When Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader for 37 years, was killed by Israel on Feb. 28, in the opening airstrike of the war against the Islamic Republic, he was succeeded by his son, Mojtaba.

当伊朗最高领袖、执政长达37年的大阿亚图拉阿里·哈梅内伊于2月28日在以色列针对伊斯兰共和国战争的首轮空袭中丧生后，他的儿子穆杰塔巴·哈梅内伊接替了他的位置。

But at 86, the ayatollah had wielded a level of influence that no replacement could soon match.

但86岁的哈梅内伊曾拥有的影响力是任何继任者短时间内都无法企及的。

Senior Iranian officials maintain that all key matters are run by the 56-year-old heir. Decision making, however, extends beyond one man, experts say, guided by a small, elite band of mostly current or former senior commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.

伊朗高级官员坚称，所有重大事务现在都由56岁的继承人掌控。不过，专家指出，决策权实际上并非掌握在一个人手中，而是由一个由现任或前任伊斯兰革命卫队高级指挥官组成的精英小团体主导。

It is not the Guards as an organization that is exerting control, they say, but a hardened “band of brothers,” whose seminal experience was the brutal, eight-year war between Iran and Iraq that began in 1980.

他们表示，真正掌权的不是革命卫队这个组织，而是一个强硬的“兄弟连”。这群人都经历过两伊战争的洗礼，这场始于1980年的残酷战争持续了八年时间。

Founded in 1979 to safeguard the newborn revolution and its leader, the Guards promoted these commanders to generals while they were still in their late 20s or early 30s. Western support for Iraq in the war convinced them that Iran had to forge its own way no matter what the cost.

革命卫队成立于1979年，使命是捍卫新生的伊斯兰革命及其领袖。这批指挥官30岁左右便已被提拔为将军。两伊战争期间西方对伊拉克的支持使他们相信：无论付出多大代价，伊朗都必须走自己的路。

After the war, they went on to control intelligence or security services. Most are believed to have some personal connection with Mojtaba Khamenei from the long years that he directed his father’s office.

战后，他们继续控制着情报或安全部门。据信，他们中的大多数人在穆杰塔巴·哈梅内伊掌管其父办公室的多年里与其保持着私人联系。

These men are among the hardest-line figures in the country — militants not only in terms of perpetuating the Islamic revolution, but also in the harsh methods they have championed while running the main organs of government repression.

这些人属于伊朗国内立场最强硬的一派：不仅在维系伊斯兰革命方面立场激进，更以铁腕手段主导着国家主要镇压机构的运作。

Their shared backgrounds, careers and ideological outlook are one reason the war has neither collapsed the government nor paralyzed it, despite the deaths of about 50 top political and military leaders, experts said.

专家认为，在约50名高层政治与军事领导人相继死亡后，伊朗政府既未崩溃也未陷入瘫痪的原因之一正是这种共同的背景、经历与意识形态。

Whatever jockeying may be taking place among these central figures over whether to seek a pragmatic end to the conflict remains largely opaque. Some shunned the limelight even before the war. Now they now remain hidden for fear of being targeted.

这些核心人物之间究竟在如何博弈、是否寻求以务实方式终结冲突，外界几乎无从知晓。其中一些人在战前便刻意回避公众视野，如今更是深藏幕后，唯恐成为打击目标。

Here are some of the most powerful figures in Iran today.

以下就是当今伊朗最具权势的几位人物。

Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, 64

穆罕默德·巴盖尔·卡利巴夫，64岁

The speaker of the Iranian Parliament since 2020, Mr. Ghalibaf has served as commander of the Guards air force and chief of the national police, as well as the mayor of Tehran.

自2020年起担任伊朗议会议长的卡利巴夫曾任革命卫队空军司令、警察部队司令和德黑兰市长。

Mr. Ghalibaf once boasted that during anti-government demonstrations in 1999, despite his rank, he had ridden on the back of a motorcycle like an ordinary militiaman to beat protesters with sticks.

卡利巴夫曾夸口说，在1999年反政府示威期间，尽管身居高位，但他仍跟普通民兵一样骑着摩托车，用棍棒殴打抗议者。

In 2004, he ran for president and tried to change his image. “He showed up on election day looking like Don Johnson on ‘Miami Vice,’” donning a white suit and sunglasses instead of his uniform, said Afshon Ostovar, author of “Vanguard of the Imam,” a history of the Guards. It was a failed attempt to appeal to middle-class voters, and made some conservative supporters suspect his ambitions.

2004年，他竞选总统，试图改变自己的形象。革命卫队历史著作《伊玛目的先锋》的作者阿夫雄·奥斯托瓦说，“选举日那天，他看起来像《迈阿密风云》里的唐·约翰逊”，穿着白色西装，戴着太阳镜，而不是穿制服。这场拉拢中产选民的尝试以失败告终，也让一些保守派支持者怀疑他的野心。

Mr. Ghalibaf is something of a bridge between the political and military elite. Considered a pragmatic figure, he negotiated directly with the United States in Pakistan last month. Some detractors suspect that he seeks a peace deal that will make him an Iranian strongman.

加利巴夫被视为连接伊朗政治精英与军方精英的桥梁人物。他通常被视为务实派，上个月，他在巴基斯坦直接与美国展开谈判。但一些批评者怀疑，他谋求和平协议的目的是让自己成为伊朗的强人。

Ahmad Vahidi, 67

艾哈迈德·瓦希迪，67岁

Mr. Vahidi is a former intelligence officer who took over the Guards in March after U.S. and Israeli airstrikes killed his predecessor. A veteran, bellicose general, he previously served as both minister of defense and interior minister.

瓦希迪曾是一名情报官员，在美以空袭炸死其前任后，他于今年3月接管了革命卫队。作为一名好战的老将，他曾担任国防部长和内政部长。

Mr. Vahidi became prominent in 1988 as the first commander of the Quds Force, which built proxy regional militias like Hezbollah in Lebanon. He is suspected of embedding terrorism in their DNA. Attacks under his watch included the bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires in 1994 that left 85 people dead, and a truck bomb targeting a U.S. Air Force barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1996, killing 19 servicemen. Iran has repeatedly denied involvement in both attacks.

瓦希迪于1988年成为圣城旅的首任指挥官，声名鹊起。该部队一手扶植建立了黎巴嫩真主党等地区代理武装，并被认为将恐怖主义基因植入其中。在他的任内发生的袭击包括1994年布宜诺斯艾利斯一个犹太社区中心爆炸案，造成85人死亡；以及1996年针对沙特阿拉伯宰赫兰的美国空军军营的卡车炸弹袭击，造成19名军人死亡。伊朗始终否认与这两起袭击有关。

Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, 69

古拉姆侯赛因·穆赫辛尼·埃杰伊，69岁

The head of Iran’s judiciary since 2021, Mr. Mohseni-Ejei has a reputation as a hanging judge who has long used the courts to throttle dissent, including a torrent of recent executions of participants in anti-government protests early this year.

穆赫辛尼·埃杰伊自2021年起担任伊朗司法总监，以“绞刑法官”闻名，长期借助司法手段扼杀异见，包括在今年早些时候大量处决反政府抗议活动的参与者。

Mr. Mohseni-Ejei was the minister of intelligence during protests after the 2009 presidential election. The public perception of a fraudulent vote fueled the Green Movement, a nationwide wave of demonstrations that his ministry helped squash through imprisonment, torture and executions. He was a target of sanctions by both the United States and the European Union.

2009年总统选举后的抗议期间，他担任情报部长。当时公众普遍怀疑选举舞弊，引发绿色革命，在全国范围内掀起了示威浪潮，他领导的情报部通过监禁、酷刑和处决等手段帮助镇压了这场运动。他曾是美国和欧盟的制裁对象。

Hossein Taeb, 63

侯赛因·塔伊布，63岁

Mr. Taeb is a Shiite Muslim cleric who ran the brutal Basij militia and then government counterintelligence operations before heading the Guards’ own intelligence organization from 2009 to 2022. Notorious for crushing dissent, the organization during his tenure also imprisoned for ransom or other exchanges numerous Iranian American and other dual nationals, detailed in reports by both the Etemad, an Iranian daily newspaper, and Human Rights Watch.

塔伊布是什叶派穆斯林神职人员，曾掌管手段残酷的巴斯基民兵组织，之后又负责政府反情报工作，并于2009年至2022年间领导革命卫队自己的情报机构。他因镇压异议臭名昭著。在他任内，该情报机构曾扣押大量伊朗裔美国人及其他双重国籍人士，用作勒索或交换筹码。伊朗的日报《埃特马德报》及“人权观察”的调查报告均对此均有详细记录。

Government violence during the 2009 protests prompted public criticism, with one Parliament member writing in comments published online, “When we place management of the recent crisis in the hands of individuals like Taeb, who are more familiar with the baton than with thought, reason and prudence, the result will be exactly this.”

2009年镇压抗议期间的政府暴力行为曾引发公众强烈谴责。一名议员曾在网上公开写道：“当我们把处置近期危机的责任交给像塔伊布这样更熟悉警棍，而不是思想、理性与审慎的人手里时，结果便只能如此。”

Mr. Taeb remains a central figure, although in 2022 he lost his top intelligence post in the fallout over Israel wreaking havoc on the country’s nuclear program. He is believed to be close to Mojtaba Khamenei, having served in the same prestigious Habib Battalion of the Guards during the Iran-Iraq war.

虽然他在2022年因以色列对伊朗核计划的破坏行动而失去最高情报职位，但他至今仍被视为核心人物之一。人们认为他与穆杰塔巴·哈梅内伊关系密切，因为两人在两伊战争期间曾同属革命卫队著名的哈比卜营。

Mohammad Ali Jafari, 68

穆罕默德·阿里·贾法里，68岁

Mr. Jafari, a two-star general, was a military adviser to the former supreme leader. Now lacking an official role, he commanded the Guards from 2007 to 2019, one of the longest tenures.

贾法里是一名两星上将，曾任伊朗前最高领袖的军事顾问。虽然现在没有正式职务，但他曾于2007年至2019年执掌革命卫队，是任期最长的指挥官之一。

Earlier, he had participated in a blatantly public foray by two dozen Guards commanders into political life, threatening President Mohammed Khatami with a letter in 1999 demanding that student protests be suppressed.

更早之前，他参与了二十余名革命卫队指挥官公然干预政治的事件——他们在1999年联名致信威胁总统穆罕默德·哈塔米，要求镇压学生抗议。

A bright tactician, Mr. Jafari, known as Aziz, is credited with developing the “mosaic strategy” of decentralized command, which enabled the force to continue fighting in the current war even as many key commanders were killed.

贾法里人称“阿齐兹”，以军事谋略见长，被认为是“马赛克战略”的设计者。在大批核心指挥官相继阵亡的情况下，这一分散指挥体系使革命卫队仍能在当前战争中保持持续作战能力。

Mr. Jafari also played a central role in creating the regional proxy forces confronting Israel. “The Revolutionary Guards will fight to the end of the Zionist regime,” he was quoted as saying in 2015. “We will not rest easy until this epitome of vice is totally deleted from the region’s geopolitics.”

贾法里还是组建对抗以色列的地区代理武装体系的重要人物之一。2015年有报道援引他的话说：“革命卫队将战斗到犹太复国主义政权终结的那一天。除非这个邪恶的化身彻底从地区地缘政治中被抹去，否则我们不会停下。”

Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, 72

穆罕默德·巴盖尔·佐勒加德尔，72岁

Mr. Zolghadr is a prime example of what analysts consider the fusion of the military into the political class. A deputy commander of the Guards and a former deputy interior minister with a hard-line reputation, he was appointed secretary of the Supreme National Security Council in March, replacing Ali Larijani, a prominent conservative figure who was killed.

佐勒加德尔是分析人士眼中“军方与政治阶层融合”的典型代表。他曾任革命卫队副司令及内政部副部长，以强硬著称。今年3月，他被任命为最高国家安全委员会秘书，接替遇袭身亡的保守派重要人物阿里·拉里贾尼。

The council, uniting senior military and civilian officials, formulates security and foreign policy. Mr. Zolghadr’s new position involves ensuring that the government’s political, military, security and judicial arms all operate in tandem.

该委员会汇集了军事与文职高级官员，负责制定安全与外交政策。佐勒加德尔的新职责涉及确保政府的政治、军事、安全和司法部门协同运作。

‘A Brotherhood’

“兄弟会”

Over the course of almost 40 years, this intelligence fraternity first dominated the Guards, and has now become “a brotherhood running the country,” said Saeid Golkar, a Guards expert who is a political science professor at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga.

田纳西大学查塔努加分校政治学教授、研究革命卫队的专家赛义德·戈尔卡尔表示，近40年来，这个情报系统出身的群体先是主导了革命卫队，如今已成为“一个掌管国家的兄弟会”。

“They had information and intelligence, they had a lot of information about how the system works, about the opposition, about reformists, even about hard-liners,” he said. “They survey, they control, they spy on each other. Because of that dominance over intelligence, they gradually became dominant in almost any aspect of politics in Iran.”

“他们掌握信息和情报，深知体制运作的内在逻辑，熟悉反对派、改革派，乃至强硬派的一切底细，”他说。“他们进行调查、控制、相互监视。正是凭借对情报领域的主导，他们逐渐在伊朗政治几乎所有层面都占据了支配地位。”