President Trump’s decision to blockade all Iranian shipments out of or into the Strait of Hormuz starting Monday morning sets up the next great test in the Iran war: Which side can endure more economic pain, Tehran’s new leadership or Mr. Trump himself?

特朗普总统决定从周一上午开始封锁进出霍尔木兹海峡的所有伊朗船只，这构成了伊朗战争中的下一个重大考验：究竟谁更能承受经济痛苦，德黑兰的新领导层还是特朗普本人？

Almost everything about how this new turn in the war plays out is likely to look very different than what has unfolded so far.

这场战争出现的新转折可能在各个方面都与此前的情况截然不同。

Instead of directing missiles and bombs at military sites, missile emplacements and Iran’s defense industry, Mr. Trump will try to choke off the country’s lifeblood, the oil that accounts for more than 50 percent of its exports and just about all of the government’s revenue.

特朗普不会再将导弹和炸弹对准军事基地、导弹阵地和伊朗的国防工业，而是试图扼杀该国的命脉——占其出口一半以上的石油，几乎是其政府收入的全部来源。

The president’s first hope, administration officials said on Sunday, is to force the government to surrender to the terms that Vice President JD Vance laid out in peace talks in Islamabad, Pakistan — and that Iran rejected, just as it did in negotiations in Geneva before the war began on Feb. 28. The list of terms starts with Iran’s agreement to turn over every ounce of its uranium stockpile, permanently dismantle its huge infrastructure for producing nuclear fuel and give up its claims to regulate traffic in the strait.

政府官员周日表示，总统首先希望的是迫使其政府接受万斯副总统在巴基斯坦伊斯兰堡和平谈判中提出的条件——和2月28日战争开始前拒绝日内瓦谈判的条件一样，伊朗对此已经予以拒绝。首要的条件是伊朗同意交出所有的铀储备，永久拆除其庞大的核燃料生产基础设施，并放弃其监管海峡交通的主张。

Failing an Iranian capitulation, Mr. Trump appears to still harbor the hope he expressed the first evening of the war: that a restive Iranian populace will rise up and overthrow the military-clerical regime that has guided the country since the revolution in 1979. But engineering that outcome is no easier than it was a month and a half ago.

如果伊朗不投降，特朗普似乎仍然抱有他在战争第一晚表达的希望：躁动的伊朗民众将奋起推翻自1979年革命以来一直统治该国的军人-神权政权。但如今要促成这一结果，并不比一个半月前更容易。

For its part, Iran’s strategy appears to be one of waging the conflict in the global markets, where Tehran has discovered new powers. Acutely aware that they lost the military contest in the first five weeks, but performed above expectations in the information arena and in terrorizing their neighbors with well-aimed missile and drone strikes, the Iranians are betting that Mr. Trump’s tolerance for political pain is limited.

就伊朗而言，其战略似乎是在全球市场上进行这场冲突，德黑兰在那里发现了新的力量。伊朗人敏锐地意识到他们在前五周输掉了军事竞赛，但在信息领域和以精准导弹和无人机袭击恐吓邻国方面表现超出预期，他们打赌特朗普对政治痛苦的容忍度是有限的。

If no Iranian oil gets through the strait, prices could keep rising over time — some companies say they are planning for $175 a barrel. The Iranians understand the potential political effects of continued inflation in the United States less than seven months before midterm elections.

如果没有伊朗石油通过海峡，油价可能会随着时间的推移而持续上涨——一些公司表示他们正在为每桶175美元的价格做准备。伊朗人明白，在中期选举前不到七个月，美国持续通胀可能带来的政治影响。

“Soon you’ll be nostalgic for $4 to $5 gas,” Iran’s top negotiator and the speaker of its Parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, warned American consumers after the failure of the talks he led with Mr. Vance. As of Monday morning, with the naval blockade about to begin, the markets did not seem especially panicked: Brent crude oil prices rose about 6 percent, to just above $101 a barrel, around the time the blockade was imposed, but were still below where they were before the cease-fire was declared last week.

“很快你们就会怀念四到五美元的汽油了，”伊朗首席谈判代表、议长穆罕默德·巴格尔·加利巴夫在与美国副总统万斯的谈判失败后，如此警告美国消费者。截至周一上午，随着海军封锁即将开始，市场似乎并没有特别恐慌：在封锁实施前后，布伦特原油价格上涨约6%，至略高于每桶101美元，但仍低于上周宣布停火前的水平。

Mr. Trump, for his part, is dialing back his previous claim that as the shooting stops, gas prices will drop. He told Fox News on Sunday that prices “should be around the same” during the midterms and might be “a little bit higher.” That is the exact fear of many Republican candidates.

特朗普本人则收回了他此前关于随着枪声停止汽油价格将会下跌的说法。他周日告诉福克斯新闻，中期选举期间的油价“应该差不多”，可能会“稍微高一点”。这正是许多共和党候选人所担心的。

This is uncharted territory. Like President John F. Kennedy’s “quarantine” of Cuba in 1962, intended to keep the Soviets from bringing nuclear weapons onto Cuban soil, it is impossible to know beforehand how this will play out. Back then, Kennedy and his advisers watched anxiously to see if the Soviets would try to “run the line” and risk military confrontation with the U.S. Navy or whether they would retreat, negotiate and find a face-saving way out.

这是一片未知的领域。就像约翰·F·肯尼迪总统在1962年对古巴进行“隔离”以求阻止苏联在古巴领土部署核武器一样，事情究竟会发展成什么样，事先很难确知。当时，肯尼迪和他的顾问们焦急地观察，看苏联人是会试图“突破封锁”，甘冒与美国海军发生军事对抗的风险，还是会撤退、谈判并找到保全面子的出路。

The Soviet leader at the time, Nikita Khrushchev, chose to back off.

当时的苏联领导人尼基塔·赫鲁晓夫选择了退让。

Now that the blockade on any ships leaving or destined for Iranian ports has gone into effect, it may soon become clear whether the new ayatollah, Mojtaba Khamenei, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps make the same choice. But without a navy, Iran knows it has virtually no chance in a direct confrontation.

现在对进出伊朗港口的一切船只进行的封锁已经生效，新任最高领袖穆杰塔巴·哈梅内伊和伊斯兰革命卫队是否会做出同样的选择，可能很快就会明朗。但由于没有海军，伊朗知道自己在直接对抗中几乎毫无胜算。

For Mr. Trump, this is yet another reversal of strategy. A few weeks ago, he decided to allow Iran to sell oil that was already at sea, in hopes of easing supply shortages. But the effects on prices were minimal. And Mr. Trump looked as though he were conducting a halfhearted war, bombing Iran while allowing it to profit. And the country's imposition of tolls on traffic going through the strait meant that a new revenue stream was opening up for Tehran at the moment it needed it most.

对特朗普来说，这又是一次战略逆转。几周前，他决定允许伊朗出售已经在海上的石油，希望能缓解供应短缺。但对价格的影响微乎其微。而且特朗普看起来像是在进行一场半心半意的战争，一边轰炸伊朗，一边允许其获利。该国对通过海峡的交通征收通行费，意味着在德黑兰最需要的时候，一个新的收入来源正在打开。

“The current situation, in which Iran gets to deny use of the strait to all except its friends or those who pay up, is untenable,” said Richard Haass, a former Republican senior national security official and the former president of the Council on Foreign Relations, who was among the first to advocate a blockade strategy.

“目前的局面是，伊朗拒绝除其朋友或付费者以外的所有人使用海峡，这是不可持续的，”理查德·哈斯说，他曾是共和党高级国家安全官员和前外交关系委员会主席，也是最早提倡封锁战略的人之一。

“It gets rich while others get poor,” he continued. “A blockade adds to the economic pressure on Iran that already existed before the war and was made worse by the war. If they want to sell their oil, they need to reopen the strait to all.”

“它变富了，而别人变穷，”他接着说。“封锁增加了战前就已存在、并因战争而恶化的对伊朗的经济压力。如果他们想出售石油，就需要向所有人重新开放海峡。”

It might work. But there is also the possibility that Iran’s reaction will be to resume attacks on energy facilities in the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and perhaps even Saudi Arabia. In that scenario, Iran would essentially say that if it cannot ship oil, its Arab neighbors will not be able to, either.

这可能会奏效。但也有可能伊朗的反应将是恢复对阿拉伯联合酋长国、科威特甚至沙特阿拉伯能源设施的袭击。在这种情况下，伊朗实质上是在说，如果它不能运输石油，其阿拉伯邻国也不能。

As with so much in this war, there was confusion on Sunday about what, exactly, was subject to blockade. Mr. Trump’s initial social media post declared a “complete” blockade on all traffic in and out of the strait. But as described in a news release on Sunday from U.S. Central Command, and later by Mr. Trump himself, the blockade applies only to ships going to or from Iranian ports. Cargo from other Gulf states will be allowed to pass, assuming they are willing to take the risk of hitting mines or being attacked by Iranian speedboats or drones. It was also unclear how the United States would determine which ships had paid a toll to the Iranians.

与这场战争中的许多情况一样，究竟哪些船会被封锁，直到周日仍存在困惑。特朗普最初的社交媒体帖子宣布对进出海峡的所有交通实施“完全”封锁。但正如美国中央司令部周日的新闻稿以及后来特朗普本人所描述的那样，封锁仅适用于进出伊朗港口的船只。来自其他海湾国家的货物将被允许通过，前提是它们愿意承担触雷或被伊朗快艇或无人机袭击的风险。至于美国将如何确定哪些船只向伊朗人支付了通行费，目前也不得而知。

The strait has been shuttered before, of course, but history does not provide much guidance that fits the current situation.

当然，海峡以前也曾关闭过，但历史并没有提供多少适合当前情况的指导。

As Mr. Haass, along with the historians Niall Ferguson and Philip Zelikow noted in The Free Press last week, the Portuguese first took control of the strait 519 years ago and charged a toll. They were ousted by Persian and British forces. Half a millennium later, the Portuguese and the British made clear that the attack on Iran, even in the name of preventing it from getting within reach of a nuclear weapon, was ill considered.

正如哈斯与历史学家尼尔·弗格森、菲利普·泽利科上周在《自由报》中指出的那样，最早是葡萄牙人在519年前控制了海峡并收取通行费。他们被波斯和英国军队驱逐。五个世纪后的葡萄牙人和英国人明确表示，即使是以防止伊朗获得核武器为名攻击伊朗，也是不明智的。

In the early 1950s, Britain blockaded the strait after Iran’s prime minister at the time, Mohammad Mossadegh, nationalized the country’s oil industry. He was overthrown in a coup that was partly supported by the C.I.A., a covert intervention that the Iranians resent to this day and that history has not treated kindly.

20世纪50年代初，在当时的伊朗总理穆罕默德·摩萨台将该国石油工业国有化后，英国封锁了海峡。摩萨台在一次部分由中央情报局支持的政变中被推翻，伊朗人至今仍对此耿耿于怀，其历史评价也趋于负面。

And there were episodic disruptions during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s.

20世纪80年代的两伊战争期间也曾发生过间歇性的中断。

But none of those experiences is a very close analog to the complex confrontation that is currently unfolding. If the blockade is short-lived and ends Iran’s ability to extort the global economy, Mr. Trump’s gamble may well look like a savvy turning of the tables. And if the Iranian leadership gives in to his demands, it may ratify Mr. Trump’s conclusion that the new leadership is more “reasonable” than the last.

但这些经历都不是当前正在展开的复杂对抗的近似类比。如果封锁是短暂的，并终结了伊朗勒索全球经济的能力，特朗普的赌博很可能看起来像是一次精明的扭转局势之举。如果伊朗领导层屈服于他的要求，这可能会证实特朗普的结论，即新领导层比上一届更“通情达理”。

If the blockade drags on, though, Mr. Trump runs the risk of looking once again as though he failed to see around corners, anticipating what could go wrong with an attack on what appeared to be a weakened Iran. The war that he thought might last only days is entering its seventh week. And for the global economy, the hard part is not close to over.

但如果封锁拖长，特朗普就有可能再次显得好像没能未卜先知，没能预料到对一个看似被削弱的伊朗发动攻击可能会出现的问题。这场他以为可能只持续几天的战争即将进入第七周。而对于全球经济来说，艰难的部分还远未结束。