已严重削弱，以至于他们“在民众中的吸引力大概只相当于一个籍籍无名的宗教教派或小型秘密结社”。

This time the Communists were saved by, of all things, Japanese aggression. After Japanese forces stormed into China’s northeastern vastness of Manchuria in 1931, the Communists remained preoccupied with fighting the Nationalists, not the foreign invaders. In 1937, Imperial Japan launched a full-scale invasion of China — a catastrophe that would claim the lives of some 14 million Chinese people. Mao, despite entering a fractious and temporary United Front with the Nationalists, preferred to let Nationalist troops bear the brunt of Japan’s onslaught as the Communist armies regrouped and established control of new territories.

这一次，拯救共产党的竟然是日本的侵略。1931年日军侵入中国东北大片领土后，共产党仍专注于对抗国民党而非外敌。1937年，日本帝国发动全面侵华战争——这场灾难夺去了约1400万中国人的生命。毛泽东虽然与国民党建立了貌合神离的临时“统一战线”，但他更倾向于让国民党军队承担抗日冲击的重担，共产党军队则乘机休整并建立新根据地的控制权。

While other histories, such as the Harvard political scientist Tony Saich’s authoritative “From Rebel to Ruler,” have discussed the difficulty that the Communists had in reaching the working class and the peasants, Dikötter spends little time on the party’s socioeconomic or cultural blandishments, instead concentrating on its violence and indoctrination.

虽然其他史学著作——如哈佛政治学家托尼·赛奇的权威著作《从叛乱者到统治者》（From Rebel to Ruler）——也讨论过共产党在争取工农阶级时面临的困难，但冯客很少花时间描写该党在社会经济或文化上的诱导手段，而是集中关注其暴力手段和思想灌输。

In the areas they conquered, Dikötter writes, Communists imposed “a state of terror,” executing local officials and those considered “politically unreliable.” He chillingly shows the Communists trying “to destroy the old order overnight” with an onslaught against Confucianism, religious institutions and village life that foreshadowed the Cultural Revolution decades later: “People were set against each other in so-called ‘struggle meetings,’ denouncing all authority, whether village elders, clan leaders or simply parents and siblings.”

冯客写道，在共产党的根据地，他们实施“恐怖统治”，处决地方官员和被认为“政治上不可靠”的人。他用冷峻的笔调展示了共产党如何试图通过抨击儒家思想、宗教机构和乡村生活，从而“在一夜之间摧毁旧秩序”，这预示了几十年后的文革：“人们在所谓的‘斗争大会’上反目成仇，谴责一切权威，无论是村长、族长，还是普通的父母兄弟。”

The Communists got another invaluable boost from the Soviet Union when it finally entered the war against Imperial Japan, days after the nuclear annihilation of Hiroshima. A million Soviet soldiers charged into Japanese-occupied Manchuria, a crucial strategic and economic prize. While Mao negotiated in bad faith about a coalition government with the Nationalists, the Soviets secretly connived with the Chinese Communists to facilitate their takeover of Manchuria after the Soviets departed. The Soviets provided the Communists with tanks, planes and weapons taken from the defeated Japanese Army.

在广岛原子弹轰炸几天后，苏联终于对日宣战，共产党再一次获得了无比宝贵的助力。百万苏联红军冲入具有重要战略和经济价值的日占满洲。当毛泽东在组建联合政府的谈判中同国民党虚与委蛇时，苏联秘密与中共勾结，为苏军撤离后中共接管满洲铺路。苏联还将从战败日军手中缴获的坦克、飞机和武器移交给了中共军队。

Dikötter is withering on credulous Americans who misjudged the Communists, including Vice President Henry A. Wallace and the foreign correspondent Edgar Snow, whose popular 1937 book, “Red Star Over China,” serves as the foil for this book’s title. He also lambastes Gen. George C. Marshall’s doomed mission to pressure Chiang and Mao into a unified government in the first years after the war, treating him not as a peacemaker handed an impossible brief, but a sucker.

冯客对那些误判形势、轻信共产党的美国人给予了严厉抨击，其中包括副总统亨利·华莱士和记者埃德加·斯诺。本书书名讽刺的正是斯诺1937年的畅销书《红星照耀中国》（Red Star Over China）。他还抨击了乔治·马歇尔将军在战后初期迫使蒋毛组建联合政府的徒劳行动，认为马歇尔不是一个接手了不可能任务的和平调解人，而是一个被骗得团团转的人。

Yet, as the journalist Daniel Kurtz-Phelan shows in “The China Mission,” while Marshall unquestionably failed, he was wary of Communist trickery and propaganda, warning President Harry Truman in 1946 that China would always be vulnerable to Soviet subversion “so long as there remains a separate Communist government and a separate Communist army in China.”

然而，正如记者丹尼尔·库尔茨-费伦在《中国任务》（The China Mission）中所展示的，马歇尔虽然毫无疑问地失败了，但他对共产党的策略和宣传一直保持警惕。他在1946年警告哈里·杜鲁门总统，只要中国“存在一个独立的共产党政府和独立的共产党军队”，就永远容易受到苏联的颠覆。

Ending his book with the conquest of Tibet in the early ’50s, Dikötter ominously writes: “Only Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan still eluded the reach of the Chinese Communist Party.” Today the party faces serious headwinds at home, from high youth unemployment to Xi Jinping’s escalating purge of the military. Yet since 2017, Xi has taken to declaring that the world is experiencing “great changes unseen in a century,” with party elites taking Brexit and Donald Trump’s first election as evidence of a precipitous Western decline that facilitates their own ascendancy.

冯客在书中以50年代初共产党征服西藏作为结尾，他以阴沉的笔调写下：“在那个时候，只有香港、澳门和台湾尚未落入中共的掌控。”如今，中共在国内面临严重逆风，从高企的青年失业率到习近平对军队不断升级的清洗。然而自2017年以来，习近平开始宣称世界正经历“百年未有之大变局”，党内精英将英国脱欧和特朗普首次当选视为西方急剧衰落的证据，认为这为自身的崛起铺平了道路。

Trump keeps confirming their viewpoint, by launching and losing a trade war against China, maiming NATO and alienating Japanese and South Korean allies. Reading Dikötter’s book today, it’s hard not to hear echoes: Once again a foolish foreigner rides to the Chinese Communist Party’s rescue.

特朗普不断印证着他们的观点：他发动并输掉了对华贸易战，削弱了北约，并疏远了日韩盟友。在今天阅读冯客的书，很难不听到历史的回声：又一个愚蠢的外国人正忙着来当中国共产党的救星。

RED DAWN OVER CHINA: How Communism Conquered a Quarter of Humanity | By Frank Dikötter | Bloomsbury | 362 pp. | $33

《红色黎明照耀中国：共产主义如何征服四分之一的人类》 | 冯客 著 | Bloomsbury出版 | 362页 | 33美元

Ever since its defeat in World War II, Japan’s place in the world has been shaped by a deliberate policy of restraint.

自二战战败以来，日本在世界上的定位一直由一项刻意奉行的克制政策所塑造。

Under its pacifist postwar Constitution, Japan has for decades kept its military budget modest, sheltered under the U.S. security umbrella, and has avoided directly provoking an increasingly assertive China. Japan’s people, scarred by the trauma of World War II, supported that approach.

根据战后和平宪法，日本数十年来一直维持有限的军事预算，置身于美国的安全保护伞之下，并避免直接挑衅日益强硬的中国。饱受二战创伤的日本民众也支持这一路线。

But this month’s landslide electoral victory by the hard-line Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi — who openly advocates a tougher approach to China and a more robust Japanese military — suggests that era may be ending. The implications for the region could be profound.

但本月，强硬派首相高市早苗以压倒性优势赢得大选——她公开主张对中国采取更强硬立场、建设更强大的日本军事力量——这表明这个时代或许即将终结。这对地区局势可能产生深远影响。

Caught between a more aggressive China and a less predictable United States, the realization has dawned in Japan that caution is no longer enough to guarantee its security. If this trajectory continues, it is likely to result in a U.S. ally that is more assertive, militarily capable — and central to deterring China. It is crucial that the United States encourages this evolution while ensuring that it strengthens, rather than weakens, regional stability.

夹在日益咄咄逼人的中国与更难预测的美国之间，日本逐渐意识到，仅靠谨慎已不足以保障自身安全。如果这一趋势持续，日本这一美国盟友很可能变得更加强势、更具军事能力，并成为威慑中国的核心力量。美国必须鼓励这一转变，同时确保其加强而非削弱地区稳定，这一点至关重要。

The changing Japanese mind-set did not begin with Ms. Takaichi.

日本心态的转变并非始于高市早苗。

It has been years in the making, as the global landscape has shifted, particularly with China’s rise as an assertive military power. China increasingly sends ships into Japan-administered islands in the East China Sea and carries out threatening military maneuvers around Taiwan. Chinese expansionism or a conflict in the region would endanger the sea lanes and supply chains upon which Japan’s trade-dependent economy relies.

这一转变已酝酿多年，全球格局已经变化、尤其是中国已经崛起为强势军事大国。中国越来越频繁地派遣船只进入日本管辖的东海岛屿附近，并在台湾周边开展具有威胁性的军事演习。中国的扩张主义或该地区暴发冲突将危及依赖贸易的日本经济所仰仗的航道与供应链。

With these threats in mind, Japan, under former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, reinterpreted its Constitution in the mid 2010s to broaden the circumstances under which it could use military force. Mr. Abe also created a National Security Council to strengthen decision-making on military matters and increased defense ties across the Indo-Pacific region. His successors, especially Fumio Kishida, continued this arc, approving the largest defense buildup in the postwar era and endorsing Japan’s ability to strike back if attacked — a shift once considered politically unthinkable.

出于对这些威胁的考量，日本在前首相安倍晋三的领导下，于2010年代中期重新解释宪法，扩大了行使武力的适用范围。安倍还设立了国家安全保障会议，强化军事决策机制，并加强与印太地区各国的防务合作。他的继任者，尤其是岸田文雄，延续了这一轨迹，批准了战后规模最大的防务扩张，并支持发展日本遭受攻击时的反击能力——这一转变在政治上曾被认为不可想象。

Ms. Takaichi has indicated a willingness to take things even further.

高市早苗已表示愿意推进这一进程。

In November, she implied that Japan could intervene militarily if China attacked Taiwan, the self-governing island democracy that Beijing claims as its territory. It was one of the clearest public signals by a Japanese leader in years that the country could come to Taiwan’s aid, and Beijing responded angrily with punitive economic measures.

去年11月，她暗示，如果中国攻击北京宣称拥有主权的自治民主地区台湾，日本可能进行军事干预。这是多年来日本领导人最明确的公开信号之一，表明日本可能援助台湾。北京愤怒回应，采取了惩罚性经济措施。

Japanese voters were not intimidated, handing Ms. Takaichi and the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party a supermajority of two-thirds of the seats in the 465-member lower house of Parliament earlier this month — the first political party to achieve that in the postwar era. That represents a historic mandate in a country whose prime ministers typically govern with narrow margins and must make deep compromises to their agenda to appease party or coalition factions.

日本选民并未因此退缩。本月早些时候，高市早苗及长期执政的自民党在选举中以三分之二的席位优势赢得465个议席中的绝对多数——这是战后日本首次有政党实现这一成绩。在日本，首相通常仅以微弱优势执政，必须为安抚党派或联盟派系而大幅妥协议程，此次胜选堪称历史性的政治授权。

Ms. Takaichi may now have the political leverage needed to succeed where Mr. Abe — her mentor — fell short: revising Japan’s Constitution to loosen constraints on its military. Article 9 of the Constitution renounces war and forbids maintaining a “war potential.” Japan has, in fact, built highly capable Self-Defense Forces over the decades, but Article 9 long served as a political guardrail, sustaining informal limits on military spending, offensive capabilities and overseas deployments.

高市早苗如今可能拥有所需的政治筹码，完成其导师安倍晋三未能实现的目标：修改宪法，放宽对军队的限制。宪法第九条规定放弃战争，禁止维持“战争潜力”。事实上，日本数十年来已建成能力极强的自卫队，但第九条长期充当政治护栏，对军费、进攻能力和海外部署维持着非正式的限制。

Revising the Constitution wouldn’t mean an overnight change. But the eventual consequences could be far-reaching — formally recognizing a more conventional role for the military and clearing the way for higher spending and expanded operations beyond Japan’s shores.

修宪并不意味着一夜之间发生剧变。但其最终影响可能深远：这将正式承认军队更常规的角色，为增加军费和日本扩大海外行动扫清障碍。

I’ve spent years talking to policymakers in Japan, where revision of Article 9 was always discussed cautiously as a distant, future aspiration. Now, in the wake of Ms. Takaichi’s election win, there is a different feeling. In meetings across Tokyo that I took part in last week, Liberal Democratic Party lawmakers and cabinet officials spoke about constitutional revision as a plausible near-term objective. Japanese television commentators who once treated the topic as an abstraction now debate timelines.

多年来，我一直在与日本政策制定者交流，修改第九条在过去总是被谨慎地当作遥远的未来目标。如今，在高市早苗胜选后，气氛已然不同。我于上周在东京参加的多场会议中，自民党议员与内阁官员都将修宪视为短期内可能实现的目标。曾经将这一议题当作抽象概念的日本电视评论员如今开始讨论时间表。

Ms. Takaichi still must tread carefully, given lingering political sensitivity over the issue. Her room for maneuver could narrow further if her expansionist economic plans add to rising inflation. But the tone in Tokyo has clearly shifted.

鉴于该议题仍存在政治敏感性，高市早苗仍须谨慎行事。如果她扩张性的经济计划会加剧通胀，她的操作空间可能进一步收窄。但东京的基调显然已经转变。

A normalized Japanese defense posture would force Beijing to reassess its behavior in the region, including its coercive activities aimed at Taiwan. Up to now, China has felt free to increasingly flex its muscles, knowing that one of America’s closest allies — and one of the world’s richest economies and most advanced democracies — was constitutionally prevented from exercising its full military potential.

日本国防态势正常化将迫使北京重新评估自身在该地区的行为，包括针对台湾的胁迫活动。迄今为止，中国之所以能够肆无忌惮地不断展示实力，是因为它知道，美国最亲密的盟友之一、全球最富裕的经济体与最先进的民主国家之一，受宪法限制而无法充分发挥军事潜力。

No one in Asia is eager for an arms race, and a more militarily capable Japan will inevitably stir painful memories in places that suffered under Japanese wartime occupation, particularly China and the Korean Peninsula. But today’s strategic choices must be governed by present geopolitical realities.

亚洲没有人渴望军备竞赛，而一个军事能力更强的日本不可避免地会在战时遭日本占领的地区唤起痛苦的记忆，尤其是在中国和朝鲜半岛。但当今的战略选择必须立足当前地缘政治现实。

A constrained Japan may have been in America’s interest in the decades following World War II, but not anymore. A Japan that is willing to share more of the responsibility and cost of ensuring security in its neighborhood is likely to be welcomed by President Trump, who has pushed for U.S. allies to do just that. This is especially important at a time when American power is stretched by threats to peace around the globe and the nation is politically divided. Washington should embrace the potential for greater Japanese strategic autonomy as a sign of an alliance adapting to modern realities.

二战后几十年里，一个受约束的日本或许符合美国利益，但如今已不再如此。一个愿意分担更多地区安全责任与成本的日本很可能受到特朗普总统欢迎，他一直在推动美国盟友这样做。在美国实力因全球和平威胁而分散、国内政治分裂之际，这一点尤为重要。华盛顿应将日本提升战略自主性的可能性视为同盟适应当下现实的信号。

A stronger Japan is not a cure-all. If accompanied by nationalist rhetoric or provocative actions, it could unsettle the region rather than steady it. The aim should instead be to project quiet, credible strength. This will require restraint in Tokyo, discipline in Washington, and close, careful coordination between the two allies.

一个更强大的日本并非万能良药。如果伴随民族主义言论或挑衅行为，它可能扰乱而非稳定地区局势。目标应是展现低调而可信的实力。这需要东京保持克制、华盛顿保持自律，以及两国盟友之间紧密审慎的协调。

An early chance to display unity will come in March, when Ms. Takaichi is expected to make her first visit to the White House for talks with Mr. Trump. That trip will come ahead of a planned visit to China by Mr. Trump later in the month. The two leaders already have hit it off — Mr. Trump offered his “total endorsement” of Ms. Takaichi before her Feb. 8 snap election win — and a strong show of solidarity in Washington should be used to make clear to Beijing the emerging new realities.

最近的一个展现团结的机会将在3月到来，届时高市早苗预计将首次访问白宫与特朗普会谈。此行将早于特朗普当月晚些时候计划中的访华行程。两国领导人已建立良好关系——特朗普在2月8日日本提前大选前便对高市早苗表示“全力支持”。双方应在华盛顿展现强劲团结姿态，向北京传递一个正在形成的新现实。

The question is not whether Japan will act more like the power it already is — global changes are already pushing it in that direction — it is how that momentous change is managed in Tokyo, Washington and across the region.

问题不在于日本是否会更像它已然成为的大国那样行事——全球变化已在推动它朝此方向发展——而在于东京、华盛顿及整个地区如何管控这一重大转变。

On Wednesday in Beijing, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz criticized Chinese trade policies that hurt German companies.

周三，德国总理默茨在北京批评了损害德国公司利益的中国贸易政策。

The next day, he visited the Beijing operations of an iconic German automaker, rode in its new luxury sedan and listened politely as its chief executive extolled innovation opportunities in China.

次日，他参观了一家标志性德国车企的北京分部，乘坐了其新款豪华轿车，并礼貌地聆听了该公司首席执行官盛赞中国的创新机遇。

The juxtaposition showed a disconnect between Mr. Merz and the 30-some captains of German industry who accompanied him on his quick trip to China this week, a disconnect that is not limited to Beijing.

这种并存凸显出默茨与本周随他短暂访华的三十余位德国工业巨头之间的立场分歧，而这种分歧并非只限于同北京有关的问题。

Mr. Merz, arguably his continent’s most powerful politician, wants Europe to become less dependent on China and the United States, economically and militarily. He has warned both countries — and his European friends — of the dangers of a world in which great powers bully their way to whatever they want on the global stage.

作为堪称欧洲最具影响力的政治人士之一，默茨希望欧洲在经济与军事上减少对中国和美国的依赖。他已向这两个国家以及欧洲盟友发出警告，称大国在全球舞台上恃强凌弱、为所欲为的世界格局充满危险。

Europe’s business leaders are, at least publicly, far more constrained. They have avoided ruffling feathers in the world’s two largest economies, eager to tune out politics and focus on profits.

欧洲商界领袖至少在公开场合则要克制得多。他们避免触怒全球两大经济体，一心想抛开政治、专注盈利。

In a meeting this week with Xi Jinping, China’s leader, Mr. Merz raised concerns over Chinese factory subsidies and its weak currency, which he said impeded economic cooperation.

本周与中国国家主席习近平会晤时，默茨对中国的工厂补贴与人民币汇率偏低表达了担忧，称这些因素阻碍了经济合作。

Yet in interviews broadcast from the sidelines, executives talked mostly about exciting new technological partnerships with Chinese companies and opportunities to increase sales and innovation in the country.

但在会场外播出的采访中，企业高管们大多谈论的是与中国企业激动人心的新技术合作，以及在华扩大销售与创新的机遇。

Europe’s political leaders are reacting differently than its business elites are to the efforts by Mr. Xi and President Trump to bend the world to their will through economic and military might, said Lauren Goodwin, the chief market strategist for New York Life Investment Management.

纽约人寿投资管理公司首席市场策略师劳伦·古德温表示，面对习近平与特朗普试图通过经济与军事实力让世界屈服于其意志的努力，欧洲政治领袖与商界精英的反应截然不同。

Politicians and business leaders caught between the great powers “have the same things they have to worry about,” Ms. Goodwin said. “Just in a really different way.”

古德温称，夹在大国之间的政界人士与商界领袖“担忧的是同样的事情”，“只是应对方式截然不同”。

National leaders like Mr. Merz, Prime Minister Keir Starmer of Britain and President Emmanuel Macron of France have called for ambitious steps to make Europe more capable in defense and more self-reliant economically. They want to keep ties with America and China, but rely on them less.

默茨、英国首相斯塔默、法国总统马克龙等国家领导人呼吁采取大胆举措，提升欧洲的国防能力与经济自主性。他们希望维持与美中的联系，但减少对两国的依赖。

Some corporate leaders have rejected that strategy, which is sometimes called de-risking. They worry it could upend longstanding investments and economic relationships across borders that have grown highly entwined.

部分企业领袖反对这种有时被称为“去风险”的战略。他们担心这会颠覆已高度交织的长期跨境投资与经济关系。

默茨周四在中国东部杭州的宇树科技产品展厅参观。

“The idea of de-risking seems like a good concept,” Bill Anderson, the chief executive of pharmaceutical titan Bayer, told Table.Media, a Berlin-based news outlet, in a video interview as he accompanied Mr. Merz to China this week. “But I think we then have to get grounded right back in reality, which is that the global supply chains that have been established over the last four to five decades have been enormously beneficial.”

“去风险的想法听起来不错，”制药巨头拜耳的首席执行官比尔·安德森本周随默茨访华期间，在接受柏林媒体Table.Media视频采访时表示。“但我认为我们必须回归现实——过去四五十年建立的全球供应链带来了巨大益处。”

Some executives, while offering careful support for Mr. Merz’s efforts this week, took pains to praise China as a market opportunity.

部分高管在谨慎支持默茨本周努力的同时，刻意称赞中国市场带来的机遇。

“Anyone who is serious about driving transformation in key sectors — from mobility to renewable energy — cannot look past China,” Ralf Brandstätter, the chief executive of Volkswagen Group China, said in a social media post this week. “At the same time, Europe, and Germany in particular, has every reason to articulate and pursue its interests with confidence.”

“任何真正致力于推动从出行到可再生能源等关键领域转型的人，都无法忽视中国，”大众汽车集团中国首席执行官贝瑞德(Ralf Brandstätter)本周在社交媒体发文称。“与此同时，欧洲，尤其是德国，完全有理由自信地阐明和追求自身利益。”

Some executives, like Ola Källenius, the Swedish-German chief executive of Mercedes-Benz, have increased their bets on America and China.

梅赛德斯-奔驰的瑞典裔德国首席执行官康林松(Ola Källenius)等部分高管正在加大对美国与中国的投资力度。

“We are on an investment offensive in the United States,” Mr. Källenius told me last month at his headquarters, during an interview in which he repeatedly praised Mr. Trump’s economic policies and declined to criticize China.

“我们正在美国大举投资，”康林松上月在公司总部接受笔者采访时表示，他在采访中多次称赞特朗普的经济政策，且拒绝批评中国。

Mercedes is a case study in the challenges facing German companies in reducing dependence on both those countries, which remain crucial markets for their products.

梅赛德斯-奔驰是德国企业在减少对中美依赖时所面临困境的典型案例——这两个国家仍是德企产品的重要市场。

Mercedes and other large multinational companies — particularly European automakers — have been playing defense against a blitz of change to the global economic order, largely wrought by Mr. Xi and Mr. Trump.

梅赛德斯-奔驰等大型跨国企业，尤其是欧洲车企，正竭力应对由习近平与特朗普主导的全球经济秩序剧变。

9月，德国慕尼黑车展上的梅赛德斯-奔驰展台。

China’s hefty state subsidies have helped it flood global markets with low-priced Chinese vehicles that are eating into German automakers’ market share. Mr. Trump’s tariffs on European exports have begun driving up the price of the cars Mercedes makes in Germany and ships to America, while his opposition to clean energy has clouded Mercedes’ plan to turn its fleet electric.

中国的巨额国家补贴使该国的低价汽车充斥全球市场，蚕食了德国车企的市场份额。特朗普对欧洲出口加征的关税推高了梅赛德斯-奔驰在德国生产并销往美国的汽车价格；而他反对清洁能源的立场则为该公司的全面电动化转型计划蒙上阴影。

Mr. Källenius is not a fan of tariffs, and has said so repeatedly; the company reported its profits were halved last year from the year before, and Mr. Trump’s levies were a major cause.

康林松对关税政策持反对态度，且已多次表态；该公司去年利润较前年减半，特朗普的关税是主要原因之一。

But when I asked him if any recent events or policies in the United States, including actions by the Trump administration that have alarmed Europe’s leaders and citizens, had changed his views on investing there, his answer was short.

但当我问他，近期美国发生的事件或政策，包括已引发欧洲领导人和民众警惕的特朗普政府的行动，是否改变了他对在美投资的看法时，他的回答很简短。

“No,” he said.

“没有，”他说。

On the rainy afternoon I visited Mr. Källenius in Stuttgart late last month, diplomats in Berlin were consumed with the fallout from Mr. Trump’s attempts to gain ownership of Greenland, the Danish territory he covets. German officials were privately expressing horror over the behaviors of federal immigration and customs officers in Minneapolis; coverage of the violence there dominated the German press.

上月末一个雨天的下午，我在斯图加特拜访康林松时，柏林的外交官们正忙于应对特朗普试图吞并他所觊觎的丹麦领土格陵兰的后续影响。德国官员私下对明尼阿波利斯联邦移民与海关官员的行为表示震惊；德国媒体铺天盖地地报道了那里的暴力事件。

I asked Mr. Källenius how he reacted to calls for business leaders to denounce the administration’s actions in Minneapolis. “I think before you pass judgment on anything, you really need to understand what’s going on,” he said. “And I would say a European business leader is not the right person to judge a situation anywhere in the world where you don’t have the local information.”

我问康林松，有人呼吁商界领袖谴责特朗普政府在明尼阿波利斯的行动，他对此作何反应。“我认为在评判任何事情之前，必须真正了解情况，”他说。“我想说的是，在不掌握当地信息的情况下，一个欧洲商界领袖并不是判断世界上任何地方局势的合适人选。”

When I asked about doing business in China, or other authoritarian countries, he said Mercedes sells into every country where Germany has diplomatic relations — 150 in all.

当我问及在中国或其他威权国家做生意的情况时，他表示，梅赛德斯-奔驰在所有与德国建交的国家销售产品——共计150个国家。

“If you would limit yourself to the places in the world that have exactly a mirror image of your society or your system down to the last bit and byte,” he said, “that would be a small group.”

“如果把业务局限于那些社会或制度和本国完全一致、如同镜像的地方，”他说，“那范围就太小了。”

德国总理默茨周三在北京与中国国家主席习近平会晤。

Mr. Källenius was relaxed, in a brown turtleneck and sport coat, in a conference room at company headquarters. He was soon to unveil the new S-class sedan — the same model Mr. Merz would later inspect in Beijing.

康林松身着棕色高领毛衣与休闲西装，在公司总部的会议室里显得从容放松。他很快将发布新款S级轿车——正是默茨后来在北京参观的同款车型。

When I asked about regulation from Brussels, Mr. Källenius offered an extended critique of European rules that he and Mr. Merz both say hinder competitiveness and growth.

当我问及欧盟监管时，康林松对欧洲的法规进行了长篇批评，他与默茨均认为这些法规阻碍了竞争力与增长。

In talking about the United States, Mr. Källenius was effusive in his praise for Mr. Trump’s administration, including its low energy costs and relaxed regulations. He described a phone call he took last year from Howard Lutnick, the American billionaire who was soon to be confirmed as the U.S. commerce secretary at the start of Mr. Trump’s second term.

谈及美国时，康林松对特朗普政府赞不绝口，包括其低廉的能源成本与宽松的监管。他提到去年接到美国亿万富翁霍华德·卢特尼克的电话——不久后，卢特尼克在特朗普第二任期伊始被任命为美国商务部长。

In the call, Mr. Lutnick pushed Mr. Källenius to move the automaker’s headquarters from Stuttgart to the United States.

在通话中，卢特尼克力劝康林松将梅赛德斯-奔驰总部从斯图加特迁至美国。

Mr. Källenius declined, but he went out of his way to explain to me that decision was a function of Mercedes’ 140-year history in Germany, and not a reflection on Mr. Lutnick’s investment pitch.

康林松拒绝了这一提议，但特意向我解释，这一决定源于梅赛德斯-奔驰在德国140年的历史，而非对卢特尼克投资提议的否定。

“He did a phenomenal job presenting the U.S. as an investment case for any multinational company,” Mr. Källenius recalled. “And I’m sold on that, except for the headquarters.”

“他极具说服力地向跨国企业展示了美国作为投资地的优势，”康林松回忆。“除了总部搬迁的事，我完全认同他。”

“There,” Mr. Källenius said, “the roots are too deep.”

“在这里，”康林松说，“根基非常深。”

China’s leader, Xi Jinping, tried to sell Germany on a future less tied to the United States and anchored instead in Chinese markets and technology.

中国领导人习近平试图向德国推销一种未来愿景：减少对美国的依赖，转而更多锚定在中国市场和技术上。

Mr. Xi pledged that China would continue to “share development opportunities with Germany and the wider world” in his meeting with Chancellor Friedrich Merz of Germany, who was on a visit to Beijing that seemed curated to highlight such opportunities. On Thursday, Mr. Merz tried out a new Mercedes-Benz in Beijing, then flew to the eastern city of Hangzhou to tour a Chinese robotics company.

习近平在与到访的德国总理默茨会晤时承诺，中国将继续“同包括德国在内的世界各国分享发展机遇”。默茨此次北京之行似乎经过精心安排，旨在突出这些机遇。周四，默茨在北京试驾了一辆新型梅赛德斯-奔驰汽车，随后飞往东部城市杭州，参观一家中国机器人公司。

But for all the pageantry, the visit has also laid bare the limits of that sales pitch.

然而，尽管场面盛大，此次访问也暴露了这一推销说辞的局限性。

Unlike other Western leaders who have met with Mr. Xi in recent weeks, Mr. Merz was publicly pointed. He paired pledges of cooperation with an accounting of how a flood of Chinese exports and an unfair playing field are harming German businesses and contributing to the loss of thousands of jobs in his country each month.

与近几周跟习近平会面的其他西方领导人不同，默茨公开表达了不满。他一方面承诺合作，另一方面也列举了中国出口倾销和不公平竞争环境如何损害德国企业，并导致德国每月损失数千个工作岗位。

“Competition between companies must be fair,” Mr. Merz said in a statement after he met with Mr. Xi on Wednesday, describing what it would take for Germany’s relationship with China to succeed moving forward. “We need transparency, we need reliability, and we also need adherence to jointly established rules.”

“企业之间的竞争必须公平，”默茨在周三与习近平会晤后发表声明，阐释德中关系未来成功所需的条件。“我们需要透明度，需要可靠性，也需要遵守共同制定的规则。”

Such demands show that Mr. Xi’s courtship of the West — an effort aided by President Trump’s alienation of U.S. allies — falls short of addressing the grievances that have long divided China and the West. Chief among them are an artificially weak Chinese currency; unequal access for foreign companies in China; state subsidies that make Chinese exports appear cheaper; and Beijing’s use of its dominance over critical minerals as leverage.

这些要求表明，习近平对西方的示好努力——特朗普总统对美国盟友的疏远是一种助力——并未触及长期以来中西方分歧的核心问题。其中的主要问题包括：中国人为压低的人民币汇率；外国企业在华市场准入不平等；国家补贴使中国出口产品看起来更便宜；以及北京将关键矿产上的主导地位作为筹码。

Even China’s sweeteners have been modest. Mr. Merz, who brought with him more than two dozen German business leaders, said China pledged to buy more Airbus planes. Prime Minister Mark Carney of Canada said last month that China would slash tariffs on imports of Canadian canola products. Both moves amount to tactical gifts rather than real reforms.

即便中国给出的甜头也相当有限。默茨此次率领二十多名德国商界领袖访华，他表示中方承诺将购买更多空客飞机。加拿大总理马克·卡尼上个月称，中国将大幅降低对加拿大油菜籽产品的进口关税。这些举措都属于战术性让利，而非真正改革。

China’s current playbook “drives a wedge between Washington and its allies without requiring Beijing to compromise on internal priorities,” said Yanzhong Huang, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Yet it does nothing to address the underlying frictions stoking Western frustration.”

中国目前的策略是“在不牺牲北京内部优先事项的前提下，离间华盛顿与其盟友”，美国外交关系委员会高级研究员黄严忠表示。“然而，这丝毫没有解决引发西方不满的根本摩擦。”

If anything, Mr. Huang said, Mr. Xi is set to double down on his vision next month when he releases details of China’s 15th five-year plan. The plan is likely to pour even more state resources into the very industries — electric vehicles, robotics, clean energy — that are undercutting Western competitors, while tightening China’s grip on the supply chains they depend on.

黄严忠认为，如果说有什么变化的话，习近平下个月公布中国“十五五”规划细节时，很可能会加倍推进其愿景。该规划很可能将更多国家资源投入到那些正在削弱西方竞争对手的行业——电动汽车、机器人、清洁能源，同时加强对这些行业所依赖的供应链的控制。

中国领导人习近平周三在北京会见默茨时，敦促德国以客观、理性的态度看待中国的崛起。

“European leaders will continue to arrive with complaints and depart with narrow wins,” Mr. Huang said.

“欧洲领导人将继续带着抱怨而来，带着有限的收获离开，”黄严忠说。

China has little incentive to change course. Exports are the only major engine keeping China’s economy growing as it struggles through a yearslong property crisis.

中国没有什么改弦更张的动力。出口是中国经济在持续数年的房产危机中唯一仍保持增长的主要引擎。

Beijing is pitching Germany on the idea that it can find prosperity by tapping into China’s growth, particularly in emerging fields like clean energy and robotics. In Hangzhou, Mr. Merz visited the humanoid robot start-up Unitree Robotics where he watched robots perform synchronized back-flips and other martial arts-inspired moves.

北京向德国推销的理念是：德国可以通过融入中国的增长——尤其是在清洁能源和机器人等新兴领域——找到繁荣。在杭州，默茨参观了人形机器人初创企业宇树科技，观看了机器人表演同步的后空翻和其他武术动作。

Mr. Xi, in his official statement, made no direct mention of Mr. Merz’s concerns. He said China would continue to provide economic opportunities, but urged Germany to view China’s rise “objectively and rationally,” and to adopt a “positive and pragmatic policy” — language that amounted to a request to stop treating Beijing as a threat.

习近平在官方声明中并未直接提及默茨的关切。他表示中国将继续提供经济机遇，但敦促德国“客观理性”看待中国崛起，并采取“积极、务实”的对华政策——这些措辞实际上是在要求德国停止将北京视为威胁。

Beijing’s ultimate goal is to pull Berlin away from Washington and weaken what China sees as a Western campaign to contain China’s rise.

北京的终极目标是令柏林远离华盛顿，削弱中国所认为的西方遏制中国崛起的阵营。

This month, Chinese state media published editorials calling for Germany to withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, arguing that the U.S.-led security alliance undermines Berlin’s autonomy. The People’s Daily, the Chinese Communist Party’s mouthpiece, said in an editorial that the only way for Germany to “de-risk” from global threats was to “de-Americanize.”

本月，中国官方媒体刊登社论，呼吁德国退出北大西洋公约组织，称美国主导的安全联盟损害了柏林的自主性。中共喉舌《人民日报》在一篇社论中表示，德国要“去风险”应对全球威胁，唯一途径就是“去美国化”。

Mr. Merz, like other European leaders, has his own frustrations with the United States, such as over tariffs and support for Ukraine’s defense against Russia. But Mr. Merz said at a conference of his center-right Christian Democrats earlier this month that the trans-Atlantic alliance would likely endure because of shared values like freedom of expression, freedom of religion and freedom of the press.

与其他欧洲领导人一样，默茨对美国也有自己的不满，例如在关税以及支持乌克兰抵御俄罗斯的问题上。但默茨本月早些时候在其所在的中右派政党基督教民主联盟的大会上表示，这个跨大西洋联盟很可能因共享价值观——言论自由、宗教自由和新闻自由——而持续存在。

Even some Chinese analysts are skeptical that Beijing’s outreach will pay off.

甚至一些中国分析人士也对北京的示好能否奏效持怀疑态度。

Li Xing, the director of European studies at Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, said he worried that President Trump would find new ways to punish U.S. allies that get too close to Beijing. (Mr. Trump has warned Canada and Britain that increasing trade with China was “dangerous.”)

广东外语外贸大学欧洲研究中心主任李形表示，他担心特朗普会找到新办法惩罚那些与北京走得太近的美国盟友。（特朗普曾警告加拿大和英国，增加对华贸易是“危险的”。）

“Trump’s trade war has caused many European countries a great deal of trouble, driving them to turn toward us,” Mr. Li said. “However, my concern lies in how much persistence these countries truly have. They come to China and speak in favor of us, but if Trump brandishes his trade stick, can these countries hold their ground?”

“特朗普的贸易战给许多欧洲国家带来了很大麻烦，促使它们转向我们，”李形说。“然而，我担心的是这些国家能不能坚持住。他们来中国，说一些偏向我们的话，但如果特朗普挥舞贸易大棒，这些国家还能站得住吗？”

Tesla’s factory in Shanghai produces far more cars per worker than its plant in California. The gap reflects something unsettling about China’s broader edge in manufacturing: It has figured out how to organize production around large-scale deployment of automation, robotics and artificial intelligence. The United States has not.

特斯拉上海工厂的人均汽车产量远超其加利福尼亚州的工厂。这一差距反映出中国在制造业方面更广泛优势中令人不安的一点：中国已摸索出如何围绕自动化、机器人和人工智能的大规模部署来组织生产。而美国尚未做到这一点。

Reindustrialization is one of the few economic goals that now commands bipartisan support. Successive administrations — first Joe Biden’s, now President Trump’s — have made rebuilding American manufacturing a priority. In Washington, the gap between American factories and global competitors is often explained as the product of unfair subsidies, distorted markets or other forms of cheating.

再工业化如今是少数能够获得两党支持的经济目标之一。从拜登开始到现在的特朗普，几届政府都把重建美国制造业作为优先事项。在华盛顿，人们往往把美国工厂与全球竞争对手之间的差距解释为不公平补贴、市场扭曲或其他形式的作弊所导致的结果。

Those factors matter, as does the power of China’s political structure to command fast change from the top down. But the central challenge for the United States is not that China bends the rules. Around the world, modern manufacturing no longer resembles the mid-20th-century factory floor. Robotics, automation and A.I. now make it possible to produce more with fewer human workers, though those who remain are more skilled and better paid. Unlike China, America has failed to reckon with this reality and organize manufacturing in ways that turn its own technological strengths into comparable gains.

这些因素固然重要，但中国的政治体制自上而下迅速推动变革的能力同样关键。而美国面临的核心挑战也并非中国破坏规则。放眼全球，现代制造业已不再像20世纪中叶的工厂车间。如今，机器人技术、自动化和人工智能使得企业能够用更少的劳动力生产更多的产品，而留下的工人技术更好、收入也更高。与中国不同，美国未能正视这一现实，也没有建立起一种能够把自身技术优势转化为同等生产率提升的制造体系。

Washington talks about A.I. as if it lives in research labs, venture capital portfolios and data centers. China treats it as factory work. Today, A.I. is embedded into China’s efforts to accelerate automation — guiding machines, scheduling work and detecting problems in real time. China has built more than 30,000 smart factories. More than half of all new industrial robots installed worldwide in 2024 went into Chinese factories. Research from Weijian Shan, an investor and economist based in Hong Kong, has found that, from sectors ranging from steel to shipbuilding, these factories now produce more per worker than comparable U.S. plants.

华盛顿在谈论人工智能时，仿佛它只存在于研究实验室、风险投资项目和数据中心里。中国则将人工智能视为工厂里实实在在的生产工具。如今，人工智能已深度融入中国加速自动化的进程——用于引导机器运行、安排生产进度并实时发现问题。中国已建成3万多家智能工厂。2024年全球新安装的工业机器人中超过一半在中国的工厂里。香港投资人和经济学家单伟建的研究发现，从钢铁到造船等多个行业，这些工厂如今的人均产出已超过美国同类工厂。

The shift is visible on the shop floor. By last year, the Chinese electric vehicle company Zeekr had over 800 robots in its factory in Ningbo. The company even experimented with putting humanoid robots to work on its factory floor lifting boxes, assembling components and performing quality checks. Rather than following fixed instructions, the robots use cameras, sensors and A.I. to respond to conditions on the line, much like driver-assistance systems that adjust to traffic. That flexibility can allow them to handle variation, work safely alongside human workers and absorb routine changes that would otherwise force production to stop. These are the kind of efficiency gains that can eventually increase productivity per worker and help ease shortages of skilled labor.

这种转变在生产车间里清晰可见。截至去年，中国的电动车企业极氪在宁波的工厂部署了超过800台机器人。该公司甚至尝试使用人形机器人参与生产，比如搬运箱子、组装零部件和执行质检工作。这些机器人不再只是遵循固定指令，而是利用摄像头、传感器和人工智能对生产线上的状况做出响应，就像能根据路况做出调整的辅助驾驶系统一样。这种灵活性使它们能够处理变化，与人类工人安全协作，并适应那些原本会导致生产中断的常规变化。此类效率提升最终将提高人均生产力，并有助于缓解熟练劳动力短缺问题。

These gains are not limited to experimental systems. At Midea, one of the world’s largest home appliance manufacturers, an A.I.-driven control system coordinates robots, sensors and machines at its Jingzhou plant. A company official said the system has reduced response times from hours to seconds.

这些成果并非仅限于实验性系统。在全球最大的家电制造商之一美的集团位于荆州的工厂里，一个由人工智能驱动的控制系统协调着机器人、传感器和各类机器设备。公司的一位管理者表示，该系统将响应时间从几小时缩短到了几秒。

Productivity gains come from multiple forms of A.I. Software can analyze camera feeds so that defects can be removed from production. Scheduling algorithms can automatically balance production, inventory and logistics — Lenovo, for example, says it has used such systems to cut production scheduling times from hours to minutes. A.I. can also analyze streams of production data in real time and highlight small inefficiencies before they slow the entire line. The technology company Xiaomi says it used smart manufacturing and over 700 robots to produce a car every 76 seconds on average in its Beijing plant.

生产率提升来自多种形式的人工智能。软件可以分析摄像头画面，从而把有缺陷的产品从生产过程中剔除。调度算法能够自动平衡生产、库存和物流——例如，联想集团表示，它利用此类系统把生产调度时间从数小时缩短到了几分钟。人工智能还可以实时分析源源不断的生产数据，在小问题拖慢整条生产线之前将其识别出来。科技公司小米表示，依靠智能制造和700多台机器人，其北京工厂平均每76秒就能生产一辆汽车。

For a decade, Beijing has pursued factory modernization as a national project, driven by all levels of the government, beyond flagship factories like Zeekr and deep into China’s manufacturing supply chains.

十年来，北京一直将工厂现代化作为国家工程来推进，各级政府参与其中，其范围不仅限于极氪这样的旗舰工厂，而是深入中国制造业的供应链之中。

Provinces fund local companies developing A.I and automation technologies. Government ministries coordinate standards so that suppliers and manufacturers can share data and solutions. The government promotes programs to train workers to use these technologies. Smaller manufacturers can plug into shared, government-supported digital networks that collect production data, coordinate schedules and monitor equipment, allowing them to adopt A.I. tools without building from scratch.

各省为开发人工智能和自动化技术的本地企业提供资金支持。国家部委协调技术标准的制定，以便供应商和制造商能够共享数据和解决方案。政府还推动培训项目，帮助工人掌握这些技术。规模较小的制造商可以接入由政府支持的共享数字网络，这些网络收集生产数据、协调生产调度并监控设备，使它们无需从零开始就能采用人工智能工具。

On the other side of the Pacific, U.S. policy on A.I. emphasizes frontier research in A.I. and large language model development. While America leads in these fields, this focus neglects other practical areas for using A.I. and automation, leaving American manufacturers struggling to use digital tools on the factory floor. Only 18 percent of manufacturers surveyed by the Manufacturing Leadership Council said they have formal A.I. strategies for their operations; two-thirds said they were struggling to scale A.I. test projects into production.

而在太平洋另一侧，美国的人工智能政策则强调前沿研究以及大语言模型的开发。虽然美国在这些领域处于领先地位，但这种侧重忽略了对人工智能和自动化的其他实际应用，导致美国制造商在工厂车间使用数字化工具时举步维艰。制造业领导力委员会的一项调查显示，只有18%的制造商表示他们为运营制定了正式的人工智能战略；三分之二的企业表示，他们难以把人工智能试验项目推广到实际生产中。

Some American manufacturers are experimenting with similar tools. Auto manufacturers like Ford are experimenting with A.I.-enabled visual detection systems to identify defects on assembly lines. They also investing in systems that can detect equipment problems before they shut down production lines. Yet these efforts remain fragmented.

一些美国制造商正在尝试类似的工具。福特等车企正在试验基于人工智能的视觉检测系统来识别装配线上的缺陷。他们也在投资那些能在设备故障导致生产线停工前发现问题的系统。然而，这些努力仍然零散，不成体系。

The barriers are practical rather than technological, especially for small and midsize companies. In many factories, production data is incomplete or still recorded manually, making it impossible to use digital tools that rely on continuous information. Three-quarters of manufacturers surveyed struggle to connect older machines to systems that could help them run more efficiently. And eight in 10 report shortages of workers who can use A.I.-powered manufacturing tools. More than half say the upfront cost of A.I. projects is prohibitive.

障碍更多来自实操层面，而非技术本身，尤其是对中小企业而言。在许多工厂，生产数据不完整或者仍依靠人工记录，使得依赖持续数据流的数字化工具难以投入应用。调查显示，四分之三的制造商难以将旧设备连接到能够提高效率的系统中；此外，八成企业表示缺乏能够操作基于人工智能的制造工具的工人。超过半数企业表示，人工智能项目的初期投入成本过高，难以承受。

Yet the U.S. policy response to China’s rise in manufacturing targets trade flows rather than factory performance. A familiar mix of tariffs, trade investigations and restrictions on imported components and technologies looks tough but does little to close the productivity gap.

然而，美国针对中国制造业崛起的政策回应主要瞄准的是贸易流动，而不是工厂本身的生产效率。关税、贸易调查以及对进口零部件和技术的限制组成的惯用手段，看似强硬，但对缩小生产率差距几乎没有帮助。

These policies actually leave American manufacturers in a bind. When they attempt to automate, they often rely on imported robotics, sensors and machinery. Yet the Trump administration has opened a national security investigation into these robotics supply chains, potentially leading to tariffs that would raise the cost of such modernizing equipment.

这些政策实际上让美国制造商陷入了两难境地。当他们尝试进行自动化改造时，往往依赖进口的机器人、传感器和机械设备。然而，特朗普政府已对这些机器人供应链启动了国家安全调查，这可能导致加征关税，从而提高此类现代化设备的成本。

If the goal is to bring manufacturing back from overseas, American policymakers should focus less on protection and more on helping manufacturers deploy digital tools. That means connecting legacy equipment to digital systems so they can generate usable data. It means modernizing older plants so equipment can integrate with sensors, software and analytics. It means investing in work force training so employees can use A.I. tools. And it means federal and state governments supporting shared digital infrastructure that allows small and midsize manufacturers to adopt advanced tools.

如果目标是真正把制造业从海外带回美国，那么美国的决策者就应该少强调保护主义，多帮助制造商部署数字化工具。这意味着要把传统设备接入数字系统，使其能够产生可用的数据；要改造老旧工厂，让设备能够与传感器、软件和数据分析系统整合。这意味着要投资劳动力培训，使员工能够掌握人工智能工具。这还意味着联邦和州政府需要支持共享的数字基础设施，使中小型制造商也能够采用先进工具。

This is what China is doing. And other advanced economies in Germany, Japan, South Korea and elsewhere are responding with similar strategies.

这正是中国正在做的事情。而德国、日本、韩国等其他发达经济体也正在以类似的战略作出回应。

America has emphasized invention and breakthroughs over deployment. But sometimes, technology needs to be treated as factory work — unsexy and perhaps boring, but essential for being competitive.

美国历来重视发明和突破，而轻视技术的应用。但有时，技术需要被当作工厂里的平常工作来对待——也许不光鲜，甚至有些枯燥，却是保持竞争力所必不可少的。

China has been good at a lot of things: manufacturing cheaply, catching up on A.I., dominating renewable energy, building hard power. What it’s been less good at is soft power. But that seems to be changing. Have you heard about Chinamaxxing? Read on.

中国有很多强项：低成本制造、在人工智能领域迎头赶上、称霸可再生能源、打造硬实力。它一直不太擅长的是软实力。但情况似乎正在改变。你听说过“Chinamaxxing”吗？接着往下看。

Today, my colleague Vivian Wang in Beijing writes about how China is suddenly winning hearts and minds. (Spoiler alert: It might not actually have that much to do with China itself.)

今天，我在北京的同事王月眉(Vivan Wang)撰文讲述中国为何突然开始赢得人心。（剧透：这或许其实和中国本身关系不大。）

Cool China

酷中国

By Vivian Wang

作者：王月眉

Last week, my colleague Yan Zhuang wrote about a funny trend: young people on TikTok who are “becoming Chinese” by embracing stereotypically Chinese behaviors — drinking hot water, wearing slippers, eating congee.

上周，我的同事Yan Zhuang报道了一个有趣的潮流：TikTok上的年轻人通过刻板印象中的中国生活方式——喝热水、穿拖鞋、喝粥——来“成为中国人”。

“Becoming Chinese” (or “Chinamaxxing,” if that’s your preferred term) may just be a TikTok fad. But it fits into something I’ve noticed recently: To a growing number of people around the world, China seems to be getting cooler.

“成为中国人”（或是你更习惯说的“Chinamaxxing”）或许只是TikTok上的一阵风潮。但这契合了我最近注意到的一个现象：在全球各个角落，越来越多人眼中，中国似乎正变得越来越酷。

Major American influencers, like the YouTuber IShowSpeed and the streamer Hasan Piker, have traveled to China, where they raved about its high-speed trains and LED light shows. The N.B.A. star Victor Wembanyama spent 10 days meditating at a Shaolin temple. A new Adidas jacket inspired by the historical Tang suit was a viral fashion hit. And of course, there was the Labubu.

视频博主IShowSpeed和主播哈桑·派克等美国著名网红都曾到访中国，对中国的高铁和LED灯光秀赞不绝口。NBA球星维克托·文班亚马曾在少林寺冥想修行十天。一款以唐装为灵感的新款阿迪达斯夹克成为爆款时尚单品。当然，还有Labubu。

Over the course of its decades-long ascent, China has been good (and is getting better) at many things: developing technology, dominating supply chains, building up military power. What it has not been great at is winning hearts and minds, especially in the West — until, seemingly, now. So what changed? It might not actually have that much to do with China itself.

在数十年的崛起过程中，中国在很多领域都表现出色（且正变得更强）：发展技术、主导供应链、壮大军事力量。它一直不擅长的是赢得人心，尤其是在西方——直到如今，情况似乎变了。那么，究竟是什么变了？答案或许其实和中国本身关系不大。

Savvier outreach and glittering infrastructure

更精明的对外传播与亮眼的基础设施

China’s struggles with soft power have usually boiled down to its authoritarian government, which has hurt the country’s image abroad in multiple ways. (Just last week, a Hong Kong court sentenced the pro-democracy media mogul Jimmy Lai to 20 years in prison.)

中国在软实力上的困境通常可以归结为它的威权政府，这在多个方面损害了国家的海外形象。（就在上周，香港一家法院判处民主派传媒大亨黎智英20年监禁。）

Government censorship has also limited many outsiders from seeing the full range of Chinese creativity. Instead, the government has tried too hard to manufacture a state-sanctioned version of Chinese cool, with heavy-handed movies. (Remember the film “The Great Wall,” starring Matt Damon? Most people don’t.)

政府审查也让许多外界人士难以了解中国创造力的全貌。相反，政府用力过猛，试图通过手法生硬的电影，打造官方认可的“酷中国”。（还记得马特·达蒙主演的电影《长城》吗？大多数人早就忘了。）

The authoritarianism hasn’t changed, but the government has gotten savvier in its outreach efforts — for example, making it easier for foreign tourists to visit China. Most casual tourists won’t encounter the more suffocating political controls here, and they get to interact with ordinary Chinese people, in all their diversity. Visitors often say they’re surprised by how normal everyday life seems.

威权体制并未改变，但政府的外宣手段变得更精明了——比如，简化外国游客来华手续。大多数普通游客不会接触到这里令人窒息的政治管控，反而能与形形色色的普通中国人交流。访客常惊叹于这里日常生活的平凡景象。

But the biggest reason for China’s sudden appeal may have little to do with China itself. Polls show that opinions of China in the West are still, on the whole, mostly negative. It’s just that America, to many people around the world, is looking bad, too. And according to scholars, if people are looking for an alternative to the United States, China may be the most obvious place to turn.

但中国突然走红的最大原因或许和中国本身基本无关。民调显示，总体而言，西方对中国的看法仍以负面居多。只不过，在全球许多人眼中，美国同样形象不佳。学者认为，如果人们想要寻找美国之外的另一个选择，中国可能是最显而易见的去处。

Even aside from the most drastic actions by the Trump administration — its threats to take Greenland, its defense of killings by federal agents in Minneapolis — there’s a sense that the U.S. has failed to provide basic things, like functioning infrastructure. China’s gleaming trains look appealing in comparison.

即便抛开特朗普政府最极端的举动——威胁吞并格陵兰、为明尼阿波利斯联邦特工的杀人行为辩护——外界也普遍感到，美国连基础设施正常运转这类基本的事都做不到。相比之下，中国崭新的高铁就显得格外有吸引力。

The political and cultural fracturing of America has “significantly weakened the appeal of the U.S.,” Ying Zhu, a film studies scholar who has studied Chinese soft power, told me. “The appeal of China at the moment is more of a reaction” to that than real enthusiasm for China itself, she said.

研究中国软实力的电影研究学者朱影（音）告诉我，美国的政治与文化分裂“大幅削弱了美国的吸引力”。她说：“中国当下的吸引力更多是对这种局面的反应”，而不是对中国本身的真正热忱。

Can the vibe shift last?

这种氛围转变能持续吗？

Still, these shifting attitudes — regardless of what’s behind them — could have real implications for how other countries approach China. Many Western leaders have visited Beijing recently, promoting trade and cultural exchange, despite blowback from China hawks at home. If there was less domestic pressure, those types of visits could become easier and more frequent. And there would probably be less appetite for moves against China, as we saw in the opposition from many young Americans to the TikTok ban.

尽管如此，无论背后原因是什么，这种态度转变都可能对其他国家的对华政策产生切实影响。尽管面临国内对华鹰派的反对，许多西方领导人近期仍访问北京，推动贸易与文化交流。如果国内压力减小，此类访问可能会变得更轻松、更频繁。正如我们看到许多美国年轻人反对禁用TikTok那样，针对中国的举措也可能失去更多支持。

A recent survey by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace found that most Americans, especially younger ones, were not very worried about what would happen if China surpassed the U.S. in global influence. That “casts doubt on whether the American public would be willing to bear significant costs to maintain a power position superior to China’s,” the authors wrote.

卡内基国际和平基金会近期一项调查发现，大多数美国人，尤其是年轻人并不太担心中国在全球影响力上超越美国。报告作者写道，这“让人怀疑美国公众是否愿意付出巨大代价，以维持对中国的优势地位”。

An important question is whether this vibe shift can last. Zhu was skeptical. “Cultural trends come and go,” she said. “Fashion and fads are sensitive to the shifting geopolitical dynamic.” She noted that, despite viral trends and Labubus, China had yet to produce, say, a global hit movie.

一个关键问题是，这种氛围转变能否持续。朱影对此表示怀疑。“文化潮流来去匆匆，”她说。“时尚和风潮对地缘政治局势的变化十分敏感。”她指出，即便有网络爆款潮流和Labubu，中国至今仍未推出一部真正的全球卖座电影。

Parts of the Chinese government, too, seem worried that other countries’ soft power is still stronger. The Ministry of State Security last month published a warning, seemingly directed at Chinese influencers, about posts showing off glossy lives outside China.

中国部分政府部门似乎也担心自己的软实力不如人。国家安全部上月发布一则警示，矛头似乎指向国内网红在网上炫耀国外光鲜生活的行为。

“They one-sidedly showcase the glamorous aspects of foreign countries. Even worse, some have selectively ignored China’s development achievements,” the post said. “That provides an opportunity for the ‘soft aggression’ of Western ideology.”

“（他们）片面展示国外的光鲜侧面，更有甚者对国内发展成就选择性失明，”文章写道。“为西方意识形态的‘软侵略’提供可乘之机。”

At a conference at Tsinghua University in Beijing in January, a group of the most influential executives and founders working in artificial intelligence in China gathered to discuss the state of their industry. The mood was bullish. One of the companies in the room, which included people from Tencent, Alibaba and Zhipu AI, could soon lead the world, they agreed.

今年1月，在位于北京的清华大学举行的一场会议上，一批中国人工智能领域最具影响力的企业高管与创始人齐聚一堂，探讨行业现状。现场气氛乐观高昂。与会者包括来自腾讯、阿里巴巴、智谱AI等企业的人士，他们一致认为，在座的某家公司很快有望领跑全球。

But one thing was holding them back: They needed more superfast semiconductors.

但有一件事在拖后腿：他们需要更多超高速半导体。

This year, Chinese chip makers are likely to produce a small fraction of the number of advanced chips made by foreign firms. Huawei, the telecommunications and electronics company leading China’s chip charge, has said it will need almost another two years to make chips that can perform as well as the current offerings from Nvidia of Silicon Valley.

今年，中国芯片制造商的先进芯片产量可能仅为外国公司的一小部分。作为中国芯片产业的领军企业，电信和电子公司华为表示，还需要近两年时间，才能造出性能与当前硅谷英伟达产品相当的芯片。

“Even the national champion is fighting an uphill battle,” said Xiaomeng Lu, a director with Eurasia Group, a political consultancy and research group in Washington.

“即便是国家领军者，也在艰难奋战，”华盛顿政治咨询与研究机构欧亚集团总监鲁晓萌表示。

Still, while Chinese chip companies make fewer, slower chips — in large part because U.S. policies have prevented them from importing key tools — there is no shortage of momentum in the country’s A.I. industry.

然而，尽管中国芯片企业因美国政策阻碍它们进口关键设备，导致产量有限且性能落后，但国内人工智能产业的发展势头依然强劲。

While Washington’s export controls have slowed China’s chip development, they have added fuel to Beijing’s decade-long push to make strategic technologies like semiconductors and A.I. entirely at home.

美国的出口管制虽然放缓了中国芯片的发展速度，却为北京持续十年的战略技术自主化进程——包括半导体与人工智能领域——注入了强劲动力。

Government and private money has been pouring into the development of Chinese artificial intelligence. Chinese tech stocks have made huge gains — Alibaba soared more than 94 percent last year. A stream of Chinese A.I. start-ups are going public. Last month, two of China’s most promising A.I. companies raised more than $1 billion in Hong Kong listings.

政府与民间资金正大量涌入中国人工智能领域。中国科技股大幅上涨——阿里巴巴去年涨幅超过94%。一批中国人工智能初创企业陆续上市。上月，中国两家最具潜力的人工智能公司在香港上市，融资超10亿美元。

The gap between the money flowing into China’s A.I. sector and the reality that Chinese companies produce fewer chips than the country needs underlines the urgency of Beijing’s self-sufficiency efforts, and how much the Chinese A.I. industry still depends on foreign chips.

涌入中国人工智能领域的资金规模与中国企业芯片产量仍无法满足国内需求的现实之间存在巨大反差。这既凸显了北京推动芯片自主的紧迫性，也显示出中国人工智能产业对国外芯片的依赖程度之深。

In December, President Trump extended China a lifeline when he allowed Nvidia to sell some of its advanced chips to Chinese companies, reversing years of U.S. policy. But whether China will get broad access to those chips remains an open question ahead of Mr. Trump’s planned visit to Beijing next month.

去年12月，特朗普总统为中国送上救命稻草，允许英伟达向中国企业出售部分先进芯片，扭转了美国执行数年的政策。但在下月特朗普计划访华之前，中国能否大范围获得这类芯片，仍是未知数。

英伟达首席执行官黄仁勋，摄于1月。此前一个月，特朗普总统表示将允许英伟达向中国公司出售部分先进芯片。

The Memory Chip Lag

存储芯片的落后

The Chinese government’s push to make cutting-edge chips at home began more than a decade ago. And it has spent more than $150 billion on the drive.

中国政府推动本土制造尖端芯片的努力始于十多年前，已为此投入超过1500亿美元。

China’s biggest tech companies, including Huawei, Alibaba and the TikTok parent company ByteDance, have started chip design businesses. Chip makers, many working with Huawei, are building dozens of factories and have hired top engineers from Taiwan and South Korea.

包括华为、阿里巴巴以及TikTok母公司字节跳动在内的中国大型科技企业均已启动芯片设计业务。各家芯片厂商——其中多家与华为合作——正在兴建数十座工厂，并从台湾和韩国引进顶尖工程师。

But the task of catching up has gotten progressively more difficult. While Chinese companies have been building their own supply chain for chip making, officials in Washington have tried to hold them back. Three presidential administrations have used export controls to keep Chinese companies from buying advanced chips and the tools to make them, over concerns the technology could fuel China’s economic and military power.

但追赶的难度越来越大。在中国企业搭建本土芯片供应链的同时，华盛顿则在竭力遏制。三届美国政府均通过出口管制阻止中国企业购买先进芯片及制造设备，担心这类技术会增强中国的经济与军事实力。

The restrictions have kept Chinese companies from buying equipment made by the Dutch company ASML that performs a crucial step in the chip making process. The lack of access to these machines, which are the size of school buses, is one reason Chinese companies are making chips that lag the performance of the top of the line from Nvidia.

这些限制令中国企业无法购买荷兰阿斯麦公司生产的芯片制造关键设备。这种设备体积接近校车，无法获得这类机器是中国芯片性能落后于英伟达顶级产品的原因之一。

Those are the kinds of chips that power artificial intelligence systems. Chinese companies will most likely make just 2 percent as many A.I. chips as foreign firms do this year, said Tim Fist, a director at the Institute for Progress, a think tank in Washington.

这类芯片正是驱动人工智能系统的核心。华盛顿智库进步研究所总监蒂姆·菲斯特表示，今年中国企业生产的AI芯片数量大概率仅为外国企业的2%。

The production gap between Chinese and foreign manufacturers is especially big for memory chips, which are essential for the large calculations done by A.I.

中外厂商在存储芯片上的产量差距尤其巨大，而存储芯片对AI的大规模计算至关重要。

Companies outside China will make 70 times as much memory storage capacity this year as Chinese chip makers will, Mr. Fist said.

菲斯特称，今年中国境外公司的存储芯片产能将达到中国芯片制造商的70倍。

The leading makers of memory chips are the South Korean conglomerates Samsung and SK Hynix. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, the world’s biggest chip producer, dominates production of the most advanced chips.

全球领先的存储芯片厂商是韩国企业三星和SK海力士。而全球最大芯片生产商台积电则垄断了最先进芯片的制造。

去年上海一场会议上的华为展台。特朗普上任后便着手推动各国停止在其电信基础设施中使用华为设备。

Huawei’s Pivot

华为的转型

In 2014, China was the world’s largest market for semiconductors. But 90 percent of the chips its companies used were made outside the country.

2014年，中国已是全球最大半导体市场，但其企业使用的芯片中有90%依赖进口。

Concerned about that dependency, the State Council, China’s top governing body, approved a plan to spend billions and made a vow: China would be making every part of its semiconductor supply chain at home by 2030.

出于对这种依赖的担忧，中国最高行政机构国务院批准了一项耗资相当于数十亿美元的计划，并立下目标：到2030年，中国将实现半导体供应链所有环节的本土化生产。

Policymakers had reason to be concerned about the risks that foreign technology posed to Chinese infrastructure. Earlier that year, documents provided by the former National Security Agency contractor Edward J. Snowden had disclosed that the U.S. government had monitored the communications of top executives at Huawei.

政策制定者有充分理由担忧外国技术对中国基础设施构成的风险。当年早些时候，前美国国家安全局雇员爱德华·斯诺登披露的文件显示，美国政府曾监控华为高管的通讯。

Then in 2017, President Trump fined the Chinese telecommunications giant ZTE for allegedly violating U.S. sanctions on Iran, crippling its business overnight. Although ZTE does not manufacture chips, the action gave China another lesson in its need for self reliance.

2017年，特朗普政府以涉嫌违反美国对伊朗制裁为由，对中国电信巨头中兴通讯处以罚款，一夜之间使其业务陷入瘫痪。尽管中兴并不生产芯片，但这一事件让中国再次意识到自给自足的必要性。

Next came Huawei. The first Trump administration embarked on a global campaign to get countries to stop using Huawei’s equipment in their telecommunications infrastructure. Huawei responded by offloading that business line and getting in step with Beijing’s self-sufficiency program.

随后轮到华为。第一届特朗普政府全发起全球行动，要求各国停止在电信基础设施中使用华为设备。华为的应对是剥离相关业务线，并紧跟北京的自给自足战略。

“Huawei was unique in its capabilities and its alignment with China’s national goals,” said Kyle Chan, a fellow at the Brookings Institution who studies Chinese industrial policy. “Huawei’s experience was a microcosm of China’s broader experience: suddenly being cut off and now scrambling to build its own.”

“华为在技术能力和与国家目标的契合度方面独一无二，”研究中国产业政策的布鲁金斯学会研究员陈凯欣表示。“华为的经历是中国更广泛处境的缩影：供应突然被切断，如今正全力自主研发。”

Beijing also pushed foreign companies to turn over technology as a price of admission to the China market. Qualcomm, a San Diego tech giant, entered into a joint venture with Huaxintong Semiconductor in 2016. The Chinese government provided land and financing, and Qualcomm offered the technology and about $140 million in initial funding.

北京还推动外国企业以转让技术作为进入中国市场的条件。总部位于圣地亚哥的科技巨头高通，2016年与华芯通半导体成立合资公司。中国政府提供土地与资金支持，高通则提供技术和约1.4亿美元初始资金。

During this time, Huawei became one of China’s most popular smartphone makers. And it started working closely with chip factories to make chips for smartphones and A.I. systems.

在此期间，华为成为中国最受欢迎的智能手机厂商之一，并开始与芯片工厂紧密合作，为手机和AI系统制造芯片。

Huawei has come out with a line of chips that are comparable to some of Nvidia’s older models. But analysts said those chips contained key components that foreign rivals like TSMC and Samsung had made.

华为已推出一系列芯片，性能可与英伟达部分旧款产品媲美。但分析师表示，这些芯片仍包含台积电、三星等外国竞争对手生产的关键组件。

自美国官员牵头游说荷兰政府阻止向中国出口设备以来，中国企业便无法购得阿斯麦最先进的制造设备。

Clouds and Clusters

云服务与算力集群

The inability to get essential tools from ASML has been a major chokehold for Chinese chip makers. Since U.S. officials led an effort to lobby the Dutch government to block shipments to China, no Chinese company has been able to buy ASML’s most advanced tools.

无法从阿斯麦获得核心设备是中国芯片厂商的主要瓶颈。自美国官员牵头游说荷兰政府禁止向中国出口设备以来，没有任何一家中国企业能买到阿斯麦最先进的设备。

Instead, Chinese chip makers have recruited engineers with experience using those machines at TSMC, the world’s top chip maker. And now, Chinese start-ups are trying to make their own chip manufacturing equipment.

作为应对，中国芯片厂商从全球顶级芯片制造商台积电挖来有相关设备操作经验的工程师。如今，中国初创企业也在尝试自主研发芯片制造设备。

A.I. systems require an immense amount of computing power to learn. China’s A.I. companies are trying to get the computing power they need by strapping together numerous less powerful chips. Huawei has taken such an approach, and the Chinese government has built what it calls “intelligent computing clusters” that are essentially state-run data centers.

人工智能系统学习需要海量算力。中国人工智能企业正尝试将大量性能较弱的芯片集群组网，以获得所需算力。华为已采用这一路线，中国政府也建成了所谓“智能算力集群”，本质上是政府运营的数据中心。

But those clusters need a lot of chips. Experts and people who work in the industry say China’s most advanced chip maker, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Company, which does some work for Huawei, has struggled to produce enough chips. The chips it does produce are prone to defects and use more electricity than cutting-edge foreign ones. SMIC did not respond to a request for comment.

但这些集群需要大量芯片。业内专家与相关人士表示，为华为提供部分服务的中国最先进芯片厂商中芯国际一直难以保证足够产量。其生产的芯片良品率偏低、功耗高于国外尖端产品。中芯国际未回应置评请求。

“Manufacturing volume is going to be an issue,” said Kendra Schaefer, a partner at Trivium China, a research and advisory firm.

“制造产能会是个问题，”咨询机构Trivium China合伙人肯德拉·谢弗表示。

Nonetheless, multiple Chinese A.I. researchers have reported breakthroughs in finding new ways to link chips together for maximum efficiency. Zhipu said last month that it had built its latest model entirely using Huawei’s chips and software.

尽管如此，多位中国人工智能研究者已报告在芯片高效组网方面取得突破。智谱AI上月表示，其最新大模型已完全基于华为芯片与软件构建。

So far, the efficiency gains have been limited and have not helped Chinese companies escape the fact that A.I. demands huge quantities of chips.

到目前为止，这类效率提升仍有限，并未能帮助中国企业摆脱AI对海量芯片的需求困境。

Another way China’s A.I. companies are getting the computing power they need is by paying cloud providers like Alibaba and Amazon for remote access to massive data centers stocked with powerful chips.

中国AI企业获取算力的另一种方式是向阿里云、亚马逊等云服务商付费，远程接入搭载高性能芯片的大型数据中心。

But the strategy is expensive.

但这一策略成本高昂。

Documents filed by Zhipu and Minimax, another Chinese A.I. start-up, with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange last month show that the two companies are spending a lot more buying cloud services than they are earning in revenue.

智谱AI与另一家中国人工智能初创公司稀宇科技上月在港交所提交的文件显示，两家公司购买云服务的支出远超营收。

China on Tuesday said it would restrict exports to Japanese companies with ties to the defense industry, the latest escalation in Beijing’s monthslong feud with Tokyo over Taiwan.

中国周二宣布将限制向与国防工业有关联的日本企业出口商品，这是北京与东京围绕台湾问题持续数月争端的最新升级。

China’s commerce ministry said in a statement that it would block the export of all “dual-use” items to 20 entities, including Mitsubishi Heavy Industries; JAXA, the Japanese space agency; and the National Defense Academy of Japan, a military training university. Dual-use products are those that have both civilian and military purposes.

中国商务部在声明中表示，将禁止向包括三菱重工、日本宇宙航空研究开发机构及军事培训院校日本防卫大学在内的20家实体出口所有“两用”物品。两用产品指兼具民用和军用功能的商品。

The restrictions are meant to thwart Japan’s efforts to expand its military as well as to exert economic pressure. Beijing has ratcheted up pressure on Tokyo since November, when Japan’s prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, said that Japan could help defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion. China considers Taiwan, a self-governing democracy, part of its territory.

此举旨在阻挠日本扩军计划并施加经济压力。自去年11月日本首相高市早苗宣称若中国入侵台湾可协助台湾防卫以来，北京持续对东京施压。中国视实行自治的民主政体台湾为其领土的一部分。

China’s restrictions could include rare earths, metals that are used in devices ranging from electric vehicle motors to missile systems. During a territorial dispute in 2010, Beijing stopped the export of rare earths to Japan for a couple of months, rattling its economy.

中国的限制措施可能涉及稀土，这种金属广泛应用于电动汽车电机至导弹系统等设备。2010年领土争端期间，北京曾暂停对日稀土出口数月，对日本经济造成了冲击。

China’s commerce ministry said it was targeting the Japanese entities because they “participate in enhancing Japan’s military capabilities.” The ministry said another 20 Japanese firms, including the automaker Subaru, would be added to a watch list, making it more difficult to obtain Chinese goods.

中国商务部称，之所以针对这些日本实体，是因为它们“参与提升日本军事能力”。该部表示，包括汽车制造商斯巴鲁在内的另外20家日本企业将被列入观察名单，这将使它们更难获得中国商品。

“These measures aim to prevent Japan’s ‘re-militarization’ and nuclear ambitions and are fully justifiable, reasonable and lawful,” the ministry said in a statement.

该部在一份声明中说，这些措施“目的是制止日本‘再军事化’和拥核企图，完全正当合理合法”。

The Japanese government said that China’s export controls “deviate significantly from international practice and are absolutely unacceptable.”

日本政府表示，中国的出口管制“严重背离国际惯例，是绝对不可接受的”。

“We have strongly protested these measures and demanded their withdrawal,” Kei Sato, a cabinet official, said at a news conference in Tokyo.

“我们已强烈抗议这些措施并要求撤销，”内阁官员佐藤启在东京的新闻发布会上说。

In Japan, Subaru and Mitsubishi also produce aircraft and machinery and they have contracts with Japan’s military, the Self-Defense Forces.

在日本，斯巴鲁和三菱也生产飞机和机械，并与日本自卫队签订了合同。

The restrictions come at a tense geopolitical moment in Asia. Ms. Takaichi, an outspoken critic of China, has promised to raise Japan’s military spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product this spring. Japan believes that it must modernize its forces to keep up with China’s rising military clout in the region.

此番限制出台之际，亚洲地缘政治局势正趋紧张。直言批评中国的高市早苗承诺，在今年春季将日本军费开支提高到国内生产总值的2%。日本认为必须实现军队现代化，才能跟上中国在该地区日益增强的军事影响力。

China has denounced Japan’s defense buildup. In appealing to Western nations, Chinese officials have invoked Japan’s aggression during World War II, saying that it must be contained.

中国谴责日本的国防建设。在向西方国家发出呼吁时，中国官员援引日本在二战期间的侵略历史，称日本必须受到遏制。

Jean-Pierre Cabestan, a researcher at the Asia Center in Paris, said China’s restrictions were aimed at showing that Beijing would not back down. Chinese officials are working to put pressure on Ms. Takaichi, who recently won a sweeping mandate from voters for her hard-line agenda, ahead of her visit next month to Washington to meet with President Trump, he said.

巴黎亚洲中心研究员让-皮埃尔·卡贝斯坦说，中国的限制措施旨在表明北京不会退让。他说，中国官员正努力在高市早苗下月访问华盛顿与特朗普总统会晤之前向她施压，她最近因其强硬议程赢得了选民的压倒性支持。

“China is making a big fuss over the militarization of Japan, which is nothing new or unusual,” he said. “Takaichi is just increasing some of the expenditures to make the Japanese Self-Defense Forces more credible.”

“中国围绕日本军事化小题大做，这不是新鲜事，也不稀奇，”他表示。“高市早苗只是增加部分开支，以提升日本自卫队的可信度。”

Mr. Cabestan said that Chinese officials were also appealing to a domestic audience. Targeting Japan’s defense industry is an easy way to fan nationalism, he said, and can help “glue everyone together around the Communist Party and the leadership.”

卡贝斯坦指出，中国官员也在迎合国内受众。他指出，针对日本国防工业是煽动民族主义的便捷手段，有助于“将所有人团结在共产党和领导层周围”。

Beijing has in recent months restricted Japanese seafood imports, discouraged tourism to Japan and canceled mainland performances by Japanese artists.

近月来，北京限制日本海产品进口、打压赴日旅游，并取消日本艺人在中国大陆的演出。

One was a general who had commanded Chinese forces arrayed against Taiwan. Another was an officer who had led the People’s Liberation Army’s training department and been praised for modernizing combat drills. A third had long served as the chief military aide to China’s leader, Xi Jinping.

一位将军曾指挥过针对台湾部署的军队。另一位将军曾领导解放军训练部门，因推动作战训练现代化而备受赞誉。第三位将军则长期担任中国国家主席习近平的首席军事助理。

These men are among dozens of once-rising senior military officers who have been detained, dismissed or simply disappeared from view without explanation over the last four years. Their downfall, documented in a study released Tuesday, reveals the staggering extent of Mr. Xi’s campaign to shake up the People’s Liberation Army, which culminated last month in the removal of the topmost general, Zhang Youxia.

在过去四年中，有数十名一度崛起的高级军官在没有任何解释的情况下被拘留、解职，或干脆从人们的视线中消失，这三人就属其列。周二发布的一份研究报告记录了他们的陨落轨迹，凸显出习近平整顿解放军的运动规模之巨，这场运动在上个月以最高将领张又侠被撤职而达到顶峰。

The purge has stripped the military of its most experienced commanders and raised doubts about its readiness to go to war, including over Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its territory, according to data compiled by researchers at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, or C.S.I.S., a research group in Washington.

根据华盛顿智库战略与国际研究中心研究员汇编的数据，这场清洗行动使得军队失去了最富经验的指挥官，引发外界对其战争准备能力的质疑，包括针对中国宣称是其领土的台湾地区。

“In the near term, given the significant vacancies, it would be incredibly difficult for China to launch large military campaigns against Taiwan,” Bonny Lin, the director of the China Power Project at the center, wrote in an assessment of the findings. “Even below that threshold, there is evidence that the purges have negatively impacted China’s exercises around Taiwan in 2025.”

“短期内，鉴于存在大量空缺，中国发动大规模军事行动攻台将极其困难，”该中心中国力量项目主任林洋(Bonny Lin)在评估报告中指出。“即便降低一些标准，也有证据表明，此次清洗已对2025年中国在台湾周边的军事演习都产生了负面影响。”

Since 2022, around 100 officers in the military’s top two ranks — general or lieutenant general — have been dismissed or sidelined, the study estimated. The tally includes about 11 officers who were purged even after retirement.

据该研究估计，自2022年以来，约有100名军队最高两个级别（上将或中将）的军官被解职或边缘化。其中包括约11名军官在退休后仍被清洗。

Those eliminated represented about half of the military’s senior leadership, spanning the top commanders as well as the leaders and deputy leaders of central departments and all of China’s five military theater regions, said M. Taylor Fravel, a professor and expert on the Chinese military at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who examined the data.

美国麻省理工学院教授、中国军事问题专家傅泰林(M. Taylor Fravel)研究了这些数据，他说，这些被清除的人员约占军队高级领导层的一半，包括最高指挥官、中央部门和中国五大战区的正副领导。

Replacing them will not be easy. The purges have shrunk the pool of candidates who would have the right combination of skills, experience and ironclad loyalty to Mr. Xi and the Communist Party. An officer must also usually have served three to five years in his or her current grade to be considered for promotion, Professor Fravel said.

取代他们并非易事。清洗行动已大幅缩减具备综合素质的候选人储备——这些人才需兼具专业能力、丰富经验及对习近平和中共的绝对忠诚。傅泰林说，军官通常需在现职军衔任职三至五年方有晋升资格。

“Xi has purged all of these people and, obviously, it’s framed as their lack of loyalty to Xi and to the party,” he said in an interview. “But he also needs expertise to have the military he wants — loyalty as well as expertise — and how will he find those people? That’s going to be harder now.”

“习近平已经清洗了所有这些人，表面理由是他们对习近平和党缺乏忠诚，”他在接受采访时说。“但他也需要专业人才来组建他理想中的军队——既要忠诚，也要专业能力——他要如何找到这些人呢？现在这将变得更加困难。”

The removals began as a trickle, with a single senior officer disappearing in 2022. That grew to 14, dismissed or disappeared, in 2023, and 11 more in 2024. By last year the purge was a deluge: About 62 were removed, many in the latter half of the year.

撤职一开始只是零星发生，2022年，仅有一名高级官员消失。2023年，被解职或失踪的官员增至14人，2024年又增加了11人。到去年，这场清洗已如洪水般汹涌：约62人被撤职，其中多数发生在下半年。

This year about 11 officers have been absent from meetings that they would usually be expected to attend, suggesting that at least some of them could also be in serious trouble. The downfall of General Zhang could set off yet more investigations into officers linked to him.

今年，约有11名军官缺席了他们通常应出席的会议，这表明其中至少部分人可能也遇到了严重的麻烦。张又侠的倒台可能引发针对与他关联军官的更多调查。

“You can think of the purge of Zhang Youxia as just completing the first phase, with more turbulence to come,” said Professor Fravel.

傅泰林指出：“可以认为张又侠的清洗仅是第一阶段的收尾，接下来还会有更多的动荡。”

Some of the dismissed or disappeared officers owed their rise to Mr. Xi himself; others were stars whose credentials marked them as the future of the high command.

部分遭撤职或失踪的将领曾受习近平提拔；还有一些是军中明星人物，其资历标志着他们本应成为未来高层。

Among them: Lt. Gen. Wang Peng, who had earned a reputation for modernizing troop training; Lt. Gen. Zhong Shaojun, who had served as Mr. Xi’s chief aide for managing the People’s Liberation Army; and Gen. Lin Xiangyang, the commander who would have been at the forefront of any Chinese attack on Taiwan.

其中包括以部队训练现代化著称的王鹏中将；曾是习近平管理解放军的首席助手的钟绍军中将；以及本应在中国对台军事行动中担任前线指挥官的林向阳上将。

While there are other officers who could fill the vacancies, the wave of removals could have a cascading effect through the ranks. As investigations expand, any promotions will likely be subjected to microscopic scrutiny. Of 52 key military leadership positions examined in the study, only around 11 are officially filled, said Dr. Lin.

虽然还有其他官员可以填补空缺，但免职潮可能在各级军官中引发连锁反应。随着调查范围的扩大，任何晋升都可能面临极其严格的审查。林洋说，在本研究调查的52个重要军事领导职位中，只有约11个是正式的补缺。

In the Chinese military, “for every senior officer, there are tens, if not hundreds, of lower officers whose careers have been tied to the senior officer,” said John Culver, a former Central Intelligence Agency analyst who is now a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. “I think this will ripple for at least two or three years.”

在中国军队中，“每一名高级军官背后都牵动着数十名甚至数百名下级军官的职业生涯，”前中央情报局分析师、现布鲁金斯学会非常驻高级研究员约翰·卡尔弗说。“我认为影响至少会持续两三年。”

So far, the tempo of China’s military modernization does not appear slowed by the purges, but the command bottlenecks may hinder some operations. The researchers at C.S.I.S. noted that China may have decreased, delayed and simplified some military exercises last year, including near Taiwan, because of the loss of skilled leaders.

到目前为止，中国军事现代化的步伐似乎并没有因为大清洗而放缓，但指挥瓶颈可能会阻碍部分行动。战略与国际研究中心研究人员指出，由于资深领导人的流失，中国去年可能减少、推迟和简化了一些军事演习，包括在台湾附近的演习。

Mr. Xi patched some holes in the military leadership late last year, when he promoted new commanders to the Eastern Theater Command, which oversees Taiwan, and the Central Theater Command, which helps protect Beijing. There is no sign yet of when he may install new commanders into the Central Military Commission, the apex body that controls the military.

去年末，习近平通过提拔新指挥官填补了东部战区（负责台湾事务）和中部战区（参与北京守备）的部分领导层空缺。目前还没有迹象表明他何时会为掌控军队的最高机构中央军委任命新的指挥官。

Chancellor Friedrich Merz of Germany has spent the opening months of this year sketching out a new vision for Europe in a world increasingly shaped by the bullying behavior of superpowers.

在今年开年数月间，德国总理弗里德里希·默茨勾勒出了一个在超级大国霸凌行为日益主导的世界中欧洲的新愿景。

His idea is roughly this: Europe should cut its dependence on China and the United States to avoid being pushed around on the global stage — but it should not cut them off entirely.

他的核心主张大致如下：欧洲应减少对中美两国的依赖，避免在全球舞台上受制于人——但不应完全切断与中国和美国的联系。

This week, Mr. Merz will road-test that idea on a trip to Beijing and Hangzhou, China. It will be his first visit to the country since he became chancellor last year, challenging his ability to address tensions between Berlin and Beijing — on trade, Taiwan, Ukraine and a host of other issues — without further inflaming them.

本周，默茨将前往中国北京和杭州，对这一想法进行实地考察。这是他去年就任总理后首次访华，将考验他能否应对柏林与北京之间在贸易、台湾、乌克兰等诸多议题上的紧张关系，同时避免进一步激化矛盾。

German officials suggest Mr. Merz will seek to minimize conflict with China’s top leader, Xi Jinping. But they also say he will push Mr. Xi on sore spots in the countries’ relationship, including Chinese economic policies that hurt German manufacturers and Beijing’s backing for President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia four years after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

德国官员透露，默茨将力求避免与中国最高领导人习近平发生冲突。但他们同时表示，默茨将就两国关系中的敏感议题向习近平施压，包括损害德国制造商利益的中国经济政策，以及在俄罗斯全面入侵乌克兰四年后北京仍支持俄罗斯总统普京等问题。

Mr. Merz is expected to stress that Germany and Europe are strengthening their military defense capability and economic competitiveness — effectively, a vision for how Europe can build its own power to rival China and America.

默茨预计将强调德国和欧洲正在增强军事防御能力和经济竞争力——实质上是在阐述欧洲如何建立自身实力以与中美抗衡的愿景。

And while Mr. Merz will emphasize the need for improved ties with China, he has made clear that he still sees the United States as Germany’s more natural ally.

虽然默茨将强调改善与中国关系的必要性，但他已明确表示，相比之下美国仍是德国更天然的盟友。

At a conference of his center-right Christian Democrats last weekend, the chancellor said China was “claiming the right to define a new multilateral order according to its own rules. Freedom of expression, freedom of religion and freedom of the press are not part of this understanding.”

在上周末举行的中右翼政党基督教民主党会议上，这位德国总理说，中国“声称有权按照自己的规则定义新的多边秩序。表达自由、宗教自由和新闻自由都不在这一范畴之列”。

Given that, Mr. Merz added, “wouldn’t it be right that we Europeans, together with the Americans, have something better to offer in response to our shared understanding of freedom, indeed our shared image of humanity?”

有鉴于此，默茨补充说，“我们欧洲人和美国人一起，难道不应该提供一些更好的东西，来呼应我们对自由的共同理解，乃至我们对人类共同形象的理解？”

The chancellor’s trip will be the fifth to China by the leader of a U.S. ally since December. Chinese officials appear eager to cast the visit as yet another important country turning toward Beijing for stability amid the uncertainty unleashed by President Trump. His administration has disrupted global trade with a flurry of tariffs, while pulling back on America’s longstanding security guarantees for Europe.

这是自12月以来第五位美国盟国领导人访华。中国官员似乎急于将此次访问描绘成又一个重要国家在特朗普总统带来的不确定性中转向北京寻求稳定。特朗普政府通过一系列关税措施扰乱了全球贸易，同时收回了美国对欧洲的长期安全保证。

2022年，梅赛德斯-奔驰在中国的生产线。尽管面临中国竞争对手日益增长的威胁，默茨仍将中国视为德国工业的关键市场。

In seeking closer ties with Germany, the world’s third-largest economy and the industrial heart of Europe, Mr. Xi is attempting to further splinter the United States from its historical allies. Mr. Xi has already reset ties with Canada and Britain during their leaders’ visits to Beijing this year.

在寻求与德国——世界第三大经济体和欧洲的工业中心——建立更密切的关系时，习近平正试图进一步分裂美国与其历史盟友的关系。在加拿大和英国领导人今年访问北京期间，习近平与这两个国家重新建立了纽带。

China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, recently signaled at the Munich Security Conference that Beijing wanted to draw Berlin closer, and called on the two countries to upgrade bilateral ties to a “new level.” Mr. Wang also said China supported Berlin’s “strategic autonomy,” which Beijing understands to mean the weakening of American influence over Germany.

中国最高外交官员王毅近日在慕尼黑安全会议上表示，北京希望拉近与柏林的关系，并呼吁两国将双边关系“迈上新水平”。王毅还表示中国支持柏林的“战略自主”，北京将其理解为削弱美国对德国的影响力。

“The aim of China’s leadership is quite simple,” said Noah Barkin, an expert on European-Chinese relations at Rhodium Group, a research firm. “It wants to present itself as a guarantor of stability in a world rocked by U.S. unilateralism and aggression. The sequence of European visits are meant to underline this message and reinforce a narrative of trans-Atlantic division.”

“中国领导层的目标很简单，”研究机构荣鼎咨询的欧中关系专家诺亚·巴尔金表示，“在一个被美国单边主义和侵略所震撼的世界中，中国希望将自己塑造成一个稳定的保障者。一连串的欧洲领导人访问旨在强调这一信息，并强化跨大西洋关系的分裂叙事。”

But there is still plenty of division between Germany and China, particularly on economic issues. After decades of courtship by German industry and chancellors, including Angela Merkel, the country’s former leader and Mr. Merz’s longtime intraparty rival, China was Germany’s top trading partner last year.

但德中之间仍存在诸多分歧，尤其在经济领域。经过德国工业界及历任总理（包括默茨在党内的老对手、前总理默克尔）数十年的拉拢，中国去年已成为德国最大贸易伙伴。

Mr. Merz still sees China as a crucial export market and an incubator of innovation for German companies with significant operations there. He will visit two of those companies’ operations — Mercedes-Benz and Siemens, as well as China’s Unitree Robotics — on his trip, along with a delegation of 30 German business leaders.

默茨依然视中国为德国企业的关键出口市场和创新孵化器，这些企业在华业务规模可观。他此行将率领30位德国商界领袖组成的代表团，并将考察梅赛德斯-奔驰和西门子两家企业，以及中国的宇树科技。

But he appears more candid than Ms. Merkel was a decade ago about the need to protect German industry from Chinese competition, and he is already eyeing alternative sources of consumer demand for German products. Notably, Mr. Merz visited India before he visited China as chancellor.

但他似乎比十年前的默克尔更加坦率地表示，需要保护德国工业免受中国竞争的冲击，并已着手开拓德国产品的替代消费市场。值得注意的是，默茨在以总理身份访华之前，先访问了印度。

In Beijing, Mr. Merz is expected to raise concerns with Chinese officials over their subsidies for domestic manufacturing and the artificially low value of its currency, the renminbi. Both are being used to help China flood European markets with low-cost products that Mr. Barkin estimates are contributing to the loss of nearly 10,000 German industrial jobs a month.

在北京，预计默茨将向中国官员提出的关切包括中国对国内制造业的补贴，以及人为压低人民币币值问题。这两项措施都在助推中国向欧洲市场倾销低价产品，据巴尔金估计，这导致德国每月损失近万工业就业机会。

Officials from both sides have expressed hope that the discussions could yield modest agreements, perhaps in opening some trade in agriculture. But many analysts say Mr. Merz’s primary goal should be striking a new tone with Mr. Xi.

双方官员都表示希望讨论能达成一些小的协议，例如在农产品贸易领域实现部分开放。但许多分析人士表示，默茨的首要目标应该是与习近平达成新的对话基调。

“There is very little to be secured from the Chinese side right now,” said Thorsten Benner, co-founder and director of the Global Public Policy Institute, a Berlin-based think tank. “The most important thing is that he sends a clear message about defending Germany’s economic interests.”

柏林智库全球公共政策研究所联合创始人兼所长托尔斯滕·本纳表示：“目前中方能提供的保障寥寥无几。最重要的是，他要发出明确信号，表明将捍卫德国的经济利益。”

Beijing has urged Mr. Merz to further open Germany’s and Europe’s market to Chinese exports. That includes for Chinese electric vehicles, which pose a direct threat to Germany’s legacy auto industry.

北京敦促默茨进一步向中国出口产品开放德国及欧洲市场，包括对德国传统汽车工业构成直接威胁的中国电动汽车。

Mr. Xi has some leverage in the discussions. Germany’s 40 leading blue-chip companies rely on China for more than 10 percent of their revenues, according to research from Deutsche Bank. Many German manufacturers would grind to a halt without vital Chinese industrial inputs like rare earth minerals. Mr. Xi has already demonstrated he is willing to throttle supplies when Chinese interests are threatened.

习近平在讨论中有一定的筹码。据德意志银行研究，德国40家蓝筹企业逾10%营收依赖中国市场。若失去稀土等关键工业原料供应，众多德国制造商将陷入停滞。习近平已表明，当中国利益受损时，他会毫不犹豫地实施供应限制。

Chinese officials are likely to push Mr. Merz to support Beijing’s claim to the self-governed island of Taiwan. Germany does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country, but it maintains diplomatic relations with the territory. China rebuked Germany’s foreign minister, Johann Wadephul, last year after he criticized Beijing for its “increasingly aggressive behavior” in the Taiwan Strait.

中方官员可能敦促默茨支持北京对自治岛屿台湾的主权主张。德国虽不承认台湾主权国家地位，但与该地区保持外交关系。去年德国外交部长瓦德普尔批评北京在台湾海峡采取“日益咄咄逼人的行为”，后遭到中方斥责。

Mr. Merz, in turn, is likely to push Mr. Xi to pressure Mr. Putin to end the war in Ukraine, though in careful language. Mr. Merz sometimes says there are three men who could force the war to an immediate end: Mr. Putin, Mr. Xi and Mr. Trump.

反过来，默茨也可能推动习近平向普京施压，迫使普京结束乌克兰战争，尽管默茨的措辞会很谨慎。默茨曾说，有三个人可以迫使战争立即结束：普京、习近平和特朗普。

The chancellor will see two of the three in the span of a week. A few days after returning to Berlin from China, he is scheduled to fly to Washington to visit Mr. Trump.

这位总理将在一周内见到这三个人中的两个。从中国返回柏林几天后，他将飞往华盛顿拜访特朗普。

Federal officials have for years tried to wean Silicon Valley from its dependence on Taiwan, an island democracy roughly the size of Maryland that makes 90 percent of the world’s high-end computer chips.

多年来，联邦政府一直试图让硅谷摆脱对台湾的依赖。这个面积与马里兰州大致相当的民主岛屿制造了全球90%的高端计算机芯片。

In secret briefings held in Washington and Silicon Valley, national security officials warned executives from companies like Apple, Advanced Micro Devices and Qualcomm that China was making plans to retake Taiwan, which Beijing has long considered a breakaway territory. A Chinese blockade of Taiwan, the officials said, could choke the supply of computer chips made on the island and bring the U.S. tech industry to its knees.

在华盛顿和硅谷举行的多次秘密简报会上，国家安全官员警告苹果、AMD、高通等公司的高管，中国正计划收复台湾——北京长期以来一直视台湾为其分离出去的领土。官员们表示，中国对台湾的封锁可能会切断该岛制造的计算机芯片供应，从而使美国科技业陷入困境。

Two presidents have tried persuading the industry to change. President Joseph R. Biden Jr. offered financial grants worth billions to improve the domestic production of chips. After that didn’t work, President Trump threatened billions in tariffs to essentially accomplish the same thing.

两任总统试图说服该行业做出改变。拜登总统提供数十亿美元的财政补贴，以提升美国国内的芯片生产能力。在这一努力未能奏效之后，特朗普总统又威胁征收数十亿美元的关税，实质上也是为了实现同样的目标。

But warnings, gifts and threats have made little difference. The U.S. tech industry has stubbornly refused to shift where it gets most of its chips, which power things like smartphones, laptops and the giant data centers that run artificial intelligence.

但警告、补贴还是威胁都收效甚微。美国科技行业依然固执地拒绝改变其大部分芯片的来源地，这些芯片是驱动智能手机、笔记本电脑以及运行人工智能的大型数据中心等设备的关键部件。

Now, there is increasing concern that inaction by some of Silicon Valley’s most important companies risks destabilizing the global economy. Those worries, drawn into focus by recent live-fire drills conducted by the Chinese military in waters surrounding Taiwan, have prompted dire warnings from White House officials.

如今，人们越来越担心，硅谷一些最重要公司的无所作为可能会破坏全球经济的稳定。中国军队近期在台湾周边海域进行的实弹演习更加凸显出这些担忧，并促使白宫官员发出了严厉警告。

“The single biggest threat to the world economy, the single biggest point of single failure, is that 97 percent of the high-end chips are made in Taiwan,” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said last month at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, slightly overstating industry estimates. “If that island were blockaded, that capacity were destroyed, it would be an economic apocalypse.”

美国财长斯科特·贝森特上个月在瑞士达沃斯举行的世界经济论坛上表示：“对世界经济最大的单一威胁、最大的单点失效风险在于，97%的高端芯片是在台湾生产的。”他的这一说法略高于行业估计。“如果这个岛屿遭到封锁，生产能力被摧毁，那将是一场经济末日。”

经过数十年的投资，台湾成为了世界半导体产业的中心。

If Taiwan is lost, the tech industry won’t be able to say it wasn’t warned. A New York Times investigation found that executives were so focused on winning in their hypercompetitive markets and maintaining big profit margins that facing up to the Taiwan problem was an afterthought. And now it will be years before the steps some companies are finally taking make a difference.

如果台湾失守，科技行业并不能说自己没有得到过警告。《纽约时报》的一项调查发现，高管们过于专注于在高度竞争的市场中取胜并维持高利润率，以至于将正视台湾问题置于次要位置。如今一些公司终于开始采取行动，但这些措施要见到成效还需数年时间。

A confidential report commissioned in 2022 by the Semiconductor Industry Association for its members, which include the largest U.S. chip companies, said cutting the supply of chips from Taiwan would lead to the largest economic crisis since the Great Depression. U.S. economic output would plunge 11 percent, twice as much as the 2008 recession. The collapse would be even more severe for China, which would experience a 16 percent decline.

2022年，半导体工业协会受委托为其成员（包括美国最大的芯片公司）撰写的一份机密报告称，如果来自台湾的芯片供应被切断，将引发自大萧条以来最严重的经济危机。美国经济产出将暴跌11%，相当于2008年金融危机跌幅的两倍。对中国来说，冲击将更加严重，经济将萎缩16%。

Many of the biggest U.S. tech companies would have enough semiconductors to operate for several months before their businesses broke down, according to the report, which was reviewed by The Times and has not been previously reported.

根据报告，在业务中断之前，许多美国大型科技公司的半导体库存仅够维持数月运营。《纽约时报》获得了这份此前未见相关报道的报告。 

The report, which was written at the encouragement of Biden administration officials, illustrated how Washington has been forced to reconsider its position on Taiwan. For decades, America’s commitment to the island was based on geopolitics, respect for democracy and containing China. It was viewed as a lopsided arrangement that was good for Taiwan and risky for the United States.

报告是在拜登政府官员的鼓励下撰写的，它表明了华盛顿如何被迫重新考虑对台湾问题的立场。几十年来，美国对该岛的承诺是基于地缘政治、对民主制度的尊重以及遏制中国的需要。这被视为一种不对称的安排，对台湾有利，对美国则充满风险。

But now, more than ever, it has become clear that Taiwan is critical to America’s economic survival, especially as artificial intelligence — which is built using chips made in Taiwan — drives the U.S. stock market and fuels economic growth.

但如今，比以往任何时候都更加明显的是，台湾对美国的经济生存至关重要，尤其是在人工智能推动美国股市上涨并带动经济增长的背景下，人工智能离不开台湾制造的芯片。

The Trump administration has been cleareyed about the risk. While some of Mr. Trump’s tariffs have appeared to be driven by impulse or retribution, he has persistently used the threat of tariffs on semiconductors to bully tech companies to buy more of their chips from U.S. factories.

特朗普政府对这一风险有着清醒的认识。虽然特朗普的一些关税举措看似出于冲动或报复，但他一直持续利用对半导体征收关税的威胁来逼迫科技公司从美国本土工厂采购更多芯片。

That arm-twisting recently led Nvidia, the world’s most valuable company, to commit to buying chips from new plants in Arizona being built by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation, a Taiwanese company that is the world’s dominant chip manufacturer.

这种施压最近促使全球市值最高的公司英伟达承诺，从台积电在亚利桑那州新建的工厂采购芯片。台积电是一家台湾公司，也是全球占主导地位的芯片制造商。

台积电正在扩建其位于菲尼克斯的制造工厂。

It was a step toward solving an intractable problem: New plants won’t be built in the United States unless companies agree to buy the chips produced in them, which would be more expensive and cut into profits. It has been a Catch-22 that federal intervention has struggled to solve.

这是朝着解决一个棘手难题迈出的一步：如果没有企业承诺购买在本土生产的芯片，美国就不会建设新的工厂；但购买本土芯片成本更高，会削减企业利润。这形成了联邦政府一直难以破解的“先有鸡还是先有蛋”的困局。

“Reshoring manufacturing that’s critical to our national and economic security is a top priority for President Trump, and the Trump administration is implementing a nuanced and multifaceted policy approach to deliver,” said Kush Desai, a White House spokesman.

白宫发言人库什·德赛表示：“将对国家安全和经济安全至关重要的制造业迁回美国，是特朗普总统的首要任务之一，特朗普政府正在实施一套细致入微、多管齐下的政策方法来实现这一目标。”

Other new commitments to U.S. chip making are trickling in. The United States is on track to spend $200 billion on semiconductor plants through 2030, enough to increase chip production capacity 50 percent, according to SEMI, a global chip industry association.

其他对美国芯片制造业的新投资承诺也正在陆续出现。根据全球芯片行业协会SEMI的数据，到2030年，美国将在半导体工厂上投入2000亿美元，足以将芯片产能提升50%。

But with Taiwan, China and other countries also pouring billions into semiconductor plants, the United States would still account for only 10 percent of the world’s semiconductor production in 2030 — much as it did in 2020 when the government stepped up its calls for change.

但随着台湾、中国和其他国家也在向半导体工厂投入巨资，到2030年，美国在全球半导体产量中的占比仍将只有约10%，这与2020年政府开始大力呼吁改变时的占比基本持平。

“The whole industry has to say, ‘We’re all going to do this,’” said Bill Wiseman, global co-leader of the semiconductor practice at McKinsey, the consulting firm. Instead, he said, executives think, “If we’re screwed, everyone else is screwed,’ so they don’t take action.”

“整个行业必须一致认为，‘我们都要这样做，’”咨询公司麦肯锡半导体业务全球联合负责人比尔·怀斯曼表示。但他指出，企业高管往往认为，“‘如果我们完蛋了，其他人也都会完蛋’，所以他们不会采取行动。”

The Countdown Begins

倒计时开始

In March 2021, Adm. Philip S. Davidson delivered a warning to the Senate Armed Services Committee about geopolitical conflict over Taiwan.

2021年3月，海军上将菲利普·戴维森就台湾问题可能引发的地缘政治冲突向参议院军事委员会发出警告。

“The threat is manifest during this decade,” said Admiral Davidson, who was the commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, which is responsible for the Asia-Pacific region. “In fact, in the next six years.”

“这种威胁在这个十年内就会显现，”戴维森表示，他当时是负责亚太地区事务的美国印太司令部司令。“实际上，就在未来六年内。”

It was the first time a senior U.S. military official had told Congress that the armed services believed President Xi Jinping of China wanted his army to be ready to take Taiwan by 2027, though many defense planners are skeptical such a move could happen that quickly.

这是美国军方高层首次向国会表示，军方认为中国国家主席习近平希望解放军在2027年前具备攻占台湾的能力，不过许多国防规划人员对这一行动是否会如此快地实现仍持怀疑态度。

Jake Sullivan, Mr. Biden’s national security adviser, ranked the U.S. reliance on Taiwan for semiconductors as one of America’s greatest vulnerabilities. He wanted the industry to recognize the risk and support construction of U.S. manufacturing plants. Mr. Biden also wanted to provide $50 billion in government subsidies to build semiconductor plants domestically.

拜登的国家安全顾问杰克·沙利文将美国在半导体方面对台湾的依赖列为美国最大的弱点之一。他希望业界能够认识到这一风险，并支持在美国本土建厂。拜登还希望提供500亿美元的政府补贴，用于在美国国内建设半导体工厂。

“We were saying: ‘This is crazy. We have to do something about it,’” Mr. Sullivan said in an interview.

“我们当时在说：‘这太疯狂了。我们必须采取行动，’”沙利文在接受采访时表示。

Change required uprooting a deeply entrenched business. Taiwan spent 50 years turning itself into the world’s semiconductor factory and becoming a leader in semiconductor research and development. It became a manufacturing hub for the chips in every iPhone and a third of the basic chips that power cars, tractors, cellphone towers and pacemakers.

要改变现状，就意味着要动摇一个根深蒂固的产业格局。台湾用了50年的时间把自己打造成为世界半导体工厂，并成为半导体研发领域的领导者。它已成为每一部iPhone所用芯片的制造中心，同时还生产了全球约三分之一用于汽车、拖拉机、通信基站和心脏起搏器等设备的基础芯片。

There were clear business reasons for the industry’s hesitation to shift from Taiwan. Chips made in the United States were more than 25 percent more expensive, industry executives said, because of higher material, labor and permitting costs. TSMC was widely considered better at building cutting-edge chips than American companies like Intel. And U.S. businesses were more focused on quarterly profits than geopolitical threats.

业界摆脱对台依赖的犹豫不决有其明确的商业原因。行业高管表示，由于材料、劳动力及审批成本更高，美国制造的芯片价格要高出25%以上。人们普遍认为，台积电在制造尖端芯片方面比英特尔等美国公司更胜一筹。而且，美国企业更关注财季利润，而非地缘政治威胁。

对台湾的封锁可能会切断台积电在该岛生产的电脑芯片的供应。

In the fall of 2021, the White House summoned top semiconductor executives to Washington for a classified briefing on Taiwan, said seven people familiar with the gathering.

据七名知情人士透露，2021年秋天，白宫召集主要半导体企业高管前往华盛顿，参加一场关于台湾问题的机密简报会。

Pat Gelsinger of Intel and other chief executives filed into a White House briefing room and listened as officials warned that a blockade or invasion could halt chip manufacturing.

英特尔的帕特·基辛格和其他首席执行官走进白宫的简报室，听取官员们警告：一旦发生封锁或入侵，芯片制造可能会陷入停顿。

The executives were skeptical. Media outlets had previously reported much of the information the government shared. They also questioned why Mr. Xi would take Taiwan, since it would damage China’s economy.

这些高管对此持怀疑态度。政府所提供的大部分信息此前已被媒体广泛报道。他们还质疑习近平为何要攻占台湾，因为这样做会损害中国的经济。

By February 2022, that argument had been undermined by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. During a White House call with executives about new rules limiting chip sales to Russia, Mr. Sullivan said Russia’s action showed countries would seize territory even if it harmed their economy.

到了2022年2月，这种观点被俄罗斯入侵乌克兰的行动削弱了。在白宫与企业高管讨论限制向俄罗斯出售芯片新规的一次电话会议中，沙利文表示，俄罗斯的行动表明，一些国家即使明知会损害本国经济，也仍然可能采取领土扩张行动。

“If you had doubts about autocrats taking on water for adventures, you may want to reconsider,” he said. He encouraged the industry to study its Taiwan risk.

“你真以为独裁者会因为担心受损失而不敢冒险吗，醒醒吧，”他说。他鼓励业界对面临的台湾风险做出评估。

After the call, the Semiconductor Industry Association hired McKinsey to take a look. They started with a basic question: What would happen if companies couldn’t get chips from the island?

那次电话会议后，美国半导体行业协会聘请麦肯锡进行调查。他们从一个基本问题开始：如果公司无法从该岛获得芯片，会怎么样？

A summary of the resulting report opened with a map of Taiwan detailing how integral the island is to the global economy. Taiwan enabled roughly $10 trillion of the world’s gross domestic product. It made chips for iPhones and more than half of so-called memory chips for cars, and it led in assembling A.I. chips.

最终报告的摘要以一张详尽的台湾地图开头，阐述了该岛对全球经济是多么不可或缺。台湾支撑着全球约10万亿美元的国内生产总值。它生产iPhone芯片，制造了超过一半的汽车存储芯片，并在人工智能芯片封装方面处于领先地位。

The island’s semiconductor manufacturing is mainly in Hsinchu, an area where Taiwan’s government discouraged manufacturing after World War II because it is next to the sloping beaches that are the best place for an amphibious assault against the island.

该岛的半导体制造业主要集中在新竹。二战后，台湾当局曾不鼓励在该地区发展制造业，因为它紧邻坡度平缓的海滩，那是发动两栖登陆的最佳地点。

If Taiwan’s factories were knocked offline, the impact would be immediate, the roughly 20-page report said. Economies would flounder. In China, the gross national product would fall by $2.8 trillion; in the United States, the drop would be $2.5 trillion.

这份约20页的报告称，如果台湾工厂停产，影响将是立竿见影的。各国经济将陷入困境。中国的国民生产总值将下降2.8万亿美元；美国的降幅将达到2.5万亿美元。

Other reports, including one by Bloomberg Economics, a research service, estimate a conflict would cost the global economy more than $10 trillion.

其他报告，包括研究服务机构彭博经济研究的一份报告，估计台海冲突将使全球经济损失超过10万亿美元。

Build It and Hope They Will Come

筑巢引凤

In August 2022, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo beamed on the White House South Lawn as Mr. Biden signed into law the CHIPS Act. It gave Ms. Raimondo $50 billion in subsidies for semiconductor investments and factories.

2022年8月，当拜登在白宫南草坪签署《芯片法案》使其成为法律时，商务部长吉娜·雷蒙多喜笑颜开。该法案给了雷蒙多500亿美元的补贴，用于半导体投资和工厂建设。

2022年，拜登总统在白宫南草坪签署《2022芯片与科学法案》。

But Ms. Raimondo still needed to persuade chip manufacturers to build plants, and persuade tech companies to have their chips built in them.

但雷蒙多仍需要说服芯片制造商建厂，同时争取科技公司将芯片生产订单交给这些新工厂。

The first part was easy. TSMC committed more than $50 billion to building a second and third plant in Arizona, two years after announcing its first facility during Mr. Trump’s first term. Intel promised to expand in Arizona and invest as much as $100 billion in an Ohio campus. Samsung pledged $45 billion for two factories in Taylor, Texas.

第一部分相对容易。在特朗普第一任期内宣布建立第一座工厂两年后，台积电承诺投入500多亿美元在亚利桑那州建设第二和第三座工厂。英特尔承诺扩大在亚利桑那州的业务，并向俄亥俄州的一个园区投资高达1000亿美元。三星则承诺投入450亿美元在得克萨斯州泰勒市建设两座工厂。

Ms. Raimondo said the plants would give the United States the capacity to produce a fifth of the world’s advanced semiconductors by 2030. But she needed tech companies to pay for U.S. chips.

雷蒙多表示，这些工厂将使美国在2030年前有能力生产全球五分之一的先进半导体。但她需要科技公司为美国制造的芯片埋单。

TSMC had commitments from Apple, Nvidia and others to buy enough chips to justify building three factories in Arizona. But the company hadn’t secured enough orders to build its planned complex, which would include three additional plants, said three people familiar with the plans. Customers were reluctant buy chips that cost more than 25 percent more and were a generation behind those made in Taiwan, where the government has an unofficial rule requiring TSMC to put its most cutting-edge technology on the island first.

台积电得到了苹果、英伟达等公司的承诺，购买足以支撑其在亚利桑那州建设三座工厂的芯片。但三位知情人士表示，该公司尚未获得足够的订单来建设其计划中的建筑群（包括另外三座工厂）。客户不愿购买价格高出25%以上且技术比台湾产品落后一代的芯片——在台湾，当局有一项非正式规定，要求台积电必须将最尖端的技术首先留在岛内。

Intel and Samsung, despite their pledges to expand production, didn’t have any commitments. Their technology had fallen behind TSMC’s, and the industry doubted they could catch up.

英特尔和三星承诺扩大生产，但它们还没有得到任何订单承诺。它们的技术已经落后于台积电，业界怀疑它们能否追赶上来。

Ms. Raimondo and her staff struggled to persuade companies to buy chips from Intel or Samsung. Without those plants, the U.S. share of global chip production would drop short of the administration’s goal of as much as 20 percent of global capacity by 2030.

雷蒙多及其幕僚在说服公司从英特尔或三星购买芯片方面陷入苦战。如果没有这些工厂，美国在全球芯片生产中的份额将无法达到政府设定的2030年占比20%的目标。

Frustrated, Ms. Raimondo asked William J. Burns, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Avril Haines, the director of national intelligence, to give a classified briefing with the latest intelligence about China and Taiwan, said five people familiar with the briefing, which has not been reported.

五位知情人士说，面对这些困难，雷蒙多请求中央情报局局长威廉·伯恩斯和国家情报总监埃夫丽尔·海恩斯就中国和台湾的最新情报进行了机密简报，此事此前未见报道。

In July 2023, three prominent chief executives, Tim Cook of Apple, Jensen Huang of Nvidia and Lisa Su of Advanced Micro Devices, entered a secure briefing room in Silicon Valley. Cristiano Amon, the chief executive of Qualcomm, joined by video. They listened as Mr. Burns and Ms. Haines said China’s military spending could mean a move on Taiwan in 2027.

2023年7月，三位显赫的首席执行官——苹果的蒂姆·库克、英伟达的黄仁勋和AMD的苏姿丰走进硅谷的一个安全简报室。高通首席执行官克里斯蒂亚诺·安蒙通过视频参加。他们听取了伯恩斯和海恩斯的简报，称中国的军事开支意味着其可能在2027年对台湾采取行动。

Afterward, Mr. Cook told officials that he slept “with one eye open.”

会后，库克告诉官员们，他现在睡觉都“睁着一只眼”。

But the companies still didn’t place significant new orders for U.S. chips, six people close to the industry said. Their lack of interest meant Intel and Samsung couldn’t fulfill their CHIPS Act contracts, which required them to have customers. The government reduced Intel’s and Samsung’s grants by a combined $2.3 billion.

但据六位熟悉该行业的人士称，这些公司仍然没有发出美国芯片大订单。由于缺乏兴趣，英特尔和三星无法履行《芯片法案》的合同，因为合同要求它们必须拥有客户。政府随后将英特尔和三星的拨款总额削减了23亿美元。

2022年，拜登在台积电位于菲尼克斯的工厂。台积电已获得苹果、英伟达等公司的承诺，将购买足够数量的芯片，以支撑其在亚利桑那州建造两座工厂的计划。

The setback came as Intel, the last U.S. manufacturer of leading-edge chips, grappled with falling sales and profits. In December 2024, Mr. Gelsinger, its chief executive, was forced out.

这一挫折发生时，作为美国最后一家领先芯片制造商的英特尔正面临销量和利润下滑的局面。2024年12月，首席执行官基辛格被迫辞职。

Worried about Intel’s future, Ms. Raimondo sent Intel and TSMC a letter before she left office saying the U.S. government would support their working together, which might help Intel survive, two people familiar with the letter said.

据两位知情人士透露，出于对英特尔未来的担忧，雷蒙多在离职前致信英特尔和台积电，表示美国政府将支持双方合作，这可能有助于英特尔生存。

Then she warned her successor, Howard Lutnick: Intel needed help.

随后她警告她的继任者霍华德·卢特尼克：英特尔需要帮助。

Too Reliant on Taiwan

过度依赖台湾

In Washington’s Foxhall neighborhood along the Potomac River, Mr. Lutnick, a former Wall Street bond broker, welcomed Mr. Trump’s decision to name him commerce secretary in November 2024 by buying a $25 million French-style estate.

在华盛顿波托马克河畔的福克斯霍尔社区，前华尔街债券经纪人卢特尼克买下了一座价值2500万美元的法式庄园，以此庆祝特朗普在2024年11月任命他为商务部长的决定。

Two months later, he received Intel’s leadership team there. The group, which included Frank Yeary, the company chairman, and David Zinsner, its finance chief, wanted help with their ailing business, three people familiar with the meeting said.

两个月后，他在这座庄园接待了英特尔高管团队。据三位知情人士透露，英特尔董事长弗兰克·亚里和首席财务官戴维·津斯纳等人希望为陷入困境的公司寻求帮助。

The tech industry’s reluctance to buy more U.S.-made chips was shaping up to be one of Mr. Lutnick’s biggest challenges. He would have to persuade chip makers and customers to spend more.

科技行业不愿更多采购美国本土芯片即将成为卢特尼克面临的最大挑战之一。他必须说服芯片制造商和客户加大投入。

The Intel team said it hoped to separate the company’s manufacturing operations from its business designing and selling chips. But Intel needed $50 billion to $70 billion and suggested the federal government provide about $25 billion, perhaps through a loan. The remainder would come from tech and finance companies.

英特尔团队表示，希望将公司的制造业务与芯片设计和销售业务分拆。但英特尔需要500亿至700亿美元资金，并提议由联邦政府提供约250亿美元，可能以贷款形式提供，剩余部分由科技和金融企业出资。

英特尔在亚利桑那州奥科蒂洛的工厂。去年8月，英特尔决定将公司业务10%的股份出售给美国政府。

Mr. Lutnick turned that idea into a bargaining chip with other companies.

卢特尼克将这一想法变成了与其他公司谈判的筹码。

Late that month, he met TSMC’s chief executive, C.C. Wei, in the office of his New York financial firm, Cantor Fitzgerald, two people with knowledge of the meeting said. Mr. Lutnick gave Mr. Wei a choice: TSMC could invest in Intel and operate Intel’s chip factories, or it could build more TSMC plants in the United States.

据两位知情人士称，当月晚些时候，他在自己位于纽约的金融公司坎托·菲茨杰拉德的办公室会见了台积电首席执行官魏哲家。卢特尼克给了魏哲家两个选择：台积电可以投资英特尔并运营其芯片工厂，或者在美国增建台积电工厂。

Getting TSMC to increase its U.S. production was essential. While Nvidia had become the world’s most valuable company because of its A.I. chips, it does not make those chips. That work is done by TSMC, mostly in its Taiwanese plants.

促成台积电扩大在美生产至关重要。尽管英伟达凭人工智能芯片成为全球市值最高的公司，但它并不生产这些芯片，这项工作主要由台积电在台湾的工厂完成。

Mr. Lutnick’s proposal occurred as Mr. Trump welcomed Mr. Huang of Nvidia to the White House for the first time. In an Oval Office meeting, the president told Mr. Huang that he planned to put tariffs on semiconductors because making them in Taiwan was risky, two people familiar with the meeting said.

卢特尼克提出这一方案之际，特朗普首次在白宫接待了英伟达创始人黄仁勋。据两位知情人士透露，在椭圆形办公室的会议上，特朗普告诉黄仁勋自己计划对半导体征收关税，因为在台湾生产芯片存在风险。

Mr. Trump told Mr. Huang that when he spoke with Mr. Xi about the island, China’s leader would breathe heavily, said one of these people who was briefed on the conversation. The president didn’t like it. He urged Mr. Huang to make chips in America.

据其中一位听取了谈话内容的人士称，特朗普告诉黄仁勋，当他与中国领导人谈及台湾时，对方的呼吸会变得急促起来。总统觉得不妙，并敦促黄仁勋在美国本土生产芯片。

Mr. Wei and Mr. Huang, who are close, spoke with each other about their companies’ dilemmas, two people familiar with their conversations said. For Mr. Wei, Intel’s operations would be burdensome. For Mr. Huang, tariffs would hurt profits. They agreed the solution was for Nvidia to buy more chips made in Arizona, which would let TSMC build additional plants.

据两位知情人士称，关系密切的魏哲家和黄仁勋曾就各自公司的困境进行沟通。对魏哲家而言，英特尔的业务将构成沉重负担；对黄仁勋来说，关税会损害利润。两人达成共识：解决方案是英伟达采购更多亚利桑那州生产的芯片，这样台积电就能扩建新厂。

TSMC and Nvidia declined to comment.

台积电和英伟达均拒绝置评。

Within a few weeks, Mr. Wei told Mr. Lutnick that TSMC would increase its U.S. investment by $100 billion and build four additional chip factories by 2028, two years ahead of its plans.

几周内，魏哲家告知卢特尼克，台积电将在美国增投1000亿美元，并在2028年前新建四座芯片工厂，比原计划提前两年。

‘Horrible, Horrible Thing’

“糟糕透顶的法案”

With TSMC’s commitment in hand, Mr. Trump turned up the pressure on the semiconductor industry.

获得台积电的承诺后，特朗普加大了对半导体行业的施压。

He called the CHIPS Act “a horrible, horrible thing” in his State of the Union address last year and urged Congress to get rid of it. He wanted to replace subsidies with tariffs that could penalize the tech companies. It was a reversal of Mr. Biden’s approach, and the start of major market interventions.

他在去年的国情咨文中称《芯片与科学法案》是“糟糕透顶的法案”，并敦促国会废除该法案。他希望用关税取代补贴，以此惩罚科技企业。这与拜登政府的做法完全相反，也标志着美国开始大规模干预市场。

In April, Mr. Trump announced tariffs for every country. The rate for Taiwan was 32 percent. The administration said it would exclude semiconductors, which would have tariff rates set separately.

4月，特朗普宣布对所有国家征收关税，对台湾的税率为32%。政府表示，半导体将获得豁免，关税税率另行设定。

Soon after, Taiwanese officials visited Washington to find out how to reduce their tariff rate, said a former U.S. official who later met with the group. Mr. Lutnick suggested that Taiwan encourage TSMC to further increase its U.S. investments or operate Intel’s plants.

一位后来与台湾代表团会晤的前美国官员透露，不久后，台湾官员到访华盛顿，试图寻求降低关税的办法。卢特尼克建议台湾鼓励台积电进一步扩大在美投资，或运营英特尔工厂。

The request showed Mr. Lutnick wasn’t satisfied with TSMC’s $100 billion commitment in Arizona. He intended to squeeze the company for additional concessions.

这一要求表明，卢特尼克并不满足于台积电在亚利桑那州1000亿美元的投资承诺，他打算逼迫该公司做出更多让步。

The Taiwanese group balked because TSMC is a private company. But when Mr. Lutnick persisted, Taiwanese officials met with TSMC executives and asked the company to help, two people familiar with the conversations said.

台湾代表团起初表示反对，因为台积电是私营企业。但据两位知情人士称，在卢特尼克的坚持下，台湾官员与台积电高管会面，请求该公司协助。

TSMC was open to investing more. But it wanted nothing to do with Intel.

台积电愿意追加投资，但不愿与英特尔有任何关联。

By last summer, the Trump administration decided to directly intervene in the chip market.

去年夏天，特朗普政府决定直接干预芯片市场。

Intel’s problems provided an opening. In July, it reported a $2.9 billion loss. Then, the U.S. government said the company’s new chief executive, Lip-Bu Tan, had previously led a company that illegally sold chip technology to a Chinese university with military ties.

英特尔的困境提供了契机。7月，英特尔公布亏损29亿美元。随后，美国政府称，该公司新任首席执行官陈立武此前领导的公司曾向一家向有军方背景的中国大学非法出售芯片技术。

The next month, Mr. Trump demanded Mr. Tan’s resignation on social media, saying Mr. Tan was “highly CONFLICTED.” He then turned the attack into a negotiating tool.

次月，特朗普在社交媒体上要求陈立武辞职，称其存在“严重利益冲突”，并将这次攻击变成了谈判筹码。

Mr. Trump met with Mr. Tan days later and suggested that Intel give the United States 10 percent of Intel’s business. The chief executive agreed to the unorthodox request, even though some argued it was on shaky legal ground. Intel gave the government equity in exchange for the $8.9 billion it had been promised from the CHIPS Act.

几天后，特朗普与陈立武会面，提议英特尔将10%的业务交给美国政府。这位首席执行官同意了这一非常规要求，尽管有人认为此举法律依据不足。英特尔向政府出让股权，以换取《芯片法案》承诺的89亿美元资金。

The deal helped Intel secure its federal subsidies, without having to meet financial benchmarks to qualify for the money.

这笔交易帮助英特尔获得了联邦补贴，无需达到财务指标即可申领。

Intel’s business predicament looked worse after Samsung signed a deal in July to manufacture chips in Taylor, Texas, for Tesla, the plant’s first customer. Elon Musk, Tesla’s chief executive, had pursued the deal after leaving the Trump administration because he was concerned about a potential attack on Taiwan, three people familiar with the deal said.

7月，三星与特斯拉达成协议，在得克萨斯州泰勒市为特斯拉生产芯片，特斯拉成为该工厂的首个客户。此举令英特尔的经营困境雪上加霜。三位知情人士称，特斯拉首席执行官埃隆·马斯克在离开特朗普政府后推动了这笔交易，因为他担心台湾可能遭受攻击。

“People maybe are underweighting some of the geopolitical risks that are going to be a major factor in a few years,” Mr. Musk later said in a call with Wall Street analysts.

马斯克后来在与华尔街分析师的电话会议中表示：“人们可能低估了未来几年将成为主要因素的一些地缘政治风险。”

After the Trump administration’s investment, Intel began making headway. Nvidia invested $5 billion in Intel and agreed to team up on A.I. chips. Apple began holding all-day engineering meetings with Intel to evaluate its manufacturing, three people familiar with the discussions said.

在特朗普政府注资后，英特尔开始取得进展。英伟达向英特尔投资50亿美元，并同意在人工智能芯片领域展开合作。据三位知情人士透露，苹果开始与英特尔举行全天工程会议，评估其制造能力。

Sophie Metzger, an Intel spokeswoman, said the company had been “encouraged by early feedback” from potential customers and shared the Trump administration’s goal to have “a leading American semiconductor manufacturer.”

英特尔发言人索菲·梅茨格表示，公司对潜在客户的“初步反馈感到鼓舞”，并认同特朗普政府打造“美国领先半导体制造商”的目标。

Last summer, Mr. Cook visited the Oval Office and promised to invest another $100 billion in the United States, which would support TSMC and other chip manufacturers. Ms. Su of Advanced Micro Devices and Mr. Amon of Qualcomm also promised to manufacture more chips in America.

去年夏天，库克到访椭圆形办公室，承诺再向美国投资1000亿美元，用于支持台积电等芯片制造商。AMD的苏姿丰和高通的安蒙也承诺在美国扩大芯片生产。

Mr. Lutnick is eager for more deals. His goal is to have 40 percent of Taiwan’s semiconductor manufacturing in the United States.

卢特尼克渴望达成更多交易，他的目标是将台湾40%的半导体产能转移到美国。

In September, he arrived at the Hay-Adams Hotel in Washington with a plan to persuade companies to give U.S. chip factories more business.

9月，他带着一项计划来到华盛顿的海–亚当斯酒店，试图说服企业把更多订单交给美国芯片工厂。

He told top chip executives, who had gathered for a Semiconductor Industry Association meeting, that the administration wanted them to buy 50 percent of their semiconductors from American plants, four people who attended said. Companies that didn’t would pay a 100 percent tariff.

据四位与会人士称，他在半导体行业协会会议上向芯片企业高管表示，政府要求他们从美国工厂采购50%的半导体，不遵守的企业将被征收100%关税。

Afterward, Mr. Lutnick used those same tariff threats to squeeze Taiwan and TSMC for more investments. He struck a deal to let Taiwanese chip companies avoid some U.S. tariffs, provided the companies planned to produce in the United States.

会后，卢特尼克再次以关税威胁向台湾和台积电施压，要求其追加投资。他达成协议：允许台湾芯片企业免除部分美国关税，前提是这些企业计划在美国本土生产。

TSMC agreed to buy land in Phoenix for at least five more plants, roughly doubling its Arizona plants, as part of a commitment by Taiwanese semiconductor and tech companies to invest an additional $150 billion in the United States. And Taiwan committed to $250 billion in credit guarantees to help move semiconductor and technology manufacturing to America.

台积电同意在菲尼克斯至少再购置五座工厂的用地，使其在亚利桑那州的工厂数量大致翻倍。这是台湾半导体和科技企业向美国再追加1500亿美元投资承诺的一部分。台湾还承诺提供2500亿美元的信贷担保，助力半导体和科技制造业迁往美国。

“We are unquestionably in a better position now than we were a few years ago, but this was never going to be solved overnight given the time it takes to get new chip manufacturing facilities up and running,” said John Neuffer, chief executive of the Semiconductor Industry Association.

半导体行业协会首席执行官约翰·诺伊弗表示：“与几年前相比，我们的处境无疑已有所改善。但考虑到新建芯片工厂所需的时间，这绝不可能一蹴而就。”

去年10月，英伟达首席执行官黄仁勋在台积电菲尼克斯工厂发表演讲后，为台积电工人签名。此次活动是为了发布美国制造的首个人工智能芯片晶圆。

In October, Mr. Huang flew to Phoenix to visit TSMC’s factory, which had made Nvidia’s first A.I. chip in the United States. He called it a “historic moment” and a major step for U.S. manufacturing.

10月，黄仁勋飞往菲尼克斯参观台积电工厂，该厂生产出了英伟达在美国本土制造的首款人工智能芯片。他称这是一个“历史性时刻”，也是美国制造业的重要一步。

Mr. Huang didn’t mention that the chip wasn’t finished. To become a leading A.I. chip, it needed to be connected with other chips. The process, known as packaging, requires shipping the American-made chip to a factory in Taiwan.

黄仁勋没有提及的是，这款芯片并未完成最终制造。要成为顶级人工智能芯片，它还需要与其他芯片进行连接，而这一被称为封装的工序，需要将美国制造的芯片运往台湾的工厂完成。

Chancellor Friedrich Merz of Germany arrived in China on Wednesday with an outstretched hand and a list of complaints for his hosts, asking for closer diplomatic ties but also relief from economic policies that he said were impeding “fair competition.”

德国总理默茨周三抵达中国，他向东道主伸出橄榄枝，同时也列出了一系列不满，一方面呼吁深化外交关系，同时也要求中国调整他所称的阻碍“公平竞争”的经济政策。

Mr. Merz, who took pains before the trip to say he would not be “lecturing” Beijing, laid out his critiques in a speech at a meeting of the Advisory Council of German-Chinese Business, to an audience that included Premier Li Qiang, China’s second-highest ranking official.

默茨在出访前特意强调，不会对北京“说教”，但在中德经济顾问委员会座谈会上，他直面包括中国第二号人物、国务院总理李强在内的听众，阐述了批评意见。

The chancellor was more blunt and more specific in his criticism than other western leaders, including the prime ministers of Britain and Canada, who have recently trekked to Beijing to reset relations with China amid the turmoil caused by President Trump.

相较于近期因特朗普政府引发的动荡、纷纷访问北京试图重启对华关系的英国、加拿大等国领导人，默茨的批评更为直率、具体。

Mr. Merz called on China to reduce subsidies for its domestic manufacturers, to allow the value of its currency, the renminbi, to rise, and to ensure continued exports of raw materials, such as critical minerals — all of which would benefit German industry. Doing so, he said, would allow Germany and China to forge a tighter bond.

默茨呼吁中国减少对本国制造商的补贴、允许人民币升值、保障关键矿产等原材料的持续出口——这些举措均将惠及德国工业。他表示，这些举措将使得德中两国缔结更紧密的纽带。

“In view of the uncertainties caused by customs policy that we see around the world,” Mr. Merz said, addressing Mr. Li directly, “we can now set a different example in our bilateral relations, through the reliability and security of the economic relations between our two countries.”

“鉴于全球范围内关税政策带来的不确定性，”默茨直接对李强说道，“我们如今可以通过两国经济关系的可靠性与安全性，在双边关系中树立全新典范。”

Following a series of discussions with Mr. Li and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, the chancellor appeared pleased. He announced a Chinese pledge to order up to 120 new aircraft from the European aerospace giant Airbus, and said more deals could follow.

在与李强及中国国家主席习近平举行一系列会谈后，这位德国总理显得心情愉悦。他宣布，中方承诺向欧洲航空巨头空客订购多达120架新飞机，并表示后续可能还将达成更多协议。

“After today, I am very optimistic,” Mr. Merz said. “This is a good path for German-Chinese relations, both in the coming months and years.”

“今日之后，我十分乐观，”默茨称。“对德中关系来说，未来数月乃至数年，这都是一个好的发展路径。”

Mr. Merz’s approach in China bore similarities to his visit to Washington last year. There, he praised Mr. Trump and stressed the importance of Germany’s alliance with the United States, even as he pushed the president to bend toward Mr. Merz’s position on support for Ukraine and other issues.

默茨此次访华策略，与去年访美时的做法如出一辙。当时他既赞扬特朗普，强调德美同盟的重要性，同时也推动美国总统在支持乌克兰等议题上向自己的立场靠拢。

2025年，中国嘉兴的一家家具厂。默茨呼吁中国削减对国内制造商的补贴，称此举不公平地影响了竞争。

Mr. Xi, in his own remarks, offered sweeping language about the partnership and their shared destiny, while avoiding mentioning the specific trade frictions Mr. Merz and other German leaders have long raised.

在讲话中，习近平用宏大笼统的措辞谈及两国伙伴关系与共同命运，却未提及默茨及其他德国领导人长期以来提出的具体贸易摩擦问题。

“The more the world becomes chaotic and intertwined, the more China and Germany must strengthen their strategic communication and enhance strategic mutual trust,” Mr. Xi told Mr. Merz at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing.

“世界越是变乱交织，中德两国越要加强战略沟通、增进战略互信，”习近平在北京钓鱼台国宾馆对默茨表示。

Mr. Xi has been working to solidify ties with Washington’s closest partners at a time when many of them are feeling alienated by the Trump administration. Mr. Merz is the latest Western leader to visit Mr. Xi since December, following the president of France, and the prime ministers of Canada and Britain.

当前，美国诸多亲密伙伴因特朗普政府而感到与美国疏离，习近平正着力巩固与它们的关系。自去年12月以来，继法国总统、加拿大与英国首相之后，默茨是最新一位访华的西方领导人。

默茨与中国第二号人物李强总理周三在北京会晤。

Wednesday’s meeting took place as tensions between Europe and the United States are under growing pressure. European Union officials said on Monday that they would pause work on implementing their trade deal with the United States after the Supreme Court ruled last week that Mr. Trump’s tariffs were unlawful. Many of the levies agreed in that deal are higher than the 10 percent duties that the president has since imposed on global imports.

周三会谈举行之际，欧美关系正面临日益加剧的压力。欧盟官员周一表示，在美国最高法院上周裁定特朗普关税违法后，欧盟将暂停推进与美国的贸易协定落地。该协定中约定的多项关税，高于特朗普此后对全球进口商品征收的10%关税。

Mr. Trump will likely be watching to see how close Mr. Merz draws to Mr. Xi. Mr. Trump had warned that it was “dangerous” for Britain and Canada to look to China as the answer to their economic woes, after their prime ministers’ recent visits to Beijing

特朗普很可能会密切关注默茨与习近平的亲近程度。此前英加领导人访华后，特朗普曾警告，两国将中国视为解决经济困境的出路是“危险的”。

Mr. Merz was accompanied on his two-day visit by the heads of more than two dozen German companies, including Volkswagen, BMW and Siemens. He was to meet with executives at Mercedes-Benz in Beijing on Thursday before traveling south to the city of Hangzhou to visit the headquarters of a Chinese robotics firm, Unitree Robotics, and meet with the chairman of Siemens Energy in China.

默茨此次为期两天的访华行程，有大众、宝马、西门子等20余家德国企业负责人随行。周四，他将在北京与梅赛德斯-奔驰高管会面，随后南下杭州，参观中国机器人企业宇树科技的总部，并与西门子能源中国的董事长会谈。

Germany’s relations with China have become strained in recent years over complaints that Beijing was employing unfair practices that had contributed to a growing trade imbalance that has led to a flood of Chinese exports into Europe. In 2023, Germany defined China as a “partner, competitor and systemic rival,” and it has moved to reduce its dependency on Chinese goods and tightened export controls.

近年来，德中关系因北京被指采取不公平做法而趋于紧张，这些做法加剧了贸易失衡，导致中国商品大量涌入欧洲。2023年，德国将中国定义为“伙伴、竞争者与系统性对手”，并着手降低对华商品依赖、收紧出口管制。

Ties have also been tense because of Beijing’s support for Russia during the war in Ukraine.

此外，北京在俄乌冲突中对俄罗斯的支持，也令两国关系紧张。

Mr. Xi and Mr. Merz discussed the war, according to an official Chinese summary of their meeting, which referred to the conflict as a “crisis.” The exchange appeared to break little ground, according to the report of the discussion in Chinese state media, though Mr. Merz said afterward that he welcomed China’s “commitment to peace in the region.”

根据中方发布的会谈官方摘要，习近平与默茨就俄乌冲突展开讨论，中方将这场冲突称为“危机”。中国官媒的报道显示，此次交流似乎未取得实质性突破，但默茨事后表示，欢迎中国“对地区和平的承诺”。

Mr. Xi reiterated China’s longstanding position that the conflict should be resolved through “dialogue and negotiation” and that the “legitimate concerns of all parties” should be addressed — language that has frustrated European leaders because it avoids assigning blame to Russia and implicitly validates Moscow’s justifications for the full-scale invasion.

习近平重申了中方一贯立场，称冲突应通过“对话谈判”解决，兼顾“各方合理关切”——这一措辞令欧洲领导人不满，因其回避谴责俄罗斯，并默许了莫斯科全面入侵的借口。

Germany has hoped that China could use its influence over Russia to help work toward a peace agreement.

德国曾希望中国能利用对俄影响力，协助推动达成和平协议。

Mr. Merz also said on Wednesday that he told Mr. Xi that Germany opposed any effort by China to use military force against Taiwan.

默茨周三还表示，他已告知习近平，德国反对中国采用武力针对台湾。

Beijing is hoping to persuade Berlin to stop labeling China as a “systemic rival” and abandon its efforts to “de-risk,” or distance German businesses from China.

北京则希望说服柏林，停止将中国贴上“系统性对手”的标签，并放弃让德国企业与中国保持距离的“去风险”努力。

Chinese officials and state media have portrayed Mr. Merz’s visit as long overdue and a reset in ties that is beneficial for both countries. Beijing also needs Europe to keep its markets open to China’s exports, a major driver of growth in a Chinese economy hobbled by a yearslong property crisis.

中国官员和官方媒体将默茨的此次访问描述为一场迟来的、对两国都有益的双边关系重启。中国经济因持续多年的房地产危机陷入困境，出口是其增长的重要动力，北京也需要欧洲向中国出口产品保持市场开放。

2024年中国武汉某住宅地产开发项目。由于国内经济仍受房地产危机拖累，北京需要欧洲保持市场对中国出口产品的开放。

China is “concerned about trade protectionism, not only from Trump, but also from Europe, which may impose restrictions on Chinese products,” said Zhu Feng, a professor of international relations at Nanjing University.

南京大学国际关系教授朱锋表示：“中国担忧贸易保护主义，不仅来自特朗普，也来自可能对中国产品设限的欧洲。”

Yet China no longer presents the same opportunities to Germany that it once did. German firms have seen their profits in the country steadily erode as Chinese companies have gained market share. The same is happening globally for the likes of German carmakers, chemical producers and machinery manufacturers that are trying to compete with Chinese rivals, resulting in the loss of thousands of industrial jobs in Germany each month.

然而，如今的中国已不再能为德国提供昔日那样的机遇。随着中国企业抢占市场份额，德国企业在华利润持续缩水。德国车企、化工企业、机械制造商等在全球范围内与中国竞争对手竞争时也面临同样的局面，导致德国每月流失数以千计的工业岗位。

“China was a driver of German prosperity in past decades,” said Noah Barkin, an expert on European-Chinese relations at Rhodium Group, a research firm. “Now it represents the biggest external threat to Germany’s economic well-being.”

研究机构荣鼎集团的欧中关系专家诺亚·巴金称：“过去几十年，中国是德国繁荣的引擎。如今，它却成为德国经济福祉最大的外部威胁。”

Japan’s shopping districts, restaurants, temples and ski resorts would normally be teeming with Chinese tourists right now as they celebrate the Lunar New Year holiday.

日本的购物区、餐馆、寺庙和滑雪胜地这个时期通常会挤满过春节假期的中国游客。

Instead, in cities like Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto, business owners say visitors from China have been scarcer this year.

然而在东京、大阪和京都等城市，商家表示今年中国游客明显减少。

The Chinese government, drawing on falsehoods and exaggerations, is aggressively discouraging its citizens from visiting Japan as part of a campaign to punish Tokyo for its support for Taiwan, a self-governing democracy that Beijing considers part of its territory.

通过散布虚假信息和夸大其词，中国政府大力劝阻本国公民赴日旅游，以此惩罚东京支持台湾——这个自治的民主地区被北京视为领土一部分。

In recent government statements and state media commentaries, Beijing has portrayed Japan as a land where people live under the constant threat of earthquakes, crime, traffic accidents and attacks by bears — and where Chinese travelers, in particular, are targeted.

在近期政府声明及官方媒体评论中，北京将日本描绘成地震、犯罪、交通事故和熊袭击威胁常在的国度——尤其中国游客在那里成了袭击的目标。

“Chinese citizens face serious security threats in Japan,” China’s foreign ministry said ahead of this week’s Lunar New Year holiday, China’s peak travel season.

“中国公民在日本面临严重安全威胁，”中国外交部在中国旅游旺季春节假期前夕如此宣称。

Beijing’s strategy of undermining Japan’s image in China as one of the world’s safest travel destinations may be working. The number of Chinese travelers to Japan has sharply declined in recent months, falling 61 percent in January from a year earlier (though the data is somewhat skewed by the timing of the Lunar New Year, which began in January last year and in February this year). Arrivals had fallen 45 percent in December.

北京旨在削弱日本作为全球最安全旅游目的地形象的策略或许正在奏效。近几个月来，赴日中国游客数量急剧下滑，1月同比下降61%（尽管数据因农历新年时间差异存在偏差——去年春节在1月，今年则在2月）。12月入境游客量下降45%。

Here’s a look at Beijing’s claims.

下面是北京的说法。

Earthquakes

地震

China has repeatedly pointed to the frequency of earthquakes in Japan to deter travel there. In December, after a powerful earthquake in northern Japan, the Chinese foreign ministry said people should avoid the country because of the risk of a tsunami or a so-called mega quake.

中国多次以日本地震频发为由劝阻民众赴日旅行。去年12月，日本北部发生强烈地震后，中国外交部表示，由于存在海啸或所谓特大地震的风险，人们应避免前往日本。

Yes, Japan sits along the Pacific “Ring of Fire,” a chain of seismologically active faults encircling the Pacific Ocean, making it one of the world’s most earthquake-prone countries. But Japan is also a global leader in dealing with earthquakes, with early warning systems and strict construction standards.

日本的确位于太平洋“火环带”沿线，这条环绕太平洋的地震活跃断层使日本成为全球地震高发国之一。但日本在应对地震方面也处于全球领先地位，拥有地震早期预警系统和严格的建筑标准。

By seizing on earthquakes, analysts said, the Chinese government is attempting to signal that its central concern is safety — not politics. In these warnings, the government rarely mentions its fierce opposition to Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s stance that Japan could help defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion.

分析人士说，中国抓住地震问题不放，旨在发出信号，表明其关注的核心是安全而非政治。在这些警告中，中国政府很少提及对日本首相高市早苗若中国入侵可协助防卫台湾这一立场的强烈反对。

“A safety narrative feels more neutral and reversible, giving the Chinese government room to signal displeasure while keeping diplomatic flexibility,” said Xiao Qiang, a specialist in Chinese propaganda at the University of California, Berkeley.

加利福尼亚大学伯克利分校的中国宣传研究专家萧强说：“安全议题给人的感觉更中立、更可逆，它给了中国政府表达不满的空间，同时又保持了外交上的灵活余地。”

Targeting of Chinese Citizens

针对中国公民的袭击

China has argued that its citizens risk being targeted in Japan, tapping into a longstanding nationalist narrative rooted in the two countries’ bitter World War II history and Japan’s record of wartime atrocities.

中国指出其公民在日本有可能成为袭击目标，这植根于两国源于二战的惨痛历史，以及日本战时暴行记录的民族主义论调。

China has highlighted attacks on its citizens, including an incident reported by Japanese media this week in which a man attacked a Hong Kong resident on the head with a beer bottle in the northern city of Sapporo. China has also said, without providing specifics, that there have been cases of “unprovoked verbal abuse and physical assault” against its citizens in Japan.

中国多次强调本国公民遭遇袭击事件，其中包括日本媒体本周报道的一起事件：在日本北部城市札幌，一名男子用啤酒瓶袭击了一名香港居民的头部。中国还表示，在日本发生了针对中国公民的“无端辱骂殴打”事件，但未提供具体细节。

There is no evidence of a surge in crime or discrimination against Chinese citizens in Japan. In fact, the number of murders, robberies and arsons involving Chinese victims has declined over the past several years, according to official Japanese statistics.

没有证据表明在日本的中国公民受到的犯罪或歧视激增。事实上，根据日本官方统计，过去几年涉及中国受害者的谋杀、抢劫和纵火案数量有所下降。

China’s attempts to heighten a sense of prejudice might resonate domestically because of the emotions people still feel about World War II, said Kurt Tong, a managing partner at the Asia Group and former American diplomat.

亚洲集团管理合伙人、前美国外交官唐伟康(Kurt Tong)指出，中国试图强化偏见的做法可能在国内引发共鸣，因为民众对二战的记忆犹存。

“These emotional, interpersonal arguments could have more resonance with the Chinese public,” he said. “It plays into the nationalist idea that they’re being disrespected as a people.”

“这类诉诸情感的个人化论调更容易引起中国公众的共鸣，”他表示。“这迎合了他们作为一个民族不被尊重的民族主义思想。”

Crime, Accidents and Bears

犯罪、事故和熊

Japan has one of the lowest crime rates in the world. But you wouldn’t know that by reading Chinese media reports.

日本是世界上犯罪率最低的国家之一。但从中国媒体的报道中，你可能无从知晓这一点。

Beijing has seized on random incidents of violence in Japan as evidence of a broader safety problem, pointing, for example, to the stabbing of three teenagers this month in Osaka.

中国政府抓住日本偶然发生的暴力事件，将其作为更广泛的安全问题的证据，例如本月大阪三名青少年遭刺伤的案件。

“The security environment in some areas of Japan has been unstable, and similar vicious cases have been occurring frequently,” the Chinese consulate in Osaka said in a statement that warned citizens against traveling to Japan.

“日本部分地区治安环境不靖，类似恶性案件多发频发，”中国驻大阪领事馆在一份声明中说，该声明警告公民不要前往日本。

China has also suggested that Japan has a road safety problem, even though traffic fatalities are relatively low in the country.

中国还暗示日本存在道路安全问题，尽管该国的交通死亡事故相对较低。

Last month, the Chinese authorities highlighted an incident in which a car rammed into pedestrians along a street in Tokyo’s popular Shinjuku neighborhood. Beijing said that two Chinese nationals were seriously injured.

上个月，中国当局强调了东京著名的新宿街区发生的一起汽车冲撞行人事件。北京称，两名中国公民受重伤。

The Chinese Embassy in Japan even issued a warning about a record surge in bear attacks in the country.

中国驻日本大使馆甚至就日本熊袭击事件创纪录激增发出警告。

Experts said that Beijing would have to work hard to convince the public to forgo trips to Japan, given the love in the mainland for Japanese food, culture and products.

专家表示，鉴于中国大陆民众对日本美食、文化和产品的喜爱，北京方面需付出巨大努力才能说服公众放弃赴日旅行。

“They’re reaching for the stuff they think might get people’s attention,” Mr. Tong said. “But Japan is such an attractive place to visit. In the long term, they might not be able to keep people away.”

“他们正在寻找他们认为可能吸引人们注意的东西，”唐伟康说。“但日本是一个极具吸引力的旅游胜地。从长远来看，他们可能无法阻止民众前往。”

The procession of Western leaders flocking to Beijing in recent weeks has been impressive. Last month, Mark Carney went, the first Canadian leader to visit in almost a decade. He signed a strategic partnership with a country that has imprisoned Canadian nationals and was accused of meddling in Canada’s elections.

近期西方领导人纷纷前往北京的景象令人瞩目。上个月，马克·卡尼出访中国，成为近十年来首位访华的加拿大领导人。他与一个关押着加拿大公民、被指干预加拿大选举的国家签署了战略伙伴关系协议。

Next up was Keir Starmer, reversing years of frosty relations in the first visit by a British leader since 2018. This week, it’s the German chancellor’s turn. More than a million German jobs depend on exports to China.

紧随其后的是基尔·斯塔默，这是2018年以来英国领导人首次访华，标志着多年来两国冷淡关系的逆转。本周轮到德国总理登场。超过100万个德国就业岗位依赖对华出口。

Not so long ago, Western countries talked about diversifying away from China. Now the opposite is happening. I called my colleague David Pierson, who covers China, to understand why.

就在不久前，西方国家还在谈论要减少对中国的依赖，实现多元化布局。如今情况却正好相反。我向报道中国事务的同事戴维·皮尔森请教，以便了解个中缘由。

No longer distancing from China

不再与中国保持距离

David, Western leaders have always flocked to China with their C.E.O.s. What’s different about the current stream of visitors?

戴维，西方领导人过去也常常带着本国企业高管涌向中国。那么，当前这波访问潮有何不同？

It’s the context, right? You’ve seen tensions grow between the United States and Europe. Not long ago, Western leaders were looking for ways to “de-risk,” or distance themselves from China to reduce their countries’ reliance on its supply chains and market. Now, they are moving back toward China again — because they’re de-risking from a more unreliable United States.

关键在于背景，对吧？大家可以看到，美国与欧洲之间的紧张关系正在加剧。不久前，西方国家还在想方设法寻求“去风险”，也就是与中国保持距离，以减少本国对其供应链和市场的依赖。而现在，他们又重新向中国靠拢——因为他们正在针对一个更加不可靠的美国进行“去风险”。

But how reliable a partner is China? There’s a reason people wanted to diversify away from China, right?

但中国作为伙伴究竟有多可靠？人们当初想要减少对中国依赖是有原因的，对吧？

That’s the thing. As I wrote recently, China hasn’t changed. It still threatens to close its markets to imports or restrict the sale of valuable exports like critical minerals when it’s unhappy with another country. And China has done nothing to pull back its economic and diplomatic support for Russia and its war in Ukraine despite all the protestations from Europe.

问题就在这里。正如我最近写的，中国并没有改变。当它对他国不满时，仍然会威胁关闭市场、限制进口，或者限制关键矿产等重要出口商品的销售。而且，尽管欧洲一再抗议，中国并未撤回在经济和外交层面上对俄罗斯及其在乌克兰的战争的支持。

The bottom line is, China doesn’t actually need to offer incentives to these Western leaders. It’s just an alternative to the U.S. at a time when countries are scrambling to rebalance.

归根结底，中国其实并不需要向这些西方领导人提供什么好处。在各国匆忙重新平衡对外关系之际，它只是美国之外的一个替代选择。

What leverage do Western countries have left on things they care about? Like China dumping huge amounts of products on global markets?

在西方国家关心的问题上，比如中国向全球市场大量倾销产品，他们还有什么筹码吗？

Honestly, not a lot. Britain and Canada do not export many valuable things to China. They just don’t have the same leverage that they used to over China. Germany is in a very, very tough spot. Chancellor Friedrich Merz is going over there to preserve the business that still exists for German companies, but the reality is, there is very little he can do to slow Chinese firms from replacing German ones in the global market

说实话，不多了。英国和加拿大并没有向中国出口很多有价值的商品。他们已经没有像过去那样能对中国施压的影响力了。德国的处境非常、非常艰难。总理弗里德里希·默茨此行是为了保住德国企业目前尚存的业务，但现实是，他几乎无力阻止中国企业在全球市场上取代德国企业。

Meanwhile, China has shown that it can go toe to toe with the most powerful country in the world. President Trump took the fight to China, and President Xi Jinping stood up to him and turned it around by using its trump card (no pun intended!): its monopoly over the supply and processing of rare earth minerals that are used in everything from computer chips and batteries to wind turbines and missiles. So China is emboldened on the world stage. Say what you will about Xi Jinping, he never underestimates his leverage. Many analysts think that he’s played this quite well.

与此同时，中国已经证明了自己能与世界上最强大的国家一较高下。特朗普总统曾主动向中国发起挑战，而习近平主席顶住了压力，并打出自己的王牌来扭转局势：那就是中国在稀土供应和加工方面的垄断地位。稀土被广泛应用于从芯片、电池到风力涡轮机和导弹等各种产品之中。因此，中国在世界舞台上更有底气了。无论你怎么评价习近平，他从不低估自己的筹码的威力。许多分析人士认为，他在这方面的表现相当出色。

So China looks strong. But China also has a lot of problems at home. How do these two things interact?

所以中国看起来很强大。但中国国内也有很多问题。这两方面是如何相互作用的？

It’s a split screen. On foreign policy, China is in a pretty solid position. But domestically, they’re on very shaky ground. They’ve been dealing with a very sluggish economy, because of a collapsing property market. And there’s just no easy way out of it. And it’s having repercussions for the rest of the world, because the only thing that’s working for China right now economically is exports. They’re making all this stuff, but they don’t have enough money at home to buy it, and so they’re just dumping it on the rest the world.

这就像分屏画面。一方面，在外交政策上，中国处于相当稳固的位置；但在国内，他们的处境非常不稳。由于房地产市场崩溃，他们一直在应对极度低迷的经济。而且这个问题没有简单的解决之道。这种局面也正在对世界其他地区产生影响，因为目前中国经济中唯一运转良好的就是出口。他们生产了大量商品，但国内缺乏足够的消费能力来吸收这些产品，于是只能把它们倾销到全球市场。

The other thing is that they’ve had this far-reaching purge in the military hierarchy. All these generals have just been kicked out, and it’s unclear what this means for China’s ability to go to war. Is its ability to take Taiwan delayed by years — or somehow accelerated by getting rid of corrupt generals? It’s just so difficult to look into elite Chinese politics, and so we’re just kind of left guessing what that means.

另一个问题是军队高层的大规模清洗。许多将领被撤职，目前还不清楚这对中国的作战能力有什么影响。这会让中国对台军事行动推迟数年，还是因为清除了腐败将领反而加速？要窥探中国的高层政治实在太过困难，因此外界只能揣测这些变动的真实影响。

Where does all this lead? Are these deals with China the beginning of a longer-term shift away from U.S. dominance?

这一切最终会走向哪里？与中国达成的这些协议，是否标志着一个长期削弱美国主导地位的转折点？

Short-term, it’s more symbolic than real because, if you actually look at the meetings, there’s not that much substance. Britain allowing China to open an embassy in London? Not exactly a big deal. I mean, you could argue that there’s a security risk, but Britain’s own security service said it can be managed. On Canada, yes, they lowered the tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, but there’s still a quota, and it’s a tiny quota.

短期来看，这更多是象征意义而非实质性的。因为如果你仔细分析这些会晤，就会发现其实并没有多少实质性成果。英国允许中国在伦敦建新的大使馆？这并非什么重大举措。你当然可以说存在安全风险，但英国自己的情报机构表示风险是可以管控的。再看加拿大，虽然降低了中国电动车的关税，但仍设有配额限制，且配额非常小。

The symbolism alone is of course a huge win for China. They can turn around to their people and say: “Look, we’re doing great. You get all these countries coming and paying their respects to us.” This helps to paper over domestic problems.

仅就象征意义而言，这无疑是中国的一大胜利。他们可以告诉国内民众：‘看，我们做得很好，这么多国家都来向我们示好。’这有助于掩盖国内问题。

Long-term, it’s harder to say. One thing is clear: We’ve seen an erosion of American legitimacy in the last year. Everyone now has doubts about America as a reliable partner. You’ve seen how things just turn on a dime, depending on who enters the White House now.

从长期来看，就更难判断了。有一点是明确的：过去一年里，美国的公信力在持续下降。如今，所有人都对美国是否是一个可靠的伙伴产生了怀疑。我们也看到了，这一切是可以随时转向的，取决于入主白宫的是谁。

Whether China can fill that vacuum in bigger ways is impossible to know. They’re trying very hard, but it’s unclear if they’re doing it for anything other than their own interests.

至于中国是否能够在更大的层面填补这个空缺，目前无法判断。他们确实在非常努力地尝试，但尚不清楚这种努力除了自身利益外是否还有其他考量。