When a man identifying himself as Chris Chen reached out this winter to an aide on a House committee focused on threats from China, he came armed with a lucrative offer.

去年冬天，一个自称克里斯·陈的男子联系上了一位供职于专门关注中国威胁的众议院委员会的助理，他带来了一个诱人的提议。

The staff member, Mr. Chen proposed, could earn $10,000 or more by barely lifting a finger. All he would need to do is agree to phone calls every other week to share information about the committee’s work and U.S. foreign policy about China.

克里斯·陈对这名工作人员提出，几乎不费吹灰之力就可以赚到1万美元甚至更多。他所需要做的只是每隔一周接听一次电话，分享该委员会的工作动态和美国对华外交政策的相关信息。

Insights into U.S. trade or national-security issues, including the Trump administration’s plans for Venezuela in the aftermath of the January military operation there, would be especially valuable, Mr. Chen said. To sweeten the pot, Mr. Chen repeatedly promised to send the aide $2,000 up front.

这位陈先生表示，涉及美国贸易或国家安全问题的内幕信息尤其有价值，包括1月份美国在委内瑞拉展开军事行动后特朗普政府对那里的计划。为了进一步提高吸引力，他一再承诺会先支付2000美元作为预付款。

The offer seemed too good to be true. Instead of quietly accepting the deal, the aide, whose identity The New York Times agreed to withhold because he works on sensitive policy issues related to China, reported it to his bosses on the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. The panel quickly concluded Mr. Chen was not the Singapore-based business consultant he claimed to be, but instead likely a Chinese intelligence officer or contractor seeking a new recruit.

这个提议好得令人难以置信。这名助理没有悄悄接受这笔交易，而是向他在众议院中国问题特设委员会的上司报告了此事。（由于工作涉及涉华敏感政策，《纽约时报》应其要求隐去其身份）该委员会很快断定，克里斯·陈并不是他自称的新加坡商业顾问，而很可能是一名正在寻找新线人的中国情报官员或线人承包商。

An offer of $10,000 for information

以1万美元换取情报

By framing the initial offer as a “trial period,” Mr. Chen dangled the expectation of a longer relationship with more payments to come, a common recruitment hook for spies.

克里斯·陈将最初的提议包装成“试用期”，以此暗示双方将建立更长期的合作关系、未来还有更多报酬，这是间谍招募中惯用的诱饵手法。

“I would like to propose … three-month trial period lasting until the end of March. … And I will provide a total compensation of $10,000 for the three-month trial period.”

“我想提议……为期三个月的试用期，持续到3月底……在三个月的试用期内，我将提供总计1万美元的报酬。”

Rather than cut off contact, the committee’s Republican majority staff agreed to keep talking to Mr. Chen. They recorded a series of calls this winter to learn more about Mr. Chen’s tactics and interests.

该委员会的多数党共和党工作人员没有切断联系，而是同意继续与陈先生联络。他们在去年冬天录下了一系列通话，以深入了解他的手段和意图。

Transcripts of those calls, which the committee shared with The Times alongside some of the recorded audio, depict a determined, at times impatient, individual eager to earn the trust of his mark and get down to business. Mr. Chen mixes holiday greetings with elaborate questions about manufacturing in Vietnam and Mexico and the future of Venezuela’s oil industry.

该委员会与《纽约时报》分享了这些通话的文字记录以及部分录音。记录显示，克里斯·陈是个意志坚定、有时会不耐烦的人，急于赢得目标对象的信任并尽快进入实质合作。他在节日问候的寒暄之间，夹杂着对越南、墨西哥制造业现状以及委内瑞拉石油工业前景的详细询问。

特朗普总统与中国领导人习近平之间的关系日趋紧张。图为两人去年秋天会晤时的场景。

Beijing and Washington have been aggressively spying on one another for decades, an inevitable byproduct of the world’s two largest economies competing across the globe. But by their nature, those shadow games rarely surface such a detailed look at how either side plies its trade.

多年来，北京与华盛顿一直在相互进行激烈的间谍活动，这是世界两大经济体在全球竞争所不可避免的副产品。但由于其隐秘性质，这类影子游戏很少会让其中一方的手法暴露得如此详细。

The outreach by Mr. Chen to an aide on the very committee responsible for investigating Chinese national-security threats appears to provide an unusually vivid portrait of how Beijing’s spy services seek to gain access to sensitive information from within the corridors of power in Washington.

克里斯·陈主动接触专门负责调查中国国家安全威胁的委员会的助理，此举似乎异常生动地展示了北京的情报机构是如何试图渗透华盛顿的权力走廊、获取敏感信息的。

By some measures, the spying on both sides has intensified in recent months, as the bilateral relationship — which will be tested next week during a summit in Beijing between President Trump and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping — has grown more strained.

按照某些衡量标准，美中双方近来的间谍活动都有所升级，因为两国关系已愈发紧张，而本周特朗普总统与中国领导人习近平在北京举行的峰会将是对这一关系的重大考验。

Chinese hackers are believed by U.S. investigators to have at least twice compromised internal networks at the F.B.I. related to its sensitive surveillance activities. The C.I.A. has published videos on social media in Mandarin openly seeking to recruit spies from China’s military that have led to new assets being developed in the country, according to U.S. intelligence officials.

美国调查人员认为，中国黑客至少两次侵入了联邦调查局内部与其敏感监视活动相关的网络。中央情报局在社交媒体上发布普通话视频，公开招募来自中国军方的情报人员，据美国情报官员透露，美方已借此在中国境内发展出新的情报来源。

After about two months of conversations with Mr. Chen, the House committee referred the matter to the F.B.I., which declined to comment when asked if it had opened an investigation, but it has been tracking increasingly brazen intelligence-gathering operations by China. It said only that “China and other foreign governments are using professional networking social media sites to target people with U.S. government security clearances.”

在与克里斯·陈保持联络约两个月后，该众议院委员会将此事移交给了联邦调查局。联邦调查局拒绝就是否已立案展开调查置评，但该局一直在追踪中国日益猖獗的情报收集行动。它仅表示，“中国及其他外国政府正在利用专业社交网络平台，对持有美国政府安全许可的人员实施定向渗透。”

Seeking to cultivate a source in the heart of a congressional committee dedicated to addressing the threat from China would be an especially audacious move.

试图在一个专门应对中国威胁的国会委员会内部培植线人无疑是极为大胆的举动。

Mr. Chen first contacted the staff member in December from a Gmail account with a display name of Kris Chen, though he signed his emails with the spelling Chris. He described himself as an employee of NimbusHub Strategic Consulting, a Hong Kong-based firm with a spartan website that promises “to provide clients with the tools and knowledge necessary to navigate an increasingly complex global landscape.” The website contains filler text in Latin, which often auto-populates within unfinished sections of websites.

陈先生首次联系该工作人员是在去年12月，使用的是Gmail账户，邮件账户显示他的姓名为“Kris Chen”，但他在邮件中的署名拼写为“Chris”。他自称供职于香港一家名为NimbusHub Strategic Consulting的咨询公司，该公司官网十分简陋，声称“为客户提供应对日益复杂的全球环境所需的工具和知识”。网站还出现了作为占位符的拉丁文，它们通常自动出现在网站未完成的部分。

Other clues point to NimbusHub as a front for China’s spy services. In a February report on malicious uses of its artificial-intelligence tools, OpenAI identified ChatGPT users who had used the model to generate email drafts purporting to be from employees of NimbusHub. The emails addressed to state officials in the United States and policy analysts working in business and finance came from personas who, like Mr. Chen, sought to offer paid consulting gigs for information.

还有一些线索表明，NimbusHub可能是中国情报部门的幌子。OpenAI在今年2月的一份关于其人工智能工具遭滥用的报告中指出，有ChatGPT用户曾借助该模型起草电子邮件，发件人自称是NimbusHub的员工。这些邮件被发送给美国各州官员及商界、金融领域的政策分析人士，发件人以虚拟身份试图以“付费咨询工作”为名换取信息，其手法与克里斯·陈如出一辙。

NimbusHub did not respond to emailed requests for comment, nor did Mr. Chen on the Gmail account or phone number he used to contact the congressional aide. The profile picture for Mr. Chen’s WhatsApp number depicts a Winnie-the-Pooh doll wearing large headphones, an apparent mocking reference to Mr. Xi. Winnie-the-Pooh imagery has for years been a target of censorship in China and a symbol of resistance, which would fit with a persona of a Hong Kong businessman at a remove from mainland China.

NimbusHub没有回复通过电子邮件提出的置评请求，陈先生用来联系国会助理的Gmail邮箱和电话号码也没有回应。他的WhatsApp头像是一只戴着大耳机的小熊维尼玩偶——这显然是在讽刺习近平。多年来，小熊维尼的形象在中国一直是审查的对象，也是抵抗的象征，这与克里斯·陈“远离中国大陆的香港商人”人设相吻合。

香港大有大厦。

There was no sign of NimbusHub at the Hong Kong address listed on the firm’s website when a Times reporter visited Tuesday. An office directory displayed near the elevator banks of the 24-story tower, Tai Yau Building, in the heart of the city’s crowded Wan Chai district, listed 94 other tenants. Two women stationed at a concierge booth in the beige-tiled lobby said they had never heard of NimbusHub.

《纽约时报》记者于周二前往该公司网站所列的香港地址时，并未发现NimbusHub的任何踪迹。这栋24层高的大厦位于湾仔繁华地段，名为大有大厦，电梯厅的租户目录列有94家公司的名称，没有NimbusHub。在米色瓷砖铺就的大堂服务台，两名女接待员表示，她们从未听说过NimbusHub这家公司。

Liu Pengyu, a spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, said in a statement that “the so-called false narrative regarding China engaging in espionage activities is entirely devoid of factual basis or evidence.”

中国驻华盛顿大使馆发言人刘鹏宇在声明中表示，“所谓中国从事间谍活动的虚假叙事完全缺乏事实依据或证据支持”。

Interest in U.S. plans for Venezuela

对美国在委内瑞拉的计划感兴趣

Days after the U.S. military in January captured the Venezuelan president, Nicolás Maduro, in a nighttime raid in Caracas, Mr. Chen asked for insights into U.S. plans for Venezuela.

今年1月，美国军方在加拉加斯发动夜间突袭，逮捕了委内瑞拉总统尼古拉斯·马杜罗。数日后，克里斯·陈便询问美国对委内瑞拉的下一步计划。

”Maybe next time we can discuss Venezuela, like how it ties into the U.S. reshaping supply chains, such as the oil supply chain, and the key minerals and the manufacturing supply chain.”

“也许下次我们可以聊聊委内瑞拉，比如它如何与美国重塑供应链联系在一起，例如石油供应链、关键矿产以及制造业供应链。”

The introductory email from Mr. Chen on Dec. 17 was full of business jargon, and presented the chance to share information as a way to offer “expert consultation and viewpoint exchange, including real-time policy and news interpretation and forward-looking strategic insights.”

克里斯·陈在12月17日发出的第一封邮件里充斥着商业术语，并将情报的分享描述为一种“提供专家咨询和观点交流的机会，包括实时政策与新闻解读，以及前瞻性战略洞察”。

After notifying his colleagues on the committee, the congressional aide responded and conveyed an interest in expanding his “advisory work outside my primary duties.” From then on, Mr. Chen appeared hooked. In follow-up emails and on phone calls, he expressed a willingness to be flexible with the work arrangement while making clear he was eager to start paying.

在向委员会同事报告此事后，这名国会助理回复了邮件，表示有兴趣“在主要职责之外拓展咨询业务”。在那以后，克里斯·陈似乎上钩了。在后续邮件和电话中，他一再表示愿意在合作安排上保持灵活，但明确表示希望尽快开始支付酬劳。

该委员会的共和党主席、众议员约翰·穆伦纳尔去年曾成为一起疑似中国情报行动的目标。

“I can pay you $2,000 — $2,000 advance payment,” Mr. Chen said during a call in January. “As soon as possible in the next few days, just to make sure our operation is getting started.”

“我可以付你2000美元——2000美元预付款，”他在1月的一次通话中说，“在接下来的几天内尽快，就为了确保我们的合作能够启动。”

Mr. Chen at times seemed most curious to learn what those close to power in the United States thought about China’s stated intentions, such as a commitment to purchase U.S. soybeans or whether China would relax control over rare-earth minerals. “So if China turns the controls back next year, do you guys have a plan B?” he asked.

陈先生有时似乎最想了解那些接近美国权力核心的人如何看待中国公开表明的意图，例如中国购买美国大豆的承诺，或者中国是否会放松对稀土矿产的管控。“那么，如果中国明年重新实施管制，你们有备用方案吗？”他问道。

The committee has been targeted by Chinese intelligence operations before. Last year, the panel disclosed that an apparent impostor was posing as its Republican chairman, Representative John Moolenaar of Michigan, and sending emails to government agencies and other institutions seeking information about potential sanctions against Beijing. Cybersecurity investigators linked the emails to a hacking group with ties to the Ministry of State Security, a central spy agency for China.

这并非该委员会第一次成为中国情报行动的目标。去年，该委员会披露，一名冒充者假借委员会共和党主席、密歇根州众议员约翰·穆勒纳尔的名义，向政府机构和其他单位发送邮件，索取有关对华潜在制裁的信息。网络安全调查人员将这些邮件追踪至一个与中国国家安全部有关联的黑客组织。

“The Chinese government actively targets Congress and congressional staff as part of a broader influence and intelligence collection effort, frequently using benign-appearing inquiries to get sensitive information,” Mr. Moolenaar said in a statement.

穆伦纳尔在声明中表示：“中国政府将国会和国会工作人员列为目标，这是其更广泛的影响力渗透和情报收集行动的组成部分，经常利用看似无害的询问获取敏感信息。”

Access to the boss

接触老板的机会

Mr. Chen does little to hide his interest in mapping the House aide’s proximity to powerful figures in Washington.

克里斯·陈几乎毫不掩饰自己想弄清这名众议院助手与华盛顿权势人物之间距离有多近。

Mr. Chen: So the congressman is the person in the committee, right?

陈：那么这位议员就是委员会里的人，对吧？

Aide: Yes, he’s the boss. He’s the top boss.

助手：是的，他是老板，是最大的老板。

Mr. Chen: If he’s the boss, you work for the chairman, right?

陈：如果他是老板，那你就是为委员会主席工作，对吧？

Aide: Correct.

助手：对的。

Mr. Chen: Wow. Wow.

陈：哇！哇！

China has a long record of targeting U.S. politicians and federal workers for espionage, including the theft of government personnel files on more than 20 million people a decade ago. Last year, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington-based think tank, and Reuters found evidence that a network of fake consulting firms controlled by a Chinese technology firm was targeting former government employees who had lost their jobs at the start of the second Trump administration.

中国长期以来一直针对美国政治人物和联邦工作人员进行间谍活动，包括10年前曾窃取超过2000万人的政府人事档案。去年，总部位于华盛顿的智库“保卫民主基金会”和路透社发现证据表明，一家中国科技公司控制着一个由虚假咨询公司组成的网络，正在对特朗普第二个任期上台之初遭裁员的前政府雇员实施定向渗透。

Recruiting an aide on the House China Committee is not likely to be as valuable as turning an intelligence official with access to classified material about U.S. nuclear weapons programs, bespoke hacking tools or espionage assets in China, experts said. But the panel is still a high-value target. The congressional aide cut off contact with Mr. Chen in late February before being paid, citing an internal ethics determination. Mr. Chen lamented the development, but emailed again days later to say he believed they could get around the conflict.

专家表示，策反众议院中国委员会的一名助理，其情报价值或许不及收买一名能接触美国核武器计划、定制黑客工具或在华情报资产等涉密材料的情报官员。但该委员会仍是一个极具价值的目标。这名国会助理以内部道德审查为由，于2月下旬中断了与克里斯·陈的联系，此时他尚未收到任何付款。克里斯·陈对此深表遗憾，但数日后再度发来邮件，称相信双方可以绕过这一障碍。

“If you are still interested in exploring a collaboration, I would welcome the chance to walk you through this alternative path during a brief call,” Mr. Chen said. “Please let me know if this is of interest to you.”

“如果您仍有意探讨合作可能，我希望能有机会在简短的通话中，向您介绍这一替代路径，”他写道。“请告知您是否有兴趣。”

The aide never responded.

该工作人员此后再未回复。