This month, President Biden threw one of the most lavish state dinners in Washington’s recent memory. Celebrities and billionaires flocked to the White House to dine in honor of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan, posing for photos in front of an elaborate display of Japanese fans. Jeff Bezos dropped by; Paul Simon provided the entertainment.

本月，拜登总统举办了华盛顿近年来最奢华的国宴之一。名流和亿万富翁云集白宫，参加这场为日本首相岸田文雄举办的宴会，并在精心布置的日本扇子前留影。杰夫·贝佐斯到场；保罗·西蒙献唱助兴。

The spectacle was part of a carefully orchestrated series of events to showcase the renewed U.S.-Japan relationship — and the notable transformation of the United States’ security alliances in Asia. The next day, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. of the Philippines was also in the U.S. capital for a historic U.S.-Japan-Philippines summit, during which a new trilateral security partnership was announced.

这是一系列精心策划活动的一部分，旨在展示美日关系的恢复以及美国亚洲安全联盟的显著转变。第二天，菲律宾总统小费迪南德·马科斯也来到美国首都，出席了具有历史意义的美日菲峰会，会上宣布了新的三边安全伙伴关系。

Both events were directed at the same audience: China.

两场活动针对的是同一个观众：中国。

Over the past several years, Washington has built a series of multilateral security arrangements like these in the Asia-Pacific region. Although U.S. officials claim that the recent mobilization of allies and partners is not aimed at China, don’t believe it. Indeed, Mr. Kishida emphasized in a speech to Congress on April 11 that China presents “the greatest strategic challenge” both to Japan and to the international community.

过去几年里，华盛顿在亚太地区建立了一系列类似的多边安全安排。虽然美国官员声称，最近动员盟友和伙伴的行为不是针对中国，但不要相信他们。事实上，岸田文雄在4月11日的国会演讲中强调，中国对于日本和国际社会都是“最大的战略挑战”。

China’s recent activity is, of course, concerning. Its military has acquired ever more potent ways to counter U.S. and allied capabilities in the Western Pacific and has behaved aggressively in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere, alarming its neighbors.

当然，中国近期的活动令人担忧。中国军队获得了在西太平洋对抗美国及其盟友能力更有力的手段，并在南海、台湾海峡和其他地方表现得咄咄逼人，令邻国十分警惕。

But Washington’s pursuit of an increasingly complex lattice of security ties is a dangerous game. Those ties include upgrades in defense capabilities, more joint military exercises, deeper intelligence sharing, new initiatives on defense production and technology cooperation and the enhancement of contingency planning and military coordination. All of that may make Beijing more cautious about the blatant use of military force in the region. But the new alliance structure is not, on its own, a long-term guarantor of regional peace and stability — and could even increase the risk of stumbling into a conflict.

但是，华盛顿对日益复杂的安全关系的追求是一场危险的游戏。这些关系包括国防能力的升级，更多的联合军事演习，更深入的情报共享，国防生产和技术合作的新举措，以及加强应急计划和军事协调。所有这些都可能使北京对在该地区公然使用军事力量更加谨慎。但是，新的联盟结构本身并不能成为地区和平与稳定的长期保障——甚至可能增加陷入冲突的风险。

The security partnership rolled out this month in Washington is only the latest in a string of new defense configurations that reach across Asia and the Pacific. In 2017 the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, known as the Quad, was revived, promoting collaboration among the United States, Japan, Australia and India. In September 2021, Australia, Britain and the United States began their partnership, known as AUKUS, and the United States, Japan and South Korea committed to closer cooperation in a summit at Camp David last August.

本月在华盛顿推出的安全伙伴关系只是横跨亚太地区的一系列新防务配置中最新的一个。2017年，被称为Quad的四方安全对话重启，促进了美国、日本、澳大利亚和印度之间的合作。2021年9月，澳大利亚、英国和美国开始建立名为AUKUS的伙伴关系，去年8月在戴维营举行的峰会上，美国、日本和韩国承诺加强合作。

All of these moves have been motivated primarily by concern over Beijing, which has, in turn, castigated these countries as being part of a U.S.-led effort to create an Asian version of NATO designed to contain China. None amount to a collective defense pact like the NATO treaty, whose Article 5 considers an armed attack on one member as “an attack against them all.” But China will nevertheless almost certainly regard the latest agreement among the United States, Japan and the Philippines — with which it is engaged in an active territorial dispute — as further confirmation of a Washington-led attempt to threaten its interests.

所有这些举动主要是出于对北京的担忧，反过来，中国谴责这些国家企图在美国领导下创建一个亚洲版的北约，以遏制中国。北约条约第五条将对一个北约成员国的武装攻击视为“对所有成员国的攻击”，而美国在亚洲的这些条约没有一个能像北约那样，构成集体防御条约。然而，中国几乎肯定会认为，美国、日本和菲律宾之间的最新协议——中国与后两个国家存在未决的领土争端——进一步证明在华盛顿领导下，这些国家企图威胁中国利益。

It’s not yet clear how Beijing will respond. But it may double down on the expansion of its military capabilities and intensify its use of military and paramilitary force to assert its territorial claims in the region, especially regarding the sensitive issue of Taiwan. Beijing could also promote further Chinese military cooperation with Russia in the form of enhanced military exercises and deployments.

目前尚不清楚北京方面将如何回应。但它可能会加倍扩大其军事能力，并加强军事和准军事力量的使用，以维护在该地区的领土主张，特别是在敏感的台湾问题上。北京还可以通过加强军事演习和部署的形式，进一步促进中国与俄罗斯的军事合作。

The net result may be an Asia-Pacific region that is even more divided and dangerous than it is today, marked by a deepening arms race. In this increasingly contentious and militarized environment, the chance of some political incident or military accident triggering a devastating regional war is likely to grow. This is especially likely, given the absence of meaningful U.S. and allied crisis communication channels with China to prevent such an incident from spiraling out of control.

最终的结果可能是亚太地区比现在更加分裂和危险，军备竞赛日益加剧。在这种争议和军事化日益激烈的环境中，一些政治事件或军事意外引发毁灭性地区战争的可能性会增加。鉴于美国及其盟国与中国缺乏有效的危机沟通渠道来防止此类事件失控，这种情况尤其有可能发生。

To prevent this nightmare, the U.S. and its allies and partners must invest much more in diplomacy with China, in addition to bolstering military deterrence.

为了防止这种噩梦，美国及其盟友和合作伙伴除了加强军事威慑外，还必须在对华外交上投入更多。

For a start, the United States and key allies like Japan should make a sustained effort to establish a durable crisis prevention and management dialogue with China involving each nation’s foreign policy and security agencies. So far, such dialogues have been limited primarily to military channels and topics. It is critical that both civilian and military officials understand the many possible sources of inadvertent crises and develop ways to prevent them or manage them if they occur. This process should include the establishment of an agreed-upon set of leaders’ best practices for crisis management and a trusted but unofficial channel through which the relevant parties can discuss crisis-averting understandings.

首先，美国和日本等主要盟友应该做出持续努力，与中国建立持久的危机预防和管理对话，让各国的外交政策和安全机构都参与其中。到目前为止，这种对话主要局限于军事渠道和议题。至关重要的是，文职和军事官员都要了解无意中造成危机的许多可能根源，并制定预防危机或在危机发生时进行管理的方法。这一进程应包括建立一套各方领导人一致认可的危机管理最佳做法，以及建立一个可信但非官方的渠道，通过该渠道，有关各方可以讨论避免危机的共识。 

The immediate focus for the United States and Japan should be on avoiding actions that add to tensions across the Taiwan Strait. The deployment of American military trainers to Taiwan on what looks like a permanent basis and suggestions by some U.S. officials and policy analysts that Taiwan be treated as a security linchpin within the overall U.S. defense posture in Asia are needlessly provocative. They also openly contradict America’s longstanding “one China” policy, under which the United States ended the deployment of all U.S. military forces to Taiwan and does not view Taiwan as a key U.S. security location, caring only that the Taiwan issue be handled peacefully and without coercion.

美国和日本的当务之急应该是避免采取加剧台海紧张局势的行动。美国向台湾部署看似永久性的军事训练人员，一些美国官员和政策分析人士建议将台湾视为美国在亚洲整体防御态势中的安全关键，这些都是不必要的挑衅行为。这些行为也明显背离了美国长期以来的“一个中国”政策，根据该政策，美国撤出了部署在台湾的所有军事力量，也不将台湾视为美国的关键安全地点，只关心台湾问题在没有胁迫的情况下得到和平处理。

Japan, for its part, has also become more circumspect about its own “one China” policy by being reluctant to reaffirm explicitly that Tokyo does not support Taiwan’s independence. Recent statements by some political leaders in Tokyo about Japanese military forces being ready to help defend Taiwan will almost certainly inflame Chinese leaders, who remember that Japan seized Taiwan after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and ’95.

日本也对自己的“一个中国”政策更加谨慎，不明确重申东京不支持台湾独立。东京的一些政治领导人最近表示，日本军队随时准备帮助保卫台湾，这几乎肯定会激怒中国领导人，因为他们还记得日本在1894年-1895年的甲午战争后夺取了台湾。

Washington and Tokyo should clearly reaffirm their previous commitments on the China-Taiwan dispute. Tokyo also should confirm that it does not support any unilateral move by Taiwan toward independence and resist U.S. efforts to compel Japan to commit to Taiwan’s defense. Although American officials have reportedly been prodding Japan to join military planning for a Taiwan conflict, a large majority of Japanese residents do not favor fighting to defend Taiwan. Tokyo can best contribute to deterring China by focusing on strengthening its ability to defend its own islands.

华盛顿和东京应该明确重申他们之前在中国—台湾争端上的承诺。东京也应该确认，它不支持台湾的任何单方面独立行动，同时抵制美国对日本提出的参与保卫台湾的要求。尽管据报道，美国官员一直在怂恿日本加入台湾冲突的军事计划，但绝大多数日本居民并不赞成为保卫台湾而战。对于东京来说，威慑中国的最好方式是集中精力，加强保卫自己岛屿的能力。

Washington and its allies should shift to a more positive approach to China, aimed at fostering accommodation and restraint. This could include working to secure credible mutual assurances regarding limits on Chinese military deployments, such as amphibious forces and missile capabilities relevant to Taiwan, in return for U.S. limits on the levels and types of arms that it sells to the island. They could also explore increasing security cooperation with China regarding cyberattacks, the defense of sea lanes and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as better collaboration to combat climate change and the outbreak of another pandemic.

华盛顿及其盟友应该对中国采取更积极的态度，旨在促进和解和克制。这可能包括努力让双方做出可信的保证，限制中国的军事部署（比如与台湾有关的两栖部队和导弹能力），换取美国限制向台湾出售武器的水平和类型。他们还可以探讨在网络攻击、海上通道防御和大规模杀伤性武器扩散方面，加强与中国的安全合作，以及在应对气候变化和另一场流行病暴发方面加强合作。

China, of course, has its own role to play. In the end, Beijing, like the United States, wants to avoid a crisis and conflict in the region. Given that, it should respond to a more cooperative American and allied approach by moderating its own coercive behavior regarding maritime disputes.

当然，中国也应该做它该做的事。归根结底，北京和美国一样，希望避免该地区的危机和冲突。因此，中国应该通过缓和自己在海上争端方面的胁迫行为，来回应美国及其盟友表现出的合作意向。

None of this will be easy, given the intense suspicion that now exists between Beijing and Washington and its allies. But new thinking and new diplomatic efforts could incentivize China to reciprocate in meaningful ways. At the very least, it’s necessary to try. Focusing on military deterrence alone won’t work. Trying to find a way to cooperate with China is the best way — perhaps the only way — to steer the world away from disaster.

鉴于北京与华盛顿及其盟友之间目前存在的强烈猜疑，这一切都不会是容易的事。但新的思维和新的外交努力可以激励中国以有意义的方式做出回应。说到底，试一试总是有必要的。仅仅关注军事威慑是行不通的。尝试找到一种与中国合作的方式，这是引导世界远离灾难的最佳途径——也许是唯一的途径。