One of the most widely shared viral memes on Chinese social media today is “the American kill line.”

如今，中国的社交媒体上传播最广的热门迷因之一是“美国斩杀线”。

Borrowed from video game slang for the threshold at which a weakened character can be easily finished off, it refers to the widely held notion in China that millions of American families are teetering on a precipice — one lost job, illness or unexpected expense away from ruin. It has become the prevailing Chinese metaphor for an America seen as mired in economic decay, violent crime and irreversible decline.

这一说法借用的是电子游戏术语，原指角色血量跌至某一临界值后便可被轻易击杀。在中国语境中，它代指一种广泛流行的观点：数以百万计的美国家庭正站在悬崖边缘，一旦失业、患病或遭遇意外支出，便会轰然坠落。这已成为中国人描绘美国的主流隐喻——一个深陷经济衰败、暴力犯罪和不可逆转的衰落之中的美国。

This is, of course, false. Violent crime rates in the United States are the lowest in decades, the country retains unmatched geopolitical and financial power and its economy remains vibrant and more than 50 percent larger than China’s.

当然，这种看法是错误的。美国的暴力犯罪率处于几十年来的最低水平，它仍然拥有无可匹敌的地缘政治和金融实力，其经济依然充满活力，比中国的经济总量高出50%以上。

Yet as Beijing prepares for President Trump’s visit this week, I see a dangerous new overconfidence taking hold in my native country based on misplaced notions of American decline. I fear it is fueling a sense of intransigence that is making Chinese leaders more willing to weaponize their nation’s power and less likely to back down in future confrontations with the United States.

然而，在北京为特朗普总统本周的到访做准备之际，我在自己的祖国看到一种基于对美国衰落的错误认知而产生的危险的新型自负情绪正在蔓延。我担心，这种情绪正在助长一种不妥协的心态，使中国领导人更愿意将国家力量武器化，并在未来与美国的对抗中更不愿意退让。

Traveling across China this spring, I am hearing this narrative everywhere. After one particularly gruesome variation on the “kill line” meme made the rounds recently, my family members in China said they feared for the safety of our relatives in the United States. I hear about students who once dreamed of studying in America now enrolling elsewhere, worried about U.S. crime and poor job prospects.

今年春天我在中国各地旅行时，到处都听到这种叙事。最近一个尤为骇人的“斩杀线”版本在网上广泛传播后，我在中国的家人甚至表示担心我们在美国的安全。我还听说，一些曾梦想去美国留学的学生如今选择去其他国家，因为担心美国的治安和就业前景。

Views of the United States have soured over the past decade due in large part to the erratic, weakened America that Mr. Trump appears to represent. A survey in December found that nearly half of Chinese respondents believe U.S. global influence is waning.

过去十年间，美国的形象持续恶化，这在很大程度上是因为特朗普似乎代表着一个反复无常、日渐衰弱的美国。去年12月的一项调查显示，近半数中国受访者认为美国的全球影响力正在减弱。

This belief is partly a defense mechanism to help Chinese people cope with their own problems: a slowing economy, a collapsing property market, high unemployment and a widespread sense of uncertainty. A Beijing taxi driver captured this uneasy mix of anxiety and swagger last month. After venting to me about the problems China’s people face, he added, “At least we have a minimum safety net here. Better than falling below the kill line in America.”

这种认知在一定程度上是一种心理防御机制，帮助中国人消化自身面临的重重困境：经济放缓、房地产市场崩盘、高失业率以及弥漫于社会的不确定感。上个月，北京一名出租车司机向我表达了这种焦虑与自信交织的心态。他向我大倒中国老百姓的苦水之后，补了一句：“至少我们这里还有最低保障，比在美国掉到‘斩杀线’以下好多了。”

Insular, nationalist voices are amplified more than ever. Zhang Weiwei, a university professor who served as Deng Xiaoping’s interpreter and has millions of online followers, absurdly claimed in a viral video in January that China is the only country in the world whose people eat well.

狭隘的民族主义声音比以往任何时候都更加响亮。曾担任邓小平翻译、在网上拥有数百万粉丝的大学教授张维为在今年1月一段广泛传播的视频中荒谬地声称，中国是世界上唯一一个人民吃得好的国家。

Communist Party rhetoric reinforces this. One need only watch China’s state-run nightly news: Most of the half-hour broadcast celebrates domestic successes before usually signing off with a few minutes on U.S. dysfunction, dominated lately by the global chaos unleashed by Mr. Trump’s war on Iran.

中共的宣传也在推波助澜。只要看一看中国国家电视台在晚上的新闻即可：在半小时的节目中，大部分时间都在颂扬国内的成就，最后通常会用几分钟时间报道美国的乱象——近来的主角自然是特朗普发动伊朗战争所引发的全球动荡。

The government also has in the past few years pushed to purge academia of “erroneous” Western intellectual frameworks — such as judicial independence and separation of powers — and replace them with concepts that stress patriotism, party ideology and national security.

过去几年，政府还推动清除学术界“错误的”西方思想框架——如司法独立和三权分立——并用强调爱国主义、党的意识形态和国家安全的概念取而代之。

The theme of U.S. decline is repeatedly reaffirmed in policy documents, speeches by political leaders and influential Communist Party journals and is now voiced even by some mainstream scholars. In the past, many ordinary Chinese shrugged off such rhetoric as propaganda. But recent surveys and studies suggest more people, especially younger Chinese, may be increasingly buying into the narrative.

美国衰落这一论调在中国的政策文件、政治领导人讲话以及有影响力的党刊中被反复强调，如今甚至得到一些主流学者的附和。过去，许多普通中国人将对此类言论视为宣传说辞，对其不屑一顾。但近期的调查与研究显示，越来越多的人似乎正逐渐认同这一说法，尤其是中国的年轻人。

I came of age in China in the 1980s when the country was opening up to the world. We were optimistic about someday rejoining the ranks of great powers. But there was also a palpable humility, a desire to fit into the existing global order. Today, I see a far more prosperous and powerful China than we dared to imagine, self-assured and inclined to play by its own rules.

我于20世纪80年代在中国长大，那时国家正开始对外开放。我们乐观地憧憬着中国有朝一日能重返大国行列，但同时也心怀一种切实的谦逊，渴望融入既有国际秩序。如今中国的繁荣与强大远超我们当年敢于想象的，它自信满满，且倾向于按自己的规则行事。

Chinese leaders no longer seem to view U.S. pressure on trade and technology as existential threats demanding compromise, but as something easily parried by wielding China’s own strengths, as President Xi Jinping did last year when his threat to halt exports of rare earths and other critical minerals forced Mr. Trump to back down on tariffs. Such leverage is a major reason China continues to push aggressively for dominance in sectors like critical minerals, as well as clean energy technologies such as electric vehicles and solar panels, and the raw pharmaceutical ingredients that make up much of the world’s drug supply. These are now nuclear options for China in future trade negotiations or a geopolitical confrontation.

中国领导人似乎不再将美国在贸易和科技领域的施压视为需要妥协应对的生存威胁，而是认为只要发挥中国的自身优势，便能轻松化解。习近平主席去年便是如此：他威胁停止出口稀土及其他关键矿产，迫使特朗普在关税问题上让步。这种反制能力正是中国持续大力谋求关键矿产、电动汽车与太阳能电池板等清洁能源技术，以及全球大部分药品原料领域主导地位的主要原因。这些领域如今已成为中国未来贸易谈判或地缘政治对抗中核武器级别的选项。

As the Chinese public’s hubris rises, it raises the political cost for the country’s leaders to show any restraint in potential crises over the South China Sea or Taiwan. Game-theory research last year showed that even modest increases in nationalism measurably raise the probability that both China and the United States will adopt more hawkish stances in a standoff.

随着中国民众自大情绪的高涨，一旦南海或台湾问题引发潜在危机，中国领导人若表现出任何克制，都将面临更高的政治代价。去年的博弈论研究表明，即便是民族主义情绪的小幅上升，也会显著提高中美双方在对峙中采取更强硬立场的概率。

This arc is not irreversible. U.S. policy toward China should be refocused on a combination of deterrence — such as strengthening America’s resilience in critical supply chains and its geopolitical presence in Asia — and restoring the human connections that once helped hold the relationship together and prevented each side retreating into its own information cocoon.

这种趋势并非不可逆转。美国的对华政策应重新聚焦于威慑与修复人文联系的结合：前者需要增强美国关键供应链的韧性，巩固在亚洲的地缘政治存在；后者则需要重建曾经有助于维系两国关系，避免双方各自退缩到信息茧房中的人文纽带。

A simple but potentially effective starting point would be for Washington to ease visa and security barriers for Chinese students and scholars and to expand fading exchanges in tourism, academia and business.

一个简单却可能有效的切入点是：华盛顿应放宽针对中国学生与学者的签证及安全限制，扩大日渐萎缩的旅游、学术与商业交流。

It’s been nearly nine years since an American president visited China (Mr. Trump, in his first term). That sort of gap is untenable. Sustained, cleareyed and firm U.S. engagement may be the best way to reverse Chinese misperceptions and reset the world’s most consequential relationship.

美国总统上一次访华是在特朗普的首任任期，距今已近九年。这样的外交断层是不合理的。持续、清醒且坚定的对华接触或许是扭转中国认知偏差、重塑这一全球最重要双边关系的最佳途径。