The American companies building artificial intelligence systems are loudly complaining that their Chinese competitors are unfairly copying their technology, and they are pleading with officials to do something about it.

开发人工智能系统的美国公司正在大声抱怨，指责他们的中国竞争对手在不公平地抄袭其技术，并正恳求官员们采取措施予以应对。

On June 10, Anthropic sent a letter to Senators Tim Scott and Elizabeth Warren, accusing the Chinese tech giant Alibaba of surreptitiously copying its A.I. technologies using a technique called distillation.

6月10日，Anthropic致信参议员蒂姆·斯科特和伊丽莎白·沃伦，指责中国科技巨头阿里巴巴利用一种被称为“蒸馏”的技术，秘密抄袭其人工智能技术。

Like other Chinese companies, Alibaba tapped into Anthropic’s technologies through tens of thousands of unauthorized accounts, according to the letter, which was viewed by The New York Times. Then it used the data it collected to train its own A.I. systems. Anthropic asked the lawmakers, who lead a Senate committee that was about to hold a hearing on A.I., to explore ways of curbing China’s distillation.

据《纽约时报》看到的这封信函显示，与其他中国公司一样，阿里巴巴在通过数万个未经授权的账户使用Anthropic的技术。随后，它利用收集到的数据训练自己的AI系统。Anthropic请求这两位的议员共同探讨如何遏制中国的模型蒸馏。两人领导着一个即将就AI举行听证会的参议院委员会。

“These distillation attacks are carried out illicitly, systematically and at industrial scale to harvest U.S. A.I. capabilities across frontier labs and repackage them as their own,” Anthropic told the two senators, referring to companies on the frontier of A.I. development.

“这些蒸馏攻击是以非法、系统化且工业级的规模进行的，旨在从各家前沿实验室中窃取美国的AI能力，并将其重新包装为自己的成果，”Anthropic在给两位参议员的信中写道，这里所指的是处于人工智能开发最前沿的公司。

Experts say China trails the United States in A.I. development by just six months. Anthropic and other U.S. companies argue that without help from distillation, China would be much further behind, which could affect major A.I. uses like business planning, drug research, mass surveillance and military weapons.

专家表示，中国在人工智能开发方面仅落后美国大约六个月。Anthropic和其他美国公司辩称，如果没有蒸馏技术的帮助，中国会落后得更远，这可能会影响到商业规划、药物研究、大规模监控以及军事武器等AI的核心应用领域。

Their complaints have new urgency now that the Chinese start-up Z.ai has released an A.I. model, GLM-5.2, that is nearly as powerful as the top American systems. It rivals them when used for cybersecurity, an area that American A.I. companies and the Trump administration have singled out as vitally important to geopolitics.

随着中国初创公司智谱AI(Z.ai)发布了一款实力几乎与美国顶级系统齐平的AI模型GLM-5.2，他们的抱怨变得愈发迫切。该模型在网络安全应用方面可与美国系统相媲美，而这一领域正是美国AI公司和特朗普政府强调的对地缘政治至关重要的领域。

But what exactly is distillation, and are Chinese companies the only ones doing it? Here is an explanation.

但究竟什么是“蒸馏”？难道只有中国公司在这么做吗？以下是相关解析。

Is distillation a new concept?

蒸馏是一个新概念吗？

Not at all. Distillation has been common in the tech industry for more than a decade. A small team of Google researchers first developed the technique in the early 2010s as a way of building more efficient A.I. systems.

绝非如此。蒸馏技术在科技行业普遍存在已超过十年。谷歌的一个小型研究团队在2010年代初期首次开发了这项技术，以此来构建更高效的AI系统。

Through distillation, researchers can collect data from a particularly powerful system and use that data to build a system that can run on less expensive hardware.

通过蒸馏，研究人员可以从一个特别强大的系统中收集数据，并利用这些数据来构建一个可以在更便宜的硬件上运行的系统。

The first A.I. model essentially shows the second model how to behave, said Geoffrey Hinton, a former Google researcher who helped develop the technique. “Think of one model as the teacher and the other as a student,” he said.

曾参与开发该技术的前谷歌研究员杰弗里·辛顿表示，第一个AI模型本质上是在向第二个模型示范如何表现。他说：“可以把一个模型看作老师，另一个看作学生。”

Distillation is a way to copy your own A.I.?

蒸馏是一种复制自身AI的方式？

Correct. But some companies used distillation to mimic technologies built by other A.I. labs. They often copied the behavior of open source technologies — systems that anyone can use, modify and copy for free and largely without restriction.

没错。但一些公司利用蒸馏来模仿其他AI实验室构建的技术。它们经常复制开源技术的行为——开源技术是指任何人都可以免费使用、修改和复制，且基本上不受限制的系统。

That is what labs hope to encourage when they open source their systems. The idea is that everyone benefits because A.I. is developed more quickly.

这正是各家实验室在开源其系统时所希望推动的。其核心理念是，由于人工智能能够更快速地发展，每个人都能从中受益。

When is distillation a problem?

蒸馏在什么时候会成为一个问题？

Anthropic, OpenAI and other A.I. labs get annoyed when companies use distillation to mimic the behavior of their proprietary systems — technologies that are not open source. These are typically their most powerful systems.

当其他公司利用蒸馏来模仿其专有系统（即非开源技术）的行为时，Anthropic、OpenAI和其他AI实验室就会感到恼火。这些系统通常是它们最强大的系统。

Anthropic and OpenAI do not allow distillation for their leading systems under their terms of service. But distilling these systems is still common.

根据服务条款，Anthropic和OpenAI不允许对其领先系统进行蒸馏。但对这些系统进行蒸馏的现象依然屡见不鲜。

In April, while testifying in a federal trial in Oakland, Calif., Elon Musk acknowledged the practice at his A.I. company, xAI. When a lawyer asked if xAI had ever distilled technology from OpenAI, Mr. Musk replied: “Generally A.I. companies distill other A.I. companies.”

今年4月，埃隆·马斯克在加利福尼亚州奥克兰的一场联邦审判中作证时，承认了他的AI公司xAI存在这种做法。当律师询问xAI是否曾对OpenAI的技术进行过蒸馏时，马斯克回答道：“AI公司一般都会蒸馏其他AI公司的技术。”

埃隆·马斯克在加利福尼亚州奥克兰的联邦法院，他于4月在此承认xAI使用了蒸馏技术。

Is that illegal?

这么做违法吗？

That’s not clear, said Sarah Tishler, a partner at the law firm Beck Reed Riden who specializes in trade-secret litigation.

专门从事商业秘密诉讼的贝克-里德-莱登律师事务所合伙人萨拉·蒂什勒表示，目前这一点还不明确。

Some legal scholars argue that the practice violates the Defend Trade Secrets Act, a 2016 law that allows businesses to sue over the theft of trade secrets, but courts have not explicitly decided that.

一些法律学者辩称，这种做法违反了2016年出台的《保护商业秘密法》，该法律允许企业就商业秘密被窃取提起诉讼，但法院尚未对此做出明确裁决。

Copyright law does not necessarily apply because distillation is an effort to copy the behavior of the system, as opposed to copying text verbatim.

版权法并不一定适用，因为蒸馏是为了复制系统的行为，而不是逐字逐句地复制文本。

Are the Chinese doing something similar?

中国人也在做类似的事情吗？

It is also not completely clear what Chinese companies are doing. They have likely distilled proprietary models in much the same way that American companies like xAI have done.

中国公司具体在做什么也并非完全透明。它们很可能以与美国公司（如xAI）极为相似的方式对专有模型进行了蒸馏。

Chinese distillation efforts, however, have caused far more concern among Anthropic, OpenAI and the other U.S. companies.

然而，中国的蒸馏举动在Anthropic、OpenAI等美国公司中引发了深得多的担忧。

About 18 months ago, the Chinese start-up DeepSeek shocked Silicon Valley when it showed that it could build effective A.I. far more affordably than many of its American counterparts. OpenAI soon accused DeepSeek of distilling its technologies.

大约18个月前，中国初创公司DeepSeek向硅谷展示了它能以比许多美国同行低得多的成本构建出高效的AI，这引发了硅谷的震动。OpenAI很快便指责DeepSeek蒸馏了其技术。

In February, Anthropic accused DeepSeek and two other Chinese start-ups of improperly harvesting large amounts of data from its systems. Anthropic said the start-ups had used about 24,000 accounts to generate over 16 million conversations with its Claude chatbot that could be used to teach skills to their own chatbots.

今年2月，Anthropic指责DeepSeek和另外两家中国初创公司从其系统中不当获取了大量数据。Anthropic表示，这些初创公司利用了大约24000个账户，与其Claude聊天机器人进行了超过1600万次对话，这些对话可用于向它们自己的聊天机器人传授技能。

How does Anthropic know this?

Anthropic是如何得知这一点的？

Anthropic closely monitors how people use its systems. Certain repeated behavior, the company said, showed that accounts linked to China were lifting data from its proprietary models.

Anthropic密切监控着人们对其系统的使用情况。该公司表示，某些重复性的行为表明，与中国有关联的账户正在从其专有模型中窃取数据。

Anthropic claimed that various Chinese companies had used a network of accounts to gain access to its systems. Each Chinese company, Anthropic said, uses this data to help train its own technologies.

Anthropic声称，多家中国公司利用了一个账户网络来接入其系统。Anthropic指出，每家中国公司都利用这些数据来帮助训练它们自己的技术。

Can Anthropic prevent this?

Anthropic能阻止这种行为吗？

Anthropic, OpenAI and Google are sharing information that they can all use to combat the practice, they said. But it can be difficult to stop. If Anthropic shuts down too many accounts, it may end up barring legitimate users.

Anthropic、OpenAI和谷歌表示，它们正在共享信息，以便共同打击这种行为。但这很难杜绝。如果Anthropic封禁了过多的账户，最终可能会把合法的用户也拒之门外。

Even if U.S. law did bar illicit distillation, Ms. Tishler said, it would most likely have little effect on behavior in China.

蒂什勒指出，即使美国法律确实禁止非法蒸馏，也很可能对中国境内的行为产生不了什么影响。

“So much of this conduct is happening outside the United States,” she noted. “It would be very challenging to address it through a U.S. court.”

“这种行为有太多是发生在美国境外了，”她指出。“通过美国法院来解决这一问题将会极其困难。”

(The Times sued OpenAI and Microsoft in 2023, claiming copyright infringement of news content related to A.I. systems. The two companies have denied those claims.)

（《纽约时报》于2023年对OpenAI和微软提起诉讼，指控其在人工智能系统相关的新闻内容上存在版权侵权行为。这两家公司均否认了这些指控。）

Anthropic5月在旧金山展示AI智能体Claude Cowork。

What else can U.S. companies do?

美国公司还能做什么？

Anthropic called on Congress to pass legislation that would allow “deeper collaboration to combat distillation attacks, both between the U.S. government and leading frontier labs as well as between the frontier labs themselves.”

Anthropic呼吁国会通过立法，允许“在美国政府与领先的前沿实验室之间，以及前沿实验室彼此之间开展更深入的合作，以打击蒸馏攻击”。

The company also said the U.S. government should extend its efforts to limit China’s access to the specialized computer chips needed to train A.I. technologies. The world’s most powerful chips are designed by American companies, and the federal government has used export controls to stem the flow of those chips to China. It is difficult to do distillation without those chips.

该公司还表示，美国政府应当加大力度限制中国获取训练AI技术所需的专用电脑芯片。世界上最强大的芯片均由美国公司设计，联邦政府一直在利用出口管制来遏制这些芯片流入中国。没有这些芯片，进行蒸馏也会变得很困难。

Alibaba declined to comment on Anthropic’s letter to the two senators. Ms. Warren, Democrat of Massachusetts, also declined to comment. Mr. Scott, Republican of South Carolina, did not respond to a request for comment.

阿里巴巴拒绝就Anthropic致两位参议员的信函发表评论。马萨诸塞州民主党参议员沃伦同样拒绝置评。南卡罗来纳州共和党参议员斯科特未回应置评请求。

Would a distillation crackdown have an impact?

打击蒸馏会产生影响吗？

Many experts believe that a crackdown on Chinese distillation would have little effect, and that distillation alone cannot build a top A.I. system as Z.ai did.

许多专家认为，打击中国的蒸馏行为不会有什么效果，而且单凭蒸馏技术是无法构建出像智谱AI那样顶尖的AI系统的。

Others believe that distillation will become less important as companies build systems, like GLM-5.2, that are designed to serve as A.I. agents. Training these agents — digital assistants that can use other software to perform tasks — is much harder to duplicate through distillation.

另一些人则认为，随着各大公司开始构建旨在充当AI智能体(agent)的系统，蒸馏技术的重要性将会降低。训练这些智能体（即能够利用其他软件来执行任务的数字助手）的难度极大，很难通过蒸馏来复制。

Distillation “won’t matter as much for the next era of A.I.,” said Sara Hooker, chief executive of Adaption, an A.I. research lab.

AI研究实验室Adaption的首席执行官萨拉·胡克表示，蒸馏“对下一个AI时代来说将不再那么重要”。

On a brisk April morning in 2024, investigators raided two European offices of Nuctech, a Chinese security equipment company with a vast global footprint. The officials from the European Union seized laptops, confiscated employees’ mobile phones and sifted through documents.

2024年4月的一个清冷的早晨，调查人员突击搜查了同方威视在欧洲的两个办事处。同方威视是一家中国安检设备公司，业务遍布全球。欧盟官员查扣了笔记本电脑，没收了员工的手机，并审查了大量文件。

They were searching for evidence that the state-backed company, once led by the son of China’s former president Hu Jintao, had gained an unfair advantage while competing to install X-ray scanners and explosive detection systems at border checkpoints in more than two dozen European countries.

他们正在寻找证据，以便证明这家曾由前中国国家主席胡锦涛之子领导、具有国家背景的公司在竞标为超过二十几个欧洲国家的边境检查站安装X射线扫描仪和爆炸物探测系统时，获得了不公平的优势。

Nuctech’s footprint is wide. Its equipment has been installed at airports and seaports in more than 170 countries. The company is also no stranger to scrutiny. It has been implicated in corruption investigations in Namibia and the Philippines, flagged in Canada for data security concerns and placed on a U.S. national security blacklist.

同方威视的业务足迹十分广泛。其设备已安装在170多个国家的机场和海港。该公司对审查也并不陌生。它曾被卷入纳米比亚和菲律宾的腐败调查，在加拿大因数据安全隐患被标记，并被列入美国国家安全黑名单。

Today, frustration in Europe over the dominance of Chinese companies across many industries is growing, and Nuctech has become a lightning rod for politicians under pressure to protect local companies and jobs. Concern over industries with potential spying or hacking vulnerabilities is mounting, too.

如今，欧洲对中国公司在许多行业占据主导地位的挫败感日益增强，在面临保护本土企业和就业压力的政界人士当中，同方威视成了的众矢之的。此外，人们对具有潜在间谍或黑客漏洞的行业的担忧也在不断增加。

The European Commission, the executive arm of the European Union, is investigating whether government support has given Chinese companies an unfair advantage. It is using a new legal tool to scrutinize public bids by Nuctech and other Chinese manufacturers of electric vehicles, solar panels and wind turbines.

欧盟执行机构欧盟委员会正在就政府支持是否赋予了中国公司不公平的优势展开调查。该委员会正使用一项新的法律工具来审查同方威视以及其他中国电动汽车、太阳能电池板和风力涡轮机制造商的公开投标。

At the same time, China has denounced the investigations as “illegal” and an “unjustified suppression of Chinese enterprises.” Since the 2024 raids, the European Commission has opened an in-depth investigation into Nuctech that could lead to divestments and bans. For the first time, China’s Ministry of Justice responded by publicly ordering Nuctech not to cooperate.

与此同时，中国谴责这些调查“非法”，是“对中国企业的无理打压”。自2024年的突击搜查以来，欧盟委员会对同方威视展开了深入调查，这可能导致资产剥离和禁令。中国司法部首次做出回应，公开命令同方威视不要配合调查。

中国前国家主席胡锦涛之子胡海峰，摄于2019年，北京。

The European Commission had investigated Nuctech in 2009 after a complaint by its British rival, Smiths Detection, and imposed anti-dumping tariffs on the company. Beijing retaliated with its own investigation into Smiths, ultimately imposing anti-dumping duties.

2009年，在收到其英国竞争对手史密斯探测的投诉后，欧盟委员会曾对同方威视进行调查，并对该公司征收了反倾销关税。北京方面予以报复，对史密斯探测展开了调查，最终也对其征收了反倾销税。

What happens this time could shape the future of relations between China and the European Union, as each side embraces increasingly divergent visions of free trade.

随着双方对自由贸易的愿景日益走向分歧，这一次的事件可能会塑造中国与欧盟关系的未来。

Nuctech embodies China’s first generation of companies to go global: state-backed, well connected and deeply financed. Its rise over the past three decades reflects both the ambitions of China’s ruling Communist Party and its willingness to pursue them over the long term.

同方威视是中国第一代走向全球企业的典型代表：背靠国家支持、人脉广阔且资金雄厚。在过去30年里，它的崛起既反映了中国执政党共产党的雄心壮志，也反映了其长期追求这些目标的决心。

“The Chinese model is very different from the Western model when it comes to private-sector development,” said Heiwai Tang, director of the Asia Global Institute at the University of Hong Kong.

香港大学亚洲环球研究所所长邓希炜表示：“在私营部门发展方面，中国模式与西方模式截然不同。”

“State-owned enterprises went out first, laying the groundwork, building infrastructure and ensuring that the private-sector firms, when they go overseas, can share some of the resources,” he added.

“国有企业率先走出去，奠定基础，建设基础设施，并确保私营企业走向海外时能够分享一些资源，”他还说。

布鲁塞尔欧洲之星火车站的一台同方威视安检扫描仪，摄于2022年。

‘All of us will serve as your salesmen.’

“我们所有人都会做你们的推销员。”

As China’s economy opened to the world and shipping containers began piling up at its borders, the country needed technology to inspect cargo for contraband. The government brought together researchers from Tsinghua University, and in 1997 the group became known as Nuctech.

随着中国经济向世界开放，集装箱开始在边境堆积，中国需要技术来检查货物中的违禁品。政府召集了清华大学的研究人员，1997年，这个团队更名为同方威视。

The company was granted access to state research bodies such as the China Institute of Atomic Energy and instructed to work closely with customs authorities, according to a paper published in a Chinese journal that cited interviews with Nuctech executives.

根据一家中国期刊上发表的援引对同方威视高管采访的一篇论文，该公司获准进入中国原子能科学研究院等国家研究机构，并受命与海关当局密切合作。

By 2000, Beijing had started urging Chinese companies to expand overseas.

到2000年，北京已开始敦促中国企业向海外扩张。

Wu Yi, then one of China’s top leaders, visited Nuctech’s facilities and implored employees to “develop the international market.”

当时的中国最高领导人之一吴仪参观了同方威视的设施，并敦促员工“发展国际市场”。

She added, “All of us will serve as your salesmen.”

她还说：“我们所有人都会做你们的推销员。”

During its early overseas push into Nepal, Syria, Lebanon, Mauritius, Suriname and Ecuador, Nuctech had no competitors, according to Chinese government documents examined by The New York Times. China’s Ministry of Commerce arranged the deals through a foreign aid program that provided assistance to developing countries to cultivate diplomatic good will.

根据《纽约时报》查阅的中国政府文件显示，在同方威视早期进军尼泊尔、叙利亚、黎巴嫩、毛里求斯、苏里南和厄瓜多尔期间，该公司没有任何竞争对手。中国商务部通过一项对外援助计划安排了这些交易，该计划旨在向发展中国家提供援助，以培养外交善意。

The ministry also assisted Nuctech with commercial deals. Nuctech was viewed as an important instrument of China’s efforts to deepen its global influence through trade.

商务部还协助同方威视进行商业交易。同方威视被视为中国通过贸易深化其全球影响力的重要工具。

One document described a contract in Malta as being secured “under the strong support” of the Ministry of Commerce “through government matchmaking.” The 3-million-euro lease deal in 2007 between Nuctech and the Maltese government covered eight years and included a €291,000 grant from Beijing for projects agreed upon by both countries.

一份文件称，在商务部的“大力支持”下，“通过政府牵线搭桥”，该公司获得了一份马耳他的合同。2007年同方威视与马耳他政府之间达成的这项租赁协议价值300万欧元，为期八年，其中包括北京为两国商定的项目提供的29.1万欧元拨款。

Nuctech also won contracts through the Belt and Road Initiative, the signature infrastructure program of China’s leader, Xi Jinping, that has directed roughly $1 trillion in loans toward projects around the world.

同方威视还通过“一带一路”倡议赢得了合同。这是中国领导人习近平标志性的基础设施计划，该计划已向世界各地的项目提供了约1万亿美元的贷款。

As Nuctech expanded overseas, it was accused of bribery and corruption in Namibia and the Philippines — allegations the company denied.

随着同方威视向海外扩张，它在纳米比亚和菲律宾被指控犯有贿赂和腐败行为——该公司否认了这些指控。

From 2000 to 2024, Chinese state-owned lenders and aid agencies made 66 grant and loan commitments worth more than $1.2 billion to buy and install Nuctech scanners and customs inspection equipment worldwide, according to AidData, a research institute at the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Va.

根据位于弗吉尼亚州威廉斯堡的威廉玛丽学院研究机构AidData的数据，从2000年到2024年，中国国有贷款机构和援助机构做出了66项拨款和贷款承诺，价值超过12亿美元，用于在世界各地采购和安装同方威视的扫描仪及海关检查设备。

“Foreign aid projects are of profound and far-reaching importance to Nuctech’s expansion,” Miao Qitian, senior vice president of Nuctech, said in a news release about a visit by an agency under China’s Ministry of Commerce. The company, he added, “is a bright and beautiful calling card for China’s foreign aid work.”

同方威视高级副总裁苗齐田在一份关于中国商务部下属机构来访的新闻稿中表示：“援外项目对同方威视的扩张具有深远而重大的意义。”他还说，该公司“是中国援外工作一张亮丽的名片”。

巴西圣保罗的一台同方威视设备，摄于2014年。

‘Using trade to weaponize dependency’

“利用贸易将依赖变成武器”

Nuctech has since captured a large share of the global market for border inspection equipment. It says it holds the leading position in Africa, more than half the market in the Americas and a more than 90 percent share in Europe.

此后，同方威视占据了全球边境检查设备市场的巨大份额。该公司表示，它在非洲处于领先地位，在美洲占据超过一半的市场份额，在欧洲占据超过90%的份额。

This dominance has raised concerns in Europe, where lawmakers question whether Chinese companies should have access to sensitive sectors that are potentially vulnerable to hacking and espionage.

这种主导地位引起了欧洲的担忧，那里的立法者质疑，是否应该允许中国公司进入可能容易受到黑客攻击和间谍活动威胁的敏感领域。

What’s more, Nuctech’s Western competitors have argued that they struggle to compete on price, citing auctions in which the Chinese company’s bids were up to 50 percent below their bidding price.

此外，同方威视的西方竞争对手表示，他们在价格上难以与其竞争。他们指出，在一些竞标中，这家中国公司的报价比他们的报价低了50%。

In an interview with The Times, Robert Bos, deputy general manager of InsTech Netherlands, one of Nuctech’s two European subsidiaries, rejected the criticism.

同方威视在欧洲的两个子公司之一——荷兰InsTech公司的副总经理罗伯特·博斯在接受《纽约时报》采访时驳斥了这一批评。

The company’s European entities “did not receive any subsidies from the Chinese government that would enable them to offer unfairly low bids in E.U. public tenders and distort competition,” he said.

他说，该公司的欧洲实体“没有接受任何中国政府的补贴，使它们能在欧盟公开招标中提供不公平的低价从而扭曲竞争”。

Mr. Bos added that winning government contracts did not always come down to price. “Sometimes we’re cheaper; sometimes we’re more expensive. In some cases, we also lose,” he said. Nuctech can offer lower prices because it manufactures equipment at a factory in Poland, he said.

博斯还说，赢得政府合同并不总是取决于价格。“有时候我们更便宜；有时候我们更贵。在某些情况下，我们也会竞标失败，”他说。他表示，同方威视能够提供较低的价格，是因为它在波兰的一家工厂制造设备。

Many of the European contracts won by Nuctech were recognized as the “most economic,” according to The Times’s review of European procurement records.

根据《纽约时报》对欧洲采购记录的审查，同方威视赢得的许多欧洲合同被评为“最经济的”。

“They are using foreign subsidies to nestle themselves into our critical infrastructure,” said Bart Groothuis, a Dutch member of the European Parliament and former cybersecurity director at the Dutch Ministry of Defense. “They are using trade to weaponize dependency.”

“他们利用外国补贴，把自己安插进我们的关键基础设施中，”欧洲议会荷兰籍议员、前荷兰国防部网络安全主管巴特·格鲁特休斯说。“他们正在利用贸易，将依赖变成武器。”

China heightened those concerns last year when it restricted exports of critical minerals that European manufacturers relied on. Nuctech could similarly gain leverage over security operations, Mr. Groothuis said.

去年中国限制了欧洲制造商所依赖的关键矿物的出口，从而加剧了这些担忧。格鲁特休斯表示，同方威视同样可以在安全行动方面获得影响力。

Mr. Bos defended Nuctech’s position, saying, “Nuctech has no leverage over either the Chinese government or European critical infrastructure.”

博斯为同方威视的立场进行辩护称：“同方威视既无法对中国政府施加影响力，也无法对欧洲关键基础设施施加影响力。”

Criticism is mounting beyond Europe, too.

在欧洲之外，批评之声也在不断增加。

In 2020, the Canadian government scuppered Nuctech’s $6.8 million deal to supply X-ray equipment in 170 embassies, and a parliamentary committee recommended barring state-backed Chinese companies from federal technology and security contracts over data security concerns.

2020年，加拿大政府取消了同方威视为170个大使馆供应X射线设备的680万美元交易，一个议会委员会还建议，出于对数据安全的担忧，应禁止有国家背景的中国公司参与联邦技术和安全合同。

Mr. Bos denied that Nuctech stored or processed customer data. “Most of our customers have their own I.T. structures, and data handling is not up to us,” he said.

博斯否认同方威视存储或处理了客户数据。“我们的大多数客户都有自己的IT架构，数据处理不由我们负责，”他说。

That same year, the United States added Nuctech to a blacklist, saying it had sold equipment that “impaired efforts to stop illicit international trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials.”

同年，美国将同方威视列入黑名单，称其出售的设备“损害了阻止核材料和放射性材料非法国际贩运的努力”。

As the European Union considers a tougher approach toward China, Nuctech has become a proving ground where both sides are seeking to draw lines.

随着欧盟考虑对中国采取更强硬的立场，同方威视已成为双方试图划定界限的试验场。

By instructing Nuctech employees not to cooperate with the European investigation, China is pushing the limits of what Europe is willing to do, said Tobias Gehrke, a senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

欧洲外交关系委员会高级研究员托比亚斯·盖尔克表示，中国指示同方威视员工不要配合欧洲的调查，以此试探欧洲行动的底线。

“China is using Nuctech as a test case for how much the Europeans will want to stick to their regulations and laws.”

“中国正在将同方威视作为一个测试案例，看看欧洲人究竟多想坚持他们的规章制度和法律。”

China test fired an long-range ballistic missile with a dummy warhead in the Pacific Ocean on Monday, the first such launch in two years.

周一，中国在太平洋试射了一枚携载有模拟弹头的远程弹道导弹，这是两年来的首次此类发射。

The missile was launched from a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine and sent a “mock warhead” into the Pacific Ocean, according to a report from Xinhua, China’s official news agency.

据中国官方通讯社新华社报道，这枚导弹由一艘中国核动力潜艇发射，将一枚“模拟弹头”送入太平洋。

“The missile landed accurately in the designated area,” the report said. The test launch at 12:01 p.m. Beijing time, Xinhua said, was “not directed against any specific country or target.”

报道称，导弹“准确落入预定海域。”新华社表示，此次试射于北京时间中午12点01分进行，“不针对任何特定国家和目标”。

It was not immediately clear where the missile landed. The launch came as the leaders of Australia and Fiji announced a mutual defense treaty and a regional security alliance, the latest in a string of agreements Canberra has been striking in with Pacific Island nations widely viewed as efforts to push back against China’s encroachment in the region.

目前尚不清楚导弹具体落入何处。此次发射之际，正值澳大利亚和斐济领导人宣布签署相互防御条约并建立区域安全联盟。这是堪培拉近来与太平洋岛国达成的一系列协议中的最新一项，这些举措被广泛视为旨在抵制中国在该地区的势力扩张。

Governments in the region were warned of the launch shortly beforehand.

该地区各国政府在发射前不久接到了预警。

The previous test in September 2024, when China fired an intercontinental ballistic missile carrying a dummy warhead across the Pacific Ocean into waters near French Polynesia, drew alarm from countries in the region. It marked the first time in more than four decades that China had publicly announced testing an ICBM in the Pacific region.

上一次试射是在2024年9月，当时中国发射了一枚携带模拟弹头的洲际弹道导弹，越过太平洋落入法属波利尼西亚附近水域，引起了该地区国家的警觉。这是40多年来，中国首次公开宣布在太平洋地区试射洲际弹道导弹(ICBM)。

2024年9月由官方媒体发布的照片显示，中国人民解放军火箭军向太平洋发射了一枚搭载模拟弹头的洲际弹道导弹。

Winston Peters, New Zealand’s foreign minister, said in a statement the country was “deeply concerned” and that the test seemed to be part of “a recurring pattern by China.”

新西兰外交部长温斯顿·彼得斯在声明中表示，新西兰对此“深表关切”，并且此次试射似乎是“中国反复出现的行为模式”的一部分。

“New Zealand considers this an unwelcome and concerning development. We, like our neighbors in other Pacific countries, have no interest in China using the South Pacific as a testing site for missile capability,” he said.

“新西兰认为这是一个不受欢迎且令人担忧的事态发展。与其他太平洋岛国邻国一样，我们不希望看到中国将南太平洋作为导弹能力的试验场，”他说。

Australia’s foreign minister, Penny Wong, called the test “destabilizing to the region” and that it was “in the context of a rapid military buildup by China, which is lacking in the transparency and reassurance as to intent that the region expects.”

澳大利亚外交部长黄英贤称此次试射“破坏了该地区的稳定”，并表示这发生在“中国军事力量快速扩张的背景下，而这种扩张缺乏本地区所期望的透明度和对意图的保证。”

The Japanese government said in a statement on Monday that it had “conveyed its serious concern regarding the intensification of China’s military activities.” Japan had urged China to reconsider the launch, the statement said.

日本政府在周一的声明中表示，日方已“就中国不断加强的军事活动表达了严重关切”。声明称，日本曾敦促中国重新考虑此次发射。

In its announcement on Monday, the Chinese government did not specify the type of missile it tested.

在周一发布的公告中，中国政府并未说明试射的导弹型号。

Jeffrey Lewis, a scholar at Middlebury College in Vermont who studies China’s nuclear weapons modernization, said that he thought the Chinese military was most likely testing the JL-3, a new generation ICBM that is designed to be launched from submarines.

佛蒙特州明德学院研究中国核武器现代化进程的学者杰弗里·刘易斯表示，他认为中国军方最有可能试射的是巨浪-3(JL-3)，这是一种设计用于从潜艇发射的新一代洲际弹道导弹。

China displayed the JL-3 missile at a military parade in Beijing last year, part of its growing array of nuclear weapons.

去年，中国在北京举行的阅兵式上展示了巨浪-3导弹，这是其日益壮大的核武库的一部分。

The latest test suggested that China’s test launches of nuclear-capable weapons will accelerate in coming years, said Mr. Lewis.

刘易斯表示，最新这次试射表明，中国在未来几年将加快具备核打击能力武器的试射。

“It suggests a new era of testing where every system will get its moment in the sun,” he said, referring to China’s growing array of new nuclear-capable missiles.

“这预示着一个新的测试时代，每种系统都有机会大放异彩，”他说，他指的是中国日益扩大的新型具备核能力导弹阵列。

“The Chinese have historically tested their ICBMs less than other countries,” Mr. Lewis said, referring to intercontinental ballistic missiles. “I think that was political and now those politics have changed and I think they’re adopting an approach of testing more. They’re willing to pay the political costs of that in a way that they weren’t in the past.”

“从历史上看，中国试射洲际弹道导弹的次数比其他国家少，”刘易斯说。“我认为这曾是出于政治考虑，但现在政治环境已经发生了变化，我想他们正在采取一种进行更多测试的策略。他们现在愿意为此付出政治代价，而在过去他们是不愿这么做的。”

The 2024 test most likely involved a DF-31 road-mobile missile that was launched from Hainan, an island province in southern China, according to an analysis published by the Federation of American Scientists.

美国科学家联合会发表的分析报告指出，2024年的试射极有可能涉及一枚从中国南方岛屿省份海南发射的东风-31(DF-31)公路机动导弹。

With robots, publicity events and official speeches, China is mounting a propaganda effort to promote and defend a new “ethnic unity” law that critics say will further undermine the rights of Tibetans, Uyghurs and other minorities in the country.

中国正在用机器人、宣传活动以及官方演讲发起一场政治宣传攻势，以推广并捍卫一部新的“民族团结”法律。批评人士指出，该法将进一步削弱国内藏族、维吾尔族及其他少数民族的权利。

The law grants sweeping powers to Beijing to pursue groups and people overseas seen as undermining national unity or inciting ethnic division. That has raised concerns that the Chinese authorities would accuse activists living abroad of crimes and seek their extradition or repatriation to China.

该法律赋予了北京方面广泛的权力，用以追究那些被认为破坏国家统一或煽动民族分裂的海外团体和个人。这引发了外界的担忧，即中国当局可能会指控居住在国外的活动人士犯罪，并寻求将他们引渡或遣返回中国。

Since the law went into effect on Wednesday, Tibetan and Uyghur activists have held demonstrations against it in Washington and Brussels. One Tibetan activist set himself on fire outside the United Nations headquarters in New York on Thursday and died. Human rights groups, Western governments and American lawmakers have issued statements criticizing the measure.

自该法于周三生效以来，藏族和维吾尔族活动人士已在华盛顿和布鲁塞尔举行了反对该法的示威游行。上周四，一名藏族活动人士在纽约联合国总部外自焚身亡。人权组织、西方政府以及美国国会议员纷纷发表声明，对这一举措提出批评。

China has pushed back aggressively against the criticism, which China’s vice minister of justice, Hu Weilie, has blamed on “distorted interpretations” by the Western media of the legislation. Mr. Hu said the law was “legitimate, legal, necessary,” and in line with international norms. On Friday, Guo Jiakun, a spokesman for China’s Foreign Ministry, accused the United States and the European Union of “maliciously slandering” his country’s policies.

中国对这些批评进行了强硬回击。中国司法部副部长胡卫列将其归咎于西方媒体对该立法的“歪曲解读”。他表示，该法律是“正当合法、必要可行的”，且符合国际通例。周五，中国外交部发言人郭嘉昆指责美国和欧盟“恶意诋毁”中国的政策。

The rhetoric underscores how intolerant the Chinese Communist Party under President Xi Jinping has become of any criticism of its treatment of ethnic minorities. Under Mr. Xi, the party has imposed heavy crackdowns on such groups, particularly targeting the Tibetans, to erode the influence of the Dalai Lama in Tibet, and the Uyghurs, a Muslim minority in Xinjiang.

这些言论凸显出在国家主席习近平的领导下，中国共产党对任何针对其少数民族政策的批评变得多么不能容忍。在习近平任内，中共对这些群体实施了严厉的管控，特别是针对西藏的藏族人（以削弱达赖喇嘛在西藏的影响力）以及新疆的穆斯林少数民族维吾尔族人。

新疆阿勒泰地区的一处夜市。中国一直试图削弱该地区的文化与宗教遗产，并强行同化其穆斯林少数民族。

While the government says the new rules will protect the traditions of all 56 officially recognized ethnic groups, they appear to be mainly focused on assimilating minority groups into the culture of the Han Chinese, who are a majority in China.

尽管政府表示新规将保护所有56个官方承认的民族的传统，但它们似乎主要侧重于将少数民族群体融入在中国占人口多数的汉族文化之中。

An editorial in the state-run Global Times on Thursday accused “some Western countries and media outlets” of maligning China’s ethnic policies. “Their claims, detached from facts and shaped by prejudice, amount to nothing more than one-sided rhetoric,” it said.

官方媒体《环球时报》周四发表社论，指责“一些西方国家及媒体”诋毁中国的民族政策。社论称：“他们的说辞脱离事实、充满偏见，不过是一面之词。”

Officials in China held events meant to rally public support for the new law. On Wednesday, at least half a dozen Chinese cities held cultural performances and public discussions to promote the new law, according to state media reports. Such demonstrations are usually symbolic, intended to signal to the world that citizens across the country are united behind a national policy.

中国官方举行了旨在争取公众支持新法的活动。据官方媒体报道，周三，至少有六个中国城市举行了文化表演和公开讨论来推广新法。此类展示通常具有象征意义，旨在向外界表明全国各地的公民都团结一致支持国家政策。

With tight censorship online, it is hard to see how ordinary Chinese perceive the new law. But such measures have set off unrest in the past. In Inner Mongolia, restrictions on the use of Mongolian in local schools prompted widespread protests in 2020. This week, local officials invited Communist Party cadres and residents to play tug of war and skip rope in the name of ethnic unity.

鉴于网络审查严格，很难了解普通中国民众如何看待这部新法。但此类举措在过去曾引发过不安。在内蒙古，由于官方限制当地学校使用蒙古语，2020年曾发生过大规模抗议。本周，当地官员以民族团结的名义邀请党政干部和居民开展了拔河和跳绳比赛。

In Chengxi District of Qinghai Province, home to the Hui, a Muslim ethnic group, a robot answered questions about the law. A video showed the robot clapping next to a sign that called for “a shared future characterized by blood ties, shared beliefs, cultural affinity, economic interdependence and emotional closeness.” In June, several counties in Xinjiang held competitions where cadres were tested on their knowledge of the new law.

在回族（一个穆斯林少数民族）聚居的青海省西宁市城西区，一个机器人现场解答了关于该法律的提问。视频显示，该机器人坐在一块标语牌旁鼓掌，标语牌上写着呼吁建设“血脉相融、信念相同、文化相通、经济相依、情感相亲的命运共同体”。今年6月，新疆数个县还举行了竞赛，对干部掌握新法知识的情况进行了测试。

The law bans any acts that “undermine ethnic unity or create ethnic divisions” among Chinese people inside or outside of China and requires all of Chinese society to participate in the mission of ethnic integration. It mandates Mandarin Chinese as the language of instruction in schools and in official communication and orders parents to “educate and guide children to love the Chinese Communist Party.”

该法禁止任何在国内外中国人中“破坏民族团结和制造民族分裂”的行为，并要求全中国社会共同参与到民族融合的使命中。它规定国家通用语言文字（普通话）为学校教学和官方交往的规范用语，并要求家长“教育和引导未成年人热爱中国共产党”。

去年在印度达兰萨拉附近，藏族人举行祈祷仪式庆祝达赖喇嘛90岁生日。而在中国，当局一直将藏族的精神生活作为管控目标，以削弱达赖喇嘛在西藏地区的影响力。

President Lai Ching-te of Taiwan, who said the ethnic unity law could be used to target Taiwanese citizens, called on the international community to oppose it. Taiwan is a self-governed island that China claims as its own.

台湾总统赖清德表示，该民族团结法可能会被用来针对台湾公民，并呼吁国际社会予以反对。台湾是一个自治岛屿，中国声称对其拥有主权。

In response, Zhu Fenglian, a spokeswoman for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, said on Thursday that the measure would help “pool the strength of all ethnic groups nationwide to advance the building of a strong country.”

对此，中国国台办发言人朱凤莲周四回应称，这一举措将有助于“为推动全国各族人民共同以中国式现代化全面推进强国建设、民族复兴伟业凝聚磅礴力量”。

Human rights groups have called for the law, which was passed at China’s annual legislative meeting in March, to be repealed. Volker Türk, the United Nations’ high commissioner for human rights, said last month that it “risks deepening restrictions on freedoms of language, education, practice of religion, culture, expression and assembly” of minorities in China.

人权组织呼吁废除这项于今年3月在中国年度立法会议上通过的法律。联合国人权事务高级专员沃尔克·图尔克上个月表示，该法“可能会加剧限制中国少数民族语言、教育、宗教信仰仪式、文化、表达及集会自由”。

In a letter to the Chinese government in April, eight human rights experts said the law could have “serious implications” for Tibetans, Uyghurs and Mongolians.

在今年4月致中国政府的一封信中，八位人权专家表示，该法可能会对藏族、维吾尔族和蒙古族人产生“严重影响”。

The law embodies Mr. Xi’s goal to forge a single national identity molded by the Communist Party. It is also part of his campaign to tighten his control over Xinjiang and Tibet, where demands for greater autonomy have in the past erupted into violence.

这部法律体现了习近平旨在打造一个由共产党塑造的单一国家认同的目标。这也是他加强对新疆和西藏控制行动的一部分，这两个地区在过去曾因要求更大自治权的呼声而引发过冲突。

To assert its control, the Chinese government has conducted mass detentions of residents and forced political indoctrination, separated children from their families and suppressed of population growth. Those measures have led to the erasure of minority languages, religious traditions and cultural norms.

为了确立控制，中国政府对当地居民进行了大规模拘禁并强制实施政治灌输，将儿童与家庭分离，并压制人口增长。这些举措导致了少数民族语言、宗教传统和文化规范的消解。

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s slain supreme leader, had seemed immovable for decades, a man whose authority had become so deeply woven into Iran’s political and religious life that imagining the country without him felt almost impossible.

伊朗被杀的最高领袖阿亚图拉阿里·哈梅内伊数十年来似乎不可撼动。他的权威已深深交织在伊朗的政治与宗教生活中，以至于几乎无法想象一个没有他的国家。

Now Tehran — the capital from which he ruled, where he was killed and which had shaped his life — is the center of his final journey, filled with mourners for funeral ceremonies taking place across several days, which are part farewell, part spectacle and part turning point.

如今，德黑兰——这座他曾在此执政、遇刺身亡、并塑造了他一生的首都——成为了他最后旅程的中心。这里挤满了前来参加为期数天葬礼的哀悼者，这些仪式既是告别，也是奇观，更是一种转折点。

In the days leading up to the first public mourning, the city changed. First gradually, and then all at once, in the way cities often change before moments of consequence.

在首次公开悼念活动前的几天里，这座城市发生了变化。起初是渐渐地，然后是突如其来地，就像城市在重大历史时刻到来前常有的变化那样。

Families from provincial towns rolled into Tehran, joining masses who revered Ayatollah Khamenei as patriarch and guardian of the Islamic republic, an order that so many others had long opposed while suffering under its deep repression. Foreign officials, many from authoritarian nations, militia members and religious leaders flew from all over the world, reflecting both Iran’s global reach and its distance from the West.

来自各省城镇的家庭涌入德黑兰，加入了将阿亚图拉·哈梅内伊尊为伊斯兰共和国大家长和守护者的民众行列；而这个政权长久以来也曾遭到许多人的反对，他们长期遭受严酷的压迫。来自世界各地的外国官员（其中许多来自威权国家）、民兵成员和宗教领袖纷纷飞抵这里，这既反映了伊朗的全球影响力，也体现了它与西方之间的距离。

We traveled there as well, the first visit by New York Times journalists to the country since before the United States and Israel attacked Iran in late February and the government cracked down brutally on protests that started in December. We found a country trying to project strength and stability but pervaded by uncertainty.

我们也前往了那里，这是自伊朗政府对始于去年12月的抗议活动进行残酷镇压、2月下旬美国和以色列袭击伊朗以来，《纽约时报》记者首次访问该国。我们发现，这个国家正努力展现力量与稳定，但处处依然弥漫着不确定性。

We arrived in Tehran, a dense city of around nine million that spreads outward in a sprawl of apartment blocks, glass towers and tree-lined boulevards, with neighborhoods that shift in character from one district to the next. Beside the pomp and circumstance, war-damaged buildings stood scarred along major roads and daily life was still shaped by water shortages and electricity blackouts. Families who lost loved ones in the crackdown were still living with grief — and hoping for justice.

我们抵达了德黑兰，在这座有约900万人口的密集城市，公寓楼、玻璃塔楼和绿树成荫的大道向外蔓延，街区风貌各不相同。在隆重的排场之外，因战争受损的建筑伤痕累累，矗立于主干道两旁矗立，日常生活仍受到缺水和停电的困扰。在镇压中失去亲人的家庭仍生活在悲痛之中，同时也期盼正义得以伸张。

周五，德黑兰市中心的恩格拉布广场上，悼念者挥舞着伊朗国旗。周五晚上，悼念者们在祈祷。周五，一名街头小贩兜售阿亚图拉哈梅内伊和其他伊朗领导人的肖像画。

As more people arrived, Ayatollah Khamenei’s presence seemed to expand with them. Across major highways and narrow alleys, in small cafes and sprawling bookstores, portraits of him began to cover the city.

随着越来越多的人抵达，阿亚图拉哈梅内伊的身影似乎也在随之扩张。无论是在主要高速公路还是狭窄的小巷，无论是小咖啡馆还是宽敞的书店，他的画像开始覆盖这座城市。

Some show him young, with a dark beard and a stern expression. Others portray the older man many Iranians had grown used to seeing over decades, his beard turned white with age. In some, Ayatollah Khamenei appears beside Mojtaba, his son and successor, the pairing feeling less like a portrait than the passing of one chapter into the next.

有些画像上的他很年轻，留着深色胡须，表情严厉。还有一些描绘了许多伊朗人数十年来早已习惯看到的那个老人，胡须因年迈而变白。在部分画像中，阿亚图拉哈梅内伊与他的儿子兼继任者穆杰塔巴并肩出现，这样的组合与其说是肖像，不如说更像是一个时代的落幕与新篇章的开启。

The funeral preparations unfolded with the choreography of a major state event. Security checkpoints, organized transportation, public announcements, carefully arranged ceremonial spaces.

葬礼的准备工作按照重大国家活动的规划有条不紊地展开。安全检查站、组织有序的交通、公众通告，以及精心布置的仪式空间。

We were granted restricted access to the funeral ceremonies by the Iranian government, which closely controlled our movements, and which required a translator and guide to accompany us. It was a quiet reminder of how closely the story itself was being choreographed, and who was permitted to tell it.

伊朗政府允许我们有限度地进入葬礼仪式，但密切控制我们的行动，并要求翻译和向导陪同。这是一个无声的提醒：报道本身也在被严密地规划，谁被允许讲述它也是如此。

The streets, too, were managed and staged.

街道同样受到管控和布置。

Along Valiasr Street, where traffic usually performs its daily ritual of impatience and frustration, movement slowed as the roads gradually surrendered to the funeral preparations. Workers built stations to feed and give water to those arriving to mourn him.

瓦利亚斯尔大道平日的交通总是充斥着日常的焦躁与沮丧，随着道路逐渐让位于葬礼筹备工作，如今车流变得缓慢。工人们搭建了站点，为前来悼念的人们提供食物和水。

Loudspeakers sent chants and laments through the air, and praised the supreme leader who was killed at the onset of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran.

扩音器播放着圣歌和哀乐，赞颂这位在美以对伊朗战争爆发之初被杀的最高领袖。

A little farther away, at Enghelab Square, another version of Tehran moved beneath a giant mourning billboard.

在稍远一点的恩格拉布广场，另一个德黑兰在一块巨大的哀悼广告牌下悄然呈现。

周五的恩格拉布广场。即举行葬礼的大莫萨拉清真寺里的女学生们。周五，公众获准瞻仰哈梅内伊大阿亚图拉灵柩的前一天，街头设立了一个食品饮料摊位。

Young women with uncovered hair and cigarettes in hand, and men with pierced ears, crossed paths with conservative women in black chadors carrying Iranian flags and praying quietly. It was an image that seemed to contain the contradictions of Iran itself: a nation Ayatollah Khamenei had shaped for decades, and one that, in his final years, had increasingly pushed back against the boundaries of his oppressive rule.

没戴头巾、手拿香烟的年轻女子和戴着耳钉的男子与穿着黑色罩袍、举着伊朗国旗、静静祈祷的保守女性擦肩而过。这个画面似乎凝聚了伊朗本身的矛盾：这是一个哈梅内伊塑造了数十年的国家，但在他生命的最后几年，这个国家却日益挑战他专制统治的界限。

We lingered for almost two hours at the square, where most people were unwilling to talk to us, wary of foreign media. We asked to interview a woman with blond hair, a dark blue denim skirt, full makeup and a hijab barely resting at the edge of her hair. She smiled softly and said, “I am afraid I won’t be able to say what’s in my heart.”

我们在广场上逗留了近两个小时，那里的大多数人都不愿与我们交谈，对外国媒体保持警惕。我们请求采访一位一头金发、穿深蓝色牛仔裙、化着全妆、头巾只是搭在头发边缘的女士。她微微一笑，说道：“恐怕我无法说出心里话。”

At the square, some people stopped to photograph the giant statue of a clenched fist. Others kept walking and driving by. Every evening, life continued beneath the preparations, ordinary rhythms folding themselves into something much larger. Street vendors calling out, motorcycles weaving between cars, tea glasses clinking in small cafes.

在广场上，有些人停下脚步，拍摄那座紧握的拳头的巨型雕像。也有人继续步行，或驱车经过。每天傍晚，生活在筹备工作之下继续，平凡的节奏融入了更宏大的图景之中。街头小贩高声叫卖，摩托车在汽车间穿梭，小咖啡馆里茶杯叮当作响。

Beneath the banners and portraits was another Tehran, a city worn by months of pressure.

在横幅和画像之下，是另一个德黑兰，一座被几个月来的压力消磨的城市。

A regional war with Israel last year compounded a financial malaise exacerbated by sanctions. Those economic frustrations boiled over into mass protests beginning in late December that the authorities crushed, killing thousands. Then came the war with the United States and Israel, taking the lives of young children at school, damaging historic sites like Golestan Palace and leaving residents checking the skies and refreshing news alerts. The past months had seemed to compress multiple eras of strain into a single season.

去年与以色列的地区战争加剧了因制裁而恶化的经济萎靡。这些经济上的挫败感在12月下旬演变为大规模抗议活动，当局予以镇压，导致数千人死亡。随后爆发了与美国和以色列的战争，这场战争夺走了学校幼童的生命，破坏了古列斯坦宫等历史遗迹，让居民们不得不时刻留意天空，不断刷新新闻警报。过去的几个月，多个时代的压力仿佛被浓缩到一个季节之中。

And states — especially autocratic ones like Iran’s — often answer uncertainty with scale.

而国家——尤其是像伊朗这样的专制国家——往往会用大规模的排场来应对不确定性。

So this exhausted capital has suddenly found itself transformed into the stage for a burial spectacle of extraordinary proportions.

因此，这座疲惫不堪的首都突然间变成了一场规模空前的葬礼盛典的舞台。

周六，大莫萨拉的悼念者们。历史悠久的古列斯坦宫内部受损。周六，经过大莫萨拉的安检处。

At the Grand Mosalla, a sprawling mosque complex in Tehran, tens of thousands arrived this weekend dressed almost entirely in black to pray for and pay their respects to the Shiite Muslim patriarch. They cried and wailed openly. They struck their chests and heads in ritual mourning. Some sat on the ground, weary and stunned.

本周末，数万名身着黑色服装的信徒涌入德黑兰庞大的大莫萨拉清真寺，为这位什叶派穆斯林大家长祈祷并致敬。他们公开哭泣和哀号，按照悼念仪式捶打胸膛和头部。一些人疲惫而茫然地坐在地上。

“Khamenei was the foundation of our lives,” said Mohamed Soleimani, from Tehran, who sat at the mosque’s grounds, head bowed, holding a photo of Mojtaba Khamenei.

“哈梅内伊是我们生活的根基，”来自德黑兰的穆罕默德·苏莱马尼说，他低着头坐在清真寺广场上，手拿穆杰塔巴·哈梅内伊的照片。

Grief also gave way to anger. Fists rose in the air. Chants of revenge filled the space — directed at Israel, at the United States and, repeatedly, at one man whose name was taken up again and again by the crowd: Donald J. Trump.

悲痛逐渐转化为愤怒。人们高举拳头，复仇的呼声响彻全场——矛头直指以色列、美国，人群一次又一次地反复呼喊着一个人的名字：唐纳德·J·特朗普。

The funeral, which will continue in the coming days through Tehran, other Iranian cities and even neighboring Iraq, seems designed to do something larger than simply bury a leader.

这场葬礼将在未来几天内陆续在德黑兰、伊朗其他城市乃至邻国伊拉克举行，目的似乎不仅限于安葬一位领导人，亦旨在实现某种更宏大的目标。

It is an effort to project continuity at a moment when the country itself seems caught in a period of transition and uncertainty.

在国家本身似乎正处于转型与不确定时期之际，这是为了展现国家政权的延续性。

So Iran moves forward for now, beneath commemorative banners and enormous portraits of Ayatollah Khamenei, still trying to understand what exactly is ending — and what is taking shape in its place.

因此，伊朗暂时在阿亚图拉哈梅内伊的纪念横幅和巨大画像下继续前行，同时仍在努力弄清楚究竟什么正在终结——以及什么正在取而代之。

周六在大莫萨拉。

Since resuscitating relations with China from a low point a few years ago, the Australian government has relied on an oft-repeated mantra to “cooperate where we can, disagree where we must.”

自从几年前中澳双边关系从低谷中改善以来，澳大利亚政府一直奉行着一个被反复提及的准则，即“在能够合作的地方进行合作，在必须反对的地方表达反对”。

Some of those disagreements came into view this week as Chinese diplomats pushed back against an Australian intelligence assessment and Canberra’s security-deal making in the Pacific, accusing the country of stoking paranoia and unfairly targeting China.

本周，随着中国外交官对澳大利亚的一份情报评估以及堪培拉在太平洋地区签署的安全协议进行回击，部分上述分歧显现了出来。中方指责澳方煽动偏执情绪并极不公正地针对中国。

In one of the public skirmishes, China’s ambassador to Australia, Xiao Qian, responded to an annual threat assessment speech given by Australia’s top intelligence official, Mike Burgess, by writing an opinion piece published this week in the Sydney Morning Herald.

在其中一场公开交锋中，中国驻澳大利亚大使肖千针对澳大利亚最高情报官员迈克·伯吉斯(Mike Burgess)发表的年度威胁评估演讲做出了回应，其撰写的评论文章于本周发表在《悉尼先驱晨报》上。

Mr. Burgess warned about foreign interference in Australian society as well as “coercive repatriations” and attempts to gain access to critical infrastructure. He did not mention China by name, but a video at the event reportedly showed footage of Chinese nationals who were arrested in Canberra for allegedly covertly collecting information on a Buddhist group in Australia on behalf of Chinese security officials.

伯吉斯在演讲中对外国干涉澳大利亚社会、“强迫遣返”和试图渗透关键基础设施的行为发出了警告。他并未直接提及中国的名字，但据报道，活动现场的一段视频播放了多名中国公民在堪培拉被捕的画面，他们被指控涉嫌代表中国安全官员秘密收集澳大利亚一个佛教团体的情报。

Mr. Xiao took issue with the clip, calling it “one-sided.” Saying Australian organizations and media outlets had “repeatedly fabricated and hyped falsehoods and fallacies regarding the security threat posed by China,” Mr. Xiao wrote that the allegations had “deeply wounded the feelings of the people of both China and Australia, and undermined the atmosphere of friendly cooperation between the two sides.”

肖千对这段视频提出了异议，称其“片面”。他表示，澳大利亚的某些机构和媒体“频繁制造、煽炒‘中国安全威胁’谎言谬论”，他写道，这些指控“深深伤害了中澳两国人民的感情，破坏了双方友好合作的氛围”。

In a twist on the Australian government’s China policy, Mr. Xiao said the two countries should be “seeking common ground while shelving differences.”

针对澳大利亚政府的对华政策，肖千换了一种说法，表示两国应当“求同存异”。

The comments come amid China’s efforts to burnish its image in the region as a responsible partner and global power, while reminding Canberra that relations could spiral again. (Punishing economic sanctions blocked Australian imports into China for several years, until 2024.)

这些言论发表之际，中国正努力在地区内树立其作为负责任合作伙伴和全球大国的形象，同时也在提醒堪培拉，双边关系随时可能再次陷入恶性循环。（惩罚性的经济制裁曾连续几年阻止澳大利亚商品进口到中国，直到2024年才宣告结束。）

At the same time, Australian public perception of China has reached a high point not seen in years, with more than 60 percent of Australians saying they viewed the country more as an economic partner than as a security threat — a drastic flip from about four years ago when those proportions were reversed. With the simultaneous erosion of Australians’ view of the U.S. administration, the levels of trust in either the United States or China to “act responsibly” in the world are now almost evenly matched.

与此同时，澳大利亚公众对中国的正面认知达到了多年未见的高点，超过60%的澳大利亚人表示，他们更多地将中国视为经济合作伙伴而非安全威胁——这与大约四年前的情况截然相反。由于澳大利亚人对美国政府的看法同时在恶化，目前公众对美国和中国在国际事务中“负责任行事“的信任度几乎不相上下。

中国驻澳大利亚大使肖千于1月在堪培拉举行的一场新闻发布会上。他曾表示，两国应当“求同存异”。

Jingdong Yuan, associate senior fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, said the pushback from the Chinese ambassador to Australia was a sign of the fragility of the relationship between the countries, which is “stable only to the extent that they both have enormous economic stakes.”

斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所高级副研究员袁劲东表示，中国驻澳大使的回击显现出两国关系的脆弱性，这种关系“仅仅稳定在双方都拥有巨大经济利益的层面上”。

“It is neither party’s interest to deliberately destabilize or cause some problems. But it doesn’t mean they see things eye to eye, so there’s still a huge gap there,” he said.

他说：“故意破坏稳定或制造麻烦并不符合任何一方的利益。但这并不意味着他们看待问题能完全一致，因此彼此之间仍存在巨大的鸿沟。”

Mr. Xiao, in his piece, accused Australian officials of viewing the relationship “through the lens of a Cold War mentality and using national security as a pretext to portray China as a hypothetical enemy,” warning that such an approach would run counter to Australia’s national interest.

肖千在其文章中指责澳大利亚官员“用冷战思维”来看待两国关系，“用‘国家安全’把中国描述成“假想敌””，他警告称，这种做法将背离澳大利亚的国家利益。

An editorial in the state-run Global Times this week was blunt: “These recent petty moves by relevant Australian authorities inevitably recall the unpleasant period in China-Australia relations a few years ago.”

官方媒体《环球时报》本周发表的社论则非常直白：“澳大利亚有关部门搞的这些小动作，令人联想起前几年中澳关系那段不愉快的历史。”

‘An excuse for geopolitical contest’

“地缘政治博弈的借口”

China is Australia’s most important trading partner, accounting for almost a third of its exports. At the same time, Beijing’s increasing military ambitions in the region have been felt closer and closer to Australian shores, as it pursued security agreements with Pacific island nations and sent warships to traverse nearby waters.

中国是澳大利亚最重要的贸易伙伴，占其出口总额的近三分之一。与此同时，随着北京在太平洋岛国寻求安全协议并派遣军舰穿越附近海域，其在该地区日益增长的军事意图正越来越清晰地在澳大利亚海岸线附近被感知到。

Since Prime Minister Anthony Albanese of Australia took office in 2022, he has performed a balancing act of trying to improve the economic relationship and back away from the previous government’s more confrontational stance toward Beijing, while aggressively tending to its partnerships in the Pacific to ward off China’s encroachment.

自2022年上台以来，澳大利亚总理安东尼·阿尔巴尼斯一直在实行一种平衡战术：一方面试图改善经济关系，告别前任政府对北京更具对抗性的姿态；另一方面又竭力维系其在太平洋地区的伙伴关系，以抵御中国的渗透。

“The Albanese government has gradually recognized that China is not a neighboring power that can be marginalized, bypassed, or ‘controlled’ through security policies, but rather an important partner with whom Australia must coexist pragmatically over the long term,” said Chen Hong, director of the Australian Studies Center at East China Normal University in Shanghai.

上海华东师范大学澳大利亚研究中心主任陈弘表示：“阿尔巴尼斯政府已经逐渐认识到，中国并不是一个可以通过安全政策被边缘化、绕开或‘控制’的邻国，而是一个澳大利亚必须与其长期务实共存的重要伙伴。”

This week, Australia finalized a long-sought security pact with Vanuatu, in which the small nation of about 330,000 about three hours by plane from Australia agreed that it will “not permit its territory to be used for any foreign military base or infrastructure” and confirmed that Australia is its “primary policing partner.” This comes after China has sought policing deals with several Pacific countries.

本周，澳大利亚与瓦努阿图正式敲定了一项谋求已久的安全协定。根据协议，这个距离澳大利亚约三小时航程、人口约33万的小国同意，“不准许其领土被用于任何外国军事基地或基础设施”，并确认澳大利亚是其“主要警务合作伙伴”。此前，中国一直在与数个太平洋国家寻求警务合作协议。

Asked about the agreement, a spokesman for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said cooperation with Pacific island nations “should not target any third party, still less be used as an excuse for geopolitical contest.” China, which is also pursuing its own agreement with Vanuatu, is approaching nations in the region “fair and square,” said Guo Jiakun, the spokesman.

在被问及该协议时，中国外交部发言人郭嘉昆表示，同太平洋岛国的合作“不应针对第三方，更不应借此搞地缘博弈”。他还表示，中国与该地区国家的接触是“光明磊落”的。北京同样在寻求与瓦努阿图达成自身协议。

澳大利亚与瓦努阿图领导人于6月在堪培拉出席一场签字仪式。在这项协定中，瓦努阿图同意“不准许其领土被用于任何外国军事基地”。

“Our cooperation is not imposed on anyone, nor does it target any third party,” he said.

双方的合作“既不强加于人，也不针对第三方”，他说。

When it comes to the Pacific islands, “That’s an area where the Albanese government isn’t hedging at all, it’s out-and-out to block incursions into the Pacific, making no apologies for that,” said James Laurenceson, director of the Australia-China Relations Institute at the University of Technology Sydney.

悉尼科技大学澳中关系研究院院长詹姆斯·劳伦斯森表示，在涉及太平洋岛国的问题上，“那是阿尔巴尼斯政府完全不含糊的领域，完全是为了阻止外部势力涉足太平洋，且对此毫不遮掩。”

China and Australia will continue to disagree on spheres of influence in the region and over U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific, but have been able to register their differences without the relationship deteriorating as it did around 2020, Mr. Laurenceson said.

劳伦斯森表示，中国和澳大利亚将继续在该地区的势力范围以及美国在亚太地区的军事存在等问题上各执己见，但双方已经能够做到陈述各自的分歧而不至于让关系恶化到2020年左右的境地。

“You’ve got Canberra and Beijing agreeing to disagree, neither side overreacts, and the relationship kind of moves on,” he said.

“现实是堪培拉和北京同意保留分歧，任何一方都不会做出过激反应，双边关系得以继续向前推进，”他说。

The stabilization has been a hallmark of Mr. Albanese’s foreign policy, who has taken a vastly different tack than his predecessors, who made a point of pledging to “stand up” to China, publicly airing accusations of foreign interference and raising questions about the origins of the Covid-19 coronavirus.

这种稳定化已经成为了阿尔巴尼斯外交政策的核心标志。他采取了与前任截然不同的策略，其前任曾高调承诺对中国要“站起来”，公开宣扬外国干涉指控，并对新冠病毒的起源提出质疑。

Mr. Albanese has met with China’s leader, Xi Jinping, four times, trying to keep the focus on trade and tourism, and exercising restraint in remarks about Chinese military presence in a way the conservative opposition at home has attacked as “weak.”

阿尔巴尼斯已经与中国最高领导人习近平举行了四次会晤，努力将焦点锁定在贸易和旅游上，并在评论中国军事存在时保持克制，这种做法被国内的保守派反对党抨击为“软弱”。

Still, he has been forthright in speaking about Beijing’s ambitions in the region, saying in a recent interview with The New York Times that the Chinese are “interested in increasing their influence at a minimum, and hegemony in the longer term.”

尽管如此，他在谈及北京在各地区的意图时依然非常直率，在最近接受《纽约时报》采访时他表示，中国“至少对扩大其影响力感兴趣，从长远来看则是谋求霸权”。

The Australian public is similarly nuanced in its views of China, said Charles Lyons-Jones, a research fellow at the Sydney-based Lowy Institute, who carried out the recent opinion polls on Australian public perceptions of China and the United States.

总部位于悉尼的布鲁金斯学会悉尼罗伊研究所研究员查尔斯·里昂斯-琼斯表示，澳大利亚公众对中国的看法同样不是非黑即白的。他近期就澳大利亚公众对中美的看法进行了民意调查。

“Australians support the trading relationship with China but remain cleareyed about the security threat,” he said. “They are highly capable of holding contradictory ideas at the same time.”

“澳大利亚人支持与中国的贸易关系，但对安全威胁保持着清醒的认识，”他说。“他们完全有能力包容相互矛盾的想法。”

The pastor of a prominent underground church in China who was detained last year as part of a crackdown on religious activity was released on Friday, his daughter said, less than two months after President Trump raised his case with China’s leader, Xi Jinping.

一位知名中国地下教会牧师的女儿表示，她的父亲已于周五获释。这位牧师是去年中国对宗教活动的打击中被捕的。就在不到两个月前，特朗普总统曾向中国领导人习近平提到了他的案件。

The pastor, Jin Mingri, who also goes by the name Ezra, was freed after more than 250 days in custody and allowed to leave for the United States.

这位牧师名叫金明日，又名以斯拉，他在遭羁押逾250天后获释，并获准赴美。

Mr. Jin, the pastor and founder of Zion Church, was detained in October and later charged with “illegally using information networks.” After the Chinese authorities shut down the physical headquarters of his church in Beijing in 2018, he moved its operations online, broadcasting sermons on the internet. Those streams were widely popular, reaching an estimated 10,000 people all over China, Mr. Jin’s daughter, Grace Jin Drexel, said.

作为锡安教会的牧师和创始人，金明日于去年10月遭到拘留，随后被指控非法利用信息网络罪。2018年中国当局关闭了该教会位于北京的实体总部后，他将教会活动转移至线上，通过网络直播讲道。金明日的女儿金婷雅表示，这些网络直播非常受欢迎，估计有1万名遍布全国的信众收看。

Mr. Jin was detained as part of a wider campaign against religious groups in China. Several other pastors were similarly taken into custody as Mr. Xi’s government tightened its grip.

金明日是中国针对宗教团体的更广泛行动的一部分。随着习近平政府收紧管控，还有几名牧师也同样遭到羁押。

Mr. Jin, 57, was one of two non-Americans whose plights were raised by Mr. Trump in May, when he met with Mr. Xi in Beijing. The other was Jimmy Lai, the Hong Kong pro-democracy media tycoon, who is a British citizen. Mr. Trump told reporters then that Mr. Xi had said he would “strongly consider the pastor” but that Mr. Lai’s case was a “tough one.” In February, Mr. Lai was sentenced to 20 years in prison by a Hong Kong court after he was convicted of “conspiracy to collude with foreign forces.”

57岁的金明日是特朗普5月在北京与习近平会晤时提到的两位非美国籍人士之一。另一位是香港民主派媒体大亨黎智英，他有英国国籍。特朗普当时对记者表示，习近平说会“认真考虑这位牧师的案件”，但黎智英的案件“很棘手”。今年2月，黎智英被香港法院以串谋勾结外国势力罪判处20年有期徒刑。

Ms. Jin Drexel said in a telephone interview on Saturday that she was “very much overjoyed and thankful that this happened.”

金婷雅在周六接受电话采访时表示，她“非常高兴，也非常感恩这件事终于发生了”。

She said she had been reunited with her father on Friday night when he arrived in Los Angeles. It was the first time she had seen him since 2020, she said, and he was able to meet his one-month-old grandson for the first time. He is named Ezra in Mr. Jin’s honor.

她说，周五晚上，父亲抵达洛杉矶后，父女才得以团聚。她说，这是自2020年以来第一次见到父亲，而且父亲也第一次见到刚满月的外孙。为了向金明日致敬，这个孩子的英文名字也叫以斯拉。

金明日牧师的女儿金婷雅今年在得克萨斯州举行的保守派政治行动会议上讲述父亲的案情，她居住在美国。

Ms. Jin Drexel later sent a statement on behalf of the family, thanking “President Trump and his administration for their tremendous leadership.”

金婷雅随后代表全家发表声明，感谢“特朗普总统及其政府展现出的卓越领导力”。

“We know that this could not have happened without the direct intervention from Chairman Xi Jinping,” the statement said. “We hope this is a signal of a positive turn for people of faith in China and relations between our two nations.”

声明还说：“我们知道，如果没有习近平主席的直接干预，这件事不可能发生。我们希望这能成为中国信徒及两国关系朝正面转变的讯号。”

John Kamm, the founder of Dui Hua, a U.S.-based human rights group that has long advocated for the release of political prisoners from China, said the fact that Mr. Jin’s release happened on the eve of the Fourth of July was symbolically important.

长期致力于推动中国释放政治犯的美国人权组织——对话基金会的创始人康原(John Kamm)表示，金明日在美国独立日前夕获释具有重要的象征意义。

“It signifies what I’ve said many, many times: that if the Chinese want something bad enough, they will make concessions,” Mr. Kamm said.

“这再一次印证了我一直说的一点：如果中国真的非常想得到某些东西，他们就会做出让步，”康原说。

Relations between China and the United States have largely stabilized after a rocky 2025, when the countries exchanged economic threats and tit-for-tat tariffs. Despite lingering tensions, both sides agreed in May to implement a “constructive strategic stability” to prevent the relationship from spiraling into direct conflict.

在经历了动荡的2025年后，中美关系已基本趋于稳定。当时两国互相发出经济威胁，并采取针锋相对的关税措施。尽管紧张态势仍未完全消散，双方在今年5月同意建立一种“建设性战略稳定关系”，以防止两国关系滑向直接冲突。

Among the policy changes that China has long wanted from the United States is a cessation of arms sales to Taiwan, which Mr. Xi has described as “the most important issue in China-U.S. relations.”

中国长期希望美国作出的政策调整之一是停止向台湾出售武器。习近平曾将台湾问题称为“中美关系重中之重”。

Mr. Trump said that he had discussed pending weapons transfers to Taiwan, a self-governing island that Beijing considers its territory, with Mr. Xi during the summit, calling a $14 billion weapons package that Congress approved in January a “very good negotiating chip.” The package has been stalled by the White House.

特朗普表示，他在峰会期间与习近平讨论了尚待落实的对台军售问题，称国会今年1月批准的一项140亿美元对台军售方案是一个“很好的谈判筹码”。目前该方案已被白宫搁置。

Before his arrest, Mr. Jin had been subject to years of surveillance and harassment. He was barred from leaving China to visit family members, who left the country in 2018, Ms. Jin Drexel said. She, her mother and her two younger brothers live in the United States.

在被捕之前，金明日已经长年受监视和骚扰。金婷雅表示，当局禁止他出境探视2018年离开中国的家人——她本人、母亲和两个弟弟均居住在美国。

The Chinese Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, but in practice, the Chinese Communist Party permits only tightly controlled, state-approved congregations to operate openly. Still, it is estimated that tens of millions of Chinese Christians worship in underground churches, also called house churches.

中国宪法保障宗教信仰自由，但在实际操作中，中共只允许受到严格控制、经国家批准的教团公开活动。尽管如此，据估计，仍有数以千万计的中国基督徒在地下教会（也称“家庭教会”）进行礼拜活动。

Ms. Jin Drexel said she remained very worried about eight of Zion’s other pastors who were remain detained in China.

金婷雅表示，她依然非常担心锡安教会其他八位仍遭关押的牧师。

One of them, Franklin Wang Lin, told his church members in June that the authorities had recently added another charge of fraud against him, in addition to one of “illegal business operations.”

其中一位牧师王林今年6月告诉教会成员，当局在原有的非法经营罪之外，近期又追加了一项诈骗罪。

In a letter, Mr. Wang wrote that he had lost more than 30 pounds while in custody and was malnourished. The letter was sent to Mr. Wang’s wife, Su Ziming, through his lawyer.

在一封通过律师转交给妻子苏子明的信中，王林写道，他在关押期间体重减轻了14公斤，并且出现了营养不良。

Mr. Wang wrote that the authorities were seeking to define the collection of donations by Christians as fraud, which would be a rejection of “the two-thousand year tradition of Christian belief and practice.”

他在信中写道，当局试图将基督徒奉献捐款的行为定性为欺诈，这无异于“对两千年信仰传承基督教道统与信仰本身的”否定。

“Our faith is not a crime,” Ms. Su said.

“我们的信仰不是罪，”苏子明说。

China is opening a new front in its pressure campaign against Taiwan, sending ships to its east to drive home a political point: Beijing claims not only the island itself but also the seas around it.

中国正在开辟施压台湾行动的新战线，向台湾以东海域派遣舰船，以此强调一个政治立场：北京不仅对该岛本身，也对其周边海域宣称拥有主权。

The China Coast Guard announced on Saturday that its ships would conduct “law-enforcement patrols” in the Western Pacific waters east of Taiwan, a self-ruled island of 23 million people that Beijing claims as its territory.

中国海警局周六宣布，其舰艇将在台湾以东的西太平洋水域进行“执法巡查”。台湾是一个拥有2300万人口的自治岛屿，北京宣称其为中国领土。

The Western Pacific is crowded with commercial traffic and would be a vital arena if Beijing ever tried to blockade or invade Taiwan. China’s coast guard ships are often hulking, well-armed vessels that complement the country’s naval forces. They have been vital to Beijing’s efforts to dominate the disputed South China Sea, sometimes by swarming waters, ramming vessels or blasting crews with powerful water cannons.

西太平洋商业航运密集。如果北京试图封锁或武力攻打台湾，这里将是一个至关重要的战场。中国海警船通常是体型庞大、装备精良的舰船，是对中国海军力量的补充。在北京试图控制有争议的南海的过程中，这些船只发挥了关键作用，有时通过在海域集结、撞击船只或用强力水炮喷射船员等方式施压。

During the patrols, the coast guard ships “will continue to strengthen law-enforcement patrols in waters under China’s jurisdiction and firmly safeguard China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests,” the China Coast Guard said on Saturday.

中国海警局周六表示，在巡查期间，海警舰艇“将持续加强在中国管辖海域执法巡查，坚决维护国家领土主权和海洋权益”。

By Sunday, the two Chinese ships, the Xiushan and the Chongming, were between 80 and 140 miles off Taiwan’s east coast, said Ou Yu-fei, an official for Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration.

台湾海巡署官员欧宇飞（音）表示，截至周日，两艘中国舰船“秀山”舰和“崇明”舰正位于距离台湾东海岸约128至225公里的海域。

Chinese coast guard ships have operated east of Taiwan before, including as part of military exercises. The difference now is that the patrols are intensive and coordinated, and accompanied by declarations of a political intent, said Ray Powell, a former U.S. Air Force officer who is the director of SeaLight, a group that monitors and is critical of Chinese maritime pressure activities against its neighbors.

中国海警船以前曾在台湾以东海域活动，包括作为军事演习一部分的活动。前美国空军军官、负责监控并批评中国对邻国海上施压活动的组织“海光”的主任雷·鲍威尔表示，如今的不同之处在于，这些巡查既密集又协调一致，并伴有明确政治意图的宣示。

“With these actions, they’re into the blue Pacific,” he said. “China just keeps squeezing Taiwan like a boa constrictor, trying to tighten its grip over lines of communication.”

“通过这些行动，他们正在进入蓝色太平洋，”他说。“中国就像蟒蛇一样不断挤压台湾，试图收紧对台湾交通线的控制。”

Beijing’s high-profile deployment of these ships east of Taiwan are a step forward in its efforts to pressure the island by challenging Taiwanese control of these seas and practicing steps that could be part of a blockade.

北京高调向台湾以东海域部署这些舰船是向该岛施压行动的进一步举措，旨在挑战台湾对这些海域的控制，并演练可能成为封锁行动一部分的步骤。

The latest patrols followed similar ones in June, when Chinese coast guard, maritime safety and scientific exploration ships engaged in operations in the same waters. The United States, Britain, France and Germany issued statements last month criticizing the Coast Guard operations off east Taiwan.

最近的巡航紧随6月份的类似行动，当时中国海警船、海事安全船和科学考察船在同一水域进行了作业。美国、英国、法国和德国上个月均发表声明，批评中国海警在台湾以东海域的行动。

“It’s another indication that China intends to continue to put the squeeze on Taiwan, warning that in the future it’s going to find itself increasingly isolated and cut off,” Mr. Powell said on Sunday.

鲍威尔周日表示：“这再次表明，中国打算继续对台湾施压，警告台湾未来将面临日益孤立和联系被切断的局面。”

Taiwan’s government responded to the latest Chinese patrols with deployments of its own, and rejected Beijing’s claims of sovereignty. The Taiwan Coast Guard sent at least two ships to track the Chinese vessels and said it would “take all necessary measures to forcefully expel Chinese vessels that engage in harassment in our national waters.”

台湾政府针对中国最近的巡查行动进行了相应部署，并拒绝了北京对主权的主张。台湾海巡署派出至少两艘舰艇跟踪中国船只，并表示将“采取一切必要手段，强势驱离骚扰的中国船舶”。

China “has no jurisdiction or related rights” over these waters, and “none of its government vessels have the authority to enforce laws there,” the Mainland Affairs Council, which oversees relations with Beijing, said on Saturday.

负责处理与北京关系的台湾陆委会周六表示，中国在这些海域“不存在任何主权及相关权利”，“中共所有公务舰艇在此也没有执法权力”。

The seas in question are outside of Taiwan’s territorial waters. They are within waters where Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan assert overlapping rights to economic activities such as mining and fishing.

相关海域位于台湾领海之外。它们属于日本、菲律宾和台湾主张对采矿和捕鱼等经济活动拥有重叠权利的海域。

The Chinese patrols east of Taiwan in June began after Japan and the Philippines announced that they were in formal negotiations over their competing claims to exclusive economic zones and continental shelves. Beijing condemned the talks, arguing that because it has sovereignty over Taiwan, it also has a legal stake in that dispute.

中国6月份在台湾以东的巡查是在日本和菲律宾宣布就两国对专属经济区和大陆架的竞争性主张进行正式谈判之后开始的。北京谴责了这些会谈，认为因为它对台湾拥有主权，所以它在该争端中也拥有合法权益。

China first sent out coast guard ships, which were then joined by maritime safety ships in what the country’s Ministry of Transport called a “maritime traffic law enforcement operation.”

中国首先派出了海警船，随后海事船也加入其中，中国交通运输部称之为“海上交通专项执法行动”。

Taiwanese officials have said that the Chinese coast guard ships radioed at least three commercial ships, demanding information about the ships’ crews, destinations and other details.

台湾官员表示，中国海警船通过无线电联络了至少三艘商船，要求提供有关船员、目的地和其他细节的信息。

Taiwan has told commercial ships passing through the area to ignore such demands from China. But a Chinese crew member on one ship complied, supplying information to a Chinese coast guard officer, said two Taiwanese officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive information. The compliance by the ship was first reported by Agence France-Presse, which said it was a Singapore-flagged cargo carrier.

台湾已告知途经该区域的商船无视中国的此类要求。但两名因讨论敏感信息而要求匿名的台湾官员表示，其中一艘船上的一名中国船员遵从了要求，向一名中国海警官员提供了信息。该船的配合行为首先由法新社报道，该社称这是一艘悬挂新加坡国旗的货船。

一艘台湾海警船正在金门附近巡逻，金门是位于中国海岸附近、由台湾控制的一组岛屿。台湾的海警船队规模要小得多。

Up to now, Chinese coast guard patrols around Taiwan have mostly been in the strait between the island and the mainland. Since 2024, China has regularly patrolled near Kinmen, a set of islands near the Chinese coast that is controlled by Taiwan.

到目前为止，中国海警在台湾周围的巡查主要集中在台湾和大陆之间的海峡。自2024年以来，中国开始定期在金门附近巡航，金门是靠近中国海岸、由台湾控制的一组岛屿。

China’s navy has also continued expanding patrols and exercises around Taiwan. In July, Chinese and Russian navies will hold a joint exercise off Qingdao, a city on China’s northeast coast, and forces from both sides would then “conduct a joint maritime patrol” in the Pacific Ocean, China’s Ministry of National Defense said on Sunday.

中国海军也继续扩大在台湾周边的巡逻和演习。中国国防部周日表示，今年7月，中俄两国海军将在中国东北沿海城市青岛附近海域举行联合演习，随后双方部队将在太平洋“组织海上联合巡航”。

As China’s leader, Xi Jinping, forges toward a fourth term in power, he confronts a dilemma common to aging autocrats: testing and recruiting a rising generation of loyal officials while ensuring his own dominance.

随着中国领导人习近平向第四个任期迈进，他面临年长威权领导人普遍会遇到的难题：如何在确保自己绝对主导地位的同时，考察并培养新一代忠诚的官员。

To manage this looming challenge, he is leaning on Cai Qi, a longtime deputy who is probably the most influential official in Mr. Xi’s inner circle.

为了应对这一日益逼近的挑战，他正倚重蔡奇——一位长期追随习近平左右、在其核心圈子中或许最具影响力的副手。

Tall, silver-haired, and constantly at Mr. Xi’s side, Mr. Cai is a supercharged chief of staff to his leader. Mr. Cai holds multiple leading roles, including in national security and running the central office for Mr. Xi and other senior Communist Party officials.

身材高大、满头银发、几乎时刻陪伴在习近平身边的蔡奇堪称领导人的超级幕僚长。他身兼多个领导职务，包括国家安全领域，以及为习近平和其他中共高级官员服务的中央办公厅。

Mr. Xi recently appointed him president of the Central Party School, the elite academy that trains rising officials. Mr. Cai is also overseeing a new campaign to instill Mr. Xi’s ideas about discipline and loyalty among cadres.

最近，习近平任命他兼任中央党校校长，这所学校是中共培养未来领导干部的摇篮。蔡奇同时还负责主持一项新运动，旨在向广大干部灌输习近平关于纪律和忠诚的理念。

Mr. Cai’s new roles indicated that he might take an important role in vetting potential new senior officials and enforcing the strict ideological standards that Mr. Xi is likely to expect from a new cohort of potential leaders. Mr. Xi is expected to secure another five-year term at a Communist Party congress late next year, a feat that would extend his rule to at least 20 years and potentially well into the 2030s.

蔡奇的这些新职务表明，他可能在把关未来的高层人选、执行习近平可能对新一批储备领导人提出的严苛意识形态标准方面发挥重要作用。预计习近平将在明年年底召开的中共党代会上获得又一个五年任期，这将使他的执政时间延长至至少20年，并有可能延续至2030年代中后期。

“The ability to speak on behalf of Xi Jinping is the rarest commodity in elite Chinese politics, and Cai Qi has that,” said Julian Gewirtz, who served as the senior director for China at the National Security Council during the Biden administration and is now a scholar at Columbia University.

“代表习近平发言的能力是中国高层政治中最稀缺的特质，而蔡奇恰恰拥有它，”曾在拜登政府国家安全委员会担任中国事务高级主任、现为哥伦比亚大学学者的朱利安·格维兹说。

He said that Mr. Cai’s leadership of the party school meant that he was “probably one of a very small number of people who can prepare the dossiers for Xi on those officials.”

他还表示，蔡奇执掌中央党校意味着他“很可能是极少数能够为习近平准备这些官员档案资料的人之一”。

习近平与蔡奇去年在北京。

Mr. Cai, 70, is among a cluster of senior officials who first worked with Mr. Xi when he was still a young official in eastern China in the 1990s and 2000s. In recent years, Mr. Cai appears to have risen to become Mr. Xi’s closest adviser and the tough enforcer of his vision. (Mr. Cai’s name is pronounced TSIGH Chee.)

现年70岁的蔡奇是最早与习近平共事的高层官员之一——那还是上世纪90年代和本世纪前十年，习近平当时在中国东部担任地方官员。近年来，蔡奇似乎已经成为习近平最得力的心腹，也是及其政治愿景的强硬执行者。

“Into the second decade of his rule, Xi has come to value strict adherence to his stated desires, and Cai has been the official to ensure that,” said Victor Shih, a professor at the University of California San Diego who studies elite politics in China.

“进入执政第二个十年，习近平愈发看重对他既定意图的严格贯彻，而蔡奇正是确保这一点得以落实的官员，”研究中国精英政治的加州大学圣地亚哥分校教授史宗瀚说。

Mr. Cai did not always seem so stern. Back in the 1990s and 2000s, as an official in Fujian and Zhejiang provinces, he cultivated a reputation as an approachable, open-minded official.

蔡奇并非总是显得如此严厉。20世纪90年代和21世纪初，在担任福建省和浙江省的地方官员时，他曾以平易近人、思想开明著称。

He visited Taiwan in 2012 and wrote a travel diary that praised its many convenience stores. He opened a Weibo social media account that attracted millions of followers, with posts addressing residents’ complaints and presenting himself as an enlightened, open official.

2012年他曾访问台湾，并写下旅行日记，称赞台湾遍布各地的便利店。他还开设了微博账号，吸引了数百万粉丝，发帖回应民众的诉求，将自己塑造成一位开明、开放的官员。

“Openness is a good thing,” he wrote in one post. “For any political party, relying on self-restraint is not enough.”

“公开是个好东西，”他曾在一条微博中写道。“任何政党，仅仅靠自我约束是不够的。”

But after Mr. Cai was transferred to Beijing by Mr. Xi, he shed his folksy demeanor and quickly transformed into a guardian of Mr. Xi’s draconian priorities. He erased his Weibo account. In 2014, Mr. Cai helped establish the secretive Central National Security Commission, which expanded Beijing’s control over domestic and external security risks.

但在蔡奇被习近平调往北京之后，他便卸下亲民姿态，迅速转变为习近平强硬政策的捍卫者。他注销了自己的微博账号。2014年，蔡奇参与筹建了神秘的中央国家安全委员会，进一步扩大了北京对国内外安全风险的掌控。

Three years later, Mr. Xi promoted Mr. Cai to be the mayor and party secretary of Beijing, a sensitive role focused on ensuring stability and order in the Chinese capital. Mr. Cai waged campaigns to remake the city in line with Mr. Xi’s vision.

三年后，习近平提拔蔡奇出任北京市市长和市委书记。这是一个极其敏感的职位，主要任务是确保首都的稳定与秩序。蔡奇随后开展了一系列行动，按照习近平的设想重塑北京。

In late 2017, Mr. Cai launched a drive to expel hundreds of thousands of migrant workers from Beijing in the name of housing safety. The city government had long been trying to reduce the number of low-income migrants in Beijing and to attract more higher-paid, university-educated professionals.

2017年底，蔡奇以房屋安全的名义发起了一场驱逐数十万外来务工人员的行动。北京市政府长期以来一直试图减少北京低收入外来人口的规模，吸引更多拥有大学学历的高薪专业人才。

2017年，蔡奇在北京发起了一场驱逐外来务工人员的行动。在大兴，整片的街区被拆除清空，居民的个人物品散落一地。

In a combative speech, Mr. Cai used the imagery of battle to order officials not to flinch from enforcing the unpopular expulsions.

在一次措辞强硬的讲话中，蔡奇以战场厮杀为喻，要求官员在执行这项不得人心的驱逐行动时，不得手软退缩。

“At the grass roots, it’s about using real swords and real guns, putting blood on the blade, having the guts to clash head-on,” Mr. Cai said in a speech to Beijing officials that circulated online. Mr. Cai’s brutal approach ignited widespread criticism in the city, including petitions and a call for him to resign.

“到了基层，就是要真刀真枪、就是要刺刀见红、就是要敢于硬碰硬，”蔡奇在一次面向北京官员的讲话中说道，该讲话在网上广为流传。他的强硬手段在北京引发强烈批评，出现了联署请愿，还有人公开呼吁他辞职。

In 2022, Mr. Xi promoted Mr. Cai to the Politburo Standing Committee, the party’s top echelon. Mr. Cai also became the director of the party’s General Office and head of its Secretariat, putting him in charge of the paperwork, meetings, health, security and travel of senior officials, including Mr. Xi.

2022年，习近平提拔蔡奇进入中共中央政治局常委会，这是中共最高权力核心。蔡奇同时还出任中共中央办公厅主任和中央书记处书记，负责包括习近平在内的高层官员的文件处理、会议安排、健康保障、安全警卫和出行事务。

Official reports indicate that Mr. Cai also oversees cybersecurity policy and is a deputy head of the Central National Security Commission, which monitors threats at home and abroad, roles that are usually kept behind a veil of secrecy. But his importance to Mr. Xi is clear. When Mr. Xi hosted President Trump on a state visit in May, Mr. Cai was first in the line of officials whom Mr. Xi introduced to Mr. Trump at a welcome ceremony.

官方报道显示，蔡奇还负责网络安全政策，并担任中央国家安全委员会副主席，该委员会负责监督国内外安全威胁，这些职务通常笼罩在保密的面纱之下。但蔡奇对习近平的重要性显而易见。今年5月，习近平接待美国总统进行国事访问时，蔡奇在他向特朗普介绍的官员队伍中排第一位。

Now Mr. Cai’s role overseeing party affairs may give him a voice in choosing the officials who will help Mr. Xi achieve his goal of transforming China into a technological superpower and of bringing Taiwan, the democratic self-ruled island, under Beijing’s control.

现在，蔡奇主管党务工作的角色或将赋予他在选拔官员方面的话语权——这些官员将协助习近平实现将中国打造成科技强国、将民主自治岛屿台湾置于北京控制之下这两大目标。

In 2018, Mr. Xi abolished a limit on his tenure as president, opening the way to lead indefinitely. Analysts say they do not expect Mr. Xi, 73, to name his own successor for years, to maintain his unchallenged control of the state.

2018年，习近平取消了国家主席任期限制，为无限期执政铺平了道路。分析人士认为，为了维持无人挑战的权力，现年73岁的习近平未来几年内不会指定接班人。

Even so, Mr. Xi will need to replenish the ranks of top officials. More than two-thirds of the officials on the Communist Party’s Central Committee — a leadership council that has about 200 full members — will retire next year if an age norm applies. That norm means that most senior officials who are 68 or older at the time of the party congress step down.

即便如此，习近平仍需要补充高层官员队伍。如果年龄惯例继续适用，那么中共中央委员会约200名正式委员中，超过三分之二将在明年退休。根据这一惯例，在党代会召开时年满68岁或以上的大多数高级官员都将卸任。

“When a political strongman like Xi Jinping reaches his late years, his sense of insecurity and distrust can rise, but he is not as familiar as he used to be with his new subordinates, which makes establishing that trust harder,” said Chien-wen Kou, a professor at National Chengchi University in Taiwan who studies China’s leaders.

“像习近平（这样）一个政治强人到晚年的时候，他的不安全感、他的不信任感是会上升的，可是他面对下面的这些部下是沒有像以前那么熟了，所以形成信任会更难的，”台湾政治大学研究中国领导人的教授寇健文表示。

But the opportunity to promote hundreds of officials carries risks. Mr. Xi has purged the People’s Liberation Army elite of many of the senior officers he had chosen to promote. Those accused of corruption and disloyalty and removed included General Zhang Youxia, whom Mr. Xi had kept on beyond the usual retirement age and appointed China’s top uniformed commander.

然而，提拔数百名官员的机会也伴随着风险。习近平此前清洗了多名由他亲手提拔的解放军高级将领。被指控腐败和不忠并被免职的人中，包括张又侠上将。习近平曾打破年龄惯例让他留任，并任命他为解放军最高指挥官。

蔡奇（满头银发、系红领带者）于2022年进入中共中央政治局常委会，这是中共权力的最高核心层。现在，预计他将在下一代高层官员的选拔过程中发挥关键作用。

“Given all that has happened, Xi Jinping will be even more cautious in recruitment screening ahead of the 21st party congress,” said Deng Yuwen, a former editor at the Study Times, a newspaper published by the Central Party School. “Xi Jinping wants to make sure that the ideas of future party and government cadres stay totally aligned with his.”

“既然出现这个事情，习近平对二十一大前的人事筛选工作会更加慎重，”曾任中央党校机关报《学习时报》编辑、现居美国的邓聿文说。“习近平要确保未来的党政干部的思想，要跟习近平保持完全一致。”

Even if Mr. Cai also steps down from his other roles next year, which is possible given his age, he may stay as president of the party school, said Mr. Deng, who now lives in the United States. Mr. Cai could then serve as Mr. Xi’s eyes and ears, spotting and vetting officials for promotion in coming years.

邓聿文还表示，即便明年蔡奇因年龄原因退下来，他仍可能继续担任中央党校校长。届时，蔡奇可能继续充当习近平的耳目，在未来几年为其物色、考察和筛选有望晋升的官员人选。

A Tibetan activist lit himself on fire and outside of the United Nations headquarters in New York on Thursday to protest China’s control over his homeland, declaring in a video before his self-immolation that Beijing’s policies were “destroying the Tibetan people.” He later died.

周四，一名西藏活动人士在纽约联合国总部外自焚，以抗议中国对其家乡的控制。他在自焚前录制的一段视频中表示，北京的政策正在“毁灭西藏人民”。他在自焚后不治身亡。

Friends of the activist identified him as Lobsang Palden, known as Lobga Rangzen, a 52-year-old resident of Queens. Originally from eastern Tibet, Lobga Rangzen had been an advocate of Tibetan independence for more than a decade.

这名活动人士的朋友确认，他是52岁的洛桑巴登，又名洛嘎让赞，居住在纽约皇后区。洛嘎让赞出生于西藏东部，十多年来一直是西藏独立的倡导者。

The police said that around 6:30 p.m. on Thursday they responded to a call for help at East 42nd Street and 1st Avenue, next to the U.N. headquarters, where they found a man with severe burns throughout his body. He was taken to Bellevue Hospital, where he was pronounced dead.

警方表示，周四下午6点30分左右，他们接到报警后，赶赴联合国总部旁的东42街和第一大道交叉口，发现了一名全身严重烧伤的男子。他被送往贝尔维尤医院，在那里被宣告死亡。

Lobga Rangzen appeared to have recorded his self-immolation on a livestream on his own Facebook page, which was verified by a friend of his. In it, he could be seen walking across a street outside of the U.N. building with a large Tibetan flag. Moments after he erected the flag on a street corner, he lit himself on fire. He stepped on to the street as his body was engulfed in flames then collapsed on the ground. (The video was later taken down.)

根据友人证实，洛嘎让赞似乎在自己的Facebook页面上直播了自焚过程。视频中，可以看到他手持一面巨大的西藏旗帜，穿过了联合国大楼外的一条街道。将旗帜立于街角后不久，他即点火自焚。火焰将他的身体吞噬，他走上马路，随后倒地。（该视频后来被删除。）

In another video posted on his Facebook page also on Thursday, Lobga Rangzen called on his compatriots in exile to unite and do more to fight for Tibet’s independence. He hinted that he planned a demonstration that day and said that it was purely for political reasons.

周四，他还在Facebook上发布了另一段视频，呼吁流亡海外的藏人团结起来，为西藏独立做出更多努力。他暗示自己当天将进行示威，并表示此举完全出于政治原因。

“So if I do a big action today, I want you to know it is not for any personal reason. It is not because I have nothing to eat or nothing to wear, but because I am doing this for my country. For the Tibetan nation,” he said.

“因此，如果我今天采取一个重大的行动，我希望你们知道，这不是出于任何个人原因。不是因为我没有吃的、没有穿的，而是为了西藏的独立，为了西藏的抗争。”

从社交媒体视频截取的照片显示，洛嘎让赞周四在联合国总部附近手持一面西藏旗帜。片刻之后，他点火自焚。

The protest took place a day after China implemented a new “ethnic unity” law that requires Mandarin be the main language of instruction in schools and includes other measures aimed at assimilating minorities such as Tibetans and Uyghurs into China’s mainstream Han Chinese majority.

此次抗议发生的前一天，中国实施了新的《民族团结促进法》。该法律要求将普通话作为学校的主要教学语言，并采取其他措施，让包括藏族和维吾尔族在内的少数民族进一步融入中国以汉族为主体的主流社会。

Since 2009, there have been more than 150 self-immolations of Tibetans in China in protest of Beijing’s hard-line campaign against what it sees as Tibetan separatism. The Communist Party has placed the region of Tibet and neighboring Tibetan areas under close security, tightly controlled its monks and monasteries and emphasized the teaching of Mandarin Chinese over Tibetan.

自2009年以来，已有150多名藏人在中国境内自焚，以抗议北京针对其眼中的“西藏分裂主义”所采取的强硬打压政策。中共对西藏及周边藏区实施严密的安全管控，对僧侣和寺院进行严格管理，将普通话教育置于藏语教育之上。

The self-immolations in China were initially carried out by monks, but nomads, farmers and others also began staging the protest. They were so frequent that in 2012, the top human rights official at the United Nations at the time, Navi Pillay, criticized China for the suppression of Tibetan rights, saying that it had driven them to “desperate forms of protest.” Ms. Pillay appealed to Tibetans to seek other ways of expressing their feelings and urged China to allow them to do so without retribution.

最初，在中国境内自焚的主要是僧侣，但后来牧民、农民和其他群体也开始采取这种抗议方式。这类事件发生得如此频繁，以至于在2012年，时任联合国人权事务高级专员纳维·皮莱批评中国压制西藏人的权利，并表示这种情况已迫使他们采取“绝望的抗议形式”。她呼吁藏人以其他方式表达自己的感受，同时敦促中国允许他们这样做而不进行打压。

Even as the self-immolations became central to the Tibetan protest movement, some Tibetans were anguished over the deaths of their young men and women and asked how the acts reconciled with Buddhist teachings. The Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader, has described the religious issues surrounding the self-immolations as “very, very complicated.”

尽管自焚成为了西藏抗议运动的核心，但一些藏人也对年轻男女的死亡感到痛心，并质疑这些行为如何与佛教教义相调和。西藏精神领袖达赖喇嘛曾形容围绕自焚的宗教问题“非常、非常复杂”。

Lobga Rangzen’s protest marks the first known self-immolation of a Tibetan in the United States, according to Tenzin Dorjee, director of research and advocacy at Tibet Action Institute, who was a friend of the activist. He said that Lobga Rangzen’s clarity and calm during his last statement suggested he had been planning this action for a while.

西藏行动中心的研究与倡导负责人、洛嘎让赞的朋友丹增多吉表示，这是藏人在美国境内已知的首例自焚。他说，洛嘎让赞在遗言中的清晰思路和冷静态度表明，他已为这一行动酝酿筹划了相当一段时间。

Tenzin Dorjee described his friend as a central member of the Tibetan community in New York, helping with cultural events and participating in countless demonstrations. “He would come to every single protest rally we ever organized,” he said.

丹增多吉形容他的朋友是纽约藏人社区的核心成员，帮助组织文化活动并参与了多次示威。“我们组织的每一次抗议集会，他都会出现，”他说。

“For him, there was no other goal or value in life that was higher than national liberation,” he said. “That was the singular thing that occupied and preoccupied him.”

“对他来说，人生中没有任何目标或价值能凌驾于民族解放之上，”他说。“这是占据并主宰他内心的唯一信念。”

According to Jamyang Norbu, a Tibetan writer and another friend of Lobga Rangzen, the activist was born in the Kham region of Tibet and went into exile in the 1980s. He attended a Tibetan monastery in India before moving to the United States, where he worked in construction and eventually became a cab driver.

据藏族作家、洛嘎让赞的另一位朋友嘉央诺布介绍，这位活动人士出生于西藏康区，于20世纪80年代流亡海外。他先在印度的一座藏传佛教寺院修行，后移居美国，在建筑行业工作，最终成为一名出租车司机。

Jamyang Norbu said that Lobga Rangzen had a brother in China who had been imprisoned.

嘉央诺布还说，洛嘎让赞有一个兄弟在国内曾经入狱。

On Thursday night, hundreds of demonstrators gathered outside of the U.N. building to commemorate Lobga Rangzen, according to Jamyang Norbu, who was at the rally. It was evidence of his friend’s popularity, as someone who frequently helped people with odd jobs.

嘉央诺布说，周四晚间，数百名示威者聚集在联合国大楼外，悼念洛嘎让赞。当时他本人也在现场。他说，这足以证明自己的朋友人缘好，因为他经常帮助别人做些零散杂活。

“He was funny, he was generous,” he said of his friend.

“他很风趣，也很慷慨，”他这样评价自己的朋友。

The presence of the demonstrators embodied Lobga Rangzen’s hope that the community would unite, overcoming differences over how to deal with Beijing. Some Tibetan activists support negotiating with the Chinese government for greater autonomy, rather than full independence.

示威者的聚集体现了洛嘎让赞的遗愿，即藏人社区应该团结一致，克服在如何应对北京问题上的分歧。一些西藏活动人士主张与中国政府谈判以获得更大的自治权，而非谋求完全独立。

“He drew a line in the sand here today. He’s saying unless you hold out for Tibetan independence, there’s no hope at all,” Jamyang Norbu said.

“他今天在这里划下了底线，他是在说：除非坚持西藏独立，否则根本没有任何希望，”嘉央诺布表示。

Tenzin Dorjee said that the last time he spoke with the activist was by phone in June, while he was hosting a fund-raiser in Queens. Lobga Rangzen called just as the event was wrapping up, apologizing that he could not make it but asking Tenzin Dorjee to call an Uber for an elderly man who had come but did not know how to order a car.

丹增多吉说，他最后一次与洛嘎让赞通话是在6月，当时他正在皇后区主持一场筹款活动。活动接近尾声时，洛嘎让赞打来电话，为自己未能赶到而道歉，随后请求丹增多吉为现场一位不知如何叫车的老人叫一辆优步。

“This is who he is, helping people all the time,” Tenzin said.

“这就是他，总是在帮助别人，”丹增说道。

How the world sees America, and how the country sees itself, can be credited, at least in part, to Hollywood. For as long as movies have been around, they have reinforced the stories we tell ourselves about our national character, such as your station in life isn’t dictated by your birth and anything is possible, including justice and untold riches, if you’re determined enough.

至少在某种程度上，世界眼中的美国以及美国眼中的美国都要归功于好莱坞的塑造。自电影诞生以来，它一直在不断强化美国人关于自身国民性的那些叙事：一个人的社会地位不由出身决定；只要足够坚定，一切皆有可能——无论是正义的实现还是难以想象的财富。

Of course, darker versions of this story also unspool in theaters. Is there a definitive movie about our nation? The answer undoubtedly varies by era and respondent. But with the country celebrating its 250th birthday and deeply divided, it’s a good time to look at the question anew.

当然，这类故事的黑暗版本也会在影院上映。有没有一部能够定义美国的终极电影？答案无疑会因时代和回答者而异。但在美国庆祝建国250周年、社会又严重分裂之际，眼下正是重新审视这一问题的好时机。

So I asked 10 writers what films they would pick to define America and why. Their choices ranged from blockbusters to indies, homegrown comedies to enigmatic Italian drama, a recent best-picture Oscar nominee to a little-known debut — in short, movies as varied as the country itself.

因此，我邀请了10位作家，让他们选择一部能定义美国的电影并阐明理由。他们的选择涵盖了从大片到独立制作、从本土喜剧到晦涩的意大利剧情片、从近期获得奥斯卡最佳影片提名的作品到鲜为人知的处女作——简而言之，这些电影本身就如这个国家一般多元。

— Stephanie Goodman

——斯蒂芬妮·古德曼

‘Killer of Sheep’ (1978)

《杀羊人》（Killer of Sheep，1978）

Stream on the Criterion Channel or rent on most major platforms.

可在Criterion频道或各大平台付费观看。

Charles Burnett’s masterpiece takes place in the Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles, in the mid-1970s, a decade after civil unrest there. Shot in black-and-white, the film is at once an expressionistic portrait of a poor Black family and of the country they live in, its idealism and bitter truths. There is soaring beauty as well as rueful comedy in Burnett’s vision, and pain that cuts to the bone. Here, every scarred wall and empty lot speaks to promises broken, as does the hollowed-out face of the father, a slaughterhouse worker (Henry G. Sanders).

查尔斯·伯内特的这部杰作以20世纪70年代中期洛杉矶沃茨社区为背景，故事发生在这里发生社会动荡十年之后。影片以以黑白胶片拍摄，既是对一个贫困黑人家庭的表现主义式描绘，也是他们所居住的这个国家的写照，展现了这个国家的理想主义与苦涩真相。伯内特的视野中有飞扬的美，也有令人心酸的幽默，更有深入骨髓的痛苦。在这里，每一面斑驳的墙壁、每一块空地都在诉说着破碎的承诺，屠宰场工作的父亲父亲（亨利·桑德斯饰）那空洞的面庞亦然。

Burnett is one of cinema’s greatest poets, but he’s also a cleareyed dialectician, as evident in the scene of children playing in what looks like an abandoned construction site, an interlude set to Paul Robeson’s “The House I Live In.” An ode to American idealism made famous by Frank Sinatra, that song opens with the question “What is America to me?” It registers very differently when sung by Robeson, a civil rights activist whose career was derailed during the Red Scare. With one indelible film, Burnett invokes American history and makes it.

伯内特是电影史上最伟大的诗人之一，也是一个有敏锐洞察力的辩证学家。影片中孩子们在一个貌似遭到废弃的建筑工地上玩耍的场景中，这一点体现得淋漓尽致——这一幕的配曲采用的是保罗·罗伯逊演唱的《我所居住的房子》。这首歌曾由弗兰克·辛纳屈唱红，是一首歌颂美国理想主义的作品，开头便问道：“美国对我而言意味着什么？”当它由罗伯逊——一位职业生涯在红色恐慌期间被毁的民权活动家——唱出时，却是另一番况味。凭借一部令人难忘的电影，伯内特既回望了美国历史，也创造了美国历史。

Other great movies about America: Ken Jacobs’s “Star Spangled to Death”; Frederick Wiseman’s “In Jackson Heights”; Ava DuVernay’s “13th.”

其他关于美国的伟大电影：肯·雅各布斯的《星光照亮死亡》(Star Spangled to Death)；弗雷德里克·怀斯曼的《在杰克逊高地》(In Jackson Heights)；阿娃·杜维内的《第十三修正案》(13th.)。

— Manohla Dargis

——马诺拉·达吉斯

‘There Will Be Blood’ (2007)

《血色将至》（There Will Be Blood，2007）

Stream on Paramount+.

可在Paramount+观看。

A ruthless, self-made mogul with a string of shady dealings in his past. An opportunistic preacher more interested in power than holiness. A country where fabulous wealth is available, if you’re willing to stomp your boot on your neighbor’s back. Paul Thomas Anderson’s 2007 epic, “There Will Be Blood,” which gave Daniel Day-Lewis one of his greatest roles, rips into the American dream, borrowing the cinematic language of Hollywood’s great westerns but inverting their themes.

一名心狠手辣、白手起家的大亨，身后劣迹斑斑；一名投机取巧的传教士，对权力的渴望远超对信仰的虔诚；一个财富触手可及的国度，只要你愿意把靴子踩在邻居的脊背上。保罗·托马斯·安德森2007年的史诗之作《血色将至》让丹尼尔·戴-刘易斯奉献了他最伟大的表演之一。这部影片撕开了美国梦的外皮，它借用了好莱坞伟大西部片的电影语言，却彻底颠覆了其主题。

In this vision of the West, the frontier yields oil as black as night and exacts blood in return as the twin forces of American prosperity — unfettered capitalists with no scruples and grifters who steal religion for their own ends — barrel toward an explosive conclusion. In this great land, “There Will Be Blood” suggests, you can gain the whole world as long as you’re prepared to lose your soul, too.

在这幅西部图景中，边疆地带产出黑夜般漆黑的石油，并以鲜血作为代价。美国繁荣的两股力量——毫无道德底线的资本家与利用宗教谋取私利的骗子——正冲向一个爆炸性的结局。《血色将至》似乎在说，在这片伟大的土地上，只要你准备好出卖自己的灵魂，就可以赢得整个世界。

— Alissa Wilkinson

——艾莉莎·威尔金森

‘Dazed and Confused’ (1993)

《年少轻狂》（Dazed and Confused ，1993）

左起：罗里·科克兰、杰森·伦敦与萨沙·詹森在这部理查德·林克莱特执导的悲喜剧中。

Rent on most major platforms.

可在各大平台付费观看。

Not long into “Dazed and Confused,” as Texas high schoolers pour out of classrooms for summer break in 1976, the cool teacher hollers about the impending Bicentennial: “Don’t forget what you’re celebrating, and that’s the fact that a bunch of slave-owning, aristocratic white males didn’t want to pay their taxes.”

《年少轻狂》开场不久，1976年得克萨斯州的高中生涌出教室奔向暑假时，那个酷酷的老师大声嚷嚷着即将到来的建国200周年纪念日：“别忘了你们在庆祝什么——庆祝的是一群拥有奴隶、贵族般的白男不想交税这件事。”

The national milestone lingers in the teenagers’ minds — “This country was founded by people who were into aliens, man,” the head stoner insists — but it’s mostly a backdrop for a rowdy night. As social cliques bleed together, conflicts arise: between old mores and new cultural groundswells, between patriotism and rebellion, between boundless freedom and nowhere to go. It’s in this friction that the Americanness of Richard Linklater’s 1993 dramedy is undeniable.

这个国家的里程碑在少年们脑海中萦绕——“这个国家是被那些痴迷外星人的人建立的，伙计，”那个整天嗑药的家伙坚持说——但它更多只是一场喧闹夜晚的背景。随着不同社交圈子的交融，冲突浮现了：旧道德与新文化浪潮之间、爱国主义与反叛之间、无限自由与无处可去之间。正是在这种摩擦中，理查德·林克莱特1993年的这部喜剧片的“美国性”无可辩驳。

As a high-school sophomore enamored with this depiction of American teen-hood, I rewatched it on VHS constantly. Choose wisely, it seemed to warn me, a child of immigrants acutely aware that who we are now sets the course for who we can be — and for whether that future self will surrender to groupthink or forever bristle against it.

当时我还是个高二学生，对这部电影里美国青少年的生活着迷不已，我曾用录像带一遍又一遍地重看。“明智地选择”，这部电影似乎在这样告诫我——作为一个移民的孩子，我敏锐地意识到，我们现在的样子决定了我们未来可能成为的样子，也决定了未来的自己究竟是会向群体思维屈服，还是永远保持反抗它的锋芒。

— Maya Salam

——玛雅·萨拉姆

‘Scarface’ (1932)

《疤面人》（Scarface，1932）

Rent on most major platforms.

可在各大平台付费观看。

Talk about American types: The epitome of slapstick mayhem and the censor-consternating sensation of 1932, “Scarface” was bankrolled by a legendary Texas-born tycoon (Howard Hughes) and directed by a big-time Hollywood auteur (Howard Hawks) from a script mainly by a celebrated Chicago newshound (Ben Hecht) as a vehicle for a former idol of New York’s Yiddish theater (Paul Muni), who plays a fictionalized portrait of the most notorious man in the country then (Al Capone). “Scarface” wasn’t the studios’ first gangster film, just the most violent and noisiest. Emerging amid a soundscape of screeching tires, clamorous machine guns and slang-slinging repartee, this Kabuki Capone is flanked by two great molls, one hot (Ann Dvorak), the other cool (Karen Morley). Because of rights issues, the godfather of American gangster films was unavailable for 33 years, which only enhanced its cult status. The meme-life of Brian De Palma’s 1983 remake attests to its power.

说到具有美国特色的人物类型，《疤面人》几乎将他们集齐。这部1932年的影片充满闹剧式的暴力，令审查机构头疼不已，上映后轰动一时。它由一位出生于得州的传奇富豪（霍华德·休斯）出资；好莱坞一流的作者导演（霍华德·霍克斯）执导；剧本主要出自一名芝加哥著名记者（本·赫克特）之手；为纽约意第绪剧院的昔日偶像（保罗·穆尼）量身打造；影片中，穆尼饰演的是当时全美国最臭名昭著的人物——阿尔·卡彭的虚构化身。《疤面人》不是好莱坞的第一部黑帮片，却是当时最暴力、最喧闹的一部。伴随着刺耳的轮胎摩擦声、震耳欲聋的机关枪声和俚语横飞的唇枪舌剑，这位带着歌舞伎式夸张色彩的“卡彭”身边有两位出色的黑帮情妇：一位火辣（安·德沃拉克饰），一位冷艳（凯伦·莫利饰）。由于版权问题，这部美国黑帮电影的教父之作消失了整整33年，这反而增强了它的邪典地位。布莱恩·德·帕尔玛1983年的翻拍版至今仍在互联网上不断被玩梗，也证明了这部电影持久的影响力。

Other great movies about America: Sam Peckinpah’s “The Wild Bunch”; Billy Wilder’s “Some Like It Hot”; Ryan Coogler’s “Sinners.”

其他关于美国的伟大电影：萨姆·佩金帕的《日落黄沙》(The Wild Bunch)；比利·怀尔德的《热情似火》(Some Like It Hot)；瑞恩·库格勒的《罪人》(Sinners)。

— J. Hoberman

——J·霍伯曼

‘The Florida Project’ (2017)

《佛罗里达乐园》(The Florida Project, 2017)

Stream on HBO Max.

可在HBO Max上流媒体观看。

Is there a more American city than Orlando, Fla.? Its attractions promise big dreams, big fun, total escape. But it often masks the tremendous working-class struggle required to keep those dreams alive. The director Sean Baker interprets the complications of Orlando, and America itself, in film form with this sun-soaked drama that unspools on the other side of the Disney world. Discount motels with names like Futureland Inn and Magic Castle are the homes and de facto playgrounds of children who spend their days engaging in games and a little mischief, amid these tarnished environs.

还有比佛罗里达州奥兰多更具美国特色的城市吗？它的景点承诺了宏大的梦想、极致的快乐和彻底的逃离。但它往往掩盖了维持这些梦想所必需的工薪阶层的巨大挣扎。在这部在迪士尼世界另一侧展开、阳光炙热的剧情片中，导演肖恩·贝克(Sean Baker)用电影形式诠释了奥兰多以及美国本身的复杂性。带有“未来世界旅馆”和“魔法城堡”等名字的廉价汽车旅馆成了孩子们的生活家园和实际游乐场，他们每天都在这些黯淡无光的环境中嬉戏并耍点小聪明。

Brooklynn Prince shines as the 6-year-old Moonee, the movie’s optimistic heart and soul. She creates her own kind of magic while the downtrodden grown-ups around her (including her mother, played by Bria Vinaite) try to make ends meet. Baker is deeply attuned to this dichotomy and guides the film with an epic scope and an intimate focus. The results are both charming and heartbreaking.

布鲁克琳·普林斯饰演的六岁女孩穆尼闪耀全场，成为这部电影乐观的核心与灵魂。当她身边饱受生活摧残的大人们（包括由布里亚·维纳特饰演的母亲）试图维持生计的时候，她创造出了属于自己的魔法。贝克对这种两面性有着极深的感悟，并以宏大的视野和细腻的焦点引导着电影。其结果既迷人又令人心碎。

Other great movies about America: Steven Spielberg’s “The Color Purple”; John Sayles’s “Lone Star”; Jordan Peele’s “Us.”

其他关于美国的杰出电影：史蒂文·斯皮尔伯格(Steven Spielberg)的《紫色》(The Color Purple)；约翰·赛尔斯(John Sayles)的《真爱同心》(Lone Star)；乔丹·皮尔(Jordan Peele)的《我们》(Us)。

— Mekado Murphy

——梅卡多·墨菲

‘Nashville’ (1975)

《纳什维尔》(Nashville, 1975)

基思·卡拉丹（车内），这是罗伯特·奥特曼经典电影中的一个场景。

Rent on most major platforms.

可在大多数主要平台上租借。

There are few filmmakers whose work encompasses America, in all its complexities and contradictions, as fully as Robert Altman’s. In his best movies, he took on sacred cows, hidebound institutions, frontier mythology and conventional notions of heroism, and did so with a knowing wink and quiet cackle. There’s something inherently American about his 1975 masterpiece, “Nashville” — how he’s reaching for something big and all-encompassing and audacious in interweaving 24 characters from a variety of backgrounds and social strata over a few days in the capital of country music.

很少有电影导演能像罗伯特·奥特曼这样，在作品中如此全面地展现美国的复杂与矛盾。在他最优秀的电影中，他以会心的微笑和低沉的笑声挑战了神圣的信条、保守的机构、边疆神话以及传统的英雄主义观念。他1975年的杰作《纳什维尔》带有某种自然天成的美国特质——在乡村音乐之都的几天时间里，他如何通过将来自各种背景和社会阶层的24个角色交织在一起来追求某种宏大、包容且大胆的东西。

The film’s unruly, unconventional structure became one of Altman’s trademarks, because he adored the messy intersections of real lives, how an eccentric outsider can end up rubbing elbows with a sneering establishment figure, and come out on top. It’s a movie full of music, of heartache, of patriotism and of political violence; it’s the entire American experience in 160 minutes.

这部电影散漫、非传统的结构成为了奥特曼的标志之一，因为他热爱现实生活中那些混乱的交集，看一个古怪的外来者如何最终与一个傲慢的建制人物混到一起，并成为最终的赢家。这是一部充斥着音乐、心碎、爱国主义和政治暴力的电影；它是浓缩成160分钟的完整美国体验。

Other great movies about America: Altman’s “McCabe & Mrs. Miller,” the story of a land powered by sex and flimflam; Oliver Stone’s “Born on the Fourth of July,” which grapples with what it really means to love your country (and serve it); Andrew Dominik’s “Killing Them Softly,” one of the most sharply cynical films about our country and our time.

其他关于美国的杰出电影： 奥特曼的《花村》(McCabe & Mrs. Miller)，讲述了一个由欲望和欺诈驱动的土地故事；奥利弗·斯通(Oliver Stone)的《生于七月四日》(Born on the Fourth of July)，直面了真正热爱祖国（并为之服务）的含义；安德鲁·多米尼克(Andrew Dominik)的《温柔杀戮》(Killing Them Softly)，关于我们国家和我们时代最尖锐、最讽刺的电影之一。

— Jason Bailey

——杰森·贝利

‘Dirty Dancing’ (1987)

《辣身舞》(Dirty Dancing, 1987)

Rent on most major platforms.

可在大多数主要平台上租借。

A study of class divides, labor, identity, women’s rights, health care and more hiding in a frothy coming-of-age romance, “Dirty Dancing” has all the right moves for understanding postwar America — and a killer soundtrack.

《辣身舞》表面上是一部轻松的青春浪漫剧，实则探讨了阶级分化、劳动、身份认同、女性权利、医疗保健等问题，它具备解战后美国的所有正确切入点——以及一首震撼人心的原声带。

Set amid the social upheavals of the ’60s in a Catskills resort, it follows the awakening, sexual and otherwise, of Baby, a sheltered young guest — Jennifer Grey, in a career-defining role — as she meets Johnny, the edgy dance instructor played by a frequently shirtless Patrick Swayze. (Note their characters’ surnames: her Houseman to his Castle; she’s Jewish and well off, and he — despite the aspirational name — is not. Their affair was a taboo-buster in their era.)

影片以60年代动荡的社会为背景，故事在一家凯茨基尔度假村展开。未经世事的年轻来客“宝贝”邂逅了特立独行的舞蹈教练约翰尼，由此迎来了她在性意识及其他层面的觉醒。“宝贝”由珍妮弗·格雷饰演，这也是她职业生涯的巅峰之作；饰演约翰尼的帕特里克·斯威兹在片中经常赤裸上身。（注意他们角色的姓氏：她姓Houseman（管家），他姓Castle（城堡）；她是犹太人，家境优渥，他——尽管名字带有期许——却并非如此。他们的恋情在那个时代打破了禁忌。）

A frank plotline about abortion was a cinematic rarity — Eleanor Bergstein, the screenwriter, fought to keep it in. The message is that culture can lead to social and political change — nobody puts Baby in a corner! — especially when it’s shimmied in by dancers and musicians (notably, the movie’s only people of color).

关于堕胎的坦率情节在当时是影坛罕见的——编剧埃莉诺·伯格斯坦极力坚持将其保留。影片传达的信息是，文化可以引发社会和政治的变革——没有人能把“宝贝”晾在角落里！——尤其是当它由舞者和音乐家（值得注意的是，他们是电影中仅有的有色人种）摇摆融入时。

— Melena Ryzik

——梅莱娜·雷齐克

‘Zabriskie Point’ (1970)

《扎布里斯基角》(Zabriskie Point, 1970)

Set in summer 1968 in the Mojave Desert, Michelangelo Antonioni’s “Zabriskie Point” is a hypnotic meditation on American ideals told through strangers turned lovers: a college dropout on the lam and a secretary driving through on a work trip. They spend one fever dream of an afternoon wandering the landscape, discussing societal tensions and stumbling into an extremely dusty orgy. (It’s Antonioni and the ’60s, after all.)

米开朗基罗·安东尼奥尼的《扎布里斯基角》背景设定在1968年夏天的莫哈韦沙漠，是一部关于美国理想的催眠般迷幻的沉思录。这是两个萍水相逢的人变成爱侣的故事：一个是在逃的大学辍学生，一个是工作出差途中开车的秘书。他们在一个如梦似幻的下午在原野上漫步，讨论社会紧张局势，并偶然闯入了一场尘土飞扬的群交。（这毕竟是安东尼奥尼，是60年代。）

“There’s a thousand sides — not just heroes and villains,” the secretary (Daria Halprin) tells the dropout (Mark Frechette), which seems to have been the Italian director’s view of the United States. Between the mesmerizing scenes of the American West and the pulsing score from Pink Floyd and Jerry Garcia are moments of intense social unrest, crime and corporate greed. The F.B.I. investigated the film for anti-Americanism, but Antonioni crafts an outsider’s love letter to America, its people and everything it can hold, warts and all.

“有一千个侧面——不仅仅是英雄和恶棍，”秘书（达里亚·哈尔普林饰）告诉辍学生（马克·弗雷切特饰），这似乎正是这位意大利导演对美国的看法。在美国西部迷人的风光与平克·弗洛伊德和杰里·加西亚激昂的配乐之间，是剧烈的社会动荡、犯罪和企业贪婪的时刻。联邦调查局曾以反美主义为由对该片展开调查，但安东尼奥尼却为美国、其人民以及它所能承载的一切——包括它的不完美——创作了一封局外人的情书。

Other great movies about America: Chloé Zhao’s “Nomadland”; Sean Price Williams’s “The Sweet East”; Martin Scorsese’s “Goodfellas.”

其他关于美国的杰出电影： 赵婷的《无依之地》(Nomadland)；肖恩·普莱斯·威廉姆斯(Sean Price Williams)的《甜蜜的东方》(The Sweet East)；马丁·斯科塞斯(Martin Scorsese)的《好家伙》(Goodfellas)。

— Amanda Webster

——阿曼达·韦伯斯特

‘Nothing but a Man’ (1964)

《只是个男人》(Nothing but a Man, 1964)

Rent on most major platforms.

可在大多数主要平台上租借。

The director Michael Roemer was born in Berlin in 1928. He didn’t know what it was like to be young, Black and precariously employed in pre-Civil Rights Act Alabama, like Duff Anderson, the admirable but self-destructive character at the center of his first feature film. What Roemer did know — the feeling of being unwelcome in your own country, the spiritual toll of de facto serfdom — he poured into his miraculous screenplay, which, in the tradition of Tocqueville and Gunnar Myrdal, reflects America back on itself as only an outsider can.

在《民权法案》颁布前的亚拉巴马州，一个工作朝不保夕的黑人青年过着怎样的生活，1928年出生于柏林的导演迈克尔·罗默并不了解。而他的首部长片的核心人物达夫·安德森就是如此，这个角色令人钦佩却又自我毁灭。但罗默深知在自己的祖国不受欢迎的感受，深知事实上的农奴制对精神的摧残——他将这一切倾注进了他这个奇迹般的剧本中。该片秉承托克维尔与冈纳·缪达尔的传统，以只有局外人能做到的方式让美国照见自身的倒影。

Starring an unforgettable Ivan Dixon (as Duff), with an outstanding supporting cast (Abbey Lincoln, Yaphet Kotto, Gloria Foster), “Nothing but a Man” tells a political story in a personal register. Its characters — informed by research trips that Roemer took across the South with his co-screenwriter, cinematographer and fellow Jew, Robert Young — are never anything other than human, for better and worse.

由令人难忘的伊万·迪克森（饰演达夫）主演，并辅以出色的配角阵容（阿比·林肯、亚非特·科托、格洛丽亚·福斯特），《只是个男人》以个人化的基调讲述了一个政治故事。其中的角色——源自罗默与联合编剧、摄影师、同为犹太人的罗伯特·扬在南方各地的调研——无论好坏，都散发着鲜活的人性。

— Reggie Ugwu

——雷吉·乌古

‘Disclosure Day’ (2026)

《揭秘日》(Disclosure Day, 2026)

In theaters.

院线上映中。

The world, as a villainous Colin Firth puts it, is on the brink. Quasi-government operatives work in the shadows. Paranoia and distrust, sometimes with good reason, fill the air. The fight to reveal the truth is as furious as the fight to suppress it. Yes, “Disclosure Day” is an aliens-are-here epic, but tonally, when the cardinals, crop circles and car chases give way to regular people struggling through a chaotic nation, it conveys the anxiety and uncertainty suffusing modern-day, non-sci-fi American life.

正如科林·费尔斯饰演的反派人物所言，世界正处于边缘。准政府特工在阴影中活动。空气中弥漫着多疑与不信任，有时这些不信任并非毫无道理。揭露真相的斗争与掩盖真相的斗争一样激烈。是的，《揭秘日》是一部外星人降临的史诗，但从基调上看，当红衣主教、麦田怪圈和追车戏让位于在混乱国家中苦苦挣扎的普通人时，它传达出了充斥在现代、非科幻美国生活中的焦虑与不确定性。

I saw it in the scene in which Emily Blunt and Wyatt Russell stop at a convenience store: We haven’t gotten to the big action sequences and revelations yet, but they are surrounded by people frantically stocking up, preparing for a war that’s looming in the background. At the end, when our heroes have finally revealed the truth to the public, the vibe shifts to a shaky, tentative optimism, and Blunt has the last word that feels like a call for understanding: “Listen.”

在艾米莉·布朗特和怀亚特·拉塞尔去便利店那场戏里，我看到了这一点：我们还没有进入宏大的动作场面和真相揭露环节，但他们身边围满了疯狂囤积物资的人，为背景中若隐若现的战争做准备。在结尾处，当我们的英雄们终于向公众揭露了真相时，氛围转向了一种动摇、试探性的乐观，而布朗特的最后一句台词听起来像是对理解的呼唤：“听着。”

Something about that feels like who we are as a country, too.

而这也像是我们作为一个国家的感觉。

Other great movies about America: Arthur Penn’s “Bonnie and Clyde”; Lee Isaac Chung’s “Minari”; Richard Kelly’s “Southland Tales.”

其他关于美国的杰出电影： 阿瑟·佩恩(Arthur Penn)的《邦妮和克莱德》(Bonnie and Clyde)；郑李烁(Lee Isaac Chung)的《米纳里》(Minari)；理查德·凯利(Richard Kelly)的《南方传奇》(Southland Tales)。

— Andrew LaVallee

——安德鲁·拉瓦利

The leaders of India and Japan announced an agreement on Thursday to expand their longstanding ties as they both seek greater stability and security in a world where the United States has become deeply unpredictable and China is asserting itself more aggressively.

印度和日本领导人周四宣布达成一项协议，扩大两国长期的双边关系。在美国变得极度不可预测、中国表现得愈发咄咄逼人的当今世界，印日两国都在寻求更大的稳定与安全。

The prime ministers, Narendra Modi of India and Sanae Takaichi of Japan, said after a meeting in New Delhi that they had signed agreements covering a broad range of their most urgent concerns, including energy self-reliance, security in the Indian and Pacific Oceans and artificial intelligence.

印度总理莫迪和日本首相高市早苗在新德里会晤后表示，双方已签署了涵盖两国最紧迫关切的广泛协议，包括能源自给、印度洋和太平洋的安全以及人工智能。

“We are starting a new chapter in our special strategic and global partnership,” Mr. Modi said following the annual bilateral meeting, which took place at the prime minister’s official guest residence, a former royal palace called Hyderabad House.

“我们正在开启两国特殊战略与全球伙伴关系的新篇章，”莫迪在此次年度双边会晤后表示。该会晤在总理官方迎宾馆、前皇家宫殿海得拉巴府举行。

He characterized the agreement as a way the two nations — the world’s fourth- and fifth-largest economies — can “strengthen regional peace, maritime security and rules-based order.” India and Japan have carried out joint military exercises for years and Japan is one of India’s largest foreign investors.

他将这项协议描述为这两个国家——世界第四和第五大经济体——“加强地区和平、海上安全及基于规则的秩序”的一种方式。印度和日本多年来一直开展联合军事演习，日本也是印度最大的外国投资者之一。

Ms. Takaichi, who arrived in New Delhi on Wednesday for a three-day visit, her first to India as prime minister, said “the most important thing is for Japan and India to leverage each other’s strengths.” The two leaders appeared at ease in each other’s presence, with Mr. Modi at one point affectionately describing Ms. Takaichi as a “younger sister.”

高市早苗于周三抵达新德里，开始为期三天的访问，这也是她就任首相以来首次访问印度。她表示，“最重要的是日本和印度要发挥各自的优势。”两位领导人相处时显得轻松自如，莫迪甚至一度亲切地称高市早苗为“妹妹”。

Though neither leader mentioned the United States, China or their respective leaders, Mr. Modi’s reference to “uncertain times” needed little explanation. The decision by President Trump to start a war with Iran resulted in the shuttering of the Strait of Hormuz and the choking off of a considerable portion of the world’s oil and gas supply.

尽管两位领导人都没有提及美国、中国或两国各自的领导人，但莫迪所称的“不确定时期”几乎不需要过多解释。特朗普总统发动对伊朗战争的决定导致了霍尔木兹海峡关闭，并切断了全球相当一部分的石油和天然气供应。

Asian countries that import the vast majority of their oil from the Middle East were hit especially hard. Japan typically sources more than 90 percent of its oil from the region. As part of the agreements announced on Thursday, India and Japan will work more closely together to build up their strategic energy reserves and invest in maritime transport of those supplies.

从中东进口绝大部分石油的亚洲国家遭受了尤为严重的打击。日本通常有90%以上的石油供应来自该地区。根据周四宣布的一系列协议，印度和日本将开展更紧密的合作，扩充战略能源储备，并投资这些能源的海上运输。

India had been running perilously low on oil, having exhausted nearly all of its reserves while the strait was closed. That caused fuel shortages across the country, adding another hardship in an economy already unsettled by Mr. Trump’s tariffs and a weakening rupee.

印度的石油储备曾处于极度危险的低水平，在海峡关闭期间几乎耗尽所有库存。这导致了全国范围内的燃料短缺，令原本就因特朗普的关税政策和卢比贬值而动荡不定的经济雪上加霜。

5月，在霍尔木兹海峡关闭导致油价上涨之际，印度古吉拉特邦的村民们在一家加油站前排起长队。

China has long been another factor in boosting India-Japan ties. While India and China are on more stable terms lately after years of worsening relations and increased trade restrictions, Japan and China have entered a period of heightened tensions.

长期以来，中国一直是推动印日关系发展的另一个因素。经历了多年关系恶化和贸易限制加剧后，印中关系近来趋于稳定，日本和中国却进入了紧张加剧的时期。

China has led an all-out effort in recent months to punish Japan over a remark by Ms. Takaichi, an outspoken critic of Beijing. In November, she told the Japanese Parliament that a hypothetical Chinese attack on Taiwan could incite a military response from Tokyo. China, which considers Taiwan, a self-governed democracy, part of its territory, has responded by restricting exports of critical minerals to Japan; increasing military patrols; and discouraging tourism to Japan.

近几个月来，中国全力以赴惩罚日本，起因是高市早苗的言论，她一向毫不避讳批评北京。去年11月，她在日本国会表示，假设中国对台湾发动攻击，东京可能作出军事回应。中国一直将自治的民主政体台湾视为其领土的一部分。作为回应，中国限制了对日本的关键矿物出口，增加了军事巡逻，并劝阻民众赴日旅游。

As she deals with Chinese pressure, Ms. Takaichi has worked to cultivate warm ties with Mr. Trump and to persuade the United States, its main ally, for security, to maintain its commitments in the region.

在应对来自中国的压力时，高市早苗努力与特朗普培养良好的关系，并试图说服其主要安全盟友美国维持对该地区的安全承诺。

At the same time, Ms. Takaichi has sought to deepen alliances with other partners in Asia, presenting Japan as a force for stability and strength in a region increasingly rattled by China’s assertive posturing.

与此同时，高市早苗也在寻求深化与亚洲其他伙伴的联盟，将日本塑造成该地区稳定而强大的力量，中国咄咄逼人的姿态正日益在这里引发动荡。

Ms. Takaichi’s government recently reversed longstanding limits on the sale of Japan-made weapons overseas, and some experts have urged Tokyo to explore the possibility of exporting warships and defense technology to India. Japan is already in talks with Australia, the Philippines, Indonesia and other countries about defense exports.

高市早苗领导的政府最近撤销了长期以来对日本制造武器出口的限制，一些专家敦促东京探讨向印度出口军舰和国防技术的可能性。目前，日本已经开始与澳大利亚、菲律宾、印度尼西亚等国就国防出口展开谈判。

Ms. Takaichi and Mr. Modi announced on Thursday that their defense and foreign ministers would meet later this year.

高市早苗和莫迪周四宣布，两国的国防部长和外交部长将于今年晚些时候举行会晤。

As a nutrition reporter, healthy eating is my bread and butter (pardon the pun). I spend a lot of time dissecting the latest nutrition news, studies and trends, and asking experts for guidance on what to eat and why.

作为一名报道营养健康的记者，健康饮食就是我的饭碗（请原谅这个双关语）。我花大量时间研究最新的营养新闻、科学研究和饮食潮流，并向专家请教：到底该吃什么，以及为什么要这么吃。

Now, at the year’s halfway point, I’m looking back at some of our most-read nutrition stories of 2026 and pulling out their lessons. Consider this your summer-eating cheat sheet.

如今，一年已经过半，我回顾了2026年我们最受读者欢迎的营养报道，并从中提炼出要点。不妨将此文当作你的夏季饮食“小抄”。

1. Frozen yogurt is not exactly a health food.

1. 冻酸奶并非真正的健康食品。

Billed for decades as a healthier alternative to ice cream, frozen yogurt is making a comeback. But nutrition experts say that its health hype is largely overblown. While frozen yogurt does tend to have less saturated fat than ice cream, it can be higher in added sugars. And its oft-touted probiotic benefits have not been well-established.

几十年来，冻酸奶一直被标榜为冰淇淋的健康替代品，如今它再度流行起来。但营养专家表示，它的“健康光环”很大程度上被夸大了。虽然冻酸奶的饱和脂肪含量通常比冰淇淋低，但可能添加了更多的糖，而它经常被吹捧的益生菌功效也缺乏充分的科学证实。

Read more about “fro-yo’s” pros and cons.

想了解冻酸奶的利弊，请阅读我们的详细报道。

2. Your diet influences your cancer risk.

2. 饮食影响患癌风险。

Many aspects of cancer risk are beyond our control. But following a diet high in fruits, vegetables, whole grains and plant-based proteins (like beans and lentils) can help lower it, along with the risk of developing other diseases like Type 2 diabetes and cardiovascular disease. What else should you eat — and avoid — to help reduce your chances of developing certain types of cancer?

癌症风险的许多方面超出我们的掌控范围，但坚持以水果、蔬菜、全谷物和植物蛋白（如豆类和扁豆）为主的饮食有助于降低患癌风险，同时也能降低患上2型糖尿病和心血管疾病等其他疾病的风险。还应该多吃什么、避开什么才能降低特定类型癌症的发生概率？

Here’s what decades of research suggests.

以下是数十年研究给出的建议。

3. Be wary of ‘low-carb’ diets.

3. 对低碳水饮食保持警惕。

Limiting carbohydrates can help with short-term goals like weight loss or blood sugar control. But over the long term, avoiding carbohydrate-rich foods like many fruits, starchy vegetables, legumes and whole grains can cause you to miss out on other beneficial nutrients, including fiber. The quality of the carbohydrates, not the quantity, matters more for health, experts say.

限制碳水化合物的摄入有助于实现减重或控制血糖等短期目标。但从长远来看，刻意回避许多水果、淀粉类蔬菜、豆类和全谷物等富含碳水化合物的食物可能导致你错失其他有益营养素，包括膳食纤维。专家指出，对健康而言，碳水化合物的质量远比数量重要。

Here’s why many nutrition experts don’t like “low-carb” diets.

了解更多关于为什么许多营养专家不喜欢低碳水饮食。

4. The science of intermittent fasting isn’t as sound as you may think.

4. 间歇性禁食的科学依据并没有你想象得那么扎实。

Proponents of intermittent fasting, which generally involves limiting your eating to certain parts of the day or week, often claim that it helps with weight loss, metabolic health, cognitive function, longevity and more. While many people find the eating plan easier to adhere to than other diets, the science on its benefits is shaky.

间歇性断食的支持者通常声称，将进食时间限定在一天或一周特定时段内有助于减重、改善代谢健康、提升认知功能、延缓衰老等。虽然很多人觉得这种方法比其他节食方案更容易坚持，但有关其益处的科学证据其实并不扎实。

Read more about what intermittent fasting can, and can’t, do for your health.

了解更多关于间歇性禁食对健康的益处和局限。

5. Oats are powerhouses of nutrition.

5. 燕麦是营养宝库。

Prosaic? Perhaps. But the breakfast staple is great for your heart and gut — thanks in large part to beta-glucan, a type of fiber that feeds good bacteria in the colon and helps lower the LDL (or “bad” cholesterol) in your blood. Oats also help keep blood sugar steady — especially for those with Type 2 diabetes.

平淡无奇？也许吧。但这种早餐主食对心脏和肠道大有裨益，这在很大程度上要归功于其中的β-葡聚糖——一种能滋养结肠中的有益菌、帮助降低血液中低密度脂蛋白（即“坏胆固醇”）的纤维。燕麦还有助于稳定血糖，尤其适合2型糖尿病患者。

Here are some of the best ways to enjoy them.

这里有一些享用燕麦的最佳方法。

6. There is such a thing as too much protein.

6. 蛋白质摄入并非越多越好。

It’s the macronutrient of the moment, but eating too much can come with some downsides, experts say. Getting most of your protein from red or processed meat, for instance, can raise the risk of heart disease, Type 2 diabetes and certain types of cancer. And if you’re leaving out high-fiber foods like vegetables and whole grains, you may suffer digestive consequences as a result.

蛋白质是当下最受追捧的营养素，但专家表示，过量摄入也会带来负面影响。例如，如果你的蛋白质主要来自红肉或加工肉类，就会增加罹患心脏病、2型糖尿病及某些癌症的风险。而如果因此减少蔬菜、全谷物等富含膳食纤维的食物摄入，消化系统也可能随之出现问题。

Learn more about the risks of going overboard on protein.

了解更多关于过量摄入蛋白质的风险。

7. You should probably try to get more fiber.

7. 你或许应该尝试多摄入一些膳食纤维。

If you’re like most Americans, you probably aren’t eating enough fiber. The good news: You can get more with small — and tasty — additions to your diet. Three cups of popped popcorn offers nearly four grams of fiber. And guacamole, salsa, bean dip and hummus are all high in fiber, too, making them a good excuse to get snacking.

如果你和大多数美国人一样，那么你的纤维摄入量很可能不足。好消息是，只需在饮食中做一些小而美味的调整，就能补上这个缺口。三杯爆米花就含有接近四克膳食纤维；牛油果酱、莎莎酱、豆泥蘸酱和鹰嘴豆泥也都富含纤维，因此给了你一个吃零食的好理由。

Get more expert tips from our story.

更多专家建议，请查阅我们的详细报道。

8. The dangers of alcohol start at one drink per day.

8.饮酒的危害从每天一杯起计。

A recent study found that Americans who had one alcoholic drink a day were more likely than those who didn’t to die from alcohol-related illnesses. Women who consumed this amount, for instance, were more likely to die from liver cancer or breast cancer. And both men and women were at increased risk of dying from liver cirrhosis and oral and esophageal cancers. The more people drank, the higher the risks climbed.

一项最新研究发现，每天饮一杯酒精饮料的美国人因酒精相关疾病死亡的风险高于不饮酒者。例如，每天喝一杯酒的女性死于肝癌或乳腺癌的风险更高；而无论男女，死于肝硬化及口腔癌、食道癌的风险也都会增加。饮酒量越大，风险越高。

Read more about the findings.

了解更多关于这些研究的信息。

9. Don’t pass on peas.

9. 别忽视豌豆。

These little legumes pack a big nutritional punch. While they don’t quite offer the same protein per ounce as beans or lentils, they still rank high among vegetarian options. One cup of garden peas has about as much protein as a three-ounce serving of firm tofu.

这种小小的豆科植物，营养价值却相当惊人。虽然按重量计算，它们的蛋白质含量不如普通的豆类和扁豆，但在素食蛋白来源中依然名列前茅。一杯青豌豆所含的蛋白质，大约相当于85克老豆腐。

Ready to see the humble pea in a new light? Read on.

准备好重新认识不起眼的豌豆了吗？请继续阅读。

10. Sipping warm water before breakfast has benefits, but is not a cure-all.

10. 早餐前喝温水有好处，但绝不是万能药。

Some on social media have claimed that drinking hot or warm water shortly after waking can improve digestion, clear skin, reduce bloating and get your bowels moving. Can it really do all that?

社交媒体上有人声称，早晨醒来后喝热水或温水可以促进消化、改善肤质、减少腹胀，还能促进排便。这些说法究竟是真是假？

We asked experts to help us fact check the claims.

我们请专家对这些说法进行了事实核查。

The world’s largest soccer stadium, designed to resemble a Vietnamese drum with space for 135,000 fans, began to take shape outside central Hanoi in February, a few weeks before the United States and Israel attacked Iran.

今年2月，美国和以色列对伊朗发动袭击前几周，一座位于河内市中心外围、设计灵感源自越南传统鼓、可容纳13.5万名观众的世界最大足球场开始初具规模。

Despite the global economic turmoil brought about by the war, and perhaps even because of it, construction on the arena and a surrounding urban development has expanded and accelerated.

尽管战争引发了全球经济动荡——甚至或可能正因为如此，这座球场及其周边城市综合开发项目的建设不仅没有放缓，反而进一步扩张并加速推进。

The Vietnamese government is leaning on big projects to make up for potential economic slowdowns caused by the war and President Trump’s tariffs. Huge, state-favored firms like Vingroup, which is building the stadium, are booming. So are foreign manufacturing giants that have made Vietnam an export hub, all while smaller businesses are struggling to survive and often being pushed aside.

越南政府正依托大型项目的建设来抵消战争和特朗普关税可能造成的经济放缓。像开发该体育场的Vingroup集团这样受国家青睐的大型企业正在蓬勃发展。那些把越南打造为出口制造中心的外国制造业巨头同样蒸蒸日上，而与此同时，规模较小的企业却在艰难求生，甚至常常遭到边缘化。

“For small companies like us, it’s so challenging, it’s harder, and it’s not fair,” said Pham Thi Mui, 36, as she stuffed a Spider-Man comforter into a bag at her family’s bedding factory near the stadium, on land that is soon to be redeveloped. “We pour our hearts into everything, and we’re the first to suffer.”

“像我们这样的小公司，处境太难了，越来越难，也根本不公平。”36岁的范氏梅（音）一边把一条蜘蛛侠图案的被子塞进袋子，一边说道。她家的床上用品工厂就位于体育场附近，而那片土地很快就将被重新开发。“我们付出了全部心血，可最先受苦的却总是我们。”

The dynamic exemplifies how the war in Iran, and the economic shock waves it precipitated, are accelerating a trend in Vietnam, and around the world: Big businesses find a way to get bigger, while smaller, local companies are being squeezed by spiking inflation or energy shortages. The Vietnamese government and banks, overinvested in certain industries, especially real estate, have not been much help.

这一现象折射出伊朗战争及其引发的经济冲击波正在如何加速越南乃至全球范围内的一种趋势：大企业找到办法扩张，小型本土企业则被飙升的通胀或能源短缺挤压。越南政府和银行在房地产等特定行业过度投入，对困境中的小企业基本上袖手旁观。

Too Big to Fail?

大到不能倒？

Experts have expressed both optimism and concern for this ambitious country of 100 million. The World Bank’s most recent report on Vietnam referred to an “uneven growth model,” where global firms drive exports but generate limited local benefits, because wages are low and few Vietnamese companies are integrated into higher-value supply chains.

专家们对这个有1亿人口、雄心勃勃的国家既抱有期待，也深感担忧。世界银行最近关于越南的报告提到一种“不均衡的增长模式”：全球性企业推动了出口，但给经济带来的益处十分有限，这是因为越南工资水平低，而且鲜有本土企业融入更高附加值的供应链。

Jonathan Pincus, an economist at Fulbright University in Ho Chi Minh City, described it as “a two-track economy.” Essentially, the wealthiest firms rarely interact with the smaller businesses that represent 95 percent of the country’s companies.

胡志明市富布赖特大学的经济学家乔纳森·平卡斯将其描述为“双轨经济”。本质上，那些最富有的企业几乎不与中小企业发生往来，而后者占越南全部企业数量的95%。

Vietnamese officials have acknowledged the problem for years, noting that sustainable development requires a strong domestic business base. But with Communist Party leaders pushing hard for 10 percent annual growth, and managing only 7 so far this year, officials still chase scale. Big-ticket foreign investment is seen as an elevator to career promotion in the party, and the turmoil of the past few months has only intensified the government’s go-big and globalist focus.

多年来，越南官员并不否认这个问题的存在，指出可持续发展需要强大的本土企业基础。但由于越共领导层大力推动实现10%的年增长目标，而今年迄今仅达到7%，官员们仍在追求规模效应。吸引大型外国投资被视为党内仕途晋升的捷径，而过去几个月的动荡进一步强化了政府追求大项目、拥抱全球化的倾向。

While Hanoi remains concerned that Washington will punish it for exporting far more to the United States than it buys, Vietnam continues to successfully recruit companies fleeing China partly to avoid and circumvent U.S. tariffs.

尽管河内仍担心华盛顿会因为越南对美出口远超进口而采取惩罚措施，但越南依旧成功吸引着大量为部分躲避和规避美国关税而离开中国的企业。

体育场工地附近的稻田。类似铜鼓体育场这样的开发项目正在挤占中小企业的生存空间。

Shipping data shows that in the first quarter of this year, China’s container traffic to the United States fell by 14 percent, while Vietnam’s rose by 19 percent. Some of those shipments might be Chinese exports, relabeled or barely altered — which the Trump administration has threatened to treat as an illegal effort to bypass tariffs — but experts report a deeper shift, with Chinese firms opening more factories in Vietnam.

航运数据显示，今年第一季度，中国发往美国的集装箱货运量下降了14%，越南则增长了19%。其中一些货物可能是换个标签或仅做轻微加工的中国出口产品——特朗普政府已威胁要将这种行为视为非法规避关税的做法——但专家们指出，更深层的变化在于，越来越多中国企业在越南设厂。

“The main takeaway is that Vietnam is gaining market share,” said Soren Pedersen, a vice president at SSA Marine, a large global port operator.

大型全球港口运营商SSA Marine副总裁索伦·彼得森表示：“最重要的结论是，越南正在扩大自己的市场份额。”

‘No One Listens to Us’

“没有人听我们的”

The smallest companies are facing the toughest math.

最小的企业正面临最残酷的现实。

From Ms. Mui’s bedding factory, you can see cranes hovering over former farmland. She said the cost of materials and transportation, as well as fees for the use of e-commerce platforms, have risen since the war in Iran started. To keep up, she said her company recently doubled the price of budget comforters.

从范氏梅的床品工厂望出去，可以看到吊车悬停在昔日的农田上方。她说，自伊朗战争爆发以来，原材料、运输成本以及电商平台使用费都在上涨。为了保本，公司最近不得不把低价被子的售价提高了一倍。

With the government forcing the factory out to make room for the stadium and a mixed-use urban district, she and her family are desperate for a business loan or government grant. They said they already invested nearly $40,000 of their own money in the business, and used up all their collateral for loans for an expansion last year, before the stadium was announced.

政府强制要求工厂迁出，为体育场和一个综合用途城区项目腾出空间。她和家人如今迫切需要商业贷款或政府补助。他们说已经向企业投入了近4万美元自有资金，而且去年在体育场项目宣布之前，他们为扩张业务耗尽了所有可用于抵押贷款的资产。

“We’re small, we’re supposed to get more support,” Ms. Mui said, noting that the government has promised to do more for domestic enterprises. “In fact, we’re facing harsher treatment with everything while bigger companies get access to loans and tax incentives.”

“我们是小企业，本来应该得到更多支持，”范氏梅说，并指出政府一直承诺会加大对本土企业的扶持。“但现实是，我们在各方面都面临更严苛的对待，大企业却能轻松获得贷款和税收优惠。”

Her mother-in-law, taking a break from packaging blankets, fought back tears. “We’re at the lowest level,” she said. “No one listens to us.”

她的婆婆在打包毯子的间隙，强忍住眼泪说：“我们处在最底层，根本没人听我们的。”

Economists generally agree that Vietnam is, like many countries, too quick to serve well-connected behemoths. It welcomes factories from foreign investors, which provide jobs, if little opportunity for homegrown innovation, and supports large state-run or state-favored conglomerates with low productivity and large debt loads.

经济学家普遍认为，和许多国家一样，越南过于急切地为那些关系深厚的商业巨头提供便利。它欢迎外国投资者建厂，这些工厂虽然提供了就业，却很少带来本土创新机会；与此同时，政府又扶持那些生产率低下、债务负担沉重的大型国有企业或受国家青睐的企业集团。

Critics often point to Vingroup. The stadium and accompanying urban development are projected to cost $35 billion, to be financed with government and private debt. And even as Vingroup’s electric-vehicle subsidiary, VinFast, reported a net loss of $3.9 billion last year, the company remains the builder of choice for an increasingly wide range of projects, including the country’s first bullet-train network.

批评者频频将矛头指向Vingroup集团。体育场及配套城区开发项目预计耗资350亿美元，将由政府和私人债务融资。即使它的电动车子公司VinFast去年净亏损39亿美元的情况下，该集团仍是越来越多项目的首选承建方，包括越南的首个高铁网。

范氏梅的两名亲属在工厂附近的家中分拣待运的产品。

In response to emailed questions, Vingroup said the stadium development “not only serves the needs of local residents but also enhances Vietnam’s national sports infrastructure, supports economic and tourism development, and strengthens Hanoi’s position as a destination for international events.”

Vingroup集团通过电邮回应称，这个体育场开发项目“不仅服务于当地居民的需求，还提升了越南的国家体育基础设施，助力经济与旅游业发展，并增强了河内作为国际赛事目的地的吸引力”。

The company denied receiving any special treatment from the government and insisted that its debt levels remain manageable.

该公司否认从政府获得任何特殊待遇，并坚称其债务水平仍在可控范围内。

Still, there is much about the company’s balance sheet that concerns experts. And Vingroup’s dominance is indicative of deeply entrenched problems in Vietnam’s economy.

尽管如此，专家们对该公司的财务状况颇感担忧。Vingroup集团的主导地位正是越南经济积弊深重的一个缩影。

A few miles from the Vingroup stadium, Techcom Industry makes heavy-duty vacuums and other products for companies like DeWalt, a subsidiary of Stanley Black & Decker.

距体育场数公里外，Techcom Industry正在为史丹利百得旗下子公司得伟等客户生产重型吸尘器及其他产品。

Tran Thi Thuy, 40, the company’s founder and chief executive, has built exactly what Vietnamese officials have said they want — sophisticated, domestic manufacturing, plugged into global supply chains. With 100 employees, the business is hardly tiny, but it is still being buffeted by geopolitics and Vietnam’s indifference to anything but the largest of the large.

40岁的陈氏翠是这家公司的创始人兼首席执行官，她打造的正是越南官员口中希望看到的企业：先进的本土制造业企业，并成功融入全球供应链。公司有100名员工，规模不算小，但它依然受到地缘政治和越南只重视顾扶持最大企业的漠然态度所冲击。

Orders are down 40 percent this year, Ms. Thuy said, blaming tariff uncertainty and weak demand in the United States. Because of the war in Iran, she added, transportation, energy and plastics costs are up.

陈氏翠说，今年订单下滑了40%，她将此归因于关税不确定性和美国需求疲软。她还补充说，由于伊朗战争，运输、能源和塑料成本都在上涨。

体育场建设项目招聘2万名工人的广告牌。

She’s still anticipating future growth, but has struggled to line up financing. Vietnamese banks wanted too much collateral for short-term loans with double-digit interest rates, she said. Her attempts to secure credit from government funds for smaller businesses also ended up mired in confusion.

她对未来增长仍抱有期望，但融资问题始终困扰着她。她说，越南银行对于抵押物的要求过高，而贷款利率高达两位数，且多为短期贷款。她尝试申请政府面向中小企业的信贷基金，结果到处碰壁。

“There’s lack of access to information,” she said. “The funds normally are managed by banks, so they keep information away from us — because they want to only give out commercial loans for their own interests.”

“信息获取渠道不畅，”她说。“这些基金通常由银行管理，所以银行把信息保密不让我们知道——因为他们只想为自己的利益发放商业贷款。”

Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance recently promised to help, possibly by guiding banks to grant loans based on business performance (as is common in other countries).

越南财政部最近承诺提供帮助，可能通过引导银行根据企业经营业绩发放贷款（这在其他国家是常见的做法）。

And yet, large foreign companies are still driving the biggest news. Samsung recently said it plans to invest about $1.5 billion in a semiconductor testing facility north of Hanoi. Its first in Vietnam, the site is set to open in 2027.

然而，占据头条新闻的依旧是大型外国企业。三星电子最近表示，计划在河内北部投资约15亿美元建设一座半导体测试工厂。这将是它在越南的首个此类设施，预计于2027年投入运营。

The United States is turning 250 tomorrow. It’s a big birthday. But what exactly is America celebrating?

美国明天就要迎来250岁生日了。这是一个重大的日子。但美国人究竟在庆祝什么？

The revolutionary ideals enshrined in the 1776 Declaration of Independence inspired generations: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”

1776年《独立宣言》中所载的革命理想曾激励了一代又一代人：“我们认为以下真理是不言而喻的：人人受造而平等，造物主赋予他们某些不可转让的权利，其中包括生命权、自由权和追求幸福的权利。”

But those ideals are now the subject of intense debate. What is the American experiment all about? What should American democracy be? These are big questions, especially during Donald Trump’s polarizing presidency. I talked to my colleague Peter Baker, our chief White House correspondent, about what this anniversary tells us about America and the moment it’s in.

但这些理想如今正引发激烈的辩论。这场“美国实验”的本质究竟是什么？美国的民主应该呈现何种面貌？这些都是重大的问题，尤其是在唐纳德·特朗普引发两极分化的总统任期内。我就此采访了我的同事、我们的首席白宫记者彼得·贝克，探讨了这个周年纪念日向我们揭示了怎样的美国以及它目前所处的处境。

America’s very messy birthday party

一场混乱的美国生日派对

So Peter, can anyone actually agree on what’s being celebrated this weekend?

那么，彼得，这个周末大家对于究竟在庆祝什么，真的能达成共识吗？

No, and that’s what’s so striking. It should be a moment of unity, right? I was 9 when we celebrated 200 years of independence. Everybody came together waving flags, remembering the Revolution and thinking about what it all meant. But it’s a much more polarized environment today. And we have a president who’s making this anniversary more about himself than about the country.

没法达成，而这正是最惊人的地方。这本该是一个团结的时刻，对吧？我们庆祝独立200周年时我才九岁。那时每个人都走上街头挥舞着国旗，缅怀当年的独立革命，并思考这一切的意义。但如今的政治环境要对立得多。而且我们现任的总统正把这个周年纪念日变成一场关于他个人、而非关于整个国家的秀。

How so?

此话怎讲？

He’s basically taken over the organization of the festivities in Washington. Take the big Fourth of July concert. That’s been completely transformed. All these musicians backed out. They didn’t want to be part of some sort of Trump show. And so instead, the president is giving what he says will be “a really long speech.”

他基本上接管了华盛顿庆祝活动的筹备工作。拿盛大的7月4日音乐会来说，它已经被彻底改变了。众多音乐家宣布退出，他们不想成为某种“特朗普秀”的一部分。因此，总统现在的安排是，他将发表一场他自称“会非常长”的演讲。

I’ve lived my whole life in the Washington area, and on the Fourth of July back in the day, you’d go to the National Mall, bring a picnic, stay through the concert by the National Symphony Orchestra, which would play patriotic music, and then you’d watch the fireworks.

我大半辈子都生活在华盛顿地区。放在以前的独立日，你会去国家广场野餐，一直待到国家交响乐团的音乐会开始，聆听那些爱国音乐，然后观看烟花秀。

But this year it’s essentially a political rally, and that will leave a lot of Americans feeling that they don’t want to be there. There’s going to be security. They can’t bring chairs or balls or Frisbees or coolers full of food and have a picnic on the mall the way they used to.

但今年，这本质上变成了一场政治集会，这会让许多美国人觉得他们不想去凑这个热闹。现场会设严密的安保，他们无法再像以前那样带着椅子、球、飞盘或者装满食物的保温箱在国家广场上野餐。

Picnics on the mall — what could be more American?

在国家广场上野餐——还有什么比这更具美国色彩的呢？

Exactly. You want to look back at what made America great? It was picnics on the mall!

确实如此。你想回顾是什么让美国变得伟大？那就是以前在国家广场上的野餐！

You mentioned the musicians backing out of Trump’s concert. That’s not the only thing that has gone wrong. There’s also his multi-million-dollar project to spruce up the Reflecting Pool for the anniversary — only to get an algae infestation and peeling paint.

你提到音乐家们退出了特朗普的音乐会。但这还不是唯一搞砸的事情。他此前还耗资数百万美元开展了一项在周年纪念日前翻新倒影池的工程——结果现在却面临着藻华和漆面剥落的问题。

Yeah, the symbolism is terrible. It makes him look like he’s focused on the wrong things to a lot of Americans struggling to pay for rent or gas. And he can’t even do it right. For those who don’t like him, it’s become a metaphor for his presidency.

是的，这个象征意义实在太糟糕了。在许多正为支付房租或油费而苦苦挣扎的美国人眼里，这让他看起来把精力放错了地方。而且他连这点事都办不好。对于那些讨厌他的人来说，这已经变成了他总统任期的一个隐喻。

For any other president this would have been very damaging. But Trump has so many of these moments that it may not matter. Still, it’s a bad story and one that has frustrated him enormously.

对任何其他总统而言，这本会是极具破坏性的。但特朗普经历过太多这样的时刻，以至于这可能也无伤大雅。不过，这依然是个负面新闻，也给他本人造成很大困扰。

What about the content of the celebrations? What exactly are Trump and his supporters celebrating?

那么关于庆祝活动的内容呢？特朗普和他的支持者究竟在庆祝什么？

They’re celebrating a view of America as they believe it once was, a better America as they see it. An America with fewer immigrants, a strong manufacturing sector, a more traditional definition of the family and so on.

他们庆祝的是一种他们心目中曾经存在过的、在他们看来更好的“昔日美国”。一个移民更少、制造业强劲、家庭定义更传统等等的美国。

It’s a view of America that doesn’t embrace some of the changes we’ve seen in the country. Those changes are discomfiting to a lot of people. And Trump has tapped into this sense of grievance that is out there among many Americans, that the country is getting away from them.

这是一种不接受这个国家已经发生的某些转变的美国观。这些转变让许多人感到不安。特朗普恰恰利用了许多美国人心中普遍存在的一种怨恨感，即觉得这个国家正在偏离他们熟悉的轨道。

It also doesn’t acknowledge some of the times it’s fallen short of its ideals. But Trump doesn’t believe in telling stories that in any way diminish the mythology of America’s greatness.

这种观点也绝不承认美国曾有违背自身理想的时刻。因为特朗普绝不接受讲述任何在任何层面上削弱“美国伟大”这一神话的故事。

How are his opponents celebrating this anniversary?

他的反对者又是如何庆祝这个周年纪念日的？

The people who don’t subscribe to Trump’s view of the world look at America as a place of change. We’re not the same country we were 250 years ago, nor, they argue, would most people want it to be. When we said in the Declaration of Independence that “all men are created equal,” what we really meant was “all white men who owned a certain amount of property.” Those were the only ones who were allowed to vote then.

那些不认同特朗普世界观的人则将美国视为一个不断变化的地方。他们认为，我们不是250年前的那个国家了，而且大多数人也不希望回到过去。当我们在《独立宣言》中说“人人受造而平等”时，当时的真实含义其实是“所有拥有一定资产的白人男性”。因为在当时，只有他们才拥有投票权。

But the Constitution also vows to “form a more perfect union.” So there’s an acknowledgment that we’re not a perfect union, but we’re trying to get there. That ideal is what traditionally made America a beacon for the world. But now there’s a worry among people who aren’t fans of Trump that we no longer are.

但宪法也誓言要“建立更完善的联盟”。因此，大家承认我们现在还不是一个完美的联盟，但我们正在努力向那个方向迈进。这种理想在传统上使美国成为世界的灯塔。但现在，那些不是特朗普粉丝的人开始担心，我们已经不再是那座灯塔了。

Is there a chance that, all of this division notwithstanding, this weekend will actually be an occasion where people come together?

抛开所有的这些分歧不谈，这个周末有没有可能实际上仍是一个让人们走到一起的契机？

Certainly in individual communities. I’m in New England with my family right now and when you drive around, you see flags everywhere, you see a lot of excitement about the holiday that has nothing to do with politics. It’s in Washington where it just feels so divided, but I expect in communities across the country they will ignore the politics — or at least put it to the side for one day.

在各个地方社区里当然是可能的。我现在和家人正在新英格兰地区，开车随处转转时，你能看到到处都挂着国旗，大家对这个节日感到非常兴奋，这与政治毫无关系。只有在华盛顿才让人感觉如此割裂。但我预计在全国各地的社区里，人们会忽略政治——或者至少在这一天把政治抛诸脑后。

And Peter, how are you going to celebrate tomorrow?

那么，彼得，你明天打算怎么庆祝？

We’re going to a barbecue with fried chicken, burgers and fireworks. We also have a family tradition of the kids reading from the Declaration of Independence and we will do that again this year. It’s such a beautiful document. The meaning of the words has evolved with our lived reality. But the ideal behind it is as inspiring as ever.

我们要去参加一个有炸鸡、汉堡和烟花的烧烤派对。我们家还有一个传统，就是让孩子们朗读《独立宣言》，今年我们还会这么做。这是一篇如此优美的文献。虽然这些字句的含义随着我们当下的现实生活而不断演变，但它背后的理想依然如以往那般激励人心。

For the past decade, an uncrossable distance has separated me from my daughter.

在过去的十年里，一道无法跨越的鸿沟将我和女儿隔开。

She is in the Uyghur homeland — what China’s government calls Xinjiang — living under Beijing’s totalitarian drive to erase our culture. I am in exile, having fled nine years ago to avoid arrest. When I last saw her, she was a wide-eyed 6-year-old. She is growing up today without her father in a country that wants her to forget who she is.

她身处维吾尔人的故土——中国政府称之为新疆的地方——生活在北京旨在抹杀我们文化而推行的极权运动之中。我则流亡海外——九年前为了躲避逮捕而逃离。我最后一次见到她时，她还是一个眼神清澈的六岁孩子。如今，她在一个试图让她忘记自己身份的国家里，在没有父亲的陪伴下长大。

Countless families like mine have been shattered by Beijing’s drive to forcefully assimilate Uyghurs into Chinese society. As many as one million Uyghurs and other Turkic ethnic minorities were sent to detention facilities between 2016 and 2019, forced to renounce Islam and subjected to Communist Party indoctrination. China says it closed those facilities, but Uyghurs still face coerced labor, mass surveillance and forced birth control. Many others have simply been imprisoned; I have reason to believe several of my relatives are among them.

北京强行将维吾尔人同化入中国社会的运动已经让无数像我这样的家庭支离破碎。在2016年至2019年间，多达100万维吾尔人及其他突厥裔少数民族被送进拘禁设施，被迫放弃伊斯兰教，并接受共产党的政治灌输。中国宣称已关闭了这些设施，但维吾尔人仍面临着强迫劳动、大规模监控和强制节育。还有许多人则直接被投入监狱；我有理由相信我的几位亲属就在其中。

When these atrocities first became known nearly a decade ago, Uyghurs assumed the global community would act to end one of the most sweeping campaigns of ethnic and religious repression since the Holocaust. For a time, the world heard us. A 2022 U.N. report said China may have committed crimes against humanity. Several countries declared it a genocide, banned goods made with Uyghur forced labor, and imposed sanctions on China. Yet China, which denies committing such crimes, has shrugged off the pressure and continued to extinguish our culture.

近十年前，当这些暴行最初为世人所知时，维吾尔人曾以为国际社会会采取行动，终结这场自纳粹大屠杀以来最广泛的种族和宗教镇压运动之一。有一段时间，世界确实听到了我们的声音。2022年，一份联合国报告指出，中国可能犯下了反人类罪。一些国家宣布这构成了种族灭绝，禁止进口维吾尔人强迫劳动制造的商品，并对中国实施制裁。然而，中国否认犯下这些罪行，无视这些压力，继续抹杀我们的文化。

Uyghurs are now coming to a crushing realization: The world has failed us. If we are to survive as a people, Uyghurs in the diaspora must preserve in exile what China is erasing.

维吾尔人现在正面临一个令人心碎的现实：世界辜负了我们。如果我们这个民族要生存下去，散居海外的维吾尔人就必须在流亡中保存中国正在抹去的一切。

President Trump’s trip to Beijing in May brought this hard truth home. His first administration declared China’s policies a genocide. But there is no indication that this human rights catastrophe even came up during his meetings with President Xi Jinping of China, the man who set these policies in motion.

特朗普总统5月的北京之行让这一残酷的真相显得更加清晰。他的第一届政府曾宣布中国的政策是种族灭绝。但没有任何迹象表明，在特朗普与启动这些政策的中国国家主席习近平会面时，这场人权灾难曾被提及。

For centuries, Uyghurs maintained a distinct Eurasian identity. When I was young, my grandmother told me how our ancestors transformed our hometown, Poskam, from a desert into a living oasis: planting mulberry trees, digging irrigation canals and building our homes — a civilization conjured from sand. Our way of life blends influences from east and west yet remains unmistakably Uyghur, with our own literary, musical, architectural, philosophical and culinary traditions, some recognized by UNESCO as part of humanity’s shared heritage. Song has been especially important. My grandmother used to say our souls live in our songs. She sang while kneading dough to make noodles, braiding my aunt’s hair and watching the sun set over our mountains and deserts.

几个世纪以来，维吾尔人一直保持着独特的欧亚大陆身份认同。我小的时候，祖母告诉我，我们的祖先是如何将我们的家乡泽普从沙漠变成生机勃勃的绿洲：我们种植桑树，挖掘灌溉渠，建造我们的家园——这是一个从沙中变幻而出的文明。我们的生活方式融合了东西方的影响，但依然拥有鲜明地道的维吾尔特色，拥有我们自己的文学、音乐、建筑、哲学和烹饪传统，其中一些已被联合国教科文组织认定为人类共同遗产。歌曲尤为重要。祖母常说，我们的灵魂就活在在我们的歌声里。她在揉面做面条时唱歌，在给我姑姑编辫子时唱歌，在眺望夕阳落入群山和沙漠时也唱歌。

But our strong sense of self has complicated Beijing’s efforts to integrate us into the Chinese nation. Its answer is to extinguish what it means to be Uyghur. A Financial Times investigation published in May documented Beijing’s systematic dismantlement of the mechanisms through which Uyghur identity is passed down. This includes taking Uyghur children from their families and sending them to boarding schools where they are forbidden from speaking their mother tongue, and eradicating Uyghur-language publishing and literature.

但我们强烈的自我认同使得北京将我们融入中华民族的努力变得棘手。他们的对策就是抹杀维吾尔人的特质。《金融时报》5月发表的一项调查记录了北京如何系统性地瓦解维吾尔身份传承的机制，包括将维吾尔儿童从家中带走，送往寄宿学校并禁止他们使用母语，以及根除维吾尔语的出版物和文学。

Uyghurs in the diaspora, scattered mostly across the United States, Europe and Central Asia, have responded. Families have launched volunteer-run Uyghur-language schools for our children. Cultural associations keep alive traditions like the meshrep — our vibrant communal gatherings featuring food, song, dance and moral education. Others are assembling online repositories of Uyghur literature, historical documents, photographs and recordings before they disappear.

流散在世界各地、主要分布在欧美和中亚的维吾尔人做出了回应。一些家庭为我们的孩子开办了由志愿者运营的维吾尔语学校。文化协会努力维持着“麦西热甫”(meshrep)等传统——这是我们充满活力的社区聚会，包含美食、歌曲、舞蹈和道德教育。还有一些人正在建立维吾尔文学、历史文献、照片和录音的在线资源库，以防它们消失。

We are not the first people to stand on this precipice. Diaspora Jews helped preserve Jewish identity for centuries; exiled Tibetans are struggling to do the same, as have many other peoples throughout history.

我们并不是第一个站在这种悬崖边缘的民族。流散海外的犹太人数百年来一直致力于维护犹太人的身份认同；流亡的藏人也在为此而奋斗，纵观历史，许多其他民族也是如此。

But there is no road map, and the challenge is immense.

但我们没有现成的路线图，挑战更是巨大的。

Much depends on sustaining our language, the irreplaceable medium of a culture. Yet I’ve seen a worrying pattern emerge across the diaspora: The first generation speaks the mother tongue. The second understands it, but increasingly responds in the local language. By the third generation, comprehension tends to fade. By the fourth, the language is often functionally dead, taking with it the bonds that connect people and communities. As a result, young Uyghurs are gradually disengaging from our gatherings and identity, which weakens our collective voice and, ultimately, our capacity to keep fighting.

这在很大程度上取决于能否延续我们的语言，它是文化不可替代的载体。然而，我观察到，流散海外的群体中出现了一种令人担忧的模式：第一代人说母语。第二代人听得懂，但越来越倾向于用当地语言回应。到了第三代，对母语的理解能力往往开始衰退。到了第四代，这门语言通常在功能上已经消亡，随之带走的是连接人与社区的纽带。结果，年轻的维吾尔人逐渐脱离了我们的聚会和身份认同，这削弱了我们的集体声音，并最终削弱了我们继续抗争的能力。

We lack some of the basic tools needed to turn this around. Many of the top Uyghur scholars, writers, artists, historians and linguists — people critical for cultural preservation — are silenced or imprisoned in China. The homegrown Uyghur schools and community organizations in the diaspora that are trying to fill that void operate mostly in isolation, under severe funding and manpower constraints.

我们缺乏扭转这种局面所需的一些基本工具。许多顶尖的维吾尔学者、作家、艺术家、历史学家和语言学家——这些对文化保护至关重要的人士——在中国遭到封口或监禁。侨居海外的维吾尔族人自发创办的学校和社区组织试图填补这一空白，但它们大多处于孤立状态，且面临严重的资金和人力短缺。

I founded the digital literary magazine Tupraq in 2024 and the news and commentary site Uyghur Post last year to help keep our written word alive. Both survive on small donations and volunteers. I have had to work multiple jobs to keep them afloat, and have repeatedly come close to shutting down.

我在2024年创办了数字文学杂志《Tupraq》（故土），并于去年创办了新闻和评论网站《维吾尔邮报》，以助维持我们书面文字的生命力。二者都靠微薄的捐款和志愿者维持生存。我必须兼职做多份工作才能维持它们的运转，它们还曾多次濒临停运边缘。

Meanwhile, Beijing is working to undermine efforts like ours. Human rights groups have documented a broad campaign of intimidation by China aimed at silencing Uyghurs abroad, and digital security watchdogs say China-linked actors are likely behind cyberattacks against Uyghur websites. Uyghur Post has faced relentless attacks, forcing prolonged shutdowns. Fake sites have sprung up, apparently to confuse readers and erode our credibility. Similar challenges are reported by Uyghurs engaged in cultural preservation around the world.

与此同时，北京正在设法破坏我们这样的努力。人权组织记录了中国发起的一场旨在压制海外维吾尔人发声的大规模恐吓运动，网络安全监督机构表示，针对维吾尔网站的网络攻击背后很可能是与中国有关联的行为者。《维吾尔邮报》面临着无休止的攻击，被迫长时间关停。虚假网站如雨后春笋般涌现，显然是为了混淆读者视听，并削弱我们的信誉。世界各地致力于文化保护的维吾尔人也报告了类似的挑战。

Pressure on China to end its atrocities against Uyghurs must never relent. But what the Uyghurs need from the global community is changing. If the world can’t stop what’s happening in China, governments and private organizations must recognize that a unique slice of human culture faces extinction — and provide funding and institutional support for the Uyghur communities within their borders who are fighting to prevent that.

要求中国结束针对维吾尔人暴行的压力绝不能有丝毫松懈。但维吾尔人对国际社会的需求正在发生改变。如果世界无法阻止中国正在发生的事情，各国政府和私营机构就必须认识到，人类文化中一个独特的组成部分正面临灭绝——并为他们国内那些努力阻止这一局面的维吾尔社区提供资金和制度支持。

I do this work for my daughter. I wake up every morning wondering who she has become, whether she remembers the songs I sang to her. I realize I may never see her again. But what we build in exile may keep fragments of the Uyghur soul intact so that young ones like her can reclaim them someday.

我做这项工作是为了我的女儿。每天早上醒来，我都在想，她现在变成了什么样子，她是否还记得我曾经唱给她的歌。我意识到，我可能再也见不到她了。但我们在流亡中所建立的一切，或许能让维吾尔灵魂的碎片保持完整，以便有朝一日，像她这样的年轻人能够重新找回它们。

The authorities in Beijing said Thursday that the pilot who flew a small plane into the city’s tallest building last week was a 66-year-old man suffering from insomnia and anxiety and who had expressed a desire to end his life in journal entries.

北京官方周四表示，上周驾驶一架小型飞机撞击该市最高建筑的飞行员是一名66岁男子，长期受失眠和焦虑的折磨，并在日记中表达过结束生命的念头。

The pilot crashed his two-seat sport aircraft into Citic Tower, the headquarters of one of China’s biggest state-owned financial conglomerates, in a busy Beijing business district last Friday during evening rush hour.

上周五晚高峰期间，此人驾驶其双座运动飞机撞上了位于北京繁华商业区的中信大厦，那里是中国最大国有金融集团之一的总部所在地。

In a sign of the authorities’ sensitivity over an event that raised questions about the city’s security, it took almost 24 hours after videos first emerged on social media for officials to confirm the crash. Discussion and posts about the crash were scrubbed from social media.

这一事件引发了外界对该市安全防范的质疑。官方对此表现出极高的敏感性：在社交媒体上首次流出视频后，官方花费了近24小时才证实了这起事件。社交媒体上关于撞楼事件的讨论和贴文也迅速被删除。

The Chaoyang District government, which administers a large area of eastern Beijing where the tower is, said in a statement that the plane had been flown by a man surnamed Liu, a self-employed resident of Beijing who was divorced and lived alone.

该大厦所在的北京东部行政区朝阳区政府在一份情况通报中表示，涉事飞机由一名刘姓男子驾驶，他是北京的一名自由职业者，已离婚且独居。

Officials said Mr. Liu had taken off from an airport in Beijing’s eastern Pinggu District Friday afternoon, then deviated from the area designated for flying and lost contact with the airport. The statement said that he then crashed into the high-rise building and died.

官方称，刘先生于周五下午从北京东部的平谷区一机场起飞，随后偏离了指定的飞行区域并与机场失去联系。声明指出，他随后撞向了这栋高层建筑并身亡。

The authorities said that 13 others at the scene suffered injuries, none of them life-threatening.

官方表示，现场另有13人受伤，均无生命危险。

“A comprehensive investigation concluded that this is a case of endangering public safety caused by personal reasons,” the statement said.

声明称：“综合调查认定，此系一起因个人原因造成的危害公共安全案件。”

The authorities in China often attribute random acts of violence to residents with personal grievances seeking “revenge on society,” offering little information on the exact motive for such attacks.

在中国，官方往往将偶发的暴力行为归咎于心怀个人怨恨、企图“报复社会”的居民，而极少提供有关此类袭击确切动机的详细信息。

The crash, less than five miles from the seat of the Chinese Communist Party in Zhongnanhai, prompted questions about how a pilot was able to fly into the city center unobstructed. China strictly controls its airspace, issuing bans on the flying of drones, racing pigeons and kites during important events.

此次出事地点距离中国共产党权力核心所在地中南海不足八公里，这引发了外界的质疑：一名飞行员何以能够毫无阻碍地飞入市中心。中国对其领空实施极其严格的控制，在重要活动期间甚至会发布针对无人机、赛鸽和风筝的禁飞令。

Many of the healthiest communities worldwide have something in common — diets rich in olive oil.

全球许多最健康的社区都有一个共同点——饮食中富含橄榄油。

The ingredient, especially the extra-virgin variety, is full of fatty acids and health-promoting plant compounds called polyphenols that make it a potent anti-inflammatory with long-term benefits. Studies suggest that consuming olive oil may help lower your risk of heart disease, neurodegenerative disease and even premature death, especially when it’s eaten as part of a Mediterranean diet.

这种食材——尤其是特级初榨橄榄油——富含脂肪酸和被称为多酚的有益健康植物化合物，使其成为有长期健康益处的强效抗炎剂。研究表明，食用橄榄油可能有助于降低患心脏病、神经退行性疾病甚至过早死亡的风险，特别是作为地中海饮食的一部分食用。

Olive oil is one of the “key drivers” of the diet’s health benefits, said Catherine Itsiopoulos, a nutrition researcher at RMIT University in Melbourne, Australia, who studies olive oil. It is the “healthiest type of fat” to use in your diet, she added.

澳大利亚墨尔本皇家理工大学研究橄榄油的营养学研究员凯瑟琳·伊齐奥普洛斯表示，橄榄油是地中海饮食健康益处的“关键驱动因素”之一。她补充说，这是饮食中“最健康的脂肪类型”。

Here’s what to know, along with recipes from New York Times Cooking.

以下是您需要了解的内容，以及来自《纽约时报》烹饪频道的食谱。

It helps keep your heart healthy.

它有助于保持心脏健康

Of all the plant-based oils, olive oil has among the highest concentrations of monounsaturated fats and polyphenols. These compounds, particularly one called oleic acid, work to balance cholesterol levels, lower blood pressure and keep the heart healthier over time.

在所有植物油中，橄榄油的单不饱和脂肪和多酚浓度名列前茅。这些化合物——特别是其中一种叫做油酸的物质——能够平衡胆固醇水平、降低血压，随着时间的推移，能够令心脏更加健康。

In a large 2018 clinical trial in Spain, people at high risk of cardiovascular disease who followed a Mediterranean diet supplemented with extra-virgin olive oil (at least four tablespoons per day) reduced their risk of heart attack, stroke and death from cardiovascular causes by 30 percent, compared with a group who followed a low-fat diet.

2018年在西班牙进行的一项大型临床试验中，与遵循低脂饮食的对照组相比，遵循地中海饮食并补充特级初榨橄榄油（每天至少四汤匙）的高危心血管疾病患者心脏病发作、中风以及因心血管疾病导致的死亡风险降低了30%。

“One single food cannot have the same effect as the whole Mediterranean cuisine,” Dr. Itsiopoulos said. “Still, even a few tablespoons of olive oil consumed per day can have a significant cardiovascular benefit.”

“单靠一种食物无法达到完整的地中海饮食所带来的效果，”伊齐奥普洛斯说。“不过，每天只需食用几汤匙橄榄油，就能对心血管产生显著的益处。”

It can reduce inflammation.

它可以减轻炎症

Along with its polyphenols, olive oil contains other antioxidants like vitamin E and squalene. These all help to reduce inflammation and oxidative stress, both of which can cause cell damage and disease, said Elena M. Yubero-Serrano, a research scientist at the Spanish National Research Council who studies the relationship between food and aging.

除了多酚，橄榄油还含有维生素E和角鲨烯等其他抗氧化剂。西班牙国家研究委员会研究食物与衰老关系的科研人员埃琳娜·尤贝罗-塞拉诺表示，这些成分都有助于减轻炎症和氧化应激，而这两者都会导致细胞损伤和疾病。

Olive oil may also benefit metabolic health by improving blood sugar control and potentially lowering the risk of Type 2 diabetes, Dr. Yubero-Serrano said.

尤贝罗-塞拉诺指出，橄榄油还可以改善血糖控制，潜在降低2型糖尿病风险，从而有益于代谢健康。

It’s good for your brain.

它对大脑有益

The healthy fats and antioxidants in olive oil also help protect the brain and reduce the risk of cognitive decline, said Marta Guasch-Ferré, a nutrition researcher and associate professor at the University of Copenhagen.

哥本哈根大学的营养学研究员兼副教授玛塔·瓜施-费雷表示，橄榄油中的健康脂肪和抗氧化剂也有助于保护大脑并降低认知能力下降的风险。

Analyzing the health data of more than 90,000 U.S. adults over 28 years, Dr. Guasch-Ferré and her team found that those who consumed more than half a tablespoon of olive oil per day had a 28 percent lower risk of dying from dementia compared with those who never or rarely consumed olive oil. They also had a significantly lower risk of dying from cardiovascular disease, respiratory disease and cancer.

通过对9万多名美国成年人长达28年的健康数据进行分析，瓜施-费雷博士及其团队发现，与从不或极少食用橄榄油的人相比，每天摄入超过半汤匙橄榄油的人死于失智症的风险要低28%。同时，他们死于心血管疾病、呼吸系统疾病和癌症的风险也显著降低。

Much of this research is observational, so it’s difficult to prove cause and effect for a single food. Still, the findings support replacing sources of saturated fats (like butter, mayonnaise or margarine) with olive oil to stave off premature death, Dr. Guasch-Ferré said.

这些研究大多是观察性的，因此很难证明单一食物的因果关系。尽管如此，瓜施-费雷博士表示，这些研究成果支持用橄榄油替代饱和脂肪来源（如黄油、蛋黄酱或人造黄油），以预防过早死亡。

What’s the healthiest way to enjoy it?

最健康的食用方式是什么？

Olive oil is extracted by crushing olives. Doing this at low temperatures produces the highest quality olive oil (extra-virgin). Refined and blended varieties, including regular olive oil, are at least partially extracted using heat, chemicals or mechanical methods.

橄榄油是通过压榨橄榄制成的，低温压榨可生产出最高品质的橄榄油（特级初榨）。而包括普通橄榄油在内的精炼和混合品种在生产过程中至少部分采用了加热、化学或机械方法。

The more processing, the fewer nutritional benefits, Dr. Yubero-Serrano said. Regular olive oil is a good source of healthy fats. But extra-virgin is the “gold standard” when it comes to nutrition because of its polyphenols and other antioxidants, she said.

尤贝罗-塞拉诺表示，加工步骤越多，营养价值就越低。普通橄榄油是健康脂肪的良好来源。但她指出，就营养价值而言，由于其富含多酚和其他抗氧化剂，特级初榨橄榄油才是“黄金标准”。

Olive oil can get a bad rap because it’s high in calories — about 120 per tablespoon. But if you eat it in moderation, and in place of less healthy sources of fat like butter, it’s unlikely to sabotage your health goals. For most people, one to four tablespoons per day is a good target for health and longevity, experts say.

橄榄油常因热量较高（每汤匙约120卡路里）而受诟病。但若适量食用，并用来代替黄油等不太健康的脂肪来源，它就不太可能破坏健康目标。专家表示，对大多数人来说，为了健康和长寿，每天一到四汤匙是一个很好的目标。

With that, here are some recipes from NYT Cooking.

《纽约时报》烹饪频道食谱推荐

1. House Dressing

1. 招牌沙拉酱

Rachel Vanni for The New York Times. Food Stylist: Spencer Richards.

This mustard-shallot vinaigrette, rich and fruity with olive oil, gets its smooth balance from the addition of warm water.

Birthrates in much of the developed world are at record lows, but there’s one demographic group that’s exploring new frontiers of fertility: ultrawealthy men. Deploying nearly limitless resources, a small number of them are reproducing at such an extraordinary scale and pace that they’re exploding previous notions of what a family is. At a moment when so many people say they feel priced out of having even one child, these adventures in prolific fatherhood are emerging as a stark example of inequality made flesh.

发达国家大部分地区的出生率正处于历史新低，但有一个人口群体却正在探索生育的新前沿：超级富豪男性。凭借近乎无限的资源，这个极小的群体正在以如此惊人的规模和速度繁衍后代，以至于彻底打破了以往对家庭的定义。在许多人表示连养活一个孩子都感到捉襟见肘的时刻，他们在批量产子之路上的高歌猛进正在成为一种刺眼的不平等具象化。

Numerous reports have landed in recent years about men using reproductive technology to produce dozens of offspring. The billionaire developer Stefan Soloviev has 22 children, some conceived through clinical methods. Pavel Durov, the billionaire Russian founder of the messaging platform Telegram, said his sperm donations had produced over 100 children. The disgraced American insurance tycoon Greg Lindberg undertook what he called a “baby project” that reportedly involved duping models into donating their eggs to him as he expanded his brood to at least 12, and the even more disgraced sex offender Jeffrey Epstein told a scientist that he wanted to spread his DNA by impregnating as many as 20 surrogates at a time with his sperm. Some very rich Chinese men, The Wall Street Journal reported, have sought the assistance of American surrogacy agencies to sire staggering numbers of children: The founder of one network of fertility clinics said that one of these men expressed a desire to have more than 200 children at once. According to the South China Morning Post, the ex-partner of Xu Bo, another Chinese businessman, publicly accused him of having at least 300 children, a claim he has denied.

近年来，关于男性利用生殖技术孕育数十名后代的报道屡见不鲜。亿万富翁开发商斯蒂凡·索洛维耶夫(Stefan Soloviev)有22个孩子，其中一些是通过医疗方法受孕的。俄罗斯超级富豪、即时通讯平台Telegram的创始人帕维尔·杜罗夫曾表示，他捐出的精子已孕育了100多个孩子。身败名裂的美国保险大亨格雷格·林德伯格开展了一项他称之为“婴儿计划”的行动，据报道，该计划涉及诱骗模特向他捐赠卵子，从而将其子嗣扩大到至少12人；而更加名声狼藉的性罪犯杰弗里·爱泼斯坦曾告诉一名科学家，他想通过用自己的精子一次让多达20名代孕母亲同时受孕来传播自己的DNA。据《华尔街日报》报道，一些非常富有的中国男性曾寻求美国代孕机构的协助，以繁衍数量惊人的孩子：一家生育诊所网络的创始人表示，其中一名男性表达了想要一次拥有200多个孩子的想法。据《南华早报》报道，另一位中国商人徐波的前伴侣公开指责他有至少300个孩子，但他对此予以了否认。

And, of course, there is Elon Musk, the richest man in the world. With a mere 14 known children by four women, his output may seem tame by comparison with some megafathers, but his influence is larger than the sum of his offspring. He was cited as a role model when he was a paltry megabillionaire. Now that he has entered the realm of the trillionaire, his actions are likely to reverberate even more. He is reported to have told one of his children’s mothers he wants to use surrogates to “reach legion level.” In the meantime, he has goaded the competition. In response to a post about Mr. Durov notching triple-digit offspring, Mr. Musk replied, “‘Rookie numbers lmao’ — Genghis Khan,” a nod to the Mongol leader’s supposed millions of descendants.

当然，还有世界首富埃隆·马斯克。他仅与四名女性育有14个为人所知的孩子，与某些“超级父亲”相比，他的产出可能相形见绌，但他的影响力却远超其子嗣的数量。他在还只是一个普通的超级亿万富翁时就被奉为了榜样。如今，随着他迈入万亿美元富豪的行列，他的举动很可能会产生更大的回响。据报道，他曾告诉他其中一个孩子的母亲，他想利用代孕来“达到军团级别”。与此同时，他还向竞争对手发出了调侃。在回应一条关于杜罗夫有三位数子嗣的帖子时，马斯克回复道：“‘菜鸟数字，笑死我了’——成吉思汗”，以此向这位据传拥有数百万后代的蒙古领袖致敬。

What drives these men to reproduce at an industrial scale? Mr. Musk’s reference to Genghis Khan holds one clue. Each man presumably has his unique motivations, and the instinct to donate your sperm far and wide may differ from the desire to create a compound full of your progeny and their mothers, but they seem united in one thing: Like kings of earlier eras who claimed divine lineage, many of these men hold their own bloodlines in exalted regard. Mr. Musk, who in 2021 changed his job title at Tesla to “technoking,” has said he wants smart people — or even just rich people, according to a report in Business Insider — to have more children. One of the mothers of his offspring, an executive in his business, told his biographer that he encouraged her to have kids and suggested he be her sperm donor.

是什么驱动这些男性以工业化的规模去繁衍后代？马斯克提及成吉思汗提供了一个线索。每个人想必都有其独特的动机，广泛捐献精子的本能可能也不是为了打造一个住满自己后代和他们母亲的大宅，但他们似乎在有一点上是共通的：正如早期宣称自己拥有神圣血统的帝王一样，这些男性中的许多人对自己的血脉抱有崇高的敬意。马斯克在2021年将自己在特斯拉的职位名称改为了“技术王(technoking)”，据《商业内幕》的一篇报道称，他曾表示他希望聪明人——或者只是有钱人——生更多的孩子。他其中一个孩子的母亲（也是他企业中的一名高管）告诉他的传记作者，马斯克曾鼓励她生孩子，并建议由他来担任她的精子捐献者。

Mr. Epstein was reportedly inspired by the short-lived Repository for Germinal Choice, a sperm bank that was reputed to have Nobel laureates among its donors. Mr. Durov, who frequently posts shirtless images of his chiseled upper body on social media, said his sperm was “high-quality donor material.” These men appear to view distributing their DNA as a gift to humankind, a philanthropic act of genetic optimization that will benefit generations to come.

据报道，爱泼斯坦受到了曾短暂存在的“生殖选择库”(Repository for Germinal Choice)的启发，该精子库曾因其捐献者中包括了诺贝尔奖得主而闻名。经常在社交媒体上用上身赤裸照片展示自己的雕像般身材的杜罗夫则表示，他的精子是“高质量的捐献材料”。这些男性似乎将传播自己的DNA视为对人类的一种馈赠，一项将造福子孙后代的基因优化慈善之举。

Monarchs also saw children as tools, proof of their legitimacy and means by which to forge alliances through marriage. Today’s most productive patriarchs speak of their children in similarly instrumental terms — sons to be the heirs to their business empires, daughters to be strategically married off to powerful men, babies to be the siblings the father never had or just bodies to stave off population collapse.

君主们同样将子嗣视为工具，既是其统治合法性的证明，也是通过联姻巩固联盟的手段。如今最多产的男性族长在谈及他们的孩子时也使用了类似的功利主义语调——儿子用来继承他们的商业帝国，女儿用来战略性地嫁给权势人物，婴儿用来充当父亲从未拥有过的兄弟姐妹，或者仅仅是用来延缓人口崩溃的肉躯。

This particular story would not have been possible, however, in some long-ago era of crowns and castles. Kings had consorts and concubines aplenty, but they were limited by biological constraints. Technokings, on the other hand, can use assisted reproductive technologies and multiple simultaneous surrogates to create webs of siblings born within months of one another.

然而，在很久以前那个王冠与城堡的时代，这样的故事是不可能发生的。国王们固然有三宫六院、妃嫔无数，但他们受到生理极限的制约。相反，“技术王”们却可以使用辅助生殖技术和多名代孕母亲打造出生时间仅相隔几个月的庞大兄弟姐妹网。

In vitro fertilization doesn’t just allow one man to produce multiple pregnancies in parallel; it allows him to exercise a measure of control over their outcomes, such as specifying a baby’s sex or even selecting an embryo based on its risk of disease — quality control, you might say, for a human factory. One egg donor participating in Mr. Lindberg’s baby project reported that its patron told her he “wanted 12 blond-haired, blue-eyed boys.” Mr. Epstein’s emails reveal a similar obsession with blue eyes. The Information reported that Mr. Musk has used polygenic embryo screening, which can cost tens of thousands of dollars and purports to enable parents to choose embryos based on desired genetic profiles.

体外受精(IVF)不仅允许一名男性并行制造多次怀孕；它还允许他对繁衍的结果实施一定程度的控制，例如指定婴儿的性别，甚至根据疾病风险来筛选胚胎——你可能会说，这是人类工厂的质量控制。参与林德伯格“婴儿计划”的一名卵子捐献者称，其资助人告诉她，他“想要12个金发碧眼的男孩”。爱泼斯坦的电子邮件也透露出对蓝眼睛有类似的痴迷。《The Information》报道称，马斯克使用了多基因胚胎筛查技术，这种筛查可能耗资数万美元，据称能让父母根据期望的基因图谱来选择胚胎。

Most of the reproductive technologies these men are using have been around for a few decades. What’s new is the impulse to use them in such bizarrely self-glorifying ways while buying one’s way out of any inconvenient constraints that other clients might encounter. It is a distinctive product of this era in which the wealthiest few can use essentially limitless wealth to buy essentially limitless power. I’ve spoken to middle-class fertility patients who borrow money or apply to charities to cover the cost of I.V.F. to have just one desperately wanted child. Men this rich easily produce scores of them, even at a price of $200,000 or more for surrogacy and donor eggs, and can then casually outsource the demands of bringing them up.

这些男性正在使用的大多数生殖技术其实已经存在了数十年。新鲜的地方在于，有人会以如此怪异且自我神化的方式去使用它们，同时用金钱摆脱了其他客户可能会遇到的任何不便限制。这是这个时代独特的产物，在这个时代，极少数最富有的人可以利用近乎无限的财富来购买近乎无限的权力。我曾与一些中产阶级的生育患者交谈过，他们通过借钱或向慈善机构申请资助来支付体外受精的费用，仅仅是为了拥有一个极度渴望的孩子。而如此富有的男性却能轻而易举地孕育数十个孩子，即使代孕和捐赠卵子的价格高达20万美元或更多，然后他们还可以轻描淡写地将抚养这些孩子的需求外包出去。

The capacity to alchemize money and sperm in this manner has turned an ordinary and beautiful event, the creation of a child, into a kind of acquisition frenzy. It has also produced a windfall for the businesses willing to rev up production and customize children to their clients’ specifications. The owner of one U.S. surrogacy agency told The Journal he had helped to “fill an order” for 100 babies for a wealthy Chinese client. Mr. Durov has covered the cost of I.V.F. for Russian women at a Moscow fertility clinic that stores his sperm. Two American fertility clinics, one in Los Angeles and one in Chicago, seemed happy to help Mr. Lindberg execute his baby project, together treating at least 19 of his egg donors and surrogates.

以这种方式将金钱和精子点石成金的能力已经令孕育生命这一平凡而美好的事变得仿佛商场扫货。它还为那些愿意开足马力生产并根据客户要求定制儿童的企业带来了一笔意外之财。一家美国代孕机构的所有者告诉《华尔街日报》，他曾协助一位富有的中国客户“填了一份100个婴儿的订单”。莫斯科一家生育诊所储存了杜罗夫的精子，他在那里为多名俄罗斯女性支付了体外受精费用。两家美国生育诊所（分别位于洛杉矶和芝加哥）似乎非常乐意协助林德伯格执行他的“婴儿计划”，总共为他的至少19名卵子捐献者和代孕母亲提供了治疗。

Engaging with the fertility industry, whether as patients or clients, can turn out very differently for women, especially those who lack the same extravagant means. A Times investigation found that Thai women lured to Georgia to be surrogates might have had their eggs extracted without their consent. Here in this country, a surrogate who had a stillbirth was doxxed and sued by the wealthy woman who had hired her, according to reporting in Wired.

无论作为患者还是客户，涉足生育产业对女性来说结果可能会截然不同，尤其是那些缺乏同等财力的女性。《纽约时报》的一项调查发现，被诱骗到格鲁吉亚充当代孕母亲的泰国女性可能在未经其知情同意的情况下被抽取了卵子。在美国本土，据《连线》杂志报道，一名出现死产的代孕母亲被雇佣她的富有女性网暴和起诉。

Then there are the children. The New Yorker recently detailed disturbing allegations of child abuse and neglect by a Los Angeles-based couple who had commissioned roughly two dozen babies from surrogates.

接下来受到冲击的是孩子们。《纽约客》最近详细报道了关于洛杉矶一对夫妇涉嫌虐待和忽视儿童的令人触目惊心的指控，这对夫妇曾通过代孕订购了二十多个婴儿。

These billionaire megafathers, by contrast, have the cultural and political winds at their backs. Tech-bro philosophers have mounted sophisticated-sounding defenses of aristocratic rule, eugenics and selective breeding, providing intellectual cover or even moral justification for the billionaires’ unorthodox paternal pursuits. And leaders around the world have gone to sometimes comical lengths to encourage their citizens to have more children.

相比之下，这些亿万富翁超级父亲却有文化和政治趋势的加持。科技圈的极客哲学家们为贵族统治、优生学和选择性育种炮制了听起来充满高级感的辩护，为这些亿万富翁不合常理的为人父追求提供了智识掩护乃至道德正当性。世界各地的领导人们有时也采取了近乎滑稽的手段来鼓励其公民生育更多的孩子。

All of this suggests it is unlikely that wealthy men will face any meaningful restrictions on how they can use assisted reproductive technologies. Nor is it clear what accountability looks like in regards to the children who have been born, some of whom have been placed in foster care. Mr. Lindberg kept his baby project going even while locked up on a bribery conviction, apparently with little thought to the well-being of the infants who were soon to be born. “How are we going to pay for the nannies, etc. for these babies when they get here?” one of his employees asked a colleague, Bloomberg reported.

这一切都表明，富豪们不太可能在如何使用辅助生殖技术方面面临任何实质性的限制。对于那些已经出生的孩子，目前也并不清楚该如何落实抚养责任，他们中的一些人已经被送往了寄养家庭。林德伯格甚至在因行贿罪入狱期间仍继续维持着他的“婴儿计划”，显然极少考虑那些即将出生的婴儿的福祉。据彭博社报道，他的一名员工曾询问同事：“等这些孩子来了，我们要怎么支付保姆之类的费用？”

When Mr. Xu, the man whose ex-partner accused him of having 300 children, spoke via videoconference with an American family court judge in the summer of 2023, he had not even bothered to meet several of his children. They were being raised by nannies in Irvine, Calif., while they waited for the documents to travel to China. He explained to the judge, who was evaluating a number of surrogacy petitions in his name, that work had been busy. (You know how it is.) There is little care, nurturing or love in these stories; there is mostly head count and optimization.

2023年夏天，当被前伴侣指责有300个孩子的徐先生通过视频会议与美国一家庭法院法官对话时，他甚至都懒得去见见自己的几个孩子。这些孩子当时正由加利福尼亚州尔湾市的保姆抚养，等待着前往中国的旅行文件。他向正在评估几份以他名义提交的代孕申请的法官解释说，工作一直很忙。（你知道那是怎么回事。）在这些故事中，几乎看不到关怀、哺育或爱，绝大多数只是人头数和优化。

An overwhelming majority of people who avail themselves of fertility services do so without abusing them. It is apparently only a few men of extreme wealth who are using them in ways that were never intended, to build not families but legions of bespoke children. The fertility sector could surely benefit from more oversight, but the richest among us will always have ways to circumvent laws that don’t suit them. We should also focus on reining in the extraordinary inequality that has given rise to a kingly class of men so powerful, they believe they can remake the world in their genetic image.

绝大多数利用生育服务的人并没有滥用它。显而易见，只有极少数极端富有的男性在以违背初衷的方式使用这些技术，他们并非是要组建家庭，而是为了批量生产定制子女。监管固然能给生育行业带来改善，但我们当中最富有的人总能找到方法去规避不适合他们的法律。我们还应当把注意力集中在遏制导致了君王般男性阶层崛起的极端不平等上，这些人如此强大，以至于相信自己可以用其基因形象来重塑世界。

A large chunk of the $2 billion haul President Donald Trump took in last year came as hundreds of thousands of his fans and other investors bet on a speculative cryptocurrency called $TRUMP, hoping its value would soar with his return to the White House.

去年，特朗普总统获得了20亿美元的巨额收益，其中很大一部分来自数十万支持者和其他投资者对名为$TRUMP的投机性加密货币的押注，他们希望这种货币的价值能随着特朗普重返白宫而飙升。

But while Trump amassed an eye-popping $636 million from the cryptocurrency, known as a memecoin, many of his followers who heeded his call to purchase the coin came out losers.

然而，当特朗普从这种被称为“迷因币”(memecoin)的加密货币中获得了高达6.36亿美元的惊人收益，许多听从他的号召购买该货币的追随者却成了输家。

That outcome, documented by an independent analysis of trades and fees paid out from $TRUMP token sales, is drawing renewed attention this week, as Trump for the first time has detailed the extraordinary $1.4 billion in revenue he secured just from the cryptocurrency industry since he returned to the White House.

这一结果由对$TRUMP代币的销售交易和支付费用的独立分析所证实。本周，随着特朗普首次详细披露自重返白宫以来从加密货币行业获得的14亿美元惊人收入，这一结果再次引起了人们的关注。

The president’s 927-page financial disclosure showed how Trump and his family reaped huge financial rewards in 2025 through his money-losing Trump Media venture and a separate cryptocurrency firm called World Liberty Financial, even as routine investors suffered vast losses.

总统长达927页的财务披露显示，2025年，尽管普通投资者遭受了巨大损失，特朗普及其家人仍通过其亏损的特朗普传媒企业和一家名为世界自由金融的独立加密货币公司获得了巨额财务回报。

He also amassed hundreds of millions through deals that involved foreign governments or corporations with agenda items pending before the Trump administration.

他还通过涉及外国政府或企业的交易积累了数亿美元，而这些交易涉及的议题当时正由特朗普政府审议。

On Wednesday, Trump dismissed questions about how much money he had made after returning to the White House, suggesting that he left personal financial decisions related to his investments to others.

周三，特朗普对关于他重返白宫后赚了多少钱的质疑不予理会，表示他把与投资相关的个人财务决策交由他人处理。

“I don’t know if I had a better career in politics or business,” Trump said as he was about to board his new Air Force One jet donated by the government of Qatar with his two oldest sons, Eric Trump and Donald Trump Jr., looking on. “But I had a great career in business. And you saw the cash.”

“我不知道自己政界还是商界的职业生涯更好，”特朗普在准备登上卡塔尔政府捐赠的新“空军一号”专机时说，他的两个年长的儿子埃里克·特朗普和小唐纳德·特朗普在一旁看着。“但在商界，我确实有过辉煌的职业生涯。你们也看到了那些钱。”

去年8月，埃里克·特朗普（左）和小唐纳德·特朗普站在纳斯达克大楼外。

The memecoin, which features an image of Trump pumping his fist the way he did after a 2024 assassination attempt, has no intrinsic value itself. Instead, it was a bet on the aura around Trump and the idea that the coin’s fortunes would rise with his presidency.

这种迷因币上有特朗普在2024年遭遇暗杀未遂后挥舞拳头的形象，其本身并没有内在价值。相反，它更像是对特朗普个人光环的押注，赌的是这种代币价值会随着他的总统任期而水涨船高。

In a way, Trump’s cryptocurrency windfall is a reflection of the speculative nature of the nascent industry, in which executives behind these often highly volatile ventures are at times able to generate huge profits at the expense of smaller investors, who often lose vast sums on experimental coins.

在某种程度上，特朗普从加密货币中获得的意外之财反映了这个新兴行业的投机性质。在这些通常会剧烈波动的项目中，幕后高管有时能够以牺牲小投资者为代价赚取巨额利润，小投资者则常因投资实验性代币而损失惨重。

Former federal financial regulators said Trump has taken that to a new extreme, structuring his crypto ventures so he always made money on the front end, according to disclosures from the companies, no matter what happened to the business in the long run.

前联邦金融监管机构人员表示，根据这些公司的披露，特朗普将这种做法推向了一个新的极端：他构建自己的加密货币项目架构，确保无论项目长期发展如何，自己总能在先期获利。

“It is hard to wrap your head around that the president of the United States would engage in this level of self-enrichment at the expense of so many of his supporters,” said Lee Reiners, a former Federal Reserve Bank examiner who now studies cryptocurrency issues at Duke University. “This is a president of the United States who has made more money off crypto since he took office than he made in any prior year in his entire business career.”

“美国总统竟然会以牺牲这么多支持者为代价，中饱私囊到这个程度，实在令人难以理解，”曾在联邦储备银行担任审查员、现于杜克大学研究加密货币问题的李·雷纳斯说。“这位美国总统上任以来靠加密货币赚到的钱比他在整个商业生涯中任何一年赚的钱都多。”

The White House, in a statement Wednesday, rejected the suggestion that Trump is exploiting his followers.

白宫在周三的一份声明中驳斥了特朗普正在利用其追随者的说法。

“All actions by President Trump and his administration are taken in the best interest of the American people,” Anna Kelly, a White House spokesperson, said in the statement. “Neither the president nor his family has ever engaged — or will ever engage — in conflicts of interest.”

“特朗普总统及其政府的所有行动都是为了美国人民的最大利益，”白宫发言人安娜·凯利在声明中说。“无论是总统还是他的家人，过去从未——将来也绝不会——卷入利益冲突。”

As of the middle of last year, according to Chainalysis, a crypto analytics firm, 58 investors in the $TRUMP coin had made profits in excess of $10 million, totaling an estimated $1.1 billion — most of them early traders who got out before the coin crashed in value. At the same time, some 764,000 crypto wallets, most with small holdings, lost money on $TRUMP, the Chainalysis data shows.

加密货币分析公司Chainalysis的数据显示，截至去年年中，$TRUMP币的58名投资者已经获得了超过1000万美元的利润，总计约11亿美元，他们当中大多数是早期交易者，在该代币暴跌前就已经套现离场。与此同时，Chainalysis的数据显示，大约76.4万个加密货币钱包（大部分持有量较小）在$TRUMP上亏损。

But every time $TRUMP was traded, the president and his partners collected transaction fees, which along with other revenues from the coin totaled hundreds of millions of dollars, his financial disclosure shows.

但总统的财务披露显示，每当$TRUMP被交易一次，总统及其合作伙伴都会收取交易手续费，这与该代币的其他收入加起来，总计达数亿美元。

Trump’s annual report shows that he earned an additional $799 million from World Liberty, including a large share when the government of the United Arab Emirates secretly purchased a stake in the company, just as Trump was returning to the White House.

特朗普的年度报告显示，他从世界自由金融额外赚取了7.99亿美元，其中包括阿联酋政府在特朗普重返白宫之际秘密购买该公司股份时他所分得的一大笔收益。

Meanwhile, the price of $WLFI, a cryptocurrency coin created by World Liberty Financial, has sunk to less than 6 cents, a more than 80% drop from its peak, generating enormous losses for investors who bought in at a higher price.

与此同时，由世界自由金融创建的加密货币$WLFI的价格已跌至不到6美分，较峰值下跌了80%以上，给高价买入的投资者造成了巨大损失。

That decline did not matter much for Trump: A Trump entity received a 75% cut of all sales of $WLFI, according to a disclosure by the company, allowing him to profit from the coin long before its price cratered.

这种下跌对特朗普来说影响不大：根据该公司的披露，一家特朗普旗下的实体从$WLFI的所有销售中抽取了75%的份额，这使他能够在该代币价格暴跌之前很久就从中获利。

While he was accumulating this new wealth, Trump’s administration was taking steps that allowed his crypto ventures to raise their profits. Early last year, the Securities and Exchange Commission announced that it would not regulate memecoins as a security. And Trump promoted legislation he signed into law expanding the use of stablecoins in the United States, a few months after World Liberty issued its own such coin.

在他积累这些新财富的同时，特朗普政府也在采取措施，为其加密货币业务创造更多利润空间。去年年初，美国证券交易委员会宣布，将不会把迷因币作为证券进行监管。此外，在世界自由金融发行了自己的稳定币数月后，特朗普推动并签署了一项立法，扩大了稳定币在美国的适用范围。

第一夫人梅拉尼娅·特朗普去年通过销售她的迷因币赚取了约600万美元。

(Stablecoins are a form of cryptocurrency that are supposed to maintain a lock on a $1 value and then are used as a way to store crypto investment funds or buy goods or services. Memecoins are considered collectibles that buyers speculate might increase in value.)

（稳定币是一种加密货币，设计初衷是将其价值锁定在一美元，通常被用作存储加密投资资金或购买商品及服务的方式。迷因币则被认为是收藏品，买家投机猜测其价值可能会上升。）

“I find it sad that these investors have no protection from the SEC — the agency has gleefully abandoned them,” said John Reed Stark, the former chief of the SEC office that investigated online investment fraud. “It is all about a scam that is as old as securities markets themselves — and it is called a pump-and-dump scheme that enriches a few at the expense of the masses.”

“我痛心的是，这些投资者得不到证券交易委员会的保护——这个机构已经兴高采烈地抛弃了他们，”曾任证券交易委员会网络投资欺诈调查办公室主任约翰·里德·斯塔克说。“这完全是一个与证券市场本身一样古老的骗局——也就是所谓的‘拉高出货’骗局，以牺牲大众为代价让少数人致富。”

The agency did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

证券交易委员会没有立即回应置评请求。

Trump has not shown signs that he is discouraged by the financial losses of his investors. Instead, he has looked for ways to temporarily increase the price of his cryptocurrency ventures through special promotions.

特朗普并没有表现出因其投资者遭受财务损失而沮丧的迹象，而是一直想方设法通过特别促销活动来暂时提高其加密货币项目的价格。

Last year, for example, he held a dinner at his Virginia golf club for the top buyers of his memecoin, sparking a bidding war that attracted investors from around the world, temporarily pushing up the price.

例如，去年，他在自己位于弗吉尼亚州的高尔夫俱乐部为他的迷因币主要买家举办了一场晚宴，引发了一场吸引全球投资者的竞价战，从而暂时推高了该币价格。

A similar event at Mar-a-Lago this year generated much less investment, with the price of $TRUMP hovering around $2.83, about an 80% decline from a year earlier.

今年在马阿拉歌庄园举办的一场类似活动吸引到的投资少得多，$TRUMP的价格徘徊在2.83美元左右，较一年前下跌了约80%。

The coin is “completely dead,” said Morten Christensen, an investor who attended the $TRUMP event at Mar-a-Lago. “Nobody cares about a meme that’s down 97%.”

参加过马阿拉歌庄园$TRUMP活动的投资者莫滕·克里斯滕森说，该代币已经“彻底死透了”。“没有人会去在乎一个暴跌了97%的迷因币。”

Even some of the president’s staunchest supporters in the crypto world have grown disillusioned.

就连加密货币界中一些总统最坚定的支持者们也逐渐感到幻。。

In April, crypto mogul Justin Sun, who spent tens of millions of dollars on $WLFI and $TRUMP, sued World Liberty, claiming that the company had illegally prevented him from selling his stash in order to prop up the price. (World Liberty denied the claims.)

4月，曾在$WLFI和$TRUMP上投入数千万美元的加密货币大亨孙宇晨起诉了世界自由金融，声称该公司为了支撑价格而非法阻止他出售自己持有的代币。（世界自由金融否认了这些指控。）