When President Trump imposed 145 percent tariffs on China a year ago, Chinese state media urged the public to revisit a nearly 90-year-old essay by Mao Zedong. The Beijing Daily declared that the text was essential to understanding China’s responses to the “chaotic” attacks of the United States and why China will ultimately achieve a “final victory” against its geopolitical rival.

当特朗普总统一年前对中国征收145%关税时，中国官方媒体敦促公众重读毛泽东近90年前的一篇文章。《北京日报》宣称，这篇文章对于理解中国如何应对美国的“混乱”攻击、为何中国最终将对这个地缘政治对手取得“最终胜利”至关重要。

This required reading was Mao’s “On Protracted War,” a 1938 tract laying out his strategy for defeating the Japanese forces that had invaded China. At its core, it is a meditation on how China can come from behind in a life-or-death contest against a stronger adversary.

这篇必读文章是毛泽东发表于1938年的《论持久战》，阐述了他击败侵华日军的战略。其核心思想是中国如何在生死攸关的竞争中以弱胜强、后来居上。

President Xi Jinping has praised the strategic foresight, discipline and patience espoused by Mao in the essay, which has emerged as a guiding framework for how China aims to face the United States. He has pointed specifically to Mao’s description of a dynamic, long-term struggle unfolding in three phases: A weaker China initially plays dogged defense, followed by a period of stalemate between equally matched forces, eventually culminating in a powerful, victorious Chinese counteroffensive.

习近平主席多次赞扬毛泽东在这篇文章中阐述的战略远见、纪律性和耐心，它已经成为中国应对美国时所遵循的指导框架。他特别提到毛泽东描述的动态长期斗争分为三个阶段：较弱的中国最初采取顽强的防御，随后进入势均力敌的相持阶段，最终迎来强大的中国反攻并取得胜利。

China’s leaders are through with playing defense and have shifted into Phase 2 of Mao’s theory.

中国领导人已经结束防御阶段，转入了毛泽东理论的第二阶段——相持阶段。

The country is far stronger than it once was, in manufacturing, technology, military power and diplomatic influence. Despite a slowing economy and persistent tensions with the United States and its allies, it has become more resilient in the face of pressure from Washington. Mr. Xi easily outplayed Mr. Trump in last year’s trade confrontation, hitting back against U.S. tariffs with Chinese export controls on the critical minerals required for modern technologies, which forced Mr. Trump to step back.

中国如今比过去强大得多，在制造业、技术、军事力量和外交影响力上均有显著提升。尽管经济增速放缓，且与美国及其盟友存在持续紧张关系，但面对华盛顿的压力，中国已变得更具韧性。在去年的贸易对抗中，习近平轻松胜过特朗普，通过对现代技术必需的关键矿产实施出口管制，反击了美国的关税政策，迫使特朗普做出让步。

Mr. Xi will provide a lavish welcome for Mr. Trump in Beijing on Thursday, but the Chinese leader almost certainly views the visit — and the broader current state of the relationship — not as a time for accommodation and lasting reconciliation, but as a temporary lull in a longer test of wills.

习近平将于周四在北京为特朗普举行盛大欢迎仪式，但这位中国领导人几乎肯定将此次访问——以及当前更广泛的双边关系状态——视为一场漫长的意志较量中的暂时平静，而非达成妥协与持久和解的时刻。

Mr. Xi’s main goal in this new period of strategic stalemate is buying time to increase China’s strength relative to that of the United States, while seeking to extract concessions from Mr. Trump when he can, including limiting U.S. tariffs and export controls, and halting Washington’s arms sales to Taiwan. Major concessions during Mr. Trump’s visit seem unlikely. Nonetheless, the U.S. president arrives with a weakened hand. The costly war with Iran, which forced Mr. Trump to delay his Beijing trip for several weeks and has battered his approval ratings at home, will no doubt make him eager to spin the visit as a win, giving Mr. Xi leverage.

在这个新的战略相持阶段，习近平的主要目标是争取时间，提升中国相对于美国的实力，同时在可能的情况下从特朗普那里获取让步，包括限制美国关税和出口管制，并停止华盛顿对台湾的军售。在特朗普此次访问期间达成重大让步似乎不太可能。尽管如此，这位美国总统前来时手中没有太强的牌。与伊朗的代价高昂的战争迫使特朗普将北京之行推迟数周，并重创其国内支持率，这无疑会让他急于将此次访问描绘成一次胜利，从而给习近平提供了杠杆。

In these ways, Mr. Xi has the American president right where he wants him.

在这些方面，习近平已将这位美国总统置于他想要的位置上。

The enduring resonance of “On Protracted War” in China today reflects Mao’s dictum of “making the past serve the present.” Decades-old historical and ideological references remain central to how the Communist Party legitimates its political, economic and strategic goals and mobilizes the country to achieve them.

《论持久战》在当今中国的持久回响体现了毛泽东“古为今用”的格言。数十年前的历史和意识形态引用依然是中共为其政治、经济和战略目标提供合法性，并动员全国实现这些目标的核心方式。

Mr. Xi appears to see the competition with the United States through the same prism of long-term struggle that Mao developed to guide Chinese strategy almost a century ago. He and other top officials have invoked the essay as a guide for responding to economic and strategic challenges. Prominent Chinese academics who channel party views repeatedly refer to the tract in framing the rivalry with America, and spectacular commemorations in Beijing last September to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II included copious references to Mao’s text.

习近平似乎通过毛泽东近一个世纪前为指导中国战略而提出的长期斗争视角来看待中美竞争。他和其他高层官员都援引这篇文章作为应对经济和战略挑战的指导原则。传达党的观点的知名中国学者在对中美对抗的阐述中反复提及此文。去年9月北京为纪念二战结束80周年举行的盛大纪念活动，也大量引用了毛泽东的这篇文章。

Mr. Trump, by contrast, is focused on optics and quick wins. He wants China to commit to purchasing more American products and to strike new commercial deals with U.S. companies, and has gushed about the grand pageantry prepared for him by China during his last visit, in 2017. Yet he seems, at best, uninterested in the topics that matter most to the security of the United States and its allies, such as China’s pressure on Taiwan, its aggressive territorial claims in the South China Sea and cyberattacks on American targets that the United States attributes to China-based actors. The United States has powerful leverage it can use against China, from access to advanced semiconductors to the dollar’s global dominance, but Mr. Trump today appears less inclined to wield it.

相比之下，特朗普专注于表面形象和速胜。他希望中国承诺购买更多美国产品，并与美国公司达成新的商业协议，还津津乐道2017年上次访华时中国为他准备的盛大场面。然而，他似乎对最关乎美国及其盟友安全的核心议题兴趣寥寥，例如中国对台湾的施压、在南海的强势领土主张，以及美国认定由中国行为体实施的网络攻击。美国拥有强大杠杆——从先进半导体准入到美元的全球主导地位，但如今的特朗普似乎不太愿意动用这些杠杆。

Mr. Trump’s shortsightedness plays directly into Mr. Xi’s larger aims. The Chinese leader believes the U.S.-led international order is coming to an end and that what follows is up for grabs. For the first time, he may now see a path toward achieving key goals such as disrupting U.S. alliances in Asia, and weakening American support for Taiwan as well as Washington’s ability to impede China’s rise through technology export restrictions and economic sanctions.

特朗普的短视直接服务于习近平的更大目标。这位中国领导人相信，美国主导的国际秩序正在走向终结，之后的世界格局尚待争夺。他现在可能首次看到一条实现关键目标的路径，例如破坏美国在亚洲的联盟、削弱美国对台湾的支持，以及削弱华盛顿通过技术出口限制和经济制裁阻碍中国崛起的能力。

Having moved past playing defense and into a stalemate, Mr. Xi is now steadily working toward the day when China is strong enough to mount a counteroffensive to attain those goals. In March, the government approved a new five-year plan to ramp up China’s already considerable industrial, technological and military capabilities.

结束防御阶段并进入相持阶段后，习近平正稳步推进各项工作，等待中国强大到足以发起反攻以实现这些目标的那一天。今年3月，政府批准了新的五年规划，旨在进一步提升中国已相当可观的工业、技术和军事能力。

China is strengthening ties with Russia and across Southeast Asia, Latin America and the global south, relationships that can help Beijing counterbalance the United States, while taking advantage of Mr. Trump’s alienation of U.S. allies. In recent months, Mr. Xi has hosted the leaders of Canada, the United Kingdom and Germany in Beijing, timing their visits ahead of Mr. Trump’s to underscore U.S. isolation. And countries around the world are turning to China, with its dominant position in green technology, to increase their energy security amid the Iran war’s disruptions.

中国正在加强与俄罗斯以及东南亚、拉丁美洲和全球南方的关系，这些关系能够帮助北京制衡美国，同时利用特朗普疏远美国盟友的机会。最近几个月，习近平在北京接待了加拿大、英国和德国领导人，将他们的访问安排在特朗普之前，以凸显美国的孤立。而世界各国正转向拥有绿色技术主导地位的中国，以在伊朗战争造成的动荡中提升能源安全。

By contrast, Mr. Trump’s war of choice with Iran is wasting money and matériel that would be better marshaled for long-term competition with China, and his administration is undermining other sources of American strength with actions such as gutting U.S. funding for science and technology.

相比之下，特朗普主动对伊朗发起的战争正在浪费本应用于与中国长期竞争的金钱和物资，而他的政府正在通过削减美国科技研发经费等行动，削弱美国的其他实力来源。

China faces significant domestic challenges — an aging population, high household debt levels and weak consumer spending. Yet its leaders seem to believe that it is the United States — not China — that is weaker than it appears. As Chen Yixin, China’s minister of state security, wrote in December: America’s “democracy is mutating, its economy decaying and its society fracturing at an accelerated pace.” Globally, he added, U.S. “credibility is rapidly going bankrupt, its hegemony is crumbling, and its myth is collapsing.”

中国面临着重大国内挑战——人口老龄化、高家庭债务水平和疲弱的消费支出。然而，其领导人似乎认为，相对虚弱的一方是美国而非中国。正如中国国家安全部部长陈一新12月撰文指出：美国的“民主异变、经济衰变、社会裂变”。并且，在全球范围内，美国的“信用破产、霸权破败、神话破灭”。

Americans may dismiss such rhetoric as propaganda. But we must reckon with the prospect that many countries agree that China is winning. Mr. Xi is bringing Mr. Trump to Beijing for a visit intended to confirm that to the world.

美国人大可不屑地视此类言论为宣传。但我们必须正视这样一种可能性：许多国家也认为中国正在取胜。习近平邀请特朗普访华，正是为了向世界确认这一点。