President Trump went to war with Iran in part to force compliance with two longstanding American demands: Tehran must stop enriching nuclear fuel for at least two decades, and it must allow international inspectors to go anywhere and see anything to verify the country is not producing a bomb.

特朗普总统对伊朗开战，部分原因是为了迫使伊朗遵守美国长期提出的两项要求：德黑兰必须至少停止铀浓缩活动20年，并且必须允许国际核查人员前往任何地点、检查任何内容，以确认它没有在制造核武器。

On Wednesday, Mr. Trump took the reverse approach to Saudi Arabia, its close ally in the region. To seal a deal for Westinghouse and other American companies to seize a big piece of the business in building two nuclear reactors on Saudi territory — and more to come — it opened the door to allowing the kingdom to begin enriching its own nuclear fuel after two years.

周三，特朗普对美国在该地区的亲密盟友沙特阿拉伯采取了截然相反的做法。为了促成西屋电气及其他美国公司拿下在沙特境内建造两座核反应堆的重大合同——且后续还有更多项目——美国为沙特打开了大门，允许其在两年后开始自行浓缩核燃料。

And it gave in to the kingdom’s demand that it not have to abide by an inspection agreement that applies to more than 140 other countries. Those rules, the Saudis said, are just too intrusive.

美国还同意了沙特提出的一项要求：即不必遵守一项适用于全球140多个国家的核查协议。沙特方面表示，这些规则太过侵入性。

Now Mr. Trump will have to make the case to Congress, and to allies throughout the Middle East, that in loosening the nuclear standards for one close ally, he is not ushering in a new age of proliferation, especially in a region of the world already on fire. If the daily missile exchanges with Iran finally give way to resumed negotiations, there is no question Iran will seize on the concessions made to Riyadh and insist on the same.

如今，特朗普将不得不向国会以及整个中东地区的盟友解释：为一个亲密盟友放宽核标准并不会开启一个新的核扩散时代，尤其是在这个本已战火不断的地区。如果与伊朗的每日导弹交火最终让位于新一轮谈判，伊朗必然会援引给予利雅得的种种让步，要求获得同等待遇。

Already on Wednesday, administration officials were arguing that there was nothing to worry about, and that the United States will be so engaged in Saudi Arabia’s nuclear future that there is no way the kingdom could divert its nuclear fuel and know-how to a secret bomb program.

就在周三，政府官员已开始声称没有什么好担心的，美国将深度介入沙特未来的核计划，因此沙特根本不可能将核燃料和相关技术转用于秘密的核武器计划。

They may prove right. But nuclear history is littered with examples of countries that pledged to obey the rules, and surreptitiously raced for a bomb.

他们或许是对的。但纵观核历史，不乏信誓旦旦遵守规则、暗中加速推进制造核武器的前车之鉴。

Iran’s first research reactor was provided by the United States to the shah of Iran, complete with weapons-grade uranium — technology that fell into the hands of the mullahs who took over the country in 1979. India’s first nuclear test used plutonium from a heavy-water reactor that had been a gift from the Canadian government in the 1950s. Pakistan stole its centrifuge designs from a European firm that hired A.Q. Khan, now celebrated as the father of the Pakistani bomb. Taiwan and South Korea, stalwart American allies, had secret bomb programs of their own until American intelligence agencies discovered them and quashed the efforts.

伊朗的第一座研究性核反应堆由美国提供给伊朗国王，并附带武器级浓缩铀——这项技术后来落入了1979年接管伊朗的神职人员之手。印度进行第一次核试验时使用的钚来自加拿大政府在1950年代赠予的一座重水反应堆。巴基斯坦则是从一家欧洲公司盗取了离心机设计图纸——阿卜杜勒·卡迪尔·汗受雇于该公司，如今他被誉为“巴基斯坦核弹之父”。台湾和韩国这两个美国坚定盟友也曾拥有各自的秘密核武器计划，直至被美国情报机构发现后才被迫叫停。

Mr. Trump has many reasons to solidify the American relationship with Saudi Arabia these days. He can argue that if the United States does not provide the country with its best reactors and nuclear technology, Russia or China will. At a time when tensions have flared with the Saudis — for a while Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman prohibited the United States from launching attacks on Iran from U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia — anything that draws the Saudis deeper into the American technology stack makes sense to the White House.

特朗普如今有许多理由巩固与沙特的关系。他可以辩称，如果美国不向沙特提供最先进的反应堆和核技术，俄罗斯或中国就会这么做。在美沙关系出现裂痕之际——王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼曾一度禁止美国从驻沙特基地对伊朗发动袭击，任何能将沙特更深地拉入美国技术体系的做法对白宫来说都是有意义的。

“Rest assured, these agreements uphold the highest standards of nuclear safety and nonproliferation,” Chris Wright, the secretary of energy, said in a statement on Wednesday announcing the deal, “while relying on the world’s best nuclear technology and scientists, designed right here in the United States.”

“请放心，这些协议坚持了核安全和不扩散的最高标准，”能源部长克里斯·赖特在周三宣布该协议的声明中表示，“同时依托于世界最优秀的核技术和科学家，而这些技术都是在美国设计的。”

Mr. Wright signed the deal with the Saudi minister of energy, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, but the White House did not immediately release the text — or the two secret letters accompanying it. All of those will now go to Capitol Hill for congressional review. But as a practical matter, Congress would have to assemble a veto-proof majority to override Mr. Trump’s initiative.

赖特与沙特能源大臣阿卜杜勒阿齐兹·本·萨勒曼亲王共同签署了协议，但白宫并未立即公布协议文本，也未公开随附的两封密函。所有这些文件都将提交国会审议。但从现实角度而言，国会必须凑够足以推翻总统决定的票数，才能否决特朗普的这项计划。

It is a process that has been used many times under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, a key element of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” program. The idea was to spread nuclear energy, with safeguards to assure that fuel is not diverted to bomb projects.

这是根据1954年《原子能法》多次使用过的程序，也是德怀特·艾森豪威尔“原子用于和平”计划的重要组成部分。其初衷是在核查机制的保障下推广核能，以确保核燃料不会被转作武器项目之用。

But Saudi Arabia poses a particular kind of problem, hard to imagine in Eisenhower’s time. It is a country that is racing to shed its petroleum-based past and eager to embrace nuclear energy to build data centers and power a future driven by artificial intelligence, yet fearful of what might happen if the Iranians get the bomb.

然而，沙特阿拉伯带来了一种在艾森豪威尔时代难以想象的特殊难题。这个国家正全力摆脱依赖石油的发展模式，希望借助核能建设数据中心，为一个由人工智能驱动的未来提供能源；与此同时，它又担心，一旦伊朗拥有了核武器，将会带来怎样的后果。

Saudi officials have made no secret of their determination to keep pace with Tehran’s apparent efforts to build a nuclear weapon, and to match them if they do. In 2018, Prince Mohammed pledged that his kingdom would try to develop or acquire nuclear weapons if Iran continued its work toward a bomb — despite the fact that Saudi Arabia signed on to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1988, after delaying for 18 years. Other Saudi officials have issued similar warnings in recent years, or talked about the need for Saudi Arabia to become a “threshold” nuclear state, a few screwdriver turns away from building its own weapon.

沙特官员毫不掩饰自己的决心：要与德黑兰制造核武器的明显努力保持同步，而且如果伊朗成功造出核弹，沙特也要拥有。2018年，穆罕默德王储曾承诺，如果伊朗继续推进核武器研发，沙特将尝试开发或获取核武器——尽管沙特在拖延18年后于1988年签署了《不扩散核武器条约》。近年来，其他沙特官员也发出过类似警告，或谈到沙特有必要成为核门槛国家——离制造自己的核武器只有几步之遥的国家。

“I find this decision incredibly shortsighted,” said James M. Acton, a nuclear analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “It appears to provide a pathway to a country that really might want to proliferate. You cannot exclude the possibility that Saudi Arabia would nationalize this facility and use it make a bomb.”

“我认为这一决定极其短视。”卡内基国际和平基金会核问题分析师詹姆斯·阿克顿表示。“这项协议似乎为一个确实有可能寻求核扩散的国家提供了一条道路。你不能排除这样一种可能性：沙特阿拉伯将这座设施收归国有，并利用它制造核武器。”

It is hardly a new problem. President George W. Bush negotiated a similar deal with the United Arab Emirates, finalized by President Barack Obama in 2009, whose terms were so restrictive that it became known as the gold standard of nuclear agreements. In return for the technology, the U.A.E. agreed to forgo producing nuclear fuel forever, and it signed the “Additional Protocol,” as the International Atomic Energy Agency calls an agreement allowing intrusive inspections. The U.A.E. now has four civilian nuclear reactors, built largely with the help of South Korea, and there is little worry that the country is interested in anything other than electricity production.

这并不是一个新问题。小布什总统曾与阿拉伯联合酋长国谈判达成过一项类似协议，并由奥巴马总统于2009年最终敲定。由于协议条款极其严格，它后来被称为核协议的黄金标准。作为获得核技术的交换条件，阿联酋承诺永远放弃自行生产核燃料，并签署了国际原子能机构所谓的《附加议定书》，允许进行具有高度侵入性的核查。如今，阿联酋已拥有四座民用核反应堆，大部分是在韩国的帮助下建成的，而且几乎没有人担心该国对核能有发电以外的任何企图。

位于阿布扎比加尔比亚地区的巴拉卡核电站，由阿联酋政府供图。阿联酋与美国签署的核能协议被视为此类协议的黄金标准。

When South Korea went down the same path, the United States won a 10-year moratorium on its making its own fuel. But when President Lee Jae Myung came to Washington late last year, he got an agreement from Mr. Trump to lift the restraints. (It appears that the restrictions are still in place, at least for now.)

韩国走上同一道路时，美国成功争取到为期10年的韩国自产核燃料禁令。但当韩国总统李在明去年年底访问华盛顿时，从特朗普那里获得了解除上述限制的承诺。（目前看来，限制似乎仍然有效，至少暂时如此。）

“It was clear Saudi Arabia was going to be different than the Emiratis,” said Robert Einhorn, a nuclear expert at the Brookings Institution who negotiated many of the toughest nuclear agreements of the past few decades as a State Department official. “They felt the inspections were just too intrusive and they weren’t going to renounce enrichment forever.”

“很明显，沙特会与阿联酋不同，”布鲁金斯学会核问题专家罗伯特·艾因霍恩表示。他曾任国务院官员，参与谈判了过去数十年间最为艰难的多项核协议。“他们觉得核查措施太过侵入性，而且也不准备永久放弃铀浓缩能力。”

While the Saudis agreed to a two-year study of whether it was economically feasible to produce their own nuclear fuel, they seem determined to pursue an enrichment capability, even if they had to wait awhile.

虽然沙特同意用两年时间研究自行生产核燃料是否具有经济可行性，但他们显然决心最终建立自己的铀浓缩能力，哪怕需要等待一段时间。

Once the terms of the Saudi deal are made public, other nations may well insist on the same treatment. The U.A.E. has a proviso in its accord that allows it to demand “consultations” with the United States if a neighboring country gets a better deal.

一旦沙特协议条款公开，其他国家很可能会要求获得同等待遇。阿联酋的协议中有一项条款，允许其在邻国获得了更好的待遇时有权要求与美国进行“磋商”。

Heather Williams, director of the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank, said the Saudi accord puts more pressure on the Trump administration to decisively eliminate Iran’s ability to build an atomic bomb.

华盛顿智库战略与国际研究中心的核问题项目主任希瑟·威廉姆斯表示，沙特协议给特朗普政府带来更大压力，要求其果断消除伊朗制造原子弹的能力。

“Preventing a Saudi nuclear weapon now means getting a concrete and hard-hitting resolution on things like inspections, what to do with the stockpile and the status of nuclear sites, including Pickaxe Mountain,” she said, referring to a complex of deep tunnels in Iran thought to harbor atomic bomb-making gear. Failure to do so, Dr. Williams added, would raise the risk of a proliferation cascade in which many nations might race for the ability to make a bomb.

她说：“如今要阻止沙特拥有核武器就意味着，必须在核查措施、如何处理核材料库存，以及包括镐山在内的核设施状态等问题上达成一个具体而强硬的解决方案。”她所说的镐山指的是伊朗境内一处由深层隧道组成的设施群，外界认为那里可能藏有制造核武器的设备。威廉姆斯博士补充说，如果无法做到这一点，将加剧出现核扩散连锁反应的风险，即许多国家可能会竞相获得制造核武器的能力。

The Saudi push for a nuclear accord with Washington, she added, echoes “a hedging strategy we are seeing with other allies and partners. Their neighborhoods are increasingly dangerous,” in many cases because their old guarantor of security, the United States, “isn’t as reliable as it once was.” The result is that they seek alternative deals and arrangements to bolster their security.

她还表示，沙特谋求与华盛顿签署核协议的努力折射出“我们正从其他盟友和伙伴身上看到的一种对冲策略”。它们所处的地区日益危险，在很大程度上是因为美国这个昔日的安全保障者“已不再像过去那样可靠”。结果是，它们寻求替代协议和安排来加强自身安全。

Dr. Williams said the Saudi accord can be seen as a victory for the United States “because it maintains U.S. partnerships in the region when China is competing for them.” The problem, she added, is that its terms are weak. “We got the partnership, but not the guardrails.”

威廉姆斯表示，沙特协议可以被视为美国的胜利，“因为在中国也正在争夺这些地区伙伴关系的时候，它维持了美国在该地区的合作关系。”但她补充说，问题在于协议条款太过宽松。“我们拿到了伙伴关系，却没有护栏。”

But to those who worry that the world is on the cusp of a new nuclear breakout — what John F. Kennedy warned about just before his assassination — the Saudi deal is a step toward that danger. Kennedy was wrong when he predicted there would be more than two dozen nuclear-armed nations by the 1970s. Today, there are only nine, but it may turn out he only got the timing wrong.

然而，对于那些担心世界正处于新一轮核扩散爆发边缘的人来说——这正是约翰·肯尼迪在遇刺前不久所警告的危险——沙特协议正是迈向这一危险的一步。肯尼迪曾预测，到20世纪70年代，拥有核武器的国家数量将超过二十多个，但他的预测并没有实现。如今，全世界只有九个国家拥有核武器。不过，事实可能证明，他只是在时间节点上的判断有误。

“There’s no happy ending if Saudi Arabia gets within several weeks or months of making a bomb,” said Henry D. Sokolski, a nuclear policy official in the Defense Department from 1989 to 1993 who now heads the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a Washington-based nonprofit organization.

"如果沙特在距离制造核弹只有数周或数月之遥的程度上止步，不会有什么好结果的，"亨利·索科尔斯基说，他曾于1989年至1993年在国防部担任核政策官员，现任华盛顿非营利组织防核扩散政策教育中心主任。

“Everyone worries about a proliferation chain reaction. Granting the Saudis the right to make nuclear fuel after what Iran has done is like trying to put out a fire with kerosene. It’s a sad situation. It should never have gone this far.”

“所有人都担心核扩散连锁反应。在伊朗发生这些事情之后，给予沙特制造核燃料的权利就像试图用煤油去灭火。这是一个令人悲哀的局面。事情本不该走到这一步。”他补充说。