For decades, South Korea was an example of the United States’ unyielding stance on nuclear nonproliferation.

几十年来，韩国一直是美国在核不扩散问题上保持坚定立场的一个典型例子。

In the 1970s, the United States pressured South Korea, a steadfast ally with whom it shared nuclear technology, to give up a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Then, it barred the country from enriching its own reactor fuel. The restriction held firm even after Seoul joined a nonproliferation treaty, accepted rigorous safeguards, and built one of the world’s largest nuclear power industries. Nor did the policy waver as North Korea built a nuclear arsenal on the South’s doorstep.

上世纪70年代，美国曾向韩国施压，要求其放弃秘密核武器计划——尽管韩国是与其共享核技术的坚定盟友。此后，美国又禁止韩国自行浓缩反应堆燃料。即便韩国加入了不扩散核武器条约、接受了严格的保障监督，并建成了规模居世界前列的核电产业，这一限制也未曾松动。即便朝鲜在韩国门口建成了核武库，美国的这一政策也未动摇。

Now, the Trump administration has apparently shattered that standard. By striking a deal that could lead to Saudi Arabia enriching uranium on its own soil, Washington has prompted an inevitable question in Seoul: Why Saudi Arabia, and not us?

如今，特朗普政府似乎打破了这一标准。华盛顿与沙特达成一项可能导致其在境内进行铀浓缩的协议，这在首尔引发了一个不可避免的问题：为什么是沙特，而不是我们？

South Korea has long negotiated with the United States for enrichment rights. While its Foreign Ministry declined to comment directly on the U.S.–Saudi accord, it said on Thursday that it was closely monitoring “trends in U.S. foreign policy on the nuclear energy sector” for potential impacts on its own talks. While the deal raises expectations for progress in South Korea’s negotiations with Washington, it could also seed deep friction in the seven-decade-old alliance if Washington continues to ignore Seoul’s demands.

长期以来，韩国一直与美国就铀浓缩权进行谈判。虽然韩国外交部拒绝就美沙协议直接置评，但周四表示正在密切关注“美国核能领域外交政策趋势”对韩美谈判可能产生的影响。虽然该协议提升了人们对韩美谈判取得进展的预期，但如果华盛顿继续无视首尔的要求，也可能在两国长达70年的同盟关系中埋下深刻分歧的种子。

“It is clear that the Trump administration is willing to make major geopolitical bargains with less emphasis on international norms and institutions,” said Leif-Eric Easley, an international studies professor at Ewha Womans University in Seoul.

首尔梨花女子大学国际研究教授莱夫·埃里克·伊斯利表示：“很明显，特朗普政府愿意进行重大的地缘政治交易，而不太重视国际规范和制度。”

On Thursday, President Trump said the agreement is contingent on Saudi Arabia normalizing relations with Israel, putting its immediate future in doubt.

周四，特朗普总统表示，这项协议的前提条件是沙特阿拉伯与以色列实现关系正常化，这使协议的近期前景充满不确定性。

Still, the contrast between Washington’s dealings with Saudi Arabia and South Korea exposes a stark double standard in American nuclear policy. Washington appears to have paved the way for enrichment rights for Saudi Arabia for power plants it has yet to build, while denying them to South Korea, which already operates 26 reactors and plans to build more to meet surging energy demands for the A.I. revolution. It has exempted Saudi Arabia from intrusive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which South Korea has long submitted to to assure the international community that no technology is diverted to weapons projects.

然而，华盛顿对待沙特和韩国的不同方式暴露出美国核政策中明显的双重标准。华盛顿似乎为沙特尚未建成的核电站铺平了铀浓缩的道路；与此同时，它却拒绝给予韩国同样的权利，后者已在运行26座核反应堆，并计划建设更多核电设施，以满足人工智能革命带来的不断增长的能源需求。美国还豁免沙特接受国际原子能机构的侵入性检查，而韩国长期以来一直接受这类检查，向国际社会证明其核技术不会被转用于核武项目。

去年，沙特阿拉伯王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼与特朗普总统在白宫举行会晤。

Many in South Korea find this American concession especially jarring given the geopolitical risks. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia has openly warned that his kingdom would build a bomb if Iran did. By contrast, South Korea’s president, Lee Jae Myung, has repeatedly promised that Seoul will not pursue nuclear weapons, choosing instead to rely on the U.S. security guarantees for deterrence as North Korea expands its nuclear arsenal.

许多韩国人认为，考虑到地缘政治风险，美国的这一让步尤其令人难以接受。沙特王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼曾公开警告，如果伊朗造出核弹，沙特也会跟进。相比之下，韩国总统李在明已多次承诺首尔不会追求核武器，而是在朝鲜不断扩大核武库的情况下，继续依靠美国提供的安全保障来实现威慑。

“The danger of a breakout by Seoul is likely lower because of its continuous close coordination with Washington on extended deterrence,” Professor Easley said, adding that unlike in the Middle East, “major war on the Korean Peninsula has been deterred for decades.”

“首尔核突破的风险可能更低，因为它与华盛顿在延伸威慑方面持续密切协调，”伊斯利教授表示。他还指出，与中东不同，“朝鲜半岛几十年来一直没有发生大规模战争。”

As South Korea was pressured to abandon its weapons program, it signed a treaty with the United States in 1972 that barred enrichment without American consent. Even during a 2015 revision of the agreement, Washington mandated that any enrichment require written bilateral agreement.

在韩国被迫放弃核武器计划的时候，它在1972年与美国签署了一项条约，未经美国同意不得进行铀浓缩。即使在2015年修订该协议时，华盛顿仍规定任何浓缩活动都需经双边书面同意。

Consequently, South Korea imports all of its uranium fuel. Seoul now wants independent enrichment capabilities to secure its fuel supply chain. It also wants to recycle spent fuel to reduce waste storage volume — a massive political headache in a densely populated country with a vocal environmental movement.

因此，韩国目前所有铀燃料都依赖进口。如今，首尔希望获得独立的铀浓缩能力，以保障燃料供应链安全。同时，它也希望能够对乏燃料进行再处理，以减少核废料储存量——这对于一个人口密集、环保运动活跃的国家而言是一个巨大的政治难题。

The U.S.-Saudi deal will likely take center stage when South Korea and the United States resume talks to implement the comprehensive investment and security agreement struck by Mr. Trump and Mr. Lee in November.

 当韩国和美国重启谈判，以落实特朗普和李在明去年11月达成的全面投资和安全协议时，美沙协议很可能成为焦点。

Back then, Washington appeared to address Seoul’s grievances by promising to support a “process that will lead to” civil enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of spent fuel by South Korea. He also approved South Korea’s plan to build nuclear-powered attack submarines, pledging American help to secure uranium fuel for the vessels.

当时，华盛顿回应了韩国的不满，承诺支持一个“将促成”韩国进行民用铀浓缩和乏燃料再处理的进程。特朗普还批准了韩国建造核动力攻击潜艇的计划，并承诺美国将帮助韩国确保这些潜艇所需的铀燃料供应。

However, the broad wording left critical details unresolved, including whether South Korea could operate enrichment or reprocessing facilities on its own soil and whether those facilities would also supply fuel for nuclear submarines.

然而，协议中的宽泛措辞留下了关键问题尚未解决，包括韩国是否可以在本国领土上自行运营铀浓缩或乏燃料再处理设施，以及这些设施是否也能为核潜艇提供燃料。

Talks aimed at resolving such questions were sidetracked by a separate trade dispute, and working-level negotiations only resumed last month.

旨在解决这些问题的谈判因贸易争端而中断，工作层面的谈判上月才重新恢复。

South Korea aims to launch its first domestic nuclear submarine within a decade, using low-enriched fuel to ease proliferation fears. But the pathway remains unclear.

韩国计划在十年内让第一艘国产核动力潜艇下水，并使用低浓缩铀燃料，以降低核扩散方面的担忧。但目前实现这一目标的路径仍不明确。

In 2004, the I.A.E.A. investigated South Korean scientists for unauthorized enrichment experiments. Today, many in South Korea openly view uranium enrichment as a vital path to “nuclear latency” — the ability to rapidly develop weapons if Mr. Trump’s transactional diplomacy renders the U.S. security guarantee, known as the nuclear umbrella, unreliable.

2004年，国际原子能机构曾调查韩国科学家进行未经授权的铀浓缩实验一事。如今，韩国国内许多人公开将铀浓缩视为成为“核门槛”国家的重要途径。“核门槛国家”意味着，如果特朗普式的交易型外交导致美国的安全承诺（即核保护伞）变得不再可靠，韩国能够迅速发展核武器。

Despite the South Korean government’s repeated denials of any intent to build atomic weapons, public and political backing for a sovereign nuclear deterrent has increased in recent years, while North Korea’s nuclear threats have escalated. In December, Pyongyang unveiled the hull of what it described as its first nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine.

尽管韩国政府多次否认有意发展核武器，但近年来，随着朝鲜核威胁不断升级，韩国公众和政界对建立自主核威慑力量的支持正在增加。去年12月，平壤曝光了一艘它称之为首艘核动力战略制导导弹潜艇的艇体。