Down a stairway and behind an unmarked door, dozens of men toil in a vast basement workshop in Ukraine. Wearing headlamps, they lean over circuit boards as wisps of smoke rise from soldering irons.

沿着楼梯往下，在一扇没有任何标记的门后面，几十名男子正在乌克兰一个巨大的地下车间里忙碌着。他们戴着头灯，俯身在电路板上工作，电烙铁升起缕缕烟雾。

A year ago, most Ukrainian defense companies could not produce these boards, which are key ingredients in small exploding drones. But this advance, among others, has helped the country reach a milestone: It can now make drones with no components imported from China.

一年前，大多数乌克兰国防企业还无法生产这些电路板，而它们正是小型自杀式无人机的关键部件。但这一进展以及其他突破帮助乌克兰达成了一个里程碑：如今它可以制造完全不依赖中国进口零部件的无人机。

Ukraine is prioritizing self-sufficiency in the production of drones as they increasingly dominate the battlefield. They now account for more than 90 percent of Russian casualties, according to Maj. Robert Brovdi, commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces.

随着无人机在战场上日益占据主导地位，乌克兰正把重点放在无人机生产的自给自足上。乌克兰无人系统部队指挥官罗伯特·布罗夫迪少校表示，俄军伤亡现在有九成以上是由无人机造成的。

Drones are also playing a major role in the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran. The Iranian military has attacked countries in the region with hundreds of its Shahed drones, and the United States has used its own version of the Shahed for the first time in combat.

无人机在美以对伊朗的战争中也发挥着重要作用。伊朗军方动用数百架沙赫德无人机对其他中东国家发起袭击，而美国也首次在实战中使用了自己的沙赫德版本。

Ukraine will not be mass-producing drones with no Chinese components anytime soon, because it’s still much cheaper to use them. Given China’s dominance of global manufacturing, it is hard to define any drone as truly “China-free.” Many components made outside China still contain Chinese parts or raw materials.

不过，乌克兰短期内还不会大规模生产完全不含中国零部件的无人机，因为使用这些零部件仍然便宜得多。鉴于中国在全球制造业的主导地位，不含中国元素的无人机很那做到。许多在中国境外制造的零部件仍然含有中国的零件或原材料。

But Ukrainian officials believe it is important to make drones with as few components from China as possible, and to be able to continue making drones if Chinese supplies should be cut off.

但乌克兰官员认为，制造尽可能少用中国组件的无人机，并且在中国供应可能被切断的情况下能够继续制造无人机，这一点很重要。

Ukraine is one of many nations that have been working to reduce their reliance on Chinese supply chains. The United States has limited the use of Chinese products in military hardware and other critical systems over security concerns. In addition, global shocks in recent years have shown the vulnerabilities that come with making China the single source of any product.

乌克兰只是众多试图减少对中国供应链依赖的国家之一。出于安全考虑，美国已经限制在军用硬件和其他关键系统中使用中国产品。此外，近年来的全球冲击也表明，如果把中国作为某种产品的单一来源，将带来巨大的脆弱性。

乌克兰士兵走过扎波罗热地区一架俄罗斯第一人称视角无人机的残骸，摄于去年。

“Given the risks of sourcing components from China, which is unfriendly to us, the main task is to produce them in Ukraine,” Major Brovdi said in an interview. “The strength of the Ukrainian manufacturer lies in the fact that import substitution has already taken place.”

“考虑到从中国采购零部件的风险——而中国对我们并不友好——主要任务就是在乌克兰本土生产这些部件，”布罗夫迪少校在采访中说。“乌克兰制造商的优势在于，进口替代已经实现。”

Two companies in Ukraine that have built “China-free” drones were picked to compete for contracts in a Pentagon “drone dominance program” under which the United States plans to buy thousands of low-cost attack drones. One of the companies, Ukrainian Defense Drones Tech Corporation, where the men were soldering circuit boards in the basement workshop, was among 11 in all selected last week for possible American drone orders.

乌克兰两家制造“无中国零部件”无人机的企业被选中参与五角大楼“无人机主导计划”的合同竞争。根据这一计划，美国打算采购数千架低成本攻击无人机。其中一家是乌克兰国防无人机科技公司，也就是那些男子在地下车间焊接电路板的公司。该公司是上周最终入选可能获得美国无人机订单的11家企业之一。

Ukraine Defense Drones makes most of its own components, and European suppliers fill most of the gaps.

乌克兰国防无人机公司自行生产大部分零部件，其余则由欧洲的供应商填补。

That reflects a sea change over the course of the war. In the first year after the Russian invasion in February 2022, nearly all of Ukraine’s drones came from China.

这反映出了俄乌战争期间的一个巨大变化。在2022年2月俄罗斯入侵后的第一年，乌克兰几乎所有的无人机都来自中国。

As demand surged, Beijing imposed export restrictions in 2023 and expanded them in 2024. While China is officially neutral in the war, experts say that Beijing has given its partner Russia preferential access to components that can still be exported.

随着需求激增，北京于2023年实施了出口限制，并于2024年扩大了限制范围。虽然中国在战争中官方保持中立，但专家表示，北京让其伙伴俄罗斯在获取仍可出口的组件方面享有优先待遇。

As the rules tightened, Ukraine resorted to middlemen to buy some parts, and Ukrainian companies began to view the Chinese market as increasingly unreliable. Kyiv turned its focus to building its own drones, and eventually to doing so with fewer Chinese components.

随着中国出口管制的收紧，乌克兰不得不通过中间商购买一些零件，而乌克兰公司也开始认为中国市场越来越不可靠。基辅将重心转向自行生产无人机，并逐渐减少对中国零部件的依赖。

By 2024, the vast majority of drones that Ukraine sent to the front were assembled domestically — but still almost entirely with Chinese components. A year later, however, the share of parts from China in Ukraine’s drones had fallen to about 38 percent, according to the Ukrainian Council of Defense Industry and the Snake Island Institute, a think tank in Kyiv.

到2024年，乌克兰送往前线的绝大多数无人机都是国内组装的——但几乎所有零部件仍来自中国。不过一年之后，根据乌克兰国防工业委员会和基辅智库蛇岛研究所的数据，乌克兰无人机中来自中国的零部件比例已降至约38%。

Ukraine still buys cheaper Chinese components because the Ukrainian military needs huge numbers of drones and has a limited budget to buy them. Drone missions fail at very high rates, another reason that Ukraine tries to keep costs down.

乌克兰仍然购买价格更便宜的中国零部件，因为乌克兰军方的无人机需求量巨大，而预算又有限。无人机任务失败率也非常高，这也是乌克兰努力压低成本的原因之一。

According to a Ukrainian official who asked for anonymity to discuss sensitive procurement issues, Ukrainian and Russian companies often buy parts from the same factories in China. Chinese bosses, the official said, keep a precise schedule at production sites so that Ukrainian and Russian buyers do not cross paths.

一名乌克兰官员表示，乌克兰和俄罗斯的公司往往从中国同一家工厂采购零部件。由于涉及敏感采购问题，这名官员要求匿名。他说，中国的工厂老板会精确安排生产时间表，以避免乌克兰和俄罗斯的买家在工厂相遇。

Col. Pavlo Palisa, the deputy head of Ukraine’s presidential office and a military adviser to President Volodymyr Zelensky, said that Kyiv was scaling up domestic weapons production in part to strengthen its hand in peace negotiations.

乌克兰总统办公室副主任、总统泽连斯基的军事顾问帕夫洛·帕利萨上校表示，基辅正在扩大国内武器生产，部分是为了在和平谈判中增强自己的筹码。

“If we import, that means dependency, and any dependency means a weaker position,” he said in an interview.

“如果我们依赖进口，就意味着依赖别人，而任何依赖都会让我们处于更弱的地位，”他在采访中说。

Expanding the sources of components, Colonel Palisa said, would make China less likely to impose further export restrictions, knowing that they would have a limited effect. “When there are alternatives, they don’t act up as much,” he said.

帕利萨上校表示，扩大零部件来源也会促使中国不愿进一步实施出口限制，因为知道那样的效果有限。“当存在替代方案时，他们就不会那么轻易采取限制措施，”他说。

Ukrainian Defense Drones, under the brand name F-Drones, produces exploding first-person-view quadcopter drones that have been used more than any other drone to destroy Russian heavy equipment.

乌克兰国防无人机公司以F-Drones品牌生产第一人称视角四轴旋翼攻击无人机，这种无人机在摧毁俄罗斯重型装备方面的使用率超过任何其他类型的无人机。

“The country was saved by $500 drones,” said Hnat Buyakin, the company’s founder, referring to the beginning of the war in 2022, when Ukraine was at a heavy disadvantage to Russia in personnel and ammunition. Soldiers improvised, modifying cheap Chinese drones in makeshift workshops along the front line to drop handmade bombs.

“拯救这个国家的是价值500美元的无人机，”该公司创始人赫纳特·布亚金说，他指的是2022年战争初期，当时乌克兰在人员和弹药方面远远落后于俄罗斯。士兵们临时想办法，在前线附近的简陋作坊里改装廉价的中国无人机，用来投掷自制炸弹。

Ukrainian Defense Drones began making drones in 2023. Initially, all of its components were Chinese. Within a year, however, it had localized production of carbon fiber frames and antennas.

乌克兰国防无人机公司在2023年开始制造无人机。最初所有零部件都来自中国。然而一年之内，它就实现了碳纤维机架和天线的本土生产。

去年，在哈尔科夫地区，乌克兰士兵在掩体里制造无人机。

It is precision work. “These antennas are a separate kind of magic — a millimeter deviation in the wire and it doesn’t work properly,” Mr. Buyakin said. The company now produces up to 15,000 antennas a day.

这是一项精密工作。“这些天线是另一种意义上的魔法——导线只要偏差一毫米，就无法正常工作，”布亚金说。公司现在每天最多可以生产1.5万根天线。

By 2025, Ukrainian Defense Drones had expanded to produce flight controllers, speed regulators, radio modems and video transmission systems. Essentially, all its components were made in Ukraine except for the cameras.

到2025年，乌克兰国防无人机公司的产品扩展到飞控系统、速度调节器、无线电调制解调器和视频传输系统。基本上，除了摄像头外，所有部件都在乌克兰制造。

The company has since gained technology for cameras, too, which it hopes to produce in Europe. For now, it buys cameras from another Ukrainian company that imports parts from Europe.

该公司此后也获得了摄像头技术，并希望在欧洲生产。目前，它从另一家从欧洲进口零部件的乌克兰公司采购摄像头。

Mr. Buyakin described the limits to “China-free” production. While his company makes carbon frames for drones, for example, the carbon itself is imported, usually from China, because that is cheaper.

布亚金也谈到了“无中国零部件”生产的局限性。例如，他的公司虽然生产无人机的碳纤维机架，但碳纤维材料本身通常仍需要进口，往往来自中国，因为那样更便宜。

Batteries that power drones are also still largely produced in China, which dominates supply chains for battery materials like lithium and rare-earth metals.

为无人机供电的电池目前也大多在中国生产，因为中国在锂和稀土金属等电池材料供应链中占据主导地位。

Ukraine has lithium deposits, but they are undeveloped. Investing in them has been a goal of a Ukrainian agreement with the United States on mineral development.

乌克兰拥有锂矿藏，但尚未开发。投资这些资源一直是乌克兰与美国达成的矿产开发协议的目标之一。

Ukraine’s goals do not end at producing drones without Chinese components. Designs in Ukraine are updated monthly based on battlefield performance, a contrast with the slow pace of traditional weapons production.

乌克兰的目标不仅仅是生产不含中国零部件的无人机。乌克兰的无人机设计会根据战场表现进行每月更新，这与传统武器生产缓慢的节奏形成鲜明对比。

In his company’s move toward China-free manufacturing, Mr. Buyakin said, “We deliberately chose the most difficult path because Ukraine is now fighting for its place in a technological war, and we are gaining this experience with our own blood.”

谈到公司“去中国化”的转型努力时，布亚金说：“我们故意选择了一条最困难的道路，因为乌克兰正在一场技术战争中争夺立足之地，而我们正在用鲜血换取这份经验。”